Do constitutional courts restrict government policy? The effects of budgetary implications and bloc-politics in the Hungarian Constitutional Court's decisions between 1990 and 2018

Abstract

In the past thirty years, with the global spread of judicial review, constitutional courts became important political actors. At the same time, evidence suggests that courts have been reluctant to adjudicate on issues with heavy budgetary implications. Fur thermore, the political leaning of the judges influences decisions that make courts more cautious of criticizing governments or constraining the government’s room to manoeuvre. The analysis looks at the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) between 1990 and 2018. We conclude that the potential budgetary consequences of a decision do not weigh in with the judicial output. Furthermore, right-leaning courts are more likely to declare a law unconstitutional that was passed by a left-wing parliamentary majority, whereas left-wing courts adjudicate unconstitutionality with about roughly the same likelihood in the cases of right- and left-leaning parliaments. Our results highlight that while the Hungarian Constitutional Court does not narrow the par liamentary majority’s room to manoeuvre by blocking policies with serious budgetary consequences, bloc-politics is still not alien from its functioning.