When Do Sanctions Work? The Cases against the Soviet Union and Russia

Abstract

The purpose of imposing economic sanctions is to respond to a violation of international law or a deviation from the rules adopted by the international system. According to theories of public choice, interest groups influence political decision-making in order to derive benefits from the political process. Targeted sanctions (smart sanctions) focusing on policy makers are supposed to increase the costs to policy makers and reduce the damage that country level embargoes would inflict on the general public. However, targeted sanctions do not always achieve their expected policy outcomes, which raises questions about the design and effectiveness of targeted sanctions. The aim of this paper is to examine the factors that make targeted sanctions more effective. The study analyses data from the Global Sanctions Database (GSDB) and pays particular attention to sanctions imposed by members of the international community, including the European Union, against the Soviet Union and Russia. The conclusions drawn from the literature and the historical examples suggest that sanctions against Russia have only, at best, slowed down its actions. The main factors causing this are: lack of a strong opposition, the relative value of economic loss versus perceived or real political values, and the economic and political interests of third parties.