Ethnic conciliation in parliaments: Western Balkans v. Western Europe

Abstract

A common feature of the present-day constitutions of the Western Balkans is the effort to solve conflicts of ethnic character using predominantly legal tools, mostly in a parliamentarian way. However, the practice shows that most legal regimes based on instruments that give preference to the interests of one or more equally strong ethnic groups can be built mostly to the detriment of democratic states. Effective and functional state institutions and ethnic power-sharing in multi-ethnic states seem to be in conflict with each other. Rule-of-law-based models can only function properly if parties have mutual trust and can solve their internal conflicts through compromises among themselves. Political agreements based on mutual trust are more effective in the long term as legal instruments. There are examples of such arrangements in multi- ethnic states of Western Europe (Belgium, Northern Ireland, and Switzerland). Analysis of the solutions of the Western Balkans countries and their comparison with these Western examples shows clearly that hard legal tools (vetoes) do not soften but sharpen conflicts, while informal arrangements based on mutual trust are more productive.