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A Brief Overview of Military Cultures and of Generations of Warfare

A hadikultúrák és a hadviselési generációk rövid összefoglalása

Abstract

The present study gives a brief summary of the various notional interpretations of military cultures, their bases of military theory, and the works by western and Hungarian theoreticians. In short the shaping of theories of warfare and their systems are also presented, including the fundamentals of fourth generation warfare. An insight is given into the Russian theories of generations of warfare.

Keywords: military cultures, military theory basis, generations of warfare, fourth generation warfare

Absztrakt

A tanulmány erősen tömörített formában összefoglalja a hadikultúrák fogalmi értelmezését, hadelméleti alapjait és a nyugati, illetve magyar teoretikusok munkáit. Röviden bemutatja a hadviselési generációk elméletének kialakulását és rendszerét, ismerteti a negyedik generációs hadviselés elméletének alapjait. Röviden tájékoztat az orosz hadviselési generációs elméletről.

Kulcsszavak: hadikultúrák, hadelméleti alapok, hadviselési generációk, negyedik generációs hadviselés.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays references to military cultures and warfare generations, or to some of their parts and elements, can frequently be found in international and military science works, however, their comprehensive elaboration and interpretation can only be read in large volumes, and

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doctoral dissertations. The overview of these sources, finding the necessary parts is a fairly time-consuming job in my opinion. In order to ease this I intend to briefly summarise military cultures and generations of warfare without making any comment. In the conclusion part of my work I try to summarise the similarities of and differences between the two systems.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY CULTURES

Nearly each science examines, differently interprets, defines, and describes the notion and content of the culture of mankind. If the notion of culture is to be interpreted in the most comprehensive way, all significant achievements of human history are to be integrated into it. According to such a wide interpretation *culture is a complex of material and intellectual values made by mankind*, which was used, preserved, and forwarded during its history. Culture appears in all fields of intellectual and practical activities.²

Each culture consists of – technological, ideological, sociological, emotional, etc. – subsystems and meets some fundamental needs. According to American anthropologist Clark Wissler, language, material culture, art, knowledge, religion, society, property relations, governance, and warfighting are spheres omnipresent in each of cultures.³

Military culture is a complex of military, intellectual, and material values, which identifies the cohesive forces of the armed forces of a given country, people, or state, and also the fundamental directions of the neutralisation or destruction of enemy forces. Military culture can be labelled as the trends and tendencies of military science or as the character of the armed forces.⁴

Military culture also includes the social traditions and customs relating to war and military, and military symbols, badges, markings, insignia (unit colours, uniforms, saluting, etc.) supporting the identification with the armed forces.⁵

A NOTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF MILITARY CULTURE⁶

In accordance with the definition of Jenő Kovács, who was one of the outstanding Hungarian military theoreticians of the 20th century, military culture is *“a warfare-relating complex of military, intellectual, and material values, which identifies the fundamental directions of the destruction of enemy forces and that of the protection of friendly forces. Military culture can*

² ÁCS Tibor: A hadikultúra históriájához (2005), In.: Hadtudomány [online] 2005. Vol. XV. No. 2. http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhht/hadtudomany/2005/2/2005_2_2.html [Accessed: 02-07-2014.] p.1.

³ Ács ibid. p.2.

⁴ Ács ibid. p.2.

⁵ Ács ibid. p.3.

⁶ FORGÁCS Balázs (2009): Napjaink hadikultúrái (A hadviselés elmélete és fejlődése a modern korban) [PhD-dissertation]. – Budapest: Doctoral School of Military Science, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Science, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2009. p.:171. http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2009/forgacs_balazs.pdf [Accessed:07-05- 2014.] pp. 37-38. The subtitle refers to all paragraphs.

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be branded as the tendency (trend) in military science, as a character of the military, but in another way.”

In his opinion there are three clearly distinguishable military cultures: *manoeuvre*, *attrition*, and *guerrilla military cultures*. However, there is another classification too because the Applegate and Moore study, which was also the basis of the research done by Jenő Kovács, identifies four ways of warfare: *static warfare*, *manoeuvre warfare*, *deep penetration*, and *guerrilla warfare*.

On the basis of the use of violence the above military cultures can be divided into two categories: *manoeuvre culture* which focuses on destruction as its main strategic objective; while *attrition warfare* and *guerrilla warfare* prefer wearing down enemy, in other words the first type has the features of direct approach while the latter ones have the characteristics of indirect approach.

MILITARY THEORETICAL BASES OF MILITARY CULTURES⁷

The starting point of the analysis of military cultures should be the notion of war. It is defined by Clausewitz as follows: “therefore war is the use of violence to force our will on the enemy.”⁸

In the military affairs of modern age various military cultures (theories relating to war and warfare) developed, in dependence on the history, culture, and level of civilisation of particular nations.

Because of the dual nature of war – efforts either to destruction or to wearing down – it can be stated that completely different directions of military will appear in both natures, which take shape in the use and intensity of warfare.⁹ Neither wearing down nor destruction appears as a clear strategic objective in any of particular wars.

The phenomena listed above are reflected in the differences between military cultures; that is in the differences between the use of violence behind military ambitions, determined by political goals.

Manoeuvre military culture – which has a destructive character – keeps violence in balance, has no home-policy objective, and has two levels of the use of violence – in the first stage the objective is the destruction of enemy forces and in the second the use of violence focuses on the enforcement of own will.

Attrition military culture – which has wearing down nature – either mitigates or counterbalances violence, has no home-policy objectives, however, the use of this military culture has only one stage as in this case violence is aimed only at overcoming the social resistance of the enemy and everything else is subordinated to this goal.

⁶ Forgács *ibid.* pp. 41-43. The subtitle refers to all paragraphs.

⁸ Clausewitz, Carl von: *A háborúról*. Vol. I. p. 37.

⁹ Kessel, Eberhard: *Die doppelte Art des Kriegs*. p. 157.

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In the case of guerrilla warfare military culture – which is also focused on wearing down the enemy – the continuous increase of the use of violence is characteristic and unlike in the above listed ones, it has home-policy objectives as well although the nature of the use of violence is similar to that of attrition military culture.

While in theory the three above mentioned military cultures can be clearly identified, in practice the features of individual military cultures mingle and nowadays the separation lines between military cultures are getting increasingly and gradually blurred.

MILITARY CULTURES IN THE WESTERN LITERATURE IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY¹⁰

Military culture is the way of deploying forces in combat, influenced by the geographical position and political culture of particular nations.¹¹ Military culture serves the environment in which strategy exists.¹² Military cultures (strategic cultures) have been researched intensively since the late 1970s.

Various nations – in dependence on the differing geographical circumstances and on politico-historical traditions and values – develop various military cultures, that is differing models of the use of military force.

Geopolitical factors – a complex of geographical, economic, social relations – have a determining influence on strategy and create differing military cultures. Military forces representing differing military cultures may have radically different structural and military technological backgrounds.

The characteristic features of military organisations, military technology, technology, and economic background play a determining role in shaping the military cultures of individual nations. Accordingly, it is the different military organisation and the different military-technological background that may be the primary appearance of different military cultures taking shape along different geopolitical relations.

Therefore, military cultures are approached by some theoreticians from security-political aspects, others from the aspects of strategies and doctrines, and some from the relations between military organisations and military technological relations.

American J. W. Legro analyses military cultures from the aspect of the escalation of military conflicts. During his research he took the decisive differences between the structures of armed forces representing different military cultures as a starting point, as the source of

¹⁰ TURCSÁNYI Károly (2008): A haderő harckocsi igénykielégítési folyamatának makroszemléletű vizsgálata [PhD dissertation]. – Budapest: Doctoral School of Military Science, Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2008. p.:186. <http://real-d.mtak.hu/568/1/Turcs%C3%A1nyi%20K%C3%A1roly%20%C3%A9rtekez%C3%A9s.pdf> [Accessed: 01-07-2014.] p.16. The subtitle refers to all paragraphs.

¹¹ Gray, Colin: National Style in Strategy: The American Example. *International Security*, 1981. No. 6. p. 22.

¹² Gray, Colin: *The Geopolitics of Superpower*. University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 1988.

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
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military cultures.¹³ Various military cultures have significantly different tools, which has a decisive influence on the retaliation to enemy strikes, and in all, the character of their entire warfare.

R. A. D. Applegate and J. R. Moore created a comprehensive model of military culture. Not only are their model and definitions acknowledged, accepted, and applied by experts but they are also used for current doctrinal analyses. The authors determined four basic forms of warfare – static, manoeuvring, long-distance, and diversion-guerrilla.

These four ways of warfare are not closely linked to the military forces of any particular nation or military culture. These are building blocks of military cultures, which appeared in World War II operations and were relative clearly identifiable many times. At the same time various ways of warfare rely on obviously different conditions regarding military technology and structure. Military cultures can be well characterised through their combinations. The point in the difference between various military cultures is how the military forces representing a given military culture are able to integrate and successfully apply various ways of warfare.¹⁴

The cause of the development of differing military cultures is mostly the different geo-strategic position (continental / maritime), different economic background (underdeveloped/developing / developed) and the military technology in service (strategic / tactical / support mechanisation) stemming from the above factors and determining the amount of military cultures that can be integrated by a given way of military culture.



The components and internal system of military culture are shown in Figure 1.

(Source: TURCSÁNYI *ibid.* p. 20.)

¹³ Legro, Jeffrey W.: Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II. *International Security*, Vol. 18. 1994 No. 1. p. 112.

¹⁴ Legro, Jeffrey W.: Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II. *International Security*, Vol. 18. 1994 No. 1. p. 16.

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AN EXAMINATION OF MILITARY CULTURES ON THE BASIS OF THE WORKS BY
JENŐ KOVÁCSMANOEUVRING MILITARY CULTURE¹⁵

In the 20th century this military culture appeared in the most marked way in Germany and in the Soviet Union, consequently its development forked in two directions resulting in a Prussian-German version and a Russian-Soviet one. The fundamental difference between the two is the duration of the armed conflict, which is closely related to the different geographical, economic, social, and cultural backgrounds of the two countries.

FEATURES

Manoeuvring military culture has the characteristics of direct approach; that is its top objective is the destruction of the enemy armed forces. The representatives of manoeuvring military culture need to make swift decisions, take favourable opportunities immediately, without any delay or hesitation, even if taking a high level of risk.

This military culture – apart from certain exceptions – usually keeps wartime violence in a balance.

In the case of manoeuvring military culture wartime violence is always motivated by foreign-policy objectives, or it is always aimed at an external enemy. *Two-stage* violence is applied: stage one is aimed at the disintegration and destruction of the enemy armed forces while stage two focuses on the enforcement of own will. Analysing the parity of destruction and wearing down it can be stated that in the case of manoeuvring military culture destruction is a priority. Naturally, elements of the tools of wearing down may also appear, therefore defence may be applied in this way of warfare but it is only of temporary character.

Manoeuvring military culture is frequent in the case of conflicts between continental states therefore in their military structures ground forces are superior to air force or naval forces.

On the development of the theory of manoeuvring military culture it was the appearance of battle tanks which had the most dramatic influence, because the effort towards destruction was best incorporated in theories on mechanised warfare.

¹⁵ FORGÁCS Balázs (2009): Napjaink hadikulturái (A hadviselés elmélete és fejlődése a modern korban) [PhD dissertation]. – Budapest: Doctoral School of Military Science, Faculty of Military Science, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Science, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2009. p.:171. http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2009/forgacs_balazs.pdf [Accessed: 07-05-2014.] pp. 45-66. The subtitle refers to all paragraphs.

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ATTRITION MILITARY CULTURE¹⁶

Jenő Kovács markedly separated this from manoeuvring military culture because he labelled this way of warfare through its most significant feature: *“attrition military culture attempts to achieve its success not through the movement of the troops but – as indicated by its name – by the destructive fires (strikes) of military means of high material values. It ensures the successful use of destructive power through the involvement of further material means and assets (through the establishment of military infrastructure).”*¹⁷

CHARACTERISTICS

A typical feature of attrition warfare is that it moderates or balances violence, because this type of warfare regards defence as the primary way of warfare and politics has a significant limiting role regarding the issues of war. Similarly to manoeuvring warfare home-policy is not involved in the use of violence as this type of warfare has always been aimed at an external enemy and it has always been motivated by foreign-policy objectives. The applied violence has a one-stage structure and its essence is that military violence is aimed at the society of the enemy and strives to break its resistance. In reality the direct use of violence is replaced by the highlighted indirect approach.

In this case defence is not the preparation phase of an offensive but *“defence is built on military superiority of forces in order to foil an offensive.”*¹⁸ According to the Hungarian military thinker *“the point and essence of this strategy are clearly expressed in possessing territories.”*¹⁹

The attrition military culture provides military superiority of forces through enormous material investment and deploys military services of large financial values, like navy and air force, which comprise the fundamental strike forces in this military culture.

In the case of a perpetual war elements of the manoeuvring military culture and those of guerrilla warfare apply, used parallel with the regular assets of indirect approach. Nevertheless, the regular elements of attrition war remain dominating.

Attrition military culture is applied by countries with borders offering natural protection thanks to their geographical positions, thus the possibility of a direct ground offensive is therefore almost completely excluded.

Attrition military culture contains the regular elements of indirect approach in order to wear down the enemy. This way of warfare often prefers the use of non-military means. The objective of the use of violence is to break the resistance of enemy society. However, there is no clear cut line between direct and indirect approach. Borders among military cultures are getting blurred thus warfare is becoming complex.

¹⁶ Forgács *ibid.* pp. 67-90. The subtitle refers to all paragraphs.

¹⁷ Kovács Jenő: Magyarország katonai stratégiája. (Complex research theme) Vol. II. p. 27.

¹⁸ Kovács Jenő: Magyarország katonai stratégiája. (Complex research theme) Vol. II. p. 28.

¹⁹ Kovács Jenő: Magyarország katonai stratégiája. (Complex research theme) Vol. II. p. 28.

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THE MILITARY CULTURE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE²⁰

It was the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the period of Napoleonic wars setting Europe ablaze, when guerrilla warfare appeared in military thinking. This type of warfare emerged on Spanish and Russian territories under the influence of national resistance movements and its general theory developed there too.

Interestingly, Jenő Kovács does not differentiate between the notions of guerrilla and partisan as in his opinion since the end of World War II the two had had a similar meaning. He identified independence, national liberation, internal social armed struggle, and national, and civil war among the types of guerrilla warfare. Popular support was identified as one of the basic pre-conditions of a guerrilla war. Another key factor was external (great power) support and establishment of bases. The first was regarded important for obtaining combat assets while the latter for the preparation for combat.²¹

Guerrilla warfare wishes to increase the use of violence right until achieving of the ultimate objective of the armed struggle and it has home-policy goals.

This type of warfare is characterised by *one-stage nature* that is war violence is aimed at the breaking of the resistance of the enemy society.²² In the case of this military culture wearing enemy down is also priority, however, at a higher-level guerrilla war the strife to destroy enemy may become dominant. Since this type of warfare is the closest to present practical and theoretical problems of the military I pay more attention to presenting its theoretical fundaments in more details.

Denis Vasilevich Davydov: He identified three primary factors of a conquering army – food, ammunition, and men – therefore he stated that depriving the enemy of these is the most important tool of a partisan war and it can ensure the success for the partisans.²³ Besides the destruction of the primary factors he also identified secondary targets, such as supplies of clothing, footwear, and weapons; surgery and hospital equipment; runners and adjutants (orderlies); and high-ranking officials as their destruction may also be favourable for the partisans.²⁴

Lenin – on the basis of the works by *Karl Marx* and *Friedrich Engels* – regarded it important to highlight that during an armed uprising it is not just the enemy armed forces that have to be fought against but in an indirect way also the terror aimed at enemy civil and military leaders is necessary for victory.

²⁰ Forgács *ibid.* pp. 91-124. The subtitle refers to all paragraphs.

²¹ Kovács Jenő: Magyarország katonai stratégiája. (Complex research theme) Vol. II.

²² A symptom of war here is armed battle but the secondary impact of the violence used is significant. The US army was forced to withdraw from Vietnam not because of its military defeat but because it lacked the support of domestic society and this pressure pushed the politics to the withdrawal. Kissinger, Henry: *Diplomácia*. Panem – Grafo, Bp., 1998., pp. 671-700.

²³ Davydov, Denis Vasilevich: *A partizánháborúról*. p. 134.

²⁴ Davydov, Denis Vasilevich: *A partizánháborúról*. p. 134.

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Mao Zedong: the Chinese leader divided guerrilla war into three phases. The first phase is characterised by the strategic offensive of enemy and the strategic defence of the Chinese; in the second phase enemy forces establish strategic defence while the Chinese prepare for their counteroffensive; and the third phase is the period of the strategic counteroffensive of the Chinese and the strategic retreat of enemy. Mao's sentences suggest a change in the use of violence as it is added methodology applied at manoeuvring warfare.

Carlos Marighella: he highlights the significance of warfare with the use of indirect means. In his opinion the use of psychological operation, in which he regards media as a key player, may demoralise the government.²⁵

The common elements of the theories listed above: presence of background (political) ideology; actions by small groups; mobility; surprise; popular support and flexibility.

BLURRING BOUNDARIES AMONG MILITARY CULTURES IN PRESENT DEFENCE AFFAIRS

Nowadays it is clearly visible in defence affairs that in many armed conflicts one warring party is overwhelmingly superior to the other one. Such struggle waged with significantly different conditions is labelled asymmetric warfare by the current special literature. Its appearance and increasing intensity, however, do not indicate the onset of a new military culture because its basis can be discovered in one or more of the above described types of warfare.²⁶

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF GENERATIONS OF WARFARE

The theory of warfare generations was elaborated mainly by two USMC officers William S. Lind²⁷ and T. X. Hammes.²⁸ Their theory grew increasingly well-known with the wars erupting after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and they got increasingly critiqued as well. Yet, the theory of modern warfare generations, or **fourth generation warfare (4GW)** is a more and

²⁵ Deception, spread of lies, generating tensions, undermining security perception. See: Marighella, Carlos: Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla. Chapter 32. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch32.htm> Accessed: 28 November 2007.

²⁶ Forgács *ibid.* p.130.

²⁷ LIND, William S et al.: The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, <http://globalquerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-generation.html>, downloaded 23-01-2011

²⁸ LIND, William S., SCHMITT, John F., WILSON, Gary I.: 4GW: Another look, In.: Marine Corps Gazette, 1994 december, 34-37 o., http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/4GW_another_look.htm downloaded 23-01-2011 and HAMMES, Thomas X.: The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation, In: Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994, pp. 35-44, http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/documents/courses_09/readings/2200_hammes.pdf downloaded 23-01-2011

more generally used theory although it has not been completely accepted by military science experts yet.²⁹

FIRST GENERATION: MUSKETS AND LINEAR TACTICS³⁰

The main military theoretical feature of the first generation warfare is the victory achieved through the concentration of manpower. Another characteristic is that strategy and tactics are rarely separated and unified military theory is developed in this period of time. The decades between 1648 and 1840-50 were characterised by limited, regulated wars fought by regular armies with the sparse use of gallantry so characteristic for the previous times.³¹ Awkwardly manoeuvring armies and fleets, arranged in lines, are rarely able to achieve a decisive victory.

In the field of military technology muzzle-loaded muskets and muzzle-loading smooth-bore artillery guns could be found in the inventory of every army and fleet. The speed of sailboats and carts significantly limited the tempo and extent of operations. That time the primary objective of the wars was to gain control of territories important for the enemy, regain lost territories, and to achieve favourable positions at peace negotiations.

Regular armies waged limited and regulated wars against each other, without involving the civil population or causing them much suffering. After a formal declaration of war the parties conducted military operations, then the war was concluded with a peace treaty.³²

SECOND GENERATION: CONCENTRATED FIREPOWER³³

The technical development and social and ideological changes stemming from the advance of the industrial revolution after the 1850s brought about significant changes and firepower became increasingly dominant. The new type of warfare got fully developed in the First World War.

The appearance of the artillery with indirect fire, and that of machine guns caused enormous losses in the autumn of 1914. Afterwards the primary objective of both warfare land and naval blockades was to wear down the industrial potential, to bleed out the enemy, instead of just destroying manpower.

²⁹ SOMKUTI Bálint (2012): A negyedik generációs hadviselés - az érdekérvényesítés új lehetőségei [PhD dissertation]. – Budapest: Doctoral School of Military Science, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2012. p.:144. http://www.uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2012/somkuti_balint.pdf [Accessed: 21-03-2013.] pp. 38-40.

³⁰ Somkuti *ibid.* pp. 42-43.

³¹ A good example to illustrate this is the sentence from the battle of Fontenoy in 1745: „Gentlemen, we never fire first ; fire yourselves.”, HOLMES, Richard (Ed.): A háborúk világtörténete p. 89.

³² ÁGH: Konfliktusok, háborúk, pp. 178-190

³³ Somkuti *ibid.* pp. 43-45.

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The development of military technology was obvious primarily in the field of artillery, however, by the end of the war machine guns, flamethrowers, battle tanks, combat aircraft, and long-range submarines also appeared. The technical development and the growing extent of railway systems allowed the rapid redeployment of significant forces and material assets on land while steamboats allowed weather-independent sea transportation.

The objective of that era was the destruction of enemy military power and warfighting potential through attrition warfare. Wars began with a declaration of war and concluded with an official signing of peace.

THIRD GENERATION: MANOEUVRE WARFARE³⁴

Outstanding theoreticians of the era realised that with a proper concentration of joint forces defences can be broken through easily because the combat-technological conditions were already given. The main objective was not just to destroy enemy forces but also to break their morale, cut their supply and communication lines, to isolate their command and control structures, thus to achieve the elimination of their combat-worthiness.

In third generation warfare the objective is not to physically destroy enemy but to eliminate the possibility to conduct war with hopes for success.

In the field of military technology fighter- and dive bombers providing close air support, long-range heavy bombers, and mechanised troops appeared whose mass deployment, underpinned with reliable signals equipment, resulted in significant changes.

Another typical feature of this generation was totality, making rear areas (the non-combatant elements of the Clausewitz trinity: state, civilian) a legal military target.

The theory was not significantly influenced by the local wars in the 1950s and '60s. The American Air-Land Battle concept, elaborated in the 1970s, was in fact a modernised version of the Blitzkrieg.³⁵ The introduction of operational level provided a solution for the hard theoretical conflicts between strategic and tactical levels.

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE³⁶

What is fourth generation warfare then? According to Echevarria (the main critic of the theory) it cannot be regarded as a logical consequence of the first three generations.³⁷ On the basis of technological development that took place meanwhile the logical consequence of the first three would be the warfare consisting of network-centric, effect-based operations, however, these concepts do not have any new theoretical and methodological aspects.

³⁴ Somkuti *ibid.* pp. 46-47.

³⁵ FM 100-5 Operations (current FM 3-0)

³⁶ Somkuti *ibid.* pp. 47-55.

³⁷ ECHEVARRIA: Fourth-generation war and other myths, p. 5.

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The 1648 Peace of Westphalia brought about an era in which a citizen was clearly different from a soldier, and in which religious and armed conflicts among various social groups ceased to exist for a long time, and interstate wars waged at fairly regular times and fashions (declaration of war, military operations, peace treaty) appeared. Clausewitz drew conclusions which determined the rules of warfighting and have still been referring to wars waged between states. The “marvellous trinity” of state, soldier, and citizen exceptionally dominated western military thinking for long.

This system was destroyed by Al Qaeda, having caused such level of destruction in the USA which had been typical only for states before.

Therefore fourth generation warfare is: “a tactics, primarily tactical procedure, conducted for clearly outlined political objectives, frequently on the basis of the ideological, religious, and ethnic community of several organisations, using military and non-military operations, procedures and methodology, built on direct and indirect influences reinforcing the impacts of one another, presenting a threat to different dimensions of security, with the combined influence of which our will may be forced on the enemy.”³⁸

Typical characteristics:³⁹

- the Clausewitz “Holy Trinity” ceases to exist;
- the participants are mainly non-states;
- traditional, industry-based conflicts are fading away;
- revival of popular (ideological or religious) wars;
- propaganda-centred warfare;
- impossible to win with only military means;
- not military-technology-centred;
- total, as due to the attacks on so called soft targets nobody is secure;
- low-intensity armed conflict (limited in space and time);
- asymmetric;
- for shaping its structure, organising its activities, preparation, supply, equipping, and resupply the non-state actor can use modern ideas and solutions taken from the field of social and economic sciences.

³⁸ RESPERGER István: In: *Resperger István, Kis Álmos Péter, Somkúti Bálint* : Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Kis háborúk nagy hatással. Zrínyi Kiadó, 2013. Budapest. p.25.

³⁹ Somkúti ibid. pp. 47-55.

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Differences between armed conflicts of the Westphalian system and the fourth generation (wars, conflicts) ⁴⁰

	Westphalia-type conflict (1-3 generations)	Fourth generation conflict
nature of conflict	international	- international; - intrastate: uprising, revolution, ethnic and/or religion based civil war
belligerents	nation-states and confederations	- nation-state/confederation and - non-state belligerents
forces and assets	- forces of comparable strength and similar organisation - hardware of nearly similar technological level, amount, (MBTs, ships, aircraft)	- non-comparable forces - non-comparable, unusual devices (suicide attacker, IEDs, car-bombs, hijacked airliners, etc.)
doctrines, procedures	similar doctrines and procedures	- different doctrines - procedures changing in dependence on situation and time
resource needs	all resources of a nation	- state: high need for resources - non-state belligerent: low need for resources
other	- warfare is a state monopoly - generally accepted rules, clear difference between peace and war and peace, between combatant and non-combatant	- state monopoly on warfare ceases - rules are rejected by non-state belligerent, boundaries between combatant and non-combatant, belligerent and neutral, peace and conflict are blurred

(The original version was modified at several parts by the author.)

⁴⁰ KISS Álmos Péter (2011): A negyedik generációs konfliktusok jellemzői és tapasztalatai [PhD dissertation]. – Budapest: Doctoral School of Military Science, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Science, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2011. p.:178. http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2012/kiss_almos_peter.pdf [Accessed: 11-03-2013.] p. 17. // p. 22. — RESPERGER I.: Az aszimmetrikus hadviselés és a terrorizmus jellemzői c. tanulmánya alapján. In.: Hadtudomány, Budapest, 2010/4, pp 68-77.

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FIFTH GENERATION WARFARE – A PREMATURE THEORY⁴¹

The theory of the generations of warfare is relatively new, however, there have already been experiments to develop it further. In the further changes in the political and social trends leading up to fourth generation warfare some researchers presume to discover fifth generation warfare.⁴² Information revolution (its technical and social fields) and the illegally obtained bio- and nanotechnological innovations may provide the non-state players with new, high-power weapons. These may generate a domino effect in an increasing number of critical infrastructure systems causing strategic-level damage. In an extreme situation one person may trigger such destructions.

Other researchers presume to have found the bases of the fifth generation warfare in wars for living space, for the control of decreasing resources, and in the military use of the forces of nature (meteorology, geophysics).⁴³

However, these ideas are still very far from being realised, they have no new elements (living-space wars) therefore it is too early to talk about fifth generation warfare.

In accordance with a probably less known Russian theory on generations of warfare Head of the Research Centre of the Russian General Staff College V. Slipchenko summarised the development of warfare in five generations in 1993. In his opinion the first generation was the era of primitive combat of forces with no firearms. The second generation was the result of the appearance of gunpowder and smoothbore firearms. The third generation warfare was typified by the spread of rifled weapons, the increase of firepower, rate of fire, and range. The fourth generation was characterised by automatic firearms, battle tanks, aircraft, increased transportation capabilities, and modern signals assets. The fifth generation warfare began with the appearance of nuclear weapons.⁴⁴

According to Russian researchers the use of precision weapons and ammunitions in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 indicated the dawn of the sixth generation warfare.⁴⁵

However, the beginning of the sixth generation is debatable in itself because the appearance of new weapons has not triggered any organisational or doctrinal changes necessary for the next generation to arrive.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Kiss Álmos Péter *ibid.* pp. 26-27.

⁴² REED, Donald J.: *Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict*, in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, London, Issue 31, 2008. pp 684-772. and HAMMES, Thomas X.: *Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges*, in *Military Review*, Leavenworth KS, May-June 2007. pp. 14-23.

⁴³ FROLOV, V.S.: *Geofiziceszkaja vojna*, in *Vojennaja Miszl*, Moszkva, 7/2005. pp. 48-56., HOUSE, Tamzy J. – NEAR, James B., Jr. – SHIELDS, William B. – CELENTANO, Ronald J. – HUSBAND, David M. – MERCER, Ann E. – PUGH, James E.: *Weather as a Force Multiplier: Owning the Weather in 2025*, research report kutatói jelentés, US Air Force, 1996. ISASZEGI János: *A természeti és a humán eredetű válságok: óvunk és/vagy pusztítunk?* lecture, Sopron, NYME, 11-03-2011.

⁴⁴ DEÁK János: *Napjaink és a jövő háborúja* (2005), In.: *Hadtudomány* [online] 2005. Vol. XV. No. 1. http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhht/hadtudomany/2005/1/2005_1_3.html [Accessed: 25-06-2014.] p. 3.

⁴⁵ Deák *ibid.* p. 3.

⁴⁶ Deák *ibid.* p. 4.

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Examining the military theory research focusing on generation changes in warfare it can be stated that there is a lack of agreement on identifying the boundaries between generations and on the number of generations but the opinion that there are different eras in warfare can be regarded as general.⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

In my opinion military cultures and generations of warfare are not really comparable theories – in spite of some clear similarities – as their research fields are incomparable.

This is because various military cultures analyse the fundamentals and methodology of armed struggle, and the potential directions of preparation for such struggle on the basis of the geopolitical, economic, industrial-technical, historic, and cultural indicators of a particular country or nation.

The theory of generations of warfare – although the theory has not been scientifically proven therefore it has been a debated theory to date – deals with the historic development of wars and armed conflicts in the context of security-policy, political-ideological, technical, and social changes.

In my opinion with regard to the asymmetric warfare so typical in current armed conflicts the status of non-state belligerents has to be clarified because this factor may prove decisive in both theories – in guerrilla military culture, and in the fourth-generation warfare – for selecting the countermeasures aimed at it.

I wish therefore to present one of the methods of defining guerrilla-insurgent or terrorist in particular, which was outlined in a concise and clear way by János Béres in his doctoral dissertation⁴⁸:

- An insurgency also regarded as a liberation war is not the struggle by an isolated group as its main feature is a significant mass base. It involves four groups which are in close connection with one another, moreover, they sometimes overlap: the leadership; the combatants (carrying out armed actions); the immediate members in the structure (supporters); and the mass base ... An uprising is always aimed at gaining political power, its objective is to establish a “counter-state”, which strives to replace the previous power and gain full-fledged legitimacy, take over all the functions of a state in a clearly marked geographical territory. For this reason various means and methodology may be applied and during the armed struggle – lacking any other options – terrorism may also be used. For insurgents, therefore, terrorism is not a goal but merely a tool.

⁴⁷ Deák *ibid.* p. 4.

⁴⁸ BÉRES János (2008): *Napjaink muszlim terrorizmusának gyökerei és visszaszorításának lehetőségei* [PhD dissertation]. – Budapest: Doctoral School of Military Science, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Science, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2008. p.:148.

http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2008/beres_janos.pdf [Accessed: 11-3-2015.] p. 14.

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- As opposed to the above, pure terrorist organisations, on the other hand, apply terror as a logical action. For them terrorism is not tactics but strategy. These groups, isolated both from reality and the masses they wish to represent, have no mass base only a group of changing number of sympathisers supports them, and driven by some kind of an ideology they themselves are the embodiment of the movement. The establishment of a “counter-state” is not their declared objective, their utopistic ideas lack the establishment of a reality-based state or possession of political power (e.g. the Islamic Caliphate, founded in 2014). All of the great numbers of terrorism definitions include the “use of violence against innocent civilians” as a characteristic feature and in practice this is the most typical feature of a terrorist or terrorist organisation. For them a target can be anyone as they regard everybody as guilty if they are not on their side and not only police or military forces or any other representatives of the existing regime (as those who do nothing against the regime are also with it). Therefore, for them there are no innocent civilians only guilty people belonging to the other side and as such they can be regarded as legitimate targets.

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