

**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE**  
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# **DISSERTATION SUMMARY**

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**Migration as a Hybrid Warfare Tool for States – From  
the Perspective of Two Security Policy Case Studies**

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**Budapest, 2023**

## **SUMMARY**

<b>1. FORMULATING THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM</b> .....	2
<b>2. RESEARCH AIMS, HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF THE THESIS</b> .....	3
<b>3. THE RESEARCH METHODS USED IN THE THESIS</b> .....	6
<b>4. SECURITY AS A CONCEPT</b> .....	6
<b>5. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND HYBRID WARFARE</b> .....	7
<b>6. HYBRID WARFARE</b> .....	7
<b>7. THE HUMAN BEING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF HYBRID WARFARE</b> .....	9
<b>8. DEFENDING AGAINST HYBRID WARFARE. THE DILEMMAS OF RESILIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS</b> .....	13
<b>9. FINAL SUMMARY. SCIENTIFIC RESULTS</b> .....	13
<b>10. NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS</b> .....	16
<b>11. THE POSSIBLE UTILISATION OF THE THESIS</b> .....	17
<b>12. LIST OF THE AUTHOR’S PUBLICATIONS</b> .....	18
<b>13. A PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE APPLICANT</b> .....	22

## 1. FORMULATING THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM

International migration, the movement of part of the population across national borders, is a global process. It can be triggered by overpopulation, lack of fresh water, food and energy insecurity, unproductive agricultural land, or armed conflict. All of these effects could, in theory, be exploited by a hostile entity (state or non-state actor in international relations), even with malicious intent. The mass influx of refugees, mainly Syrians, from Turkey in 2015 and then Kurdish migrants, mainly Iraqis, trying to enter the European Union from Belarus in 2021, have put the states and the institutions that defend the Schengen border under enormous pressure. In my thesis I will describe and analyse these two examples in detail. While the migrants are indeed threatened by war, political, ethnic, or religious persecution, and famine in their home countries, my suggestion is that such masses have not always set out for Europe for the reasons mentioned above. Displaced from their homes or forced to leave their countries because they cannot survive, and subjected to all kinds of physical and psychological hardship, these vulnerable people can all-too-easily become both pawns and victims of political games.

*“War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.”* When Clausewitz made this statement in the 19th century, it was indeed true, although much has changed since then. Nowadays, wars in the classical sense are not necessary to impose a will on entities, even those that are not a state by their nature (e.g., non-governmental organisations, terrorist organisations, secessionists, multinational corporations, ‘private armies’, etc.). Hybrid warfare provides a number of techniques for this. One only has to think of social pressure. The statement that what is not peace is war is no longer universal, as the boundaries between these two states of being have become increasingly blurred. If this conclusion is accepted, peace in the current international context is nothing more than a constant struggle against possible hybrid threats.

Hybrid threats are pre-planned, coordinated and then precisely executed attacks against different functions of society. They can only be defended against if the state acts at the level of the whole of government. In my thesis, I therefore also examine the contribution of building societal resilience to countering these threats. The concept of resilience will be introduced later, but I would like to stress its importance not only in the context of fourth and potentially fifth generation warfare, but also in the context of natural and non-military man-made crises.

In my thesis, after having defined the research problem, I have processed the relevant literature; I have also published some of my results in independent publications. My basic knowledge of political science, law, and security policy, which I acquired through my studies, contributed greatly to my choice of topic.

## **2. RESEARCH AIMS, HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF THE THESIS**

In my thesis, I aim to research the current changes in international security and modern warfare, and to examine the state's options for defence in the light of these changes. Among the new types of threats, migration is also a key issue, which can lead to national and public security risks, such as radicalisation in the countries of destination.

The target of hybrid warfare is not directly military force, but the self-organising capacity of the perceived enemy society itself, the area known in traditional warfare as the hinterland, but not only its capacity to maintain forces and morale, as in the case of armed operations targeting the hinterland (e.g., strategic bombing). Furthermore, hybrid attacks are not always aimed at defeating the target state (target organisation, target person, etc.), but often only at achieving a (foreign) political or economic change of direction or a favourable outcome for the aggressor.

Hybrid operations take place at several levels: among the population in the conflict zone, among the population in the hinterland and in the (in some cases multi-ethnic, multi-religious) states or communities involved. These operations consist of a set of carefully prepared military, diplomatic and economic courses of action, operationally implemented by states or non-state actors (e.g., separatist or terrorist organisations, extremist political or religious groups), pursuing predefined strategic objectives. These types of challenges require a new approach to governance. The new security environment requires greater cooperation between domestic actors at a national level and between states and various alliance systems or international organisations at international level. In my thesis, I explore this in more detail in the context of resilience.

In my thesis, I wanted to examine the social pressures generated by mass irregular migration according to the criteria of hybrid warfare, from the perspective of the research questions outlined below. My aim is to examine the causes and circumstances of the mass irregular border crossings in 2015 and 2021. By presenting the characteristics and types of hybrid warfare, I studied whether

migration pressures can be artificially induced and, in this case, whether they meet the criteria of fourth (or, potentially, fifth) generation warfare. At the end of my research, I wanted to outline some options for defending against such a possible form of modern warfare.

In this context, it is worth exploring the set of instruments, including the regulatory environment and, consequently, the scope of action of public administrations, which can enhance the resilience of society to hybrid attacks. If migration is seen as an instrument of hybrid warfare, it is worth examining in what way and to what extent it is possible to counter it by means of administrative instruments explicitly, and where the boundary lies between the human rights that could be violated in this way and the right of states to self-defence and to preserve national and public security.

In the light of the above, I formulate the following hypotheses and related research questions, which I will examine in the content of my thesis.

1.

Research question: *Is hybrid warfare, a form of unconventional warfare or a form of warfare with significant new elements compared to the past? If the answer is yes, is it possible to defend against it by military means alone, or does it require other - unconventional - means of action compared to those previously known?*

Hypothesis: **Hybrid warfare is an unconventional method of warfare, and therefore it is not sufficient to counter the challenge it poses by military means alone, since it is inherently resistant to them and requires - in its own way - hybrid means.**

2.

Research question: *Does the free movement of people, made possible by globalisation, which has facilitated or restricted the movement of knowledge, material and intellectual goods, as well as the movement of people across borders, for economic and humanitarian reasons, allow the exploitation of irregularly migrating masses of people as a tool of hybrid warfare? If migration can be used as a means of exerting pressure or as a tool of warfare, what methods can be used to achieve this in the practice of international relations?*

Hypothesis: **Irregular migration can be used as an instrument of destabilisation and can therefore be used in the course of hybrid warfare to exert pressure, to provoke (induce),**

**facilitate, increase or restrain, or to prevent certain forms of defence against it, by states (or non-state actors) with the wrong intention, in order to achieve this objective.**

3.

Research question: *In the context of the use of migration as a potential hybrid instrument of warfare in fourth and fifth generation warfare, does the Clausewitzian division (soldier or command, citizen, state), from which humanitarian law has been drawn in the past, disappear? If the answer is in the affirmative, is there a need for a change in the approach to the law of war and peace, and in the applicable law?*

Hypothesis: **With the rise of hybrid warfare, the boundaries between previously known categories are partly dissolving, due to the nature of the threat, and therefore the law of war and peace must take this into account and respond to this phenomenon.**

4.

Research question: *In the context of hybrid warfare, especially if the manipulation of migration is a means to this end, which law should we apply: 'New York' or 'Hague' law; should the international human rights protection regime, and in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, or special humanitarian law prevail?*

Hypothesis: **With regard to hybrid warfare, it is humanitarian law and fundamental human rights that must be taken into account first and foremost, since we are dealing with a form of warfare that does not go beyond the threshold of war, but when mass migration is used as a means of warfare, certain fundamental human rights may be restricted.**

5.

Research question: *What non-military means can be used against hybrid warfare, primarily with the aim of immunising society against it, and what kind of norm-setting is required?*

Hypothesis: **To counter hybrid warfare, it is possible to increase resilience at the societal level by means of administrative instruments, and this should be the aim of further norm-setting in the future.**

### **3. THE RESEARCH METHODS USED IN THE THESIS**

My thesis is partly descriptive: I will show what forms modern warfare can take, through the method of observation. However, an analysis of the phenomena presented is inevitable, and therefore, where necessary, I will also formulate some of my own observations, supported by literature and facts, using methods of source analysis and source criticism.

To prove my hypotheses, I intend to follow the paths set out by deductive as well as inductive logical methods. I will start my thesis with deduction, i.e., from the initial idea, and then support this with the relevant literature. I will use induction at the end of my dissertation, when I will deal with the migrant crisis, i.e., the use of this phenomenon as a tool for exerting pressure. This is cardinal for the research as I will draw the final conclusions from it. After presenting the theoretical background, I will look for regularities and patterns in the Turkish and Belarusian examples presented, and after due examination I will revise my hypotheses.

I have used primary and secondary sources in my review of the literature. My primary sources of information were legislation, news agency reports describing specific events and other monographs or studies that examine fourth generation warfare. My secondary sources of information were intended to provide a comprehensive picture of my research area through secondary documents related to the field, such as the studies of selected examples.

In my dissertation, I have formulated sub-questions that require research using exploratory, comparative, historical and explanatory methods (otherwise typical of border sciences, given my research topic, which is situated at the intersection of geopolitics, social policy, military science and law).

### **4. SECURITY AS A CONCEPT**

Security is primarily the guarantee of the existence and continuity of the material and spiritual preconditions for individual and collective subsistence and prosperity, which, according to the classical conception of international relations, is the task of states.

This task presupposes not only abstention but also action on the part of the States. The preconditions of security can be achieved in different ways according to theories of international relations: realist theory attributes greater importance to individual action and selfishness on the part

of states, liberal theory to collective action and supranational legality, while critical theory does not provide a clear position on this issue.

The need to achieve security may also vary over time, as liberal perceptions of international relations may be undermined by the unjust and disproportionate assertion of great power interests in multilateral institutions, leading to a strengthening of the realist approach.

## **5. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND HYBRID WARFARE**

The prohibition of violence is currently a rule of public international law, and its enforcement is also permitted by the use of force to combat aggression, primarily through UN Security Council measures or the right to self-defence under international law.

This conclusion, however, applies *de lege lata* only to the prohibition of armed aggression, hybrid threats are not included in this scope, and their suppression is therefore permissible primarily by legal, administrative, means, until such time as hybrid threats and means are defined in international law and regulated in a set of rules of conflict.

States and other entities engaged in hybrid warfare exploit precisely the combined effects of the different intensity of this mode of warfare compared with conventional warfare and the relative unpreparedness of public international law to avoid the use of instruments to enforce the prohibition of force against their enemies or to blunt the instruments used against them.

This behaviour creates a fundamental link between the prohibition of violence, hybrid warfare and one of its methods, lawfare (the abuse of international and national law): hybrid warfare may manifest by a method of turning the content of law against the spirit of that law.

## **6. HYBRID WARFARE**

In this chapter I have attempted to define the concept of hybrid warfare and to describe its main characteristics. In doing so, I have described the otherwise extremely divergent views on the concept and its basic paradigm.

I have found that these range between the recognition of hybrid warfare as a completely new strategic phenomenon and the outright denial of hybrid warfare as a new form of warfare, both in terms of its methods and its objectives. In this context, I have expressed the view that the distinctive



feature of hybrid warfare is not only the high degree of coordination of its methods or its ability to remain below the threshold of conventional warfare (such means and ends have been present in the history of war), but (perhaps primarily) also that it is a symbiosis of conventional and hybrid methods, in the complementary fusion of the battlefield and the hybrid space of action based on non-dynamic means, in the transversal coordination between the two forms of warfare, not only in the high degree of coordination or technological implementation of the different hybrid methods. Hybrid warfare can thus even be seen as a new form of total warfare (simultaneous warfare in many fields, involving the civilian population, in this case not necessarily as combatants or economic hinterland).

I then placed hybrid warfare in the generational division of warfare (noting that some theories argue that this division is meaningless). I found that, in line with the international literature, if the generational paradigm is accepted, hybrid warfare would fall within the (mature) fourth generation of warfare, or the still contested fifth generation of warfare, especially in the latter case, the more prominent role of non-state actors in the conflict.

I then reviewed the ‘international practice’ of hybrid warfare, presenting the connections between the doctrine known as the Gerasimov Doctrine and the concept of hybrid warfare, partly in agreement with the view in the literature that hybrid warfare is not typically new and not typically a Russian paradigm, even if the Russian Federation has made spectacular use of its methods.

I then analysed the different methods and elements of hybrid warfare. In the literature on lawfare, I found that it typically refers to the set of abuses of international law by the weaker party, its interpretation, such as humanitarian law, or the law of war and peace, but that abuses of international law by the ‘legislator’, in the case of great powers that are ‘beneficiaries’ of international law, can also arise in the design of international institutions. I then examined examples of what can be considered two subtypes of lawfare, but which in international practice are treated as distinct from hybrid warfare: examples of interventions based on minority protection and alleged genocide, humanitarian reasons or pretexts, which lie in the grey zone of international law. Finally, I turn to the problem of information warfare, where intelligence techniques and their results are used in ways that can be integrated into hybrid warfare. From the issues examined, it can be concluded that hybrid warfare touches on a number of points in international law, in particular as

regards the threshold for war and the range of legitimate reasons and pretexts that can be used to launch a war.

I concluded my analysis by presenting the methods and results of hybrid warfare and, in particular, the most relevant “veterinary horse” of hybrid warfare as it stands today, the Russian Federation and its 2014 aggression and 2022 invasion of Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, other conflicts, as well as the methods and results of Russian hybrid warfare defenses.

I concluded that not only counter-warfare and defensive methods can be effective against hybrid warfare, but also international law, at the risk of limiting the scope of action not only of the Russian Federation and other rogue states, which pose a threat to international peace, but also of the Western powers.

## **7. THE HUMAN BEING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF HYBRID WARFARE**

With the increase in global mobility, international migration has become a complex and powerful problem with significant implications for states, communities and migrants worldwide. Understandably, migration has risen to the forefront of countries’ political and security concerns. Globalisation and international interconnectivity have contributed to an increase in migration.

In the age of hybrid warfare, where the line between peace and international conflict is blurred by the actions of rogue actors, migration has become an unconventional method of modern warfare and a means to satisfy the malicious ends of some state and non-state actors and has thus gained acceptance.

Competing countries in international relations are aware that a massive and unpredictable flow of migrants is causing economic and political tensions for the European Union. The source of conflict is immigration between Member States, which causes internal political instability and polarisation, and challenges the ideological foundations of liberal democracy and tolerance within the Union, which is the basis of the EU’s self-justification and its declared *raison d’être*. Economically and militarily weaker neighbouring states are using the possibility of mass migration to put pressure on richer member states to obtain funds and political support that they would otherwise not be able to obtain. For weaker states, the threat and blackmail of mass migration is the perfect tool to manipulate stronger states.

By using migration as a tool to exert pressure, Turkey has succeeded in its negotiations with the EU. It has won promises of increased funding and tacit approval for military interventions in northern Syria. Turkey has recognised how refugees can become a tool for achieving foreign policy goals that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. From a broader perspective, the deal provided Turkey with a tried and tested method of asserting its interests and extracting concessions from the EU, exploiting fears of a new refugee influx that worries many member states. The terrorist attacks in several European cities have given rise to the fear - objectively unjustified in the circumstances and the fact that the perpetrators are mainly EU nationals only with a migrant background - that potential terrorists could enter the EU with the refugees.

The Belarusian example shows that other states also believed that migration had become an effective tool for blackmailing the EU and obtaining political and economic concessions. The Belarusian regime worked out its plan in great detail and then encouraged forced migration. Although it was not particularly successful, the tactic showed how displaced people can be used as a geostrategic tool.

Turkey and Belarus, and indirectly Russia, have sought to instrumentalise migration in order to force the EU to make concessions on foreign policy and finance. Russia has also complemented this with disinformation, propaganda, cyber-attacks and blackmail over gas exports. The EU and its Member States are in solidarity with migrants; in this sense, they are bound by international refugee law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibit expulsion to countries where refugees may face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

According to the Greenhill typology (generators, provocateurs, opportunists) we can conclude that Turkey acted as an opportunist in 2015-2016, taking advantage of the migration movements generated by others, i.e., the civil war generated by the warring parties in Syria. Although Turkey's proximity to the conflict and its own interests - mainly the stabilisation of the northern Syrian territories bordering Turkey and the wider geopolitical context (including the Syrian-Russian relationship) - did not allow it to refuse to accept refugees (and thus opportunism is not the reason), it could have avoided the spread of the crisis towards the Balkans, and would have had sufficient resources from the international community and the EU to do so.

The EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016 was a major success for Ankara, as it effectively secured a pledge from the EU to lift the visa requirement for Turkish citizens, alongside six billion euros in aid. The EU also committed to accelerate Turkey's stalled accession process and, last but not least, the EU pledged to take in refugees from Turkish refugee camps. In addition to all this, the entire North Atlantic alliance system has essentially turned a blind eye to the unjustifiable violation of internationally recognised borders in Turkey's invasion of northern Syria.

In contrast, Russia acted as a typical provocateur in 2021 when it used Belarus as a proxy to create an artificial migrant crisis on its border with the EU. It can be argued that Russia has taken advantage of the EU's reaction to the botched presidential election in Belarus and a hijacking.

As well as the reasons for and types of migration, how individual countries are addressing the challenge of migration is also an important question. The science of security policy is concerned with migration processes, assessing the risks involved and forecasting the future. It is also important to formulate relevant policies, as the flow of people leads to conflicts and security risks. It is also interesting to look at the security situation of migrants: in many cases, they are on the move because they face some kind of threat, be it political, religious, racial, or ecological. They are not themselves guilty of using their migration for hybrid purposes.

International migration, which is the movement of people across national borders, can be classified according to several aspects, such as motivation, direction, and legality. This may take place voluntarily, be externally induced, individual, in groups, etc. It is not so easy to distinguish between the different types, as they are mixed in reality.

Since the last decades of the twentieth century, migration has taken on mass proportions and has become a global phenomenon that has attracted the attention of security policy experts because of the potential damage to state sovereignty. Experts are divided on whether population migration should always be a security issue, as it can have a number of benefits. For host countries, there is a double benefit: on the one hand, cheap labour and immigration can mitigate population decline. On the downside, cultural or religious tensions and the strain on the host country's social welfare system should be mentioned. This leads to the conclusion that if a state can manage immigration, it does not become a security risk. It is true that this is not easy, especially when large numbers of people arrive at once, as happened in 2015. As a result, there is a growing consensus among states that the growing international migratory pressure needs to be alleviated outside the EU, not just at

the borders of the community. It is also the time when European public opinion has woken up to the inevitability of developing a long-term public strategy to regulate immigration, thus preventing migration from becoming a security problem. The fact is that irregular migration is a threat to the security of a state.

In addition to economic, social, and political reasons, the triggers of international migration can include many natural, climatic, or geographical factors. But increasingly, migration is also economically motivated, moving from areas with a low standard of living to more developed ones. However, when considering the drivers of migration, such and similar reasons that threaten individual survival, we should not lose sight of factors that reduce the quality of human life through unreasonable, arbitrary, or excessive restrictions on fundamental human rights and freedoms or make life itself impossible. For example, lack of water or food can be caused by war or drought, or by denial of access to such resources for some minority groups. Members of ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities may also be encouraged to migrate by the prospect of living their identity without risk, which they may see as a significant improvement in their quality of life. For this reason, the legal environment should be given the same attention as the climate and human environment as a cause of migration phenomena.

Migration is often driven by overpopulation and low living standards, so those who want and can afford better education or job opportunities will leave. The inequalities created by globalisation are illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of migrants are in the working age group (25-49 years in age). Population decline, in a developed region, such as the ageing European countries, can be a wake-up call for those living in overpopulated, underdeveloped regions. Globalisation has also contributed to the surge in migrant numbers, and the world has changed dramatically with the spread of the internet. Endless information is available about more developed countries, it is easier to organise a trip and communication is easier thanks to the information revolution. The economic and political differences between countries have become more visible, and this new information is a motivation for migration. The availability, lower prices and faster speeds of global transport are also important factors.

International migration thus appears primarily as a global reality, not as a method of warfare. I argue that its classification as a hybrid instrument of warfare depends to a large extent not only on the participation of the participating states in each alliance system, but also on the extent to which

and in what way and for what purposes they foment migration. The 2015 (Eastern Balkans) and the 2020-2021 (Belarus) crises, despite their similarities, are still partly different in their assessment of this issue: in the first case, there are heterogeneous academic positions, in the second case there is quasi-consensus on the fact that Belarus has engaged in hybrid warfare.

The different assessment of the same instrument and similar methods in the context of the “threshold of war” is a risky phenomenon in international law and needs to be addressed. For this reason, a detailed, practice-oriented elaboration of the concept of international bad faith in relation to hybrid warfare in general may be necessary, both in jurisprudence and in international relations.

## **8. DEFENDING AGAINST HYBRID WARFARE. THE DILEMMAS OF RESILIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

To summarise the results of my research, it can be concluded that in hybrid warfare - and if we accept that one of its instruments is artificially induced irregular migration, then also in the latter - this mode and means of warfare and the defence against it lead to serious dilemmas in the field of fundamental human rights.

In part, hybrid actors may use lawfare as a means of trying to make the defending party appear to be in violation of international law. More seriously, the mechanisms for defending against hybrid warfare, the mechanisms of resilience, necessarily involve a number of instruments falling within the scope of action of public administrations, which must be applied with due regard for human rights and the - as yet undeveloped - international legal framework that does not exist for hybrid actions.

Each of the specific resilience models explicitly calls for an ‘ecosystem’ of protection, a combination of different modes of action. It is therefore inevitable that norm-setting at the interface of government action and political action should be part of this ecosystem, providing a clear framework for administrative action against all forms of hybrid warfare, including artificially induced migration.

## **9. FINAL SUMMARY. SCIENTIFIC RESULTS**

After the end of the Second World War, the concept of security in international relations was defined by the followers of the realist movement as an inter-state relationship closely linked to

wars and armed conflicts. However, the emergence towards the end of the century of new realities such as the oil crisis, environmental pollution or globalisation has broadened the meaning of the concept of security, a process of redefinition that is still continuing today. Thus, the focus of security policy has shifted from a purely nation-state interpretation to one of international cooperation. Today, international organisations, multinational companies and NGOs are active players in international security alongside states.

The range of security challenges is also constantly expanding: *“new challenges such as state failure, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, mass migration, organised crime, the struggle for resources, the protection of critical infrastructure cannot even be properly mapped using the previous concept of security based on a realist paradigm.”* - concludes Peter Rada. The CORE model defines the factors of security in great detail. Security in the modern age is complex and multidimensional: *“it can be considered in terms of military, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, industrial, commercial, human, social, environmental, health (epidemiological), legal, public security, national security (intelligence), and demographic”*.

It can be seen that today's complex security challenges require more than a military approach - other non-state actors, i.e., the civilian sphere, must also be involved in effective crisis management. The most effective form of combating hybrid warfare, which uses mainly non-military elements (diplomatic, political, technical, economic, information) to achieve its objectives, is social, administrative and military cooperation at various levels. The novelty of the fourth (potentially fifth) generation tactics is the high level of coordination of the various techniques and the fact that the military element is only complementary to the others and is the ultima ratio. This implies that the response to complex threats must be similar, hence the concept of social resilience to counter attacks against citizens.

According to this idea, the response to hybrid challenges must come primarily from nation states rather than from the international level, and the term resilience has been used to denote national resilience from the outset. Strengthening social resilience is a task for public administrations, including defence administrations.

Following the events in Ukraine in 2014, both NATO and the EU have focused on defending against hybrid threats, emphasising the importance of the national level. As the international community was then faced with a planned and carefully coordinated multidimensional attack. As

a result, the theory of hybrid warfare began to be taken more seriously by the scientific community. The effectiveness of this new type of warfare is due to a high degree of coordination and the combined use of civilian and military techniques and assets. The attacking side does not aim to destroy the enemy's military power alone, but rather to break down the resistance of the entire country and disrupt its operations as much as possible. A country can only effectively counter such attacks by increasing the resilience of its society.

Hybrid threats require complex governmental as well as international cooperation. This was put into practice at the 2016 EU-NATO Summit in Warsaw, where participants agreed to strengthen resilience and to increase communication and cooperation. The simultaneous use of 'hard' and 'soft' forces of fourth generation warfare was also responded to at NATO's 2018 Brussels Summit, where the need for a renewed stability effort was agreed. It was the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the rise of ISIS that prompted these moves, as the international community realised that conflicts in individual countries were having a major impact on the international scene. The issues of mass migration and cyber-security were also addressed in the statement concluding the meeting. Resilience, as a guarantee of stability, will feature as a stand-alone issue in the new European Global Security Strategy.

NATO's strategy over the past ten years has steadily shifted from defending against cyber-attacks to defending against information operations and influence, as evidenced by its new strategic concept, launched in 2022. The coalition's tasks are crisis prevention and management, deterrence and defence, and cooperation to maintain security. The document underlines the importance of strengthening national and collective resilience, territorial sovereignty, respect for international and human rights and the rejection of aggression. It notes that there is no peace in the Alliance area and identifies the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China as global threats, not only in traditional locations but also in space and cyberspace. Their tools include disinformation campaigns, energy blackmail and methods to pressure and destabilise through migration. The novelty of the strategy is that it also makes the provisions of Article 5 applicable to hybrid attacks.

At the national level, Hungary responded more seriously to the protection against hybrid threats at the municipal level in 2019 with the Act CV of 2019, which amended the National Security Act, the Defence Act and the provisions on the protection of critical infrastructure. This was followed by the National Security Strategy 2020, which identifies the protection against hybrid threats as a



national task. This document also names Russia and China as threats but underlines that they are also economic partners. The next steps were the creation of Act XCIII on the Coordination of Defence and Security Activities in 2021 and the new National Military Strategy.

The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy are the ones that deal most with the issue of fourth generation warfare, the former describing the state's understanding of hybrid attacks, the latter precisely organising the tasks of the armed forces in the event of hybrid attacks. From the government's point of view, hybrid warfare is a set of activities capable of destabilising the administration and disrupting social unity, but without crossing the threshold of the threat of war.

As we have seen, policies against this type of threat have been continuously developed in Hungary, with the help of the international community, NATO and the EU, of which we are members. From 2020 onwards, the strengthening of social resilience has also been a priority, although the detailed design of the nation's resilience strategy is still in progress at the time of writing.

All this shows that the increasingly complex international problems, in particular hybrid warfare and even migration without instrumentalisation of migrants, have posed significant challenges for the international community, the Euro-Atlantic institutional system and Hungary alike, thus outlining the different levels and areas of action for a national and international future resilience infrastructure. One of these areas of national action is public administration, which must be given sufficient room for manoeuvre to deal with hybrid threats.

## **10. NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS**

1. I have shown that migration can be used as a hybrid means of pressure and, in extreme cases, as a means of warfare - by non-military means.
2. I have shown that a state can deliberately foment irregular migration as an aggressor against other states, as a means of political, economic, security and other forms of pressure in hybrid warfare to achieve outcomes favourable to that aggressor, either by maintaining or increasing the insecurity of refugees in its territory, or by propaganda and providing the logistical conditions for artificially fomented migration.

3. I identified that Turkey used the 2015 migrant wave to exert political and economic pressure on the European Union in line with its own domestic and foreign policy and economic interests.
4. I have identified the reasons and means by which Belarus has sought to use migrants as a means of exerting pressure on the EU to blunt vehement reactions and regime change efforts following the botched presidential election, to lift EU sanctions, to disrupt EU unity and to meet financial expectations.
5. I have shown that an effective administrative defence against hybrid warfare is to increase social resilience.
6. I have demonstrated that the field of action of public administration is significant in increasing social resilience.
7. I have shown that hybrid warfare, and the artificially induced migration that is its instrument, requires both international and national norm-setting.

## **11. THE POSSIBLE UTILISATION OF THE THESIS**

My thesis has produced academic results that are of current practical use for international security policy and humanitarian law.

It has established that migration can be used as a tool of international pressure and, in extreme cases, hybrid warfare, to achieve political, economic and other outcomes. The main legal significance of this finding is that this form of hybrid warfare can be combated by means of national and international law, even more drastically than the usual acts against public order, even at the cost of restricting the exercise of certain fundamental rights.

The factors identified in my thesis (such as the causes of migration, the involvement of state or non-state actors in migration as generators, provocateurs or opportunists, the detectability of the objectives to be achieved, and possibly lawfare) that point to the presence of purposeful migration are relevant to the justification for the use of these more drastic instruments and to the assessment of their proportionality in a democratic state. In this way, it is also possible to distinguish between the effects on fundamental rights of action to protect public order and action to protect national security.

I have also concluded that hybrid warfare should be at least defined in international law, and that the nature and extent of bad faith in international law could be a threshold for this normative definition, which is still being developed.

In the field of international relations, my research is useful in identifying the actors and their typical behaviour that act in bad faith in fomenting or exacerbating migration flows. It also presents a potential and growing toolbox of instruments to counter them.

As recent developments on the day of finalisation of this thesis - the potential closure of the border between Poland and Lithuania with Belarus to prevent the infiltration of Wagner PMC fighters as migrants - demonstrate, the transformation of irregular migration from a tool of hybrid warfare - essentially a means of pressure - into a weapon in its own right, should be treated as a current possibility and should be the subject of further, increasingly urgent research, in which the academic results of my thesis can also be used in the future.

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VERESS Csongor Balázs: *Quo vadis Román Hírszerző Szolgálat?* – In. Corvinák, 2023. 08. 03. – <https://corvinak.hu/velemeny/2023/08/03/quo-vadis-roman-hirszerzo-szolgalat>, (2023. 08. 16.).

VERESS Csongor Balázs: *Az egyesülés (titkos) szolgálatában?* – In. Corvinák, 2023. 01. 31. – <https://corvinak.hu/velemeny/2023/01/31/az-egyeseles-titkos-szolgalataban>, (2023. 08. 16.).

### **13. A PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE APPLICANT**

#### WORK EXPERIENCE

2021 – Research fellow, Mathias Corvinus Collegium (Hungary)

2016 – 2019 Administrator, Consulate General of Hungary in Cluj (Romania)

2011 Intern, EU Parliament (Belgium)

#### EDUCATION AND TRAINING

2017 – PhD, National University of Public Service (Hungary)

- 2016 – 2017 Master of Laws, University of Debrecen (Hungary)
- 2014 – 2015 Budapest Academy of Diplomacy Program, National University of Public Service,  
(Hungary)
- 2010 – 2015 BA in Law, University of Bucharest (Romania)
- 2004 – 2009 BA in Political Science, University of Babes-Bolyai (Romania)
- 2006 – 2007 Leader Training – Euroclass Project, Silkeborg Hojskole (Denmark)  
Study language: English

Languages: Hungarian (Mother Tongue)  
English (Advanced)  
Romanian (Advanced)