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U.S. Foreign and Security Policy in the Early 21st Century

PhD Thesis

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To Martyna,
who had to sacrifice many possibly joyful evenings for this paper!
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1. Introductory remarks

Shifts among the holders of domestic power often result in a change of goals, means, strategy, alliances and style in the foreign policy of their counties. Of course, the more striking the change – revolutionary, radical or just orthodox regime change,¹ change of the ruling class or faction within the ruling classes – the greater the shift in the foreign political attitude is to be expected.

In the United States, after the presidential elections in 2000 and 2008, an exchange of the people holding highest administrative posts took place. That might seem unspectacular. But given the U.S. position as the world’s leading status quo power, which is involved in all major hotspots of world affairs – North Korean and Iranian proliferation issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict, “War on Terrorism” and the re-shaping of the Mideastern order, the Taiwan Strait and the Eastern Asian security environment – and engaged in two war theatres – Afghanistan and Iraq, both being heavily disputed at home – the following administration’s foreign policy would shape world politics decisively. Even if the U.S. had retreated from world politics due to internal and financial reasons, which was and still is highly unlikely, this decision would have had a great impact on world politics.

The task of this thesis will be to analyse possible choices among grand strategies or the long-term vision of America’s foreign policy and the international position that the Obama administration faced when it came into office in spring 2009. As described above, the U.S. foreign

¹ Typology was developed for categorising revisionists in the international system by Buzan (Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, New York, 1991, p. 303-311), but is also useful when talking about internal changes in political systems;
policy was at a turning point and the American electorate, voting for 'change', at least expected certain modifications of the U.S. politics – including the foreign policy. The thesis will explain the differences to the previous administration and the possible reasons for these changes. As president Obama made ‘change’ the main message of his candidacy, it should be examined how much change there actually was and whether that change was caused by external circumstances or policy choice.

The thesis will also include an ex-post examination of the possible grand strategy options, which the administration could have chosen in 2009, and analyse the one that was eventually selected, including some remarks on why it was selected. This will require, however, some elaboration on strategy or foreign policy planning as such. The thesis aims at delivering a more detailed and valuable analysis than a bare phenomenological-hermeneutic comparison of the political language. However, reconstructing political decisions before the archives are opened up is a difficult task. Decisions are always choices between different possible futures, and describing the possible futures, between which the administration thought it had a choice, involves – necessarily – some speculative thought. Nevertheless, the author hopes to give some interesting thoughts and judgements on the American foreign policy between 2001 and 2012.

1.1. Research questions

- How to describe, compare and analyse different outlines or approaches to a nation’s foreign policy?
- How to incorporate existing paradigms, analytical tools and models (taken from the research on foreign policy planning, foreign policy choices, grand strategy, and general planning theory) into this comparison?
- Among which options on grand strategy designs could the newly-elected administration in 2008 choose (discussing only plausible alternatives)?
- On which premises about the challenges, structure and condition of the international system, the overall mission of the USA, and the preservation of the functional integrity of its political and economic system is each strategy option based on?

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3 Based on: Gustav C. Gressel, Europäische Ostasienpolitik auf dem Prüfstand: Eine Evaluierung in den Problemfeldern der großen Politik, master thesis at the University of Salzburg, 2007;
Which long-term visions, goals and strategies, medium-range policies and programmes, and which short-term actions would be required to implement each strategy?

How would they have differed in terms of goals, means, procedural designs, allies and capability development?

How would they have balanced internal needs/demands and foreign policy goals/demands of the external environment?

In several long and mid-term decisions the administration had different strategy and policy options. Why did the administration choose the one option it eventually did?

How did that grand strategy materialise in conceptual/legislative actions, and in high and low level political actions?

How far did it have to be modified through the appearance of unforeseen incidents?

1.2. Hypotheses

There is an ongoing debate whether any American President is able to significantly change U.S. foreign policy or not. Every president has to deal with constant demands of domestic politics, certain protracted interests of lobby-groups, or entrenched structural interests of the United States. These would narrow down the presidents’ possible choices. Despite different political and ideological backgrounds of the American administration, their foreign policy shows more continuity than change.

After 9/11 and during the first Obama-campaign, change in foreign policy was expected from various experts. Hermann distinguishes four levels of change: (1) Adjustment Change, (2) Programme Change, (3) Problem/Goal Change, (4) International Orientation Change. Adjustment Change means that a government does neither change its goals, priority or means of foreign policy, but de- or increases the use of those means. Programme Change means that a government does not change its foreign policy goals, but pursues them with new or different means and programmes. Problems/Goal Changes means that a governments entirely changes its primary or at least some of the very top foreign policy goals. International Orientation Change means that a government changes all its alignments and policy vectors, like for example Sadat made Egypt from a Soviet proxy into an American ally.
ing that Obama had successfully changed American foreign policy, the thesis sets up the following two hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1:** Obama successfully carried out “International Orientation Change” in U.S. foreign and security policy.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Compared to Bush’s “grand strategy design”, Obama’s “Problem/Goal Changes” are more frequent than “Programme Changes”.

Hermann also distinguishes the sources of political change: (1) Leader Driven Change, (2) Bureaucratic Advocacy, (3) Domestic Restructuring, (4) External Shock. Assuming that the president or his administration is the one who brings about change the following four hypothesis can be stated:

- **Hypothesis 3:** Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, leader driven change will outweigh change due to external shocks.
- **Hypothesis 4:** Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, leader driven change will outweigh bureaucratic advocacy.
- **Hypothesis 5:** Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, domestic restructuring will outweigh change due to external shocks.
- **Hypothesis 6:** Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, domestic restructuring will outweigh bureaucratic advocacy.

### 1.3. Methodology and research procedure

First of all, the author considers himself as a traditional empiricist and a realist. Furthermore, he does not feel compelled to adhere to post-modernism in the fields of methodology and analysis, and follows the strict terminology of macroanalytic historical sociology (defining political science as the sociology of power) as the basis of further descriptive and analytical work.

Much of the traditional literature and many concepts are neither outdated nor restricted to pure black-and-white contrasting. Sharp analytical work and clear criteria are – in the experience of the author – more useful for analysis than post-modern obfuscation (so-called comprehensiveness). Unfortunately, after the Cold War, some parts of the applied literature in International Relations uphold the claim that ‘everything changed’ or seem to be in a race for

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8 Ibid, p.11-12;
10 See: Ossip K. Flechtheim, Grundlegung der Politischen Wissenschaft, Meisenheim am Glan, 1958, p. 11-ff;
claiming the most fundamental change on their side.

One area that has been affected by 'comprehensive' waffling is the field of strategy analysis. The phenomena that are described as strategy or are attributed as strategic seem to be endless. Some reproduce political expressions simply by calling everything strategic that is officially called a strategy, regardless of the relevance of the document. Others apply the term to any presumably planned or coordinated type of state behaviour, regardless of the duration of such actions. Or regardless of whether the planned action is aimed at achieving tactical goals, such as setting better preconditions for further negotiations, or whether it truly reflects long-term pattern behaviour that is aimed at achieving long-term gains.

This thesis proposes a rather strict, that is narrow, definition of strategy or its adjective strategic, narrowing the term to the top level of an organisation’s planning process, above tactical and operational-level planning. The presentation of a possible scheme for strategic planning at the national level\(^\text{11}\) will be the basis of this thesis. It will be used as a reference to discuss the U.S. foreign policy options.

The thesis frequently refers to values, perceptions and belief systems of the political elites. These references, however, do not implicitly support the post-modern, constructivist view that subjectivity is omnipresent and unavoidable, that thoughts and opinions substitute reality and that thoughts shape reality and not the other way round.\(^\text{12}\) In short, the author rather believes in the primacy of matter than in the primacy of thought.\(^\text{13}\) On the other hand considering actors as rational entities does not make them 100% predictable and politics deterministic, because the preferences of the decision-makers are never known to the outside world. Political leaders not only make decisions, but they also determine the decision-preferences for a particular decision – and those preferences are influenced by customs, values and other unknown factors. This is similar to computer games, in which the computer’s artificial intelligence is the ultimate unemotional, rational actor and where the AI follows strategic priorities that are set quite randomly – resulting in AI-decisions that seem unlogic or irrational to the human counterpart. Even in rational calculation systems, there is a lot of unintended irrationality. This is the same with politicians: they weigh the same factors differently, concentrate on different elements of the same material universe. Incomplete information, behavioural effects –

\(^{11}\) Gressel, *Europäische Ostasienpolitik auf dem Prüfstand*, p.27ff.
\(^{13}\) This dispute is an old one, and the ideas of constructivism and postmodernism may be traced back to the 19th century German Romanticism. See: Hermann Braun, “Welt”, in: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Band 7, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, p. 433-510, especially p. 473ff.
peer pressure, political and ideological socialisation, etc. – reinforce this uncertainty.\textsuperscript{14} To make another point for the primacy of matter: after some time, even the most romantic, idealist, and normative administration will face a reality check in terms of limited power, internal and external resistance and disagreement, if not outright forceful opposition.

When analysing the decisions of the governments in question, both material and immaterial factors have to be taken into account. The heuristic problem with this is that material factors are easier to identify, describe, and evaluate, while immaterial factors are more obscure and hidden from the outside world. To make the paper more than a guess and a normative judgement, certain criteria and references were defined for analysing these phenomena. This puts certain limitations on the thesis and its findings. But methodological correctives – such as in-depth interviews with the holders of power and key elite personnel – are beyond the reach of the author (or even beyond the reach of most researchers), as they would not yet comment on recent events. When reading the thesis, these limitations are to be taken into account.

\textit{1.3.1. Data elicitation}

Three main data sources were used for the thesis: government communication (e.g.: official strategies, policy papers, reports, speeches, comments), the political and administrative elites’ statements (e.g.: statements, comments, publications), and analytic literature. Newspaper articles\textsuperscript{15} were an invaluable source of this thesis, especially concerning recent events. As the Wikileaks scandal reviled, many classified cables contain assessments and findings that are similar to those of quality newspapers and good investigative journalism. Even more, some articles in the newspapers quoted above are based on information leaked from government sources or intelligence services.

\textit{1.3.2. Data categorisation}

There are some reservations as to the usefulness of official documents and statements by public officials, because the aim of this kind of communication is rather to persuade the public to follow a certain cause or opinion, to camouflage or justify intentions or actions rather than to

\textsuperscript{14} See: Kenneth N. Waltz, \textit{Man, the State and War, a theoretical analysis}, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 16-79;

analyse and describe them. These statements need to be decoded first, before an analytic statement on the intentions and objectives of the U.S. government can be made. The scheme related to the foreign policy planning mentioned, driven from the 1970s classical economic planning, have a certain heuristic value, when searching for information and categorising them.

In order not to give the impression that the U.S. government lies or misleads the public all the time, the author has to mention that the quoted analytical scheme originally was developed to analyse the foreign policy of more secretive states, particularly China. The debate on foreign policy decisions and courses of action in the U.S. is certainly more open and transparent than in China. Indeed, since the author works in the defence bureaucracy and has to deal with several European states, it seems hard to find a state that is more transparent than the United States. And if structures within the U.S. government are not transparent as such they are leaked within a considerable amount of time. Making use of this analytical tool is justified for analytical rather than investigative reasons.

1.3.3. Analysis and evaluation

As the n of cases is 1 and the available data is purely qualitative, the analysis is limited to qualitative methods. The paper provides a qualitative analysis, i.e. a case study on foreign policy decision-making. However, given the unique position of the United States in the global power structure, some comments on the international system are relying on quantitative data. To analyse the decisions made by the new U.S. administration, methods of policy research and comparative politics will be applied.

1.3.4. Scope of the thesis

The thesis will describe the American foreign policy and its grand strategy from 2001 (inauguration of George W. Bush) until the U.S. presidential elections on November 6th 2012. As U.S. foreign policy evolves day by day, one has to set a deadline at some point. As the topic of the thesis is the change or continuity after Bush, Barack Obama’s first term of office should be reference enough.

The thesis will describe the decisions, considerations, and problems of Obama’s first term in

16 Gressel, Europäische Ostasienpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, p.25ff;
office, as they came up at their time. Should Obama choose to review or reverse past decisions in his second term, which might be the case, this cannot be included in this thesis.

1.4. Preliminary structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical framework and will present a method for comparing different grand strategies or foreign policy concepts. Furthermore it seeks an answer to the question whether it is useful for analysing foreign policy changes or not.

Chapter 3 addresses the most important aspects of the foreign policy and the strategic framework of the Bush administration. It will describe the point of departure for the post-Bush foreign policy. Since any policy reflects what the current president perceives as the faults and shortcomings of his predecessor, any post-Bush foreign policy would refer to the Bush years. And as it inevitably would have to cope with the developments initiated under Bush – e.g. the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the financial crisis – it is worth noticing why and how such crisis came about.

Chapter 4 describes four potential options for a post-Bush grand strategy. They are based on Ross’ and Posen’s 1996 article17, but adapt their descriptions to the conditions and constraints of the situation of 2008.

Chapter 5 then deals with Obama’s foreign policy in accordance to the same scheme as Bush’s. It focuses on the most important decisions and policies and tries to elaborate on the underlying considerations.

The chapter ‘Conclusion’ presents the findings, verification and falsification of the hypothesis. Again the scheme is used for the comparison of the two foreign policies and the quantification of change occurred.

Two pieces of the appendix are vital for the comprehension of the thesis: the complete table of the analytical scheme described in chapter 2 and the table comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies. The latter is used to quantify the amount of change that occurred in foreign policy with the change of the U.S. administration.

The appendix contains some clarifications of terms used frequently in the thesis: foreign-policy, power, types of international systems, structure and order, and the international society. It seemed important because the analytical framework was originally developed in German and there are different conventions using certain terminologies. There are also some differences in the reception and interpretation of English sources between the two communit-

ies, thus the appendix includes some explanatory digressions.

Another chapter moved to the appendix contains remarks on the state of the Russian political regime. To the author, both Obama and Bush misestimated the motivations, preferences, and premises of the Russian leadership. To the author, the Russian regime’s adherence to Eurasism (a Russian version of what is usually called Fascism) as political ideology and guidances is underestimated by Western observers, hence frequently misinterpreting Russian moves. This of course is a controversial statement, worthwhile to be discussed. However as the Russian regime is not the topic of this thesis by itself (but on the other hand the issue is relevant to explain U.S. policy failure), the issue is dealt with in the appendix.

Finally, the appendix comprises some graphs about the distribution of military potentials (not power!) amongst the world regions. As the thesis particularly focuses on power politics and decisions about certain military campaigns, some quantitative background information might be of interest.
2. Theoretical framework

As mentioned above, the discussion about strategy and strategic action covers many topics. As the number of great powers that are presumably entitled to have a strategy is small, much is left to qualitative judgements. Even within qualitative methods, comparative research faces numerous limitations, as each power or state, and each time, has certain presumably unique characteristics. Comparisons may maintain a certain level of abstraction in order to reach valid conclusions. The more abstract, the less applicable the comparison will be if one tries to forecast certain events or judge certain decisions. Hence, many analytically correct judgements will have little practical value.

On the other hand, there are personal or expert statements, solely based on instinct and powers of reasoning of the person making the statement. Although this might lead to acceptable results, such personal judgements may result in arbitrariness and judgements based on normative opinions and selectively picked facts. This is especially true within the bureaucracy, where experience and knowledge is often confused with a certain position within the bureaucratic hierarchy and intellect with selective profound knowledge of bureaucratic details.

Game theory, although it made valuable contributions enhancing the predictability of decisions or crisis behaviour, is difficult to apply to long-term strategic analysis. Games simulate decision-making processes, thereby being focused on the analysis of decisive moments or a particular decision. Although a game-tree might simulate the succession of several moves and counter moves, the tree increases its probable outcomes by the \( n \) of game rounds. In addition, there are inherent methodological problems, which are yet to be solved: the problem of limited information and the problem of quantification of qualitative facts (aims and gains as well as subjective factors, such as influence and prestige). Game theory might provide a helpful second opinion or useful tool to structure one’s thoughts and information, but it will not replace qualitative judgement.

When discussing topics like strategy or grand strategy, one has to be fully aware of these lim-

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19 See: Ibid., p. 62-69;
20 The Author has witnessed the practical application of certain games in analysing the political situation in the Balkans, especially Bosnia and the Kosovo question. The results were quite good and did provide useful hints as to practical policy advice. Game theory, therefore, should not be dismissed as purely academic. Some of the results have been published, see: Erich Reiter, Reinhard Selten (Eds.), *Zur Lösung des Kosovo-Konfliktes, Die Anwendung der Szenariobündelanalyse im Konfliktmanagement*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003; Erich Reiter, Predrag Jurekovic (Eds.), *Bosnien und Herzegowina, Europas Balkanpolitik auf dem Prüfstand*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005;
Methodological improvements, if properly applied, may reduce the margin of error, but they will never remedy this shortcoming of strategic analysis. On the other hand, strategic analysis is still required by governments and executive bodies, in order for good to prevail – administered somehow by somebody. Even with methodological limitations in mind, one should be as accurate as possible.

2.1. Strategy, foreign policy choice or muddling through? The difficulty of reconstructing foreign policy decision-making

Beside the methodological remarks, some concepts of foreign policy analysis have shaped the following scheme for strategy analysis, and thereby are worth being mentioned. Some relate directly to the debate of strategy or grand strategy, some rather provided underlying assumptions on the working principles of the international system.

2.1.1. The Concept of Adaptation

One of the most important basic assumptions to this analytical scheme is the concept of adaptation. It was put forward by James N. Rosenau in the late 1960, challenging the then held assumption on the primacy of foreign and security policy in the political process. He stated that national societies and their international environments influence each other. "For the fluctuations in the essential structures of a society stem from a composite of three sources: from international developments and the society’s success in coping with and benefiting from them; from trends at home and the society’s success in absorbing them into its essential structures; and from the internal behaviour whereby the society adjusts its institutions and values to meet the requirements of its external behaviour and the demands of its environment."

The ruling elites thereby try to preserve the structures of their societies as much as possible to preserve their own power as well as the functionality of the ruling apparatus. Foreign policy then, is defined in the following way: "...all foreign policy actions, undertaken by a national society stem from at least one common source, namely, the need to keep essential structures within acceptable limits by achieving a balance between the changes and demands from within the society on the one hand and the changes and demands from its salient

It is very important to consider the internal situation that the political elite faces beyond slogans or notions like 'populism hinders foreign policy'. Ordering and maintaining domestic social, economic and political structures is the key task of the political system per se. The external influences and interdependence of the respective society with the international milieu provide the terrain to act upon for foreign policy as such. "By essential structures we mean those interaction patterns that constitute the basic political, economic, and social life of a national society. By acceptable limits we mean those points on a continuum between which the fluctuations in the essential structures do not prevent the society from maintaining its basic patterns or altering these patterns through its own choices and procedures." The interdependence of national societies is a given state, however, each one’s essential structures have limited capacities to absorb demands for change.

All the above should not lead to the impression that the process of adaptation is a one way process, with the international environment providing and the national society receiving. States cannot only shape their adaptation process, but influence the international environment as such to the needs of their society. The ability to do so is mainly determined by two factors: on the one hand, the state’s power potential in terms of influence and power, on the other, its ability to use those potentials skillfully, to use strategy and policy to manage the implementing actions as well as guiding routine processes to accomplish its goals. Without a certain degree of planning or strategic considerations, even large potentials may be used improperly. Without any potential, even the most skillful strategy will remain fruitless. Then, one can only wait for historic events to happen and try to adapt as much as possible.

Depending on how much potential is used how skillfully in which environment, different mode adaptations to the international environment are achieved. The level of adaptation achieved, however, does not imply that this adaptation is shaped by a structured plan defining

22 Ibid., p. 2-3;
23 Ibid., p. 3;
24 Rosenau defines the essential structures as the following: "To anticipate the ensuing formulation, the patterns whereby the life and property of societies are preserved and protected, their policy decisions made and implemented, their goods and services acquired and distributed, their members’ cooperation achieved and maintained, are considered essential preconditions for their survival." Rosenau, The Adaptation of National Societies, p. 21.
These four categories may be considered essential indeed: however, a more detailed approach is provided by Faupel (Klaus Faupel, Einführung in die Internationale Politik – Introduction into international politics, class held at Salzburg University, 2002-2003): The political system has to provide functions and services along four ‘shells’, starting from the core: social order (association, exchange of goods and services, property, family, social, political and individual integration), state (education, infrastructure, judiciary, internal security/law enforcement, administration), environmental factors (ecology, communication and locomotion, location), economic order, external security.
25 See: Rosenau, The Adaptation of National Societies, p. 6-17;
goals according to which international structures should be influenced and which external influences should be welcomed or diminished. Muddling through, deciding issue by issue which pattern of interactions to be adapted is still feasible. It is even more likely if foreign policy is seen in close relation with domestic policies and – as it is the case in open, pluralistic systems – a large number of entities are trying to influence this through various channels. Since foreign policy action is aimed at adapting to the external environment, any foreign policy strategist will have to take the internal structures into account, which demand or require external adaptation. Moreover, in international relations, domestic constituencies and international behaviour are interlocked. The scheme proposed in this thesis considers such interlocking.

While these inter-linkages are widely recognised in the field of domestic politics as well as when it comes to regime types, much is left to be explored on the topic of influence of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy.

Rosenau distinguishes four types of adaptation: acquiescent, intransigent, promotive and preservative adaptation. Acquiescent adaptation means that the state perceives itself solely as the recipient of demands with little or no chance to influence them. The state has to accommodate to these demands, like a satellite state. The opposite is intransigent adaptation, where the ruling elite is under no circumstances willing to give in to any demand from the outside, but rather seeks to force its international environment to adapt to its needs. Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia are perfect examples, although it seems that the leadership of today’s Russia would prefer this mode if it had the chance to do so. Promotive adaptation means that the leadership has a considerable amount of freedom in choosing the balance between influencing external structures and adapting internal ones. This requires a considerable strength on the part of the state’s society, international influence and also domestic structures that easily adapt to changing circumstances. On the other hand, in the event of preservative adaptation conflicting demands from the outside and from within a society put the government under extreme pressure, which then must decide, on which side the losses will be greater.

28 Rosenau, The Adaptation of National Societies, p. 6-17;
2.1.2. The Grand Strategy Debate

The debate on Grand Strategy approaches this matter from a very different angle. "Grand Strategy in the first half of the 20th century consisted basically of the mobilization and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower, and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those of allied and, when feasible, of neutral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime."29 With the advent of the Cold War and the omnipresence of the nuclear threat, preparation for war became a constant factor in politics – without ever fighting the war one constantly prepared for. Thus, grand strategy gradually became a tool to describe the way in which a state tried to survive – or to reach its political objectives – in the everlasting struggle for power. "Strategy" in a wider sense is understood as a planned and coordinated approach to international (power) politics, describing how the state should use its means to achieve desired political aims. In this particular thesis the term strategy is used to describe the long-term goals and guidances of this planning process – hence "strategy" in a much narrower sense (see chapter 2.2.2.).

Analysing politics with the hierarchical planning structure of a general could systematise the foreign policy approach as such. Unfortunately, the literature has severe limitations. Much of the literature aims to describe current or past grand strategies.30 Although it is interesting by itself and, as in the case of quoted literature, well written, there is little abstraction to the subject that would make these considerations applicable to other cases. Some even restrict themselves to a single case study.31 The main goal of this literature is to explain a specific behaviour of specific states in a fixed time frame, to pass judgement on it and, possibly, the future behaviour of a specific actor, but not to deliver an analytical framework for further discussions.

Usually, the realist discussion on the future structure of the international system and its criticism offers more hints on the long-term goals of certain states and their accomplishments than the grand strategy debate.32 This is due to the inherent principle of realism in describing inter-

national relations as a constant struggle for power and influence. If the respective authors elaborate accurately for which aims the exertion of influence is pursued and if the means to achieve this are properly described, the realist analyses may be a good point of departure for further elaborations on the respective states’ strategies.

However, there are certain articles that provide a sharp analytical approach to the topic, such as, most notably, Posen’s and Ross’ article on possible post-Cold War grand strategies. They link the elite’s assumptions to the functioning principles of international relations, normative concepts, perceptions of the international environment, political goals to preferred assets of statecraft, priorities, policy concepts, alliances, military strategies and, ultimately, force structures.

They also put a clear emphasis on interpreting the missing and inconsistent parts in the political communication of elites. “... we borrow liberally from academics, government officials, journalists, and policy analysts who have contributed to this debate, but on issues where others have kept silent, or been inconsistent, we impose consistency in the interest of clarity. Our purpose is not advocacy, it is transparency.” In so doing, they do not fall prey to concepts that define goals too abstract or sometimes in a quasi-esoteric way, such as geopolitics.

The strategy debate tells us that leaders and their political entourage have a certain view on the international environment and its functioning, and that they will start to plan their actions and shape their assets to achieve the required change among these functional principles. However, this is one factor. The international environment they face, bureaucratic politics, the in-

33 See: Andreas Jakobs, "Realismus", in: Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler (Eds.), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Leske und Budrich, Opladen 2003, p. 35-60;
34 Posen, Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", p. 5-53;
35 Ibid., p. 5;
36 "Geopolitics is a pseudoscience erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, and hence the fate, of nations." Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, Brief Edition, Mc. Graw Hill, Boston et al., 1993, p. 174;
ternal political debates, the quest for legitimacy and public consensus are other decisive factors, just as well as the counter-moves and potentials of their internal as well as external contenders. Political leaders, just as military planners and business executives, have to take these factors into account. Otherwise, they will most likely face failure of their well-intended and thought-through strategies.

2.1.3. Planning Theory

As the ruling apparatus is nothing more than a large organisation, it might be assumed that at least some forms of organisational planning are applied in order to plan or guide its actions. If so, one could apply the categories of business planning to foreign policy-making. Business or organisational planning follows certain hierarchical procedures. First, the business environment and its inherent trends are analysed, including assumptions regarding the functioning principles of market dynamics. This is quite the same as with the many forecasting projects run by bureaucracies and research institutes. The particularity of the political regime, elite values, etc. may be compared to corporate identity and the corporate value process in enterprises. Then, the strategy-programming-budgeting and executing hierarchy for business-planning can be adapted to foreign policy strategy, policy-development, budgeting, and executive plans. For further details on the application of business-planning methods in policy planning, see Chapter 2.2. Both (multinational) cooperations and state bureaucracies are large structures with a large number of employees, a wide-spread field of activities and services, and the aim to grow and survive over time to come. If strategy is understood as a planned and coordinated approach to power politics and top-management planning a planned and coordinated approach to corporate business, it may be assumed that they share methodological similarities.

2.1.4. Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis

The subject of comparative foreign policy analysis is quite complex. The subject emerged during the behavioural revolution in social sciences, reaching international relations in the

late 60s and early 70s. While comparative politics had already found quantitative, empirical tools for research and analysis (thereby emancipating from the philosophical and legalistic roots of the subject), international politics was still confined to qualitative and rather normative debates of scholars of the traditional schools of international relations. In order to emancipate themselves from the theorist or traditionalist camp, the behaviourists tried to adapt these quantitative and comparative methods to the field of foreign policy.41

The original drive was to increase the $n$ of certain phenomena to be investigated. Therefore, phenomena of distinctive common properties were categorised in order to discover where this phenomena would occur, interact or correlate with other phenomena.42 The school, however quickly lost its methodological strictness and, by using qualitative comparisons, it was soon (ab)used to designate all sorts of case studies, even single-case studies. Such arbitrary usage is quite against the meaning of the method, as many parallel cases should increase the level of generalisation and abstraction. “Only by identifying similarities and differences in the external behaviour of more than one national actor can analysis move beyond the particular case to higher levels of generalisations.”43 This is, however, where the difficulty of this particular topic lies. Some aspects of comparative foreign policy are used to detect change in consecutive administrations of one country (methods of comparative foreign policy analysis have influenced the creation of the scheme described in Chapter 2.2.). The thesis will show whether this application can yield useful results.

2.1.5. Does “muddling through” render strategic analysis useless?

All planning may be useless if sudden events challenge the premises and strategic goals a nation or political leadership has. Governments try to forecast the opponents’ moves, but this can never be anticipated for sure. Incomplete or deceptive information about the opponent, incorrect assessment of the others’ preferences, undiscovered capabilities, secret arrangements, etc. usually inhibit perfect situation awareness.

In analogy to the concept of ‘fog of war’44, also the concept of ‘fog of politics’ may be re-
ferred to, meaning general uncertainty of the events to come, the contenders’ actual moves and whether the planned policy would work out. This fog will become even denser if one tries to influence internal structures and communal contenders in other states or territories: even less information, even less knowledge about the reasoning process of the local leaders, the interests of their group, the decisive leaders themselves and the evaluators (who are hardly known), who receive their revenues from sources not known or deliberately hidden, and who have to popularise their policies and rule among a very confined community.

This is why many authors, especially from the post-modernist camp, claim that international relations have become too difficult, too complex and too unpredictable to stick to traditional strategic planning.45 However, one should neither be over-critical of strategic planning nor the explanatory ability of strategic analysis.46 During the period investigated in this thesis, a “near perfect” (in terms of unpredictability, not morally) random event with dramatic consequences happened: 9/11. It was neither planned nor foreseen, and the administration had to react and modify all concepts previously drawn up. However, once they switched to what used to be termed as “primacy” in 1996, the administration did exactly as described in the strategy of primacy.47 Leaders, elites and bureaucracies do not change overnight. They maintain their perception about the functioning principles of the international system, the perception of chances, risks, opportunities, fears and interests. They usually refocus their efforts, shift some priorities and – as usually in a crisis – do more of what they think is good and effective. Coming back to the Bush primacy example, Ross and Posen were indeed effective in predicting the administration’s behaviour, because they had analysed many plans, speeches and papers of representatives of the George H. W. Bush administration, who would later become officials in the George W. Bush administration to describe primacy. Basically, what the administration did after 9/11 was what its key personnel thought that should be done if the United States’ position in the international system is challenged.

Even if a formalised strategic master plan does not exist, the top administrative level will think about the country’s future. “Late at night, when their staffs have left, when the overwhelming demands of daily tasks are barely met, the president and his or her top advisers must wonder anxiously whether new warning lights are blinking, unseen. They need to know, as we all do, what the path ahead might look like, what threats and opportunities are most sig-

nificant, and how the United States can best prepare.\footnote{Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro, “Introduction”, in: Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro (Eds.), To Lead the World, American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, Oxford, 2008, 1-10, p. 2;} There does not need to be a formalised strategy to make politicians think about long-term implications of their actions and the most challenging tasks for the future. Often political socialisation, professional or academic background, elite-perceptions, ideological preferences, and political and bureaucratic advice substitute the formal draft of a grand strategy or contents and deliberations of a long-term planning process. Only because strategic thought is not formalised, it does not mean that it does not exist.

In the end, analysing perceptions, interests, domestic demands and contenders’ behaviour will be a valuable tool for forecasting foreign policy behaviour, even in case of unexpected events and crisis.

In this thesis the scheme is used for the analysis of grand strategy, not for strategic planning on behalf of the United States’ government. A strategic planning circle – if one wants to plan and implement a strategy – would necessarily include a feedback-loop or instruments of strategic controlling, measuring the differences between the actual situation or actual program output and the desired program goals, as well as instruments of strategic early warning to constantly check the premises of the planning process.\footnote{See for these issues: Alexander Fink, “Der strategische Managementprozess im BMLVS, Mit Profilvarianten und Umfeldszenarien zu robusten Strategien”, in: Johann Frank, Johann Pucher (Eds.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2013, Chancen und Grenzen europäischer militärischer Integration, Böhlau, Wien, Köln, Weimar, p.565-585; See also for the U.S. perspective on the issue: Friedrich W. Korkisch, The Political-Military Decisionmaking Process in the USA, Intervention Policy, Theory, Legal and Political Issues, Procedures, Military Considerations, Centre for Foreign and Defense Policy, Santa Barbara, 2008;} However for the analysis of current strategies and the systematisation of evident political communication, routine-programmes, and non-routine actions, the degressions on strategic controlling may be omitted.

### 2.2. A Scheme for Strategy Analysis

The blending of the concept of adaptation, grand strategy debate, comparative foreign policy analysis and general planning theory led to the following scheme for strategic analysis. The following roster is a theoretical compendium of the steps, plans, goals and considerations, which could be part of a grand strategy of any given power. Depending on the state's resources, internal political situation and scope of foreign policy, some or many of the theoretically possible considerations will not be applicable practically. It has to be noted too that, due to the unavailability of internal documents or the closing of Wikileaks, assumptions may have to be made, and, thus, the analysis may be speculative to a certain degree.
As the scheme was developed for the purpose of comparing the grand strategies of different states, its main purpose was to categorise and systematise the various possible contents of such a strategy. The higher the number of states (n) to compare, the easier it is to compare the congruent and diverging features of their respective foreign policies.

2.2.1. The Scheme

The full scheme used for the analysis is displayed as a table in the appendix. Each field covers a possibly relevant issue in a grand-strategy planning process. The table is divided along two axes. The vertical axis is obvious: it follows the planning horizon from the long-term perspective to short-term planning, also including the resolution of planning details. The differences that occur between long-term and short-term planning are due to the difficulties to forecast the status of the respective fields or problems. An immediate problem or situation might be assessed in detail, but has to be dealt with using the existing resources the government has at the state’s disposal. On the other hand, the situation in the far future is hard to predict, but the government might be able to adjust its means and tools to cope with the situation then anticipated by launching respective programmes (developing resources, technology, armed forces, civil services, public agencies, etc.). This means for the planning process that the shorter the planning horizon is, the more the planning process focuses on actions, while the longer the planning horizon, the more the focus shifts towards the development of proper goals and visions. Here the thesis’ understanding of strategy is distinctively different from the contemporary literature in military strategy or security politics. For the latter, strategy is more about means and courses of action, in this thesis “strategy” is more about defining goals and desired end-states. Operationalising this goals in tangible actions and campaigns is the task of tactical and operational planning.

The division into long, medium, and short-term planning, however shall not predetermine a hierarchy among these goals (or at least not a strict one). Challenges and problems on the short-term horizon might well overshadow or overrule long-term plans, especially when they

50 See: Gressel, Die Europäische Ostasienpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, p. 27ff.
threaten key premises like the regime or state survival, core values, etc. On the other hand, concentrating only on achieving immediate gains while disregarding their long-term effects can lead to catastrophic failure, too.

The scheme is not built around generic, presumably “objective” or predetermined national interests, like, for example, geopolitics derives all state interests simply from the geographic position of a country. Very subjective reasons, like the particular interests in terms of power, order, existence and status of the ruling class or the elite fraction governing the country are at the very centre of the analysis. Holsti’s statement that “... some leaders and regimes define those interests in narrow class or clique terms – ‘what is good for me and my friends is good for my country’”\textsuperscript{53} can be taken as a central premise of this work.

And, although this scheme is focused on the foreign policy planning process, there is no natural priority of either foreign or domestic politics. The elites rather judge which front – the internal or external – presents a greater threat or offers more gains to their core interests and then decides to shift priorities to the respective field or instrumentalises one for the other.\textsuperscript{54}

One has to take into consideration that in the current international system the survival and territorial integrity of many states in the system do not seem to be threatened, it is much rather the electoral process in many democracies that poses a greater risk to the power of their political leaders. When analysing foreign policy, the internal policies do not have to be described in depth. One has to take note of the limitations and demands of the internal situation towards the field of foreign policy.

In the following sub-chapters the main topics of the vertical axis will be described. Of course, a complete script for foreign policy planning would also contain a description of evaluation, revision, prognoses, command and control structures, etc. But the aim of this chapter is not to elaborate the actual foreign policy planning process, but to use planning tools and terms for the analysis of the policy itself. So these topics – which are just as or even more important as the plan itself – are not described in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{53} Holsti, \textit{International Politics}, p. 252;

\textsuperscript{54} Of course, the government might misjudge this situation. One should recall that the Soviet Union, although a military superpower, collapsed due to the dissatisfaction of its own population. On the other hand, the wealthy and internally secure French 3\textsuperscript{rd} Republic underestimated the threat of Nazi Germany and was overrun quickly in 1940. See: Randal L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing”, in: \textit{International Security}, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, p. 159-201; Jack L. Snyder, \textit{Myth of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition}, New York, 1991;
"Planning premises mean literally that which goes before, previously set forth, or stated as introductory, postulated, or implied. … Planning premises cut through every part of the planning process. In developing them important choices are required in deciding which premises are applicable, which are most important, which should be studied in depth, and how much resource should be used to define them."\textsuperscript{55} The premises describe the assumed future reality that should be taken into account in the planning process. All relevant developments that are assumed to occur in the specific operational environment are to be described — although not to the greatest detail.\textsuperscript{56} Practically, those premises and trend analyses that governments use for their long-term considerations are often one of the sources available on the open market and, therefore, offer valuable insights into the planning process.\textsuperscript{57}

Then there is another more difficult task to grasp — the norms and values that guide decision-makers and the political elites.\textsuperscript{58} "No one can understand the diplomacy-strategy of a state if one does not know its regime, if one has not studied the philosophy of those who govern it."\textsuperscript{59} For the political class or the evaluators, norms and values are normative premises not to be compromised. They are derived from religious, cultural, ideological, ethic/nationalistic, dynastic norms or from certain convictions concerning the nature of the political system and they influence foreign policy to depart from the path of pure power politics.\textsuperscript{60} Even if the political class would be opportunistic in terms of gaining more power, it still would have to justify its actions to the evaluators\textsuperscript{61} and the mass audience as such. "Politics is a team sport"\textsuperscript{62}, and to keep the other players from quitting, the coach sometimes has to act against his personal convictions. What is more, in foreign policy decision-making there hardly ever is one right and

\textsuperscript{55} Steiner, \textit{Top Management Planning}, p. 199;
\textsuperscript{56} See ibid, p. 199-223. Contrary to the economic field, the assumed future in the field of politics can to a much higher extent be shaped by the actors themselves. This is at least true for the larger actors in the international system, as they not only have a position comparable to an oligopolist, who can act on his own behalf, but they can also set the rules of the game, something that economic actors are hardly capable of.
\textsuperscript{60} “Is it true realism, the one which takes the whole reality into account, which dictates the diplomatic-strategic conduct not to a retouched portrait of what international politics would be if statesmen were wise in their egoism, but want it is with the passions, follies, ideas, and violations of the century.” Raymond Aron, ibid, p. 444.
\textsuperscript{61} See appendix 7.3.4.
\textsuperscript{62} Klaus Faupel, Introduction in International Relations, lecture at the University of Salzburg, repeatedly held from 1972 to 2007, quoted according to the notes of the author in October 2002.
one wrong option, but a bundle of options each with different advantages and drawbacks. Moral adequacy or better domestic justification might be the reason that gives one option the edge over others. Theoretically preferable, but internally insupportable options are to be ruled out.

Finally, all strategies, policies, programmes and actions have to be weighted against the interest of system survival and maintaining the position of power for the ruling personnel. The maintenance of power for themselves and the ruling elite fraction is the top priority for the decision-makers and will not be compromised, if possible. There might be concessions in the form of an evolutionary change in the political system, and, worse, concessions regarding the political geography. But these concessions have to be within certain limits, in order not to endanger the ruling system as such. Losses in these fields usually are to be avoided, even at very high costs. The current conflict in Syria, where the ruling elite is holding on to power with almost every available means, is a prominent example for this rationale.

2.2.2. Long-term or strategic level

“Strategic planning was defined … as the process of deciding the basic mission of a company, the objectives which it seeks to achieve, and the major strategies and policies governing the use of resources at the disposal of the firm to achieve its objectives.”63 The long-term or strategic goals describe the future, desired place or role the unit wants to achieve within its organisational environment, thereby developing a long-term vision of the unit’s own role and mission.64 They are based on the judgements outlined in the premises.65

A methodological characteristic of the long-term or strategic level is that single actions by other players as well as their exact potential and political means cannot be forecast exactly. More important are relative terms, relationships and balances. Prognoses of the developments on economic, military, demographic, technological and other factors will lead to general prognoses of different trends regarding the distribution of wealth, power and patterns of transnational interactions within the international system. As the international standing can only be described in relative terms, the position of the respective state within the global power structure will dominate strategic planning. Not because the international structure is more important per se than anything else, but because it is a helpful abstraction and generalisation, which

63 Steiner, Top Management Planning, p. 237;
65 As an example see: National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future,
combines general trends of elements that can hardly be described in detail. As will be explained later on, other levels will be dominated by very different categories than the general system structure.

The basic aim of the long-term planning process is the elaboration of strategic goals. As mentioned above, the long-term planning process concentrates on goals and aims, while for short-term planning, the goals are fixed, but their achievement and execution is the challenge. The strategic goals determine how the organisation can fulfill its central mission under the perceived environmental conditions. The question remains up to which detail the conditions should be elaborated. Again, the position of the state in the international structure may be regarded as a focal point. First, because many considerations about the own mission and the central self-understanding of states are derived not from foreign policy, but from internal policy and internal factors, such as ideology, religion, tradition, etc. When it comes to foreign policy, the focus will be in how far the central values may be expanded, promoted, preserved or defended. And more precise goals regarding means and capabilities will orient themselves rather towards these relationships than the other way round. The only exception may be political geography, which in many cases involves central struggles about identity and central values – at least at a general, abstract level. As the U.S. is an established state with undisputed borders and no further territorial claims, political geography may be disregarded in this case.

Another important category concerning especially world powers is the question of international order or the goals connected with it. In general, states seek to legalise whatever gains they make within the international structure, for example political geography, influence or power, military and transnational structures. In practise, the structure is changed first, then the international order is debated according to the structural changes accomplished. Nevertheless,

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especially great powers often feel compelled to change the international order in a – sometimes more evolutionary – way that is articulated frequently. They try to adopt certain rules and norms according to their needs or to change certain procedures, especially when new problems emerge or the gap between order and structure grows over time. On the long-term level, however, not every small amendment has to be taken into account, but rather the general visions regarding the further development of the international order as such and the modus operandi, the functioning principles, of the international order.

In the end, strategies may be outlined as safe paths towards the achievement of strategic goals. However, the goals remain the important element, while planning at the strategic level and the strategies themselves constitute rather vague guidelines towards them.

2.2.3. Mid-term Planning

In mid-term planning, the strategic goals will be interpreted – which means adding goals for all or most political categories, assumed effects, risks, conditions, allies, etc. On this level, means and actions can be anticipated with a much higher probability, so that a lot of pondering may be invested into developing different causes of actions, alliances, policies, etc. It is also on this level that the development programmes for the means of foreign policy are developed. While on the strategic level, technological progress and innovation, for example, are grasped on a very abstract level, in mid-term planning they are very much operationalised in R&D programmes or armament programmes. This is why most of the applied literature on strategy or grand strategy falls rather into the area of policy description, as it foremost discusses the allocation of means and guidelines for the application of military force, the deployment of military assets in peacetime and crisis, and possible goals for military operations, etc. The position to achieve in the international system or the desired change or defence of the international order – in short the strategic goals – are presupposed. However, as mentioned above, those long-term goals are not to be taken for granted and should be debated at greater length.

Mid-term planning is generally referred to as policy planning or programme planning. In

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72 See: Steiner, Top Management Planning, p. 264ff.
every policy field, programmes are set up, in which certain resources are allocated to certain tasks and which provide guidelines and timelines for the fields in question. However, policies and programmes are not elaborated in detail (yet), primarily because the budget is laid down for one year only. The programmes are only intentions of allocating funds to the specific projects over the year. Much remains to be done in the more detailed short-term or operational planning, which then describes how to spend the actual amount of money allocated for the programme each years to come.73 They rather describe the framework for the further operations in the field, both routine and non-routine. Policy fields do not necessarily have to be identical with administrative structures. Some policies will affect several ministries, providing an overlapping plan to coordinate administrative resources of several ministries towards a certain goal, defined on the strategic level.74 This means that the mid-term planning is usually done on governmental level. Although usually one ministry takes the lead in planning and policy conceptions, at this level each policy framework has to be coordinated with the other portfolios, and the government as such has to decide priorities, overlapping goals, procedures and inter-ministerial coordination among the policies. While the short-term level (operational planning) might be left to the bureaucrats, this is a governmental challenge.

There are two types of policies – active and reactive ones.75 Active policies are immediately executed to achieve a certain goal or condition, to acquire certain means or goods to influence other actors, like for example aid programmes, scientific research programmes or military assistance programmes. The government makes an effort to achieve its goals without waiting for external incentives. Reactive policies, on the other hand, set guidelines, goals and principles to act upon if a certain event occurs. The policy for a ‘non-first use’ of nuclear weapons, for example, is such a reactive policy. It defines the reaction of the state in the case of a certain action of others – in this case the use of nuclear weapons – and the consequences for the allocation and structure of own means. In this case this would include the force structure of the own nuclear weapons and probably setting goals or criteria for the development of further second-strike capable weapons systems.

2.2.4. Short-term Planning

The task of short-term planning is to guide the actual implementation of the goals, policies and programmes outlined before. This is about the executive actions that (should) implement

73 Wild, *Grundlagen der Unternehmungsplanung*, p. 162;
74 See: Jann, *Kategorien der Policy Forschung*, p. 26;
75 reaktionssteuernde und handlungsanleitenden Policies; Windhoff-Heritier, *Policy-Analyse*, p. 35-41;
whatever has been drafted previously. These acts may be divided into two categories: routine and non-routine operations: routine operations are constantly reproduced according to plans, orders, laws and guidelines, while non-routine operations are uniquely implemented. In general, due to the anarchic nature of international relations, routine actions play a rather minor role in foreign policy as compared to domestic politics, and a rather minor role in high politics as compared to low politics. Yet, while routine actions are not that spectacular, they dominate the daily life of the foreign bureaucracy.

All inter and transnational actions are subject to the other states’ policies, which might manipulate them consistent with their interests. Even set rules and orders may be questioned, interpreted in accordance with one’s own interests, sometimes unilaterally changed or ignored. Hence, even routine procedures sometimes have to be backed, supervised or reinforced by non-routine actions. This is why the scheme portrayed above concentrates more on non-routine actions.

Generally, in short-term planning, a certain goal has to be achieved with certain means. Strategic planning is more or less about the overarching goals and the development of one’s own executive apparatus, which is one of the main focuses of mid-term planning, while these categories are both predetermined on the short-term level. The available means have to be used and the goals are already clear. However, proper implementation requires skills and knowledge, especially in demanding operations, such as military ones, and this level should for no sake be disregarded. Indeed, as many events are hardly predictable, reacting, improvising and acting within the short-term framework is not only the politicians’ daily business, but can, if done skilfully, open opportunities on the mid to long-term level that had not been anticipated!

2.2.5. Timelines

Now there is the question, which timelines may be set for the different levels. For how long does short, medium and long-term planning eventually plan ahead? First, as mentioned above, the aim of this thesis is not to provide the tools for real-time foreign policy-planning, but to use planning tools and methods for analysis. Therefore, this question is not considered as very important. In order for a certain document to qualify as strategy, policy, programme or short-term plan, qualitative criteria – which scope, objective, etc. it covers – are far more important than the time it is meant to be valid for. Nevertheless, some crude timelines may be given,

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77 Ibid., p. 33;
mainly because administrative and/or political processes usually are conducted along a certain
schedule that predetermines the deadlines for the planning process.

Most of the short-term planning is done within a budget year. As short-term planning operates
with well-defined resources, the budgetary legislation regulates just that, thereby setting the
planning horizon. Of course, short-term planning is not restricted to the one-year timeframe,
as some programmes have their respective budgets and means allocated for a longer time-
frame, and some executive operations simply take considerably longer. As a general assump-
tion, one to three years can be applied to short-term planning.

Mid-term planning is more difficult to define. In democracies, the electoral period (4 to 7
years, depending on the system) sets certain limits towards the horizon of governments. But if
the government has sufficient self-confidence concerning the next elections, their planning
may well exceed this timeline. Communist countries used to draft 5-Years Plans to develop
their economy. The Quadrennial Defence Review in the U.S. sets the goals for the develop-
ment of the armed forces, military R&D and procurement, and is revised every four years.78

All these papers are typical mid-term plans. Concerning programmes, in few fields, such as
defence, space exploration, energy development and some other fields of applied science, pro-
grammes are planned to exceed this timeframe from the beginning. So the frame of about four
to eight years may be set for mid-term planning.

Beyond this, it is all about long-term goals, the own core mission, long-term forecasts and
normative premises. Saying that actual strategy is hardly written down in government papers,
simply because it is beyond the calculable term in power for most elected governments, which
of course require competitive elections – unlike fixed ones, such as in Zimbabwe or Russia.

As mentioned before, informal institutions, such as common education or career paths, trad-
tion, elite consensus and so forth, often play a bigger role in formulating strategy, setting stra-
tegic goals and fostering strategic thinking, than formalised, bureaucratic bodies and proced-
ures do. Individual socialisation in the ruling elite and political socialisation of communal
groups within the political system are key in fostering premises, values and collective long-
term goals.

2.2.6. Applied and codification levels

So far, the categories of the analytical level have been explained, but the applied and codifica-

78 See for the latest version: Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010, download in Feb
2011 at: www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf;
tion levels have not yet been touched upon. The analytical level describes the different cat-
egories that could be applied or filled in an actual planning process if a planning process were conceptually comprehensive. The practical goals, programs, means, measures, etc., which are relevant for the government and would apply to this abstract category, establish the applied level. Of course, not all categories that are theoretically possible are practically relevant. Considering this, the U.S. does not have to worry about its territorial stock, while for other states the quest for territorial integrity is of immediate and existential importance.

Furthermore, a state or government will not openly speak about all goals, aims and means it considers or has at its disposal. For many topics, Leon Gambetta’s motto of “always think about it, never speak about it”\(^79\) is the main modus operandi: Did North Korea ever talk about a nuclear weapon before exploding one? Does Iran speak of one today? Did Bush reveal all reasons to go into Iraq, or did Chirac comment, why he was against it? Probably not! There are sensitive, but vital questions that are not officially articulated, although they play a central role in the future planning perspective of a state entity. Usually they are disguised as another topic or discussed with a different vocabulary. The Fatah does not openly raise the question of the extinction of Israel, but well raises the ‘refugee question’ – implying its extinction. Putin never speaks about Russian territorial expansionism, but rather about the defence of Russian citizens abroad.\(^80\) One purpose of the diplomatic language is to influence and convince the audience, not to correctly inform it.\(^81\) That is why the codification level describes the pseudo-debates that are waged around other, more sensitive topics.

2.2.7. *U.S. foreign policy documents in accordance with the scheme*

The final step is to clarify, where the published official documents of the United States’ government would fit into the scheme. As pointed out previously, the analysis must not rely on the mere reproduction of political communication. Nevertheless, even if incomplete or sometimes codified, these documents give some hints on the leaders’ thoughts and intended cause of actions. Generally, at least compared to other great powers, the U.S. is quite open and frank on what it wants and what it would like to do. A vivid media landscape, competing branches

\(^80\) Russian Federation: The State Duma expands the president’s powers to use troops abroad, Osrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Centre for Eastern Studies Online, 28 October 2009;  
\(^81\) See: Klaus Faupel, “Dimensionen der Souveränität”, in: Michael Take (Ed.), *Politik als Wissenschaft, Festschrift für Wilfried Röhrich zum 70. Geburtstag*, Berlin, p. 188;
of the bureaucracy, which leak a great amount of information to discredit their bureaucrat
competitors, and an independent and well suited legislative branch have led to a (relatively)
high transparency in U.S. foreign policy.

The National Security Strategy,82 drafted every four years by the White House, formally is the
highest guideline to U.S. Foreign Policy. Indeed, many remarks about the development of the
international system, the role of the United States within this system and some remarks on the
desired future path of foreign policy are found within these documents. Of course, a consider-
able amount of words is spent on motivational, communicative and legitimatory tasks, ex-
plaining and justifying U.S. foreign policy, or as in the 2010 National Security Strategy, to
clearly distinguish the new administration from the old one. In 2002 much attention was given
to the upcoming war in Iraq, a relatively narrow goal. However, the National Security
Strategy can be treated as a strategic document, in view of its limitations.

The other very interesting document that in some parts touches the strategic level is the Quad-
rennial Defence Review Report (QDR),83 drafted by the Secretary of Defence in coordination
with the Joint Chief of Staff. The document contains – or contained – some useful remarks on
how the U.S. military should prepare to underpin the global role of the United States during
the next decades, thereby leaving some valuable notes on the key roles and goals set out for
the nation. However, the long-term content in the QDR has declined steadily since 2001, and
the key role of the paper is classical mid-term policy and programme planning: setting the
goals regarding the structure, mission and equipment of the armed forces, predominantly for
the next four years.

The National Defence Strategy,84 drafted by the Secretary of Defence, is also a mid-term doc-
ument, quite in the same range as the QDR. The Nuclear Posture Review, the Missile Defence
Review and the National Space Policy are set to supplement the QDR and the Defence

82 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, download at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; The White House,
National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, download at:
House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, download at:
Unfortunately, the 2002 and 2006 NSS are not available for download at U.S. governmental sites since President
Obama took office. Therefore, they have to be accessed at other websites, which are more frequently changed.
83 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010; Department of Defense, Quadrennial
Defense Review 2006, download at: www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf; Department of Defense,
84 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2008, download at:

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Strategy in specific policy fields.\textsuperscript{85} The National Military Strategy\textsuperscript{86} drafted by the Joint Chief of Staff, on the short-term level, then outlines the missions for the different branches of the armed forces.

But the security-apparatus is not the only entity publishing reports, the State Department is equally busy. During the Bush era, the “Strategic Plan” outlined predominantly policy goals and listed the policies to be developed.\textsuperscript{87} With the slogan of transitional diplomacy, the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice intended to refocus the department’s policies and programmes,\textsuperscript{88} tying programmes to certain performance goals and measuring success. Unfortunately, these documents have been removed from the department’s website after the change of administration.\textsuperscript{89} During the Obama administration, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report was introduced as main (mid-term) foreign policy planning document,\textsuperscript{90} replacing the strategic plan.

Despite the relatively large number of official documents and papers, many topics outlined in the scheme above are treated rather informally. This does not necessarily imply in-transparency of the system, nor genuine obscurity of the foreign policy process. Not all topics considered by executives and top administrative personnel need to be formalised. Elite consensus, political socialisation, common educational roots, shared belief systems, etc. influence the planning of politicians and their preferences, especially concerning premises and the long-term or strategic vision of the country. One should not underestimate such informal agreements. Documents and papers serve for communication and motivation (to a much lesser extent information). They communicate to the own public and the audience abroad, how the administration views the state of realm and what it wants to achieve. And it should communicate


\textsuperscript{89} The only document available is a printout from: Department of State, Performance Section, Transformational Diplomacy; However, the original report contained more parts.

to the different branches of bureaucracy and its own population that succeed in accomplishing certain goals is feasible. However, if there is a general consensus on certain issues, i.e. where to deploy or what is the nature of the own mission, there is no need to communicate this.\textsuperscript{91} France has a highly centralised education system, through which it educates the top bureaucracy and political elites (elite administrative schools like ENA or Sciences-Po) about the French mission and the French outlook on foreign policy. There is no need to philosophise about this at a later stage.

Likewise, in the U.S., there is a broad consensus on what the U.S.’ place in the world should be, what the important American values are and what the world order should be like. Apart from the premises derived from a more general debate, the U.S. perception of the international environment can also be discussed with some references on the general academic discussion on international relations in the U.S. Apart from classified information and short-term bureaucratic decisions, they confront the same problems with a (sometimes) similar mindset and similar sets of information, as the acting administration may do. Equally, quality newspapers have good access to the administrative elites, often quoting officials’ private opinions under the conditions of anonymity. The openness in the U.S. strategic debate greatly facilitates analysis.

\section*{2.3. Chapter Conclusions}

Since the advent of political science as a field of research, the prediction and analysis of countries’ foreign policies was one of the major issues of research. In the previous chapter, only those theoretical and methodological strands were explained that directly influenced the analytical scheme displayed in the appendix (chapter 7.1.): Rosenau’s concept of adaptation, the grand-strategy debate, planning theory and comparative foreign policy analysis.

Of these, planning-theory or the application of top-management planning concepts for foreign-policy analyses had the biggest impact on the analytical tools used and the structure of the thesis. Both large corporations and state bureaucracies are fairly large organisations with different branches to coordinate, a broad field of operations and a certain interest at least to survive for the time being in their respective operational environment – if not to grow and dominate it. To tools and methods of top-management planning may easily applied in foreign

\textsuperscript{91} Again this does not imply that U.S. governmental documents are generally misleading or deceptive. Compared to other governments, the United States (particularly under George W. Bush) are relatively open and transparent. But everything is relative, and therefore all governmental publication and communication needs to be critically evaluated, interpreted, missing parts supplemented and conflicting statements put into perspectives.
policy.
For the purpose of foreign-policy analysis, the planning-scheme provides a framework to cat-
egorise, systematise and structure foreign-policy concepts, published documents as well as
tangible actions committed by the administration. It also provides a heuristic help to search
for missing parts in declared policies, to recollect a more comprehensive picture of the stock
of foreign-policy actions, policies and programs or to put a single issue into broader perspect-
ive. At the end of this thesis, the scheme will be used to quantifier the amount of change
between the two administrations.
Concerning the terminology and the underlying premises of the scheme, the thesis departs
from the mainstream grand strategy debate in several ways. First it defines strategy in a much
narrower way than usual in the strategic debate. Strategy in terms of the thesis are long-term
goals and general (long-term) guidelines how the respective entity wants to reach its desired
place in its respective environment. It focuses on designed end-states and goals, while the
guidelines for actions are rather vague, leaving much to more tangible mid- and short-term
planning.
Second, the often assumed primacy of foreign-policy is questioned. Leaders have to judge, on
which “front” their political power really is at stake: in domestic or in foreign politics. In most
cases, electoral processes or domestic resistance pose a greater threat to the ruling elites’
power than foreign threats. Of course this is to a large extent a sign of the great stability en-
joyed under the “pax-Americana” in the early 21st century. Therefore on several occasions,
domestic issues have to be taken into account.
3. The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy

The following chapter will treat the Bush administration’s foreign policy concepts as they were planned or perceived, and what has become of them. Generally, the Bush administration has been criticized for its foreign policy outcome in the public debate. “In the past few years, book after book has appeared discussing the shortsightedness and ineptitude of the administration’s actions in Iraq. So vast is this literature and so focused has been the administration’s defence of its actions in Iraq that most of us have lost sight of the larger issues of international security.”92 This chapter tries to judge the Bush administration as little as possible, rather trying to describe what it tried to achieve and why. Still, it is hard to bring into one’s mind the situation the U.S. of 2000/01. Ten years after the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, the American-style capitalist economic system and liberal democracy seemed to be the undisputed winners: the U.S. enjoyed a budget surplus, the economy and the stock market were booming - in what later was referred to as the ‘dot-com-bubble’ - and the U.S. military emerged as the winner of the Gulf and the Balkan Wars, impressively ahead of all other competitors. The question was how the ‘unipolar moment’ could be preserved or what should be done at that moment.93

3.1. Premises

According to the scheme outlined in Chapter 2.2., premises and the forecast on the international environment shape further decisions and preferences. As both are quite informally agreed and passed on, this part has to include some wider considerations on the international system.

3.1.1. Specific demands among the ruling elites

When debating U.S. foreign policy, the aspects of values in foreign policy will pop up rather sooner than later. There is even a whole school in international relations devoted to diminishing the role of values and normative settings in international relations,94 so there must be some

92 Leffer, Legro, “Introduction”, p. 3;
94 For the realist school see: Realism, in: Griffiths, O’Callaghan, International Relations, the Key Concepts, p.
record of normatively motivated decisions. As mentioned in the introduction, this is not a hermeneutic thesis, so the author does not intend to “understand” — in a hermeneutic way — American decision makers. Therefore it is quite irrelevant, how the aspiration to lead the world is justified or thought to be justified in the United States. It matters that there is an aspiration for global leadership. Concerning the ideological foundation of American foreign-policy thinking an elaborated stock of literature exists. The interesting part for this thesis is when and where normative settings or ideological affiliations lead to preferred policy choices?

Recollecting the literature quoted above, the first premise is that the U.S. is seen as the power to lead the world. There are different ideological roots and interpretation of this leadership role, but at the end no elite faction would support any kind of foreign policy that would depart from the role-model of a global lead-nation. This is both true for the Bush as well as for the Obama-administration. However conceivable differences exist on how this leadership role is to be exercised.

The spread of democracy and democratisation is, of course, at the core of the normative debate within the United States. Every U.S. administration after the Cold War was somehow judged as spreading democratisation, and interestingly enough, every administration was criticised by the following one for doing things wrong. Clinton was criticised by the Neo-conservatives for tying down U.S. capabilities in protracted nation-building operations in rather unimportant theatres. And the Bush administration was criticised by Obama for doing it by force in Iraq. And, surprisingly, every new administration somehow promised to diminish the role of the ‘democratic mission’ in their future foreign policy, but ended up justifying its foreign policy agenda with the argument of spreading democracy and human rights. The democracy and constitutionalism are the core pillars of the American identity. But there are

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contradictory propositions whether the United States should spread democracy and human rights in other societies. Until 1945, isolationist and, subsequently, realist politicians and authors challenged the assumption that this could be done easily or should be done at all. Liberal, internationalist, and neo-conservative forces argue that this should be the primary task of U.S. foreign policy. Hence, in circles of ambition the democratic mission of the United States often served as impetus for action abroad, while its applicability in other societies was rather criticised in circles of restraint.101

The Bush administration’s perception of this topic was contradictory and blurred from the start. In a now famous Foreign Affairs article, the designated National Security Adviser Con­doleezza Rice not only pointed out that the United States should refrain from adventurous nation-building operations, but also stayed remarkably calm in promoting democracy. Although defining American values as universal, she advised not to make them a policy agenda, particularly not towards China.102 “George W. Bush ... by criticizing Clinton’s foreign policy as overzealous – and as it turns out, ironically, especially for doing too much nation building. The Republican candidate called for the United States to scale back its goals and concentrate on reinvigorating its traditional Cold War alliances.”103

In Bush’s first year, there was no intention of adding the spreading of democracy to the political agenda. Indeed, with the first foreign policy crisis of the Bush era, a collision of a U.S. intelligence-gathering plane with a Chinese interceptor in the South China Sea, the administration resolved the issue without showing any interest of somehow criticising China normatively.104

After 9/11 things started to change, although gradually. In the immediate discussions on Afghanistan and Iraq, democratisation played a role, but not a very dominating one. Afghanistan was about the defeat of the Taliban – few questions were asked, such as who the Northern Alliance was and how it should govern the country once victory had been achieved.105 In the debate on the War in Iraq, the spread of democratic values appeared for the first time. Achieving a democratic transition of the country and transforming the entire region was one goal perceived in the Iraq War of 2003.106 But that was one cause among others, and preventing Saddam Hussein from producing WMDs, deterring other states from acquiring WMDs and end-

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101 See: Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 31-70;
102 Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 49, p. 55ff;
103 John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design”, in: The National Interest, No. 111, Jan./Feb. 2011, 16-34, p. 20;
105 Ibid.;
106 In der Demokratisierungs-Falle, Die USA sind im Irak gefangen – wenn sie die Macht abgeben, provozieren sie das Chaos, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, 19 February 2004; Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design”, p. 21;
ing the support of terrorist organisations by the Iraqi regime were the other issues that were discussed and promoted much more than democratisation itself.\textsuperscript{107}

Only after these issues proved to be wrong or not feasible and the cause of the war situation in both countries deteriorated – or when all previous plans for the post-war period did not work at all –, the debate on democracy was submitted to a restart.\textsuperscript{108} It was used to justify the ongoing wars and the U.S. intended to show American support for democratic movements around the world.\textsuperscript{109}

Promoting democratic values is not only one of the core premises – or the core premise – in American foreign policy. Every U.S. administration will have to justify its actions at home from the angle of promoting democracy. “Making the world over in America’s image”,\textsuperscript{110} as Mearsheimer defined one of the goals of primacy, seems to be a basic instinct in American foreign policy. It is tuned into a practical concept if all other strategies run dead or previous concepts of foreign policy are obviously wrong or lost legitimacy. Promoting democratic values is the classic fallback concept for U.S. foreign policy explanation. But it will be executed very selectively, and usually other strategic or economic interests and opportunities determine if the democracy-promoting option will be realised or not. The Obama administration will not be an exception to this rule!

Debating the Bush administration’s foreign policy, the issue of ‘Christian’ values and neo-conservativism – although hardly ever debated without prejudices – can hardly be avoided. Especially among the European left, the Bush administration is depicted as Christian fundamentalist, waging crusades against Muslims, ideologically preferring Israel in the Middle-East policy and trying to spread the Christian values all across the world.\textsuperscript{111}

While it is quite obvious that normative concepts had a strong impact on Bush’s foreign policy, there is little to no evidence of Christian fundamentalism. While the Islamist roots of Al-Qa’ida cannot be denied, the rules, norms and programmes for police cooperation and

against terrorist recruitment and financing are directed against all kinds of terrorist organisa-
tions. Several Muslim countries were effectively regarded as key allies in this struggle, al-
though, like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, they had a distinct Islamist political agenda or political
culture. In Turkey, the U.S. even showed support for the Islamist AKP government, which
broke the power of the Western-minded, secular military-administrative establishment. Is-
rael and the U.S. had been close allies since the early 70s. There has been little change in the
U.S. policy towards Israel. However, during the Bush period, rather conservative and nation-
ist governments were in charge in Israel, and they were not as enthusiastic about engaging
in peace talks, as the governments of Rabin and Barak had been, with whom Clinton could
cooperate. And indeed, during Netanjahu’s first term in the 90s, the peace process was at the
same standstill as later. Back then, there was a Democrat in the White House.
If the Bush administration was influenced by missionary thoughts, then they were centred on
genuine American values: democracy, open societies, competitive free markets and free entre-
preneurship. “Powerful secular trends are moving the world towards economic openness and
– more unevenly – democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train
and the other off. Some states still hope to find a way to uncouple democracy and economic
progress. Some hold on to the old hatreds as divisions from the modernising task at hands.
But the United States and its allies are on the right side of history.” American triumphal-
ism’ suggested that there was only one way of modernising and developing – at least in the
long run – and that was adopting an open, capitalist economy, free trade and, ultimately,
democracy. All other paths or policies were regarded as deceptions of local leaders to keep
their grip on power. Once these obstacles were removed, society would unfold its powers to-
ward democracy and modernisation. Now, one might argue that especially the more experi-
enced members of the administration knew better – and they probably did – but American tri-
umphalism was very popular with the rear echelons of the Republican Party and larger parts
of the political establishment.
As discussed later, the Bush administration certainly overestimated the attractiveness and uni-
versality of American norms, values and political practises, the eagerness of other people to

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112 See: Daniel Byman, “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism”, in: Survival, Vol. 74, No. 4, Winter 2005/06, p. 117-
144;
113 See: Vahap Polat, “Die Türkei unter Erdogan”, in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), Zur Außen- und Innenpolitik der Türkei,
Schriftenreihe des Internationalen Instituts für Liberele Politik Wien, November 2010, p. 23-43;
114 For the political development in Israel and Bush’s failed attempts to revitalize the Middle-East peace process:
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Utopianism vs Realism, in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Strategic Survey 2002/3, p. 173-186; and: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Fin de Siècle? in: The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/4, An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs, Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2004, p. 172-183;
115 Rice, “Promoting the national Interest”, p. 46;
adopt them and the problem-solving capacity of simply implementing American-style systems of order in other parts of the world. American triumphalism was omnipresent in the Bush era strategic documents, which, in conjunction with a strong belief in victory, had a considerable influence on what burdens the administration thought could be shouldered by the United States. However, one should not overestimate the religious dimension of this triumphalism: in all the secular fields and sciences (for example in economics, where market-oriented reforms were embraced, the military field, where the ‘revolution in military’ affairs dominated the publications, or various models of democratic peace, etc.) there were some major elements of this triumphalism. It was almost inevitable that – the one way or the other – the new American administration would endorse some of these ideas.

3.1.2. Premises: Perception of the development of the international environment

Apart from values, the secular trends of the development of the international systems are taken into consideration on various levels of foreign policy. At the beginning of the Bush administration’s first term, the ‘unipolar moment’\(^ {116}\), in which the United States enjoyed a considerable power gap vis-à-vis all other possibly contending powers in the international system, was at its height.\(^ {117}\) Then, it seemed that this mixed unicentrist moment was still to last, and for many, including the Bush administration, there was some thought whether this unicentrist state of the system was not just a moment, but the beginning of a new epoch. “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. … Today, the United States enjoys a position of unpar-


\(^{117}\) The unipolar moment did not mean that there were no other power centres or even contenders at all, just that the power-gap between the U.S. and the contenders meant that they had no chance to openly challenge the U.S. or even try to spoil U.S. action in third countries. Other power centres like Europe or Japan were allied to the U.S. and would accept the U.S. as benevolent hegemon. Sharing similar interests and normative preferences many of the then developed democracies would choose a balancing behaviour, even if suggested so by structural realists, because this balancing would not serve their interest. However there was an intense debate amongst scholars on whether the U.S. should act cautiously to not lose support from the other democracies or whether the U.S. could act even unilaterally to achieve certain changes in the international system, because the others would accept these changes. For the debate on structural determination of interests, primacy, polarity and the acceptance of U.S. leadership see: Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”, p. 5-56; Van Erera, “Primed for Peace”, p. 7-57; Jervis, “The Future of World Politics”, p. 39-73; Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War?”, p. 5-43; Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”, p. 5-51; Jervis, “International Primacy”, p. 52-67; Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters”, p. 68-83; Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, p. 44-79; Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry”, p. 5-33; Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability”, p. 34-77; Waltz, “Structural Realism after Cold War”, p. 5-41;
alled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage." 118

The sense of triumphalism was still present in the political thinking of the then elites. The superiority of the victorious liberal Western thought and especially democracy seemed to be self-evident. The above quote shows that the administration did not believe that the tide of westernisation and democratisation would turn soon: “Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order.” 119 Whether this democratic triumphalism was actually believed may be called into question. In the Report Mapping the Global Future, 120 the National Intelligence Council portrays a rather different world: in the coming decades, other nations, predominantly China, will rise and even economically surpass the United States. Then, they can challenge the current order and overcome American leadership. 121 “The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players – similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century – will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries.” 122 If the United States does not prepare for the time of hegemonic transition, the outcome, as shown by history, might be devastating. The NIC had little illusions, whether the new rising power would support and uphold the old American-led world order 123 or even develop towards democracy. The trend of democratisation will be halted or even reversed in some parts of the world, especially in the Russian hemisphere. 124 The U.S. – although it will probably still be the predominant power in 2020 – will face growing difficulties and hardship in acting as a global hegemon.

Moreover, aspirations by regional states to achieve local or regional hegemony were undeni-

119 Ibid, p. IV;
120 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future;
121 Ibid., p. 47ff;
122 Ibid., p. 47;
123 For a similar judgment see: “Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the ‘strategic partner’ the Clinton administration once called it.” Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 56;
124 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, p. 73;
able. If China or Russia realised their confined hegemonic aspirations, as well as support the other regional powers’ aspirations to get access to other regions for themselves, their rise might have destabilising consequences around the globe. As a result, the world over the next decades would be transformed from a uni-centrist to a poly-centrist world with revisionist tendencies in global powers (China) and regional powers (Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Venezuela and others). But the American considerations – at least at that time – gave few clues as to how these actors would challenge the U.S. and what different kind of order they would try to enforce. The considerations whether these states would adopt a revisionist agenda in the future was – to a large extent – based on their regime type as well as structural considerations.

Interestingly enough, the NIC project places heavy emphasis on a growing energy demand and distribution, when assessing great-power politics and possible frictions among great powers. This observation is not unfounded: energy resources, especially oil, are not only fundamentals of economic growth and social well-being, they are necessary to wage great-power wars or hegemonic wars. Gaining exclusive access to a certain region – the Middle East – and having the possibility to control its resources may facilitate or make impossible the contender’s options to wage a new hegemonic war. This was consistent with the 90s estimations on strategies of primacy. For their advocates: “... outside of the Persian Gulf, most conflicts in what was once referred to as the Third World will be of little concern.” It was not that the United States itself was so much dependent on Middle-East oil, but other powers, most notably China, were. Combining this with the moment of unipolarity just leads to the consideration of acting unilaterally in order to turn the tide in the Middle East to one’s favour: removing the regimes hostile towards the U.S. and installing a range of like-minded regimes, so that in the future revisionists will fall short of their plans simply for the lack of energy.

Of course, it may be contested that the U.S. leadership perceived the international environment that way. The NIC is not part of the government, but it must be assumed that the government would certainly pay attention to the advice of the intelligence community, and the Mapping the Global Future programme, terminated in 2004, was commissioned by the government, prior to the great decisions in 2003. Moreover, as such reports are not part of the official political communication, they do not have to take into account domestic debates (appealing to

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126 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, p. 59-63;
127 For the concept of hegemonic wars see: Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 9-49, p. 186-210;
the own electorate) and the question of international communication (appealing to allies and signalling intended behaviour to foes). Of course, the matters of grand strategy should never be reduced to oil alone, but considerations like these are very likely to come up when the question is raised as to how the unipolar moment should be seized best. A rising China was the major concern for the campaigning Bush in 2000\textsuperscript{130} and the change of the status quo in the Middle East was contemplated even before 9/11.\textsuperscript{131} When Cheney was Secretary of Defence in 1992, a Defence Planning Guidance was leaked to the press, which placed the concern over the emergence of another rival at the centre of all strategic considerations: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration … and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. … Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.”\textsuperscript{132} So there are reasons to assume that the Bush administration – despite the American triumphalism displayed in official communications – was quite aware that the unipolar moment was passing by sooner or later and that, at that moment, they had to lay the foundations for American leadership to survive. However, as explained below, they quite underestimated the resistance they would meet and the amount of resources needed to achieve these goals.

It is acknowledged that after 9/11 the Bush administration did rather not think in terms of restraint and strategic prudence.\textsuperscript{133} But the attacks also led to the re-evaluation of Islamist revisionism\textsuperscript{134} as a threat to the United States of America.\textsuperscript{135} While the strategic debate usually was focused on structural considerations, then ideological differences to Islamist thought and principles of the political and the social order were the primary concern. Now the United States, and particularly the Bush administration, was aware on what kind of different order a revisionist party might tend to implement. And, as discussed later on, the administration took

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 54-57;
\item \textsuperscript{131} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2002/3}, p. 174-175;
\item \textsuperscript{133} Alin, Jones, \textit{Weary Policeman}, p. 56-57;
\end{itemize}
into consideration which states or regimes rather supported or rather opposed this kind of re-

visionism.

3.2. Strategic Goals and the Strategy of Primacy

The choice to go to Iraq and the concept of pre-emptive war are associated with the Bush ad-

ministration like no other political decision taken by the president and is usually attached to

‘primacy’ as a strategic concept. However, whether the Bush administration stumbled into this

after 9/11 or whether 9/11 just provided a reason for mass mobilisation to carry out the

strategy of primacy that was developed before is a question of minor importance.

The fact is that, after the ‘global war on terror’ had been declared, the Bush administration did

expand the U.S. role and direct engagement in world politics dramatically – not only by

means of the military. The U.S. claim to lead the world and to change the world – if necessary

by force – was articulated clearly. Calling the Bush doctrine\textsuperscript{136} a strategy of primacy will prob-

ably go uncontested. However, when critics and commentators of the Bush doctrine focus on

the concept of preemption, the spread of democracy by force and the military engagement of

states that presumably proliferate weapons of mass destruction, they not only fall short on

capturing the whole strategy, but they also discuss some principles or slogans that were hardly

executed: beside Iraq, where the military confrontation was ongoing since 1990, there was no

preemptive engagement in any other country, despite some other countries pursuing a very

pronounced anti-American foreign policy, such as Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Cuba, Syria,

and Bolivia. In no other country except Iraq, democracy was spread by force. Even in those

countries that democratised during Bush’s term of office, the role of the U.S. in preparing this

democratisation (not applauding once that happened) may be contested. And although Iran

considerably boosted its nuclear ambitions and North Korea actually became a nuclear power
during Bush’s term in the White House, neither these states nor those supplying them with

missiles and nuclear material, i.e. Russia and China\textsuperscript{137}, came under attack or were confronted

with any military pressure. Therefore, the author tries to capture the Bush strategy beyond

preventiveness.

\textsuperscript{136} For a very brief description of the Bush doctrine see the introduction to: Leffler, Legro, \textit{To Lead the World, American Strategy after the Bush-Doctrine}, p. 2-4.

3.2.1. The strategy of primacy – structural goals

As mentioned before, the strategy of primacy makes particular use of the unipolar moment to set the conditions and create facts in order to prevent any other power from challenging the status quo and the American leadership in particular. “Unipolarity” is seen as more than just a short window of opportunity or occasional comfort enjoyed after the end of Cold War. What is more, unipolarity and its preservation lie at the heart of the strategy: “Primacy, like selective engagement, is motivated by both power and peace. But the particular configuration of power is key: this strategy holds that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace. … Peace is the result of an imbalance of power in which U.S. capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners.”

As the Department of Defence put it in 1992: “... the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. … In the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. … We will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.”

Promoters of primacy pretend that the liberal order is accepted or will be accepted as relatively just and comfortable by the predominant majority of the states in the international system. Therefore, they will probably refrain from counterbalancing, restricting this behaviour to a smaller number of revisionist states that can be confronted or contained with the consensus of the international society. This is why the Bush administration did not appreciate any attempt to bind the United States to the opinion or co-decision of others as well as dismiss any notion of multi-polarity. If the United States were fighting for the ‘good’ order, any kind of call for restraint would be an attempt of revisionist counter-balancing. This notion caused particular unease in those regional powers that considered their neighbourhood rather their own affair and tried to constrain U.S. involvement into their affairs.

But despite the often ambitious, universalistic and unconventional rhetoric, the Bush administration was guided by traditional balance of power considerations rather than by messianic

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141 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 47-48;
and offensive exceptionalism. "... the United States and its allies and partners, must also hedge against the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future."142 Just like any other American government since 1945, the Bush administration was primarily concerned about other powers openly challenging the current world order and international security. Only with primacy, the deterrence included the punishment, not only containment, of those states that already tried.

The question whether these states or allies are democratic or not holds a particular place within this concept - not only for ideological, but also for practical reasons. First, states that are internally organised along liberal principles and political orders are presumably more confident with a liberally minded international order and will refrain from counterbalancing against the United States. Second, as regime structure has always been a latent pattern of influence,143 one could estimate that the United States had considerably more (positive) influence among the democratic countries. Promoting the own regime type was seen as a sustainable measure of fostering American leadership - much more durable than blackmailing or corrupting dictators. (The fact that democratic regimes are forced to make popular policies and that, apart from Western societies, the American-led liberal order, American leadership and American values are not that popular is a point to be discussed later). Considering the liberal triumphalism mentioned above, the Bush administration certainly was quite optimistic about the acceptance of American leadership.

For the Bush administration, normative and ideological coherence of allies - as well as ideological opposition among enemies - was by far more important than shared short-term goals or structural interests. While structural reasons for cooperation might fade away easily, shared normative, cultural or ideological preferences will generate similar goals despite structural changes. Therefore, the Bush administration treated Islamic extremism as the most fatal threat to U.S. security and did act on Islamist militants beyond Al-Qa’ida itself. It was the group of Al-Qa’ida that attacked, but it was Islamist revisionism that gave birth to these groups. “The

struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the early 21st century and finds the great powers all on the same side—opposing the terrorists.” This was not due to the structural strength of revisionist Islamic states, the military reach of Islamist non-state armed groups or the destructive power of terrorism (which had been exaggerated ever since), but because of the enormous ideological and normative difference between the Islamist and Western ideas for social and political order. These differences would, over time and at various occasions, create friction and violent clashes, and entities embracing political Islam would always try to challenge the Western international order and the American leadership in particular.

Next, U.S. hegemony should be as universal as possible. The fewer states that manage to elude the American order, the better. American influence on nuclear powers, notably China and Russia, the states most likely treated as future contenders, is certainly limited and will stay so. However: “For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy towards Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they pose are very different.” Shaping the political considerations of these states will be decisive, yet, that is easier said than done. “... the choices of major and emerging powers, including India, Russia, and China, will be key factors in determining the international security environment of the 21st century.” And while India was considered rather as a future partner and Russia as a possible spoiler, it was China that had the greatest potential for being a future adversary. “Of all the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages...” If direct influence is limited to these powers, indirect influence might still be in the reach of the United States: the U.S. could dominate or influence the environment in which these states operate or on what they depend on for securing their own prosperity.

Acquiring nuclear weapons is seen as the obvious sign that in the long run regional “would be” hegemons will try to challenge American influence or, at some point, the regional stability and regional order. “Proliferation is a problem because it undermines U.S. freedom of action by increasing the costs and risks of U.S. military interventions around the world. Because they serve to perpetuate a U.S. military advantage, current nonproliferation efforts should be continued. But while prevention is a useful first line of defense in combating proliferation, by it-

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145 Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 55;
147 Ibid., p. 29;
self it is inadequate to the task. The United States must also be able to deter and defend against the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by present and future powers which might develop such capabilities.148 Or as the National Security Strategy of 2002 put it: “These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.”149 Nuclear armament was the ultimate means for revisionist states to escape American influence and the precondition to challenge it.

The emergence of regional systems of nuclear deterrence or regional hegemons armed with nuclear weapons – as the precondition for regional hegemony – has to be prevented, if necessary by force. However, forcefully preventing the emergence of nuclear powers leaves much leeway for different kinds of implementation: from a surgical strike like Osirak in 1982 to what happened in Iraq after 2003. And it is important to notice that regional hegemony is to be prevented – WMDs are just the most obvious sign of trying to achieve such hegemony! Therefore, states that neither sought regional hegemony nor revisionism (like Israel) were not much of a problem. The regional hegemony was the real issue, not proliferation.

It has to be mentioned that primacy, and especially the primacy George W. Bush tried to implement, was not only about using the unipolar moment to forcefully pursue American interests and to contain or defeat future competitors. Considerable attention was paid to strengthen the attractiveness of the United States as a global hegemon by promoting social welfare, revitalise the American economy, spending more on international aid, foster international free trade and contribute to global welfare.150

Ironically, many of the programmes intended to support American leadership and attractiveness (especially at home), contributed to the emergence of the financial crisis and, subsequently, to the debt crisis that severely damaged the American position in the international system.

3.2.2. Goals and aims concerning the international order

The decision to invade Iraq without an explicit U.N. Security Council mandate calls into
question the importance of international law and the current international order as such. Some authors have termed the Bush administration as a revisionist government, trying to overthrow the then agreed status quo. This however is an overstatement. First, because there is a valid argument that the U.N. mandate to use force on Iraq from 1990/91 was still valid and that Iraq’s violation of the preconditions of the 1991 ceasefire were actually a proper legal foundation to resume military action. Concerning this, the United States had permissively interpreted international law, but had not breached it. Additionally primacy in theory, and the Bush administration in practice, had a quite differentiated approach to international law and international institutions and organisations than both orthodox legal scholars and revisionists. "In addition to maintaining U.S. primacy by reassuring others of the purity of its intentions, the draft DPG envisioned the United States seeking to prevent the rise of challengers by promoting international law, democracy, and free-market economies, and precluding the emergence of regional hegemons. It is important to note that though primacy focuses on the maintenance of overwhelming U.S. power and influence, it remains strongly committed to liberal principles. It is simply more judicious about the commitment of U.S. military power to particular liberal projects than is the cooperative security strategy."

International institutions generally enhance the predictability of the actors that adhere to them. If other states are to be discouraged from counterbalancing the United States, a certain amount of predictability of the United States’ behaviour is definitely necessary. If states feel that they cannot predict the decisions to come in the international arena, they will automatically try to acquire the means to influence future decisions or at least to deter others from taking decisions that harm them. This, of course, includes a robust military backup of one’s interests, which, again, would be interpreted as counterbalancing or hedging against the United States. An America that randomly behaves as it wishes and promotes its own interests unilaterally would definitely be counterbalanced sooner rather than later. The strategy of primacy again attempts to prevent counterbalancing by being an attractive hegemon on the one hand,

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but on the other hand willing to apply measures of force against opponents probably outside the current legal margins. Advocates of primacy try to overcome this contradiction by showing a gradual and differentiated support of international organisations.

International regimes and organisations that directly contributed to the upholding of the liberal international economic order, especially the WTO, but also regional free trade arrangements such as NAFTA, were broadly supported. The same accounts for U.S.-led alliances like NATO or bilateral agreements in East Asia.\textsuperscript{155} Indeed, such organisations should be expanded – as NATO was in 2004 – to foster and expand the zone of stability and prosperity granted through U.S. leadership.\textsuperscript{156} Other organisations, in which the likely contenders or undemocratic nations were represented, were viewed with suspicion.\textsuperscript{157} Not only that they were said to be incapable of fulfilling their tasks – which is in fact true for the U.N. Security Council\textsuperscript{158} – they were regarded as an instrument for the contenders of the United States to contain them – like a legally tied down Gulliver by Russian and Chinese Lilliputians. Russia and China would simply vote against U.S. interests, while in their own affairs they would find abstruse excuses to act without consulting the U.N. Security Council themselves, what Russia actually did in Georgia in 2008.

The unemotional assessment of this is: “Yet, international organisations should not be entirely rejected because of fears that they may draw the United States into conflicts or concerns that they cannot credibly deter aggression. Even a hegemonic power will, from time to time, find it useful to exploit the diplomatic cover provided by international organisations. If the façade of multilateralism renders the rule of an extraordinary power more palatable to ordinary powers, as it did during the Gulf War, international organisations are a strategic asset.”\textsuperscript{159}

It might be argued, however, that the Bush administration had an entirely different approach to the concept of international legitimacy (in this case being indeed revisionist), that was not random self interest. This new understanding tried to replace the consensus of governments or states by the consensus of peoples, meaning that, whatever governments agree upon, which by being democratic systems represent the will of their people, has to be more legitimate than

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\textsuperscript{157} Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 47f; Streit zwischen der UNO und den USA, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 9 June 2006;

\textsuperscript{158} From out of 60 cases of armed interstate conflict, including internationalised internal conflicts, the UN-Security Council only in four cases resumed to coercive measures that influenced the conflict as such. See: Gressel, \textit{Das Gewaltmanagement der Vereinten Nationen}, p. 20-22;

\textsuperscript{159} Posen, Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, p. 38;
\end{footnotesize}
whatever some autocrats decide for their countries. Although never clearly endorsed by Bush himself, the idea of the ‘concert of democracies’,\textsuperscript{160} which was later supported by the Republican candidate John McCain in his 2008 election campaign reflected these ideas about a new international order.

The neoconservatives’ goals concerning the international order are somehow blurred and often contradictory. Moreover, not everything some backbenchers say to their constituents regarding the United Nations or the American obligations under existing treaties is to be taken seriously or should be considered as the opinion of the respective government.\textsuperscript{161} The argument that the will of the peoples would bear more weight than the will of governments – or dictators – is indeed troublesome, as it closely resembles the old communist argument that only ‘Peoples’ Democracies’ represent the true interest of the people, which was of course the interest of the working class, while opposition from Western states was dismissed as capitalist obstruction of the true people’s will. Last but not least, global popular approval of the Iraq War was not that high after all.

There was also the argument that, since terrorists would act outside the framework of traditional inter-state politics, the United Nations would not provide much help fighting it.\textsuperscript{162} Still, saying the U.N. was not of much use, does not say that the U.N. would do harm in the matter, as most actions dealing with terrorism are indeed not acted upon through international war, either. While recognising the inefficiencies of the system, which had always been there from the late 40s onward, there was no concluding argument to, and nor decisive action to replace, the current world order with another one.

Claims in Europe, and in Germany in particular, that the “new American Imperialism” was set to replace the United Nations and subdue European allies to mere obedient subjects of American foreign policy,\textsuperscript{163} are clearly overstated. Richard Harknet stated that Iraq, basically, was seen as an opportunity, given the legal situation, the American preparedness in terms of constant surveillance and reconnaissance and the Iraqi terrain, which facilitated the military task. But the Iraqi situation was unique and so it would probably be the only preventive war ever conducted.\textsuperscript{164} And he was quite right with that assessment.


\textsuperscript{161} For hardline positions see: www.moveamericafoward.org;

\textsuperscript{162} To quote one of the few reasonable articles on the matter: Christian J. Tams, “The Use of Force against Terrorists”, in: European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Issue 2, download at: http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/2/359.full;

\textsuperscript{163} For such an opinion see: Ernst Otto Czempiel, “Pax Americana nach dem Irak-Krieg”, in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, p. 119-134;

The United States developed a rather permissive interpretation of international law in many operational fields, such as counter-terrorism policies (especially detainment practices), espionage, unconventional covered interventions, and so forth. This practices spread considerable amount of distrust and anger amongst allied Western nations,\textsuperscript{165} they do not constitute a breach of “the” international order as such. Rather the United states adopted controversial practices contradicting some sectoral norms and rules (hence some sectoral orders), which will be described in more details in the section concerning mid-term planning (3.3.7.). A general revisionist policy is adopted, when the international order as such no longer represents or fits the interests of the leading power(s).\textsuperscript{166} Despite the arguments, disputes, sorrows, and frequent bending of international law, this was not the case with the United States. Even though the Bush administration was not very enthusiastic about the United Nations and its affiliated organisations, it preferred its maintenance (and evolutionary reform) over the revisionist quest for a new order.

3.2.3. Strategy

After having said all that about the structural goals and perceptions on the future of the international order, there is not much left to be described as strategy. Strategies describe general long-term paths to achieve the desired goals. However, as each administration’s term ends after four years, thinking in those long-term horizons is usually vague. As a summary of what has been said above, the outline of the strategy of primacy was:

- Preventing the rise of another hegemon able to challenge the United States, by setting conditions in the international system that compel also hostile nations to comply with the American held status quo and the recent international order. “The reality is that a few big powers can radically affect international peace, stability, and prosperity. These states are capable of disrupting on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people.”\textsuperscript{167} Emerging powers should only face the choice either to comply with the American hegemony or remain isolated. This

\textsuperscript{167} Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 49;
should be roughly achieved by way of:

- Revitalising the American economy, enhancing the prosperity of the American people, securing popular support for primacy, securing the economic resources to support primacy and enhancing the attractiveness of the United States as a role model and a benevolent hegemon.\textsuperscript{168}

- Expanding the umbrella of American stability by expanding NATO and other American security arrangements in Asia and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{169}

- Reinforcing the drive towards free trade and global economic integration, especially through the expansion of the WTO, while remaining cautious towards exclusive, regional integration.\textsuperscript{170}

- Removing or containing regimes that aspire local dominance in regions of strategic value. There should be no valuable strategic partners for revisionist autocracies to acquire a strategically favourable position to challenge the U.S., especially not enabling them to wage a hegemonic war.\textsuperscript{171}

- Centre of U.S. efforts would be the Middle East, as it harbours the most dangerous revisionist ideology: Islamism. To defeat this ideology on the long-term, these conditions have to be met:

  - Reaching a peace-deal between Israel and the Palestinians, which probably would have to be enforced. To be able to do this, rejectionist forces have to be weakened first.

  - Implementing a reform-agenda throughout the Middle-East, promoting democracy and open society.

  - Preventing regional revisionist powers from evading U.S. pressure: prevent nuclear proliferation, defeat conventional potentials if necessary.

To achieve this, the United States may rely on their overwhelming economic, technological, and ultimately military potential. One has to notice that the then young information revolution – of which America considers itself as the core and driver – was viewed to transform all forms of traditional power: arguments, influence, military potential and transnational (–economic) potential. Therefore, the administration thought that the United States’ power and influence


\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 25-30, p. 38, p. 40;

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p. 13-16;
would remain strong, at least as long as the United States kept the technological edge.

3.3. Implementing Primacy: Allies, Alliances and Resistance to the War on Terror

After sketching the long-term goals, some remarks on the implementation of primacy are called for. As mentioned previously, primacy is a very demanding strategy to follow, and even more demanding to sustain. Furthermore, the concept suffers from some inherent contradictions, in terms of implementation, legitimisation, popularisation and explanation. There is much room for speculation or interpretation about how primacy would have to be implemented – pretending that everything went according to the plan.

3.3.1. Interpreted objectives

The international environment for the Bush administration’s first term was quite favourable. The United States maintained its leading position after the end of the Cold War and, as described previously, this unipolar moment – actually meaning a mixed unicentrist system – should be maintained by counterbalancing other actors, while further extending the edge of Western stability, provided by the United States to democratic regimes, and by removing or keeping in check ambitious regional hegemons. As said before, only those regions matter, in which a future contender might arise: this was basically the Eurasian continental mass\textsuperscript{172} – or more precisely China, Russia and the Middle East.

In the mid-term perspective, it was clear that China would not democratise or become a cooperative Partner in international relations, although one might have expected that it would become one in the long run.\textsuperscript{173} The chance of bringing about change in China by embedding it into the international order was still considered intact.\textsuperscript{174} But on the other hand, China could be handled if it were contained within its borders in terms of its military reach and further integrated into the world economy, increasing interdependence and, thus, the latent costs of hostile or revisionist behaviour.\textsuperscript{175}

Russia was on the edge, too. Being a defective democracy in the 90s, the wars in the Balkans

\textsuperscript{172} Posen, Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, p. 30;
\textsuperscript{173} The White House, National Security Strategy 2002, p. 27f;
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid; And further: Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”, in: International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring 2003, p. 5-56;
\textsuperscript{175} Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 55f;
aroused nationalist feelings in the Russians. “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has used the war [in Chechnya] to stir nationalism at home while fuelling his own political fortunes. … The long-term effect on Russia’s political culture should not be underestimated.”176 The new Russian nationalism, starting to demand exclusive spheres of influence in the ‘near abroad’ was signalling to the United States that its influence in the region would be contested. “The war [in Chechnya] is a reminder of the vulnerability of small, new states around Russia and of America’s interest in their independence. If they can become stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform their economies and political systems – a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best.”177

At least in 2001, the Russian path towards nationalist-authoritarianism or even fascism178 was not obvious and not inevitable, but the development of the Russian democracy was at risk. But then, an unstable, weak Russia that would sell nuclear material or expertise to rogue states was believed to be a greater threat to the United States than a strong, but nationalist Russia.179 Coaxing and appeasing it was the chosen policy option.180 The fear of a weak, failing Russian state caused the U.S. to turn a blind eye on the side effects of Putin’s restoration of the state181 that marked the path towards sliding into fascism.182 Therefore containing or counterbalancing Russia was – at the time – not on the mind of the American administration,183 although the Russian elites perceived the American behaviour – especially regarding NATO enlargement – as hostile towards Russia.

The cornerstone of the first strategy – expanding the arc of stable democracies – was already on the way. 1999 marked the first round of the expansion of NATO in Europe, bringing Po-
land, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the Alliance.\textsuperscript{184} As the Russian example illustrated, transition was not immune to failure! Bringing the then fragile new democracies into NATO not only secured the young process of political reforms, but also the assurance to be defended by the alliance gave them room to manoeuvre to act independently and not to yield to Russian demands. And – not completely altruistic – this secured Washington influence on these states\textsuperscript{185} and promised further support of U.S. global efforts by a stronger and larger NATO. To push forward the edge of NATO was an important goal of the Bush administration, even after the expansion of 2004. In 2008, a discussion on further enlargement was on the way and the U.S. tried to convince the Alliance to accept Ukraine and Georgia.\textsuperscript{186} However, due to strong resistance from Western European nations, most notably Germany, only Croatia and Albania were accepted in 2009.\textsuperscript{187}

In East Asia, it is much more difficult to extend an organisation that stabilises local states. ASEAN does, by definition, not structure the internal regimes of its member states. Moreover, the organisation and various forums grouped around it practice a very loose forms of cooperation.\textsuperscript{188} Therefore, the administration paid little attention to them, rather focusing on expanding the global free-trade agreements to continental East Asia (especially introducing China and Vietnam into the WTO).\textsuperscript{189} This would, or should, prevent any meaningful and exclusive form of regionalism (which might be a tool for China to dominate the regional order and exclude the United States). Maintaining or revitalising the bilateral ties to the states of the Asian rim, especially Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and, with some reservations, Taiwan was another objective to strengthen American influence.\textsuperscript{190} Ultimately, improving the American ties to India would be a great opportunity to improve the U.S.’s influence in one of the emerging big economies that would probably prefer American leadership to Chinese revisionism, although that might be with reservations.\textsuperscript{191} Another region of strategic importance is, and was, the Middle East. “Regional competitions among small states matter to the extent that they could energize intense great power security competition. This risk preserves the Persian Gulf as a core U.S. security interest. The problem is not so much U.S. dependence on Gulf oil but the far greater dependence on it by many

\textsuperscript{184} U.S. Department of State, \textit{Strategic Plan 2004-2009}, p. 7-9;
\textsuperscript{185} See for the strategic interests concerning NATO-enlargement: Brill, “Die NATO-Osterweiterung und die geostrategischen Interessen der Mächte”, p. 637-648;
\textsuperscript{186} Bush pledges to help Ukraine join NATO, International Herald Tribune Online, 1 April 2008;
\textsuperscript{187} Wie Russland die NATO-Partner spaltet, Die Welt Online, 30 September 2009;
\textsuperscript{190} The White House, \textit{National Security Strategy 2002}, p. 40-41;
\textsuperscript{191} Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 56;
other great powers. A struggle over the control of the Gulf could draw in great powers on opposing sides, or set off competition elsewhere to expropriate energy resources. Moreover, should most of the economic potential associated with this oil fall into the hands of one ambitious actor, it could provide the underpinnings for a substantial regional military challenge. However, the strategic situation in the Gulf did not favour the United States. The U.S. traditionally had close relations with Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi-Arabia. The events of 9/11 and the tacit support of Al Qa'ida, the Taliban and other radical Islamist organisations by these states strained this relationship soon after that. Iraq and Iran, the two other major oil producing countries beside Saudi Arabia, were definitely hostile towards the United States. Relatively robust relations with Russia and, especially, China – visible in a number of arms deals – provided a clear picture that, in case of a hegemonic struggle, they were on the side of America’s challengers. Sanctions and isolation did not bring about the desired regime change in Iraq, rather strengthening the regime. On the other hand, direct military presence in the Gulf strained relations with the other Gulf States and incurred long-term military costs for the United States. Regime change in one of the two states (Iran or Iraq) was a priority goal to achieve in the medium term. Indeed, plans to achieve regional change were not new. “After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, planners viewed the imminent war against Iraq as the opportunity to rid the region of its last ‘radical alternative’. With the revisionist Ba’athist regime eliminated, the region would embrace a progressive, pro-American agenda. U.S. military power would, as in post-war Europe, guarantee regional security, and hesitant local states would be lured into cooperative arrangements. ... Formalised U.S. military ties to regional states, the Madrid conference and a strong push for regional missile non-proliferation regime, signified goals that went beyond ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The U.S. was aiming to reshape the region.” Regaining the lost momentum to change the Middle East seemed to be of greater significance after 9/11. However, the circumstances in the region dramatically changed since Bush (sen.) left office in 1992.

Another region that came into the focus of American foreign policy were Afghanistan and Central Asia – although as a direct consequence of the events of 9/11. Despite all geopoliti-

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195 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 211-242;
196 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002/3, p. 174-175;
197 Lothar Rühl, “Die strategische Lage zum Jahreswechsel”, in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Heft
isation, especially from the Russian side, there was no particular American interest in the region before 11 September 2001. In terms of energy resources, it was already obvious that the region would not become a second Persian Gulf. The regimes of the region were all dictatorships run by the last generation of Soviet administrative personnel, which had no connections to, or special relationships with Washington. The only exception to that was Afghanistan, which was simply chaotic.

However, now that the war in Afghanistan had to be waged, some thoughts about the regional situations were articulated. As the theatre was not a distinct American priority, the Bush government tried to shift the burden onto allies, the local government and the region as soon as possible. After the Karzai government proved to be incapable of governing the country, the ties to the Pakistani security apparatus proved to be a two-edged sword, and plans for a regional integration came up, in which America tried to involve its northern neighbours into the stabilisation effort and somehow provided a long-term economic vision for Afghanistan. However, all these plans fell short of the expectation. The low-profile approach towards Afghanistan was soon revised, as European allies pushed for a more “comprehensive” state-building approach, and the Afghan leaders were eager to receive this help at the Petersberg-Conference. The more ambitious agenda of building a functioning Afghan state predetermined a strong U.S. commitment to the region for decades to come, although the Bush-administration only reluctantly increased their efforts in Afghanistan.

Concerning the interpreted objectives regarding the international order, little has to be amended to the lines of the previous chapter. On the mid-term level, the United States had to achieve the following goals:

- International acceptance for its permissive interpretation of international law (see Chapter 3.3.3. and 3.3.7.).
- Protecting the U.S. economic interest when expanding the liberal international eco-

1/2002, 3-18, p. 10-18;
198 In the 90s, many states tried to gain the attention of the United States by greatly exaggerating the amount of energy resources in their soil. This led to an exploration boom in the 90s and wild speculations on the pipeline-net that would transport these resources to the world markets. Turkey’s interest in playing a major role in that reinforced this hype. See: Fiona Hill, “Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks”, in: Lenmore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis (Ed.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, Cambridge MA, 2004, 211-239, p. 214f;
199 Czempiel, „Die Pax Americana nach dem Irak-Krieg”, p. 121ff;
The first issue touched the core of the international order. Discussions on the reform of the U.N. Security Council were going on since the end of the cold war. The discussion gained momentum, when in 2005 Brazil, Germany, India and Japan brought forward a proposal for reforming the UNSC, granting permanent membership (but no Veto-right) to their countries. The United States were not enthusiastic about this plans, as any expansion of the Security Council would probably decrease its functionality even more. The United States wanted to achieve reforms concerning the operational procedures and adjacent organisations first, then talk about reshuffling memberships. However, as the four-party effort soon was met with rival proposals and ever expanding demands for further representation, the General Assembly could not even put up their mind about reforms. At the end it did not cost the U.S. much effort on their own to defend the then current state of the Security Council. However, U.S. demands of a reform of the bureaucratic body of the U.N. and its field missions were not met either.

The Second issue will be explained in the respective chapter. The third demanded the adoption of some contradicting policies and positions. On the one hand, the U.S. was eagerly supporting the completion of the Doha-round in the WTO (started in 2001), expanding free-trade and investment possibilities. On the other hand the United States was reluctant to open its domestic agricultural market to foreign competition. They shared this interest with other industrialised countries, particularly the European Union. But this reluctance led to the breakdown of the Cancun round in 2003, derailing any attempt to further strengthen global trade liberalisation. So generally the U.S. were quite satisfied with the then current status of the global economic order and would not trade sectoral losses for a further enhancement of free-trade policies.

The other issues were the attempts of particularly European nations to limit global CO2 emissions by introducing a CO2 contingent trading system. Such a system would particularly place a heavy financial burden on industrialised societies, and particularly on the United States. The United States were reluctant to join such an agreement and the refusal of other

202 As nations lobby to join security council, the U.S. resists giving them veto power, New York Times Online, 15.05.2005;
204 Plans to Expand Security Council May be Frustrated for Now, New York Times Online, 15.06.2005;
206 Ibid. p.3;
newly industrialised countries to sign the Kyoto-protocol (especially China) was a welcomed reason (or excuse, depending on one’s point of view) not to do so too. While particularly Europe had expected the U.S. to take a leading role, the increasing unease of the U.S. concerning its trade deficit with Asia and the increasing public debt hardly permitted taking any additional financial burdens.

Now trade and environmental issues are not at the hart of this thesis. However, as mentioned before, the U.S. thought to gain acceptance for primacy as a “benevolent hegemon”. Such a benevolent hegemon is expected not to decide selfishly in every issue, but to respect the interests of the international society208 and particularly of its closest allies. Not doing so would sooner or later decrease the legitimacy of the United States. To push for primacy on the one hand, but acting quite selfish in other spheres of international relations was one of the many inconsistencies of U.S. foreign policy.

3.3.2. Analysis of the potentials

To assess the potentials of the United States, the then anticipated power in terms of arguments, influence, military potential and potential to put pressure on others by manipulating transnational transactions for the United States and her opponents have to be weighted. First, the most controversial point of the Bush Doctrine, the application of military force, will be assessed.

In the opinion of the planners of the Bush administration, the unmatched advantage of the United States in terms of military power had to be used more consequently for the purpose of America’s foreign policy. “American military preeminence should ensure that U.S. forces could be used at will, but would seldom have to be, since threats to U.S. interests would be deterred by overwhelming military capabilities. Advocates of primacy, perhaps in an effort to reassure the rest of the world, have counselled that the United States use force sparingly. They advise against the use of military force on behalf of purely economic interests, or to promote American values, reverse setbacks to democracy, support the United Nations, or resolve civil wars.”209 While saved for decisive engagements, to secure vital strategic interests, the military should be used at will, even offensively without the consensus of the international society or formal allies.210 The use of military power should serve two purposes:

208 See for the term appendix 7.3.5., or for the term: Barry Buzan, Andrea Gonzales-Pelaez: “International Community after Iraq”, in: International Affairs, Vol.81, No.1, January 2005, p.31-52;
210 The White House, National Security Strategy 2002, p. 15f; See also: Andreas Reckemmer, “Die UNO, die Irak-Kontroverse und das Prinzip der kollektiven Aktion, Weltorganisation unter Rekonstruktion?”, in: Erich
• Removing key threats to vital American interests.
• Deterring other possible contenders from challenging the United States’ interests.

Tackling one of the contenders militarily should serve as a punitive example to others, not to threaten the United States’ interests and comply with the norms of the international system. In this regard, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and to a lesser extent Syria and Libya were on the list of threats. However, given the advantageous situation in Iraq, this country would serve as a punitive example to deter others.\(^{211}\)

To justify military action and rally support at home and abroad, the doctrine of preemptive military action was adapted. “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”\(^{212}\) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was not the only danger that had to be addressed in the event of preemptive military force, but the one that concerned the public most and, therefore, was discussed more vigorously. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, however, never was at the core of the strategic considerations. WMD proliferation was one of the symptoms of regional hegemonic ambitions, rather than a threat in itself. And concerning Iraq, there was a feeling in U.S. officials (both Republicans and Democrats) that the policy of containment was failing and Saddam’s hegemonic ambitions would lead towards another war sooner or later.\(^{213}\) The Bush administration – in their perception of primacy – would not wait for Iraq to give the U.S. a proper reason for action and would not prosecute the war upon Iraq’s initiative, but to acted as soon as conditions became favourable for the U.S. “There are a number of criticism that might be leveled at the Bush Administration’s handling of the pre-war diplomacy. … However, one fundamental reason why the case of preventive war was not presented clearly and forcefully is because it is a tremendously difficult war rationale to make, particularly in the United States.”\(^{214}\) And, as discussed in the Options part, it was quite clear that the military option was only feasible in the Middle East to reverse the adverse structure of influence in the larger countries of the Persian Gulf. Not only were the military capacities of the United States unmatched there, but also the

\(^{213}\) Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*, p. 411;
\(^{214}\) Harknett, “Fear, Opportunity and Preventive War”, p. 116;
two contending nuclear powers – China and Russia – had no strategic reach to counter the American move. While a military move by the United States – especially a preemptive one – in close proximity to China or Russia could trigger a dangerous spiral of escalation, in the Middle East the United States was unmatched and could practically do as it pleased.

To deter others from taking hostile action, however, the preemptive military action had to be swift and successful. Otherwise, contenders would exploit the opportunity to pin down American forces in the theatre or permanent American military engagement in one region might invite other nations to challenge the status quo because they would assume that no American forces could be redeployed from these theatres to stop them. “Protracted military involvement in non-critical regions is to be avoided. Because world order and stability are to be maintained, however, the United States is to look favourably on the use of force to resist aggression. Despite the lip service given to restraint, this self-appointed mission could involve a lot of fighting.”

The solution to this problem should have been provided by a new military doctrine, called Rapid Dominance. The doctrine particularly emphasises the introduction of new information technologies into the armed forces, which should presumably change the nature of warfare. By using data networks, the fog of war is to be lifted, and network-based data fusion provides a near perfect situation picture, displaying friendly and enemy forces. The commander then can direct decisive blows to the enemy’s centre of gravity, demoralising him and breaking his will to fight after a short period of time, with few casualties and little damage to the country as such.

By way of punitive action in Iraq, Iran might be deterred from further developing its nuclear programme or challenging the United States in the region. “Arguably, a successful outcome in Iraq – whether real disarmament under UN inspections or replacement of Saddam with a government prepared to comply with Iraq’s treaty commitments – might help tip the balance in favour of those in Tehran arguing for restraint. In principle, elimination of the Iraqi WMD threat could reduce one of the key Iranian motivations for acquiring WMD and set an example for avoiding actions that would make Iran a target of international pressure.”

Leaked plans – although this has to be treated with caution – of initiating a chain of reform and change

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216 See for the doctrine: Harlan Ullman, James Wane et. al., Shock and Awe, Achieving Rapid Dominance, National Defense University, Washington D.C., 1996. The paper should not be regarded as an actual blueprint to the invasion of Iraq, but it shows how the defence planners thought at the time and what conclusions they drew from the wars America had fought since 1989. Especially Cheney/Rumsfeld emphasised the ‘revolution in military affairs’, the preference of light, fast, deployable forces, and the ability to expand durability, protection and firepower of forces with networking abilities. All this led to the illusion of fighting fast wars for free.
across the Middle East indicated that the United States was quite confident about the outcome of the campaign in Iraq.\(^{218}\) After the job was finished there, the United States could pay attention to Iran, Syria or other trouble spots if the doctrine of Rapid Dominance lived up to its promise. There is no need to comment on this in detail, the historical evidence is critical enough. Other shortcomings, such as little to no planning for the time after the fall of Saddam, insufficient knowledge of the local clan and tribal rivalries and interests and reliance on totally incapable personnel from the Iraqi diaspora to run the country only supplemented these grave errors in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan.\(^{219}\)

However, in the early 2000s, the American leadership was very confident regarding the American military potential and what could be achieved through it. When these concepts proved to be illusions in 2005, the latest, major adjustments were made within the military apparatus. But they are to be discussed later.

Analysing the economic potential and its implications for foreign policy is more difficult. Many analysts list some economic factors as potentials for power and many refer to the United States as a superpower, particularly because its high share of the global GDP and its technologically advanced and highly innovative industry. This might all be true, but how can a state harness this potential in foreign policy in terms of power? The United States do not have a command economy, in which the state controls whatever the economic units do, thereby creating pressure and influence. Global tariff reductions and almost universal trade regimes, like the WTO, reduced, but did not entirely abolish, the possibility to manipulate transnational transactions at will to influence other nations.\(^{220}\) Economic indicators, therefore, are only an abstraction that the state might have fewer or more revenues at its disposal. Revenues obviously depends more on fiscal politics and public spending behaviour than on the economy as such. Economic assets to be used on foreign policy refer to branches in which the respective state might have to a lesser or greater extent of state control (like in nuclear energy or arms deals). In this branches it is far more easy for a government to offer benefits or to withhold certain services to put pressure on another party.

Still, despite far-reaching free trade agreements and tariff reductions, there are still numerous possibilities of selectively implementing agreements, using loopholes of existing treaties, finding creative non-tariff obstacles to exclude competitors, subsidies, fiscal and financial

\(^{218}\) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/4, p. 157;
\(^{219}\) See: Ibid., p. 162-171;
policies and (transnational) assistance programmes that states can use to make an impact on economic relations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 305ff, 362ff.} However, this impact depends on the cleverness and creativity of the political and administrative elites rather than on sheer market size.

One could have expected that the Bush administration, in adhering to free trade and laissez-faire economy, rarely tried to manipulate business for the sake of politics. The most prominent exception to this was India, where the Bush administration tried to enter into a strategic relationship with New Delhi by offering assistance in nuclear energy and lucrative arms deals.\footnote{U.S. and India to strengthen security ties, International Herald tribune Online, 28 February 2008; Bush has quietly tripled aid to Africa, The Washington Post Online, 31. December 2006; Of course, many of these programmes contained large purchases of drugs and equipment within the United States, which benefited domestic politics. But given the often addressed waste of direct development aid payments by local elites, a larger share of direct goods in development aid programmes makes sense.} A kind of chequebook policy was adopted with regard to Pakistan to keep the leadership cooperative concerning Afghanistan. The "buy American" initiative in China to mitigate the trade deficit and reduce domestic criticism of his Asia politics was the third exception (see Chapter 3.3.5.8).

Nevertheless, the Bush administration expanded direct payments, technical and development aids basically to increase the attractiveness of American global leadership in the 3rd World. Especially Africa came to the attention of the Bush administration, tripling development aid and founding generous programmes to fight Malaria and HIV.\footnote{Data from 2000. Fischer Weltalmanach 2002, Frankfurt am Main, p. 1088, 1097, and 1218; See also for the then U.S. advantage: Heinz Brill, "Strukturen der Weltpolitik im Wandel", in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 5/2011, 539-551, p. 549;} These programmes were often accompanied by efforts to open up the local markets to American investments and business, which – aside from benefiting American business – would foster free trade and open economies.

In addition to direct help and assistance, there is some political influence generated through the proximity or preferences of economic elites. Economic elites (CEO of large enterprises, heads of business associations and similar interest groups) usually are very well linked with the political leadership of their respective country and they lobby for states in which they have significant cooperation and business interests. Their influence on active politics may be disputed, but at least they try to avoid confrontations between business interests and politics. In these terms, it is helpful for the U.S. being the most capable single economic power, with a GDP of 9,837.4 billion USD (with about twice as much as the then second Japan), 1,257.6 billion USD imports and 781.1 billion USD exports (together more than twice that of the then second Germany), investing 139.2 billion USD abroad and receiving 281.1 billion foreign direct investment.\footnote{Ibid., p. 305ff, 362ff.} It may be assumed that, for economic reasons, the level of tolerance towards
the United States’ foreign policy will be greater than towards other nations and that this will
contribute much to the acceptance of primacy by other nations. Avoiding counterbalancing
despite the open display of the unilateral, preemptive use of force is one of the key goals of
primacy. However, this is quite a diffuse utilisation of economic attractiveness. The adminis-
tration may rely on this factor, or may not do so.

This also accounts for the assessment of the American influence in the international system as
such. The U.S. has enormous influence on other states for various reasons. In Europe, the spe-
cial relationship with the UK was robust and would survive even a crisis. Many of the new
countries in Eastern and south-eastern Europe were very grateful to the United States for win-
ning the Cold War and contributing to their (re-)integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures
and order.225 The United States could hope for their support. However, a strategy of primacy
would repel, and eventually did repel the European nations that had hegemonic ambitions
themselves, notably France.226

With a more ambitions and daring foreign policy, the United States could count on the support
from young democracies that were themselves endangered by other regional hegemons, such
as Russia227 or presumably China. However, their contribution to the American effort would be – along with their national resources – limited, and it turned out that there was still the
problem of dragging the United States into conflicts that were beyond the reach and interests
of the U.S. foreign policy.

In East Asia, the United States could hope for a similar effect; countries that had reservations
towards China would ultimately prefer the distant hegemon over the close one. But one has to
admit that China, in contrast to Russia, reacted much more skilfully to U.S. primacy by
dodging this period with a charm offensive,228 thus diminishing the desire of local actors to
counterbalance it. This actually lowered the acceptance of U.S. primacy in Malaysia and In-
donesia. Chinese rapprochement towards South Korea and the illusory ’sunshine policy’
strained the U.S.-South Korean relationship.229 As we know today, the Chinese behaviour was

225 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002/3, An Evaluation and Forecast of
World Affairs, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 113ff;

226 Werner Link, Keine Akzeptanz, “Das Kardinalproblem hegemonial-imperialistischer Politik der USA”, in:
Erich Reiter (Hg.), Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003, Mitter, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, p. 135-
146; For a more nuanced picture, but clearly outlining French ambitions to lead Europe: Francois Heisbourg,
“The Transatlantic Strategic Relationship, From Lapsed Alliance to New Partnership?”, in the same volume, p.
331-340;

227 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/4, p. 105-106;

228 See for the Chinese charm offensive: David Shambough, “China Engages Asia, Reshaping the Regional

229 See for the U.S. relations to the Asian countries after 9/11: Gilbert Rozman, Noah Rozman, “The United
States and Asia in 2002: Needing Help against ’Evil’”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 1, January/February 2003,
January/February 2003, p. 135-146; And on South Korea’s straining relations with the U.S. under President Roh:
skilfully executed – but temporary by nature.

The question whether the Middle East would support U.S. primacy was a tricky one. Generally, as the traditional allies of the United States in the region were all autocratic systems, the demand for regime change and democratic change was seen as a threat rather than an opportunity. Even if Saddam Hussein had been isolated in the region since 1990/91, there was still the question of who would fill the power vacuum if he left. It had been estimated since the 90s that economic interests would persuade most Arab governments to dodge the anger in the street, remain calm and wait out what would happen next. Actually that is what they did. And yet, it is not known publicly, whether in the background some U.S. officials reassured the local elites that regime change was not meant as a universal concept on dealing with all the region’s regimes.

However, the events in Iraq were not the only pillar on which the U.S. position in the region rested upon. Since 2005, an increasingly assertive Iran had been seeking confrontation not only with the U.S., but re-igniting old Arab-Persian and Shi’ite-Sunnite rivalries. The threat of an assertive Iran made the Gulf States again look for a response from Washington. Considering the strained relationship of the U.S. with these countries after 9/11, this quite happened by default.

The power generated by strong arguments is the most difficult one to assess. Here, one should not be so naïve as to think opponents can be talked into submission. But especially for creating fellowship, rallying allies and reassuring the public opinion at home just as well as abroad that the right thing is done, is an asset that is not to be underestimated. However, after an initial wave of sympathy, which followed after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration failed miserably in this regard. The official reasons to invade Iraq – the primary reason were Iraq’s WMD programme and Iraq’s support of Al-Qa’ida – were not very credible from the beginning and soon proved to be wrong. The remaining reasons then – the spread of democracy and the threat that the Baathist regime was to the region – were overtaken by the events: a deteriorating security situation that hindered democratic developments and were a new concern to Iraq’s neighbours. The misfortune was that although the Bush administration’s foreign policy was not centred only on Iraq, and indeed made several innovative proposals regarding

missile defence, NATO enlargement, proliferation security, intelligence cooperation, regional security, etc. It was politically overshadowed by the events in Mesopotamia. These initiatives were treated with suspicion and hostility, just because they were American. And even those governments that supported America for strategic reasons faced strong domestic opposition. Hence, in terms of gaining influence, the United States, since 2003, had to regain ground lost through their line of argumentation by way of providing hard assets — security, aid and political attention.

Advocates of primacy had few ideas on how to sell primacy to the international public. And those authors who denied the soft-balancing behaviour against the United States listened to other hard reasons — economic interest, regional security concerns, bargaining behaviour — why they think the lone superpower still remains unchallenged. It seems that the administration either did not really care how its actions were received globally or was blinded by self-confidence and overestimation of the democratic and moral authority of the United States.

Analysing the potential of every contender in the international system and of every allied nation would certainly exceed the scope of this thesis. However, some remarks about critical capabilities need to be made.

First, the two major revisionist contenders — China and Russia — had no expeditionary capability that would come close to that of the United States. They could not project power into other regions, except for their immediate neighbourhood. However, they could support local allies and proxies with arms and military knowledge to evade U.S. pressure or alter the regional influence of Russia and China. The most prominent example is the Russian and Chinese supply of advanced ballistic missiles to Iran, with North Korea serving as the black

235 For the relative military strength compare the IISS Military Balance of the respective years. Note that for regional power projection against the U.S. or a close U.S. ally a modern Navy and Air Force with a good air-to-surface-force coordination is needed. In the early 2000s, China was starting to introduce some Russian-made weapons (Su-27 fighters, destroyers and submarines), which indicated a trend towards such capabilities, but in very limited numbers. Indigenous developments, such as the J-10 fighter, the KongJin 2000 AEW Plane, flying command posts, enhanced surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft were all developed or introduced in the later 2000s. See for the Chinese weapons programmes: Chinese Aviation at SinoDefence: http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/aircraft.asp; Regarding the Russian Armed Forces, one has to note that much of the equipment listed in the Militarily Balance at the time was in non-operational condition. The performance of the Russian troops in Chechnia was miserable, and there was hardly a chance that the Russian Armed Forces would improve their readiness and operational capabilities soon. See: Martin Malek, Russland — eine Großmacht? Bestandsaufnahme und Zukunftsperspektiven; Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, 4/2003, Landesverteidigungsakademie, Vienna, especially p. 20-23;
market hotspot. It is not clear whether Iran’s nuclear programme is supported by these countries, but it cannot be ruled out.

In a region torn by conflicts, such as the Middle East, cross-border support for insurgents or allied tribal warriors is a very common thing, complicating the military environment. The list of these cross-border military links is long: Iran had supported the Kurds in Turkey and in Iraq, the Shi’ite militias in eastern Iraq, via Syria the Shi’ite Hizbullah in Lebanon. Equally, ongoing confrontations with the Taliban in Afghanistan boosted Iran’s role among anti-Taliban forces, particularly among the Afghan Shi’ite. Iraq used to support Sunni opposition groups in Iran and had close contacts with the Palestinian Fatah within the PLO. Syria supported Hizbullah to retain control of Lebanon, as well as the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement to divert Sunni radicalism towards Israel. The Gulf States, quite for the same reasons, supported various radical Sunni-Islamic movements across the globe, but especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This included the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida. Aside from distracting internal dissent towards other conflicts, a certain pan-Islamist political agenda, who’s goals are quite congruent with Al-Qa’ida’s aims, has to be taken into account in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom supports the global spread of radical revisionist Islamism, including the...

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236 Contrary to popular claims, neither North Korea nor Iran has ever produced a missile entirely on its own. While Iran has managed to modify non-critical parts (fuel tanks, warheads, structural arrangement) of some missiles, they depend on the import of key components such as engines, thrusters, navigation and guidance systems, jet-vanes, and the facilities to carry large solid propellant engines. All smaller liquid propelled missiles (Hanswon 5/6, Shahab 1/2, Quiam) are basically Russian R-17 SCUD missiles. The larger ones (Nodong, Shahab-3/5M, Ghadr-1) are Russian R-18, a cancelled Soviet missile model from the late 50s. The multi-staged liquid-fuelled ones are a combination of both, sometimes incorporating salvaged parts from SA-5 SAMs and R-27 ballistic missiles – both of Russian origin. The solid propellant Sejjil is of Chinese origin, originally named M-18. See: Markus Schiller, "Fernwaffen in Iran und Nordkorea – Technische Einschätzung der Bedrohungssituation", in: Peter Segward-Base (Ed.), Beiträge zum Workshop Raketenabwehr 17 Februar 2010, Schriftenreihe des Amtes für Rüstung und Wehrtechnik, 2. Ausgabe, Wien, 2010, p. 107-122; Theodore Postol et. al. A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program, Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on the [sic] Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential, MIT, 2009; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Schmucker, Schiller, Fernwaffen in Entwicklungsländern.


238 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p. 29ff, 87ff;

239 Lead Reports Detail Iran’s Aid for Iraqi Militias, International Herald Tribune Online, 22 October 2010;


241 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p. 223-257; While helpful for the U.S. in 2001, it proved to be problematic later on. A Stronger Enemy? Afghan Insurgents’ Improved Skills Could Come from Outside Sources, Defense News, 8 June 2009, p. 28;


sponsorship of various paramilitary and terrorist organisations.\textsuperscript{244}

So there was – and still is – a lot of expertise in cross-border destabilisation and support for unconventional guerilla warfare in the region. Breaking this cycle of mutual destabilisation was a daunting task. That the neighbours of Iraq had the historical ties and the local knowledge to disrupt the political progress in that country was a known fact before the invasion.\textsuperscript{245}

The risk, that these structures might fall back on the United States were presumably underestimated by the Bush administration.

\textit{3.3.3. Calculation of options: dealing with contenders, Iraq and Afghanistan}

Now, that the goals and capabilities have been outlined, different options of dealing with some of the actors and problems mentioned above are to be discussed. Politics is hardly restricted to one choice, and the Bush administration faced several of them.

To start with the most challenging task: China. As mentioned above, it was unsure, or even doubtful, whether China would submit to the American-led world order, when it became a powerful nation in its own right. China constantly criticised not only the U.S., but also free trade, global economic balances, etc. It was very critical of the principles the United States tried to promote after the Cold War: democracy and open society, universal respect of human rights and humanitarian interventionism. It used every loophole in existing treaties and obligations to advance its interests at the expense of particularly the United States.\textsuperscript{246} Even if the order was formally not disputed, there were severe differences in their interpretation. There was a very tangible problem when, for example, a Chinese fighter crashed into an American surveillance plane, trying to drive it out of what Beijing claimed to be Chinese airspace over Chinese territorial waters and what Washington said was international airspace over the open waters of the South China Sea in April 2001.\textsuperscript{247}

Hence, containment would be desired, at least in the future. Then again, since the 1996 Taiwan crisis, China has not done anything that would justify containment – for the time being. The Chinese military was large and powerful enough – including nuclear deterrence – to

\textsuperscript{245} See for an excellent article that forecasts much of what would happen later: Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq, Challenges and Opportunities", in: \textit{International Security}, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, p. 47-78;
\textsuperscript{247} Rühl, "Die strategische Lage zum Jahreswechsel" 2002, p. 7;
preclude an attack on China proper. But it was – at the time – hardly a threat to the rest of the region, because the PLA lacked several key capabilities, and mentally the military leadership was still fighting a domestic guerilla war.

As China grew ever more important, the market and the economic elites, including in the U.S., lobbied for a moderate policy, in order not to upset the government in Beijing. This would have made a robust containment difficult within the U.S., and hardly any of the East Asian neighbours would have supported such a course. However, abandoning the region would be risky too. China had the fastest growing economy in the world. The economic interdependence, especially with the U.S. West Coast, grew and the Pacific region as such became the main driver of the American economy. If China used its weight to change the regional economic order against the American interests, this would have had severe consequences for the U.S. economy. At the time, important negotiations on an ASEAN+ Free Trade Area progressed. And it was not quite clear, to what end state this development would lead.

Hard security was still a useful asset that the United States could provide to the states of the region. Keeping up the existing assistance treaties and defence agreements, the U.S. would keep a foot in the door and a base to rely upon in times of crisis. At the very least symbolic presence would reassure the states of the region that the U.S. was committed to the region and that stronger pressure from China would not have to be feared. It also gave an incentive not to seek outright conflict with American interests.

The situation with Russia was similar, although Russia was considerably less important to U.S. interests than China. The wars in the Balkans showed a considerable amount of hostility by the Russian political elites towards the United States and the West as such. However, these were carrier and naval aviation capabilities, modern C4ISR systems, long-range precision ammunition, long-range (theatre) air defence, capable submarines in sufficient quantities, long-range ASW capabilities, air-refuelling, electronic intelligence, long-range C2ISR and naval situation awareness capabilities, but also still reforming its airborne and maritime infantry units. See for the then judgement of China’s military capabilities: The National Institute for Defence Studies Japan, East Asean Strategic Review, Tokyo 2003, p. 181-202.

In 2007 the author participated in the 'International Symposium Course' at the National Defence University, Beijing, China. Gaining some insights in Chinese military thinking and training, there was an obvious lack of expedience in combined arms warfare, air to ground coordination, joint operations, airspace management, flexible leadership and making use of modern C3 equipment. The Army dominates the armed forces. High posts in PLA Navy and Air Force are often occupied by Army (land forces) personnel, with little to no experience and knowledge in air or naval warfare. 90% of the general staff course graduates are army (land forces) personnel. This is typical of infantry-based, guerilla war armies, such as the Vietnamese, the Cambodian or even the Austrian Armed Forces. (Observations by the author participating in the 'International Symposium Course 2007' at the National Defence University Beijing, October to December 2007; Shambough, "China Engages Asia", p. 64-99;

See: US, China, square off, Asian Times Online, 32 December 2003;
Lieberthal, "The United States and Asia in 2001", p. 2-7;
Jaques Rupnik, "Die Welt im Balkanpiegel: das Agieren der Großmächte", in: Dunja Melcic (Ed.), Der
there was not much Russia could do about this. Russia tried to reclaim the former Soviet space as an exclusive zone of influence, and it could mount a lot of pressure on the former Soviet states and satellites if it could single them out and treat them individually. Nonetheless, at that time, the anti-Western rhetoric was judged by many as a show for the home audience, and it was important that Russia could be satisfied with confidence-building measures. A notable exception from such naivety was Condoleezza Rice. Expansion of NATO was the most convenient way to counter any hegemonial or imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe – not only those of Russia, but also disputes among the new democracies. This would also stabilise Europe’s eastern flank, pushing the frontier of instability further away from the important – but stalling – European economies. In other regions (southern Caucasus, Central Asia), U.S. ties and interests were marginal and there was no reason to sacrifice resources to battle Russian influence.

Putting direct pressure on Russia was difficult to achieve. Militarily, the still large arsenal of nuclear weapons gave Russia a feeling on invulnerability. Economically, the petrol kleptocracy depended on the oil price, but hardly on U.S. trade policy – as the Russian customers were by and large on the European continent.

Directly confronting Russia would probably be a useless endeavour. And still at some point, the United States aimed at changing Russia’s behaviour. Most prominent was proliferation, as Russia sold obsolete missile technology via North Korea across the globe. This material showed up in Iran, Iraq, Libya and other revisionist countries in the Middle East and, combined with nuclear programmes, undermined U.S. freedom of action in this strategically important part of the world.

After 9/11, Russian experience, contacts and intelligence on Afghanistan was another valuable asset. President Bush gave Russia nice smiles to ensure Russian support for the operation. The need for alternative transport routes to Afghanistan, to avoid being logistically too dependent on Pakistan, precluded a hard-ball strategy towards Russia, ensuring support from the Central Asian regimes.

255 Reiter, "Die zweite NATO-Osterweiterung", p. 18-19;
256 Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 60;
257 For a description of the Russian regime see: Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, Maragaret Mommus, Angelika Nußberger, Das System Putin, Gelenkige Demokratie und politische Justiz in Russland, München 2007;
258 Richard Lugai, Help Russia Help America, Comment in the International Herald Tribune Online, 30 May 2008;
259 Schiller, "Fernraketen in Iran und Nordkorea", p. 107-122;
260 Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 226ff;
However, the engagement towards Russia was short-lived. Moscow never changed its position on proliferation, its influence in Afghanistan was fairly limited and the Central Asian regimes could be bribed separately. But Russia grew increasingly hostile and militaristic, engaged in escalation around the periphery.\footnote{261} One may say that engaging Russia was a dead option from the start. Whether a more serious containment policy was feasible, given the obvious need for European support, which was not to be taken as granted due to the transatlantic friction, and worth the effort, given the limited American interest east of Warsaw, is another matter.

Another difficult hot spot was – and still is – North Korea and its nuclear programme. The regime in Pyongyang is unpredictable to Western standards, escalating the situation on the Korean peninsula whenever internal or economic (or both) reasons require attention from the international society. As Western analysts could hardly predict North Korean behaviour and escalatory steps, the situation grew worse when North Korea held its first nuclear test in 2006. Its missile arsenal – although it is unlikely that a first-generation nuke will fit on an R-17 or R-18 missile – and the proximity to South Korea and Japan still pose a dangerous mix.\footnote{262} Preventive military action would result in a strong Chinese reaction. China intervened on behalf of North Korea in 1950, sacrificed almost a million lives in war and is not willing to let this bitterly claimed prize go. Economic sanctions proved to be quite useless on the isolated regime, especially as long as Russia and China did not implement them. By inviting both of them to six-party talks, the United States tried to delegate some responsibility of containing North Korea on China. However, the game was tricky. China used North Korea as a bargaining chip to prevent a Korean unification on Western terms – like it happened in Germany before.\footnote{263} As the sunshine policy of President Roh Moo-hyun continued and China continued


\footnote{263 This Chinese position was consistantly communicated by Chinese officials and academics, while participating in the 'International Symposium Course 2007' at the National Defence University, Beijing, 2007;}

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hoping to gain more influence in South Korea and ultimately to drive out the Americans, North Korea was indeed quiet. However, as the sunshine policy deteriorated and the political climate in South Korea shifted, North Korea turned back to its accustomed attitude.\textsuperscript{264} For the U.S., this was a loose-loose situation: either it lost the important South Korean ally to China or it still had to deal with a China-backed North Korea.

The first theatre of war that opened up after 9/11 was Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq, there had been no prior planning or long-term interest in the country before the attacks. The campaign was rather a direct reaction to the attacks. To Bush, the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks ruled out a limited retaliation,\textsuperscript{265} and after the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden – what was expected – their regime had to be toppled militarily. The initial campaign in conjunction with the stabilisation effort later on required different options to be considered.

As soon as the deployment of the troops was decided upon, there was the question whether the direct effort should commit larger numbers of troops or rather support local anti-Taliban alliances. The latter offered the advantage of a more rapid initialisation of the operation, a smoother and lighter build-up of the forces, and no neighbouring power, i.e. Russia, Iran or Pakistan, would feel threatened by a small and specialised U.S. force. International cooperation would be smoother. The disadvantage would be that the local parties could not be tightly controlled or supervised with small forces. If they subverted the war effort, pursued their own goals disregarding the coalition effort or simply failed to deliver the expected results, the U.S. would be in trouble without being in the position to do something about it.

A larger U.S. invasion force would eradicate the problem of reliability and effectiveness. There might be a possibility that key Al-Qa’ida members could slip through Afghan or Pakistani local forces, but not through U.S. forces. And in the aftermath of the operation, the U.S. could establish quickly control over the entire country and, thereby, enable the central government to take over control as well. From the viewpoint of nation-building, a large contingent would have enabled the U.S. to start with the work immediately, not allowing any power vacuums to emerge. However, there are serious drawbacks on this option. First, deploying several hundred thousand troops in a landlocked, cut-off country like Afghanistan would have taken a considerable amount of time – sufficiently for key Al-Qa’ida operatives and infrastructure to disappear. Second, negotiating the rights to deploy such a force either with Pakistan or the Central Asian neighbours would be a tough task. And last, but not least, was nation-building really necessary?

\textsuperscript{264} This, however, was after Bush left office, see Chapter 4.2.1. in this thesis.
The obvious goal was to destroy Al-Qa’ida’s bases and support in Afghanistan as well as denying the organisation to use the country again as an operative base. Leading the Northern Alliance to victory over the Taliban was an obvious consequence of these goals. But then, basically Afghanistan should have been governed by this tribal alliance. Of course, this new state would not be perfect, hardly a democracy and lack the institutions and capabilities of a modern bureaucratic nation state. But was build-up really that necessary in order to deny the country to Al-Qa’ida?

When the Afghan Constitutional Assembly gathered near Bonn in December 2001, further ambitious goals and broad international support were agreed upon. To build up the Afghan government in a comprehensive way reflected the European attitude towards these conflicts and previous measures on the Balkans. But the Bush administration hardly shared the ideological ’poverty plus underdevelopment equals conflict’ paradigm of their European counterparts, so there was hardly a necessity to follow this advice. Bribing the tribal leaders not to support Al-Qa’ida any longer, making credible threats if they did not comply and leave the country as it was would have been a rude, but viable option. Before Iraq, the democratisation argument was not yet used to legitimise the recent steps of the U.S. foreign policy. The military operation was sufficiently justified by 9/11. And unlike Iraq, there was no vital region to transform or other states to counterbalance from inside Afghanistan.

Finally, the Untied States and their allies agreed on rather ambitious goals concerning Afghanistan. “Having returned to Afghanistan after 11 September, it seemed incumbent upon the United States and its allies to do things right this time – above all, not to let the country again fall victim to the medieval cruelties of Taliban rule.” After serious deficits of the new Afghan government became obvious in fall 2002, the Bush administration dropped its rather cautious approach to Afghanistan and together with their European Allies agreed on reconstructing Afghanistan as a capable state. Afghanistan was to be transformed into a democratic state, capable of effectively governing the whole country from the centre, with an open society, granting human rights and good life choices to its citizens. The cause was noble, although the path was long. It consumed many resources, especially as the Bush administration was to open another theatre in Iraq.

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266 Lothar Rühl, "Die strategisch Lage zum Jahreswechsel", in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 1/2003, 3-12, p. 6;
268 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 75;
The most controversial decision – both at home and abroad – that the Bush administration had
to take was the decision to go to war in Iraq. The debate on this topic was – and is – endless.
However, it is worth noticing that the United States did not jump from peace to war in this re-
gard. The military confrontation between the regime of Saddam Hussein had been going on
since August 1990. The United States were in charge of enforcing two no-fly zones, one in the
north above the 36th parallel and one in the south below the 32nd and later the 33rd parallel.
Formally, this should inhibit the use of the Iraqi Air Force against Kurds and Shiites, but it
practically legalised reconnaissance and strike missions to prevent Iraq from assembling lar-
ger troop formations at its disputed borders – as Iraq did in 1992. The no-fly zone in the south
was enforced through air bases in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi-Arabia. A small contingent in
Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia served as a deterrent to prevent Iraq from taking military actions.270
Even before 9/11, the establishment and the duration of this military presence were ques-
tioned. The military presence caused not only opposition from religious Muslims, it added
basing problems and high costs to implement the no-fly zones. The Iraqi regime survived des-
pite harsh economic sanctions, which tied the population more to the regime rather than
caused civil unrest. On the contrary, the suffering of the Iraqi people put pressure on the
United States to withdraw.271 Nobody knew how long Saddam’s dictatorship would last. He
had survived Kurdish and Shiite uprisings in the past. Neighbouring dictatorships survived
serious civil wars, like the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in 1982.
Retreating from the region was not an option, because it would have been interpreted as a
long-term success for Saddam Hussein. It would signal the world that you could out-sit Amer-
ican pressure without giving any reason at all to reduce the pressure on Iraq. With the retreat
option excluded, only the following possible courses were to be considered:272

• Prolonging the containment against Iraq, ignoring public and international criticism.
• Changing the format of the containment effort.
• Conducting a preventive war.
• Exploiting a change in the regional situation that would make the direct containment
  unnecessary.
• Exploiting internal developments within Iraq that would lead towards a regime
  change.

271 See: Harknett, “Fear, Opportunity and Preventive War”. p. 111;
272 These Options are based on: Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*, p. 211ff; However, portions that would include
a ‘post-Mullah’-Iran in a new Middle-East policy as well as options of reducing the American footprint in the
containment policy were not discussed there.

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Out of these options, Bush chose the preventive war. “Preventive war requires not only a sense that security is getting worse, but also a conviction that you can do something about it. For military operations to be viable, in combat terms the strategic environment must favour the offence. Whether offence dominates depends on the technology of the day, the particular balance of forces between potential combatants, geography as well as operational and tactical factors.” Concerning Iraq, the security situation was indeed getting worse. The containment — at least in the then current form — produced no results as far as Iraq was concerned, but alienated the societies of the Gulf States. Furthermore, in almost all Arab states an increasing number of youth called for economic and political change, while the authoritarian regimes in place provided no opportunity to address demands or to express the anger — beside bashing the U.S. and Israel. This became more pressing after 9/11. “The Bush Administration concluded that autocracy, radical ideology, and restless populations are the perfect conditions for supporting a terrorist mentality.” Although wildly rumoured plans of the U.S. administration to achieve change throughout the whole region had to be treated with some suspicion, since conspiracy theories are quite popular in Middle East and even echoed by government officials, politicians, academics, scholars and journalists, the chance of creating an open and democratic Iraq as an alternative to the autocratic stalemate in the region was widely discussed and for some time was a popular option in the U.S.

In addition to the aspect of reforming the region, the 9/11 attacks made the United States seek an alternative ally in the Gulf region. And there were few states that might qualify as an ally, because, beside a more reliable relation towards the United States, a certain amount of regional influence and military and economic potentials were required to have some weight of their own. Iraq, after a regime change, might fulfil these requirements.

Moreover, the war itself was militarily viable. “The UN No-Fly Zones gave the United States unprecedented operational and tactical advantages, in terms of training. For years, the U.S. military actually practised for war over the territory of the country it was going to attack. Geographically, Iraq was very susceptible to U.S. surveillance and thus extremely vulnerable to American precision weaponry. The desert and also the road system presented an opportunity for rapid advance.” Based on rapid mechanised operations, superior fire-power, communic-
ation, leadership and training advantages, the U.S. Army would have a tremendous advantage over the Iraqi forces. The only chances the Iraqi Army had, was urban warfare and the use of WMD. Using the latter was counterproductive, as Kenneth Pollack concluded, because the U.S. forces were prepared for such a case and vengeance for such an attempt would prove devastating.\textsuperscript{280} Urban fighting was the only relevant issue, but even if the Iraqi forces were skillful and determined, it was estimated that they would not cause more than 10,000 casualties\textsuperscript{281} – a number that the U.S. public opinion would probably accept. However, Pollack also gave clear advice to make use of ground forces, especially infantry, to gain control of the cities as quickly as possible and effectively control the country. He also recommended the deployment of over 10,000 engineers and civil engineers to start rebuilding infrastructure immediately.\textsuperscript{282} He did not believe that an air campaign could deliver more than a fast, forceful and massive ground offensive.\textsuperscript{283} However, the most daunting task would be rebuilding, not invading, Iraq.\textsuperscript{284}

Being Clinton’s adviser for the Gulf Region and lobbying for an invasion of Iraq even back then, Pollack’s work is valuable for assessing change and continuity in American foreign policy thinking during a democratic and a republican administration. Considering a military conflict as inevitable, a preventive war was advocated, and the strategy for legitimising the invasion and selling it to the public was based on WMD and the alleged sponsorship of terrorism. The Bush administration actually executed what Pollack had recommended to President Clinton. The differences came with the aim and scope of the reconstruction effort, which will be discussed later on.

In 2003, the conditions to wage a war were good. There also was a bipartisan consensus that the world was better off without Saddam Hussein. The administration, however, discarded the reasons why Clinton did not go to war. These took into account the changed circumstances after 1992. First, Saddam Hussein had successfully cracked the Shi’ite uprising in southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{285} This quite disabled the most potent possible internal ally inside Iraq. The Kurds, still militarily capable, controlled the northern part of Iraq.\textsuperscript{286} Yet, it was unimaginable that U.S.

\textsuperscript{280} Pollack, \textit{The Threatening Storm}, p. 347-349;
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., p. 351;
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., p. 338-342;
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p. 342-344;
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p. 387ff;
\textsuperscript{286} Walter Posch, "Entwicklung und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der kurdischen Selbstverwaltung im Irak", in: Walter Posch, Nathan J. Brown (Eds.), \textit{Kurdische Unabhängigkeitserziehung und irakische Verfassung}, Studien und Berichte Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien, April 2004, 7-90, p. 27ff;
forces would occupy Iraq with the help of the Kurds alone. This would automatically trigger the resistance of other ethnic groups and stir Turkish concerns – a situation that was to be avoided. An ‘Afghan model’, according to which the United States would support an Iraqi Northern Alliance and leave the bulk of ground operations to indigenous armed groups, therefore, was very difficult to conduct. After the experiences in Afghanistan, where the tribes and warlords forming the Northern Alliance later on hindered the emergence of an effective central government – at least in the American narrative – it posed a serious problem: how to deal with the then probably very self-confident local leaders during the reconstruction period. At that time the Iraqi terrain, favourable to armoured warfare, was said not to be suitable for such operations, as the insurgents would lack the prohibitive rear areas (like the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan) to which they can retreat in case they are confronted with overwhelming government forces. However in 2011 the United States conducted an air-support campaign for non-mechanised Libyan rebels against a mechanised enemy. But given the weak position of Iraqi anti-Saddam non-state armed groups after 1993, hardly any auxiliary forces were available even for a full-scale American invasion.

Moreover, in 1996 and 1998 the Iraqi government uncovered and executed several CIA agents. This more or less destroyed the American HUMINT base inside Iraq and made further assessments of the stability of the regime, the situation of the local communities and the moods and interests as well as the dynamics in the major tribes and social groups much more difficult. Kenneth Pollack had few illusions about the American state of information on Iraq:

“Our information about the situation in Iraq is poor. Once we arrive in the country, we might discover that the reality was quite different from what we had expected, requiring us to reformulate plans, strategies, and possibly even goals to conform to what we encounter.” And he proved to be right. At the time this lack of knowledge was seen primarily as a reason not to believe in the success of covert actions to eliminate Saddam Hussein. The problem with not knowing the local political and social structures is not so much an underestimation of military dangers during the invasion, but rather knowing whom to trust after the invasion. There are

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287 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 293ff;
288 Ibid., p. 298ff;
289 Ibid., p. 310-320;
290 This campaign was conducted by a hesitant President trying to avoid the commitment of ground forces. Compared with the pessimism of many commentators at the time, this operation progressed better than anticipated. However, from a pure military view, an “airpower-only” campaign was never the most favoured option. Compared to Libya in 2011, Iraq in 2003 enjoyed a much higher priority in U.S. strategic thinking. Therefore it is conceivable that at the time, U.S. military planners and advisers ruled out a rather risky “airpower-only” campaign to oust Saddam Hussein.
291 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 71-85;
292 Ibid., p. 402;
293 Ibid., p. 281ff;
very rare cases, in which a new, post-war or post-revolutionary government was set up and successfully run by people returning from exile. Usually formerly suppressed or marginalised counter-elites see the opportunity to size power. It is good to know who they are, what background the have, who supports them, and for what reason. Again, it is surprising how clearly Pollack describes the risks of sectarian strife, internal tribal warfare and the possible roles of neighbouring countries would play: Turkey in the Kurdish north, Saudi Arabia sponsoring Sunni extremists, and Iran through Shi’ite groups.294

Without a good HUMINT base inside Iraq and intelligence on the effectiveness and political orientation of non-governmental armed groups, it was difficult to judge whether an uprising was likely in Iraq and who should be supported if one was to occur. Fighting without local support and proper intelligence seemed unwise for the Clinton administration. It might be possible that the Bush administration, especially the then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, considered the technical superiority of the U.S. Forces, the new networking abilities and the electronic intelligence sufficient to make up for these deficits, but this will be left to further research.

Nonetheless, discussing the options in Iraq, all options – deterrence and containment, an Afghanistan-style intervention or full intervention – had serious drawbacks. The risks and opportunity costs, being tied down in a war for a long time, taking the resources to finish Afghanistan and solve other crises in the world – were known and discussed in Washington. Most notably, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel questioned the wisdom of invading Iraq: “If we invade Iraq, what allies will we have? Who governs after Saddam? What is the objective? Have we calculated the consequences, particularly the unintended consequences? What does [a war with Iraq] mean for the unfinished work with Afghanistan? For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? For the tenuous truce between nuclear armed India and Pakistan? … I support the Bush administration policy of regime change in Iraq [but] we must recognize, however, there are no easy, risk-free options...”295 Staying with containment and waiting for an internal dynamic to exploit, like in Libya 2011, would have been not such a bad option. But hardly anybody predicted the Arab Spring a decade before it actually happened, so this was not considered a good option at that time.

The other question was whether there were other states to turn to as an alternative, which would provide a face-saving option to the U.S.? Could the U.S., given the events of 9/11, shift much of the burden of containing Iraq to local allies and move on? After withdrawing from

294 Ibid., p. 387-402;
Iraq in 2011, the United States concluded major arms deals with Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf States. The United States could have done so earlier – equipping local states and being a stronger ‘over the horizon’ reserve was a theoretical option. Missile defence assets were supposed to give some reassurances against Iraqi ballistic missiles – just as they do now against Iranian missiles. The urgency to act in Afghanistan would serve as a good reason to reduce troop strengths in the Gulf. But this option had serious drawbacks, too. First, the U.S. policy of double containment was aimed at containing both Iran and Iraq. It was doubtful whether the Gulf States were able to do that. And if so, whether they would do so and resist the temptation to acquire WMD on their own? After 9/11 the U.S. had several reasons not to trust Saudi Arabia. And if the U.S. could have exploited the situation in Iran in a better way to gain another regional ally?

Confronting Iraq automatically meant not to confront or engage Iran. U.S.-Iranian relations had been at odds since 1979, and both the international agenda and the nuclear programme of Tehran worried Washington. However, since 1997 under the leadership of Mohammad Khatami, a rather reformist government tried to push the Islamic Republic towards modest reforms. The détente between the U.S. and Iran culminated in a tacit cooperation to eliminate the Taliban in Afghanistan after September 2001. After that, the relations cooled down. Bush included Iran in the axis of evil – undermining the reformists, which were internally criticised for the rapprochement towards the U.S. – and Iran remained ambiguous about its nuclear intentions, raising doubts whether the reformists were a policy change at all. On the other hand, especially Iranian authors claimed that a different U.S. policy could have made a difference. Until Ahmadinejad assumed power, there were several attempts of Iranian officials to negotiate the normalisation of bilateral relations.

It is hard to assess whether a rapprochement-policy of the U.S. towards Iran could have delivered the desired results. The conservatives still had a strong power base throughout both of Khatami’s terms, with the Guardian Council in a strong veto position and in control of major parts of the security apparatus. They blocked the reformists successfully and there was little doubt that a more generous U.S. would not have changed this basic behaviour. However, amongst Iranian intellectuals there was the opinion that in case of a sincere change of Western policy towards Iran, the street could rise against conservatives trying to block changes. On the

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297 See for Khatami’s détente: Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p. 202-222; and Afghanistan p. 223ff;
298 Ibid., p. 243ff;
other hand, achieving regime change within Iran in any case would be a daring and, most probably, quite a bloody task. As far as the mainstream Western perception was concerned, there was little that could be done from outside to help make this happen anyway. However, continuing internal unrest and youth protests in Iran showed that there was severe discontent with the regime. And it was a viable political option to try to capitalise on this discontent. The war in Iraq was alienating the Iranian public, and the spreading disorder in Mesopotamia decreased the appetite for regime change and revolution in Iran. On the other hand, it could not be guaranteed that the Iranian public would be willing to confront the conservatives under the threat of governmental reprisals, because the U.S. had not invaded Iraq. Was the United States aware of the option of supporting the opposition in Iran? It is conceivable that it was, but neither the existence of such plans nor the reasons why they were turned down can be found or proved at the time of writing. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to add further speculations about this issue.

Another option was to see the results of the reform movement first, and then deal with Iraq on the basis of this result. A cooperative Iran would certainly transform the whole containment effort of the U.S. And it would offer additional options inside Iraq, as Iran’s support for the Shi’ites in Iraq would be to the American advantage, instead of being another risk factor. In Afghanistan, having an alternative transit route for the supplies of Enduring Freedom would probably have made a difference as well. However, this would have required a radical break with the then existing U.S. Middle Eastern policy – as well as betting on an uncertain trend. And the administration and also the political elites seemed not to be willing to take the risk.

The last question regarding different options was the U.S. foreign policy towards Ukraine and Georgia. The colourful revolutions that happened during the Bush administration’s term in office (the author found no convincing evidence that the administration had a hand in it, so it has to be assumed that the U.S. reacted to the events unfolding), and left both countries with a Western-oriented government in office. Both governments were committed to a reform agenda enabling or facilitating a possible membership of NATO as well as of the EU.

In Ukraine, the government supported NATO membership, however, the majority of the population did not. Aside from popular opinion, there were no reasons preventing Ukraine from joining NATO if the government had been granted a “Membership Action Plan” (MAP). EU integration was a popular option, but a very daunting task, given Ukraine’s economic situation, and met with little love from the EU core member states. In Georgia, NATO and EU

299 Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad, p. 58ff;
300 For the situation in Ukraine see: Oksana Czarny, Die Ukraine und die Europäische Union, Stand und
integration were popular, but the territorial conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were formal obstacles for the integration in both.\(^{301}\)

The United States supported the membership pledges of both, and also supported Georgia in various internal and military reform programmes to foster interoperability between NATO and U.S. forces.\(^{302}\) In Georgia, this support was presumably misread and the Georgian leadership at least did not fear pushing in the circle of escalation.\(^{303}\) Georgia unofficially lost its Western support by this war and is isolated now and faces an ever deteriorating military situation with Russia. In Ukraine, the tide of democratisation quickly turned back, when the reformist camp was caught up in internal struggles and lost elections and power in 2009/10 to pro-Russian authoritarian movements.\(^{304}\) These bitter results of the colourful revolutions pose some questions as to whether there were different options to play with in both countries. Did the U.S. overdo it and create misleading impressions in both countries, or did the U.S. failed to do what it should have, thereby letting two countries slip away? There were of course other options and the situation in Georgia in particular was not handled overly well.

One option was to totally withdraw from the region of the former Soviet Union after the 2004 NATO expansion and, thereby, unofficially recognise Russia’s claim to an exclusive sphere of influence, but this was not very appealing. In 2003 and 2004, when the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine promised new democratic regimes in these countries, the United States just had led a war in Iraq and a larger military operation in Afghanistan on the cause of democracy. It would have been very disturbing for the rest of the world to see the U.S. go to war in the Gulf for the cause of a political change, but would not support such a change when it happened in other regions. Furthermore, the Russian claim to an exclusive sphere of influence was contradictory to the concept of universality of the liberal international norms and values, for which the U.S. had fought two world wars to uphold.

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\(^{301}\) For the situation in Georgia see: Peter Schmidt, “Der georgische Knoten, mögliche Beiträge der EU zur Beilegung des Georgien-Konfliktes”, in: Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Reihe Studien, IILP Wien, Vol. 27, October 2008, p. 30-33;

\(^{302}\) This was mainly because Georgia sent larger contingents to Iraq and later Afghanistan. See: Eugene Kogan, Armenia’s and Georgia’s Security Agenda, Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Reihe Studien, IILP Wien, July 2012, p. 13ff. and 18ff.;

\(^{303}\) The responsibility for the escalation is still debated. While the Russian version that blamed Georgia is the most widely accepted, there are some serious doubts with the presumed Georgian ‘war-plan’, that rather suggested that Georgia’s reaction was not that well prepared. At the very least, the Georgian side allowed itself to be lured into the spiral of escalation by Russia. How far a presumed reassurance that the West would be on Georgia’s side played a role with that, is still open to debate. See for an initial result: Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, September 2009, Volume I, p. 10ff;

The U.S. could have done more of course. One might speculate endlessly, which step would have produced which results. It has to be noted that, given the experiences in Eastern Europe, the chance for a successful transition and sustainable pro-American government was much higher among former Communist European states than in those regions where the United States was paying dearly for the cause of democratisation, i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, beside democratisation, there was no real American interest in either Ukraine or Georgia.305 The main goal of expanding NATO – beside the spread of the American value system – was the stabilisation of Europe in the terms of preventing a new Cold War division in Europe and creating a buffer for the important European markets and centres against any hegemonic or imperial claims.306 Europe and its buffer would not reach to Central Asia. The NATO expansion round of 2004 had quite accomplished this goal. And for the Americans, the Europeans should bear their own security themselves and do more to stabilise their eastern border. Ukraine and Georgia lacked priority for the U.S., so rendering not much more than the diplomatic lip service regarding the support of the two states was an option.307

While doing little, the U.S. could have done that little better than it actually did. Given the unpopularity of NATO membership in the Ukraine, the U.S. could have used its diplomatic weight to persuade transatlantic-oriented states within the EU to speed up association with the Union instead of the dead-end road towards MAP. Yet, given the poor record of such attempts for Turkey, one has to admit that the American capabilities to do this are not particularly good. And concerning Georgia, the U.S. had to have been clear about the limits of U.S. support for Georgia. Despite the geopolitical fantasies of some spectators, the Caucasus was, and is, not worth a great-power confrontation! U.S. officials had been often enough to Georgia308 to make this simple logic clear.

3.3.4. Domestic factors affecting foreign policy

Explaining all factors of American domestic politics that either facilitated or complicated U.S. foreign policy would require quite an effort – or even another thesis on its own. Here, only some basic assumptions will be dealt with.

The Bush administration's foreign policy was very controversial abroad and within the U.S., and the discussion about it could be described exhaustively. But recognising the existence of

305 Klaus Becher, Die USA als Faktor des Konfliktmanagements in Georgien, Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Reihe Studien, Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik Wien, September 2007, p. 7ff;
306 Brill, "Die NATO-Osteuweiterung und die geopolitischen Interesse der Mächte", p. 637-648;
307 See: Becher, Die USA als Faktor des Konfliktmanagements in Georgien;
308 Gressel, "Der Krieg am Kaukasus", p. 19-20;
criticism is one thing, its political impact is another. The main question to be answered here is whether domestic politics had a restraining or facilitating effect on foreign policy. As Bush, in his memoirs, tried to defend himself and his decisions, this defensive stance was not taken from the start. Indeed, after 9/11, the administration could count on broad domestic support. Opposition and criticism were directed against the domestic counter-terrorism policy rather than at the broad cause of foreign policy itself. Even in the very beginning of operation Iraqi Freedom, there was little internal opposition. Many democrats, journalists and public opinion leaders still thought that the war to end Saddam’s rule and the WMD programme was justified and would produce positive results. “Neither American political culture nor any underlining domestic pressures or constraints have determined the key decisions in American foreign policy since Sept. 11. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Americans would have allowed President Bush to lead them in any of several directions, and the nation was prepared to accept substantial risks and sacrifices.”

Indeed, had there not been the feeling of a direct threat and the need to go to war with America’s enemies, the Iraq War, the massive increase in the U.S. military spending and the expansion of U.S. military operations worldwide in the course of the war on terror would hardly be imaginable. In the years up to re-election, the domestic front was more a support than a constraint to the Republican administration. Up to the 109th Congress, Republicans had had a thin majority in both houses, but key acts on the war on terror or Iraq passed with greater majority.

The situation deteriorated when the Abu Ghraib Scandal came up and with a domestic event that was handled quite badly by the Bush administration: the aftermath of hurricane Katrina. The popularity and support for the President started to decline. But regarding foreign policy, the dice had been cast already. Domestic pressure to end the wars in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, that in Afghanistan, made the management of those conflicts more difficult. But given the precarious situation on the ground, they were already difficult enough.

The Bush administration was in a total defence of its foreign policy. The continuation of military operations had to be defended with the argument that a premature withdrawal would do greater damage to the U.S. than continuing the fighting. The surge in Iraq gave rise to the
hope that the domestic opposition might be sidetracked. But gaining legislative support for the surge was an uphill battle for the Bush administration and showed the weariness of the legislators to commit an ever increasing amount of money and manpower for the war in Iraq. Nonetheless, the Bush administration made one major strategic blunder, probably to appease the domestic opposition. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, which had been concluded in late 2008 and would limit the American presence until 31 December 2011. This strict time schedule had been demanded by Malaki, but Bush gave in to it, partly because in the election campaign there was doubt that the Republicans were indeed serious about withdrawing from this unpopular war. The situation in Iraq had become a major issue in the presidential campaign, dimming Republican chances for victory. However, there was little reason to believe that such a contract would change the mind of the determined opponents of the Iraq-war, or interest those voters who are less concerned. After all the Republican candidate Mc Cain rejected the option of an early withdraw, so the move did not seem to underline any specific policy intended by the Republican candidate.

This SOFA later narrowed Obama's options in Iraq and, to some extent, pre-determined his Middle East Policy. Furthermore, Obama was not quite able to bridge the partisan gaps that had widened during the Bush administration. Strong partisan criticism and delegitimisation of the President by the liberal and the left spectrum of the political landscape returned after January 2009, with hard, inflexible and delegitimising criticism of the right, especially the Tea Party Republicans. Partisan division widened and, in the end, the institution of the presidency suffered most.

Moreover the rejection of American values in Iraq, the miscalculations on which the decisions to go to war were based, and the increasing domestic opposition led to a war-weariness in U.S. public opinion. For the time to come, the U.S. public would be very sceptical towards any U.S. involvement in the Arab world, regardless the cause and circumstances. This weariness would have profound impact on the foreign policy of the next administration.

There is another issue that needs to be commented - although briefly: lobbying. Every repres-

314 Ibid., p. 355ff;
315 Lindsay, “The Shifting Pendulum of Power: Executive-Legislative Relations on American Foreign Policy”, p. 208-209;
316 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 73-74;
318 McCain, in Foreign Policy Talk, Turns His Back on Unilateralism, New York Times Online, 27. March 2008;
entative or politician depends on support by interest-groups, business-associations, etc. to raise the money, organisational structures, and domestic support to win elections. At the end, these lobbying-groups demand some sort of compensation for their efforts: regulatory politics, subsidies, public acquisition of certain goods, and so forth. Seeking to influence governmental decisions through lobbying is a particular American phenomenon – although present in all political systems (with respective variations). However, usually Lobbying is about domestic policies, like subsidies, public acquiescence, infrastructure and regulatory policies. Neither business nor syndicates earn much in foreign-policy, especially not in “high-politics”. It may be taken for granted, that the agricultural lobby successfully prevented any opening up of the U.S. agricultural markets to foreign competition. It may be assumed that there is heavy lobbying concerning trade policies, tariffs, and especially energy policies. But this are topics not central to this thesis, therefore not treated at length.

However, there is a debate about the influence of lobbying on topics central to this thesis. First of all, Walt and Mearsheimer made an interesting argument on how far the ‘Israel-Lobby’ influenced the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq. The authors make some good points outlining the continuity and influence of the pro-Israeli lobby on U.S. public opinion. However, concerning the Iraq-decision, it would be an overstatement to credit Israeli lobbying for this particular move. The strategic rationale to resolve the Iraq issue was – at that time – strong within the U.S. administration, political elite, and bureaucracy. Some top-officials in the Bush administration (especially Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of Defence Rumsfield and Deputy Secretary of Defence Wolfowitz) were arguing for another Iraq-war since the 90s. At some occasions, the Bush-administration – utterly convinced of their own arguments – associated support for the U.S. cause in Iraq with a general support for the leading international role of the United States. In the U.S., being for the removal of Saddam was a matter of patriotism. It would have been unwise for the Israel-lobby not to wave the flag! After all, if of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy would have achieved the intended results, Israel would have profited from the new regional balance of power. One further indication that the Iraq-debate was driven rather by domestic American considerations than by lobbying from abroad, was that Israelis (those living and writing in Israel) were less enthusiastic about the

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war in Iraq as a contribution to Israel’s security situation or were much more sceptical about the feasibility of U.S. plans in Iraq than those Israelis and Jews living in the U.S. (being influenced by the domestic debate then dominating the news). “The Iraq war was not the result of the influence of Israel and the U.S. based pro-Israel lobby. Nor was concern for Israel’s security the motivating factor for neoconservative advocates inside and outside the Bush-administration. Although neoconservatives, the pro-Israel lobby, and Israel’s government all supported, to varying degrees, a war with Iraq, they did so for a variety of reasons, not all of which they agreed upon.”

This does by no way mean that Israel does not enjoy a special relationship with the United States or that the Israel-lobby in the United States is entirely powerless. But its overall influence is much more indirect: it shapes general preferences of the American political elites and evaluators, creating public and elite sympathies for Israel’s interests. But is is not able to “order” a certain decision from the U.S. government. Especially high-profile governmental decisions such as the Iraq war are always the results of multiple discussions amongst governmental actors: the top cabinet members, elite factions, the different branches of the bureaucracy, domestic political actors, and interest groups. They all try to influence the government the one way or the other. A lobbying group is one actor amongst others. Of course it may be argued that the one or the other lobby finally tipped the balance into one direction. But even to tip a balance, there has to be support from many other actors for a certain decision first.

One particular influential actor with regard to foreign policy is the bureaucracy. Some branches of the bureaucracy had indeed a hard ride with the Bush-administration. Further described in chapter 3.3.6.2., the military apparatus was subjected to deep reforms. “Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure as secretary of defence will continue to be marked by his attempts to transform the military into lighter, nimbler force better able to take advantage of new technology and respond to new threats.” The bureaucracy was not quite happy with these reforms, especially as the heavy emphasis on network technology did not bring about the intended success. Later concentrating on large-scale counter-insurgency operations, Air-Force and Navy feared for their share in new procurement programmes and the overall defence budget. The fear

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323 See for the then debate about Israel’s security: Yossi Beilin, “Israel’s Security as a Major Consideration for Peace in the Middle East”, in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2004, E.S. Mittler, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, p. 469-480;
325 Mearsheimer, Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.168ff;
327 Ibid., p.226-229;
that the focus on current wars would hinder the development of capacities to win the next one was not without some truth, however in the wake of mounting casualties in the current campaigns, this argument was difficult to defend domestically.

Equally the intelligence community was particularly unhappy with the politicisation of their findings in the wake of the decision to go to war in Iraq. However the task of preventing the next terrorist attacks on American soil gave reason enough to increasing budgets and competences on an unprecedented scale. The Department of Homeland Defence was spared from Republican scepticism against a large bureaucratic apparatus. As described in chapter 3.3.7. documents would later leak to the public suggesting that the power and competences of the intelligence services were used extensively, interpreted creatively, and even abused considerably.

However, much research needs to be done beyond this thesis. Some questions hard to answer at this point of research are: how far did industrial lobbying facilitate the adaptation of the “post-modern military doctrine” in the United States? At the End, there was considerable interest selling new “network able” platforms to the military. Did lobbying from certain branches of the defence industry facilitate the development of the U.S. missile defence architecture? After all, there was no domestic support for developing new offensive strategic missiles so the development of defensive ones would give some new impetus to missile development. But it will be up to other theses to cover this issues.

3.3.5. Policies – object-bound and general policies

The following chapter will describe some of the key policies of the Bush administration. The description does not need to cover everything the Bush administration ever did, rather depict the policies that defined the administration’s approach to key problems in international relations, and which are worth being compared to the policies of the Obama administration.

3.3.5.1. The Global War on Terrorism

One of the most prominent and controversial policies of the Bush administration was the

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Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) that contained various operative tasks – from military operations to a broad range of new regulations for transnational transactions of various types.\textsuperscript{330} The goals of the policy were blurred to some extent, especially because high-ranking officials, in particular President Bush, had formulated very high-flying objectives: “No group or nation should mistake America’s intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.”\textsuperscript{331} The strategy’s authors found a way to somehow formulate reasonable goals for their chief’s rhetoric. The Americans thought to mount overwhelming pressure – including the use of military operations – on terrorist organisations affiliated with global Jihadism, in order to disrupt their operations and make their operational environment more difficult. Instead of an overall victory, their operative effectiveness was to be reduced to the point that these terrorists cease to be a global threat, becoming an isolated problem of the criminal domain in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{332}

The policy rested on two pillars. One was to increase the pressure on the respective organisations militarily by attacking their structures wherever they reached a considerable degree of organisational and military size. The other pillar was to adapt the handling of transnational routine interactions to disturb the support operations (recruiting, financing, training, propaganda, etc.) of terrorist organisations. The U.S.-led and championed open and low-barrier international system of trade and financing had to be adapted in order to confront the inherent threats and risks of its open architecture. This was a quite complex undertaking, hardly mentioned in contemporary literature.\textsuperscript{333}

But first, the military theatres will be treated. While Iraq was an operation initiated upon American choice, the Afghan, South-East Asian, Asian and to some extent Latin-American theatres were activated as a response to local terrorist challenges. The criteria for military engagements were laid down in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:\textsuperscript{334} Primarily, states should combat terrorism by themselves, but cooperate in doing so. If a state was too weak to do so alone or lacked certain capabilities, the U.S. would gradually support this state through state and capacity-building programmes, including operative capabilities by the U.S. military apparatus itself. Only if states were apparently unwilling to cooperate and when international pressure would suffice to make them comply, a direct intervention would take

\textsuperscript{330} For a good compilation of the strategic aims, feared risks and taken measures in the GWOT see: Lawrence Freedman, “Die Auswirkungen des Terrorismus auf die internationale Sicherheit”, in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2002, Band 2, p. 483–496;
\textsuperscript{331} The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington D.C., 2003, p. 1;
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., p. 12–13;
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid., p. 13ff;
In Afghanistan, the Bush administration was committed to the creation of a strong, centralised, democratic government in Kabul, which would take over the responsibility for security within its own country. Initially, a small U.S. military presence (one army division, one marine expeditionary unit and some special forces) were left in Afghanistan to combat the remaining Taliban and search for key Al-Qa’ida personnel. Rebuilding the country and its administrative infrastructure was left to NATO’s ISAF with its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in a non-combatant role as well as other aid organisations. They were to improve the reach of Kabul’s central government out into the countryside and, together with the Americans, train the new founded Afghan National Army (ANA). However, this approach did not work at all. The government in Kabul never gained much legitimacy in the countryside and for various reasons the local warlords and tribal leaders saw the expansion of Kabul’s competences rather as a threat than an opportunity. The Taliban, in turn just needed some time to regroup, resupply and find out where the weaknesses of the Americans was. Moreover, they had to reactivate their infrastructure in Pakistan, giving them safe havens for conducting a guerilla campaign in Afghanistan.

Since 2005, the number of attacks against allied and U.S. government forces had been increasing. The areas bordering onto Pakistan and the tacit support of the Taliban by certain factions of the Pakistani security apparatus became an increasing problem. There were other problems as well: the underfunding of the whole effort, insufficient troop numbers, internal fighting among local warlords and catastrophic performance of the Afghan government authorities, especially in the security sector.

However, the Bush administration did little to reverse the course of the war. The campaign in Iraq did consume most of the means – military and financial ones – and although the budget

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335 See: Ibid., p. 21; this was rather a reassurance to the rest of the international community that the U.S. would not use the GWOT to topple other regimes. The only state in which the U.S. permanently intervened against the will of a government was Afghanistan, and this operation was already being conducted when the strategy was written. But many authoritarian states felt very nervous about the U.S. goal of regime change after the Iraq War, nevertheless the U.S. had to rely on their cooperation.


340 Ibid., p. 113;


for Afghanistan was increased from USD 19 billion in 2006 to USD 39 billion in 2007, it stayed far short of the 131 bn. for Iraq.\textsuperscript{344} Saving Mesopotamia from chaos had always been a higher priority than saving Afghanistan. The military campaign was continued as a low intensity conflict, but until substantial forces were freed from Iraq – which was not the case until the very end of Bush’s second term – no critical switch of the strategy could have been undertaken.

But Afghanistan was not the only theatre for Enduring Freedom. The other less known theatres were the Philippines, the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Philippines the task was to support the Philippine government in fighting Islamist insurgents and terrorist groups (the Abu Sayyaf and the Jemaah Islamiyah) in Mindanao and on the adjacent islands.\textsuperscript{345} As the operations were concealed and covert, there is not much to evaluate and judge upon – open source reporting is close to non-existent. However, the situation was not that simple. Neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia, both predominantly Muslim countries, had mixed feelings about the U.S. presence and the Philippine government’s handling of the insurgency. While being at odds with Islamist movements at home, they feared that the campaign might end in a general suppression of the Muslim minority, and of course they had to deal with strong anti-American sentiments and prejudices at home.\textsuperscript{346} Yet, the Philippines succeeded by and large in dividing the insurgents and maintaining a viable ceasefire with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),\textsuperscript{347} while combating those radical elements that did not agree to a ceasefire and the negotiating process. Despite ceasefire violations and incidents, this has to be regarded as quite a success. The operations worked according to the principles laid down in the counterterrorism strategy: put the terrorist organisation under pressure from the security apparatus, on the one hand, and try to divide and diminish their support and tackle the situation they use to gain legitimacy, on the other. However, contrary to other theatres of the War on Terror, the U.S. could count on a capable local ally both in political and military terms.

Combating Islamist terrorist organisations around the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean proved to be much more difficult. The theatre’s significance was that Somalia and Ye-

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid., p. 45;
\textsuperscript{347} Separatists in Philippines Agree to Reconcile, New York Times Online, 15 December 2007; Interestingly the deal was brokered by Gaddafi’s Libya.
men were both alternative staging areas and basing areas for Al-Qa’ida and other Islamist internationalists, who were driven out of the oil-rich Gulf States. Especially Yemeni personnel held key posts in Al-Qa’ida’s executive structure in 2001, and hunting down their local networks was a priority goal. But Yemen ceased to cooperate with the United States in this regard as a reaction to the pending invasion of Iraq. The situation further deteriorated when the Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU) seized power in Somalia in December 2006. Despite an Ethiopian invasion that stopped the ICU, the situation in Somalia stayed fragile and hostile during the Bush administration’s last term.

Lacking the means to open a third major theatre of war, the United States had to rely on local allies to help them contain the Islamists. Based at Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa has the primary duty to train military personnel and units from surrounding states in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics. U.S. direct military operations were limited to single strikes on key Al-Qa’ida personnel or limited counter-piracy actions – although due to the secrecy of these operations the full extent of the U.S. military presence in the region will remain unknown for some decades to go. The United States politically backed the establishment of an African Union Mission to Somalia and there are constant rumours about the U.S. backing the Ethiopian intervention in the conflict. But given the lack of access to information and the popularity of conspiracy theories and allegations of U.S./CIA interference in almost every affair in this region, such an hypothesis can neither be verified nor clearly falsified. The U.S. provided military training and assistance to the Kenyan and Ethiopian Armed Forces as well as to the remnants of the Somali central government’s forces. An Ethiopian intervention that at least temporarily prevented Somalia from becoming another Taliban-dominated Afghanistan could have served the short and medium-term interests of the U.S. However, neither Ethiopia nor the AU or the remnants of the Somali government were able to fill the power vacuum and stabilise the situation.

Concerning Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Saharah, the situation was less dramatic. Here again the U.S. Military was in a supporting role, assisting the armed forces of Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania in their struggle against Al-Qa’ida, insurgents and drug smug-

348 Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi-Arabia*, p. 130ff;
351 See for the webpage of the taskforce: http://www.hoa.africom.mil/;
352 Matthies, "Konfliktdynamik und externe Akteure in Somalia", p. 24-25;
glers. To coordinate both theatres, an additional joint command was established in Africa in 2007.\textsuperscript{355} However, the U.S. had difficulties finding a host nation for the command,\textsuperscript{356} which is now situated in Stuttgart, Germany. When Bush left office, the Military Balance listed 1,900 personnel deployed in Africa.\textsuperscript{357} That is a quite low number, especially by American standards. Beside this, maritime surveillance missions to intercept all kinds of illegal shipments were set up under the umbrella of Enduring Freedom and Active Endeavour.\textsuperscript{358} These operations were the link towards a broader policy of the Bush administration, with the aim of managing the interdependency and broad transnational interaction that is known under the term of globalisation under the conditions of the terror and the proliferation threat. The aim was, while not reducing or limiting legal free transnational interaction, i.e. reversing globalisation, to reduce the risks associated with it. Most visible to everyone were the new flight security regulations, the policy was broader, setting up new regulations for maritime transport, customs, border, and maritime supervision, data exchange between security agencies and the increase of communication surveillance.

Beside the major theatres of war, and especially in Iraq, the Global War on Terrorism was not a very bellicose policy. Most of it can be referred to as state-building, security sector cooperation and enhanced supervision of the free flow of people and goods.

The U.S. had some previous experience in trying to strengthen states to enforce the monopoly of force and to fight sub-state violent groups, i.e. the war on drugs in Latin America.\textsuperscript{359} Since the mid-80s the United States provided military and police assistance, economic aid and expertise to several Latin American states – especially Colombia – to fight Communist guerilla forces that financed their revolutionary activities by producing drugs. After the end of the Cold War, the socialist-revolutionary agenda of the guerillas was sidelined by the pure financial interests of drug dealing – and the war continued. There are allegations that later left-wing governments, like that of Chavez, would support the FARC/ELN for the reason of pan-socialist solidarity, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into details in the South American power struggles.\textsuperscript{360} After 9/11 the Bush administration applied the same legal instruments for

\textsuperscript{355} See the web presence of US-AFRICOM: http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp
\textsuperscript{356} Ploch, Africa Command, p. 10;
\textsuperscript{358} Gunther Hauser, Die NATO Transformation, Aufgaben, Ziele, Peter Lang, Wien, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, p. 85ff;
\textsuperscript{360} See for a further discussion: David R. Marnes, Latin America and the illusion of peace, IISS Adelphi Paper, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 94-107;
fighting terrorism to the counter-drug struggles in Latin America. FARC/ELN were put on the list of terrorist organisations and military assistance and other programmes were adjusted to the new policies. From a technical perspective this was comprehensible: if there are legal and policy instruments that were seen as more efficient than previous ones, they would be used in other theatres of operation, too. However the Latin American drug cartels and drug guerillas were not part of the terrorism problem in itself; they did not adhere to Islamic revisionist thought, they had no detailed foreign policy agenda and they did not challenge the United States or Western civilisation politically. Hence, while similar instruments were used in fighting them, the drug wars in Latin America, although declared a part of the war on terror, are to be treated as something different. As criminal organisations pose a challenge to the public security in technical terms, but hardly to the political and the social order as such, they are regarded as a mere technical problem and not as a big political issue. That is why this aspect is not treated in detail in this thesis. As mentioned in the introduction, the author does not adhere to concepts of ‘comprehensive’ or ‘human security’.

3.3.5.2. The Middle East Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Another controversial topic was Bush’s Middle East policy. Iraq was only one theatre, restarting the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians was another goal of the Bush administration. Indeed, removing Saddam Hussein was seen as a precondition for this. After showing their strength and determination in Iraq, few states and non-state actors would dare to confront the United States. Pushing Saudi Arabia towards political reform, that was the common assumption, would undermine Islamism in the region. And it would deter the Palestinians from launching another Intifada or from believing that the destruction of Israel were a viable goal. “By standing resolutely behind Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Bush believes he will convince the Palestinians that they will get nowhere with violence, message the administration wants the entire world to understand as part of the war on terrorism.”

Manoeuvring the United States into a position of strength, from which Bush could force the Arabs and the Israelis to make concessions, was the initial plan. Bush’s rose garden speech on 24 June 2002, in which he set the creation of a Palestinian state as a goal of U.S. foreign policy – the first time that an American president had announced such a decision – was full

363 Ibid., p. 159;
364 Ibid., p. 159;
of self-confidence. However, events in Iraq soon foiled this policy. Instead of dominating the events in the Middle East peace process, the United States would soon be found on the reactive side.

The momentum did not stop in 2003. Right after the invasion of Iraq, Bush and the then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon began talks about an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.\textsuperscript{365} Officially, this was Sharon’s plan. But it was closely coordinated with the U.S., even delayed after the 2004 presidential elections (in order not to create domestic problems or resistance from the Jewish community in the U.S. for Bush’s re-election).\textsuperscript{366} The disengagement plan had full support of the Bush administration, which tried to rally Arab and European support for it.\textsuperscript{367}

It can be assumed that to the U.S. the withdrawal from Gaza was a kind of trial for further Israeli disengagement. Gaza was not a part of the ancient kingdom of Israel, so the ideological loss of it was minor to the Israeli religious right. Only few settlers lived there, around 8,500, who could be compensated and resettled in the Israeli core-land easily.\textsuperscript{368} A successful pull-out from Gaza might have been the prelude to further withdrawals. At least the U.S. discussed these options with Israel.\textsuperscript{369} Israel’s hasty construction of the security barrier was also an indication that the U.S. support for a prolonged occupation of the West Bank would not last forever. Sharon was under enormous domestic pressure, fearing that the U.S. would later demand a complete pull-out from the West Bank.\textsuperscript{370} When European and Arab politicians leashed out on Bush for announcing that the U.S. might accept that Israel kept some settlements on the West Bank,\textsuperscript{371} they overlooked that no U.S. president ever had put Israel under such pressure to make tangible concessions and had come so close to a complete withdrawal than Bush during the spring of 2004. His distrust of formalised institutions and UN-headed negotiations was justified. In the past, shuttle diplomacy, i.e. separate negotiations with representatives of the parties involved, and direct American pressure had moved the peace process much more than formal diplomatic squabbling. And no quartet, envoy or other negotiating format ever came closer to achieving substantial concessions from the parties involved than Bush did after his military victory in Iraq.

However, as soon as it became clear that the triumphant victory in Iraq was elusive and that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{365} Sharon strebt Gebietsausgleich mit Palästinensern an, Widerstand in eigener Koalitionsregierung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 February 2004;
  \item \textsuperscript{366} American envoys to be briefed on PM’s disengagement plan, Haaretz Online, 18 February 2004;
  \item \textsuperscript{367} U.S. Trying to get Europe, Arabs behind the disengagement plan, Haaretz Online, 27 February 2004;
  \item \textsuperscript{368} See for the pullout: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2006}, The IISS Annual Review of World Affairs, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 223-226;
  \item \textsuperscript{369} PM to meet with U.S. envoys on extent of West Bank pullout, Haaretz Online, 10 March 2004;
  \item \textsuperscript{370} Vor dem Treffen Sharon-Bush in Washington, Was geschieht nach Israels Abzug aus dem Gaza-Streifen?, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 April 2004;
  \item \textsuperscript{371} Breite Kritik an Bushs Kehrtwende in der Nahostfrage, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 15 April 2004;
\end{itemize}
the U.S. would be tied down rather than be revealed by their presence in Iraq, Israel lost interest in further talks and the Palestinians stepped up violence and terrorist attacks. Arafat passed away and in Israel internal turbulence complicated politics. Any further attempts to revive the talks were fruitless. While the Israelis prepared and executed the disengagement plan from Gaza, Hamas gained political momentum in the Gaza Strip, ultimately winning the elections in spring 2006. The Middle East peace process was dead for years to come. From then on, the United States could only react and try to manage the frequent eruptions of violence that occurred especially between Hamas-led Gaza and Israel. There was no freedom to manoeuvre in terms of a substantial alternation of the situation on the ground. The momentum was lost.

The other theatre where the United States could have brought about a certain change of events was Lebanon and Syria. After tensions about Syria’s role in both Iraq’s increasing insurgency problem and the murder of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005, Syria agreed to negotiate in both cases with the West. Soon, Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon, Assad continued talks about normalising the relations with Jordan, and Syria started internal reforms by allowing other parties to legally register. However, as the U.N. Tribunal uncovered more and more details about the Syrian involvement in the Hariri plot, with which Syria was quite uncomfortable, although Assad could be sure that U.S. and French pressure would limited to sanctions and diplomatic efforts, from which they were eventually saved by Russia, the rapprochement was called off. Despite close French-American policy coordina-

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372 Israel rückt von Nahost-Friedensplan ab, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 6 October 2004;
373 Rückkehr der Gewalt nach Nahost, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 16 January 2005;
374 Sharon fails to convince NRP party to stay, Jerusalem Post Online, 7 November 2004; Nur Wahlen können Ruhe bringen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 15 November 2004;
375 Diplomatische Offensive in Nahost, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 April 2004; Israel supports UK peace summit but won’t participate, Haaretz Online, 17 December 2004; Abbas erhält Einladung ins Weiße Haus, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 January 2005;
376 Hamas Triumph bei Lokalwahlen in Gaza, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 29 January 2005; Die Hamas in der Gust der Wähler, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 6 May 2005; Hamas zum Regieren entschlossen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 08 January 2006; Israel über palästinensischen Wahlauflauf besorgt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 26 January 2006; Demokratische Weihen für die Hamas, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 January 2006; Hamas victory in Palestine vote stuns MidEast, New York Times Online, 27 January 2006;
378 Syrien zieht Truppen im Libanon näher an die Grenze zurück, Reaktionen auf internationalen Druck, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 February 2005; Abzug Syriens aus dem Libanon abgeschlossen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 27 April 2005;
379 Syria’s Assad, Jordanian PM meet on boosting ties, Jerusalem Post, 3 May 2005;
380 Abkehr vom Einparteiensstaat, Syriens Baath Partei für Zulassung weiterer Parteien, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 June 2005; Syria’s dissidents unite to issue a call for change, New York Times Online, 20 October 2005;
tion, both powers did not succeed in outmanoeuvring Syria’s influence in Lebanon. Soon internal violence and border clashes with Israel dominated Lebanon, peaking in the abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah on 12 July, triggering a war between Israel and this organisation.

President Bush’s vision of enforcing peace as a strongman in the Middle East has its merits. Despite the criticism and anger, a U.S. that was able and willing to use its mighty military war engine at will was a credible stick that forced Arabs to the negotiation table or to comply with former agreements and Israelis to make concessions. Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad confessed to the Italian newspaper La Republica that in the aftermath of the Iraq campaign he feared “a direct military assault by the U.S.” And this was his primary reason to comply with the U.N. and withdraw from Lebanon. However, as the struggle in Iraq intensified, it became increasingly clear that the U.S. would not risk another war theatre. By mid-2005, the U.S. influence and authority started to decline. In 2006, Bush’s position of a strongman turned into the opposite. Unable to pressurise the local parties, internal divisions and conflicts re-emerged. Freed of fear from serious punishment, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon did as they pleased. The coma of Ariel Sharon left a power vacuum in Israel, governed by a fragile coalition of Kadima and Labour, both led by untested leaders (Olmert and Peretz). As the big stick of the American shepherd vanished, all sheep headed out for different directions – each to be eaten by his own wolf.

3.3.5.3 The U.S. Policy towards Europe and the Russian Federation

One of the most important decisions concerning the European security architecture was taken in Bush’s term of office, even though it was not only due to the work of this particular administration, and not only due to American politics: the second NATO expansion to the East, accompanied by a simultaneous expansion of the EU.

The political-strategic rationale for the enlargement was not new to U.S. foreign policy, it had

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383 USA und Frankreich stimmen Libanonpolitik ab, Einfluss Syriens zurückdrängen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 May 2006;
385 Zwei israelische Soldaten im Libanon entführt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 12 July 2006;
386 Syrien fällt aus seiner Rolle, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 March 2005;
387 Sharons Ärzt e räumen Behandlungsfehler ein, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 20 April 2006; Koalitionsverhandlungen in Israel abgeschlossen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1 May 2006;
been a driver of their policy towards NATO since 1991. Basically, enlargement had to serve the following aims.388

- Strengthening the political independence and sovereignty of the new, independent, Eastern European states.
- Supporting democratic transition.
- Strengthening NATO.
- Creating a buffer zone between the industrialised Europe and Russia to preclude possible neo-imperialist tendencies within Russia to harm it.
- Strengthening the transatlantic camp within Europe – what Rumsfield later called ‘new Europe’.
- Preventing a German-Russian axis at the expense of the states in between them. This point may be disputed, but given the record of Schröder’s and Merkel’s policy towards Russia, the ‘repetition of Rapallo’ was indeed partially realised and Germany’s uncritical approach towards Moscow raised some concerns.

The first round of NATO-enlargement took place in 1999, with the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the alliance. The 1999 summit also saw the birth of the Membership Action Plan for those European states interested in joining the Alliance later.389

In the same year, the war in Kosovo demonstrated that NATO was the only really relevant and capable security organisation in terms of expeditionary warfare and that the United States still had a predominant position in Europe’s security architecture.390 Additionally the difficulties to come to terms with Russia on the Balkan-politics, the rise of very nationalist forces within the Russian opposition, irritating statements from parts of the Russian elites and the internal sorrows and difficulties of Russian economic and political transformation led to a certain amount of caution and uncertainty whether Russia ever would be able and willing to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic order, or whether it might fall back to revisionist policies.391 Enlargement and transformation towards crisis management and out-of-area operations were distinct policies of the Clinton era to maintain the strategic relevance of NATO and to maintain the American-European strategic alliance even after the Cold War. In principle, this policy was continued

388 See for the pre-Bush considerations regarding a NATO enlargement: Brill, “Die NATO-Osterweiterung und die geopolitischen Interessen der Mächte”, p. 637-648;
by the Bush administration.

In principle meant that, while the goals stayed the same, the United States pursued their interests with a very different tone, not very much oriented towards fostering consensus within the formal institutions of the Alliance. American interests were promoted and Washington watched who would follow. In the wake of the Iraq war, this was especially obvious\(^{392}\), when the then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfield even articulated that America would accept a split within Europe, distinguishing between an old and a new Europe.\(^{393}\) But even when reacting to 9/11, the United States did not consult NATO in the first place, and rather relied on their own capabilities and those of selected Allies, thereby maintaining full control of the operation.\(^{394}\)

The little information the U.S. passed on to their European allies regarding Iraq and the secrecy, in which the deployment of missile defence assets was negotiated, created distrust in the European allies.\(^{395}\) These developments raised doubts as to whether the expansion of NATO was just another attempt to create new, informal alliances and weaken the traditional European powers, i.e. France and Germany.\(^{396}\) The distinctive transatlantic orientation of almost all new member states and candidates, after the United States had put considerable effort in the enlargement summit in Prague 2002,\(^{397}\) quite overshadowed the considerations regarding the long-term development of the European military order and security architecture. However the United States was not the only power shaking the confidence in the Alliance. On the eve of the Iraq War, Chirac and Schröder refused to give NATO permission to plan for the protection of Turkey – should it be attacked by Iraq. Turkey itself neither participated in the Iraq invasion, nor allowed the U.S. to use its territory to open up a second front in the North. For the new member states this defensive deployment was not aimed at Iraq, but a blunt subversion of Article 5 and common defence – and they were quite right with that.\(^{398}\)

On the other hand, 9/11 facilitated the transformation of NATO towards expeditionary warfare

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\(^{393}\) Europeans Try to Stem Anti-U.S. Anger, New York Times Online, 24 January 2003;


\(^{398}\) Ibid., p. 411f;
or out-of-area deployments and global partnerships.\textsuperscript{399} Finally, the second enlargement of NATO after the Cold War took place in 2004,\textsuperscript{400} while Croatia and Albania had to wait until 2008. The issue on how far the Euro-Atlantic order should expand to the East was a delicate one. Some states – most importantly Ukraine – were internally divided concerning NATO accession. But at least the goal of joining the EU was undisputed amongst the elite factions.\textsuperscript{401} In August 2008 the “window of opportunity” to expand this order to the East without risking military escalation with Russia ended. This said, the double-enlargement round of 2004 was a historic event that will shape the strategic situation in Europe for the decades to come – and it was a strategic victory for the West. However the increasing split within the Alliance after 2003 meant that many chances to further expand this zone of stability and prosperity were missed. It will need decades, until another window of opportunity might open again.

One of the most difficult questions that remained open after 2004 was how to deal with Russia. Moscow fiercely opposed the enlargement, just as it had opposed the NATO intervention in the Balkans and the 1999 enlargement, but there was little it could do to prevent it.\textsuperscript{402} There were two different opinions on the matter: one that thought Russia could be appeased or assured with confidence-building measures, because ultimately NATO’s role in combating terrorism and fighting the new (postmodern) threats would be in the Russian interest, too. By reaching out to Russia the perception of NATO as a threat to Russia might be overcome.\textsuperscript{403} The United States initially believed in this option as well, as the various attempts at strategic consultations show – not only in the NATO-Russia Council but also bilateral ones. At least initially, Bush thought he could build up a relationship resting on personal friendship and trust with Putin.\textsuperscript{404} The Russian behaviour after 2004, however, showed that this rationale was built on wrong assumptions with regard to Russia’s regime.

While the United States initially thought that the fight against Islamic revisionism and the stabilisation of Afghanistan would be a proper common interest on which a new strategic partnership may rest, the Russian-American honeymoon was short-lived.\textsuperscript{405} It was terminated not due to the American invasion of Iraq, but due to inner-Russian changes in the political system.

\textsuperscript{399} Ibid., p. 418-419;  
\textsuperscript{401} Leonid Polyakov, "Die Sicherheitspolitik der Ukraine zwischen Russland und dem Westen", in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2002, Band 2, E.S. Mittler, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, p. 409-434;  
\textsuperscript{402} Malek, \textit{Russland – eine Großmacht?}, p. 28;  
\textsuperscript{403} See for this position regarding Russia: Reiter, “Die zweite NATO-Osterweiterung”, p. 18-19;  
\textsuperscript{404} Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, p. 196;  
described in the appendix.

Particularly the prosecution of politically active entrepreneurs and the crackdown of free media in Russia alienated the United States. A series of escalating incidents and policies from the Russian side followed – citing NATO, U.S. missile defence installations or perceived subversion of the Russian political system as causes or reasons for the harsh Russian reaction. As explained in the appendix, the Russian reasons were more excuses for the domestic audience to legitimise the erosion of democracy, the “securitisation” of every aspect of society and ultimately, Russia’s slide into fascism.

Finally, for any American policy towards Russia, the achievable result quite depends on the evaluation of its regime. If Russia were a regional power, longing for a separate sphere of influence, which could be engaged, appeased, contained or subverted – basically this would depend on whether the Russian sphere or its boundaries are accepted or not. If Russia just seeks to underline its great power status, it could be satisfied by engaging and consulting it. If Russia were a rational power, there could be room for bargaining with this regime.

However, if Russia is a fascist system that needs external conflict for ideological reasons, any form of engagement or rapprochement is dead from the start, because Russia cannot accept not having enemies. For Bush, it seemed that he initially believed in the first view of the Russian regime but finally reached the conclusion that the second was the correct one. But this was at the very end of his term, when any major policy adjustment regarding Russia was not possible any more.

The Russian demands were more than the articulation of certain interests in specific contingencies. Russia was the first of the (potentially) revisionist powers to articulate a different vision of an international order. While not directly challenging the current system on a global level, the demand for a privileged sphere of influence, in which Russia could do as it pleased, was a challenge to the universal applicability of the then established rules. Russia demanded exclusive regional dominion for itself, thereby calling for a parallel world order. If the United States (or the West as such) stood behind the postulate of self-determination, freedom, independence and legal equality of all states in the international system, the Russian demands were a severe challenge to that, although one can argue that after Iraq the Bush administration’s credibility on this subject was questionable.

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The United States severely underestimated the challenge Russia would pose for international security and stability and especially Bush himself was misled by Putin. This error prevented the United States from developing meaningful support for the young democracies in Eastern Europe after the colourful revolutions. For Ukraine there was nothing more than lip-service from Washington. A Membership-Action Plan for Ukraine was illusive given the resistance of pro-Russian states like Germany. And it actually backfired in Ukraine as NATO-accession was a very controversial policy in Kiev, weakening then president Jusczenko and other pro-Western forces. The U.S. did not mediate in the internal divisions that soon crippled the reform-minded government in Ukraine. And the U.S. provided no assistance in the financial crisis, that hit hard in Ukraine. All this gave rise to pro-Russian forces, reclaiming power in 2009. In Georgia perceived U.S. political backing misled then President Saakashwili to even greater miscalculations. At the end of Bush’s second term, the attempts to spread democracy beyond the NATO/EU boundary in Eastern Europe lay in ruins. And diplomatically Russia was not even confronted for its roll-back strategy. Mass audiences in Europe and even in the United States blamed the Bush administration for the state of affairs. To a certain extend, this is true (as Bush did to little for this region). But especially in Europe, those that pointed fingers were even worse in underestimating the assertiveness, aggressiveness, and determination of fascist Russia.

3.3.5.4. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Libya

Another big issue that has haunted American foreign policy since the 60s was and is the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Saddam’s WMD programmes and Iraq’s non-compliance with U.N. inspections were one of the reasons for going to war with Iraq, but as Pollack points out rightly, the WMD programme was not the only reason for war. Given the limited progress of Iraq in this matter, the WMDs were even less threatening than Saddam’s conventional power. But Iraq has been treated already in the previous chapter, the following chapters will examine how the other proliferators were treated.

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411 See: Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 168-180;
One of the major cases solved during, and to a certain extent by, the Bush administration was Libya. With the help of the Khan network\textsuperscript{412} Qaddafi’s regime worked on uranium enrichment facilities and had acquired blueprints for a simple fission weapon. “In October 2003 the United States and several allies, working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), intercepted a shipment of centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. Although later reassessed as having overestimated Libyan capabilities, intelligence estimates at the time suggested that Libya would have the capacity to build a nuclear warhead by 2007.”\textsuperscript{413}

In the case of Libya, the Bush administration continued the secret negotiations that the Clinton administration together with the British, which primarily concentrated on the compensation for victims of the Lockerbie bombing and on Libya ceasing support for terrorist organisations.\textsuperscript{414} Libya cooperated with the U.S. on tracking down the suspects of the attacks and provided information on Al-Qa’ida,\textsuperscript{415} fostering trust between the two parties. As Qaddafi faced a stagnating economy, increasing political isolation, irrelevance and growing internal discontent, and the fear of being the next victim of the U.S. regime change policy, he made a deal with the U.S. and Great Britain to abandon all WMD projects.\textsuperscript{416} This was a major success of the administration, although the bargaining skills of their British counterparts seemed to have played a vital role. Apparently, it seems that during the negotiations hawks within the Bush administration (like Cheney, Rumsfield or Bolton), who demanded concessions concerning human rights and democratisation, had to be outmanoeuvred by Rice, Powell, and other more moderate personnel.\textsuperscript{417} Yet, they succeeded.

3.3.5.5. Prolièration of Weapons of Mass Destruction – North Korea

With other actors, the Bush administration was less successful. The situation in Korea was

\textsuperscript{412} Abdul Qadeer Khan was a Pakistani nuclear scientist and head of the Pakistani Uranium enrichment programme from 1976 to 2004. In order to obtain the machinery and materials necessary for the development of nuclear weapons, he started building up a blackmarket-network for nuclear proliferation. Once Pakistan was able to produce them, he used his contacts to sell and distribute nuclear technology and machinery to other states interested in nuclear proliferation, especially Iran, North Korea and Libya. See: Chaim Braun, Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings, New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime”, in: International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, p. 5-49; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs, Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the AQ Khan Network, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006;


\textsuperscript{414} Ibid., p. 71ff.

\textsuperscript{415} Ibid., p. 72ff; A terrorism expert who requested anonymity told the author that Libya’s information on Al-Qa’ida, especially their Yemeni branch proved vital for the initial counterterrorism successes. This was one of the reasons why Robert Gates, then head of the CIA, later Secretary of Defence, opposed a forceful removal of Muammar al Qaddafi by French and British forces.

\textsuperscript{416} Ibid., p. 72-79;

\textsuperscript{417} Ibid, p. 72ff.
difficult. The old framework agreement, negotiated by the Clinton administration, which traded economic and financial benefits to North Korea in exchange for full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was making little progress. Distrust and mutual accusations of non-compliance delayed the implementation. The Bush administration never favoured the terms and conditions of the agreed framework, but wanted to stick to it, as long as it prohibited North Korea’s work on Plutonium separation. However, in violation of the agreed framework, North Korea pushed a Uranium-enrichment programme, which was uncovered by the U.S. in 2002 and admitted by North Korea in 2003. "On January 10, [2003], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its simultaneous severing of all ties to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the first nation ever to do so." With the agreed framework being gone and with additional proposals and intents to isolate North Korea ignored by Pyongyang, Washington seemed to have run out of ideas. On the one hand, the Bush administration did not want to reward North Korea for breaking the agreements by offering more benefits for returning to the agreed framework. On the other hand, pressure seemed to bear no fruit unless it was military action – something Washington wanted to avoid given the upcoming military campaign in Iraq. Multilateralising the talks on North Korea was the chosen procedure, and the first six-party talks were held in August 2003. At best, it would broaden the coalition to put pressure on North Korea, and if not, it would at least multilateralise the blame of having failed. Indeed the administration was divided on whether it was possible to roll back North Korea’s potential at all: “Some senior officials continued to believe that a satisfactory negotiated outcome was still possible with North Korea, while others asserted that Pyongyang was too far down the path of nuclear weapons development to ever yield such capabilities.” The Bush administration also tried to play the ball into Chinese hands: as the key ally of North Korea, it should not only host the talks, it should become co-owner of the process. China put pressure on North Korea on various occasions not to abandon the talks, but throughout the process China supported its ally more than anticipated by Washington.

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418 See for history and development: Gressel, *Die Nuklearrüstung Nordkoreas und die Interessen der an den Pekinger Gesprächen teilnehmenden Staaten*.
420 Ibid., p. 12ff;
422 Samore, “The Korean Nuclear Crisis”, p. 16-19;
423 Wenig Optimismus vor Nordkorea – Treffen, Auftakt zu einem zähren Verhandlungsmarathon, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 August 2003, p. 3; Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 3;
424 Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 4;
425 Unmut Pekings über Pjöngjang, Truppenaufmarsch Chinas an der Grenze zu Nordkorea, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 September 2003, p. 4;
Growing anti-Americanism in South Korea, the then enjoyed popularity of Roh Moon Hyun’s Sunshine Policy, and economic tensions with Japan severely impaired Washington’s attempts to create a strong regional coalition with its immediate allies against North Korea.426 In Japan, the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea led to a firmer position towards Pyongyang.427 But in South Korea, the re-election of President Roh Moon in 2002 meant that a major policy shift by Seoul was not to be expected before 2007. Thus, the negotiations went on, with North Korea threatening and provoking,428 then again suspending and resuming negotiations 429 Whenever the other five thought they had found a formula for a compromise, North Korea either found an excuse to turn it down or resorted to provocative behaviour. Neither wooing by South Korea430 nor pointing fingers by the U.S.431 nor Chinese efforts to persuade Pyongyang to moderate432 had any impact on North Korean behaviour. Finally, on 5 October, North Korea tested its first nuclear device,433 reaching its long-term goal of self-sufficient nuclear deterrence.

The nuclear test made it obvious that the U.S. non-proliferation policy regarding North Korea had failed. The blow to U.S. foreign policy cannot be underestimated, as proliferation arguments had been put forward for the Iraq campaign, where ultimately no WMD had been found. There are multiple reasons for this failure. First, the ability of the Regime in Pyongyang...
ang to survive despite all the economic and administrative shortcomings was underestimated. As leaked in 2006, the U.S. intelligence community had predicted the collapse of the regime in the foreseeable future: “The panel described the isolated and impoverished country as being on the brink of economic ruin and said that ‘political implosion stemming from irreversible economic degradation seems the most plausible endgame for North Korea.’ The majority among the group argued that the Pyongyang government ‘cannot remain viable for the long term’ and could fall within five years.” So additional action on behalf of the U.S. would not be necessary or might be even counterproductive, as it might draw in Chinese support. However, the hope for Pyongyang to collapse proved to be elusive.

Second, the amount of Chinese support for North Korea was underestimated. The whole idea of the Six-Party-Talks was to draw the Chinese in and convince Beijing to put pressure on Pyongyang. Chinese economic aid seemed to be vital for North Korean survival, and if China changed its position during the negotiations, this would successfully isolate Pyongyang. However, Beijing had no interest in bringing North Korea anywhere close to collapse. North Korea was seen as a blue-chip to prevent a Korean reunification on ‘southern terms’, especially if Seoul were still a close ally of the U.S. And in the long-run, a unified Korea might emerge as another regional power like Japan: strong in economic and military terms and politically independent. The Chinese regarded the Korean Peninsula as their natural field of influence and would not give it away, even if the North Korean leadership behaved irresponsibly. Meanwhile, China considered developing ties with the South, to gain influence there in the long run. That this goal was eventually foiled by North Korean provocative behaviour years later was another matter. Obviously, Beijing is not immune to severe strategic miscalculations. China was angry with the North after the 2006 nuclear test and assented on U.N. sanctions. But this was rather because Chinese politicians, previously downplaying Pyongyang’s capabilities, lost face due to the North Korean test. It was not because of the nuclear capability itself, that was something China had already known for a long time.

Third, U.S. policy towards North Korea stayed ineffective, because the U.S. could not concentrate their forces on other theatres than the Middle East for the time being.

434 ‘Collapse’ theory tilted U.S. policy on North Korea, New York Times Online, 27 October 2006;
437 The Author was on a two and a half month visit to China from September to December 2007, where several military and political counterparts expressed this view. A reunification was deemed unthinkable, as long as there is an American foothold in Korea. Letting North Korea collapse would “give away the gains we sacrificed over 1 Million Chinese soldiers for in 1950 to 53”.
438 Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula”, p. 48-53;
439 China cut off exports of oil to North Korea, New York Times Online, 30 October 2006; South Korean Minister visits China for talk on sanctions, New York Times Online, 26 October 2006;
Thus far, Washington’s efforts to isolate and pressure North Korea have been unsuccessful and counterproductive. Rather than mobilize an international consensus against Pyongyang, Washington’s current approach has strained ties with Seoul and Tokyo. Rather than capitulating, North Korea has retaliated by upping the ante, and the response by the US and its allies has appeared uncertain and ineffectual. Nonetheless, the advocates of pressure argue that the US will be able to mount a more effective pressure campaign when the Iraq war is over, and the US can bring its full political resources to bear on convincing the Security Council and key states such as Russia, China, South Korea and Japan to increase pressure on North Korea. Moreover, once Saddam Hussein is toppled, the US will be free to build up forces in the Pacific, necessary to strengthen deterrence and reassure allies as North Korea threatens to lash out against political pressure and economic sanctions.440

Given the deteriorated security situation in Iraq after the invasion, this re-distribution of assets towards the Pacific never materialised. Indeed, Bush’s position on North Korea softened rather than hardened after the war, never to reach the kind of pressure that was mounted on Iraq.441

The U.S. efforts to contain or roll back the North Korean nuclear policy did not stop in 2006. Soon after the international society articulated its dismay with the test, the North signalled readiness for negotiations.442 Talks were focused on U.S. financial sanctions,443 which gave the North again an opportunity to gain time by calling negotiations on and off for various reasons.444 In early 2007 a draft agreement between the six parties offered financial and economic aid for resuming U.N. inspections and disassembling the critical nuclear facilities. The agreement resembled the 1994 agreement that had been so intensely criticised by Bush earlier on.445 Again the North aimed to show its cooperation with the IAEA by inviting inspections and dismantling the long-disputed Yongbyon research reactor.446 The North also agreed to hold talks on conventional troop reductions and other security issues,447 for which it was rewarded with a

440 Samore, “The Korean Nuclear Crisis”, p. 20;
441 After the War, The President; President Takes a Softer Stance on North Korea, New York Times Online, 22 July 2003;
442 North Korea will resume nuclear talks, International Herald Tribune Online, 1 November 2006;
443 USA und Nordkorea sprechen bilateral, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 December 2006;
444 Nordkorea Gespräche ohne Ergebnis beendet, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 December 2006; Vages positives Signal Nordkoreas, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 08 February 2007; North Korean nuclear talks near collapse, International Herald Tribune Online, 11 February 2007;
447 Chinese and North Korean officials hold disarmament talks, International Herald Tribune Online, 3 July 2007;
normalisation of its international relations. However, the dismantled installations were decades-old Soviet research facilities, connected with the fruitless Plutonium programme. Dismantling them did not really harm North Korea’s nuclear capacity and the renewed open connections toward the rest of the world gave the regime time to recover. In May 2009, Pyongyang tested the next nuclear device. All negotiated agreements were void.

3.3.5.6. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Iran

As was the case with Iraq, Iran was the other one of two major states accused of proliferating WMDs in the Middle East. Its missile, chemical and nuclear weapons programmes had been active since the First Gulf War (1980-1988) with Iraq. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the U.S. and Iran had been at political odds and, during most of the 1980s, the U.S. preferred Iraq over Iran. However, unlike Iraq, there was no active military containment and supervision of no-flight zones in Iran, there was no international supervision framework that Iran had violated, and the U.S. public did not perceive the regime in Tehran as the main public enemy – which they did in the case of Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In the contrary, a charismatic reformer since 1997, Mohammad Khatami had gained his presidency in 1997 and his reformist movement had won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections in 2000, sowing hopes for a reintegration of Iran into the international society. Negotiations in Iran on signing the additional protocol of the NPT were going on for years. There were several alleged nuclear sites and an uranium enrichment programme of yet unknown extent. The matter was presumably resolved when on 21 October 2003 Iran in negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom declared that it would sign the additional protocol and halt the uranium enrichment process.

Unknown to Western observers, the Tehran agreement was a mere manoeuvre staged by con-

Nordkoreas Militär schlägt Gespräche mit den USA vor, Vertreter der UNO sollen Gespräche begleiten. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 13 July 2007;
448 United states to take North Korea off terror list, International Herald Tribune Online, 27 June 2007; U.S. and North Korea take another step towards improved ties, International Herald Tribune Online, 23 July 2008;
450 See: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, A net assessment, London, 2010;
451 Growing Soviet influence in Iraq alerted Regan in the later 80s, gradually leading to a re-evaluation of the Regime in Tehran. See: Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p. 110-126;
452 See: Ansari, Iran under Achmedinechad, p. 16-19;
453 Inspectors in Iran find highly enriched Uranium at at an electrical plant, New York Times Online, 20 September 2003;
454 Iran will allow UN inspections of nuclear sites, New York Times Online, 22 October 2003; Europeans to meet with Iranian president, New York Times Online, 20 October 2003; Encouraging words from Iran, New York Times Online, 22 October 2003;
ervative circles, to roll back the drive for power of the reformist movement. One important silent arrangement between Iran and the Europeans was that the latter would not interfere in Iranian domestic affairs. This kept European complaints and pressure low, when on the eve of the 2004 parliamentary elections the Guardian Council banned over 3,000 reformist candidates and manipulated the elections in many ways. The newly elected conservative parliament “immediately announced that it would not ratify the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and berated Rouhani and his team for being too soft in their negotiations with the West.” This move was not only a blow to the European effort to prevent a nuclear Iran. The U.S. coordinated their efforts with the Europeans – a bitter dispute over Iraq by the way – leaving the part of the promising rewards to the ‘E3’ (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), while supporting their efforts with the threat of sanctions.

The reform movement in Iran had lost its momentum in 2003, mostly due to the fact that the Guardian Council, the judiciary, blocked all reform efforts and the reformists, who lacked control over enforcement assets, could do little more than watch while the clerics let their reforms run into nothingness. Their support deteriorated and the Iranian population grew disillusioned and passive. But some measures taken by the U.S. helped to weaken the reformists.

First, the Iranian support for the U.S. in toppling the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (mainly the sharing of intelligence, the detaining and interrogating of fled Taliban by Iran) was traded by the reformists as an example for restructuring and redefining the relationship with the West and for showing that Iran could escape its international isolation. When Bush included Iran into his axis of evil, not only reformists felt betrayed, it also played into the ‘we against them all’ world view of the radicals. The same was true for Washington, which dismissed the arrest of Al-Qai’da personnel in Iran as insufficient to prove that Iran was truly committed to the War on Terror. Second, while the initial Iranian reaction to the invasion of Iraq was perceived as positive, since Iran was glad to get rid of its long-term enemy Saddam Hussein and since the campaign relieved Iraqi Shiites from the suppression by the Baathist regime, the chaos, sectarian violence and political disorder that followed after the invasion disillusioned many Iranians and strengthened the radical view that the only alternative to the current Iranian

455 Ansari, Iran under Achmedinechad, p. 30-31;
456 Ibid., p. 32;
458 Ansari, Iran under Achmedinechad, p. 18f;
459 Ibid., p. 25-26;
460 After the war, Counterterrorism, U.S. still critical on Iran, despite Al-Qaeda arrests, New York Times Online, 27 May 2003;
regime was chaos.\textsuperscript{462} Third, the West, especially the U.S., underestimated that the reform movement was in desperate need of a foreign-policy success to boost its domestic standing. The West generally distrusted Iran and was suspicious about Iranian officials from both camps. The reformists, who held posts with little influence on the executive, like the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary, the secret services, etc. were judged to have little influence on the nuclear programme and other important issues. The conservatives, despite being ideological opponents, held the posts that mattered and should be negotiated with. This undermined the internal credibility of the reformists as wise statesmen and helped the radicals to promote a harder line towards the West.\textsuperscript{463}

The Western approach towards Iran after the Madis election in February 2004 remained unchanged, using a carrots-and-stick tactic to make Iran ratify the Additional Protocol and at least halt the Uranium enrichment programme. However, after having suffered a setback in the negotiations in 2004, the centre of the Western considerations shifted more towards the sticks, that is possible sanctions.\textsuperscript{464} There was also growing disagreement between Washington and Brussels on whether negotiations on the terms of the old Tehran Agreement were sufficient or if a Libya-style agreement, i.e. dismantling all nuclear facilities, was necessary.\textsuperscript{465}

With increasing pressure from the conservatives at home, Iran’s chief negotiator Hassan Rouhani faced several dilemmas. First, he had to show a tough stance against the West, in order to quell the conservative parliament, and then he had so show some progress to demonstrate the skills of the reformists on the international stage. Presidential elections in Iran were upcoming and the reformist electorate had to be mobilised.\textsuperscript{466} This made it increasingly difficult to strike a deal. Iran started demanding higher rewards for the same security guarantees – a clear concession to the radicals at home.\textsuperscript{467} Later, Iran claimed it would comply with the IAEA if it were granted the right to use nuclear power peacefully and found a solution to maintain reactors for generating electric power under strict supervision.\textsuperscript{468} As a precondition, Uranium enrichment was to be halted.\textsuperscript{469} Yet, Iran soon rejected this proposal to gain further

\textsuperscript{462} Ansari, \textit{Iran under Achmedinechad}, p. 61;
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid., p. 47-51;
\textsuperscript{464} EU macht Iran ein letztes Angebot, Verzicht auf Uran-Anreicherung oder mögliche UN-Sanktionen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 October 2004;
\textsuperscript{465} Europäer legen Kompromiss im Atomstreit mit Iran vor, USA skeptisch über neuesten Vorstoß, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 October 2004;
\textsuperscript{466} Ansari, \textit{Iran under Achmedinechad}, p. 47-49;
\textsuperscript{467} Iran verlangt ein besseres Atomangebot, "unfertige Vorschläge der europäischen Troika", Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 October 2004;
\textsuperscript{468} Weg aus der Sackgasse, EU begrüßt Verzicht Teherans auf Uran-Anreicherung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 15 November 2004; Siegesstimmung in Teheran, Bestätigung des Rechts auf friedliche Atomenergie, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 November 2004;
\textsuperscript{469} Iran stoppt Anreicherung von Uran, Abkommen mit EU nach eigenen Angaben umgesetzt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 November 2004;
concessions from the West – especially to maintain a limited Uranium-enrichment capability.\textsuperscript{470} This of course was unacceptable to both the U.S. and the West, especially as Iranian links to the Khan proliferation networks surfaced, which deepened the West’s suspicion of Iran.\textsuperscript{471} New ballistic missile tests in December 2004 did not restore the trust either.\textsuperscript{472} The negotiations lingered with ups and downs until the presidential elections in Iran in mid-2005.\textsuperscript{473} The 2005 presidential elections, won by the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were a turning point in the negotiation process between Iran and the West. The new Iranian leadership demanded security guarantees from the U.S. as a precondition for ceasing uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{474} This not only confirmed that the nuclear programme had security implications – as with North Korea\textsuperscript{475} – there were other problems with those guarantees: given Iran’s involvement in the insurgency in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, Iran never wanted to specify under which conditions the U.S. should not resort to violence against Iran. Effectively, Tehran asked for a permit to destabilise the entire region.\textsuperscript{476} The negotiations soon hit a dead end, the West tried to push this issue in the Security Council\textsuperscript{477} and Iran went ahead with Uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{478} Only resistance from Moscow saved Tehran from being made an issue in the Se-

\textsuperscript{470} Iran will Atomprogramm doch behalten, Rückschlag für erzielte Vereinbarung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 November 2004; EU resists Iran’s attempt to alter accords, International Herald Tribune Online, 25 November 2004;
\textsuperscript{471} Iran and Pakistan linked, International Herald Tribune Online, 18 November 2004; Powell bestätigt Berichte über Iranisches Atomprogramm, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 November 2004;
\textsuperscript{472} Iran Heading towards Conflict, Jane’s International Security News Online, 11 November 2004; Iran unveils redesigned Shahab missile, Jane’s International Security News Online, 27 September 2004; Tehran altering ballistic missile, Jane’s International Security News Online, 6 December 2004;
\textsuperscript{473} Iran relativisiert Zusage zur Aussetzung der Uran-Anreicherung, IAEA hofft auf Lösung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 November 2004; Neue Kritik der Uno-Atomagentur an Iran, Urananreicherung trotz Zusagen fortgesetzt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 November 2005; Schachspiel um Iran’s Atomprogramm, Die USA und die Europäer bisher ohne Erfolgsstrategie, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 17 December 2004; Iran erwarten viel von Europa, Der Uran-Anreicherungsstopp nicht endgültig, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 30 November 2004;
\textsuperscript{474} Iran droht mit Wiederaufnahme der Uran-Anreicherung, Deutscher Außenminister warnt Teheran, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 31 July 2005;
\textsuperscript{475} North Korea similarly demanded a unilateral guarantee by the U.S. that the U.S. would not use force against North Korea. However, the North refused to sign a multilaterally binding peace treaty with the other parties, as demanded by the U.S. Pyongyang tried to effectively cancel the U.S. defence pact with South Korea, against which the North – not having signed a peace treaty with it – would resume violence, knowing that the U.S. was forbidden to react militarily. However, this plan was so blunt and obvious, that only the European left treated it as a serious proposal. See: Rozman, Rozman, “The United States and Asia in 2002”, p. 12;
\textsuperscript{476} Straw nennt einen Militärschlag gegen Iran unvorstellbar, Großbritannien hält Tür weiter offen, 29 September 2005; USA schließen derzeit Nichtangriffs garantie für den Iran aus, Die Welt Online, 14 December 2005;
\textsuperscript{477} EU droht dem Iran offen mit Verhandlungsabbruch, Scharfe Reaktion Irans, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 August 2005; Uranaufbereitung in letzter Minute verschoben, Iran bleibt trotz entgegenkommen hart, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 August 2005; Iran warnt die USA, Scharfe Ablehnung einer Einschaltung des UN Sicherheitsrates in den Atomstreit, Die Welt Online, 11 August 2005;
\textsuperscript{478} Iran moves Uranium plant to full production, New York Times Online, 11 August 2005; EU sagt nächste Atomgespräche ab, Pariser Abkommen missachtet, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 23 August 2005; Scharfe Kritik der Atombehörde am Iran, Weitere Schritte in Richtung Urananreicherung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 September 2005;
curity Council. After Russian commercial interests were suspected behind the backing of Iran, the Western powers started working on a compromise solution, granting Iran the right to a supervised and tightly inspected nuclear energy programme and Russia the possibility to provide reactors and the fuel required for them. Nuclear fuel has to be produced by the company building the reactor, unless design details are shared, which is unlikely for commercial reasons. The Uranium-pellets for the reactor have to be made in accordance with the reactor’s internal design, so regardless of Iranian enrichment efforts, the reactor fuel for Russian-made reactors would have to be provided by Russia anyway. Iran, in order to gain reactor fuel from the enriched Uranium, would have to ship it to Russia for further processing anyway. But Russian opposition against more pressure on Iran had political and ideological, not economic reasons. Russia wanted to keep an ally against the U.S. in the region – even at the cost of nuclear proliferation.

In November 2005 an Iranian defector provided the IAEA with Iranian plans for an implosion warhead, a nuclear test facility and a nuclear armed reentry vehicle. Iran kept talks open for the sake of talks, while it changed the facts on the ground by proceeding with its nuclear enrichment activities. But with Russian diplomatic backing, the chances to bring Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the Security Council remained slim, while Iran behaved increasingly self-confident. Were there credible policy alternatives to the U.S. backed EU-3 negotiations with Iran? And why was Iran so self-confident?

479 Atempause für Iran, EU und USA rücken von ihrer harten Position ab, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 September 2005; USA und Frankreich drohen Iran mit dem Sicherheitsrat, Die Welt Online, 15 October 2005; Abfuhr für Rice in Moskau, Russland will die USA im Atomstreit mit Iran nicht unterstützen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 16 October 2005;
480 Chamenei: Iran’s Atomprogramm wird fortfgesetzt, Die Welt Online, 22 October 2005; Iran bleibt im Streit um Atomprogramm umnachgiebig, Die Welt Online, 9 November 2005; EU fordert von Iran Ende der Iran-Arbeiten in Isfahan, Die Welt Online, 9 November 2005; Kompromissvorschlag im Atomstreit mit Iran, USA und EU zu Eingeständnissen bereit, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 November 2005;
482 Referal of Iran to U.N. put off, International Herald Tribune Online, 25 November 2005;
484 Europa: Mao’s fight talk strategy is a winning one for Iran, International Herald Tribune Online, 1 December 2005; Iran will zweites Atomkraftwerk bauen, Moskau mahnt zur Kooperation mit IAEA – Netanjahu für Präventivschlag, Die Welt Online, 06 December 2005; Iran will Atomgespräche mit EU wieder aufnehmen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 December 2005;
485 Iran stellt Bedingungen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 November 2005; Iran will auf Uran-Anreicherung im eigenen Land nicht verzichten, Die Welt Online, 25 November 2005; Iran verschärft Streit um sein Atomprogramm, Die Welt Online, 19 December 2005; Iran rejects demands it stop atomic activities, International Herald Tribune Online, 4 January 2006; Definitly, Iran starts uranium programme, 10 January 2006; Iranische Atom-Provokation soll folgen haben, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 January 2006; EU will gegen Iran den Sicherheitsrat einschalten, 12 January 2006; 3 EU nations want Iran taken to UN, New York Times Online, 13 January 2006; EU verfehlt die Geduld mit Teheran, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 12 January 2006;
At the same time the negotiations with Iran were cancelled, Israel’s new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanjahu suggested a pre-emptive military strike against Iranian installations, either by the U.S. or by Israel itself – especially after Ahmadinejad called the Holocaust a myth and threatened to wipe Israel from the face of the earth. The United States never ruled out military actions against Iran, but was an additional military campaign feasible? Certainly, the U.S. had the necessary assets to launch an extended air campaign against Iran, destroying and damaging some, if not most of, Iran’s nuclear facilities. But in such a case the U.S. could not verify the effectiveness of their strikes on the ground. All targets would have to be located from the air, often facing uncertainties on what actually would be underneath the Iranian soil or inside suspicious military installations. An air campaign would only slow down the Iranian nuclear programme, not terminate it. The U.S. neither had sufficient ground forces available for another ground war against Iran, nor would the U.S. public support such a war. If no American troops would occupy and inspect Iranian nuclear facilities, there would always remain uncertainty about the possible reminiscences of the Iranian nuclear programme. Even worse, a renewed ground campaign would probably do even more damage to the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq in 2005 was on – or beyond – the threshold of a sectarian civil war, with waves of violence erupting as the country tried to draft a constitution and move on with elections. Shi’ite parties extended their political influence and seized the government, while Sunnis felt increasingly marginalised. The new Iraqi government, whose stability and effectiveness was key to any prospect of American success in Iraq, set up a policy of reconciliation and cooperation with its Shi’ite eastern neighbour. To make matters worse for Iraq, Turkey threatened to invade the Kurdish north if Iraq were not able to terminate the

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486 Netanjahu für die Bombardierung iranischer Atomanlagen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 December 2005; Israel rüstet sich für Präventivschlag gegen Iran, Besorgnis nach Rede Achmedinedehads, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 December 2005;
487 USAschließen derzeit Nichtangriffs garantie für Iran aus, Die Welt Online, 14 December 2005;
489 Schiiten klare Wahlsieger im Irak, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 February 2005; Schiiten klare Wahlsieger im Irak, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 February 2005;
491 Versöhnungsbesuch Jaafaris in Iran, Beratung über Sicherheit, Energie und Industrie, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 July 2006; Ayatollah Sistani unterstützt irakische Verfassung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 23 September 2005;
PKK’s support network there. At the same time, the U.S. forces in Iraq had almost no support or sympathy from the local population. Iraqi politicians started calling for a U.S. withdrawal from their country.

Considering the circumstances, an American military campaign against Iran at that time would destabilise Iraq. Such a move would have jeopardised all American efforts to stabilise post-Saddam Iraq. While the exact extent of Iranian influence and backing for Iraqi insurgent groups is still disputed, one may assume that at least some of the Shi’ite fractions in Iraq would have responded to an Iranian call to arms in such an event. Given the internal instability and the tensions between Iraq and Turkey, a collapsing Iraq could have escalated to a full-fledged regional war.

An Israeli air-strike against Iran was equally unlikely. The Iranian targets are over 1,500 km east of Israeli air bases – at the very edge of the Air Force’s longest ranged planes. Over 14 target sites, many of them hardened, hidden, and dug into mountains, would preclude an Osirak-style hit-and-run surprise attack by the Israelis. Possessing much less aircraft, having no long-range UAVs at that time and only two reconnaissance satellites in space, the air campaign would have to last much longer, because target reconnaissance and damage assessment would have to be done by aircraft as well. And the suppression of Iranian Air Force and air defence assets have not yet been considered. Additionally, the Israelis would have to use airspace close to Iran to refuel their strike and reconnaissance aircraft and counter-air patrols, in order to maintain military pressure on Iran. But which Arab nation would tolerate the Israelis doing this? Would Erdoğan’s Turkey, Saudi Arabia or the Americans in Iraq agree tacitly? As any Israeli strike might complicate the situation for the U.S., tolerating that Israel used the Iraqi airspace (the U.S. Air Force was the airspace control authority over Iraq) for strikes against Iraq would make matters only worse. Iran would retaliate against the U.S. by ratcheting up the insurgency in Iraq and probably in Afghanistan, too. And even beyond Ira-

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493 Kaum Rückhalt für fremde Armee, Iraker halten Angriffe auf U.S. Armee für gerechtfertigt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 23 October 2005;
494 Amerikanischer Truppenabbau im Irak für 2006 geplant, Optimismus für irakische Truppen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 13 November 2005;
nian clients, such a move would lead to protest and resistance from any Iraqi sectarian fraction. It is very likely that Tehran knew that the threat of military force would not materialise and that it could carry on with its nuclear programme without fear of military intervention from either Israel or the United States.

From a position of military impunity, Iran could play cat and mouse with its negotiating counterparts. China and Russia would still save Iran from sanctions, hence Iran could even actively start to provoke the West with military manoeuvres, strengthening Ahmadinejad in internal Iranian politics. As Iran grew more and more defiant of U.N. resolutions, which called for cooperation with the inspections, it dismissed Russian as well as European proposals. The U.S. shifted to direct negotiations with Iran in mid-2006. However, it is to be mentioned that, contrary to Iranian claims at the time, the West did not insist on the full dismantling of the Iranian Uranium enrichment process, but rather on tight inspection and transparency of the programme. But Iran could play the different national interests in the Security Council against each other, while making further progress with Uranium enrichment.

In mid-2006 the U.N. Security Council agreed to demand a halt of the Uranium enrichment in Iran, as a confidence-building measure until the case was settled through negotiations. Iran gained more time. Of course, Tehran later declined to follow the Security Council’s demands.
This game repeated itself until Bush left office. Whoever prepared whatever proposition, Iran bought time and turned the proposition down in the end. Later, the discussions stalled and missile tests and military preparations on both sides\textsuperscript{508} turned the public opinion away from the fact that Russia and China were unwilling to agree to sanctions within the U.N. framework\textsuperscript{509} and that the situation in Iraq precluded effective unilateral military actions.\textsuperscript{510} Like with the U.S. Middle East policy, the war against Iraq had rather diminished the effectiveness of U.S. policies and narrowed the options the administration could choose from.

3.3.5.7. Proliferation of weapons of Mass Destruction – Other Issues

Preventing the further proliferation of WMD – especially nuclear weapons – was one of the key issues of George W Bush’s foreign policy. While the issue of proliferation was not the only – and certainly not the most important – reason for the war against Iraq, the administration had hoped that the punitive example of 2003 would deter others from acquiring such weapons. Quite the contrary, however, was the case. As soon as it was clear to Iran and North Korea that the United States would be occupied with Iraq for the time being, they ceased to cooperate with the IAEA and pushed for nuclear weapons. The fact that North Korea openly achieved this goal during the Bush administration is a bitter mark on a presidency that was so determined to stop the proliferation effort.

Besides engaging the proliferators directly, the Bush administration also tried to make the environment for them more difficult. Especially the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is worth mentioning. The initiative was founded in 2003, especially as a reaction to North Korean threats to proliferate nuclear warheads and technology.\textsuperscript{511} The states that cooperate within this initiative agree to interdict shipments suspected of containing materials or goods connected to the proliferation of WMD or their delivery vehicles.\textsuperscript{512} They also agree to adopt

\textsuperscript{508} Exercises aim to deter Iran. New York Times Online, 22 May 2006; Säbelrasseln Irans mit Raketen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1 November 2006; Iran testet Shalab-3 Raketen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 November 2006; Neues Säbelrasseln der USA gegen Iran, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 13 January 2007; Resolution gegen Angiff auf den Iran, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 January 2007;

\textsuperscript{509} Russland und China fordern Milde, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 November 2006; Russland wirbt für Gespräche mit Iran, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 November 2006; Umrisse von Uno-Sanktionen gegen Iran, Neue Zürcher zeitung Online, 22 December 2006;

\textsuperscript{510} “The door we never opened...” Asia Times Online, 6 January 2007;

\textsuperscript{511} “Li [Li Gun, North Korea’s lead official in the talks] purportedly claimed that (1) North Korea had already completed the assembly of several nuclear weapons; (2) North Korean engineers had successfully reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods sequestered under the Agreed Framework (…); (3) the North might undertake a ‘physical demonstration’ of such capabilities or even export of weapons and nuclear materials; and (4) the North was prepared to forego all its nuclear weapons in exchange for bilateral security, economic, and energy guarantees from the United States.” Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 5;

\textsuperscript{512} See: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement
stricter regulations concerning trade and shipments of these sensitive goods. Under the umbrella of the PSI several exercises were conducted, there was no successful (known) interdiction during Bush’s term in office – although proliferation continued. The PSI was one of the many attempts of the Bush administration to close loopholes in existing non-proliferation treaties without re-negotiating the treaties themselves. The latter was not attempted because of the perceived rejection of tougher rules by many states, including Russia and China. But that was the central problem with all non-proliferation politics: China and Russia were the main proliferators of missiles and nuclear technology and the Bush administration, just like any other government, had no interest in confronting them head-on. There might have been the hope that interdicting shipments to Iran or elsewhere might uncover their role in nuclear and missile proliferation. But this did not happen. The North Korea, used as turntable for Russia’s proliferation black market, was still able to deliver shipments. And air transport links across the vast Asian landmass were out of reach for the PSI in general.

Neither the old arms control regime, ad-hoc cooperation of the willing, nor punitive examples through the use of military action could prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons if the respective governments were willing to bear the costs of diplomatic and economic isolation. There was, however, another option: defensive military preparations – or missile defence. This will be discussed in another chapter.

3.3.5.8. The U.S. Policy towards South Asia

Whether the U.S. was engaged in counter-proliferation when signing a cooperation treaty on nuclear energy with India is under dispute. The precondition for this cooperation was the signature of a partial inspection regime with the IAEA by India. India, which had never signed the NPT and detonated nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998, was treated with suspicion by previous American administrations. Proliferation was one of the issues, the close ties to the Soviet Union, economic isolationism and anti-American rhetoric in foreign policy were the oth-
But after the millennium India integrated itself into the world economy, opened up its markets and stopped its neutralist, anti-American rhetoric. Due to an open border dispute with China and being a democratic country, many experts in the West considered India as a potential U.S. ally in counterbalancing Beijing. This trend was reinforced, when the U.S. and India found themselves on the same side in the War on Terror – the struggle against militant Islamists.

“In a September [2004] meeting with Prime Minister Singh in New York, President Bush reiterated the government’s commitment to increase Indian access to American high technology, including in the areas of civilian space, nuclear power, and missile defense. India was gratified by its rising strategic importance in U.S. eyes, but New Delhi remained deeply concerned about the Bush administration’s increased links to Pakistan.”

In March 2005, the then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proposed a closer cooperation between the two countries, including the opening of the Indian Defence Market for American products. The proposal was seen as the kick-off for a broader technical and industrial cooperation, and Indian support for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, approaching India was not an easy task for the U.S., primarily because of the tensions with Pakistan over the Kashmir region. Cooperation with Pakistan was vital for any prospect of success in Afghanistan. But any deepening of the Indian-American ties would make Islamabad suspicious. Musharraf found it difficult to explain to the domestic audience that America was doing something different in Afghanistan (fighting dangerous extremists while supporting a Muslim state) than India in Kashmir (suppressing the Muslim population in the Pakistani view). So it was not surprising that, before the Indian-American rapprochement or even the nuclear deal was discussed publicly, the Americas tried to ease tensions between the two states. Constant American mediation was behind the opening of cross-border links in 2005 and the beginning of peace talks between the two. However, just after the

518 Pollack, “The United States in Asia in 2004”, p. 10;
520 "New Era” on defence for India and the U.S., *International Herald Tribune* Online, 30 June 2006;
521 Starkes Engagement Indiens in Afghanistan, Singh betont sein Interesse an Wiederaufbau und Sicherheit, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* Online, 29 August 2005;
third round of peace talks\textsuperscript{523} the situation escalated at the Afghan-Pakistani border, with the U.S. flying drone attacks across the border\textsuperscript{524} and Pakistan, to quell U.S. pressure, sent troops to its north-western border to fight Pashtun-insurgents.\textsuperscript{525} This brought Musharraf into an uncomfortable position, as large parts of the Pakistani society rather sided with the Taliban rather than for the Americans. Fighting the Taliban and making peace with India at the same time was hardly feasible for any Pakistani leader. So he was hardly in a position to react to the Indian peace offers at the time.\textsuperscript{526} Some days later, the American-Indian nuclear deal was proposed publicly.\textsuperscript{527} The United States tried to reassure Pakistan by redirecting military aid towards an upgrade of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet,\textsuperscript{528} but at that time, India’s effort in Afghanistan had already alerted hardliners in Pakistan, who advertised stronger support for the Taliban in order to destabilise and ultimately replace the Karzai regime, seen as too friendly towards India.\textsuperscript{529} Musharraf not only struggled with the Afghan border region, the growing opposition within Pakistan also posed a much greater threat to his political survival.\textsuperscript{530} Especially the opposition by the judiciary – inner circles of the ruling apparatus – were seen as problematic. The conflict reached a first climax, when Pakistani soldiers stormed the Red Mosque in Islamabad, occupied by militant Islamist students.\textsuperscript{531} The situation became tense. After being elected by a controlled parliament, Musharraf tried to extend his grip on power.\textsuperscript{532} However, the opposition became stronger and not even emergency rule saved him from calling general elections, which the opposition won in a landslide result in February 2008.\textsuperscript{533} An impeachment trial soon forced Musharraf to resign and to seek exile in the UK.\textsuperscript{534}
Needless to say, Musharraf’s removal from power was a major setback for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Whatever the concern about the Afghan-Pakistani border, the situation grew only worse as the new government started a policy of reconciliation with the Taliban. There was a lot of criticism of Pakistan’s reluctant grip on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the tribal areas as well as the reluctance of the Pakistani security forces to root out Al-Qaeda during Musharraf’s time in office, but this only grew much worse after he had to leave. It is surprising that the Bush administration stayed relatively calm during this transition period. It is surprising that the Bush administration did nothing but watch Musharraf fall. Was the democratic ideology blinding the administration? America’s efforts to ensure a power transition that would leave Musharraf in office ended after the latter resorted to emergency laws to rule the country. To the U.S. this was beyond the margin of tolerance. Did the administration really think that a government dependent on the Pakistani public opinion was more cooperative than a general? Or did Bush’s team reach the conclusion that they could not do anything for Musharraf and that a nice rhetoric towards the opposition would at least not make his life more difficult?

One can point a finger at Bush concerning the rapprochement with India. This could have been postponed until the campaign in Afghanistan was over or a definitive peace treaty between the two states was reached. The growing ties between India and the U.S. were seen as the main reasons why U.S. efforts in Afghanistan were foiled. The weaker the Pakistani leadership was - and it grew weaker after Musharraf’s left – the stronger was the Pakistani support for the Taliban. There was no need to hurry in the relations with India: the Indian-Chinese rivalry would not disappear, as neither would the Indian democratic constitution. So the foundation for better understanding between the two states was solid and would not have faded that easily.

3.3.5.9. China and East Asia

The American effort in Asia was focused on two problems: convincing the neighbours of North Korea to put more pressure on Pyongyang so that it would terminate its nuclear programme, as described above, and increasing the local awareness of the war on terror, espe-

535 Pakistan victors want dialogue with militants, International Herald Tribune Online, 20 February 2008;
536 Pollack, “The United States in Asia in 2004”, p. 11;
537 Musharraf Leaves White House in Lurch, New York Times Online, 4 November 2007;
538 When Obama took office, the Pakistani support for the Taliban was considered the most pressing issue in the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, as Pakistan harboured the most dangerous Islamist terrorists, it was judged to be the primary security risk to the U.S. See: Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 88-89;
cially convincing the Southeast-Asian states to pressurise Indonesia into adopting a harder line towards Islamist movements and terrorist organisations.539

Since a possible revisionist China had been declared as one of the major possible security challenges for the United States and since the historical U.S. alliances in East Asia had been emphasised before Bush’s election,540 one was inclined to expect a very active U.S. policy towards the region. Indeed, the region had a cold start when an American surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter collided in the South China Sea and China held the American pilots in custody and examined the crashed plane.541 In the same way the U.S. caused discomfort in Tokyo when it tried to turn Japan towards containment of its rising western neighbour.542

However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 soon shifted priorities towards the Middle East. Now, the question was up for Washington, whether it could persuade China to help the U.S. in the war on terror or if the reshaping of the regional order in the Middle East would be interpreted as a containment policy against China? The Bush administration made a great effort to reassure China that the American goals in the war on terror were not directed against China. Similarly, it tried to persuade China to exercise greater pressure on North Korea.543 The American influx into Afghanistan initially made the Chinese step up their aid to Pakistan, in order to prevent Pakistan’s total dependence on the United States.544

The other urgent issue regarding the war on terror was to pressure Southeast Asian countries to curb their radical Islamist movements and exchange data with U.S. intelligence services.545 This immediate security goals drove other questions, especially more long-term plans of regionalism, regional economic integration and issues of financial and trade policies. However, especially regarding China, the war on terror proved to open up common grounds and mutual understanding, while economic questions would have led rather to a more confrontational stand.546

The new Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao quickly picked up the positive signals from Washington, and a number of bilateral visits and working groups followed – including the restoration of military-to-military contacts.547 The impression of closer Sino-U.S. ties was reinforced in 2003 by Washington’s warning to Taiwan on the referenda policy of the country’s

539 Rozman, Rozman, “The United States and Asia in 2002”, p. 12-13;
540 Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, p. 52;
541 Rühl, "Die strategische Lage zum Jahreswechsel", p. 6-8;
542 Rozman, Rozman, “The United States and Asia in 2002”, p. 1;
543 Ibid., p. 8-11;
545 Rozman, Rozman, “The United States and Asia in 2002”, p. 12-13;
546 See: Ibid., p. 13-14;
547 Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 7;
new President Chen Sui-bian. One referendum was on countermeasures against Chinese short-ranged ballistic missiles (SRBM) and one on constitutional changes in Taiwan, resulting in the eradication of many old institutions, which represented the rule over mainland China once held.\(^{548}\) Washington made it clear that it opposed any unilateral change in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and would even use military pressure to maintain it – in both directions.\(^{549}\) While China apparently played a more constructive role in the North Korean nuclear game\(^ {550}\) and the ongoing Chinese-U.S. consultations regarding Taiwan, it seemed that a ‘co-management’ of East Asia’s security challenges was possible and that if Washington refrained from criticizing Beijing’s internal politics, it could benefit from a strategic cooperation with China.

The cordial relationship was further enhanced by increasingly robust economic ties between the countries, as U.S. enterprises invested in China at an unprecedented level, thereby contributing much to the Chinese economic miracle. Problems as to U.S. trade deficits and the value of the RMB\(^ {551}\) were still regarded as solvable and, indeed, China planned to compensate the inflow of cash and jobs by purchasing American high-value goods, such as planes and cars, and by buying U.S. treasury bonds.\(^{552}\) In fact, at that time shuttle diplomacy and frequent bureaucratic consultations tried to ease the problems and friction resulting from the increasing interdependence.\(^ {553}\)

However, the hopes for a U.S.-Chinese co-management of East Asia were not long-lived. By the end of 2004, two major architects of the détente policy towards China, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, left the Bush administration,\(^ {554}\) being replaced by Condoleezza Rice, who had a more sceptical approach towards China. With shrinking approval rates owed to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the ill-fated reaction to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the administration received an increasing amount of criticism from Congress for their China policy. Besides foreign policy issues, such as China’s close relations to rogue states and its increasing military build-up, Congress demanded action

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\(^{549}\) Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 8;

\(^{550}\) Ibid., p. 3-4;

\(^{551}\) The value of the Chinese Renmimbi is bound to the U.S. dollar at a certain administered exchange rate. However, as Chinese trade surpluses with the U.S. grew, the RMB – if it were a convertible currency – would instantly grow compared to the Dollar, making Chinese products more expensive and American cheaper. This would over time diminish or reverse the trade imbalances. However with an administrated exchange rate not adjusting to an increasingly competitive Chinese economy, the U.S. trade deficit with China would mount continuously.

\(^{552}\) Pollack, “The United States in Asia in 2004”, p. 5-6;

\(^{553}\) Ibid., p. 6;

regarding the trade deficit, the currency value and international property rights (IPR) infringements by China. The Bush administration turned down proposals for tariffs and other hard measures against China, instead of trying to resolve the issues through bilateral negotiations.555

But Beijing had its share in the deteriorating relationship. After the ‘pan-green’ (the DPP of Chen Subian) movement lost political momentum in Taiwan, the U.S. restraint on secessionist tendencies in Taiwan was not needed any more. After reformist insurrections in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – with the latter being brutally suppressed – China positioned itself on the forefront of the rejectionist states, supporting a declaration by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) calling on the U.S. to name a departure date for its military presence in Central Asia, wooing Uzbek President Ismail Karimov and ramping up Chinese investment in Central Asia to stabilise the existing regimes.556 Not that Central Asia was that much of a long-term strategic interest for the United States that their presence was to be maintained at all costs, but taking on a confrontational stance despite the ongoing effort in Afghanistan did at least puzzle Washington. In that respect the Bush administration perceived the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the war on terror rather as an issue of common interest for the great powers.

When Ahmadinejad came to power in Iran and steered towards open confrontation with the West,557 Sudan stepped up its military effort in Darfur,558 North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks and tested its first nuclear device in 2006,559 and the value and depth of the ‘strategic partnership’ or ‘strategic relationship’ with China was put to question. Washington seemed to have underestimated Beijing’s determination to continue its cooperation with rogue states, especially Iran and North Korea, and overestimated China’s willingness to trade long-term strategic relationships with those states for short-term benefits regarding Taiwan, international prestige and other economic issues.

In South Korea, the United States responded to the election of Roo Moo-hyun, who came to power by exploiting a wave of anti-Americanism by reducing and relocating U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula in 2003. The move was accompanied by demands that South Korea take more responsibility for its own defence, by calling into question the doctrinal premises on which the U.S. forces were deployed there and by indicating that the Korean-deployed troops

555 Ibid., p. 14-17;
557 Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad and the policy of confrontation;
558 Refugee Crisis Grows as Darfur Crosses a Border, New York Times Online, 28 February 2006;
559 North Koreans Say They Tested Nuclear Device, New York Times Online, 09 October 2006;
be used as a reserve to act in other theatres as well.\(^\text{560}\) The move did not only respond to Korean demands, it also showed the new South Korean president the limitations of his own actions: he would not be able to rely on U.S. troops for national defence, on the one hand, while exploiting a populist stance towards the United States on the other. Although the U.S. downplayed the redeployments of U.S. forces from the DMZ by highlighting the increased effectiveness of U.S. forces, rapid deployment and precision strikes, which would make up for the quantitative downsizing, South Korean military planners were not convinced of these arguments.\(^\text{561}\) Seoul quickly responded to American demands to contribute with troops and aid to the Iraq effort, in order to normalise the relations with Washington again.\(^\text{562}\)

Japan, although it was worried about the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, increasingly found common grounds with the U.S. in the fields of North Korea and missile defence. While domestic politics were perturbed by U.S. bases and their locations, cooperation in missile defence, which started in 2003,\(^\text{563}\) would prove to be a much stronger bond between the two nations. Prime Minister Kozumi promoted an ambitious course to strengthen Japan’s international role, increased Tokyo’s contributions to U.S.-led efforts in Iraq, took responsibility for the regional security situation in the Indian Ocean and pushed for defence modernisation.\(^\text{564}\) The United States welcomed these steps and Japan became the only power, whose pledge for a permanent seat in the Security Council was officially supported by the United States.\(^\text{565}\) The more China’s power and assertiveness grew, the tighter the American-Japanese relations became. In February 2005 Japan joined the U.S. on several regional issues, such as the Korean nuclear crisis and the stability in the Taiwan Strait, with a joint U.S.-Japanese security statement.\(^\text{566}\) For Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and the then ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the U.S. alliance provided a framework for reshaping the domestic foundation of the defence policy and efforts towards the normalisation of Japan in military terms.\(^\text{567}\) The U.S. was increasingly bogged down in the Middle East and realised that it would have to rely on regional allies in Asia. Close security ties saved Japan from American criticism on the trade deficit and the exchange rate, although those issues were just as problematic as with China.\(^\text{568}\)

\(^{560}\) Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 9;  
\(^{561}\) Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2004”, p. 7-8;  
\(^{562}\) Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”; p. 9;  
\(^{563}\) Ibid., p. 9;  
\(^{564}\) Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2004”, p. 9;  
\(^{565}\) U.S. supports Japan for UN Council, International Herald Tribune Online, 17 June 2005;  
\(^{566}\) Sutter, “The United States and Asia in 2005”, p. 16;  
\(^{568}\) Sutter, “The United States in 2005”, p. 18;
In the beginning the Bush administration had focused its attention southward. The war on terror demanded a certain amount of cooperation by the Southeast Asian states. After the Bali attacks, Indonesia slowly reversed its reluctant policy towards Islamist terrorist organisations. In 2003, the U.S. granted Thailand and the Philippines non-NATO ally status, supporting their role in the war on terror and concluded a free trade-agreement with Singapore. For the rest of the second term, the policy consisted primarily of day-to-day routine business to strengthen – or set up – cooperation in counterterrorism. In 2005 the United States’ rapid reaction to the Tsunami catastrophe eased relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. As the US-Chinese relationship and a possible regional dominance by China replaced the war on terror as the main – or sole – U.S. political topic in Southeast Asia, Vietnam became interested in a closer relationship with the U.S. The visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai in Washington concluded with the signing of several bilateral accords, most notably those granting U.S. military training and advice to the Vietnamese Army.

The most amicable relationship was developed with Australia, which supported the U.S. efforts both in Afghanistan and Iraq with substantial contributions. Australia, like Japan, was one of the major initial supporters of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Australia’s Prime Minister Howard was one of the major ideological supporters of the controversial U.S. foreign policy. Close coordination with Australia proved useful because Australia supported American – or Western – viewpoints and interests in many regional diplomatic formats in which the U.S. itself was not represented – especially the East Asian Summit.

At any rate, by the end of 2007 the emerging sub-prime crisis started to overshadow the American policy towards Asia. “In Asia, relations with China, while complex, are on balance favourable. The alliances with Japan and South Korea are firm. ... With Mongolia, relations remain good, and with Taiwan, they have improved since the shift there in political power. In South and Southeast Asia also, U.S. relations range from satisfactory to strongly positive, with the exceptions of Myanmar, rising problems with fragmented Pakistan, and

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570 Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 10-11;
571 Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2004”, p. 11-12;
572 Sutter, “The United States and Asia in 2005”, p. 20;
573 Ibid., p. 20;
574 Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003”, p. 10-11;
575 Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2004”, p. 10;
576 Dittmei, “Asia in 2005”, p. 6-7;
deeply troubled Afghanistan.”578 While the Bush administration’s policy towards the Middle-East was regarded as a failure by both the public and the experts’ community, his policy towards East Asia was to a great extent a success. However, this did not change the President’s approval ratings, nor did it make life easier for the Republican presidential candidate. Furthermore, Bush had traded a large trade-deficit and currency imbalances for good relations with China. It is open to discussion whether these sacrifices were worth the gain. Bush’s successor would have to deal with these economic imbalances – one way or the other.

3.3.6. Programmes – shaping future means

The Bush administration was quite ambitious when it came to restructuring the foreign policy means. In the eye of the non-conservative scepticism towards the bureaucracy, almost all executive bodies for foreign policy faced a programme for reorganisation: the State Department, U.S.-AID and, of course, the military. After 9/11, a broad reorganisation of the internal security services and the secret services was addressed – although this is not a matter of concern for this paper. Nonetheless, contrary to conservative calls for a slim bureaucracy, all bureaucratic bodies grew in size due to reformation.

The focus of this paper is placed on the restructuring programmes that actually had a political impact, like the missile defence programme or the restructuring of the army in terms of a post-modern military doctrine.579 Cancelling the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from 1972 was discussed heatedly by disarmament experts, while the plans to deploy certain elements of the missile defence shield in Europe triggered an extensive political debate on the purpose and feasibility of the system in Europe. In the context of the missile defence debate, the questions of nuclear weapons will be addressed. The discussion regarding the ‘revolution in military af-

579 The author refers to the thoughts about military planning that came up after the 1990/91 Gulf War and the Balkan Wars, respectively. It stated that the interstate wars and great-power confrontations were almost over, and new risks, originating from the interdependence of globalisation, power-vacuums in the periphery of the international system and single rogue states world create the pending problems for the security agenda, like proliferation of WMD, terrorism, crime, illegal migration, civil wars, humanitarian catastrophes, failed states, etc. It emphasised the merits of the information revolution and stated that this would transform the essence of the armed forces. Small, deployable, network-centric forces would seek rapid and decisive victory over technologically underdeveloped foes, thereby giving the U.S. the opportunity to tackle the trouble-makers within the international system one after the other. For further literature see: Edward A. Smith, Complexity, Networking & Effects-Based Approach to Operations, the Future of Command and Control, CCRP Publication Series, 2006; Heiko Bochert, Vernetzte Sicherheitspolitik, Politisch-strategische Implikationen eines neuen Leitbildes, in: Strategische Analysen des Büros für Sicherheitspolitik, Vienna, February 2004; Wolfgang Braunandl-Dujardin: Comprehensive Approach, vom strategischen Leitgedanken zur vernetzten Politik, IFK Projektbericht, Wien 2011;
fairs’, ‘network-centric-warfare’, ‘shock-and-awe’, and other concepts were emphasised especially by Bush’s first Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfield, who tried to reform the U.S. military according to these ideas. They influenced the American decision to go to war with Iraq and triggered a debate on the transformation of almost every Western army and, at least, leading to debates in China – and to a lesser extent in Russia - how these concepts could be countered.

3.3.6.1. Missile Defence

While missile defence is commonly considered as the Bush administration’s idea, the administration effectively only introduced or reinforced a policy and weapons systems that had been developed during the Clinton era. After the 1990/91 Gulf War and the Iraqi bombardment of Israeli cities by way of R-17/SCUD missiles, the defence against ballistic missiles became a new priority and, subsequently, new weapons systems were developed.580 In the United States, concept studies and research work on conventional defensive weapons for intercepting medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles had been conducted since the 1980s. Fielding these weapons would imply that the ABM Treaty, which restricts the use of ballistic missile systems, would have to be cancelled. However, there was an intense debate how imminent the missile threat of the new proliferation states (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, etc.) actually was. In this respect, the Republicans were quite convinced that there was an imminent threat, while the Democrats were rather cautious as not to cause a new arms race with Russia and China.581 Nevertheless, after the launch of a multi-staged missile by North Korea on 31 August 1998,582 the purpose, the planned flight path, the payload and the missile type of which were not stated officially, the Clinton administration proposed the Missile Defence Act that eventually authorised the deployment of various weapons systems for defending the U.S. homeland – and allies as well, although this was not officially admitted at that time – against ballistic missiles launched from rogue states or in the event of accidental launches from other states.583

580 These were basically modified anti-aircraft missile systems, capable of intercepting short-ranged ballistic missiles within the atmosphere. These were the Patriot PAC-3, the Israeli Arrow (1&2), the European ASTER 30, and the Russian S-400. See for the Missiles: Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 49, Coulsdon, 2008, p. 234-238, 302-305, 348-351;
583 See for the law: National Missile Defence Act of 1999: Calendar No. 9, 106th Congress, S. 269, To state the
The rationale for this decision was more complex than mere homeland protection—and stayed quite the same during the Bush administration. Although the preparation of the North Korean launch had been detected by satellite reconnaissance, there was no information on the purpose of the flight and the eventual danger it would pose to U.S. allies in the region. On the one hand, a simple flight test did not pose a sufficient cause for pre-emptive military action against North Korea—and given the Chinese support of North Korea, such a course of action would have triggered a severe crisis in world politics—if not a great-power war. On the other hand, threatening North Korea with retaliation could be counter-productive, too. The North Korean missile could cause unintended damage if it crashed, for example, and the Chinese reaction to such a move was hard to predict, because China might continue backing the North. It was possible that in such case a collaborative effort towards North Korea would call for a different kind of reaction. But the retaliatory threat would predetermine the reaction of the United States, and not fulfilling the retaliatory threat might jeopardise the credibility of deterrence and put defence commitment into question. The question of deterrence is even more difficult when it comes to nuclear deterrence: should the U.S. risk nuclear escalation at the Chinese border for a very limited local nuclear threat? And given this doubt regarding the realisation of a nuclear threat, how credible would such a deterrence posture be?

In dealing with regimes like North Korea, where the preferences of the leadership are hardly known, the actions are unpredictable and the risks of triggering escalatory dynamics are high, the United States had to maintain some flexibility and freedom of movement. In the case of North Korea’s misbehaviour, the reaction would have to be coordinated with the U.S. allies and, if possible, with the Security Council, including China. This flexibility could not be attained through pre-emptive military action or through punitive deterrence. But missile defence offered the possibility to encounter the missile attack, without pre-determining the response to a missile attack. And the visible deployment of missile defence assets would act as a deterrent tool by itself, show the allies the U.S. concern about the threat, provide security, and political freedom of action for them, and diminish the attacker’s chances to score a decisive first strike, since the aggressor had to consider that at least some targets would survive. However, especially in Europe this logic was never really understood, as every missile defence decision was discussed on Cold War terms of a possible Russian-U.S. stand-off.

584 For the details of the missile test see: Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK; Sascha Lange, Oliver Thärent, Raketenabwehr in und um Europa?, SWP-Aktuell, Vol. 20, Berlin, 2007; Klaus Becher, Ziel und Zweck der US-Raketenabwehr und die europäische Interessenslage, Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe des Internationalen Instituts für Liberale
Although Bush and the Republican Party had endorsed a more capable missile defence shield, when in power the Bush administration actually continued with the plans laid down by the Clinton administration.\textsuperscript{586} The Bush administration, on the other hand, formally withdrew from the ABM-Treaty, which the Clinton administration dared not to, given the icy Russian-American relations after the Kosovo campaign.\textsuperscript{587} The matter caused little concern in Moscow, as the then new Russian President Vladimir Putin stated: “I fully believe that the decision taken by the president of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.”\textsuperscript{588}

The new missile defence posture was also intended as a clear signal to states seeking to produce nuclear weapons and acquire the necessary delivery means. They should never get the chance to deter the United States from intervening in local conflicts as missile defence systems would diminish the deterrent value of a limited arsenal.\textsuperscript{589} Yet China traditionally embraced a policy of limited deterrence,\textsuperscript{590} and the new U.S. policy was not that welcome,\textsuperscript{591} because it could threaten this strategic rationale.

As the proliferation situation in the Middle-East was meant to be tackled through direct action against Iraq,\textsuperscript{592} the early missile defence architecture was oriented towards East Asia, where it

\textsuperscript{586} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2002/2003}, p. 28-29;

\textsuperscript{587} The ABM Treaty imposed several severe limitations on the deployment of ballistic missile defence forces, which made the cancellation of the treaty a necessity in order to field even the more limited missile defence plan of the Clinton administration. According to the ABM Treaty, each side could only deploy one interceptor site around the capital or an ICBM launching site. But with North Korea, the East-Coast and Washington D.C. was not threatened at all, and the U.S. nuclear deterrence potential would not play a big role should North Korea escalate a regional scenario (counting on China to counterbalance the American nuclear force). The ABM treaty also prohibited the protection of allies and the deployment of ABM systems on ships. The first would render the whole effort useless, as protection of allies in regional conflicts – facing missile-armed opponents – was one of the key drivers of the whole missile defence programme. And basing ABM systems on ships was essential for the protection of the U.S. bases in the Pacific and the Pacific allies. Given the geography of Japan, any forward deployment of missile defence systems would have to be seaborne. Reinforcing local defence systems rapidly was also achieved best by seaborne assets. And in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf provided another excellent line of communication on which ships could be moved up and down to protect U.S. bases and regional allies. For the ABM Treaty see: Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html; America withdraws from ABM Treaty, BBC News Online, 13 December 2001;


\textsuperscript{589} America withdraws from ABM Treaty, BBC News Online, 13 December 2001;

\textsuperscript{590} “Limited deterrence” means that China relies on few nuclear weapons and delivery systems that, in case of an attack, would deal significant damage to the attacker. Given a policy of counter-value targeting, the possible attacker would probably refrain from playing the nuclear card, because the possible destruction thus inflicted would outweigh any gains. With this policy, China could maintain an effective nuclear deterrence for over 40 years without having to bear the burden of a full-scale nuclear arms-race like the U.S. and Russia. See: Alistair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking,’ The Concept of Limited Deterrence”, in: \textit{International Security}, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1995/96, p. 5-42;

\textsuperscript{591} Missile-ready China warns U.S. against plan to destroy spy satellite, International Herald Tribune Online, 18 February 2008;

\textsuperscript{592} See: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2001/02}, p. 28-35;
should supplement the U.S. foreign policy towards an increasingly unpredictable North Korea. 26 ground-based interceptors (GBI) were based at Fort Greely, Alaska, four in Vandenberg AFB, California (this was more an developmental site), a sea-based GBR-B radar was to be deployed in the Aleutian Islands, and three Cold War legacy early-warning radars in Thule, Greenland, Fylingdales, United Kingdom and Beale, California were to be modernised. As possible North Korean missiles would approach the U.S. over the Aleutian Islands, Alaska or the Bering Sea, the actual purpose and probable foes of the defence shield were hard to overlook. These large strategic systems were to be supplemented by smaller operational-tactical ones, especially seaborne SM-3 interceptors. For the East-Asian theatre, they were key to defend Japan, South Korea, possibly also Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines and the U.S. bases in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, as seaborne weapons are the only way to achieve forward basing, a certain depth of the defensive perimeter and to quickly reinforce certain hotspots. The SM-3 was an attractive tool for regional cooperation and Japan joined the development of the SM-3 Block II as the first non-U.S. Navy force to adopt the SM-3 for their large air defence destroyers – later followed by South Korea. As missile defence was a backup-strategy against proliferation in East Asia, it was soon evident that the direct, confrontational approach towards the proliferators in the Middle East lost momentum (see Chapter 3.3.5.6). Iran, under the new president Ahmadinejad, emerged as a new contender, with very slim preventive military options against it. Moreover, the real threat of an Iranian bomb caused severe tensions among the other Gulf States. With the United States tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, preventive warfare was not an option. Although a direct nuclear attack by Iran on any of the Gulf States or the United States was unlikely, an Iranian bomb would give Iran immense regional prestige and power – and leverage in the internal conflicts between Shi‘ite and Sunni Muslims, which increasingly affected the Middle

593 The missile defence architecture at the time did not mention any installations in Europe or on the U.S. East Coast. The defensive systems heading westward were expected to be operational by 2004. North Korea was the only nation that was explicitly mentioned as a threat. However, the State Department was ordered to negotiate within NATO for a possible cooperation of European allies within the missile defence architecture. See: The White House, Washington, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-23, 16 December 2006, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd-23.htm; A short overview may be provided by: Missile Defense Agency, The Missile Defence Programme 2009-2010, August 2009, Washington D.C.; or: Missile Defense Agency, Global Ballistic Missile Defense, A Layered Integrated Defense, BMDS Booklet, fourth edition, Washington D.C., 2006. Unfortunately, the MDA’s publications are very superficial, illustrated coffee-table books, rather than informative papers.
596 Iran’s Nuclear Quest, New York Times Online, 27 August 2012;
East, especially as several Gulf States had considerable Shi’ite minorities.\textsuperscript{597} Counter-proliferation, which meant acquiring nuclear weapons from Pakistan, was at least considered by some Gulf States if the United States could not provide a viable solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{598} Missile defence was at least a part of the solution: strengthening the Gulf States’ conventional capabilities and providing missile defence assets was seen as a viable counter-move to the Iranian threat other than counter-proliferation.

However, while the Gulf States could be easily defended by mobile assets by deploying land-based THAAD-Systems around big bases and important cities and by patrolling the Persian Gulf with SM-2 and SM-3 armed ships, the Bush administration was worried about the implications of Middle-Eastern missile proliferation beyond the Persian Gulf. There was the concern that Iran – or possibly other Middle-Eastern states in the future\textsuperscript{599} – would, by possessing nuclear weapons and delivery means, try to intimidate the European allies as well as the U.S. public opinion. For the United States, the possibility to form a coalition and to have a credible chance to intervene in regional conflicts in the Middle East was a vital interest, and it should not be derailed by missile proliferation.

The Bush administration negotiated a NATO missile defence shield,\textsuperscript{600} but until 2005 these negotiations did not lead anywhere. Moreover, given the dissent within NATO regarding the Iraq invasion, the U.S. probably preferred to control the system unilaterally. It was clear that they would be the only country seriously committed to missile defence investment. So the Bush administration secretly negotiated with the United Kingdom, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic about hosting a U.S. missile defence system in Europe.\textsuperscript{601} Doing so without the knowledge of the other NATO states was not particularly gallant, but then again, given the previous failure of the multilateral approach, such a step could have hardly been a surprise for Chirac and Schroeder, and their outcry was exaggerated by the respective political camps.\textsuperscript{602}

In 2006, the new architecture was presented, comprising an interceptor base in Rezikowo, Poland with ten two-stage GBI interceptors and a radar site housing the GBR-P fire control radar in the Czech Republic. Iran was cited as the main threat to Europe.\textsuperscript{603} Their deployment in

\textsuperscript{597} See: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2007}, p. 239-241;
\textsuperscript{598} Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race, New York Times online, 6 December 2011;
\textsuperscript{599} Saudi-Arabia was already possessing medium-range missiles (Chinese DF-3) with a range of around 2,600 to 3,000 km, bringing some cities of Europe (Budapest or Vienna) within their range. See: www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df3.asp;
\textsuperscript{600} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2002/3}, p. 38-39;
\textsuperscript{601} Polen will Basis für US-Raketenschild weiden, Die Welt Online, 18 November 2005;
\textsuperscript{602} “US-Raketenabwehr ist eine Provokation”, Die Presse Online, 22 August 2007; Steinmeier warnt vor neuem Wettstreit, Stern Online, 17 March 2007;
\textsuperscript{603} USA planen Abwehrsystem gegen Iran, Polen und Tschechien als Standorte, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 May 2006;
‘new’ NATO countries caused heavy opposition by Russia, threatening to target the sites with nuclear missiles, withdrawing from the INF, the CFE treaties or to significantly modernise Russia’s nuclear arsenal.\(^6^0^4\) The Russian arguments, were unsupported by science and manipulative in nature,\(^6^0^5\) never the less they were echoed by the European left and a growing number of pro-Russian political factions in Europe.

While some authors view the strong Russian reaction as the result of the unilateral, hostile or, at least, unwise actions of the United States towards Russia,\(^6^0^6\) others rate the Russian reaction as exploitation of widespread anti-Americanism for domestic purposes to popularise the Putin regime.\(^6^0^7\) The Russian reaction to the deployment can be seen embedded in a general trend towards confrontation by (fascist) Russia with the West. Picturing the West as an enemy, was not only welcomed from the point of view of internal developments to justify substituting democracy, parliamentarianism and freedom rights with the necessity of national security to stop the enemies from undermining the state authority, but also the idea of re-establishing once-held imperial glory, to which any foreign military presence was seen as a threat to the Russian national sphere of interests was an obstacle, played a role in Russian thinking.\(^6^0^8\) Russian intimidation of the European states worked well. In the Czech Republic, the public opinion turned against the deployment of the radar sites, citing the Russian concerns and fear of a possible arms race as the main reason.\(^6^0^9\) These concerns were echoed by many European

\(^6^0^4\) Larijani bekräftigt die Bereitschaft Irans zur Zusammenarbeit, Putin warnt USA vor neuem Wettstreiten, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 10 February 2007; Andrei V. Zagorski, "Die Kontroverse über amerikanische Raketenabwehr in Europa: Lösungsversuche in der Sackgasse?" in: Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik, Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Wien, Dezember 2007, p. 18-24;

\(^6^0^5\) The Russian arguments were changing over time, but some basic lines might be recalled: First the Russians said that the 3rd Site would endanger the nuclear balance between the United states and Russia. This is wrong, as Russian ICBM would only be reachable from U.S.-based GBIs, not from the two-staged ones in Europe. (See.: Peter Sequard-Base, "Amerikas drittes Standbein in Europa, Physikalisch-technische Aspekte der Raketenabwehr", in: Österreichische Militär-zeitschrift, 5/2008, p. 563-576). Second, Russian Defence Secretary Ivanov claimed that the U.S. radar would look deep into Russian airspace, which is wrong because the Earth is rather round than flat and X-band radio waves move directly into space, not being reflected by the ionosphere. The Russian airspace is well behind the horizon. (See for the Russian propaganda: Ist US-Raketenabwehrsksytem gegem Iran oder gegen Russland gerichtet? – Wscemja Nowostej, RIA Novosti Online, 19 August 2007;). Third, there was a claim that the U.S. could switch these defensive warhead with offensive, which is quite misleading. First, the defensive Kill-Vehicle for the GBI weights 63kg. Switching this to a 475kg nuclear warhead (or the proposed 2000kg conventional strike vehicle) would result in a weapon with greatly inferior performance. And a fixed, known installation would not be much of a help for an offensive weapon, as this is only intended to maintain missiles at a high readiness over prolonged times. As the attacker chooses the time of the attack, an offensive weapon does not need this feature. Instead, submarine-based platforms (the United States converted some surplus SSBN-submarines to SSGN → they could be re-converted very easily). And above all, the ICBM-based prompt global strike was a paper-concept, not to be realised in the foreseeable future.

\(^6^0^6\) „U.S. Raketenabwehr ist eine Provokation“, Die Presse Online, 22 August 2007;

\(^6^0^7\) Zagorski, "Die Kontroverse über amerikanische Raketenabwehr in Europa", p. 21f;

\(^6^0^8\) See: Shevtsova, Lonley Power, p. 282ff;

\(^6^0^9\) Czech leader in favoi of missile defense system; Russian general responds with threat, Mainichi Daily News Online, 22 February 2007;
politicians, especially from the far left.\textsuperscript{610} In Poland the government insisted on deploying American air-defence assets and modernising the Polish air-defence infrastructure by the U.S. to compensate for the additional risk from a possible Russian attack.\textsuperscript{611} The dissent was particularly felt at the NATO Summits, where the United States tried to gain support for their missile defence plans or even to secure NATO participation. If not done for other purposes, as well, the Russians had a good test case for how to split the Alliance.\textsuperscript{612} American attempts to soften Russian opposition by agreeing to confidence-building measures, like inspections or data exchange, were dismissed outright.\textsuperscript{613} Russia demanded either the right to use the technically totally unsuitable\textsuperscript{614} radar station in Gabala as a substitute for the European sites, which would mean effectively ceasing the third site, or total technical cooperation,\textsuperscript{615} effectively granting the Russian defence industry exclusive access to U.S. state-of-the-art sensor technology and military communication. It is hard to imagine that any major world power would have agreed to the Russian terms and it is quite conceivable that the Russian demands were formulated to provoke a negative U.S. response, thereby passing the diplomatic buck again to the United States. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the failure to settle the missile defence issue was the true goal of the Russian government. As mentioned, dividing Europe worked well and the U.S. were unable to counter this Russian move. Since then, the United States have been on the diplomatic defensive, while Russia maintains the rhetoric initiative.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO agreed, although very un-specifically and ambiguously, to consider a NATO missile defence architecture. At the same time, neither Ukraine nor Georgia were given a Membership Action Plan (MAP), one important precondition for

\textsuperscript{610} US-Raketenabwehr: Merkel warnt vor 'Spaltung Europas', US-Pläne eines Raketenabwehrsystems in Polen und Tschechien sorgen für Aufregung in Deutschland, Die Presse Online, 21 March 2007; "US-Raketenabwehr ist eine Provokation", Die Presse Online, 22 August 2007; Die neue Runde im Raketensturm, Die globale Verbreitung der Nuklear- und Rakentechnologie beginnt, die Sicherheitslage weltweit zu ändern, Die Presse Online, 4 April 2007;

\textsuperscript{611} Gespräche über Raketenabwehr, Polen und USA nehmen Verhandlungen auf - Tschechien kritisiert Russland, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 May 2007; Russland warnt Polen vor neuer Konfrontation, Financial Times Online, 4 April 2007;

\textsuperscript{612} Wie Russland die NATO-Partner spaltet, Die Welt Online, 30 March 2008; EU verweigert Bush Hilfe bei Raketenabwehr, Financial Times Deutschland Online, 10 June 2008;

\textsuperscript{613} Festhalten an Raketenwaffe, USA stehen in direkten Gesprächen mit Russland über Projekt in Osteuropa, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 4 April 2007; US-Allianz mit Russland bei Raketen-Abwehr denkbar, Die Presse Online, 4 April 2007; Absage an neuen Kalten Krieg, Die amerikanische Aussenministerin Rice versucht in Moskau die Wogen zu glätten, 15 May 2007; Raketenabwehr-Streit ohne Annäherung, Ergebnislose russisch-amerikanische Gesprächsrunde in Baku, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 September 2007; Putin droht den USA, Die Zeit Online, 12 October 2007;


\textsuperscript{615} US-Allianz mit Russland bei Raketen-Abwehr denkbar, Die Presse Online, 4 April 2007;
full membership. Did the United States trade missile defence for NATO enlargement? It is hard to give a firm answer to this question. Moscow was neither appeased, nor conciliatory towards missile defence after Bucharest, so even if appeasing Moscow was intended – by the U.S. or by the European spokesmen of Russian interests, like Germany, Italy or Spain – it hardly worked.

The suitability and the proposition of the American missile shield in Europe were open to a wide range of speculations. Positions differ and, as with all newly developed weapons programmes, the exact data and parameters of the weapons systems are classified. One of the most elaborated open-source studies credited the system with a good performance – except for the power output of the fire control radar. The site could defend the United States as well as Europe, excluding Turkey, against ballistic missiles, while the ability to intercept Russian missiles heading towards the U.S. was doubtful. The other question was, whether other Middle-Eastern nations in addition to Saudi-Arabia, which had about 10 launchers for the ≤3,000 km range DF-3, would soon field intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would make such a system necessary. Developing such a weapon system – if not accomplished by importing – the proliferators, Iran for example, would need to purchase (seaborne) telemetry equipment and to conduct a series of trials, noticeable to the rest of the world. Yet, no Middle-Eastern state had the necessary equipment to monitor flight tests beyond the 2,000 km range. However, the Bush approach to missile defence was to field a successful defensive architecture as a deterrence against future missile proliferation, therefore, being ahead of the actual proliferation situation was part of the policy.

The other feature questionable from the U.S. point of view was whether the defence of Europe against ballistic missiles was worth the effort. The United States itself could have been defended with a third GBI site on the U.S. eastern coast. This would have made all negotiations regarding deployments and security measures superfluous. Ballistic missiles, fielded by a Middle-Eastern actor would, in case of a crisis, be used to intimidate the public or the political elites of those countries that considered intervention. The desire to be protected by the the

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616 Georgia and Ukraine split NATO-Members, New York Times Online, 30 October 2008;
617 This applies especially to the the complexity of the RAAB simulation programme: Peter Sequard Base, Ausgewählte Simulationsberechnungen zur Raketenabwehr, Schriftenreihe des Amtes für Rüstung und Wehrtechnik, Vienna, 2010;
618 With the two-stage GBI, there were only minimal ‘firing windows’ to engage a Russian ICBM. These are impractical under real operational conditions. While other simulating programmes simply calculate the ballistic ability to reach the opponent warhead, in RAAB the ability of the sensors (radar and infrared) to observe the target are calculated too, as well as the warhead’s limited amount of energy and fuel necessary for the guidance of the kill vehicle and the necessary course correction. With these calculation added, the range of the interceptors is reduced drastically. See: Peter Sequard Base, Ausgewählte Simulationsberechnungen zur Raketenabwehr, Schriftenreihe des Amtes für Rüstung und Wehrtechnik, Vienna, 2010, p. 82ff;
619 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programmes, p. 101ff;
United States is understandable. But base protection in Europe could have been achieved by a much cheaper system. A system capable of defending the entire European continent from a single firing base meant that Washington must have appreciated the European contributions to the 1990/91 and the 2003 Gulf Wars or, at least, expected further substantial support for their future efforts. Otherwise, the deployment of such a system (contrary to another base in the U.S. and a minimal base defence architecture in Europe) would not seem to be cost-effective.

3.3.6.2. Military Reform – the Rumsfield Doctrine

The defence and military reforms conducted were less controversial in the public eye than other policies of the Bush administration, but they were among the most detrimental endeavours of the administration. When George W. Bush asked Donald Rumsfield to join his team as Secretary of Defence after the elections in 2000, he remembered in his memoirs: “When I interviewed him, Don laid out a captivating vision for transforming the Defence Department. He talked about making our forces lighter, more agile, and more rapidly deployable.”620 After 9/11, the Bush administration tried to achieve their goals from a position of military strength. Rumsfield’s ‘captivating visions’ were to deliver the desired military effectiveness, on which the strategy of primacy would rest.621 However, the military domain was, ultimately, the field in which Bush’s foreign policy failed. Instead of delivering the momentum of strength to engage revisionist states, being bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2005 rather was the Achilles heel, which Iran and other actors used to change facts on the ground, knowing that the United States were in no position to manoeuvre.

The visions of Rumsfield and other advocates of ‘defence transformation’ were centred on buzzwords, such as Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), Effects-based Approach to Operations (EBAO), and later Comprehensive Approach (CA), to describe a perceived change in the nature of war, the operational art and also tactics. Yet, from the open source documents available, all these buzzwords are described by a strikingly unsystematic allocation of random assumptions of communication technology’s impact on warfare. This conceptual delirium was primarily caused by the introduction of post-modernism into the analysis and teachings in war and warfare. Like other post-modernist streams, the RMA predominantly challenged the traditional way of fighting and claimed that the technological – and to a lesser extent societal and economic – progress has revolutionised the military affairs from...

620 Bush, Decision Points, p. 84;
rather than providing a systematic description of how warfare had changed and which patterns of it—and what had not. There was a dogged insistence on the assumption that 21st century warfare would in all respects be different from all past wars and military campaigns and that all lessons learnt in previous wars be discarded. Worse than that, the RMA proponents assumed that the opponent would stay technologically low-skilled and tactically inflexible—not adjusting his operational and tactical procedures to the U.S. strengths and ways of information gathering. This was more a description of how the U.S. would like its enemy to conduct war, rather than how the enemy would actually act! “RMA advocates, however, neglected many of the continuities of armed conflict and did not recognize the limitations of new technologies and emerging military capabilities. In particular, concepts that relied mainly on the ability to target enemy forces with long-range precision munitions separated war from its political, cultural, and psychological contexts. Some of this work focused on how U.S. forces might prefer to fight and then assumed that preference was relevant to the problem of future war.”

At the heart of this ‘post-modern military doctrine’ was the notion that information technology had revolutionised business and business planning. Therefore, the Armed Forces would necessarily have to revolutionise, too. The impact on information technology was transformed in two concepts: network-centric warfare and precision strike. Network-centric warfare treats the use of data networks for military purposes. Precision strike is basically a new way to drop bombs. It is a combat procedure, not even a tactical manoeuvre, which was em-

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625 It may be argued that hitting a target with one precision guided weapon from a stand-off distance rather than throwing large numbers of ordnance at close range and putting the aircraft at risk would be a huge leap forward in warfare. Being more efficient, modern air forces could destroy much more targets in a much shorter time, thereby altering the military value of air war as such. However there are both tactical and operational-strategic flaws to that rational. First, the new, high tech aircraft that are able to deploy precision weapons and their ordnance cost much more than old or “legacy” aircraft, therefore being much fewer. Moreover they are much more difficult and costly to maintain, need more and specialised infrastructure therefore usually need longer transit-times from their high tech airbases to the battle area and back. Old or legacy aircraft operated from improvised airstrips close to the battle area. At the end, the number of targets engaged stays the same, or even decreased over time. Moreover the proliferation of long-range digital air-defence systems such as the S-300 and S-400 has by large offset the range-advantage of precision weapons and the aircraft are again at risk. Thanks to RMA they are even more at risk today, because the West had neglected the development of stand of anti-radiation weapons for the last 20 years. RMA-enthusiasts totally ignored the fact of high tech proliferation. It seems they thought rouge regimes will stick to hand-cranked AA-guns forever. Second, target destruction alone is insufficient. Targets have to be properly identified, discriminated to be engaged properly. Then, one needs some kind of forces to exploit target destruction and turn it into a military or political result. Concerning target recognition and discrimination RMA-analysts seem to have underestimated the difficulty to properly identify the right targets by technical means only. This is especially true for counter-insurgency operations. Concerning the political-strategic exploitation of destroyed targets, RMA-analysts have provided no concept at all.

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phasised in up to strategic concepts as a pillar of RMA. But how does a new way to drop bombs change military campaigns or the whole usability of the armed forces in foreign policy? Why should a higher accuracy in dropping bombs change the political and social dynamics of an armed struggle between organised social groups?

In business life, the information revolution has multiplied the ability to gather and process information, thereby enabling the top management to react much quicker to changes and make decisions and take measures in a much more targeted way than before. This applied to the military domain, so some thought, and would not only drastically make the management cycle faster, as decisions could be based on much more data for precision, better planned action. However, what is missing is that the business environment operates within a well-quantifiable environment. Information can be reduced to certain important figures, i.e. sales, stock, costs per sold items, etc. The soldier, on the other hand, is confronted with a very different environment that is hard to quantify and in which instinct and determination are at least equally important as information. Moreover, more information does not necessarily produce enhanced situation awareness!

The confidence in information technology led to two further buzzwords: full spectrum dominance and effects-based approach to operations. “Literature describing the RMA and the movement known as ‘defence transformation’ was rooted in the belief that surveillance, communications, and information technologies would dramatically improve ‘battlespace knowledge’, eliminate surprise, and permit U.S. forces to achieve ‘full spectrum dominance’ through the employment of precision-strike capabilities. Concepts and ideas with labels, such as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive operations, and shock-and-awe, entailed the application of ‘leap-ahead’ capabilities that would enable small ‘networked’ forces to win wars quickly and at low cost.”

Full spectrum dominance was centred around the idea that the combination of technical advantages of space, airborne and land systems combined with full situation awareness would enable the superior forces to hit the enemy at will and to always choose the time, the location and the intensity of combat operations. Possessing these abilities, the superior force would not have to work itself through the whole opposing fighting force, but rather execute those operations that would diminish or terminate the enemies’ will to resist. Military operations should concentrate on these determining effects. Again, this theory was taken from the business environment and proved particularly hard to implement. “The effects-based approach to warfare

626 Cebrowski, Garstka, *Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future*;
627 Department of the Army, *The Army Capstone Concept*, p. 6;
628 See: Smith, *Complexity, Networking & Effects Based Approaches to Operations*, p. 195ff;
is heavily dependent on mathematical methods for predicting and measuring effects. This increasing trend toward using various metrics to assess essentially unquantifiable aspects of warfare only reinforces the unrealistic views of many that warfare is a science rather than both an art and a science. In reality, the effect of one's own actions on the enemy is not easy to predict—especially when the enemy is not a conventional, hence calculable, army—and as information superiority never materialised in the way the RMA-proponents thought, the fog of war became even denser. “A more serious deficiency of the assessment concept is its almost total lack of a sound intellectual framework. EBO proponents assume that the effects of one’s actions could be precisely measured and almost instantaneously known to decision-makers. This is highly unlikely.”

The war-planning for both Afghanistan and Iraq was sub-optimal, especially lacked proper plans for the period after the main hostilities ended and overestimating the amount of tasks that the few soldiers on the ground would soon face. Although the shortcomings of American war planning in those theatres are not only due to faulty theoretical assumptions, the post-modern military doctrines mentioned above reinforced the hubris and negligences occurred.

Post-modern military thinking influenced not only the conduct of war itself, but also the further R&D processes. Network-centric operations prefer mobility and deployability over traditional platform-centric attributes, such as protection, fire power and survivability. This led to the development and introduction of light, mobile vehicles, like the Stryker and the Future Combat Systems (FCS), which where then unsuitable for combat due to their limited survivability.

In sum, the revolution in military affairs proved to be erratic. Nothing describes the failure of these concepts better than the U.S. experience in implementing them! The doctrine of ‘21st Century Warfare’ did not survive the first decade of the century. The Rumsfeld Doctrine neither provided the U.S. with viable concepts for then existing necessities, nor did it enable the U.S. to fight future wars. On the contrary, its result was that the U.S. had spent billions of dollars for new-generation weapons systems that the U.S. could not use at all.

Even worse, the belief that wars could be won quickly and at low cost was a tragic error—and the main cause of failure of the whole foreign policy outline. The position of strength, in
which the Bush administration wanted to manoeuvre the United States, never came to materialise. Moreover, the illusion of a rapid victory led to an early split of military forces between Afghanistan, Iraq and other minor theatres of war. Conducting two major military operations at once – both to accomplish very high-flying (comprehensive) war aims – was a great burden to the treasury. And while the president could, or did, hope that someday economic growth, stimulated by tax-cuts, would outrun the debts, the subprime-crisis finally buried these dreams.

3.3.7. Unconventional cross-sectoral practices

After 9/11 the United States not only adapted its military doctrine, introduced new weapons systems and renewed the debate on missile defence. Other practices introduced in the foreign-policy apparatus were even more controversial – and continue to shape the debate on U.S. foreign policy to the present day. Those are or were: the detention of terrorist suspects caught abroad in a special detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the abduction of terrorist-suspects from the soil of other sovereign nations, the introduction of ‘covered interventions’ using remotely controlled aircraft and special-forces teams and the increasing use of cyber-espionage and cyber-sabotage.

The first issue regards the detainment of ‘illegal combatants’ at a special detention centre at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. After 9/11, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Act P.L.107-40” stated that personnel fighting against U.S. forces in Afghanistan were ‘illegal combatants’, not fighting within the framework of the international law on war and therefore were not to be treated as prisoners of war. They could be detained at a special facility outside the U.S. proper, until their fate was decided upon by military authorities. The policy was controversial for two reasons: firstly because of the legal status of the enemy combatants, secondly because of the legal vacuum these people were held in.

The first issue is a rather legalistic discussion with little practical value. A more orthodox interpretation of the law of war would hardly treat the Taliban as combatants, because of the lack of statehood of the Taliban-regime. The U.S. never recognised it, and the loose assembly of fighters may hardly be called an army. Only under very restricted circumstances non-state combatants and resistance-fighters are recognised combatants, as long as they adhere to the

laws of war (like respect of non-combatants, lawful treatment of prisoners of war, etc.) and wear their colours openly, i.e. make them distinguishable from the civilian population. Now the Taliban did not adhere to any of those laws and regulations, so – in an orthodox interpretation of the laws of war – they would have to be court-martialed as war-criminals immediately after detention. The court-martial should be the same as for U.S. military personnel.635

The most convenient legal interpretation would be to treat them as thugs and criminals according to local criminal law (it is still puzzling to the author why the U.S. did not stick to this kind of legal arguments). Now the issue was that at the time of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan there was no functioning state that had a functioning jurisdiction, so the U.S. had to ‘substitute’ this legal vacuum with their own court-martial system. This was done for example in Germany in 1945 until the German juridical system was re-established. However locking up detainees for a considerable amount of time without trial was a very “creative” interpretation of this practice.

This touches the second issue: according to which procedure those detainees should be treated. Now one of the reasons they were kept in Guantanamo Bay was to gain information from them, therefore subjecting them to various questionable interrogation techniques. Only after a number of legal cases against the government were lost (by the U.S. government), the techniques with which the detainees were interrogated were regulated more strictly and the detainees were subjected to trials with more civilian oversight than previously intended by the government.636 It is essential to a functioning democracy and the separation of powers that the juridical apparatus corrects the wrongdoings of the executive branch. It is certainly frustrating that the leading power of the West needs to be reminded at court that all human beings are entitled to a minimum set of human rights, but at least it was (as opposed to several other powers were detainees are deprived even of those rights).

But not all detainees in Guantanamo Bay were arrested in Afghanistan. Some were arrested by special forces teams or the CIA in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, or other problematic countries. Concerning those detainees, the argument was brought forward that these states are either unwilling or incapable (or both) to prosecute those subjects accordingly. A formal warrant and request for extradition would only alert the respective Al-Qa’ida personnel (as the terror network has infiltrated state authorities with sympathisers) and frustrate the entire an-


ti-terror effort.
This practice might be understandable regarding failing states, but a yet unknown number of
detainees have been detained in first-world countries, some even allies to the United States.
Cases are known from abductions in Italy, Sweden and the UK, others are rumoured.637 There
were some detained at covered facilities ("black-site" prisons) without knowledge of the host-
nation and without any legal grounds to do so in these countries. As the full extent of these
practices are still not known today, it is hard to judge this policy. But even that what is known
today is a clear breach of international as well as several domestic laws of allied nations. Even
if this behaviour was tacitly tolerated by some states, on the long run it would only alienate
the respective political and administrative elites of those countries. And – as almost every
covered action of U.S. services is leaked somewhere sometimes – it caused public outrage in
those states where it happened. This outrage did not quite facilitate supporting U.S. policies
by their fellow allied governments. In case of primacy, the fellowship of other states may not
be a big concern, but it would be one if the preferred strategy would change in the future and
the U.S. would become more dependent on other nations.
The next controversial practice were – and are – small-scale covered interventions in third
countries by remotely piloted aircraft and special forces teams to capture or kill operatives of
terrorist organisations. Most frequently they are conducted in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia.638
Again in those states the local security apparatus is either unwilling or incapable (or both) of
arresting those operatives and formal procedures of handing over warrants and requests for
extradition would be fruitless paperwork. Moreover in a "war on terror", or a war-like situ­
ation with several sub-state actors, harbouring such elements would at least constitute a
breach of neutrality by those states. However, conventional international law hardly covers
these issues. In principle both the legal and political arguments concerning drone-strikes have
had a valid point. However there are still tricky issues of target designation and identification
(often the intended target was confused with other subjects) as well as collateral damage that
need to be addressed (at least those issues led to some critique by U.S. allies and are objects
of intense discussions in NATO on how, when and under what circumstances to resort to
drones). At least in this case, critique from established states is minimal, a sign that the U.S.
arguments are accepted in the international society. Conducting a full scale intervention or a

637 See for the issues of "extraordinary rendition": Margaret L. Satterthwaite, "Rendered Meaningless: Ex-
Nadya Sadat, "Ghost Prisons and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law", in: Case West-
2013, p. 53-78;
lavish state building programme in all those states affected by covered interventions would be far too costly under any circumstances. And immediate security risks (like sub-state violent organisations operating from these areas) have to be addressed somehow.

The final issue regards to cyber-espionage and cyber-sabotage. There are few legal norms governing the use of network-data and the United States enjoyed a considerable advantage in terms of technology and commercial usage (most big service enterprises in e-business were American). After 9/11 the patriotic act enabled U.S. intelligence services to make use of this advantages to spy on probable terrorist suspects, other hostile entities, as well as to gain access to information abroad.

However as it was leaked a decade later, the progress in storage-technology would soon allow U.S. intelligence services to analyse indiscriminate mass communication and consumer-behaviour in the internet. Additionally dedicated spying was not restricted to hostile governments or terrorist suspects. Even leaders of allied countries or friendly organisations – like the EU – were spied upon. Furthermore cooperate virtual private networks have been cracked and the NSA sneaked into many cooperate networks of private enterprises. This behaviour suggests that the NSA’s competences were systematically abused for private or corporate interests. Moreover the U.S. policy of promoting the free use of the internet and free communication got a cynical note if at the same time policies that should enhance individual freedoms did in fact facilitate spying. The NSA Scandal, uncovered in late 2013, showed that the U.S. cyber-espionage programmes were considerably expanded by the Obama-administration, although the basic structures and legal foundations (including all controversial issues) were setup under Bush’s term in office.

Cyber sabotage of the contenders’ infrastructure (such as Iran’s nuclear programme) on the other hand is a new, but relatively undisputed practice of the United States. There was no doubt that Iran would do the same to the U.S. if it had the chance to do so.

In summary those new policies shook the international reputation of the United States and caused certain distress amongst public opinion leaders. However in terms of maintaining the international order, those issues rather touched the peripheral norms concerning the “modus operandi”, the tools with witch foreign policy is conducted, rather than the core-substance of

642 Obama Order Sped Up of Cyberattacks Against Iran, New York Times Online, 01. June 2012;
the international order. They did not make the U.S. a revisionist state. However if some prac-
tices would have continued like the illegal abductions of terrorist suspects on the soil of estab-
lished, functioning states, one would have to rethink the judgement.

Even more worrisome, the United States are setting an example to other states – much less
trustful in their execution of foreign policy – and set new standards in customary international
law in their behaviour that might be picked up by others. But what if Russia would apply
American standards in combatting terrorism to eliminate members of the liberal opposition
abroad or China on the Dalai-Lama? Both countries copied U.S. pattern behaviour and certain
practices of the U.S. – Russia regarding what it sees as preemptive defence and China con-
cerning cyber-espionage. Having this in mind, the United States should be more cautious
how they use their means and how to justify it.

3.4. Chapter Conclusion

After the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, Bush’s strategy of primacy was ba-
sically about re-designing the Middle East. There are few authors, even radical socialist ones,
who would disagree with the thesis that 9/11 was at least related to the political, social, and
economic situation in the Middle East.

Bush intended to change the Middle East from a position of strength. The peace process
between Israelis and Palestinians, something that Bush’s critics claimed he did not care about,
was at the very centre of his thoughts. He believed that the parties themselves were unwilling
to conclude peace and that there would not be any peace, unless you were able to enforce it.
Furthermore, he intended to punish and deter revisionist and rejectionist actors in the region,
or else someone would quickly spoil the peace efforts to be made. And concerning that, he
was absolutely proven right.

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was the case, in which America should show its strength. There was
no need to pick on him for proliferation or the peace process itself, neither was the Baathist
regime somehow affiliated with the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni terror group Al Qa’ida. But it was
the strongest regional military power, so containment was a deadlock to the U.S., producing
considerable costs and hardly any results, although the terrain and the enemy were known – at
least that was supposed – and fighting the kind of warfare the U.S. thought they could win
easily. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was a pop culture figure of evil, (see for example the re-

spective South Park episodes of the time), so the American public would probably support the war.

The war itself was not a matter of democratisation or bringing enlightenment to the Arab world or other normative twaddle that was used to justify it later on. The point the war made was clear: “We, the United States have had enough. We will bring order to that chaos, and you will follow. If not, regardless how strong you are, whatever military might and WMDs you may have, we will come to your palace by tank to finish you off”. And this message was well understood by the leaders of the region. Shortly after the invasion, there was no leader in the Middle East whatsoever who would consider rejecting U.S. policies or confronting the United States. And the United States made considerable process in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Lebanon and Syria. However, exactly as the success faded in Iraq, so did the strength of the Bush Doctrine.

It is worth noticing that this strong emphasis on the military might in Bush’s foreign policy was a particularity of his Mideast policy. As primacy to a certain extent rests on a large military apparatus, he indeed committed a lot of money to military modernisation. But he did not commit the forces to indiscriminate interventions all around the world. The efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear issue through multilateral negotiations were a good example for that.

The criticism of Bush concerning unilateralism is unfair and to a large extent overdone. Bush was not a unilateralist, first of because he was not a man who emphasised principles as such. He acted unilaterally, when he thought that it was more useful to do so, and multilaterally, when he needed allies. The best example of a multilateral Bush were the negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear programme. Despite the differences with Germany and France over Iraq, the U.S. worked closely with the E3 to find a solution to the problem. Never again would a German foreign minister, who at the time was Joschka Fischer, negotiate with a third power on behalf of the United States. Under Obama, the so much praised multilateralist, this would have been impossible.

The loose tongue and often confrontational rhetoric of the Bush administration had his drawbacks as well. For example, it was imitated by the fascist leadership of Russia to justify its own expansive and aggressive policy. Furthermore, this rhetoric created expectations that the U.S. would come to the rescue of all pro-democratic and pro-American leaders, regardless of the situation they were in. Georgia’s willingness to militarily react to Russian provocations in August 2008 was such an example. Presumably, Saakashvili believed that the U.S. would come to Georgia’s rescue, which they did not. In terms of the scheme, the Bush administration was very untalented in codifying its foreign policy.
One interesting feature of Bush’s strategy was depicting radical revisionist Islam, or ‘terrorism’ as the primary threat to the United States. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, this would be seen as an understandable reaction. But the Bush administration went beyond the reaction against 9/11 with this world view. They built a considerable consensus on which they could live with other great powers, such as China, for some time also Russia and India, also promoting that this religious revisionism was a danger to the club of established states and, therefore, had to be fought. In terms of Muslim states and societies, the administration judged in how far they were supportive of, or vulnerable to, this kind of thinking and picked their allies according to that – at least in most cases. This was once a fresh alternative to thoughts or universalist liberalism on the one hand and structural considerations on the other.

Of course, it may be disputed whether Islamism – or Jihadism, political Islam, Islamic revisionism, etc. – was such a threat after all. However such a discussion would be led about the effective power and influence of Islamic revisionist organisations. Are they only radical, unimportant, marginalised organisations or a driving force in Mideastern societies? If the first explanation is true, they are just a matter of police work in their respective societies. If the latter is true, Bush was right to consider the fight against them as an urgent necessity in foreign policy.

Something else needs to be clarified. The term ‘war on terrorism’ – as most of the catchwords in political communication – is very misleading. The United States never thought of just fighting terrorist organisations. The usage of terms such as ‘global Jihadism’ in respective documents gives a hint that the whole rejectionist concept behind those Islamist organisations was to be fought. Now how should this kind of revisionism be described?

Revisionism is the desire to change the structures and orders of the domestic and/or the international system. The objectives of revisionism may be categorised:

<table>
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<th>Objectives of Revisionism</th>
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<td><strong>Domestic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Power:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• ruling personnel (sharing power, handover power)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• territorial organisation (autonomy, separatism/independence, irredentism)</td>
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<td><strong>Regime:</strong></td>
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Political Islam tries to achieve change in all of these fields. A domestic political order and an international political order based on Islamic rules and laws would stand in sharp contrast to the yet established rules of the West. Islamists, therefore, trying to establish political systems based on these rules consistently clash with other political groups. This struggle is not about cultural particularities or religious freedom, it is about the establishment of collectively binding rules for entire societies, defining the rules for political contests and the rules for collective governance. The quest for the predominant model of social and international orders becomes even more dramatic, when the affected society harbours religious minorities or the international decisions affect non-Muslim states.

With regard to the international system, Islamist forces want to establish a partial international order, in which certain norms and pattern behaviour regulate the peaceful coexistence of Islamic societies, while declaring the rest of the World as free pray for Islamic expansionism that nobody really has to care about – freedom to wage war and expand towards them, unbound by provisions of humanity, etc. Much like the Wehrmacht had few regards for Russians in 1941 to 1945, such wars of expansion would take a heavy toll on the affected non-Muslim societies. The history of the Balkans, Austria or the Caucasus has plenty historical examples for this behaviour. The Taliban’s behaviour in Afghanistan and the Islamists behaviour in Mali add new chapters in other regions.

Most Islamists claim the universal applicability of their norms and principles, which makes them a direct competitor to Western Liberalism, just like Communism until 1989 or National Socialism in the 1930 and 40s. The spread of Islamic revisionism as a political thought and political aspiration in the international system, therefore, may be legitimately judged as a

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threat to the existing order. There are however considerable differences concerning power and influence in the international system between contemporary Islamism, National Socialism in the early 40s or Communism during Cold War. Not even all Muslim states and societies subscribe to Islamic revisionism, although the tendency to do so is increasing, and around the millennium this revisionist ideology was confined to isolated regimes of weak or petrol-dependent states, non-state groups and terrorist organisations. It is open to debate whether Islamic Revisionism is a serious challenge or just a molestation to the international society.

In fighting Islamic revisionism, Bush faced certain dilemmas. Approaching India while fighting in Afghanistan and relying on Pakistan was an issue of conflicting interests. Letting down the Musharraf governments was one of the biggest political mistakes of the Bush era. In many Muslim countries the secular, educated, pro-Western elites could not count on overwhelming public or popular support. They could either rule by autocracy or not rule at all. Gaza, Turkey, and Pakistan were examples where a pro-Western secular government was ousted by Islamists as soon as free elections were held during Bush’s time in office. Later, the Arab Spring would add some more. The question of who governs what country is not a merely academic or normative one. It is one of the most essential questions regarding the power structure (influence on other regimes) in the international system. Letting one state be ruled by Islamists would not only mean a considerable loss of influence on that state, the U.S. would also risk this state to challenge the current, U.S.-led international order. Iran after the 1979 revolution is probably the most prominent example.

In the Cold War, the U.S. would hardly trade a pro-U.S. autocrat for a communist democrat, also knowing that under communist leadership democracy would not stay for long. In the global war on terror an equal behaviour might have been expected. However the Bush administration in some cases regarded democratic principles as the higher value than fighting Islamism – the turnover of Gaza, Turkey, and Pakistan were accepted. In the latter case, the price for democratic generosity had to be paid with American lives in Afghanistan.

The ambitious aims of the Bush administration led to a military overstretch that cannot be denied. Primacy is vulnerable to such overstretching, as Ross and Posen predicted in 1996:

“Fifth, the pursuit of primacy poses the constant risk of imperial overstretch. Primacy is inherently open-ended. A little bit more power will always seem better. Selective engagement is vulnerable to this temptation; primacy is even more so. Attempting to sustain an image of such overwhelming power that others will not even think of making the effort to match U.S. capabilities, or challenge U.S. leadership, seems a good recipe for draining the national treasury. Primacy may
be affordable today, but it is less likely to be had on the cheap in the future. Ultimately, primacy is probably unsustainable and self-defeating. Primacy is little more than a rationale for the continued pursuit of Cold War policy and strategy in the absence of an enemy.  

With the Bush administration, this overstretch was reached unusually fast. What made the president and his team underestimate the costs and efforts to be made in the military campaigns? And given the obvious mistakes conducted during the Iraq war, why did this happen? To the view of the author, the biggest mistake of some members of the administration, most noticeably Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfield, was to think they knew war better than most of their generals and could lead war according to revolutionary new thinking or as the author calls it a post-modern military doctrine. The author could not have possibly described the mistakes of the post-modern military doctrine better than the Army Capstone Concept of 2009.  

Shock and awe, full spectrum dominance, network centric warfare, effect-based approach to operations, all these buzzwords describe post-modern military thought that, misguided by the fascination for new technology, disconnected war from the violent struggle among societies war always used to be. War is nothing else as to enforce a certain kind of political or social order by the means of organised violence. And how this campaign of organised violence is conducted is very flexible, as both parties keep adjusting their means and methods according to their goals and perceived weaknesses of the enemy. Parties may be very creative in finding ways of inflicting casualties upon each other. War may last as long as the political will to resist is not broken – something that is hard to guess in advance.

On the other hand, the apostles of defence transformation perceive war as a computer game to be led according to American rules, disconnected from the societal struggle that it was made to decide. Moreover, advocates of the post-modern military doctrine overlooked that the Serbs chose not to fight after NATO intervened, while Iraqis and Pashtunes chose to do so. A normal guerilla doctrine is to dodge the initial onslaught of the superior power, then try for the weaknesses of the enemy, seek sanctuaries beyond enemy control – at best abroad – and finally start the guerilla campaign with the support of the local population. After some time, the insurgents would find some weak point, where it was possible to physically contest and harm the enemy. With local support, in which the population acts as the eyes, ears, and communication assets of the guerillas, as Mao put it, information superiority passes over to the guerillas. They seize the initiative and the guerilla movement gains momentum. This was the way in

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648 See for a very critical analysis of the Rumsfield doctrine or postmodern military thinking: Department of the Army, The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028; Department of the Army, The Capstone Concept;  
649 See: Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, p. 13-22;  
650 See: Emil Spannocci, Verteidigung ohne Selbstzerstörung, Vienna 1976, p. 33ff;
which Tito, Mao Ze Dong, Ho Chi Min, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro prevailed. And it worked again in Afghanistan, and, partially, in Iraq. To lift the fog of war by ‘playing computer’ – i.e. to put much faith in electronic intelligence and electronic C3ISR-means – was the essential, tragic illusion that brought down the whole Bush doctrine. The decision to go to war was based on the illusion that they could be won in short time at low costs. This was not the case.

“Not since the early years of the Cold War has America faced such profound strategic challenges and the imperative to make hard choices. This is an era of consequence for America and for the world, and the time before a new President will make key decisions is short. The next occupant of the oval office, Democrat or Republican, will need to not only articulate a vision for the role of the United States in the world, but also devise a grand strategy that is smart, sustainable, and saleable both at home and around the world. This is a daunting, though not impossible, task.”

When the electorate of the United States chose a new president on 4 November 2008, the situation for the new candidate was everything but comfortable. Hit by the financial and economic crisis and stunned by the rejection of American values and policies in the Middle East, the academic as well as popular political discussion tended towards declinism: the U.S. could or would lose its pre-eminent position in the international society and therefore the pax Americana, the U.S.-led international order, would come to an end. However there were various different – and contradictory – estimations what kind of political order and which power(s) would finally succeed the United States as global hegemon, or even whether the United States could reverse this fate by retrenching, regrouping, and re-aligning its foreign commitments?

In terms of Rosenau’s schemes of adaptation, the United States had passed from promotive to preservative adaptation: there were high demands from the essential structures of society and the international environment, which were hard or even impossible to fulfil at the same time. In the Middle East, Iraq and neighbouring countries were worried about the future situation in Iraq. Although the war in Iraq was increasingly unpopular, withdrawing the military immediately would cause considerable damage to the reputation of the United States. The same was true for Afghanistan, where the security situation had deteriorated and the surround-
ing states – especially the severely destabilised Pakistan – carefully watched the United States and the outcome of their endeavours. The U.S. ability to bring the ongoing wars to an acceptable end was not only a question of regional security. The United States was embedded in many bilateral and multilateral alliances, whose partner nations either fought alongside the U.S. or at least saw the U.S.’ role in both conflicts as a test case for the continuity and predictability of American foreign policy.

Then again, the demand to consolidate the military situation in Iraq and Afghanistan was in sharp contrast to domestic demands. Not only were these wars unpopular, but the ever-critical economic and financial situation of the United States required reducing the federal spending and re-balancing financial assets of the foreign policy and the military domain toward financial and economic consolidation programmes. During its last days, the Bush administration completed hefty rescue packages for financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis, which further contributed to the high foreign debt.657

These contradicting demands called for very difficult compromises and trade-offs between foreign and domestic responsibilities. The earlier freedom to conduct foreign policy almost at will and to drive for change in entire world regions was over. While 2008 did not mark the much-proclaimed end of the ‘unipolar’ era,658 it did mark the end of the post-Cold War world, in which the United States was the main driver of change in the international system, implementing the ‘new world order’ in the name of democratic change and economic globalisation. The U.S. remained the most influential and most powerful state in the international system, although it became increasingly driven by events. However, even muddling through could be conducted with some strategic guidance. Even more, the restrained resources and conflicting demands rather suggest a careful consideration and re-evaluation of goals, aims, means and strategies of the U.S. foreign policy. The end of the Cold War marked a break in world politics, permitting the United States to consider a wide range of grand strategy visions. Moreover, the end of the post-Cold War world would be another turning point to rethink the grand strategy.

In this chapter, the different options or visions contained in the U.S. grand strategy659 are re-evaluated behind the backdrop of the 2008 situation. This brief check is necessary to mark possible options for political actions in the future.

657 Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, New York Times Online, 03 October 2008;
4.1 Remarks on Domestic Demands and the International Situation

While evaluating the options, the international environment and the then perceived trends will be elaborated. This is the point of departure for any new foreign policy concept. The focus of the following lines will deal with different demands, possibilities and restrictions for a new policy to be conceived. Therefore, the paper will concentrate rather on selected aspects than give a broad description.

4.1.1. The political impact of the sub-prime crisis

While foreign policy and the Iraq crisis had dominated the 2004 election campaign, the pending financial crisis was one of the primary concerns in 2008. The debate on the economic causes, faults in the financial systems and the consequences for domestic politics may be discussed elsewhere; for this thesis it is more important to elaborate on the extent to which the crisis would restrict foreign policy and in which manner foreign policy could be used to overcome the emergency. The situation turned extremely serious when the collapse of the home-equity market took the pension funds into a downward spiral, amounting to 8.3 trillion USD in 2008 alone.\(^{660}\) The losses affected customer behaviour and industries as well. A recession was on the way, which might cost the United States substantial power, and the estimates when China would overtake the United States in terms of the economy were revised and set in the nearer future.\(^{661}\) The psychological shock effect of such a crisis – at least at the time it occurred – should not be underestimated.\(^{662}\) For the first time since the early 1940s the premise that the U.S. should – or could – lead the world, was challenged amongst the public and evaluators,\(^{663}\) although to a lesser extend amongst the political elite.


\(^{661}\) “Goldman Sachs advanced the date at which it expects the Chinese economy to surpass the U.S. economy to 2027. In a 2009 Pew Research Center poll, majorities or pluralities in 13 of 25 countries believed that China will replace the United States as the world’s leading superpower. Even the U.S. government’s National Intelligence Council projected in 2008 that U.S. dominance would be ‘much diminished’ by 2025.” Joseph S. Nye Jr., “American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis”, in: *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 143-153, p. 143;

\(^{662}\) The Chinese economy slowed down after 2011, and it seems that slower growth-rates are a rather permanent feature of the Asian market for the time to come. (See: Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, Kwanho Shin, “When Fast-Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China”, in: *Asian Economic Papers*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter/Spring 2012, p.42-87). Therefore the prognoses on when China would overtake the United States as leading economic power have been revised since. However then in 2008, the prognosis that an authoritarian regime would outperform the wealthiest democracy and leading power rather sooner than later was a considerable shock to U.S. policy-makers and evaluators;

One major issue was the increasing trade imbalance between the U.S. and the rest of the world, particularly Asia. In 2010, for example, the U.S. trade deficit reached 634.6 billion USD annually, of which 273.1 billion were the deficit to China alone.

Not only did economists dispute the wisdom of sustaining such a huge trade deficit over a long time, but it was also questioned how a state could accumulate large trade deficits without triggering inflation. According to traditional economic theory, trade deficits would re-balance themselves after some time. The currency of the country that enjoys a trade surplus would gain in value while those with a deficit would lose in value. After some time, the cheap currency would attract investors, which would result in economic growth and competitive exports in the country that previously suffered the trade-balance deficit. However, China’s currency was – and is – not freely convertible, and the exchange rate of the RMB was bound to the dollar, thereby offsetting the balancing mechanisms of the international monetary market. Furthermore, in many developing countries, China and Russia in particular, the revenues gained from export surpluses were not spent, but rather served as foreign currency reserves. To facilitate investments then, national banks in the West kept interest rates down; this discouraged saving – particularly in the U.S. – and led to creativity in constructing attractive financial products.

The high saving rates in Asia and the oil producing countries did not stimulate domestic consumption in the emerging economies, which in turn did not increase U.S. exports. While the economic advantage of a weak dollar – that is boosting exports – never materialised, the investment that occurred, attracted by a very dynamic U.S. financial market and promising good revenues for investors, reinforced investment bubbles.

This does not imply that China provoked the U.S. financial crisis, but the situation of globalisation and economic interdependence between free-market economies and semi-market economies with considerable political manipulation of the domestic market were a severe problem of the international economic system by the end of first decade of the 21st century.

This dilemma was not easily to be solved. First, China also was one of the biggest U.S. export

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667 See: Moirison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, p. 20f;
markets and the fastest growing export market for U.S. merchandise exports. This was especially true for aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing and other enterprises with a high profile in Washington (by far preferred by the Chinese in their ‘buying American’ offensive), which created a sound lobbying base for maintaining strong trade relations with China.

Furthermore, China’s membership in the WTO made punitive actions against the country in terms of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, etc. quite difficult to implement. The Bush administration had refrained from taking action against China in the WTO in order not to disturb bilateral relations, even though it was clear that China adhered to irregular practises, especially IPR infringement, discriminatory industrial policy and standardisation, and illegal subsidies. However, even bringing those issues to the WTO would take time and it was, and still is, doubtful whether the organisation could handle the depth of the Western-Chinese trade problems with its means. Putting the WTO into question would pose a high risk to the United States, which might lose even the current level of globalisation and free trade which is not only cheered for ideological reasons, but also said to be the foundation of American and global wealth and stability. However, for the further grand strategy debate, one has to note the pending problems with the world economic order.

The other severe problem was the sovereign debt situation. Bush’s tax reductions, the war on terror, which cost $1,291.5 billion up to 2011, the expanding military budget and the growing healthcare and social security costs, was a severe burden to the U.S. federal budget. Emergency laws from the beginning of the financial crisis, such as the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which amounted to over $150 billion that year, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, amounting to around $550 billions, added large sums to the budget. And yet, in 2008, it was

669 Momson, China-U.S. Trade Issues, p. 3-7;
671 Sutter, “The United States in Asia in 2005”, p. 14-17;
672 Momson, China-U.S. Trade Issues, p. 22ff;
674 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011, p. 45;
676 See for the act: One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, at the second session, H.R.5140, An Act to provide economic stimulus through recovery rebates to individuals, incentives for business investment, and an increase in conforming and FHA loan limits, at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr5140/text;
hardly known which stimulus action would have to follow or which enterprises and financial institutions would have to be saved from bankruptcy in the near future. The U.S. federal deficit grew to 9% of the GDP in 2009 and the overall debt was close to 100% of the GDP that year.\textsuperscript{679} "According to the Congressional Budget Office, the United States will face "severe long-term budgetary challenges" as a result of pressure from "ongoing increases in health care costs, along with the ageing of the population."\textsuperscript{680}

As with the trade deficit, there was, and still is, a debate on the wisdom of sustaining such a high sovereign deficit continuously over long periods of time. Even if in the wake of the economic crisis the critical voices on the long-term implications of all stimulus and bailout plans were silent, the debate on the debt situation would re-surface sooner or later. In the short-run, there was the danger that debtors might lose the confidence in the federal government that served their bonds, which would increase interest rates and increase the costs of taking up money.\textsuperscript{681} The U.S. debt level at that time was beyond that of some states obviously in financial trouble in Europe, and the loss of good ratings was a serious threat that later materialised.\textsuperscript{682} In the long run, the United States would not be the first great power to break down over its excessive debts.

Saving money would be a future priority in the foreign policy of the United States. It was obvious that the United States could not maintain the pre-2008 level of engagement in international affairs. Some tasks and missions would have to be cancelled, others be shifted to allies and other states, while some missions of critical importance would have to be maintained. As discussed further below, there were important trade-offs to be made, each reflecting a different evaluation of world affairs. For example, one could freeze future weapons developments, concentrating only on the current operational needs for Iraq and Afghanistan if prevailing in them was considered a high priority in order not to lose credibility. On the contrary, if the military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq were considered out of proportion and if military modernisation for facing future operational needs were a priority, a quick withdrawal – even on adverse terms – from these conflicts would be necessary. Given the financial restraints, both aims could hardly be achieved simultaneously.

Trade-offs like these would have to be made with regard to all kinds of engagements, tasks and alliances. Theoretically, there is no field of foreign policy so sacred that it has to be main-

\textsuperscript{680} Brimley, "Finding our Way", p. 13;
\textsuperscript{681} Labonte, The Sustainability of the Federal Budget Deficit, p. 12ff;
tained at all costs. Every country or mission can be dropped – at a certain price. But just as in theory every private enterprise can fail, political and ideological preferences, internal considerations and demands from other states would certainly influence a possible decision on a bailout, labelling some institutions, interests, programmes and actions as vital. And last but not least, the urgency of trading certain options against each other would depend on the future administration’s perceived urgency to balance the federal budget. The Bush administration, for example, in 2007 still thought that it could balance the federal budget by 2012, which was utterly unrealistic.683

4.1.2. East Asia – the U.S. and the rise of China

While the Bush administration’s foreign policy was not received very well by many experts, his legacy in Asia was throughout positive.684 In 2008, the probability of war between the states in the region was estimated to be at its lowest point ever. This was, among other things, due to the rapprochement between China and Taiwan after the Kuomintang’s victory in the 2008 presidential elections.685 Other reasons for stability were of the particular nature of Bush’s Asian policy.

With the signing of a 10-year cooperative programme on environmental protection and energy between China and the United States on the occasion of a visit to the Olympics in Beijing,686 Bush marked the last keystone of his ‘bring business to China’ policy. Trade and economic interdependence between the two countries greatly increased from 2000 to 2008, when U.S. exports increased from $16.3 billion in 2000 to $71.5 billion in 2008 and Chinese exports to the U.S. from $100.1 billion in 2000 to $337.8 billion in 2008, respectively.687 And U.S. investment in China, particularly in the manufacturing sector, was seen as a major contribution to China’s growth. In the wake of good economic relations between the U.S. and China, regional allies of the U.S., which in the field of security and defence relied on an alliance with the U.S., signed trade agreements on their own with China, boosting their home economies as well.688 This web of stable military alliances combined with increasing economic interdependence was judged as extremely stable. However, the United States had to pay a price for it. As

683 Executive Office of the President of the United States of America, *Budget 2008, Summary Tables*, p. 151;
684 Scalapino, “The United States and Asia in 2008”, p. 5-15;
686 Scalapino, “The United States and Asia in 2008”, p. 6-7;
687 Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, p. 2;
688 Scalapino, “The United States and Asia in 2008”, p. 6-10;
described in the previous chapter, the large trade deficit and an increasing de-industrialisation took place in the U.S., and given the economic crisis, it was questionable if the U.S. would further pay the price for this arrangement.

Bringing forward the issues of currency imbalances and Chinese WTO-rules violations (IPR-infringements, illegal subsidies, discriminatory product standards) and the Chinese practise to acquire resources at lower prices by concluding arrangements with the extracting countries, which allow Chinese firms to import raw materials at depressed prices – most notably from politically isolated countries such as Iran, Sudan, etc. – would prompt a Chinese reaction. Many analysts considered the fact that China depended on U.S. consumption for their export industries, so retaliatory action by Beijing would effectively harm both of them economically. Therefore such a behaviour was considered as unwise thus unlikely. Nonetheless, it was argued that the currency reserves and U.S. treasury bonds held by China might give Beijing a certain leverage and influence over U.S. economic policies.

But those, who had high confidence in economic interdependence as the guarantee for regional stability, overlooked the fact that China was not so impotent in the field of traditional security and foreign policy. China was the major supporter of the Kim dynasty in North Korea and its support could, and did, influence North Korean compliance with the IAEA’s inspections. In a tenser international situation, Pyongyang would have a freer hand to pursue its nuclear goals and possibly export its capabilities. The same was true for Iran, where China – although that was never publicly admitted – supported Tehran’s solid propellant missile programme. China enjoyed good relations with Pakistan and could encourage Islamabad to further distance itself from Washington, whose increasingly unpopular drone strikes and efforts in Afghanistan would provide very fertile soil for such actions. The new democratic government’s quest for popularity and legitimacy actually suggests that moves which could seriously jeopardise the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan could be considered by Islamabad. The same could be done with other Central Asian states.

Last but not least, the Chinese reaction would depend on the intensity of the U.S. moves on trade issues. Talks on Asian regionalism were going on for years, without producing significant results. Withdrawing from the WTO would not be a serious option for Beijing, lacking a regional, if not global, economic framework that could replace it. But China could try to push

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689 See for example: Nye, "American and Chinese Power after the financial Crisis", p. 143-153;
691 See: Dick K. Nanto, Mark E. Manyin, China – North Korea Relations, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, R41043, 28 December 2010;
692 See: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programmes, p. 43ff;
such an agenda.

The American leverage against China would also depend on the support by local U.S. allies in a more confrontational approach. This was hard to estimate. In South Korea, the landslide electoral victory of the conservative Grand National Party and their presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak was seen as a great relief for U.S.-South Korean ties. In containing North Korea, the new administration found common ground with the United States, but national outrages following the lift of a ban on U.S. beef imports unveiled some of the fragility of these relations, especially in economic terms.

In Japan, quite the opposite was the case. After a scandal about the mishandling of the pension fund, the leading Liberal Democratic Party was defeated in the upper-house election and would soon be defeated in the lower-house election as well. The new leadership of the DPJ made their preference of a more pacifist foreign policy clear, vetoing the further deployments of Japanese warships to support the United States in the Indian Ocean. Under considerable domestic pressure, the then Japanese Prime Minister Fukudsa Yasuo recalibrated the Japanese defence and foreign policy: further attempts to revise the constitution were revoked and counterbalancing a rising China in an arc of democracies was not mentioned as a foreign policy objective any more. Collective defence with the U.S. was not thematicised. In economic terms, the creation of a regional economic order and institutions was brought forward. This was quite the opposite from what the U.S. wanted. Because the Japanese economy still had not regained its momentum, Japanese hands would be all tight down in an economic U.S.-Chinese struggle.

In Taiwan, the election for president of Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang and the landslide victory of the Kuomintang in the legislative elections had dramatically reduced cross-strait tensions and were welcomed by both China and the U.S. However, this removed a reason of tacit U.S.-Chinese understanding for eight previous years: American moderation of Taiwanese independence rhetoric, which was appreciated by Beijing. With the KMT in power, the necessity for a U.S.-Chinese co-management of the Taiwan Strait was gone. This was one reason why the Chinese government could afford a more distanced policy toward the United States.

The other issue that made China increasingly sceptical of the United States was the pending

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695 Ibid., p. 123-125; 127-128;
697 Ibid., p. 108;
698 Ibid., p. 110;
feeling — greatly reinforced by the economic crisis — that the United States was in fact weaker than it seemed and that it effectively was, in international relations, punching above its weight. And while China — although struggling — still maintained a growing momentum, China could — or should — rise from its position of a regional power and develop a vision of a world order of its own, and then challenge the United States in cases where the American order was perceived as unjust or unsuitable.\textsuperscript{700} Nationalism was rising in China, and given increased domestic strains from the economic crisis and the unwillingness for meaningful political reforms and inner troubles,\textsuperscript{701} the Chinese leadership could respond to those nationalistic feelings in order to gain internal legitimacy. This could make East Asia a difficult playground for the U.S. foreign policy, although starting from a fairly stable basis. The inner-Chinese debate on how the U.S.-led world order should take shape would reveal some thoughts about the Chinese elites’ perception of China’s international role and the order it wanted to introduce, when university teachers, PLA’s mid-ranking officers and teachers at defence-related institutions started to publish on those topics. Prior to that, these questions were only discussed behind closed doors or within the framework of official party positions.\textsuperscript{702} Although these discussions do not serve as policy blueprints, some common features can be identified and assumed to underline the Chinese discussion.\textsuperscript{703}

- The order of formally equal and independent states should be replaced by a more hierarchical order, in which China (or other states in other regions) enforce obedience, so-called “stability”, in their dominions. There will be different layers of sovereignty, depending on the respective nations’ standing with regard to China. More liberal authors claim that other civilisations may have different systems, which might give way to an order of parallel dominions with some sort of consultation between the different power centres.

- Chinese values rate order over freedom, ethnics over law, and authoritarian government over democracy and human rights. As they fundamentally contradict the implicit values of the current world order and, especially, the American interpretation of these values, it is hard to find a compromise between the two. The majority of Chinese thinkers, therefore, perceive world politics as a zero-sum game between the U.S. and


\textsuperscript{702} Callahan, “China’s Strategic Futures”, p. 620-622;

\textsuperscript{703} Based on: ibid., p. 622-638;
China.

These thoughts confirm the suspicions of previous American strategists that China would become a revisionist power once it will have assumed its place as a great power in the international system. Chinese official statements are still very vague on the pursuit of a new world order, so the actual scope of Chinese revisionism is hard to guess. In terms of the law of the sea, China’s revisionism was already visible: The South-China Sea dispute was not only about maritime borders. By trying to treat the whole sea as Chinese territorial waters, China follows essentially a mare clausum policy, challenging again the old doctrine of the protestant seafaring nations of the open seas (de mare libero). As the protestant nations have been fighting for the open sea since the 15th century, it is doubtful that the United States would regard the Chinese behaviour as a marginal problem.

After all, the question of Chinese revisionism was not a question of “if” but of “how”. And, therefore, the United States had to prepare themselves for some sort of reaction to Chinese revisionist behaviour.

There would be four options to choose from in terms of a China policy for the U.S.: cooperative engagement, “congagement” (synchronising economic engagement while containing China militarily), containment and confrontation. Cooperative engagement was the primary EU strategy towards China until 2006. This policy is based on the assumption that economic interdependence would moderate Chinese foreign policy behaviour, while in the long run the increasing level of economic modernisation would require some sort of political modernisation (that is democratisation) as well. Non-confrontational behaviour and strategic partnership would diminish suspicions of democracy and put an end to the Chinese political elites’ fear that democratisation was just a tool to harm China. The Europeans, however, were not very successful with this policy. “The Chinese leadership has repeatedly stated its support for reform, including on basic rights and freedoms. But in this area progress on the ground has been limited.” Moreover, a policy resting on re-


706 See the then approach of the EU: Gressel, *Europäische Ostasienpolitik auf dem Prüfstand*.

gime change in the possible distant future gives little answers to contemporary issues, such as North Korea and the South China Sea.

‘Congagement’ was the Bush approach to China: combining preparations for possible military containment with elements of engagement in all fields possible, primarily the economy, but also fighting terrorism or diplomacy with North Korea (six-party talks). This was regarded as a success, but the U.S.-Chinese economic relations needed re-adjustments.

Containment would put a stronger emphasis on counterbalancing China, in the fields of economy and the military, fostering alliances in Asia, and so forth. Given China’s increasing assertiveness and forcefulness – reinforced by the crisis in the West – this option was considered best by those who regarded China’s assertiveness and increasing nationalism as a permanent development, not just a kind of crisis behaviour on the Chinese side.

Confrontation or aggressive containment is rather a theoretical option for the U.S., because the American position is more reliant on allies in the region than the Chinese position. It is doubtful whether these allies would support such a policy.

4.1.3. Europe: the Georgian War, Missile Defence and transatlantic strains

While the Bush administration did handle East Asia fairly well, the same cannot not be said about Europe. Although the 2004 NATO and EU enlargement processes were advantageous for the the United States, American influence in Europe diminished. The NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 showed some of the symptoms of this strategic fatigue between the United States and their European allies. The dispute about the accession of Georgia and the Ukraine was well noted. But the Greek veto against the Macedonian membership – simply for the sake of their name dispute – puzzled U.S. policy makers. It was seen unimaginable that Greece, which was seen as a security consumer like many other European states rather than a security provider, would confront the United States as a sole actor, not backed by any of the greater European nations, with a veto in such a case in a NATO summit. But it did, exposing the inability of the United States to secure, or even predict, a certain level of strategic coherence of the NATO members.

Likewise, the deployment of missile defence assets to Europe became stuck in a tough negotiating process with the future host nations. In the Czech Republic an agreement with the gov-

708 Bush pledges Ukraine help to join NATO, International Herald Tribune Online, 1 April 2008; Wie Russland die NATO-Partner spaltet, Die Welt Online, 30 March 2008; New divisions arise in NATO over 2 bids for membership, International Herald Tribune Online, 27 March 2008;

709 Jilted Macedonia walks out of NATO summit, Der Spiegel Online, 3 April 2008;
ernment lacked internal ratification by the parliament,\(^{710}\) while Poland negotiated over the compensation of the Polish security risks for hosting the sites.\(^{711}\) However, the United States turned out to receive unexpected and unintended help from Russia. Moscow, in halting the gas deliveries for the Czech Republic after the ratification of the SOFA and, even worse, with the escalating war in Georgia, shifted attitudes towards Russia in Europe. Not only did that make Poland agree with missile defence, the invasion of Georgia sent shock waves through the European capitals, which again felt secure in their transatlantic commitment in terms of mutual defence.\(^{712}\)

Since France played an active part in the mediation of the Georgian crisis, the United States was relieved from directly engaging in this difficult situation.\(^{713}\) Moreover, an increasing strategic coherence with France gave rise to the hope that many obstacles and suspicions between Washington and the old continent would dissipate. For example, when France pushed for removing the issue of a Turkish full membership of the EU from the agenda of the EU Council meetings, the U.S. remained silent. Unlike in the past, the U.S. did not echo the British interest of going for a full Turkish membership.\(^{714}\) Siding with British interests in cases of economic policy, enlargement issues and the future of the EU as such, caused doubt as to America’s intentions towards the European project in some countries. Then again, French absence from NATO’s military structure and criticism of U.S. foreign policy raised distrust in Washington.\(^{715}\) Yet, until the End of 2008, the post-Georgian Europe and the economically destabilised United States eased the tensions. While George W. Bush remained unpopular with the European mainstream,\(^{716}\) the European public were curious about the next president and particularly fascinated with Obama.\(^{717}\) Although the relations with Europe were difficult, if not

\(^{710}\) Czech Republic formally approves US missile defense plan, International Herald Tribune Online, 21 May 2008; Tschechien erlaubt U.S. Raketenabwehr, Russland droht, Deutsche Welle Online, 8 July 2008;

\(^{711}\) Neue Gespräche über geplante Raketenabwehr in Polen, Russland weiter skeptisch, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 August 2008;

\(^{712}\) See: Roland D. Asmus, \textit{A Little War that Shook the World, Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West}, New York, 2010; Merkel sichert Georgien Unterstützung zu, Russlands Präsident kündigt den Beginn des Truppenrückzuges an, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 17 August 2008; Unruhe in Osteuropa über Ossetien-Krise, Polens Präsident lanciert eine Vermittlungsmission, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 12 August 2008; Es geht um mehr als um Georgien, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 August 2008;

\(^{713}\) Französischer Drei Punkt Plan für Georgien, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 August 2008; Ceasfire proposed as Russia bombs Georgia, CNN Online, 11 August 2008; Harte Worte zwischen USA und Russland, Europäische Union startet ihre Vermittlungsmission, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 August 2008; Sarkozy plans Moscow peace mission, CNN Online, 11 August 2008; L’accord pourrait vite devenir lettre morte, Le Monde Online, 13 August 2008; France says EU considering sanctions against Russia, International Herald Tribune Online, 28 August 2008;

\(^{714}\) EU-Gipfel: Kosovo und Türkei als Stolpersteine, Die Presse Online, 13 December 2007;


\(^{716}\) Im Zeichen von Krieg und Enttäuschungen, Rückblick auf die Präsidentschaft von George W. Bush, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 20 October 2009;

\(^{717}\) Obama gets Europe’s ear, pleasing crowds without specifics, International Herald Tribune Online, 25 July
troublesome, throughout the Bush era, there were signs of relief and re-approachment. Of course, much would depend on the next administration’s primary goals, how far the European allies would be of use and what attention and care the Alliance would deserve in Europe. The other issue was if and how to deal with the states situated in between Russia and Western Europe in terms of the NATO/EU borders. Given the nature of the Russian regime (as explained in appendix 7.4.) a détente between Washington and Moscow was highly unlikely. However this does not keep any new administration from trying. It was equally unlikely that Russia would abandon claims for a zone of exclusive, privileged influence in the post-Soviet space. The Russian doctrine of limited sovereignty of the former post-Soviet states contradicted U.S. and Western assumptions on the equality and the universal, equal sovereignty of all states. But should the United States be the actor that guaranteed the independence and sovereignty of these newly independent states or should this task belong to the Europeans? And what risks should the United States take when acting in this region?

4.1.4. Iraq and Afghanistan

One of the most important and controversial questions in the election campaigns of Barrack Obama and John McCain was how to deal with the two major military campaigns the United States were involved in. As the Iraq campaign was domestically the most controversial step at the beginning – and until then accounted for most of the casualties in the Global War on Terror – also the continuation of this military operation was debated most intensively. The overseas operations amounted to over 1.2 trillion by 2011 and were the primary cause of the ever-increasing military budget, hence there was a good economic and fiscal rationale for reducing them. Maintaining two large-scale operations divided the U.S. military and security apparatus. If the U.S. were unable to gather the necessary number of soldiers and critical amount of material and money to win in one theatre while operating in two or more, in the end they might lose both conflicts, while, alternatively, they could at least decide one conflict in their favour.

However, several choices had to be made: should the U.S. maintain both campaigns until con-

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718 Adomeit, Russlands Politik in Osteuropa, p. 6ff;
720 The international Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011, p. 45;
721 As a large military apparatus and high personal costs has to be maintained to serve these large contingency operations, see: The international Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011, p. 41-51;
ditions for a credible victory were reached? Should they withdraw from Iraq or Afghanistan, or both of them, start doing so either in Iraq or Afghanistan or start immediate withdrawal from both theatres? And what costs would the United States be willing to bear for withdrawing?

As mentioned, a withdrawal from Iraq was the more popular move. And, in the short-term, Iraq was the country with the more promising security trends. The so-called surge, a massive increase of U.S. troops from 130,000 to 175,000, combined with a compartmentalisation of important towns, followed by securing one compartment after the other, combined with locally allocated aid and the recruitment of indigenous security forces,722 paid off. “Violent civilian deaths of all kinds had declined by 45% in Iraq as a whole and by 70% in Baghdad, … ethno-sectarian deaths had declined by 55% across the country and by 80% in Baghdad since their peak in December 2006.”723 Moreover, 95 of the 101 Iraqi Army’s battalions were estimated as combat ready,724 and even deployed in larger operations against Iraqi Shiite forces in the south of the country.725 These were indeed promising developments, however, there were reasons to doubt the self-sufficiency of the Iraqi security apparatus and the new calm as such. First, the inventor of the surge, General Petraeus, insisted that the surge was only an interim measure to reduce the sectarian killings, to militarily weaken radical elements, and to open a window of opportunity for political reconciliation.726 However, this political reconciliation did not materialise until 2008, and was not enforced later on. In 2007 the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front pulled out of government in protest over sectarian discrimination in the government and over lack of reconciliation.727 The Kurdish representatives disputed the distribution of the oil wealth of their country, which was mostly produced in their own region.728 This struggle would stay on for a while.729

The Army became increasingly divided along sectarian lines and became more and more a Shi’ite army. Holding the office of the Commander in Chief gave Malaki a better grip on the Armed Forces, reinforcing not only the Shi’ite domination of the officer’s corps, but also the power for his increasingly paternalistic and autocratic rule.730 The most important effect of the

722 See: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2008, p. 205-209;
723 Ibid., p. 206;
724 Ibid., p. 207;
725 Ibid., p. 211f;
726 Ibid., p. 206;
727 Ibid., p. 213;
728 Ibid., p. 214;
729 Kurdistan stellt wegen Streit mit Bagdad Ölexporte ein, Zentralregierung ist finanziellen Verpflichtungen nicht nachgekommen, Neue Zücher Zeitung Online, 2 April 2012;
730 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2008, p. 207-208;
countless U.S. military advisers and trainers, embedded on all levels of the Iraqi Army was to prevent sectarian misuse of the Iraqi Army. How would the Iraqi Army act without American attendance? The increasing discrimination and political marginalisation of the Sunni Iraqis also raised doubts about the future of the local militia of the Awakening Council, which were either to be integrated into formal security forces – what Malaki did not want – or which would then pose a threat to security by being unemployed, non-state armed groups in existence.

Moreover, American troop reductions in 2005 to 2006 and British troop reductions in the Basrah area in 2007 to 2008, both in preparation of the intended redeployment of the respective military presence, sparked a wave of violence in Iraq. The militias, hoped for an imminent withdrawal of the allied forces and tried to improve their political standing (or criminal enterprise or simply to erase the confessional enemy) by challenging the central government by arms. Moreover, the Sunni Awakening Council’s tribal militias were incapable of acting as a military or security force without direct U.S. support. They had been vital in crushing Al-Qa’ida groups in Iraq and bringing down the level of sectarian deaths among the Sunni population. However, nobody could foresee what would become of them when the United States left.

In other words, the situation in Iraq was increasingly stable, but not entirely self-sustaining. Withdrawal, however, was possible and there was a chance that such a withdrawal would not be considered as a military defeat for the United States by the international society, as the U.S. military was indeed able to deal with the insurgency and continued the surge. If the country descended into civil war afterwards, one could blame the Malaki government for their inability to reconcile and the Iraqi Armed Forces for not maintaining their then high level of combat readiness.

Would it be a wise decision to let Iraq collapse? And which price would the U.S. be willing to pay in terms of either regional destabilisation or re-alignment of forces to compensate for their withdrawal? In this respect, one has to bear in mind what regional implications the disintegration or a renewed civil war in Iraq would have. Iran’s influence on several radical Shi’ite movements was obvious. But would Turkey stand by if the Kurdish north sealed itself off from the rest of the country? And how would the U.S. react to a NATO country’s involvement in the civil war, if not regional war? And how would the Gulf States react if their Sunni-Arab

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731 Ibid., p. 208;
733 Ibid., p. 207, 211;
734 Ibid., p. 209;
affiliates were the most obvious victims of the new post-American Iraq and the looming civil war? Would they add the costs for their involvement to the oil price? How would a second oil shock in the middle of a recession and a financial crisis affect world economy and U.S. domestic politics? And would the United States have to intervene again sooner or later in order to prevent a regional war between Iran, the Gulf States and Turkey over what was left of Iraq? From the point of view of 2008 it is hard to estimate which escalatory scenario was how likely, what the actual preferences of the local actors were, when on which ground they would resort to violence and with what concessions they could be kept calm. Predicting the preferences of communal actors in a different cultural and political environment was always difficult. But given the regional implications of Iraq’s security situation, the stakes were high.

As an immediate withdrawal was risky, this did not rule out a graduated approach to a withdrawal, linking each step to certain conditions to be met in terms of political and military performance by the Iraqi government and authorities. There was a large blurred zone between downscaling the military presence in Iraq and a stepped approach to withdrawal. The latter could be the result of a successful period within the first phase, but the first was not necessarily conditioned to the latter. And there was still an open debate on whether to pre-determine the possible steps of a withdrawal, and most importantly, whether fixed timetables should be set. The latter would give a radical revisionist group a certain timeline to hold out, restrain their followers, comply with government demands and prepare for the day after. As soon as the U.S. completed the withdrawal of its forces on schedule, they would be free to pursue their goals with all means. It must be noted that with domestic expectations towards a promised withdrawal, it would be difficult to sell an extension of a previously-agreed timeline to the American electorate.

But Iraq was not the only war theatre, in which either military victory or a smooth withdrawal was to be achieved. The U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan was the other major commitment in the war on terror. As the war in Afghanistan started as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks in the United States, it was seen both by the domestic and the international audiences as the more legitimate war as compared with Iraq. There were always more allied nations contributing to Afghanistan then there were to Iraq – nonetheless, there may be doubts regarding

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736 Then presidential candidate Obama tried to play on this sentiment by declaring the war in Afghanistan a “war of necessity” the U.S. must not lose. See: Obama defends Afghanistan Strategy, New York Times Online, 17 September 2008; Obama tells veterans Afghanistan is a “war of necessity”, Los Angeles Times Online, 18 September 2008;
the helpfulness of many of those contributions – and the international society as well as the domestic audience would probably be more willing to support a continuation of military operations in the Hindukush – at least when compared to Iraq. But briefly, this was where the advantages of Afghanistan ended.

Unlike Iraq, the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated. The Taliban, after having suffered some battlefield defeats in the previous year, regrouped and redeployed over the winter of 2007/2008. They moved to areas where allied forces were either weak or held back because of caveats, and instead of seeking open battle, they basically tried to cause casualties in small ambushes and IED attacks.\footnote{The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2008, p. 296ff; See: Spanocci, Verteidigung ohne Selbstzerstörung, p. 9-19; Rani D. Mullen, “Afghanistan in 2008, State Building at the Precipice”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 1, January/February 2009, 28-38, p. 32-33; Ibid., p. 29-30; A stronger Enemy? Afghan Insurgent’s Improved Skills Could Come From Outside Sources, Defense News, 8 June 2009, p. 28; Matthew J. Nelson, “Pakistan in 2008, Moving beyond Musharraf”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 1, January/February 2009, 16-27, p. 21-24; 737} This is a classic phase in guerilla warfare, in which the guerilla force seeks new base areas, while exploring the weaknesses of the occupying force.\footnote{738} NATO’s heavy reliance on airstrikes against the insurgence was such a weakness, as Taliban forces increasingly placed their ambushes around civilian infrastructure to cause collateral civilian deaths. The strategy worked, the civilian death toll rose and public opinion in Afghanistan and Pakistan turned even more against the U.S.\footnote{739} Moreover, they targeted key government and allied personnel with suicide attacks.\footnote{740}

Like in Iraq, neighbouring countries supported, at least in a passive manner, some guerilla forces. Iran was one of them. The Iranian footprint in the insurgency became increasingly visible,\footnote{741} but the most troublesome was Pakistan. Taliban fighters relied strongly on recruitment from Pakistani tribal areas, on Pakistan’s border area for retreating, resupply and re-grouping, and on Pakistani territory for training and their financing activities.\footnote{742} Given the political instability in Pakistan and the need for the new government to appear popular (in a country with very strong roots of political Islam) made it impossible for Islamabad to act effectively in its border areas,\footnote{743} even if it tried to do so. The Taliban increasingly become a national movement with Pashtuns on both sides of the border, although the term ‘national’ should not be overemphasised due to searing rivalries among clans and tribes. This unity rather reflects their common opposition to the Afghan government, the US and NATO forces as well as the then Pakistani government of Musharraf. The consequences were that the coalition forces were drained of local allies and reliable native intelligence, and could hardly play the fractions off
against each other, as they did in Iraq with the Sunni Awakening Council.\footnote{See: Nasreen Ghifran, “Pashtun Ethno-Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1092-1114, p. 1104-1110;}

And unlike Iraq, there was not even the idea of a capable indigenous state and security apparatus that would help the coalition forces’ effort. The Afghan state failed in multiple ways. First, it relied to 90% on foreign aid for existence, and the officials’ real revenues were mostly from corruption and the drug business.\footnote{Mullen, “Afghanistan in 2008”, p. 36;}

The economic growth of some 7% was by far offset by the inflation of appropriately 20%,\footnote{The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2008, p. 304;}

because the growth was sustained simply by international monetary influx from aid and the spending of international personnel and could not be met by any kind of local supply in goods and services. Corruption was endemic. “... the average Afghan household paid $100 in bribes every year, this in a country where over 70% of the population survives on less than $1 a day.”\footnote{Mullen, “Afghanistan in 2008”, p. 35;}

The government was incapable of providing any significant level of services beyond certain city centres and could not provide any economic or social policy that would strengthen the trust of the local population with it. And the Afghan security services – both the army and the police – were nowhere close to even Iraqi standards, although they were increasingly used in combat against the Taliban. But from their official strength of over 72,000 only around 1,000 were employed in combat at any time,\footnote{The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2008, p. 301-302;}

so it seems that only some hand-picked units were actually used for real operations.

For the long-term considerations of the viable options towards Afghanistan, there were many open questions. Was the failure in Afghanistan and the – initially – success in Iraq only a result of the unequal distribution of attention, military forces, aid and expertise between the two theatres of war? Was it only because an able commander found a viable strategy for Iraq, and could the same strategy succeed somewhere else? If yes, shifting the attention from the less popular war in Iraq to the more popular war in Afghanistan was possible. Then it would also be possible to continue to supervise the situation in Iraq, while the forces gradually withdrawn from Iraq could be used in the Afghan theatre. In this way and under the best circumstances, one victory after the other could be achieved.

However, there were several reasons why the two questions asked above might not work out.\footnote{Michael Hart, “West’s Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality”, in: The National Interest, Vol. 118, March/April 2012, p.8-18;}

The differences between Iraq and Afghanistan were not only about the Allied forces, numbers, money and commanders, there were striking historical, cultural, ethno-political and
sociological differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, which facilitated a stabilisation of Iraq, but not of Afghanistan.

First, while Afghan society was a classic example for a pre-modern society,\textsuperscript{750} there had been attempts of (enforced) modernisation in Iraq since the 50s. One might raise objections against the ruling practises of the Baath regime, but the institution of a police and army were known in Iraq, exactly as the government, the bureaucracy, the mandatory school system, etc. And while, together with the political leadership, also the leading echelons of the bureaucracy were changed, there was enough grass route expertise left to facilitate the restart of the ruling system. Even if people were not within these organisations, they quite knew what to expect from them and how to deal with them. Not that the Iraqi regime and bureaucracy were perfect or close to Western standards, but they were working within their limits. Once the problem of immediate security was solved, the state could be re-created within a reasonable amount of money and time.

Afghanistan, on the other hand could be described as migration-age tribalism with Kalashnikovs. The few imitations of state institutions that were created under the monarchic, the communist and later the Karzai regimes were never able to penetrate society in depth. If someone would provide security to Afghanistan, this would still not mean that an Afghan state could be created. The so-called bureaucracy is effectively a nodal point for corruption money. It can hardly be reformed towards delivering any kind of public services. Moreover, there were no expectations in society concerning the services and functions of public institutions. Society continued to work along tribal and clan structures and the pre-modern social roles they offered. If Afghanistan were to be brought to Iraqi standards, the coalition forces would not only have to maintain security and build a state, but they would have to build a modern society first. The latter undertaking would last decades, if not centuries.

Second, the Iraqi oil industry was much better suited to provide instant money in order to finance a state organisation and redistribution via an economic policy than the narco-industry, on which the Afghan society rests. The reasons for this deserve further research and economic analysis beyond the scope of this thesis. The Afghan society apparently totally depends on the shadow economy, which makes it very difficult for political and bureaucratic institutions to tap into this money. If it cannot be regulated and redistributed via official channels, it is useless – in practical terms.

Third, in Afghanistan in 2008, the coalition forces were met with hostility by almost the entire Pashtun community. The situation might have been avoided, but the development had been

initiated a long time ago. The American and the international forces were seen as the major threat, and the situation could only improve without them. In Iraq, on the contrary, the United States had a working relationship with factions within all ethnic or confessional groups, which essentially helped them to win over additional factions time and again. Some minority groups, especially the Kurds, viewed the presence of the United States as a reassurance against sectarian discrimination by others. At least the United States managed to be some kind of mediator that was more or less accepted for the time being. This was not the case in Afghanistan. It was doubtful whether the U.S. could again manoeuvre itself into such a position after seven years of war, especially as the Pashtun culture was much more concerned with revenge for inflicted injustice than the Arab.

If Afghanistan could not be cured, could it be abandoned? What costs would the United States have to bear for leaving Afghanistan to its own?

There would be little prospect of stability after withdrawing from Afghanistan. The Karzai government would probably be ousted and large parts of the country would again be under the rule of the Taliban. Any kind of non-Pashtun alliance would be likely - formally known as Northern Alliance - which would probably be in a type of military struggle with the Taliban. The Taliban, just like the current Afghan state, would primarily finance itself from the cultivation of narcotics - poppy, especially, and cannabis, popular in the north of the country. The new Northern Alliance would probably receive international assistance and military help from Afghanistan’s northern neighbours, possibly Russia and the United States as well. But would this make that much of a difference? The training camps for Islamic internationalists, like Al-Qaeda, had long ago moved to Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. Regaining Afghanistan would not add a significant capability to them, as they finance and recruit themselves through the wealthier Islamic communities in the Middle East, North Africa and their Diaspora in the West. Moreover, as Afghanistan is a very remote country, the chaos there could hardly spill over to other regions and countries. Actually, the training sites in Pakistan, Mali, or other Central African states are much better suited to launch operations against Western targets than those in Afghanistan before 9/11.

Afghanistan’s neighbours do not matter much to the United States: Central Asia never was, and never will be, the ‘heartland’ that geopolitical thinkers were busy to conjure up. The per-

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ceived future exploitable energy resources – oil and gas – were elusive and never matched those of Russia’s gas and the Middle Eastern gas and oil reserves. China to the east mattered, but the Chinese economic centres are all situated on the eastern coastline, far from Central Asia. Central Asia, on the other hand, does not offer the lines of communication and infrastructure either for significant trade with, or for preparation of military action towards, China. Iran mattered, especially for its role in the Persian Gulf, not in Central Asia. A collapsing Afghanistan would help rather the U.S. with regard to Iran, because (like before 2001) it would force Iran to concentrate its military resources on its eastern border. Pakistan’s troubles were self-inflicted. Why should Washington bother about the country that had supported American enemies for so long? After all, the possibility that the Pashtuns and Baluchis would take power in Punjab was a highly unlikely scenario, not for religious, but for ethnic reasons.

However, the reactions of the domestic and the international public opinions would probably be very different. Afghanistan was still the theatre, where the 9/11 attackers were sought. It would need some explanation on the part of the politicians why it should be abandoned now. And of course, leaving Afghanistan without a semblance of victory, would give the international public audience – and especially Islamic internationalists – the impression of a military retreat due to attrition.

The execution of a high-ranking figure, Osama Bin Laden at best, would help considerably in this situation. It could serve as an explanation to the domestic and the international audiences that the war’s goal of bringing the 9/11 attackers to justice was accomplished. Of course, this would say nothing about other goals or the security situation in Afghanistan, but the U.S. does not necessarily have to wage war on behalf of Karzai. But at the time, there was no clear evidence of his hideout – only rumours about his presence in Pakistan. If he still was in this area, a presence in Afghanistan would be very helpful to catch him. But would he be caught in two years, five years or ten years? Could an entire military operation or war be planned around, and based on, the manhunt for one person?

4.1.5. Confronting Iran

As if the two major theatres of war were not a sufficient burden to bear for the United States, a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear programme was on the horizon. The political con-

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754 Seized Phone offers clue to Bin Laden’s Pakistani Links. New York Times Online, 23 June 2011;
frontation about the nuclear programme was described earlier. But whether this confrontation would – or should – be escalated into a military one, was a different question. The rhetoric of a military strike was led by Israel, which felt threatened by Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric and the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme. The debate was echoed in the United States and, on many occasions, the American and the British administrations were forced to comment on the rumours. There was at least some preparation for a regional conflict, from Iran, and the United States. The nuclear programme made the Arab Gulf States nervous, although another war in the region was not the preferred solution. The discussion about military strikes became very real, so that some Congressmen even prepared a resolution, trying to ban it, although internally the U.S. remained ambivalent.

As mentioned in a previous chapter, a military confrontation was very unlikely as long as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were waged and while Iran had its hands in the conflicts. The United States tried to calm the international debate about pre-emptive strikes by denouncing any plans for pre-emptive military action and, later in 2007, by releasing an intelligence estimate, stating that Iran would have abandoned its military nuclear programme by 2003. The release was obviously intended as a signal that military action was not likely under the

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755 Netanyahu für Bombardierung iranischer Atomanlagen, Teheran warnt Israel vor Militärschlag, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 December 2005; Israeliische Sorgen um Irans Nuklearpläne, Pressekonferenz des amtierenden Regierungschefs Olmert, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 January 2006; Israel und Iran, der ‘Point of no Return’ rückt näher, Der Spiegel Online, 20 January 2006;
756 Straw nennt Militärschlag gegen Iran unvorstellbar, Großbritannien hält Türen weiter offen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 29 September 2005; Irans Nuklearanlagen sind gut versteckt, Einige Fragen und Antworten zum Konflikt um Teherans Atomprogramm, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 15 January 2006;
757 This involved enhanced missile-testing, preparation and manoeuvres from both missile and conventional forces as well as sending fighters abroad to prepare for retaliation against the U.S. in case of a pre-emptive strike. See: Iran droht bei Angriff mit Selbstmordattentätern, Sondereinheit der Revolutionären Garde, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 17 April 2006; Säbelrasseln Irans mit Raketen, Erstmaliger Einsatz von Mittelstreckenwaffen bei Manöver, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1 November 2006, Iran testet Shahab-3-Raketen, Militärische Manöver im Persischen Golf, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 November 2006;
758 This involved the launching of new imagery satellites, air-force manoeuvres and political threats of a pre-emptive strike. See: Israel befördert Satellit ins All, Iranisches Atomprogramm beobachten, 26 April 2006; Oberkommandierender für möglichen Militärschlag gegen Iran, Israel bereitet sich angeblich auf Krieg vor, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 August 2006; Israel erwägt Nuklearschlag gegen Iran, ‘Sunday Times’ weiss von Plänen zur Zerstörung von Atomanlagen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 7 January 2007;
759 This involved manoeuvres with other regional powers in the Gulf, in Iraq as well as Turkey preparing for an escalation from the side of Iran. See: Exercises aim to deter Iran, New York Times Online, 22 May 2006; Neues Säbelrasseln der USA gegenüber Iran, Drehgesten vor dem Hintergrund des Irak-Kriegs und des Atomstreits, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 13 January 2007; U.S. Navy raises presence near Iran as nuclear talks continue, International Herald Tribune Online, 10 July 2007;
761 Resolution gegen Angriff auf Iran, US-Parlamentarier wollen Kompetenzen des Präsidenten beschneiden, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 January 2007;
762 USA dementieren Angriffspläne auf Iran und Syrien, Berichte als Legenden bezeichnet, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 July 2007;
763 See: National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 6ff;
Bush administration and that there was still room for negotiations.\textsuperscript{764} This caused severe confusion amongst the European allies, who did not share the optimistic estimations of the U.S. National Intelligence Council and who suddenly found themselves more hawkish than the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{765}

At the same time, Bush became very critical of Iran’s role in Iraq, citing its support for radical Shi’ite organisations, particularly after Muktada al Sadr fled to Quom, and arms shipments to insurgent groups from Iran were intensified.\textsuperscript{766} As described earlier, the military involvement in those conflicts indeed posed a threat to the U.S. effort. Yet, on the other hand, Iran’s cat-and-mouse game with the IAEA’s inspections continued and, basically, Iran used the time gained and the relief of the international pressure to strengthen its enrichment facilities and to further develop the uranium enrichment and the Plutonium production programme.\textsuperscript{767}

What was Bush waiting for? One answer could be that, by 2007/2008, Ahmadinejad came under increasing internal pressure due to the failure of Iran’s economic policy and the increasing pressure of international sanctions.\textsuperscript{768} Symptomatic for the desperate economic situation was the rationing of motor fuel and household heating oil in 2007, which caused riots in Tehran.\textsuperscript{769} However, at the time the Iranian leadership did not show any sign of trying to compromise with the opposition or reformist groups. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Ministry of the Interior banned almost all reformist candidates and the elections themselves were decided between different radical-religious fractions, both with close ties to the Guardian Council.\textsuperscript{770} However, lacking any serious military options against Iran’s nuclear facilities and in view of the fruitless negotiations with the IAEA and the E3, the hope for internal regime change would be at least one policy attempt. Still it would be questionable if this satisfied the Israeli concerns and domestic hawks, and whether this would reassure the Middle East, which was increasingly caught in sectarian tensions.\textsuperscript{771} To the Gulf States, America’s dealing with Iran was to a certain extent a question of the credibility of the United States as a security guarantor. Thus, action or non-action to a certain extent was a test case for America’s ability to

\textsuperscript{764} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2008}, p. 215;
\textsuperscript{765} U.S. finds Iran halted its nuclear arms effort in 2003, International Herald Tribune Online, 4 December 2007; France and Germany say Iran’s nuclear program still a ‘danger’, International Herald Tribune Online, 6 December 2007;
\textsuperscript{766} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2008}, p. 216;
\textsuperscript{767} Ibid., p. 216-221;
\textsuperscript{768} Ibid., p. 222ff;
\textsuperscript{769} Ölland Iran rationiert das Benzin, Bevölkerung reagiert mit Gewalt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 27 June 2007;
\textsuperscript{770} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Survey 2008}, ibid., p. 223;
\textsuperscript{771} Amerika im Spannungsfeld zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten, Kritik aus den USA an der verdeckten Irak-Strategie Saudiarabischs, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 31 July 2007; Sunni-Shiite tensions out in the open in Lebanon, International Herald Tribune Online, 18 May 2008; Syrien und Iran provozieren USA und Israel, Vorwurf der Verschwörung, 17 February 2007;
still act as the world’s leading power.

Short of a viable military option and in addition to an inner-Iranian solution, the United States could do little more than strengthen their regional allies. Large arms deals with Saudi Arabia were concluded to bolster their conventional capabilities. Moreover, as mentioned in the chapter on missile defence, the Gulf region was easily protected by sea-based assets, such as SM-3 and SM-2-equipped destroyers. Producing more of these missiles, at the expense of, for example, the GBI-base in Europe, would definitely help.

Other options that were not considered at the time as preferable were counter-proliferation or an Israeli strike. Counter-proliferation would mean letting one or more rivals of Iran acquire nuclear weapons, too, and letting a regional deterrence architecture work on its own. This was the least preferred option, as such a system was judged unstable and the dynamics in the change of the balance of power – altering the positions of Saudi Arabia and probably Turkey – would give the new nuclear powers a free hand to pursue other goals than just counterbalancing Iran. But this option was judged as one of the most likely courses of action the local parties would take in the case of losing U.S. security guarantees.

The other option would be to give Israel green light for a strike against Iran. However, in 2008, such a move would have had severe security consequences for the United States. The U.S. Air Force at the time was the Airspace Control Authority in Iraq. Israel would have to use Jordanian and Iraqi Airspace for transit, as the use of Turkish or Saudi airspace for such a strike was unlikely, and, given the insufficient range of Israeli planes, refuelling aircraft would have to fly in loops over Iraqi airspace. Since Israel did not have enough fighter jets to mop up the Iranian nuclear programme in one swift strike – at least in a scenario that involved conventional weapons only – the Israeli operation would take days if not weeks. In such a case, the U.S. could not pretend to be surprised or unable to stop the Israelis. So it would be at least a facilitator of such an operation and have to bear the political consequences, which would be quite the same as if the United States were to strike on their own.

On the other hand, one should not underestimate the regional dimension of the public showdown between Iran and Israel. Both countries try to establish themselves in the Arab Middle East, if not as the region’s leader, and each has to offer compensation for a major shortfall in the Arab eyes: Iran for being a Persian-Shiite nation, trying to export a revolutionary ideology, and Israel for being a Jewish nation that is unable to conclude a final peace agreement with the Palestinians. Both countries try to bridge shortcomings in the Arab eye by publicly turning

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772 U.S. Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia, New York Times Online, 28 July 2007;
773 See: Gressel, "Ein israelischer Militäraufschlag gegen den Iran";
774 For Israel’s capabilities and options concerning the Iranian nuclear programme see: Ibid.;
against each other.\textsuperscript{775} Iran, by declaring the extinction of Israel a public goal, which their respective government fails to deliver in the eyes of the ordinary Arabs, and Israel, by offering the region its powerful military, which is far more capable than anything Iran has, as shown in various wars, as a balancer against Iranian power.

If so, the Iranian-Israeli stand-off would follow different rules. The more internally unstable Iran became and the more worried the Arab leaders became about Iran’s nuclear programme, the more Iran would resort to anti-Israeli rhetoric. On the other hand, the more the Israeli government depended on settlers and right-winged groups, and the less it were willing to compromise in the Palestinian issue, the more would Israel try to play the Iran card. Yet, if the Israeli government proved to be conciliatory, Iran could switch from spoiling rhetoric to spoiling action, in order not to let its primary propaganda tool slip through its fingers.\textsuperscript{776} With the Israeli legislative elections coming up in February 2009, the future of this matter was, for some time, beyond the reach of American foreign politics. It was quite clear that the new American administration, one way or the other, had to keep a watchful eye on the two parties.

4.2. Possible Options for a post-Bush foreign policy

Now that the starting situation for the next administration’s foreign policy is described, the possible grand strategy options for the next American president can be discussed. As mentioned before, the choices were very limited. Much of the new president’s agenda would consist of dealing with the decisions of his predecessor and the aftermath of the (failed) strategy of primacy. However, it is worth noticing that the Bush administration underwent a policy shift after 2005, abandoning much of the controversial rhetoric and confrontational actions that were associated with primacy. Muddling through the crises would probably be the best description for his foreign policy after 2005/6.

How could his successor conduct foreign relations? First, the most likely course is to continue muddling through in an environment of preservative adaptation, but it is not the only one. Politicians still have choices, just like the electorate. Some options are more appealing than others, but even the least probable choices should not be entirely dismissed. In preservative adaptation, the government creates a lot of losers in foreign policy, as the mutually exclusive demands of the many stake holders cannot be satisfied in any way whatsoever. The question is how to distribute losses: to whom and to which extent? This will require further decisions

\textsuperscript{775} See further: Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p. 261ff;
\textsuperscript{776} Iran did so after the Madrid Conference. See: Ibid., p. 151-156;
with complex implications, calling for strategic considerations. The possible options will be described in accordance with the scheme laid out in chapter 2.2., but in a much simplified way. The four options are taken from Ross and Posen. As all these options are hypothetical, they will be discussed quite freely, without much reference to actual political debates. The reality check of the assumptions put forward in this chapter will be made in chapter 5.

Ross and Posen discussed their policy options in the mid-90s, in a time of promotive adaptation. After winning the Cold War, the United States enjoyed the freedom of conducting any kind of foreign policy they wished. The scope of the U.S. foreign policy depended on their ambitions rather than on their resources. By 2008, however, the situation had changed. Preservative adaptation is a much more restrictive environment for conducting foreign policy. Does preservative adaptation preclude certain grand strategies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grand Strategies</th>
<th>Neo-Isolationism</th>
<th>Selective Engagement</th>
<th>Cooperative Security</th>
<th>Primacy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquiescent Adaptation</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intransigent Adaptation</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotive Adaptation</td>
<td>Highly unlikely</td>
<td>Rather unlikely</td>
<td>Preferred</td>
<td>Plausible/likely</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preservative Adaptation</td>
<td>Likely, attractive to some</td>
<td>Preferred</td>
<td>Rather unlikely</td>
<td>Highly unlikely</td>
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As shown in the previous table, some grand strategies are more likely within different modes of adaptation. While it is not very likely that the United States resort to isolationism in an age of unipolarity, isolationism will be the only choice in the – entirely unlikely – event of acquiescent adaptation. Intransigent adaptation is a radical sort of primacy, so the matter does not need to be discussed.

The fact that something is unlikely does not mean that it is impossible. As discussed in the sub-chapter on the respective premises, the different grand strategies are derived rather from different normative or ideological mindsets or domestic alignments than from different deliberations on foreign policy. The domestic conditions that influenced the various politicians’ views of foreign policy did not necessarily have to – or did not – change in line with different

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strategic situations. The Neo-Conservatives, in promoting primacy, did not turn into Liberals or Leftists because of the financial crisis. Of course they would not endorse the same kind of primacy in 2008 as they did in 1996 or in 2001, but they would still consider direct, active American leadership and pre-emptive action in the most important strategic issues as an indispensable goal of foreign policy. Equally, convinced Liberals, although promoting indiscriminate humanitarian interventions was impossible at that time, would still try to redefine American foreign policy in order to better promote democratic transitions, the adherence of human rights, and international institutions. Indeed Flournoy and Brimley\textsuperscript{778} sowed that – with major modifications – all four grand strategy visions continue to exist and thrive in the American academic debate. Therefore, all four grand strategy options will be discussed. Special attention will paid to how the different grand strategies would give answers to the questions raised in chapter 4.1.

4.3. Neo-Isolationism

“Neo-isolationism is the least ambitious, and, at least among foreign policy professionals, probably the least popular grand strategy option”\textsuperscript{779} according to Ross and Posen back in 1996. The low popularity of this strategy with the political elites and foreign policy commentators remained very much in 2008, although the U.S. electorate, disillusioned with the rejection of American values and principles in the Middle East, lost confidence in the American economic model in the course of the economic crisis, would support a candidate who credibly embodied such a vision. Ron Paul, who contested regularly in Republican primaries, was such a candidate.\textsuperscript{780} The lack of support from media, interest groups and opinion leaders, however, gives a glimpse into how popular this option would be with the evaluators. Neo-isolationism is not an outright stupid or short-sighted idea, although it may seem odd to many people, because it rejects many post-modern assumptions regarding international relations and the world economy, and entails very straightforward consequences from this challenge of conventional wisdom. It is necessary to consider these challenges and assumptions as an alternative. And it is necessary to bear in mind that the United States still has the possibility of retrenchment and even retreat.

\textsuperscript{779} Posen, Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, p. 7;
\textsuperscript{780} See for his statements in the 2008 campaign on his homepage: http://www.ronpaul.com/ronpaul2008/presidential-debates-2008/
4.3.1. Premises

The premises normally comprise the assumptions regarding the state and the functioning of the international environment, the perceived secular trends of its developments, the specific values of the ruling elite and their preferred measures for preserving their access to power. In this case, the values of the (possible) ruling elite (fraction) are the most interesting features, so they will be treated first.

Neo-isolationism does not necessarily have to come from the libertarian side of the political spectrum, but after 2008 libertarianism, Austrian-school economic thinking, and neo-isolationism have much common ground. This makes the appearance of this particular grand strategy design in the libertarian camp more attractive. The first common ground for libertarianism and isolationism is their scepticism towards the state, state interference not only in economic affairs, but regulatory politics as such. While both are aware of the diverse troubles and difficulties in world politics, they both believe that American interference would not help, but make things worse instead. “Given the absence of threats to the U.S. homeland, neo-isolationism holds that national defense will seldom justify intervention abroad. The United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford, the costs of maintaining world order. The pursuit of economic well-being is best left to the private sector. The promotion of values, such as democracy and human rights, inspires ill-advised crusades that serve only to generate resentment against the United States;”781 They would further state that not every peripheral conflict really matters to U.S. interests (in terms of security and economy), indeed very few would. And even with those that would, direct intervention is hardly ever justified.

The other ideological root of neo-isolationism is defensive realism.782 Defensive realism stresses that over-ambitious foreign policy could soon overstretch any great power, regardless its competitive advantage, that the military apparatus is not well suited for social engineering, and that social mobilisation (ethnic, religious, tribal, etc.) for war or covered war may hardly be engineered or controlled from abroad. They are very sceptic towards the post-modern military doctrine and the significance of new, post-modern threats. Rather they perceive the world in terms of classic great-power politics. While defensive realism is an ideologically a much more moderate form of neo-isolationism, in country dominated by liberal political

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thought like the United States, a purely realist grand strategy has few chances to be implemented. Domestic politics would demand some sort of liberal vision blended with it, or at least it would have to be justified on liberal terms. However it is likely that if a libertarian presidential candidate would gain the highest office, he would borrow heavily from defensive realists in conceptualising his foreign policy.

As both strands are very sceptical towards the intervention of the state (in economics, societal affairs, etc.), the interests or reasons for intervention should be very narrowly defined. Threats that justify military attention should pose a direct risk to the United States. “U.S. strategists have responded to the facts of the post-Cold War world with costly national security policies that produce new problems faster than they solve current ones.”783 The United States is not entitled to, and should refrain in the name of self-interest from, fighting wars or engaging in defence postures on behalf of another nations, or with the desire to redesign certain regional orders in their favour. This would be the task of the regional states as such.

In terms of the international order, the libertarians still stress the benefits of free trade, barrier reduction, and so forth, even if they remain sceptical towards the WTO and other international organisations.784 This unveils quite a contradiction not only in Ron Paul’s populism in particular, but also in the libertarian line of thought as such: why would the world still support free trade, free travel, globalisation and the liberal international order if it were not sure that the United States maintain it and if there were no treaty or set of rules for this free trade? To the libertarians, free trade and economic competition simply are the best state of affairs, and this rationale would be shared by the majority of the states. But this simply is an outright ignorance of history. Over the centuries, an open economy world order was only realised when it was enforced by a liberal-minded world power (first Great Britain and later the United States),785 and revisionist tendencies have never stopped. Indeed, a retreat of the United States as the principal maintainer of the status quo might invite other powers, such as China, to implement other forms of international organisations and economic orders, following state-centred, mercantilist principles.786

However, defensive realists would support a major retreat, stating that neither China nor Russia are in the position to dominate the Eurasian continent or implement such a mercantilistic, segregated international order.787 Domestic imponderabilities (especially with China), lack of

783 Ibid., p. 91;
784 See for the related speech of Ron Paul: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmGcaOkRcTU;
786 For the discussion see: Schweller, Pu, “After Unipolarity”, p. 41–72;
787 Posen, “A Strategy of Restraint”, p. 87-88,
resources (especially with Russia), and most important regional balances of power (Russia vs.
Europe and China vs. Japan and South Korea) would imperil such attempts or at least would
facilitate American responses to such a behaviour. There is no reason to pre-empt or to prema-
turely engage in confrontational policies in any of those regions.

Isolationists who are more elaborate than Ron Paul would state that the current world order
has its merits, but maintaining it does by far not need such extensive efforts as humanitarian
interventions or nation-building, and even if certain states and regions would opt out from the
current system and form other trade blocks or regional political, security and economic organi-
sations, the damage dealt to the U.S. economy would still be less than the costs of trying to
prevail this through a proactive foreign policy. They would point out that the interdependence
of the states is overrated, particularly for the United States with its large domestic energy re-
sources and local market, separated from the rest of the world by oceans. If certain trade part-
ners were eliminated or hampered, they could be substituted by others. The U.S. would hardly
depend on single actors and as long as the world order were not at stake, like in the Second
World War, there would be no particular convincing argument for U.S. action or intervention.
Regional stability primarily would be the responsibility of the regional powers and regional
security organisations. Too much involvement of the United States would only encourage
free-riding.788

The costs that the United States would have to bear when they retreated from various regions
and political initiatives would be offset by investing in the domestic economy or savings for
the federal budget. The United States would not have to spend billions for huge armed forces
and their deployment across the world. Foreign aid could be abolished, because international
aid and other transnational monetary transactions corrupt local elites and disturb the competit-
iveness of other states. Combined with other cost savings corresponding to slim government
concepts, the United States would be able to tackle the pending ills of its economic situation:
its high budget deficit and its sovereign debt, and by being able to increase the economic com-
petitiveness in the long run even the trade deficit might be coped with.

Radical Islamic Revisionism would still be seen as a challenge to U.S. values and the Amer-
ican order, but it would hardly justify a global military engagement in major land theatres. In-
deed the matter is quite tricky for libertarians, as even boosting homeland security is hardly
desirable, which originates in the libertarians' suspicions of a big state, internal intelligence
services, data collection, and data traffic supervision by the state.

788 Ibid., p. 95;
4.3.2. Long-term strategies

Since the isolationist or libertarian ideal strikingly differs from the situation in which the United States actually was in 2008, the biggest problem for the isolationists would be how to get from the status quo, in which the U.S. was engaged all around the world, to the desired end-state, in which the United States would be disengaged. Simply walking out of Afghanistan and Iraq, abandoning the war on terror, the United Nations, NATO and the WTO might sound good in populist election speeches, but seems utterly unrealistic. A more gradual approach to the withdrawal would be likely.

An isolationist administration would, in any event, regard domestic goals, such as the recovery from the economic crisis, the restructuring of the economic and financial sector, and the reduction of the public debt, higher than any foreign policy goal. Reducing its international profile at the cost of reduced influence and standing in the global power structure would be tolerated. Hence, the priority of regions and issues would be seen through the economic viewpoint. In economic terms, only Western Europe, Oceania, and East Asia deserve major attention as regions, since the American economy and financial sectors are highly interlinked with these regions. Other regions would not matter much, possibly with the exception of India. The Middle East and its energy resources would be debated, but from a strictly isolationist point of view, increasing the domestic and neighbouring energy production as well as restructuring domestic energy consumption could come very close to the goal of energy independence.

As Europe, Oceania, and East Asia are singled out as the only important regions to the U.S. foreign policy, the question remains whether they are stable as such, will remain stable for the next ten to fifteen years and whether a direct military presence will be needed to maintain their stability. In 1996 no prominent revisionist ideology had a hold on one of the three regions. In 2008, the situation could be judged as different, when Russia attempted to regain control over the territories of the former Soviet Union and when China showed increasing discontent with the current economic order and strengthened and modernised its military apparatus much faster than any of its neighbours. The confrontation with China could accelerate

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789 Ibid., p. 94;
791 At least there is a debate on energy independence, in which its advocates the new independence in foreign policy as being independent of imports from the Middle East as one of the major advantages. See for example: Daniel Yergin, America's Energy Security, Wallstreet Journal Online, 12 December 2011;
792 The National Institute for Defence Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2008, Tokyo, p. 17ff; p. 67ff;
if the United States brought forward issues of trade and currency imbalances and if the Chinese would practice their policy of artificial energy purchasing prices more aggressively, something an administration probably would do when it is focussed on economic issues. The isolationist approach would be supported by the calculation that the costs of a Chinese war against any of its Eastern neighbours, i.e. Japan or South Korea, would by far outweigh the gains and, therefore, would be unlikely for the short to the medium term. So there might be a strategic rationale for disengagement. However, compared to the 90s, provisions for re-entering both theatres should be considered more closely. In the mean time, convincing local allies to do more for their own security would be the baseline for the American security and defence policy. Foreign deployment would be reduced, but probably not be abandoned at all. Islamic revisionism would be treated as a challenge to homeland security rather than a major strategic threat. Reducing the international footprint of the U.S. and disengaging from the Middle-East could facilitate putting pressure on the Arab Gulf states to stop the support of transnational Islamist terror organisations. Indeed, if the United States left global energy politics and pricing to the free market alone, it would be in a good position to untie the political and economic ties to the Gulf monarchies. This could turn the Middle East upside down.

4.3.3. Medium-range policies

The most immediate consequences of such an isolationist strategy would be felt in Iraq and Afghanistan. As both regions were regarded as of minor importance to core U.S. interests, withdrawal would be initiated as soon as possible, disregarding the stigma of the lost war that would be associated with both theatres. For the above-mentioned reasons, a withdrawal from Iraq would be much easier to organise, so it would probably be conducted first. In Afghanistan, the retreat would be more difficult, as Karzai would probably try to keep the Americans in as long as possible, subverting the transition. No neighbour or other organisation would be willing to take over responsibility in Afghanistan. But commitments to comprehensive security might be withdrawn and the situation on the ground be handed over to tribal forces on the notion that the modernisation of Afghanistan did not work. Karzai could still be removed. Managing tribal warfare by supporting the tribes that conformed rather to U.S. interests would be a much cheaper and more feasible procedure for Afghanistan than a comprehensive approach.

Withdrawing from both theatres as soon as possible could serve as a warning shot to the rest of the world that the United States was serious about abandoning previously held security
commitments. This might help to set the stage for negotiating a different burden-sharing with some alliances that might be kept in the end.

Since the Middle East is not regarded as a vital region, there would be few incentives for further U.S. involvement. The United States would certainly not try to break the deadlock between Israel and the Fatah or influence other dynamics for change in the region. The suspicion that Islamism might be the driving force behind political changes, could serve as reason why it should not to be engaged. The primary policy towards the region would be promoting energy independence and diversification towards more imports from neighbouring regions in order to reduce the amount of imports from the Middle East. However, such a policy would still remain vulnerable to shocks created from power shifts and power struggles within the region, as their effect on energy prices can not be avoided. In this particular case, a more assertive Iranian policy towards its neighbourhood could present a serious challenge for the isolationist cause.

Europe would be another theatre of retreat for the United States. Western Europe is considered by many capable of defending itself against a Russian aggression or any other emerging threat, although the author does not agree with this conventional wisdom. However, even if it were not quite that capable of defending itself, the isolationist logic goes, it would be capable of affording its own defence, and there is no reason why the U.S. should bear the military burden alone. A complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, including the tactical nuclear weapons and the American contribution to stabilisation missions in the Balkans, would set a clear signal to the European powers to step up their efforts regarding national defence. Although isolationists frequently make a point in leaving NATO instantly, the U.S. could delay this decision for some time to see how Europe would cope with the new security situation. As NATO expansion would certainly be off the table, the situation of Ukraine and Georgia would not be a matter of concern. By restructuring and reinforcing the defence sector, the European nations could take over the minor operative tasks that the United States fulfilled in Europe, while a dormant NATO could still be seen as a possible anchor for the U.S. to re-enter Europe if the need arose or to bring its nuclear forces into the Russian calculations should Russia use its nuclear superiority as a frequent bargaining tool. If, however, Europe still proved incapable of looking after its own security, the U.S. would withdraw from NATO.

The Asian region, in the light of the rise of China, might be a different scenario. The hardcore

isolationist position is that there is no reason to deter China, that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan can or shall fend for themselves and that the trade and currency imbalances are mainly due to the failed U.S. financial and economic policy. While some of the assessment is certainly true, there are some serious question marks on an ‘abandon’ Asia policy.

Contrary to the credos of economic liberals, decisions on financial and economic policies are hardly ever taken only on the grounds of economic reasoning. While isolationists are busy criticising this matter in domestic U.S. politics, they overlook that this is even more common in other nations and that this affects the United States. In terms of free trade and open economies, everybody cheats, it quite depends to what extent they do so and how much cheating the dominant power will tolerate. As the U.S. budget deficit would not evaporate overnight, even an isolationist government would have to rely on other states to give the U.S. money. And they will not do so for economic reasons alone, but primarily as an investment in the political, security, or economic role that the U.S. plays in the international system. Why would they still invest into the U.S. if the U.S. withdrew their services? If the U.S. had to borrow money on market terms, not on political terms, the credit costs would sky-rocket, as the American debt situation is quite comparable to that of Italy or Greece.

Even if the United States radically redesign their financial policy and committed itself to an open and free trade agenda in an even purer liberal sense than today, this does not mean that others would automatically do so as well. Even devaluing the Dollar, for example, would not quite suffice, as the RMB was bound to it. Re-introducing the gold standard, on the other hand, as Ron Paul used to argue, would, if intended as a global model, need the agreement of other nations. All Asian nations are export-oriented economies, which are less likely to support a measure that would prohibit them from devaluing their currencies at will – to a certain extent a proven measure to deal with domestic economic struggles. However, redrawing the international financial order at the same time as abandoning and probably upsetting all international trading and financial partners, except maybe for Beijing, would be quite a daunting task.

Since libertarians often complain about the defence industry’s harmful political lobbying in Washington and since their foreign and security policy is extremely unambitious, one might expect that the isolationists’ approach towards the military domain were a low-profile policy,

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795 For a good disquisition on the matter see: Gilpin, Global Political Economy; Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations;
too. The main task of the military would be the preservation of military skills for the event of a worsening global security situation. America’s nuclear deterrence would preserve the invulnerability of the United States. A modest missile defence programme, designed only to defend the United States, might be kept as an insurance against possible proliferators.\textsuperscript{798}

This is necessary as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not seen as a vital concern to the United States, at least as one that should trigger a military engagement. Systems of regional nuclear deterrence would emerge that would regulate themselves, just like the free market. Even to defensive realists, “[t]he lesson of these new nuclear powers, therefore, is that proliferation cannot be prevented; it can only be managed.”\textsuperscript{799} There is, however, some disagreement between libertarians and defensive realists to what extent the United States needs to be involved in this management process. As the strategic intents of these actors usually have a regional focus, they will refrain from threatening the United States directly – as long as the United States refrains from intervening in their respective spheres of influence. In most cases, the proliferators’ desire to acquire nuclear weapons is based on their ‘understandable’ defensive security interests that will not immediately cause war or nuclear escalation.\textsuperscript{800} So intervention is not always justified.

While the efforts in the Global War on Terror would be reduced dramatically, there probably would remain some sort of international presence, to train other countries’ counter-terrorism forces to fight piracy, drug-trafficking, etc. The “Global War on Terrorism” would be regarded as a matter police and intelligence forces, cooperating with other nations and only occasionally resorting to very limited, covered interventions.\textsuperscript{801} Isolationists still believe in free trade and globalisation, so at least the minimum military effort should be maintained to manage the rights associated with it.

The United States should not pursue or push for interventions on a larger scale. If large-scale humanitarian interventions would be desired by other states or allies, the United States should refrain from taking a leading role, especially in combat operations. “Instead, the United States should only engage in armed philanthropy in large coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate. America should not insist on leadership; indeed, it should avoid it. On the whole, the United States should offer logistical, rather than direct combat, assets.”\textsuperscript{802}

\textsuperscript{798} Isolationists do not really conceal, what kind of force structure they want, this is taken from: Posen, Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, p. 12-13;
\textsuperscript{799} Posen, “A Strategy of Restraint”, p.90;
\textsuperscript{801} Posen, “A Strategy of Restraint”, p. 97;
\textsuperscript{802} Ibid, p. 97;
Downsizing U.S. efforts in the rest of the world could ease tight resources for a new policy towards the southern neighbourhood. Isolationists stress that security to the U.S. is provided by the geographic distance to other regions, but the instability and drug wars of Central America are not that far away. The libertarian policy of legalising drugs would have a profound impact on the southern neighbourhood. If not a strictly isolationist U.S., the world could witness a much more regionalist United States.

4.3.4. Remarks on the possible implementation

As mentioned above, isolationism should not be dismissed outright, because some assessments of the international situation are hard to dismiss. The American economic situation is, indeed, not all China’s fault and the United States are far less dependent on developments in the rest of the world than they are usually supposed to be, and the United States economic and foreign policy contains a series of inconsistencies, double standards and distortions from special-interest lobbying groups. However, recognising this alone does not make a policy, neither a strategy.

Ron Paul’s populist statements have already been mentioned. Now, what kind of populism is it, what message does it deliver to the people so that it seems so convincing to the common man? In the eyes of the author, the populist notion comes from a sort of ultra-liberal ‘self-purification’ ideology. A very narrow interpretation of the American constitution, the close adherence to economic liberalism – or liberal economic theory⁸⁰³ – the omnipresent criticism of government and bureaucratic overreach and the recalling of earlier times as being more prudent, restrained, etc. suggest that libertarianism is the American version of a backward-looking, morally self-righteous populism. Islamic fundamentalism, recalling the greatness and purity of the caliphate is the oriental version of the same notion.

A tragic error of isolationism is that abandoning power politics does not necessarily make others do so as well. On the contrary, the power vacuum left by an isolationist U.S. will be filled by others. The isolationists make the point that most – or all – of the problems in international relations are due to the American involvement in it. Islamic terrorism targets the United States, because the United States intervenes in the Islamic world. Proliferation is an issue, because the United States wants to interfere elsewhere and change the regional balance of power.

in their favour – instead of leaving the region in its “natural” equilibrium. The tragic error is, however, that there is no natural equilibrium in world politics as liberal economics might suggest. The international order rises and falls with the willingness of the principal power(s) to enforce it. If they refrain from enforcement, other powers will take the stage and set the course for revision. There is no guarantee that other powers will adhere to the same principles of order as the United States, or in the name of reason and rationality, refrain from aggression and expansion. Iran definitely has certain defensive interests. But who guaranties, it would not turn aggressive if unchecked? China is willing to cope with the status quo, but is the imponderability of a major (military) revision of the status quo not one of the main reasons for this behaviour? To conclude with Oswald Spengler’s verdict on the inter-war year’s liberal isolationism: “... only fools, cowards, and criminals ... believe or pretend to believe that surrendering world politics would protect from its consequences.”

A similar argument could be put forward to the denial-of-problems rhetoric. When Ron Paul argues that China is not the main reason for American trade and financial imbalances, he is right, but this does not make the Chinese behaviour in some fields of economic politics unproblematic. The same accounts for the endless criticism on international organisations: the WTO is certainly not the optimum, but exiting it would not create a different trade regime. NATO has its faults, and so does the United Nations Organisation. But simply ignoring the problem by opting out of the organisations that are somehow connected to it neither solves the problem of Europe’s security architecture and common security nor the problem of defining a world order. Even if perfection cannot be achieved, the libertarians never take into account the negative effects if the current world order is abandoned. Finally, an isolationist president might find himself on a very proactive agenda as soon as the fear of losing the world to much more undesirable ideas would come up. Just to mention, George W. Bush took office with the promises of tax reduction, bureaucracy containment, ending nation-building and fiscal conservatism – and ended up in two wars, with a record deficit and the not-quite slim Department for Homeland Defence.

Defensive realism can’t be spared of similar – although more moderate – critique. Most arguments of defensive realists against an activist U.S. foreign policy are settled and noteworthy. However, that does not provide a clear concept on how to retrench and re-design U.S. policies

804 See: Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 9ff, 50ff, 211ff; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 56ff.
805 Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”, p. 5–56;
from global activism to the desired humble and restrained international role, defensive realists envision for the United States. A more nuanced defensive realism might rather resemble selective engagement than isolationism. Last but not least, defensive realists fail to provide a popular narrative to sell their strategy to the American public.

4.4. Selective Engagement

Selective engagement is the term for a much more reluctant, but never the less engaged U.S. grand strategy. In the 90s the concept was difficult to explain to a public with overwhelming liberal-internationalist expectations towards foreign policy.807 Now, in the middle of the economic crisis and after the rejection of the democratic vision in the Middle East, a rather dry and unemotional foreign policy concept could be more easily implemented.

4.4.1. Premises

Unlike isolationists, the promoters of selective engagement recognise, that the liberal international order, on which the United States interest and legitimacy rests, does not maintain itself. “An open international economic order should not be taken for granted, however, because globalization will not continue unless proper political steps are taken to preserve it.”808 Maintaining this international order, will require constant efforts.

Advocates of selective engagement put forward that the unipolar moment will fade rather sooner than later. “...it is simply impossible to muster sufficient power and will to keep domestic and international peace worldwide, or to preserve the United States as the undisputed leader in a unipolar world. The United States does have 22 percent of the gross world product, at least half again as much as Japan, its closest economic competitor, but only 4.6 percent of the global population. Global economic development will gradually reduce the U.S. economic advantage, and demographics already limit the U.S. capacity for intervention in labor-intensive civil wars. Desert Storm does not suggest a permanent, overwhelming U.S. military superiority; other wars may not be so easy.”809 However, even if the United States will lose power in relative terms to others, the United States will remain the predominant political actor, given its global net of alliances and partnerships. As the United States can still contain a

807 Posen, Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", p. 20;
809 Posen, Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", p. 16;
rising revisionist power and keep the peace among the global powers by throwing its own weight into conflicts and issues, which might endanger the overall systemic stability or might give a rising revisionist power the chance to challenge the status-quo.

Of the regions and conflicts that matter, Europe, the Middle East and Asia-Oceania are of primary concern, since the chance that a major revisionist power might emerge in the industrialised Eurasian landmass and since the dependency of the new power on Middle-Eastern oil might trigger the desire to dominate the region. As of 2008, China might be singled out as a future possible competitor, since it was the only emerging power that was willing and, within a time frame of about 10 to 20 years, able to challenge the United States. Russia, while developing a revisionist attitude and revisionist policies, would not be able to really compete with the Western powers, as its internal policy was strangling economic and technological progress. With China at the centre, Asia, Oceania and the Pacific alliances would become the centre of future American foreign policy. "As China’s economy continues to grow and its military forces improve in quality, America’s preeminent position in East Asia is under challenge. China is now a more important economic market for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan than the United States, and China’s global economic influence continues to grow, through its demand for energy sources and raw materials. China is the military hegemon on the mainland; the United States, if it is to be an influential political-military actor in East Asia, must remain the maritime hegemon."

Checking revisionist states should not be pursued unilaterally. Maintaining a global web of alliances should preclude an aggressive revisionist policy by contending powers. Alliances would also ensure a sustainable burden-sharing of the status-quo powers. As the advocates of selective engagement adhere rather to cyclical models of world history, sustainability and avoiding overstretch are at the heart of their strategic considerations.

As the Asian powers heavily depended on Middle-Eastern oil, the Middle East would remain in the focus of the American foreign policy. "Because Gulf oil currently supplies about 40 percent of the oil consumed globally every day, and is projected to supply an even greater percentage a decade or two from now, the United States must prevent any power — external or internal to the region — from disrupting the flow of oil out of the Gulf. The 2003 Gulf War

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812 Art, “Selective Engagement after Bush”, p.27;

813 Umbrecht, "Zukünftige Auswirkungen der energiepolitischen Anhängigkeit Chinas und Asiens vom Mittleren Osten und von Zentralasien", p. 191-220;
eradicated the Iraqi threat to the stable flow of Gulf oil, but Iran now aspires to be the regional
ehegemon in the Gulf.\footnote{Art, “Selective Engagement after Bush”, p.30;} However, the attempt to remake the region in its own image or to
preventively vindicate the regimes associated with revisionist alliances – as done in primacy –
would be dropped. Instead, the United States would rely on the moderate Arab regimes to sta-
bilise the Middle East.

Concerning the value-system or ideological set-up of a selectively engaging administration,
they would follow the classical realist assumptions and theories about international relations.
Such ideas would come from the moderate Republican camp (with Richard Nixon as the his-
toric reference rather than Ronald Regan), like John McCain or Rudolf Giuliani, but not the
Tea Party or libertarian Republicans. On the Democratic side, moderates, such as Joe Lieber-
man or Leon Panetta could be named. Harry S. Truman or John F. Kennedy would be historic
references.

The main problem for such a foreign policy would be that it does not follow the mainstream
popular emotions of moralism and the vision of the democratic mission. As noticed above,
both visions were at their low in 2008, so the public might be more receptive for a branch of
very dry rationalism. And unlike the isolationist claims, it would be much easier to incorpor-
ate the demands of several interest groups within defensive-realism, which would be more
popular among opinion leaders. Basically, cuts and savings would have to be accomplished,
but losses would be quite evenly distributed among the domestic issue-groups, and interna-
tional allies.

It is hard to determine how the war on terror would be perceived by the advocates of selective
engagement. Usually traditional defensive realists rather care for the structurally more potent
competitors than for the ideologically more aggressive ones. It is conceivable that fighting ter-
rorism would again be regarded as a task for homeland defence and not as the core issue in
foreign policy. However, after the experiences of 9/11 they might be more sensitive to re-
gional powers vulnerable to Islamist revisionism, i.e. Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, etc.

### 4.4.2. Long-term strategies

Unlike isolationism, which abandons world politics or cooperative security, and primacy, in
which world politics should be conducted to change the international system, selective en-
gagement defines its goals in close relation to the status quo. But contrast to the 90s, in 2008
the actual status quo could not be maintained. Prolonging the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
was not a viable option, not only due to the high economic costs, but also because it tied military resources there, which sooner or later would be needed in other theatres. As conventional great-power politics would require conventional military forces, the current development of the U.S. armed forces towards a tool for achieving comprehensive security in unconventional military environments was not the desired path for the future U.S. military.

As the Middle East is judged to be more important than Central Asia, Afghanistan would likely be abandoned. However, to avoid the image of having lost a war, one could seek a brief victorious moment or an assassination of a high-ranking Al-Qaeda member as sufficient for a withdrawal. A pro-Western Iraq could be of use in the Middle-Eastern balance of power, so the role of the U.S. military in Iraq should be transformed, but at best preserved at a smaller scale to prevent Iraq from collapsing or falling prey to the emerging sectarian struggle across the region. In respect to the latter, an increasingly assertive Iran, that tried to meddle in the internal affairs of Lebanon, Syria and some Gulf States, was the predominant threat. As Iran enjoyed strong links to both Russia and China, the Iranian quest for regional hegemony was hardly a purely Middle-Eastern affair. Then, there was also a kind of Sunni revisionism, embodied in the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliates, such as the Hamas, but also among the Turkish AKP or Saudi-Arabia-sponsored NGO’s, which had to be monitored closely. In counterbalancing Iran, the United States should not give unconditional support to the Gulf States or Turkey to suppress other ethnic and religious minorities or change the regional order according to their own hegemonic goals. Again, maintaining close ties with Iraq could be useful to retain a certain independence from Turkey or the Gulf States, while still being able to keep Iran in check.

In all regional policies, local alliances would play a key rule, as the United States would try to shift as much responsibility towards local actors as possible. The United States would have to orchestrate a web of alliances around the globe: NATO in Europe, the bilateral alliances with Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, unofficially with Taiwan, with Turkey, Egypt, Kuwait and the GCC members in the Middle East. As China would be the most capable contender, the alliances in East Asia would probably be the most important ones. The creation of a more integrated multilateral – but U.S.-centric – regional security system in Asia would be a long-term goal. An expansion of the regional alliances would be welcome, but it would only be pursued if it brought a net increase of alliance capabilities over the increased

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burden to defend more territory. Enlargements that weaken an alliance were to be avoided. Concerning the international order, the selective engagers would be quite comfortable with the status quo, both in terms of the political as well as the economic order. That does not mean that the United Nations were to be supported enthusiastically, but every course for revision would bear higher risks and embody higher losses to U.S. interests than gains that could be achieved through them. This was a typical perception during preservative adaptation. If the current organisations would have to be changed, the United States would rather accept losses of influence to allied industrialised nations, such as in Europe or Japan, and would try to equally distribute gains to China, India and Brazil, not to strengthen China singularly.

4.4.3. Medium-range policies

As mentioned previously, the rise of China would be the predominant issue to deal with for selective engagement in foreign policy, and some form of containment would be the most likely policy option. This would entail a stronger focus on Asia, and as the overall resources for foreign policy would decrease, the new policy concerning East Asia would have to be implemented at the expense of other regions, such as Latin America, Africa, Europe and to a lesser extent the Middle East.

The burden of maintaining the international order should be shared by the allies. The revival of the alliances with the Oceanic countries Australia and New Zealand – traditional allies from two World Wars and the Cold War, that shared a large amount of cultural, linguistic and political patterns – as well as strengthening the relations to the East and South-East Asian allied partners – Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan – would be the immediate priority. China, despite its increasing economic influence, must not turn over one of America’s core allies. The recent developments in Asia, especially the new governments in South Korea and Taiwan (see chapter 4.1.2) as well as Bush’s Asia-policy of 2007/08 facilitated such an approach. A good relationship with these countries would also be an insurance against any attempt of regional integration and regionalisation, which would evolve into a new regional order excluding the United States and their interests.

The United States' primary role in the Asian Pacific would be that of a credible counterbalance to China. The U.S. could offer a different kind of relationship in political, economic and military terms, but the success of such a policy would largely depend on the regional states’ willingness to accept this role.

Some states in the regional structure of influence might be described as neutral or swing
states, choosing to woo either the United States or China – depending on the mood and the interest. China, since the 2000s, tried to win them over by way of a diplomatic charm offensive, close ties in public and private (transnational) transactions as well as a much softer stance on the various territorial disputes. However, much would still depend on how China would act in the South-China Sea dispute. The United States, for their part, tried to ease tensions with Malaysia and Indonesia on issues of the war on terror during Bush’s last years. Under selective engagement the war on terror would become less prominent than before that, and with a new figure in the oval office the public perception of the United States in those states would change rather for the better. Engaging them could well fall on fertile ground. Depending on China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, maritime security, traditional security and maritime borders could become an easy common ground for the U.S. and their allies.

With a number of defective democracies and authoritarian communist regimes, relations would have to be balanced between domestic demands to press for democratisation and tacit understanding in traditional power politics. Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos were not quite the sunshine allies to present to the domestic audience, but especially in Vietnam an increasingly powerful China raised long-term concerns about its economic, political and military independence. Vietnam also tried to maintain its influence in its neighbouring counties Laos and Cambodia, just to prevent a Chinese takeover in their eyes. Military relationships with the United States were unfolding rapidly and the Vietnamese sought much closer ties to the United States than the U.S. was willing to accept for normative reasons. From the pure military point of view, Vietnam in particular, would be a determined and militarily well-experienced ally to count on in the case of a confrontation with China.

Burma, at the time essentially a Chinese protectorate, would need to show serious internal reforms before it could come close to the United States. This would have to be a Burmese initiative, since a selectively engaging administration would probably not actively seek a policy of reform change in Myanmar.

Concerning China, a selective engagement-oriented presidency would slowly retreat from some of Bush’s big-business-friendly approaches towards China and try to play up some of the trade and currency issues against China. The purpose of this exercise would – beyond gaining internal popularity and relieve in economic terms – test the preferences of China and local states. Should China give in and conform to the habits of the established powers in terms

817 See: In Vietnam, New Fears of a Chinese ‘Invasion’, Time Magazine Online, 16 April 2009;
818 See: Lips, Teeth and the U.S. Navy, International Herald Tribune Online, 04 June 2012;
of subsidies, industrial and monetarist policy, and intellectual property? Or would China defend its practices against increasing resistance? Since China demanded several changes to the economic order, i.e. the replacement of the dollar as a leading currency, a bigger role of emerging powers in international financial organisations, in the aftermath of the crisis, the U.S. had some bargaining chips at hand.

Additionally, in a more confrontational environment, the states of the regions would face choices, giving the United States an impression of how far the region would follow them or to what extent they would prefer U.S. leadership. It would also reinforce the credibility of the American alternative, as it would rule out Chinese-American co-management of Asia without the smaller states.

Besides the disputes about economic issues, U.S. military supplies to Taiwan were one of the most sensitive bargaining chips in the hands of the United States. However, selective engagement is rather based on containment through alliances than on direct confrontation of the rising powers. Supporting Taiwan is a tricky issue: on the one hand, Taiwan heavily depends on U.S. support and, to a certain extent, the credibility of the U.S. security guarantees depended on their fulfilment, while, on the other, a direct confrontation with China was not the most desired outcome. And given the experiences with Chen’s presidency, the danger of giving Taiwan free hand for provocative actions or for losing the initiative in the Taiwan Strait to Taipei was a matter of concern, too.

The next issue would be whether Iraq or Afghanistan should be a priority for the United States. Afghanistan would have deserved the least priority, as there were no important issues and interests beyond the struggle against Al-Qa’ida. The Karzai government as well as Pakistan had sufficiently discredited themselves already, and the Horn of Africa and Yemen emerged as a new hot front for combating Islamic terrorist organisations, which made Afghanistan increasingly redundant.

The case of Iraq, however, was still important for the desired order of the Middle East. The region should not be dominated by a power that was hostile to the United States and sufficiently stable so that it would not hamper the global economy. As of 2008, the Iranian nuclear programme and Iranian hegemonic ambitions were seen as the greatest threats to these goals. Who, then, would be the allies? The conservative Gulf States would have been, despite their support of revisionist Islamic movements, such as the Al Qa’ida or the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey, as a NATO member, would qualify as well, despite of the leading party’s desire to

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819 In China, Tentative steps Toward Global Currency, New York Times Online, 10 February 2011;
gain a more independent – that is more distant – position to the U.S. in the region, which included the re-approximation towards Russia, Syria and Iran.\textsuperscript{820} Indeed, Erdoğan’s ambition for a common integration – whatever that meant – with Lebanon and Syria was a challenge to America’s concepts of regional order and stability not far away from Iran’s revisionist tendencies.\textsuperscript{821} Egypt was an ally, too, which guaranteed free movement through the Suez Canal. Israel, although a close ally in the region, was unable to project stability beyond its borders for cultural reasons. Jordan was moderate, but lacked the power to influence anything beyond its borders.

Iran’s threat to the Gulf States could be – at least in military terms – countered by strengthening the military apparatus of the Gulf Allies and by providing missile defence capabilities to counter the Iranian missile threat – or at least to make Iranian offensive planning more complicated and success incalculable. In terms of conventional military forces and strategic arms, that is nuclear weapons, Iran could be controlled or contained. The bigger problem was latent instability, supported by subversion, agitation and the spread of sectarian violence. Since the Lebanese War in 2006, the region seemed to be increasingly divided by sectarian Shi’ite-Sunnite rivalry. Iraq and Lebanon were the obvious fronts, but the fighting could spill over to Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen or even Saudi Arabia. If Iraq could settle its internal disputes on a stable and enduring basis, this could considerably ease regional tensions. Yet, given Iraq’s internal instability, this was far from obvious at the time.

The Arab-Israeli conflict would play a rather minor role. Attempts to solve it occupied the attention of previous American administrations, without success. On the other hand it was obvious that most Middle-Eastern governments were, in substance, more sensitive to issues within their immediate neighbourhood or the overall regional balance of power than to the Arab-Israeli conflict. While solving this issue stood at the very heart of George H. W. Bush’s Middle-Eastern policy after the 1990/91 Gulf War, and of Clinton’s as well, this was the final issue to be treated after eliminating regional revisionist dictators in George W. Bush’s vision of American policy towards the Middle East; even so, there are some doubt as to whether the conflict really deserved that much attention. After all, other dynamics had been shaping the regional security situation and the balance of power since 2001. This grand strategy design had a minimalist normative or ideological footprint, so there would be few incentives to strike a deal in this conflict.

\textsuperscript{820} Eugene Kogan, *Turkish-American Strategic Partnership versus Turkish-Russian Partnership without Strategy*, Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik Wien, Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Reihe Studien, Oktober 2009;

\textsuperscript{821} See: Joshua W. Walker, *Turkey’s Syrian Dilemma: Testing the ‘Regional Solutions for Regional Problems’*, Commentary, European Policy Centre Online, 09 July 2012;
Europe, as mentioned above, would lose much of its priority in the eyes of the United States – at least in terms of security policy.\footnote{See for this prospects: Jeremy Shapiro, Nick Witney, \textit{Towards a Post-American Europe, A Power Audit of US-EU Relations}, European Council on Foreign Relations, Cambridge, 2009;} The conflicts on the periphery of Europe, that is the Balkans, the southern Caucasus and Ukraine, were of no particular interest for the United States. And Europe would be able to defend itself.

However, with the economic crisis that endangered America’s global economic leadership the American-European relations could develop a totally different momentum. Despite frequent American scepticism towards the European economic integration, it would probably need this body now more than ever. Europe was, after Asia, the second most important market for export goods and direct investment.\footnote{See for the 2008 volume of trade between the EU and the United States: United States Census Bureau, \textit{Trade in Goods with the European Union}, at: www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0003.html;} Notwithstanding minor differences, in all international trade regime negotiations, the EU was still the power with the closest position to the U.S. – compared to all other major blocks.\footnote{See for the U.S. perspective on this: William H. Cooper, \textit{EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude}, Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, RL30608, December 21, 2011;} The economic crisis affected Europe as well and, by expanding their sovereign debt for extensive rescue packages, the European states were in a very similar situation compared to the United States. Cooperation in trade and financial issues would probably continue. It is likely that the United States in 2008 were unaware of the financial troubles the Europeans would soon face, but in this case trying to maintain the Union would be of interest for a selective engager.

In the military domain a grand strategy according to selective engagement would seriously challenge the revolution-in-military-affairs agenda of the Bush administration. First, because of the increasing importance of inter-state security, conventional warfare would again be the main driver for military development. Instead of delivering comprehensive security in unconventional and civil wars, the United States military would have to deliver deterrence and victory in a coalition and alliance in inter-state confrontations. Given the weaknesses of several Middle-Eastern states as well as the still pending problems of terrorism, the skills and capacities in unconventional warfare would not be abandoned, but rather this tasks would be handed over from the main fighting forces to special operation forces, which would continue to hunt down terrorists in covert and targeted operations. But pacification of a whole country for the sake of hunting terrorists was an issue of the past.

The focus on alliances would also mean to restructure many armament, R&D and procurement programmes, as certain systems should not only be introduced in the U.S. military, but
also be affordable and operational for allied armed forces. In coalition wars, the military skills and equipment of the allies would count the same as the U.S. military. Defence-industrial cooperation was an important tool of influencing defence modernisation in other countries. The cooperation with Japan in missile defence (SM-3 Block II) was one example, the Joint Strike Fighter another. Such multinational programmes would be given priorities, exactly as the intention to try and sell U.S. equipment to allied partners.

Proliferation would still be an issue for the United States, especially if it concerned revisionist states that were willing to upset the regional order of their neighbourhood. The U.S. could, if all other means had failed to deliver results, resort to military intervention to reverse such a development, but try to build up pressure by sanctions first. Unlike isolationists, selective engagers do not believe in self-sustaining equilibria in regional systems of mutual deterrence. However, intervention would not be the preferred countermeasure.

The main problem with selective engagement, just as remarked by Ross and Posen, is that the strategy recognises a lot of tasks to be met, but tries to achieve everything at minimal costs. This might prove illusory. Selective engagement may be easily be expanded towards a very ambitious strategy design. For example in 2008 Robert J. Art mentioned a very comprehensive agenda to be vital for the United States: from keeping the great-power balance, nation-building in Afghanistan, preventing genocide and WMD-proliferation, fighting terrorism globally, maintaining the liberal international order with distinctive regional initiatives to fighting climate change, the agenda does not differ much from liberal cooperative security or primacy. In practice, politicians pushed by domestic considerations, interests groups, and the bureaucracy, would hardly refrain from tackling multiple demanding problems at a time, quickly pushing the executive apparatus to (or over) its limits (as George W. Bush did).

On the other hand, the narrower the United States perceive their interests, the less likely other allies will support them in ensuring these interests. Much will depend on the diplomatic skills of the president to ensure fellowship as well as the executive apparatus to effectively coordinate common action.

4.5. Cooperative Security

Isolationism and selective engagement are easily discussed by confronting Ross’ and Posen’s arguments of 1996 with the 2008 strategic situation. This is far more difficult in line with the

826 Art, “Selective Engagement after Bush”, p. 23-41;
concepts of cooperative security and primacy. Both grand strategies were viable when the
United States enjoyed freedom of action after the victory in the Cold War and the almost un-
opposed era of the 90s. Or, to put it in Rosenau’s context, when the U.S. society was in the
mode of promotive adaptation, being able to influence the international environment on a
broad scale and to a large extent upon its own choice.

With preservative adaptation, the implementation of a cooperative security strategy is more
complicated, as the United States would not have such huge resources, such a freedom of ac-
tion and such a big fellowship to promote a liberal-institutionalist foreign policy as described
by Posen and Ross in the 90s. However, the ideological idea of liberal institutionalism did not
die in the United States and an elite fraction committed to these ideas could still try to influ-
ence American foreign policy in line with this concept. However, the implementation would
differ considerably as compared to what was thought to be feasible in 1996.

4.5.1. Premises

While American authors regard realism as the mainstream foreign policy school in the United
States, it seems that often there is rather a realist disguise of liberal ideas and interests. Neo-
isolationism in its present form is pushed by a group of economic liberals. Cooperative secu-
ritv would be pushed by an administration adhering to political liberalism and liberal interna-
tionalism. Advocates of cooperative security argue that peace is indivisible and that the
United States would have a general interest in promoting peace, stability and prosperity
through fostering international organisations and global governance. In short, cooperative se-
cURITY was number one item on the wish list of European leaders as regards the new president.
However, in an environment of preservative adaptation, the cooperative security concept
would have to be adopted and deprived of its overly ambitious and resource-intensive pro-
grammes.

One premise, previously attributed to cooperative security and liberal internationalism, which
would have to be given up after the Bush administration, was the concept of granting interna-
tional security by promoting democracy globally. This paradigm was a part of the Bush

doctrine, or at least it served to legitimise the U.S. foreign policy, and was not very popular, or even discredited, among liberal internationalists the time. However, while forceful democratisation was to be abandoned, the United States would still support pro-democratic movements wherever they would emerge.

So on which ideological pillars would the new international liberalism rest? Probably the notion of complex interdependence and post-modern vulnerability would be a basis. According to this world view, the collective ownership of security would be based on increasing economic and social interdependence, making many other players in the system immediately vulnerable to a single actor. Therefore, international cooperation and policy coordination would be the key to address the problems caused by interdependence. The new administration would most probably prioritise the various problems linked to transnational interactions, such as fighting crime, terrorism and piracy, cyber regulation, climate protection, environmental protection, etc., higher than traditional security topics.

Advocates of cooperative security argue, that there is still no credible alternative model for a social and economic order that could rival the West (like Communism or Fascism were before). Other states, although ruled by authoritarian regimes, still need to incorporate the Western capitalist system and free trade practices, as well as interlink with the West economically and financially to modernise, and gain wealth and power. Therefore, these states would refrain from revisionist policies (or at least restrict revisionism to symbolic policies and matters of international prestige) and cooperate for the sake of self-interest.

Regulating state behaviour in the international system and collectively enforcing these rules could – from the U.S. perspective – be seen as appropriate measure of retrenchment. The rules of the game should prevent an aggressive revisionist behaviour, and by fostering broad international coalitions within the framework of international organisations would shift some burden of upholding the status quo to the other states. Indeed, the advocates of cooperative security state that: “The most serious threat to American national security today is not a specific enemy but the erosion of the institutional foundations of the global order ... America’s leadership position and its authority within the global system are in serious crisis – and this puts American national security at risk. The grand strategy America needs to pursue in the years ahead is not one aimed at a particular threat, but rather one aimed at restoring its role as the recognized and legitimate leader of the system and rebuilding the institutions and partnerships upon

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829 See: Manuela Spindler, "Interdependenz", in: Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler (Eds.), Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen, Leske und Buxsch, Opladen, 2003, p. 89-116;

which this leadership position is based." To the advocates of cooperative security, the crisis of U.S. leadership was of their own making, so it again could be reversed by changing U.S. foreign policy and international behaviour.

Still, in doing so the administration might encounter a new dilemma. While in the 90s most international organisations embraced the liberal, free-market ideas that prevailed during the Cold War, in 2008 especially Russia and China promoted more state-centric, authoritarian, and protectionist ideas. As described in the appendix, the Russian opposition against the West is not only about prestige and symbols, it touches the essence of politics: Russia has very different ideas about the political, social, and economic order of Russia, as well as the international order of its vicinity, stemming from the fascist ideology of its leadership. The American attempt to "restore its role as global leader" could face stiff resistance despite of the goodwill of the U.S. administration.

4.5.2. Long-term strategies

One of the biggest problems of a cooperative security strategy is that the current composition of the Security Council would make this grand strategy very difficult to implement. China and Russia, both veto powers in the Security Council, do not share the belief in the universality of human rights and democracy, and would probably use their veto in cases where the U.S. administration tried to advocate or defend these values. Given the experience of these states with the Bush administration, they would probably be more sensitive to such issues than before. In the U.N. Security Council they could (and would) veto any American attempt to promote its political values. And among other international governmental organisations there would be no guarantee that genuine liberal values and ideas would be accepted or find a majority. For liberal internationalists or liberal institutionalist, this is a profound dilemma: the final value of those institutions is seen as educating the world towards democracy and human rights, but their respective decisions seem to be the biggest obstacle to achieving this goal.

Sooner or later, the president would have to decide whether he wanted to be an institutionalist or rather a liberal. The Bush administration followed primacy for the very same reasons – it chose to be quite liberal, in rhetoric at least, rather than institutionalist. But in 2008 this path would be fairly rocky.

The strategy would rest on other pillars. First, the administration would revive the discussions

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831 Ibid., p. 45-46;
about reforming the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, which stalled in 2005. Bringing more democracies into the Security Council would not necessarily make this body more effective and decisions easier, but it would make it more difficult for China and Russia to promote a rejectionist agenda. On the other hand, as indiscriminate liberal interventionism would be dropped from the agenda, securing mandates for military actions would not be that much of an issue.

Second, the United States would trust in the long-term transformational effect of international trade and globalisation. The school of neo-liberalism maintains that mutual economic interdependence would be a driver for peace and cooperation among states and for internal reform. The thesis that economic competition would force states to open up and liberalise their political systems to get a more effective and reliable administration, has lost some meaning, since China – and to a much lesser degree Russia – managed to combine a certain degree of economic liberalism, economic growth, and technological progress with autocratic rule. Then again, China since then refrained from open provocative military action, which could give some hope that this theory is correct. At last, increasing economic ties would provide the foundation for the last pillar. In this grand strategy, forms of cooperative engagement seem to be more likely than in others.

Third, the United States would promote international institutionalism in areas that are less contested, like security policy and war. The increasing economic and social interdependence would provide the technical objects for regulation, and this regulation should be organised in institutions by way of a wide range of norms that would regulate the general behaviour of

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832 Ibid. p. 47, p.55f.;
834 See for this school: Spindler, "Interdependenz", p. 89-116; Siegfried Schieder, "Neuer Liberalismus", in: Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler (Eds.), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 2003, p. 169-198;
states. The new emerging powers in the system should be bound into a web of institutions. By adopting a more radical revisionist stance, the new states would risk the breakdown of multiple regulatory systems that would then endanger the economic interdependent relationship that these states build their wealth on. Such a strategy would probably see the U.S. try to expand global and regional organisations on all fronts and regions. Still, it would be a very blurred strategic concept. It would care much more about the order than about the structure of international relations. Being concerned about behaviour and mindsets first, and material facts second, makes the planning process more oriented towards short-term goals and reactive by nature — especially under the circumstances of preservative adaptation, where the freedom of action to promote one’s own values and normative convictions has been almost lost.

4.5.3. Medium-range policies

Given the strategic priorities mentioned above, the United States would rather not adopt a more confrontational policy towards China in financial and trade issues, as the economic ties with China — although with considerable costs for the United States — would be seen as a major guarantee of international peace. Like in the Bush administration, there would be occasional attempts to mitigate the effects of the trade deficit. However, an administration dedicated to cooperative security would try to give the regional integration within Asia a new start. Rather than seeing regional integration as a threat to American security and influence, institutionalising regional economic integration would be perceived beneficial because it makes military aggression and revisionist behaviour more costly and, therefore, unlikely. Like the Bush administration, the United States would try to retain either direct involvement with this regional integration or at least strong representation of the Oceanic democracies, i.e. Australia, New Zealand, to maintain the Western-democratic agenda within the new regional order. Moreover, the higher integrated the neighbourhood of China would be, the costlier — hence unlikelier — its revisionist behaviour. The more states the United States could embed in the liberal international order, the better. Revisionist states would refrain from taking on the majority of the international society for the reason of both economic and political self-interest. While this approach might not seem to be very demanding in the fields of high politics, problems and distortions in high politics might easily disturb the integration through low politics:

\[\text{836 Ikenberry, "An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal", p. 53-54;}
\[\text{837 Ibid. p. 57-58;}\]
for example, what kind or representation would Taiwan get in such a new regional order? Giving the unresolved borders in the South China Sea and the Problems with North Korea, the attempt to deepen regional integration could force the U.S. to take a more prominent stance regarding these topics, which probably would make relations with China more difficult. The notorious debate about human rights and internal regime organisation, that is democratisation, which would hardly be absent in a liberal government, could make the implementation of such a policy very difficult.

As liberal internationalism is usually one of the more active strategies, one might expect some new drive in the Middle East policy, although this strategy hardly provides the tools to deal with this particular problem. Solving the issue via democratisation of the Arab regimes was tried under the Bush administration – with very limited success. As mentioned above, the promotion of democracy, the traditional instrument and strategy of liberal internationalists, was discredited or seen as something beyond the fiscal feasibility of 2008. However, the occurrence of local pro-democracy movements within the Arab states would probably be supported by liberal internationalists – despite the realists’ call for caution about the involvement of Islamist circles in such movements.

Concerning classical liberal internationalism, the Middle East Quartet would be a format to at least maintain negotiations about the peace process. Despite the lack of resources, liberal institutionalists would still believe the Arab-Israeli conflict to be at the hart of Western-Muslim misunderstanding and that somehow working towards a resolution of the conflict would be imperative for U.S. foreign policy. However, giving the trend towards rejectionist governments in Israel and the Arabs, such a policy would rather be one of waiting for opportunities than that of active inputs for peace.

The traditional activist agenda of liberal internationalism would pose some tough decisions concerning U.S. overseas engagement. As democratisation and comprehensive nation-building is an essential part of the concept, it would find it hard to leave Afghanistan and Iraq. In both theatres the U.S. had standing commitments to develop democratic political systems and open societies. With the ideological claim, that both concepts were universalist, a retreat before substantial progress was made would shake the ideological foundation of the entire grand

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839 See for a proper critique of this claim: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London, 1998; Huntington’s thesis that democracy and open societies were not universalistic but rather particular Western features had reinforced amongst liberals the desire to prove the universalism of their thesis and implement such concepts in the Muslim world. Indeed, much of the joy for the “Arab Spring” in the liberal West just stems from the desire to prove Huntington wrong than from any form of understanding for regional affairs.
strategy, if not ideology.

In Iraq, more progress was achieved towards democracy than in Afghanistan, although this progress was quite vulnerable. Continuing the build-down of forces in Iraq to finance a build-up in Afghanistan would be the most obvious choice. But at least in Iraq, an exit would be tolerable, since the goal of (superficial) democratisation would have been reached, and a liberal-minded administration would probably care less about the further alignment of Iraq in the regional struggle for influence and power.

An administration committed to cooperative security would still have worked hard to keep up the international engagement in Afghanistan. From the perspective of pure normativism, the desire to deliver freedom and democracy to Afghanistan, after years of civil war and Taliban rule, was strong. But as mentioned above, the chances to achieve this goal were diminishing. Would a liberal-minded government still try against all odds?

Ross and Posen identified a strong position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of the pillars of a cooperate security strategy. Undiscriminating confrontation of the proliferators would have been a precondition for strengthening the credibility of international non-proliferation regimes and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics.

However, such an ambitious non-proliferation policy was and is illusive during preservative adaptation. Moreover, given that the stabilising missions in Afghanistan and, maybe, Iraq were to be continued, another military engagement would not have been feasible. This would have restricted the American non-proliferation policy regarding sanctions, which – given the political support from China and Russia for North Korea and Iran – were doubtful that they would work. However, lacking any alternatives, they had to try. Diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in international relations would not be confined to new nuclear powers. It would probably call for deep reductions in the established nuclear powers too. It would be conceivable that the administration pushes for new strategic arms reduction treaties and arms control regimes.

Europe would still be in the focus of the American foreign policy, as it would serve as a role model for peace through cooperation and international institutionalism. Given the success of the European integration and of NATO, an administration committed to cooperative security would still try to expand both institutions wherever possible: from NATO and the EU to the

Balkans, Eastern Europe and, if possible, to the southern Caucasus. This would bring the United States on a collision course with Moscow. However, at least from a normative perspective, a liberal-internationalist administration would not recognise Moscow’s hegemonic – or even imperial – claims for an exclusive zone of influence, neither would it consider this revanchist and authoritarian regime as a trustworthy partner.

Given the need for cooperation among the Central Asian states and considering Moscow’s influence on them to maintain the northern supply route to Afghanistan, the normative reasoning might soon be replaced by pragmatism towards Moscow. While the old Europe was still sceptical towards Ukraine and Georgia, Washington would and could not do very much for a further enlargement. Realising this, a pragmatic formula would have to be found, not renouncing the open door policy, but on the other hand not doing very much to encourage it.

The other question was, how much could the U.S. do for EU enlargement? Not being a security organisation per se, and enjoying at the time a considerable attractiveness in its neighbourhood, enlarging the Union could help to spread the Western-democratic political and economic order. Since the United States was not a member of the Union, it would have to rely on allies within, to push the enlargement agenda. In the past, such a policy rather backfired, especially regarding the debate about Turkey’s accession, spreading the fear of integrating Trojan horses by some EU member states and making the accession process for those states more difficult rather than easing it.

While the previous grand strategies were centred on areas of interests mostly determined by the international structure and the importance for the stability of the international system, a grand strategy based on liberal internationalism could focus on regions beyond these interests. While cooperative security was judged as militarily ambitious in the 90s, intervening in all sorts of humanitarian crises, it would have to be more cautious in times of preservative adaptation. However, the United States could develop more profiled agendas in regions where democracy could be spread at lower costs and where human rights and free trade could be promoted more easily: Africa and Latin America. Lacking a major rejectionist or revisionist player, such as Russia or China (although the emergence of Hugo Chavez as a promoter of Socialist economic systems and anti-American movements and parties across South Amer-

842 Ikenberry, “An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal”, p.54-55;
ica would pose a challenge to American liberalism in Latin America), the United States would at least face less resistance for an international agenda than in Central-Asia, Eastern Europe or the Middle East, in terms of getting mandates in the UN Security Council or for setting agendas in regional organisations. Although the new administration would try to avoid military involvement, it might still face decisions whether to intervene in internal power struggles on the side of a pro-democracy movement. A dedicated liberal agenda could mount domestic pressure on the administration to do something for the principles and values it tried to promote. Then the administration faces a dilemma either to again find a cause for humanitarian intervention without a U.N. mandate, or to be blocked by China and Russia. Ultimately, neither China nor Russia were in the position to prevent or preclude a U.S. military intervention in the rest of the world. It would be up to the United States whether they want to bear the military, economic and diplomatic costs of yet another unilateral intervention.

In the military domain a liberal-minded administration would probably try to continue Rumsfield’s transformative ideas, changed in the terms of the recent military experiences. It would continue to emphasise the comprehensive approach, which means bringing more government agencies to the military theatre and coordinate them through integrated headquarters. It would strengthen the State Department’s role in operational decisions and further enhance the capacity of the armed forces to conduct area security operations and operations other than war. Another issue where this strategy would considerably differ from the others is missile defence. Given a strong emphasis on arms control and verification, an administration committed to cooperative security would be at odds with many aspects of Bush’s missile defence policy, which by the way was a tacit acknowledgement that arms control had failed. On the other hand, it could use the then existing missile defence installations as a bargaining chip for further arms control or nuclear arms reduction talks – if the U.S. government gave reduction priority over non-proliferation. Or it could be used as a bargaining tool to convince China and Russia to stop proliferating missiles and nuclear technology. Both states oppose the U.S. system, but on the other hand provide the reason for its existence: they proliferate strategic weapons technology.

From the perspective of arms control, several topics were of interest to the United States: a further reduction of nuclear weapons, missile defence deployment, missile proliferation, and

845 See: Mares, Latin America and the Illusion of Peace, p. 31ff;
848 See: Schmucker, Schiller, Fernwaffen in Entwicklungsländern.
military space applications. While realists tend not to connect these issues, to preserve the United States some freedom of action to advance in new fields of technology, the arms control community sees them rather as objects to be tied together in a comprehensive agreement. It is argued that deep reductions (beneath 1,000 nuclear warheads) would not be feasible without coming to terms with missile defence and military space, together with all other de-jure and de-facto nuclear powers. For the United States, refraining from using its technological superiority in the field of missile defence and military space would be traded against an agreement on better rules regarding non-proliferation with Russia and China. But this would not be easy. First, deep reductions between Russia and the U.S. would bring nuclear parity within reach of other, smaller nuclear powers. It would also reduce the costs for effective deterrence with a small arsenal, which in turn would encourage proliferation. Limiting or abolishing missile defence assets would then cancel the assets to tackle proliferation beyond nuclear deterrence. And once familiar with closed information, the president would realise that Russia and China, violating or bypassing almost every existing arms control convention, are much more engaged in proliferation than the arms control advocates or the public proliferation debate would ever admit. Therefore, any new or enhanced non-proliferation regime would probably need a new and demanding verification and supervision regime, which would touch very tricky issues of sovereignty and industrial and military security of many states. Although such provisions might be popular from an ideological point of view, they might prove very difficult to conclude.

4.6. Primacy

If an environment of preservative adaptation restrains a liberal-institutionalist agenda and a grand strategy based on cooperative security, it might just preclude any attempt of maintaining primacy. Given the economic restraints, it is hardly conceivable that the United States continue the demanding foreign policy course of the first Bush years. But even if the level of ambition of the first years of the Bush administration were not maintained – Bush indeed moderated his aims and ambitions after 2005 – there were quite a lot of people that thought what Bush did was right and should be continued. But after 2005 the Bush administration walked away from primacy, so even a call for continuity would hardly be a call for primacy. As Kagan stated correctly, the ambitious and moralistic rhetoric prior to the

849 See: Acton, Deterrence during Disarmament, p. 83ff; 850 Timothy J. Lynch, Robert S. Singh, After Bush, The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy, Cambridge et al., 2008;
Iraq war was rather a diplomatic cover for a decision based on *Realpolitik*, than a cession in American strategic thought.\(^{851}\) (See also chapter 3.1 for that issue). However, an idea could be given about how a grand strategy might look like if an administration with a (rather) neo-conservative mindset or other preference for primacy stood in power.

4.6.1. Premises

The basic premise of the strategic concept of primacy is that only U.S. supremacy can and will guarantee international stability.\(^{852}\) The ideological reasoning why this supremacy has to be achieved varies. This might come from the rather liberal belief in democratic peace\(^{853}\) and the desire to implement democratic peace as a systemic guarantee for stability. Or it stems from the desire to “remake the world” more in the American image, or it is the realist distrust in other powers that they are able to co-govern the international system, then without any revisionist agenda towards the international order. Scepticism of “co-governance” or “collective hegemony”,\(^{854}\) multi-centric systems or concerts of powers might be the reason to try and maintain U.S. primacy as long as possible. While the first ideological background would suggest a very strong ideological conviction towards primacy, the latter would allow a gradual withdrawal from primacy as long as it proves unsustainable.

Concerning sustainability, the advocates of primacy state that although in economic troubles, the United States still enjoy a competitive advantage – economically, militarily, technologically – over all other nations. Hence the “unipolar moment” continues.\(^{855}\) Moreover, many of the advanced industrialised societies are allied to the United States and still prefer U.S. leadership over Chinese or Russian leadership. According to them, the stories about American decline are rather an academic and political hysteria than a trend supported by facts. The current economic crisis would be overcome, like any other crisis before.

Compared to selective engagement it would differ in the following way:

- There would be little trust in cooperation with allies unless direct U.S. leadership is guaranteed – or at least less trust than in collective security and selective engagement.
- There would be a stronger commitment to existing military campaigns, especially Iraq,

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\(^{852}\) Posen, Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, p. 30ff;

\(^{853}\) See for this: Hasenclever, "Liberale Ansätze zum „demokratischen Frieden“", p. 199-225;

\(^{854}\) See for this topic: Werner Link, *Die Neuordnung der Weltordnung*, p. 120;

as the goal for re-shaping the Middle-Eastern regional order would be maintained.

- The premise to tackle the ideologically most hostile and not the structurally most powerful opponent would remain a guiding principle of U.S. policy.

Especially the last premise would make a considerable difference in the grand strategy and the evaluation of the different choices compared with selective engagement. Indeed, this is a departure from what Ross and Posen envisioned for primacy, but it was one of the distinctive premises of the Bush administration, probably to be continued by another neo-conservative administration.

Still, any administration previously committed to primacy would perceive world politics rather as a matter of chances than a matter of risks. If opportunities arose to promote American values and interests, they would try to use them – even if there were certain risks associated with it. And it would refrain from being bound too much by treaties and multilateral obligations, e.g. concerning climate change, arms control, and so forth, as they would be perceived as mitigating chances rather than preventing certain risks.

4.6.2. Long-term strategies

When considering the general options for strategies and further goal for policies, the first striking premise would have to be taken into account: the primary enemy is the most ideologically hostile one, not necessarily the structurally most powerful. Since 9/11 this ideological competitor was radical, revisionist, political Islam or Islamism, or "the persistence of a Leninist revolutionary ideology grafted onto a distorted version of Islam." To the supporters of primacy prevailing in the ideological struggle against Islamism was one of the, if not the

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856 Posen, Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", p. 30ff
857 Also called Terrorism, Jihadism, and so forth in the general discussion. In the West there is a general reluctance to discuss religion as something political, as it is usually regarded as something private, the state and politics should not touch. But again, religion serves many functions, or more precise, religious social systems interact with other social systems such as economics, politics, social life, etc. Generally the “private” part of religion, the one that is or should be protected by freedom of religion, is the set of rules and norms that the individual follows to achieve personal salvation: personal religious observance. (See: Michael Argyle, “Religious Observance”, in: David L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol.13, MacMillan, London, New York, 1968, p.421-428). However, every religion also comprises rules and norms concerning social, political and economic life and those are subject to political debates and political struggle. These rules and norms do not address the individual, but society as such, regulating collective behaviour. (See: Robert N. Bellah, “Religion: The Sociology of Religion”, in: David L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol.13, MacMillan, London, New York, 1968, p.407-413). Without having further digressions in Islamism, in case of this thesis, the political ideology of Islamism is regarded as a political ideology, regulating collective behaviour and addressing the society in order to reshape it as a whole, in contrast to the religion of Islam that is followed individually by believers to achieve personal salvation. The issue of historic interlinking of politics, economy and religion in Islamic societies is a matter beyond the scope of this thesis. For further readings see: Gallagher, "Islam", p.202-216;
primary goal of U.S. foreign policy. “Our central thesis here is a simple one: we are in the
eyear stages of a Second Cold War, ... if the Second Cold War is ultimately to be won, under-
standing the parallels between the two Cold Wars is a fundamental prerequisite in forming
statecraft, strategies, and tactics that may eventually secure that victory.” Even if the term of
the “new cold war” is not supported by all advocates of primacy, the similarity of the ideolo-
gical struggle then and now is. Islamism has replaced Communism as the predominant revi-
sionist ideology; catastrophic terrorism nuclear deterrence, and Iraq and Afghanistan were the
new protracted wars in which the U.S. had to contain the spread of Islamism, like it had
fought against the spread of Communism before. Prevailing in these wars and supporting
those states and regimes that would fight Islamism was the utmost strategic priority. “There
are only two states in the region now that combine a serious commitment to combating takfir-
isim [= Islamism], the desire for close relations and cooperation with the United States, and
the beginnings of political structures that could become legitimate, stable, non-authoritarian
states: Iraq and Afghanistan. Coincidentally, these states occupy critical strategic positions –
they straddle Iran, and while Iraq is at the heart of the Arab Middle East, Afghanistan occu-
pies a critical nexus between Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and China.” This
would actually mean that the United States would prioritise their engagement in the Middle
East as compared to the one in Asia or Europe. But how to prevail against this radical political
ideology?
Encouraging or even enforcing change towards more democracy and open societies was one
of the most-often mentioned means of achieving the desired outcome. If radical Islamist
forces competed for power and issues in an electoral process, they would either have to mod-
erate their views or would not play a significant role. According to conventional believe of the
supporters of primacy, authoritarian regimes, allied to the West serve as causes for legitimisa-
tion of radical Islamist forces rather than as useful allies. However, as mentioned in chapter
3.3.5.2. the election of Hamas in Gaza and the popularity of Hezb’Allah in Lebanon, as well
as the difficulty of implementing democratic systems in Afghanistan and Iraq discredited this
point of view. The spread of democracy did rather facilitate working conditions for Islamist
movements than hinder the spread of that ideology. Fighting Islamism and promoting demo-
cracy in the Arab World were – and still are – contradicting interests. However, as democratic
triumphalism is the strongest characteristic of the neoconservative political identity, they have

859 Lynch, Singh, *After Bush*, p. 10;
860 Ibid., p. 10-15;
not yet came up with any alternative strategy. The more closely the neoconservative ideology is followed, the more contradictions and strategic imponderables will emerge.

4.6.3. Medium-range policies

As mentioned before, the rise of China and, therefore, the Asian theatre would be of concern for the supporters of primacy, but unlike “selective engagement” the region would not deserve the highest priority in primacy. While being the most powerful state of all powerful competitors, in ideological terms China was not that much of a threat – at least as long as it would not try to market and export its own political system or try to create an alternative regional or world order, and still support and benefit from free trade and the current world economic order. China profited enormously from the American-led order and – so was the general opinion – therefore it would not try to challenge the United States. At the time of economic crisis, the question for the United States was what costs it would have to bear in terms of trade deficit and currency imbalance to keep China in the game. Conscious of the security implications, the administrations could raise the issues, but not in an overly confrontational manner.

Since the United States were quite suspicious of other powers, it would hardly perceive the military-strategic situation as naturally self-sustaining. China could, or would, exceed its power, even in the military field if not counterbalanced in a certain way. Even when it did not exercise military power over its neighbours, its military modernisation would – in the absence of a serious U.S. commitment to the region – allow China to dominate the region and put severe pressure on the local states to comply with its interests. On the other hand the Middle East would consume most of the U.S. military resources in the foreseeable future, the security of the East Asia would to a large extent have to rely on the local allies, supported by American naval, air force and missile defence assets. The aim of the administration’s China policy would be to preclude a military dominance of the region by China on the one hand, but to engage China economically on the other.

Like in selective engagement, the United States would seek to reinforce the cooperation of the local allies and to enhance the local allies’ defence capabilities through cooperation in training, doctrine and armament. Overcoming historic cleavages between South Korea and Japan would be one difficult aspect in this regard. The most tricky question would be, which role Taiwan should play as a possible first line of defence? If the regional allies had to take a higher degree of responsibility for their security, Taiwan, which was at the core of one security hotspot, would have to step up its efforts in modernising especially its navy and air force.
Not that Taiwan was unwilling to do so, but pending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were causing considerable tensions between Beijing and Washington. As mentioned above, the U.S. was unwilling to confront China head-on. In an Asian security architecture, where the self-reliance and the inner-theatre cooperation of the local allies would be considered a priority, Washington would have to strike a very difficult compromise between enabling Taiwan to modernise its armed forces, re-ensure the island about the American commitment, while keeping rather good relations with China.

This “congagement” approach towards China is based on the assumption that Beijing will refrain from any confrontational or revisionist course as long as it is embedded in the current world and economic order. Yet, numerous experts challenge this assumption, stating that the relative compliance of Beijing with the current international norms and institutions is only a temporary adaptation to the U.S. military predominance and will fade once this predominance is overcome. But as the neoconservatives expect to fight the Second Cold War in the Middle East, this criticism may be ignored.

The next region to witness an American draw down would be Europe. Not that Europe was regarded as unimportant, but at times of severe constraints in U.S. budgets and of the necessity to reduce defence spending, the burden-sharing debate would resurface again and the United States would demand more European contributions for their own security. This would be a significant shift within primacy, since primacy is usually associated with the United States unilaterally guaranteeing international peace and security. But given the economic difficulties, such ambitious policies are to be abandoned and, basically, even dropped by the Bush administration after 2005. The United States would try to maintain the leading momentum in the region perceived as pivotal – the Middle East – but would have to make sacrifices in other regions.

Europe should become more self-reliant regarding its own security. This would mean that the agendas of collective defence in Europe should be primarily managed by Europeans. The same is true for crisis management as well, but to a lesser extent. To maintain primacy, the U.S. would still be very active and eye other initiatives, conducted without or beyond their leadership, with suspicion. Therefore crisis management would rather remain an American business. Taking an increasingly revanchist Russia into account, European security per se

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863 Taiwan Might Delay F-16 Update, Defense News, 07 June 2012, P. 1, p. 7; U.S. To deny Taiwan New Jets, Offers AESA Radar in Upgrade for Older F16s, Defense News, 15 August 2011;
could not be taken for granted. While the United States provided the nuclear deterrence, the
conventional forces in Europe would have to be made up primarily by European armies. The
same would account for stabilising missions in the vicinity of Europe, where the United States
have little to no interest, most notably the Balkans.
The expansion of the zone of stability, basically the NATO states, would still be an American
interest. But as European nations would have to take a real share in the defence of this area, it
would be hard to push its expansion beyond borders the Europeans were willing to defend.
Debating Ukrainian or Georgian NATO membership was difficult, and given the war in the
Caucasus in 2008, it was very unlikely that the minds in the European capitals would change
soon. They had little appetite to be drawn in conflicts on the Caucasus. As the Georgian role
in the conflict was put into question, some, especially Germany, would not face a military
confrontation with Russia.\textsuperscript{865} Granting security that was not enforcible in crisis would render
an alliance meaningless. Unilaterally granting security, not only a risky business, could lead to
significant military commitment in a region that may not be regarded as strategically pivotal.
So, in practice the United States could hardly continue enlargement if there were no European
consensus. And U.S. influence on the Europeans was limited at that time.

So the Middle East was the pivotal region, on which the a strategy of primacy (or what re­
mained of it) could rest. Geopolitical oversimplifications that point out certain regions as vi­
tal, simply because they match some crude assumptions on geography, should be avoided.\textsuperscript{866} The Middle East was indeed pivotal to maintain a certain momentum in the concept of
primacy outlined by the Bush administration and the community supporting that point of
view. First, for the struggle of ideology, the Middle East was the theatre of the struggle
between the two most adversary ideologies: Western liberalism, on the one hand, and Islamic
revisionism, on the other. Believing in the universality of Western values and the principles of
the Western political order, the implementation of these values in the ideologically most chal­
lenging environment would constitute the ultimate test for the superiority of the Western value-
system.

Second, since no other major industrial power could rival the United States in the military

\textsuperscript{865} See: Tiflis bestreitet Schuld am Georgienkrieg, Financial Times Deutschland Online, 30 September 2009;
\textsuperscript{866} The most prominent example for such an oversimplification was Mackinder’s geopolitical thought, describing
the Russian and Central Asian landmasses as the “Heartlands”, and declaring that whoever ruled over those parts
of the world, would dominate it. (See: Halford Mackinder, “The Geopolitical Pivot of History”, Geographical
Natalia Narochnitskaya, “Russia in the new geopolitical context”, in: \textit{International Affairs, A Russian Journal of
World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations}, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2004, p. 60-73). However, with the brief
exception of the Soviet Union, no significant world power ever governed this region.
field without having access to Middle-Eastern oil, challenging the United States militarily would be quite difficult as long as the United States enjoyed good working relations to the major oil-producing countries. Commanding the vitals for the world economy and for exercising military power would be a tool to maintain a kind of primacy throughout the system. However, while sound on paper, such aims are difficult to implement. Fair-weather relations with the Gulf States are not enough. The oil producing states in the Middle East would have to support the United States in times of crisis and effectively abandon their support for international revisionist Islamic organisations, including Al-Qa’ida. In view of the cultural strains between the two, of the hostile feeling of the Arab in the street towards the United States and of the uncomfortable meddling of the U.S. in the internal affairs of those states, there has to be a real dependency of these states on the United States to make them comply with U.S. demands.

One of the possible dependencies was deterrence against a nuclear Iran – something quite realistic for the foreseeable future. The United States were the most developed nuclear power, conventionally far superior to Iran, and had the most advanced missile defence technology in their arsenal. As long as the nuclear crisis with Iran was looming, the Gulf States would rather side with the U.S. than making guesses on any hegemonic competitor. However, as long as the nuclear crisis in Iran was imminent, Iran itself could serve as an anchor for any revisionist power in the Middle East. In case of China, possible land-based transit routes would even eliminate the need to challenge the United States Navy on distant oceans in case of such a conflict. An isolated Iran, longing for any kind of international support, would be quite dependent on China for the time being. Then again, for the U.S. to rely on the Arab-Persian tensions would guarantee a certain degree of influence, but would leave the Middle East as a divided region.

The second contingency was stability in Iraq. As one of the most important oil producing states, the Arab state occupies a geographically important place within the Middle East. An unstable Iraq would mean that the sectarian tensions across the Middle East deepened, possible spilling over to other countries. Letting Iraq down could provide Iran the opportunity to

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867 Russia might be the only exception, however, Russia was far away from being able to challenge the United States seriously. See for the distribution of oil production and oil reserves, see: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/11, Vienna, download on 25 June 2012 at: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/202.htm; esp. p. 21,30;

868 See for comparison the discussion on the command of the “commons”: Posen, “Command of the Commons”, p. 5–46;


push its own puppet factions to power. This would jeopardise all the effort the United States had put into Iraq since 1990.

On the other hand, stabilising Iraq and maintaining considerable influence there would not only afford the United States an influential ally within the region, but also an important staging point for influencing internal Iranian affairs. The strong ties between Iranian and Iraqi Shiite societies, which had played to the favour of Iran during the period from 2003 to 2008, could be used in reversed effect if, indeed, Iraq became stable, wealthy and democratic. In 2008, however, Iraq would not meet any of these criteria soon.

The third and last contingency was the Arab-Israeli conflict. The genuine willingness to advance the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians may be debated in the case of some states. But beside the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian conflict, including their dynamics in the respective internal political situation was something of regional concern. And the United States with their close relations to Israel were instrumental in moving Tel Aviv towards any kind of solution or renewed negotiations.

Re-starting the Middle East peace process or to negotiate an Israeli-Syrian engagement or to lastingly weaken Syria in Lebanon would be an equally difficult endeavour. The preferences of the local actors were difficult to judge and since the conflict had been a constant pattern of political life and a part of the political legitimisation of the parties, they would hardly be willing to settle the conflict. The Bush administration tried to enforce peace from a position of strength. Indeed from this position Bush could achieve something, but success faded as soon as the American strength was questioned by the situation in Iraq. There were hardly any fresh ideas, how Washington could regain momentum.

With Iraq playing a pivotal role, Afghanistan would still remain a sideshow to the overall grand strategy. Although a battle area between Western and Islamic-revisionist thought, Afghanistan was neither an Arab nor a Middle-Eastern country and the outcome of this struggle would mean little to the overall situation on the Persian Gulf. Since the U.S. forces were over-stretched and the electorate was tired of the constant war effort, Afghanistan would rather be abandoned. However, as both theatres were regarded as hotspots of the ‘New Cold War’, the U.S. would try to maintain a military foothold in both of them. But staying in Afghanistan does not preclude a change of strategies or aims. A neo-conservative administration that was convinced of the superiority of the democratic system and an open society could regard Karzai and his ruling clique more of an obstacle to the reform of the Afghan state. Karzai’s sub-
sequent manipulation of the Afghan presidential elections would provide a reasonable and legitimate reason to remove him from power and exchange him for a more capable leader. The other option would be a less ambitious or minimalist policy: re-negotiating the internal power of the warlords, or basically trading Karzai’s head for a relatively undisturbed retreat. The only goal would be to prevent the Taliban from seizing power, but the U.S. would ask few questions as to how the Afghan warlords and tribal leaders would achieve this. Basically unable to end the Afghan civil war, the United States would have to realign the parties so that the international public, especially in the Middle East, perceived that for the moment the United States was winning.

The issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of the most severe concerns for any administration oriented towards primacy. Nuclear weapons and long-range delivery means would provide new, rising, revisionist, regional powers the possibility to challenge the regional status quo and possibly deter the United States from intervening. However, at that time the United States were tied down militarily, and as the advocates of primacy usually had little faith in arms control, disarmament and sanctions, the United States could hardly do anything against further proliferation. Cooperative efforts, such as the PSI, could at least slow down the process. In terms of Iran, the nuclear issue might be solved through a revolution or regime change in the future. As regards other contingencies, introducing missile defence systems would be a proper means to diminish the contenders’ offensive chances. Moreover, the Bush administration would also promote international cooperation in missile defence and deploy American systems to important regions, most notably the Middle East, Asia and Europe.

In the military domain, the United States would continue the transformation and orientation towards stabilisation missions. Continuing the military engagement in the Middle East, stabilising and restructuring Iraq, maybe taking a role in Lebanon and preparing the exit in Afghanistan would be demanding tasks. This would also continue to require a relatively high proportion of defence assets, budget and personnel priority for land forces and Special Forces. Defence cuts, which were inevitable, would primarily hit the Navy and the Air Force. This would put additional pressure on America’s Pacific allies to increase their military capabilities. Large scale aircraft- and ship-building programmes would have to be reduced. They could to some extent be offset by inviting allies to take part in the R&D effort and by fielding more
defence equipment. Given the domestic priorities of the allied nations in supporting their defence industries, this would come at the price of technology transfer of course.

4.7. Chapter Conclusions

Compared to the international situation in 2000, when George W. Bush was elected president, both the domestic as well as the international environment has changed considerably – for worse –, and would pose severe challenges to the new U.S. administration. In times of preservative adaptation, foreign and domestic policies are more about the distribution of losses than the realisation of chances. The situation would be difficult to manage for any new president, and whoever holds the office would receive a lot of criticism (predominantly by the looses of the new adaptation process).

Both in the Middle East and in Asia, the situations were tricky. In Asia, Bush’s “congagement” policy, integrating China into the world economy, co-managing regional security issues, while maintaining the alliance-system to counterbalance any hostile behaviour was judged extremely stable, although hardly sustainable. Issues of trade-imbalances, currency-exchange rates, and often distorting economic policies were looming. Given the adverse economic situation, any U.S. president would face difficulties defending a continuation of the previous policies at home. Likewise in the Middle East, the ever increasing costs of the two interventions were commending a reduction of the U.S. military effort. Iraq was on the roads to stability, and being a pivotal state in an ever more tense and divided region, could play an important role as bridge between Sunni and Shiite, projecting stability into the neighbourhood – if Iraq would stay stable and allied with the United States.

However the effort in Iraq was very unpopular at home. To both the domestic as well as the international audience the effort in Afghanistan was much more legitimate. However ‘stabilising’ Afghanistan was by far more complicated than stabilising Iraq, as it would require the creation of a modern society first – an endeavour that would require tremendous resources and time in terms of decades, if not centuries. Scaling back the effort in Afghanistan to the conditions on the ground (‘managed tribal warfare’) would require a high degree of operational flexibility and sacrificing many of the ‘comprehensive’ goals and values the U.S. and its allies thought to implement. This again is difficult to explain domestically.

Whatever any U.S. administration would have done, in the defining issues of U.S. foreign policy, the United States was in a ‘loose-loose’ situation. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, politicians always have choices. Some seem unlikelier than others, but there is always more
than just one way to proceed. Recollecting the primaries and then the presidential campaign of 2008, any of the four grand strategy choices would have been possible somehow. Isolationism would have been the most radical break with American foreign policy, as it would mean to revert to pre 1941 or even pre 1917 U.S. foreign-policy traditions. Outrage in the internationalist cycles and heavy resistance in bureaucratic and industrial circles (not only foreign and military bureaucracy live of the international role of the U.S. but entire industrial branches and the regions in which this businesses are situated) would make such a strategy very difficult to implement domestically. But on the other hand, the United States are much less dependent on many developments in the outside world than either postmodernists or the bureaucracy would be willing to admit. Isolationism is not an infeasible thing. And to a certain extend, orchestrating retrenchment and slowly retreating from some world regions, the Obama-administration (especially in its second term, but that is not topic of this thesis) has certain isolationist tendencies within its foreign policy.

From a systemic perspective an isolationist U.S. would have grave consequences. In Asia just as in Europe, regional stability and the freedom and independence of many smaller states rests on the presence of the United States. In the Middle East, regional rivalries could spur open hostilities or war if not contained by the United States. So if the U.S. was to adopt a more isolationist stance, it would have been wise to do so gradually and preparing the international environment for it. Considering this, the extreme positions of some isolationists like Ron Paul seem infeasible and may be regarded as pure populism.

Selective engagement on the other hand, is wildly accepted in the academic community and bureaucracy. The advantages are described above. Any administration would not have any problems referring to this grand strategy – both at home and abroad. On the other hand, soon a competition would arise which contingency, theatre, war, initiative, etc. would be strategically important and deserves the United States’ attention. There are advocates for every undertaking. So for any implementation, the president and his administration would have to have a clear vision what he wanted and where and when and with whom. Otherwise such a strategy might soon look like indecisiveness or arbitrarily engaging without a plan.

It is particularly difficult to justify such a strategy in terms of securing universal values and norms: the administration will engage in one case due to national interests but not in another similar case, because it is far of that interest. As the strategy of selective engagement rests on allies by large, it is also difficult for the administration to coordinate the policies and decide upon the wishes and aspirations of allied nations - especially when they are conflicting. The

Obama-administration – as will be shown in the next chapter – has run in some of these problems.

In times of preservative engagement, the more ambitious strategies seem unlikely. However both political narratives on which both “collective security” and “primacy” rest, were still living on in American politics and it would not be surprising if the elements of both were found in any future U.S. foreign policy.

Collective security rests on liberal internationalism. Superficially it is similar to the mainstream political thinking in Europe. But usually, U.S. politicians were more assertive when it comes to punishing those who violate international law and liberal principles. Additionally, the United States always had a higher regard for the rights of people over the rights of states. This would soon lead to conflicts over the role of the United Nations Security Council’s relevance, particularly when this body is used by Russia or China to ensure the supremacy of the rights of states over people. Due to the restraining financial and political situation the United States were in in 2008, a renewed liberal-internationalist agenda could not be very active and forthcoming. It would probably cease some of the controversial U.S. practices like the prison in Guantanamo Bay, large-scale communication surveillance and not step up the practices of covered interventions. The commitment to Afghanistan, the Obama administration made, was a sign of his liberal-internationalist roots. However it would be an overstatement to call him a liberal internationalist, as his policies towards Russia, Eastern Europe and his reaction to the upheavals in the Arab world indicated. The promotion of democracy would be thought wherever it could be done at lower costs than before (in Iraq). This could encourage the U.S. to seek more profiled policies towards regions previously neglected, especially its Latin American neighbourhood.

Primacy was the most demanding grand strategy option, associated with the early era of Bush jun. (2001-2005). Regarded as failed by most commentators, and even abandoned by Bush after 2005 it was difficult to imagine how any new administration might be successful promising more of the same. On the other hand the ideological roots of primacy – liberal triumphalism – were still present in U.S. politics: as Tea-Party movement in the Republican party. But in many terms, the primacy of 2008 would be different from the primacy of 2001. They have in common that the U.S. perceives itself as the lead nation not just of the West but of the free world as such in the struggle against repressive ideologies. And this ideological foe was radical revisionist Islamism. A dedicated continuation of the “Global War on Terror” was still conceivable in 2008. The U.S. would keep up their efforts both in Afghanistan and Iraq, while probably developing a more low-profile approach to other regions.
All four grand strategy options were on the table in 2008. There were no compelling reasons to exclude one, although the preferences of the academic community lay with “selective engagement”. But as will be shown in chapter 5, within the Obama-Admistratuion itself there were proponents of different grand strategy designs. Even more, unforeseen events have again posed several tests to the administration and made adjustments to previously conceived policies necessary.
5. Obama’s Choice

Now that the different options for a possible grand strategy have been outlined, this final chapter will try to examine the choices made by the Obama administration. The different strategic options indicated before had different implications to the policy and the implementation-level. In real life, however, an administration will not necessarily base all its foreign policy on one single ideological or strategic concept and, just as with the Bush administration, the strategic perceptions and concepts might change over time and due to events. Moreover, as governance is a team sport, different strategic perceptions or preferences might guide different sections of the ruling elites, different branches of the bureaucratic apparatus or advisers, evaluators and other groups of people influencing the governmental outcomes. Putting this puzzle together involves a lot of guesswork. But it is worth a try.

5.1. Premises and long-term vision of the administration’s strategic thinking

Evaluating premises and the ideological and epistemological backgrounds of governing and bureaucratic elites is quite a difficult thing to do from the distance. Especially as long as they are in power, where every comment on such a matter is regarded as political in terms of judging normatively rather than as an analytical evaluation, it is difficult to find an independent statement. Moreover, as long as people are in power, they may not speak openly about their motives and considerations underlying certain decisions. Thus, the findings of that chapter are very preliminary indeed.

5.1.1. Premises

Debating about Obama’s ideological and political roots is quite difficult. Being elected to the U.S. Senate from Illinois, it was soon obvious to Democrats that the young senator was a good speaker, could easily capture the attention and win the audience over. However, in political terms it was hard to figure out what his electrifying speeches were all about. His voting

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874 Klaus Faupel, Einführung in die Internationale Politik, Lecture on the University of Salzburg, Winter-Semester 2002/03, October 2002;
record was nothing special\textsuperscript{876} and the interest groups endorsing him were primarily from a domestic context, although it was interesting that no prominent pro-Israeli lobbying group had ever endorsed him, instead several Islamic interest organisations did.\textsuperscript{877} The structure of his endorsements and his voting record hinted at a rather – for American standards – left-liberal past, but given his flexibility to adopt popular political opinions and his ability to achieve his political steps before the presidential campaign rather through short-term alignments, urban populist might be the best description.\textsuperscript{878} One might say that he probably would not try to influence the overall foreign policy concept, but adapt whatever position he liked from others.

But again, governance is a team sport, and as he inherited most of Bill Clinton’s team, including his wife as the Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke as AfPac Special Envoy and Billy Mitchel for the Middle East, Clinton’s moderate internationalism might be the best reference.\textsuperscript{879} The most important attempt to signal continuity was the nomination of Robert Gates, George W. Bush’s Second Secretary of Defence, to continue in the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{880} Having been the head of the CIA under Bush Senior and having led the Department of Defence during the difficult times after Bush’s strategy of primacy had failed, he was an advocate of selective engagement or offshore balancing, and a strong opponent of internationalist or normativist approaches to foreign policy. He was actually responsible for shifting the DoD’s priorities away from the transformational agenda and for concentrating on prevailing in the then military theatres.

This ideological heterogeneity posed a severe challenge to president Obama and would make policy-making difficult at times. But in 2008 Obama was quite a newcomer (in relative terms of course) within the Democratic Party. He had no dedicated independent power-base within the Democratic Party. Therefore he had to pick candidates from the several different wings of the party in order to strengthen his position amongst the democrats. After all, an infight in the party was the least he could afford.

So how did the administration perceive the secular trends in the international system? This is hard to tell, as during the campaign and its aftermath the main foreign policy debate was focused on criticising Bush, not telling how the new administration actually perceives the diffi-
culties of the time. On the other hand, discrediting opponents and telling the audience whatever they want to hear is a basic rule of every election campaign, not only that of Democrats!

One notion is that the administration rejected a ‘huntingonian’ world view. To them, Al-Qa‘ida operatives seemed more like errant criminals than the violent arm of a broader political ideology that had its roots in the Islamic religion. The obvious consequence was that in official documents any notion of the religious affiliation of Al-Qa‘ida was avoided. In his Cairo speech Obama stated that not only the Islamic religion but also its political thought and social order would be compatible with the Western norms. This indeed was a radical break with the previous government that had perceived the political-social agenda of Islam as a challenge to the West and as an obstacle to reform and modernisation.

The Global War on Terror became simply Overseas Contingency Operations and the United States were at war with Al-Qa‘ida, not with the militant Islamist terrorism as such. In addition to the designation, the consequences of this shift in perception were enormous. First, the paradigm that not the ideologically most hostile opponent was considered as top priority was dropped. Conversely, at least for the subsequent administration a quite realist outlook on world politics and structural features became more relevant. The other consequence was that, while the Bush administration had perceived any radical revisionist Islamist organisation as hostile, because of spreading an ideology that directly challenged the U.S. and its values, the Obama administration only fought the one branch of Islamists that was responsible for attacks on the United States proper. This would mean that other states that were confronted with revisionist Islamist organisations, could not automatically count on the help of the United States. It would also mean that, when judging governments of Islamic countries, their willingness to fight Islamists and Islamist thought would not be regarded as the most important criterion.

Beside that, there was a clear notion that the unipolar moment was over. “To Mr. Obama, that unipolar moment is a gauzy memory. Those longing for it are pining for a global order that cannot exist again.” The idea how the world would function after U.S. primacy was never developed in depth, but it was clear that the United States could not successfully change or model the world structurally or in terms of world order alone. Given the higher priority of low politics, such as trade, finance, environment, etc., the coalitions of like-minded countries and alliances were not the only pillars on which U.S. political consultation could rest. Those

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882 See the text at: Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo, New York Times Online, 04 June 2009;
883 The Debatable World, New York Times online, 20 October 2012;
884 See for the President Elect’s Agenda: http://change.gov/agenda/.
issues demanded broader cooperation. The United States had to create working relations with those governments that actually ruled over most of the soil, people and economic assets elsewhere.

There was a shift of paradigms regarding the security risks stemming from increasing transnational interdependence, i.e. terrorism, organised crime, etc. While in the past the best course of action was considered to be fighting these problems at their roots, which basically was to conduct expeditionary warfare in order to battle these problems outside the own country, now these risks were contained rather by non-military state assets, such as the police, the border guard, etc., within the United States themselves, or countries closely cooperating with them. Transnational risks were not regarded as reasons for war.

The promotion of democratic values and principles remained an imperative of the American foreign policy, although it was not such a prominent issue as during the Bush administration. Never the less the spread of democracy was a constant matter of debate within the United States. It has to be added that the preference for democratic governance was still clearly visible during Obama’s first four years in office.

5.1.2. Long-term objectives and strategies

The situation, in which the Obama administration came to power, as described in Chapter 4, was difficult. To state that the strategic vision was blurred and that long-term goals were defined later on, would fall short of the notion that muddling through was indeed a typical crisis behaviour pattern. The mortgage and banking crisis that evolved into an economic and sovereign debt crisis, put a lot of stress on the government and deliberate thinking settled in later. The primary goal of the first years – 2008 to 2010 – was to relieve the United States’ budget and restructure the military commitment abroad. The revitalisation of the domestic economy and the financial re-balancing were the ultimate rationales behind political considerations, and foreign policy had to support this aim. This phase was done in a muddling-through mode, rather than upon long-term considerations. Unfortunately for Obama, the Republicans scored a major success in the 2010 mid-term elections and a bitter partisan battle over taxation and debt limits arose. The fiscal dispute not only further paralysed U.S. do-

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886 Seal of the President of the United States of America, *National Security Strategy, May 2010*, p. 7ff;
887 Allin, Jones, *Weary Policeman*, p. 174-176;
888 With republicans unwilling to raise taxes and Democrats unwilling to considerably cut state-expenditure. See: Ibid., p. 126ff;
mestic politics, but also made long-term planning quite difficult. Thus, the muddling-though phase was unintentionally prolonged.

In the beginning, the President tried to pretend a strategic vision putting forward the same populism of his presidential campaign. The Prague, Istanbul and Cairo speeches, in which he outlined his vision of a world without nuclear weapons and a general rapprochement to the Islamic world, were the most prominent output of this populist attempt. As shown later, those promises were hard or even impossible to fulfil, and there were no traces of them to be found in U.S. politics later on. The speeches, however, made an impression on domestic liberal evaluators and the European left. Indeed the commentators benevolently stated that the primary goal of these speeches and the new soft tone of the administration was to reach out its allies and partners. Yet, it may be questioned if the audiences that were moved by those speeches were the ones to support the United States in the future. It is more likely that Obama wanted to re-assure the domestic audience that change swept through the White House. The first National Security Strategy initially rather emphasised the differences as compared to the Bush administration, than indicated what was new about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Given the harsh criticism on Bush’s foreign policy during the election campaign, such speeches were hardly surprising. Nevertheless, such speeches and formal documents should not be confused with actual strategy.

To be fair in judgement, the new administration inherited this muddling-through mode from Bush’s second term in office. With the economic crisis and a severe overstretch of forces, any administration would find it hard to give a new impulse to foreign policy. In the case of the Obama administration, this new impulse came in 2011, after the withdrawal from Iraq. Like in many other countries, the strategy was not communicated openly, but can be reconstructed through the actions, speeches and executive documents. And during Obama’s first term, it consolidated over time. Starting with “just being different than Bush, no matter how”, the administration developed quite consolidated views of a strategy of selective engagement.

The most obvious element of the new mindset was the dropping of primacy. The United

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890 For a perfect example of an ideologically blinded miss-perception of Obama’s foreign policy see: Heinz Gärtner, Obama, Weltmacht, was nun? Außenpolitische Perspektiven, LIT-Verlag, Vienna, 2008; Heinz Gärtner, USA, Weltmacht auf neuen Wegen, LIT-Verlag, Vienna, 2010;
891 Alin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 176ff, 169ff;
892 See: Seal of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy, May 2010, especially p. 7ff and p. 12ff
893 Peter Rudolf, "Rekonstruktion der amerikanischen Führungsrolle, Folgen für die ‘Grand Strategy’", in: Johann Frank, Johann Pucher (Eds.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2011, Globale Herausforderungen – globale Antworten, Böhlau, Wien, Köln Weimar, p. 29-38;
States would remain the most powerful state in the world, but successfully defending the current world order would only be feasible with the help of the framework of alliances.894 Moreover, the United States would not want to bear the burden of defending the current world order alone, which seemed not sustainable after all. Among those allies the very traditional European and Asian allies came to the U.S.’ mind, which were regarded as definitely pro-status quo.895 However, the European allies rather frustrated the United States: being shaken by a severe sovereign debt and monetary crisis, the European nations drastically reduced their military spending and, consequently, their defence expenditures and international engagement.896 This dismantling of the European capabilities would disrupt the U.S. plans to lead coalitions of like-minded states. “The effectiveness of any leader is a function of the efforts of those who follow. And a leader without followers has little choice but to go it alone.”897 At any rate, the strategic centre of gravity shifted towards the Pacific.

There was a major shift in assessing the significance of transnational risks and the possible, or actual, competitors for the power structure in international relations. By 2011, when the United States’ foreign policy again gained in momentum, the doubts about which side China would choose and whether it would integrate itself in the American or Western world order were almost certainly answered by China.898 Beijing backed North Korea in the confrontation and shelling that surrounded the introduction of Kim Jong-un into the North Korean leadership circle.899 Additionally on the Chinese side, considerations about the post-American world

894 Seal of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 9ff;
895 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 169ff;
897 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 182;
898 Nigel Inkster, “Conflict Foretold: America and China”, in: Survival, Vol. 55, No. 5, October-November 2013, p. 7-28; There were objections to this confrontational view on China within the American academic society and political establishment – most notably Henry Kissinger (See: Henry A. Kissinger, The Future of U.S. - Chinese Relations, Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity, first published in Foreign Affairs, reprinted electronically and downloaded at: http://www.henrykissinger.com/articles/fa0412.html). Indeed, in December 2010 a “U.S. China Grand Strategy Executive Agreement” was drafted and allegedly discussed between Obama and Hu Jintao (the alleged proposed paper may be downloaded at: http://centencp.com/uschinarelations/p2_2d.pdf.), paving the way for deeper cooperation and “harmonious relations”. However, while the paper was eagerly discussed in the academic sphere, both countries did not live up to it: the United States Congress was never ready to lift the arms embargo and trade-restrictions for high-technology goods, while China never moved on South-China Sea disputes and North Korea. Indeed the circulated proposal is so naive and illusive that the author has serious doubts on the authenticity of the document.
899 Analysis: China keeps pressure off North Korea, Mainichi Daily News Online, 25 November 2010; Tensions high after Korea trade shelling, Mainichi Daily News online, 24 November 2010; Obama pledges U.S. will defend its ally South Korea, Mainichi Daily News Online, 24 November 2010; DPRK shells South Korea island, killing 2, Japan Times Online, 24 November 2010; Südkoreanisches Militärlflugzeug abgestürzt, Neue Züicher Zeitung Online, 12 November 2010; «Unechtliche» Signale aus dem Norden, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 October 2010; Kim Jong Il als Parteichef bestätigt, Auftakt des Kongresses der kommunistischen Partei Nordkoreas, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 28 September 2010; Wer wird Nachfolger Kim Jong Ils? Nordkoreas Arbeiterpartei bereitet sich auf den ersten Kongress seit 44 Jahren vor, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 08 September 2010;
order matured and – to some extent – were communicated in public. If China saw world politics primarily as a zero-sum contest with the United States, why should the United States view it differently? If China wanted to challenge the U.S. in the global leadership role to implement a just and harmonious world order, why should the U.S. still pretend to be a strategic partner? China’s criticism of the United States during the financial crisis and Chinese attempts to replace the Dollar as the global trading and reserve currency left little doubt that, although the outline of the alternative Chinese world order was still blurred, Chinese revisionist tendencies would grow along with China’s power. The paradigm of the Pacific pivot was born: to maintain a leading role in world politics and, hence, the United States would have to defend its position in the Pacific as the pivotal security provider and the most important political force.

Identifying China as the gravest long-term threat to the U.S. global leadership is one thing, addressing this threat is another. As mentioned before, primacy tried to reshape the world in a manner that revisionism had no chance of success from the outset. But re-shaping the Middle East to deny any other possible revisionist power access to the region had proven very costly, probably more costly than containing China in Asia. Furthermore this indirect approach was based on the assumption that the Middle East would harbour the only long-term and globally significant oil reserves, which were necessary to wage a large hegemonic war. Actually, this assumption was true since 1945. But technological progress and economic shifts in the energy markets would make the exploitation of unconventional oil and gas economically feasible, which would dramatically change the distribution of exploitable reserves. North and South America would have a considerable share in the world’s oil and gas production. The Middle East could lose its pivotal position in global energy supplies. Consequently the strategic rationale for a Middle-East-First policy diminished.

Another compelling logic was that, although in the long-term China could be a formidable

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900 See for this discussion: Schweller, Pu, “After Unipolarity”, p. 41-72; Callahan, “China’s Strategic Futures”, p. 617-642;
901 China Urges New Money Reserve to Replace Dollar, New York Times Online, 23 March 2009;
903 The official document dealing with the Pacific Pivot in detail is: Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington D.C., January 2012. Although drafted as mere defence strategy by the Department of Defence, it is the most detailed (officially drafted) vision of America’s future role in world politics and the last “big” strategic document approved by the President (although drafted by the DoD) before the 2012 election campaign. Therefore it was much more meaningful than for example the National Security Strategy of 2010. It is probable that if a NSS were to draft in 2012, it would comprise much of the phrasing now written in the the defence strategy.
905 Ibid., p. 19;
competitor for the U.S., it did not have any meaningful allies, while the United States enjoyed a system of alliances and good relations in Asia and Europe. Maintaining global leadership would be as much about maintaining and establishing alliances as it was about maintaining economic and technological strength within the United States. This logic was reflected in many U.S. documents, especially those regarding the restructuring of the U.S. armed forces, for which cooperation with allies would be called for. Of course, the existing web of alliances could be improved. Improving the relations with India would be a major advantage. Not only would India’s rivalry with China and its geographic situation make it a favourable military ally, preventing one of the biggest new economies from turning towards revisionism would be a remarkable success in defending the current economic order. In economic terms, keeping all major industrialised regions within the current system would be important. Beyond the BRIC nations, of which India was of interest from the economic and the strategic viewpoints and Brazil for economic reasons, and Europe, a number of regional powers with political aspirations (i.e. Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, etc.) were eagerly trying to convert their economic growth into political influence. The more regional powers were on the side of the U.S. the better. The promotion of the G20 format for economic and political consultations was one indicator of the American attempt to boost the legitimacy of the current world order in these states: if they were to accept this order, they should receive some kind of representation at its steering board. However, one may still debate how relevant the G20 really is!

Finally, it has to be mentioned that not only hard strategic considerations guided the Pacific Pivot. Considering the long-term trends in transnational interactions, the shift of attention from the Atlantic to the Pacific was conceivable. East and Southeast Asia enjoyed the biggest share of the global gross domestic product. The region would account for over 19 trillion USD in GDP, while Europe would produce 17.4 trillion, the U.S. 15.2 trillion, the Middle East and North Africa 2.7 trillion, the former Soviet Union 2.4 trillion, and Sub-Saharan Africa 1.2 trillion USD. It was also the economically most dynamic region with high growth rates even in times of global recession. China’s economy grew by 8.5% and India’s by 5.4% during the 2008/09 crisis, for example. While the Chinese GDP in 2000 was about 12% of the GDP of the U.S., it rose to 50% in 2011 as compared to the United States. Although it was to be expected that the impressive growth rates of China would slow down when it became wealthy

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906 See: Department of the Army, *The Army Capstone Concept*.
907 Allin, Jones, *Weary Policeman*, p. 178;
909 Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2011, Frankfurt am Main 2010, p. 630;
910 Brill: “Strukturen der Weltpolitik im Wandel”, p. 549;
and labour costs increased, and domestic or regional consumption would take a higher share, reducing actual economic interdependence between the U.S. and China. Asia would remain the powerhouse of global production, while labour intensive production would (intra-regionally) migrate to neighbouring Asian states, changing little in the inter-regional balance. This shift of economic power already affected the United States economically, socially, demographically and, lastly, politically. The U.S. exported goods and services worth 119,127 million USD and imports goods worth 216,543 million USD to and from Asia, as compared to the 107,543 million USD exports and 141,851 million imports for Europe, including Turkey and Russia. This strong trade link was not restricted to cheap low-tech manufacturing goods. In terms of high-tech products the United States exported 29,634 million USD to the Pacific region, while importing 66,355 million USD, with the figures for Europe being 22,040 millions exports and 23,821 million imports. In short, the Pacific region was the most important trading region of the U.S., especially regarding high-value goods. Demographically 422,063 legal immigrants (40.5% of the total amount) in the U.S. in 2010 were from Asia, compared to 88,743 from Europe (8.5%). This figure does not include the Asian students who attend American universities, but do not apply for permanent residence. As American political and economic elites are much more inclusive and transitive than those in Europe, the culminating effects of this demographic change will sooner or later affect American politics. Isolationism towards the struggles for power and ideological hegemony in Asia will hardly be accepted, just like indifference towards Europe could not be maintained in two World Wars originating from this continent. The business community and domestic pressure groups would increasingly demand that America play a role in Asian politics. In this case it would be wiser to prepare the ground for the U.S. in Asia sooner rather than later.

5.2. Mid-Term Objectives

Mid-term objectives are goals to be reached within the present term in office of the president or sometimes in the second term. Unless the author wishes to duplicate the previous chapter or the chapters below, only few topics need to be further elaborated on.

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912 Ibid., p. 21;
If, however, there were one imperative of the mid-term level in contrast to long-term consider­ations, this would be retrenchment. According to MacDonals and Parent, the relative loss of power can be managed more or less skilfully by the relevant power.914 If it succeeds in re­aligning – essentially reducing – its foreign commitments, especially in the military field, and its domestic expenses, there is a certain chance it regains its strength and competitiveness. As mentioned above, this was the first and foremost goal in the early years of the Obama admin­istration. Hence, some remarks will be made as to the budget and the withdrawal from Iraq, which both were essential for the sake of retrenchment.

5.2.1. Mid-term objectives – or how to retrench?

Although not a topic of foreign policy, the financial situation of the United States had a pro­found impact on it. In 2009, the U.S. budget deficit soared from 162.8 billion in 2007 and 454.8 billion USD in 2008 to alarming 1,417.2 billion USD.915 The deficit was caused primarily by the collapse of income and corporate taxes due to the recession, to a minor percentage due to increased costs in welfare programmes, that is unemployment, as well as the purchase of troubled banks and foul financial assets.916 The Bush administration decided to intervene massively in the economy to alleviate the effect of the downturn and to help financial institu­tions and enterprises to stay afloat,917 and the Obama administration continued this policy. With the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the administration dedicated another $787 billion to reviving the economy, largely taking effect in late 2009 to 2010.918 While the previous packages were largely guarantees and loans, which were indeed paid back to a cer­tain amount later on, such stimulus packages practically meant increasing demand through public spending. This would be an even bigger burden for the budget, especially in the medium to long-term perspective. The logic behind this idea is that, by re-starting the economy, further losses of tax income will be avoided and that some day the re-started economy will outgrow the interests of the debt from that time. However, there are serious risks connected with such a policy. First, there are doubts as to whether the economy can be kick-started at all or whether these packages are mere tricks to impress the electorate, assuming that the economy will re-start anyhow. The increased debt would restrain the budget later on, forcing the

916 Ibid., p. ii-viii;
917 Ibid., p. 16-22;
918 Ibid., p. 22;
government to reduce services. It should be noted that this policy was commented on in quite a different way.919

Yet, expansive fiscal policies during crises put extra stress on other policy areas to reduce costs. Otherwise, the budget deficit will grow too fast. Still, with plans to expand healthcare and warnings of an ageing population,920 resulting in soaring welfare costs, the Obama administration clearly decided to make retrenchment a foreign policy task. It was a deliberate choice. From the three biggest spenders of the 2009 budget, the Ministry of Defence was on par with both the Department of Health and Human Services as well as the Social Security Administration.921 The overseas contingency operations, which roughly cost the MoD $180 billion a year (see table below), are indeed a considerable sum, but not everything in a 3.4 trillion922 household. Below the costs of overseas contingency operations are displayed.923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation and Source of Funding</th>
<th>FY01 &amp; 02</th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY10</th>
<th>FY11</th>
<th>FY12 Pending Request</th>
<th>Cumulative Total FY01-FY12 incl. CRA/Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Department of Defence</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>127.2</td>
<td>138.5</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>768.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid &amp; Diplomatic</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-Medical</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Iraq</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>142.1</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>823.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Department of Defence</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>523.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid &amp; Diplomatic</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-Medical</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Afghanistan</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>557.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Security</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Unallocated</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In foreign policy, the Department of Defence’s overseas contingency operations, together with the personnel and defence investment to complement them, were the ones that made the difference. They were a factor of considerable importance for domestic politics and the popularity of the administration. It was for this reason that the withdrawal from Iraq was selected.

As debated in the previous chapter, in line with Bush’s idea of the Middle East, Iraq was or

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921 Ibid., p. 9;
922 Ibid., p.iii;
could have been in the centre of many Middle East policy options. Contrary to Afghanistan, the country as such did matter. However, given the way the war in 2003 was sold to the public – Iraq’s WMD programme, Iraqi alignment with Al-Qa’ida – it became a highly controversial war from the start, domestically and internationally. Controversial wars that are not successful become unpopular wars.

Criticising the Bush administration for the war in Iraq and exploiting the war-weariness of the American electorate became one of the main pillars of Obama’s electoral success, much more than his visions, his wisdom or his charismatic appearance, which his admirers tried to impute on him. “Kerry claimed that preoccupation with and preparation for Iraq meant there had been inadequate force levels in Afghanistan, including Tora Bora, where the U.S. instead had to rely on anti-Taliban Afghans under the banner of the Northern Alliance. Obama carried the same argument into the 2008 presidential campaign. Such arguments expressed a recognisable liberal internationalist perspective that was based as much on moral reasoning as strategic logic.” Actually it was a mixture of electoral populism and liberal-internationalist moralism that influenced Obama, not strategic rationales. As described in Chapter 4, there was no strategic rationale behind Afghanistan – except moral and legalistic reasoning. Moreover, after seizing power, the President was briefed on the catastrophic political and security situation in Afghanistan that would hinder any further American effort in that country. But as he had promised the electorate to withdraw from Iraq, the decision had been taken before thinking about the future course of foreign policy, it had to be implemented somehow. Obama’s decision to leave Iraq was supported by the fact that the American Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), negotiated in mid-2008, would expire in 2011. This SOFA reflected Malaki’s desire to get rid of the American forces sooner rather than later, in line with Obama’s campaign rhetoric, and this has to be considered as one of the major strategic blunders of the Bush administration. On the other hand, there were still some questions left open that allowed U.S. policy makers to considerably alter the course in Iraq:

- What would be Iraq’s place in a future U.S. policy for the Middle-East?
- Under what conditions and in what time frame would the United States withdraw (renegotiate the SOFA)?
- How to proceed in Afghanistan?

These decisions were important mid-term considerations, however, they were very much at

924 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 74-77;
925 For example see: Gärtnert, Obama, Welthmach undas nun?;
926 Allin, Jones, Weary Policemen, p. 75;
927 See: Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 78ff;
928 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 73;
flux during the negotiations of the withdrawal. So some remarks may be said about their implementation.

5.2.2.1. Leaving Iraq

A significant downsizing from 160,000 to 145,000 soldiers of the American troops in Iraq was initiated during the last months before the election.929 The plan to transfer the operative combat tasks to Iraqi forces and to concentrate the U.S. operation on supportive tasks, training, supervision, as well as to function as a general reserve was part of the later phases of the surge. The new administration, in retaining the old Secretary of Defence, followed up that plan and withdrew the last brigade from combat duties in mid 2010.930 The timeline for withdrawing from Iraq was set according to the SOFA by the end of 2011.931 Having promised the electorate the withdrawal, the credibility of president Obama – especially at home – was at stake if he changed his mind too fast.

After the official takeover of operative duties by Iraqi security forces, a wave of terrorist incidents and hostage-takings challenged the credibility of the Iraqi security forces.932 But more important for the Americans than to reconsider their exit strategy was the outbreak of the so called Arab Spring in December 2010 (see chapter 5.3.) The outcome of these popular uprisings was unknown, or doubtful at least. How many of the – at least superficially – pro-American regimes would fall? What future would radical revisionist Islam have in the new regimes and the regions after that? Would the popular uprisings spark a renewed round of sectarian violence in the region? This was hard to tell. But Iraq’s position was dramatically altered due to the revolution. First, because the Iraqis were tired of internal war, that was why Iraq was probably the country least likely to be the theatre of another revolution. Second, the still fragile internal security situation would still be an anchor to justify American troop presence, which would make Iraqi elites dependent on U.S. support, hence at least pragmatically pro-American. If the region was at stake and intervening was – for internal reasons – not an op-

929 Geringer Abbau der US-Truppen im Irak, Zusätzliche Marines nach Afghanistan, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 09 August 2008;
930 USA übergeben Grüne Zone in Bagdad an Iraker, Meilstein auf dem Weg zur vollständigen Souveränität - Uno-Mandat ausgelaufen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 01 January 2009; Letzte US-Kampfbrigade übergibt Aufgabe an irakische Armee, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 07 August 2010;
931 USA beginnen neue Phase im Irak, Vizepräsident Biden verkündet Operation »Morgendämmerung«, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 01 September 2010;
932 Mindestens 41 Tote bei Selbstmordanschlag in Bagdad, Attentäter stellte sich in Warteschlange vor Rekrutierungsgebäude, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 17 August 2010; Zwölf Tote bei Anschlag auf Armeegebäude in Bagdad, Blutigstes Attentat seit Ende des amerikanischen Kampfeinsatzes im Irak, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 05 September 2010; Hunderte trauern in Bagdad nach Geiseldrama, Zeremonie nach Massaker in christlicher Kirche, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 02 November 2010;
tion, Iraq would be a fallback-position that could be secured more easily. Not surprisingly, the discussion about a post-2011 role of American soldiers in Iraq emerged in the spring of 2011. While no immediate operational tasks would be given to those troops, they would be maintained for training and advisory proposes. But most importantly, they would establish a power factor independent of the central Iraqi government, which could be decisive in securing the then intact sharing of powers by the sectarian groups, which was desired at least by those groups that feared that they would lose in the struggle to come. Since the United States did not want to propose itself maintaining some troops in Iraq – basically for domestic reasons – the discussion ensued whether Iraq could propose such as solution to the U.S., but on American terms, which included the immunity of the American personnel. Since the radical elements escalated violence to put the U.S. under pressure, the U.S. actually had a strong card to play with Iraq. But as the U.S. presence was unpopular with most of Iraq’s population, and the government of Malaki would definitely not be on the losing side of further internal power struggles, so he was very reluctant to lead the negotiations with the Americans. Official talks started in August. The United States offered to leave 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers in Iraq for the purposes mentioned above. With the imminent withdrawal, a debate started in Iraq as to whether its government could be trusted without American supervision. And, since maintaining a presence in Iraq was perceived as of interest primarily to the American government and as a constraint to Malaki’s rule, the Iraqi government tried to bargain for revenues. Ultimately, Obama did not join this game, but rather withdrew American forces from Iraq, showed his disappointment with Baghdad, reduced the financial and gov-

933 Keine Verlängerung der US-Truppenpräsenz im Irak, Regierung in Bagdad hält am Abzugstermin Ende Jahr fest, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 April 2011;
934 Should U.S. Stay or Go? Views Define Iraqi Factions, New York Times Online, 10 May 2011;
937 In Iraqi Village, a Raid Sows Distrust of Americans, New York Times Online, 01 August 2011;
939 Iraq to Open Talks With U.S. on Troop Presence Past 2011, New York Times Online, 03 August 2011;
ernmental aid to Iraq and promised neighbours to make up for the withdrawal from Iraq by deploying U.S. military to other Gulf nations.

What did that mean in terms of policy development? It meant that, regardless of the ups and downs with American policy on the Persian Gulf, Iraq would not have a role in any future regional policy. It also meant the reversal of all that Bush had fought for since 2003: gaining an alternative foothold to the Gulf in addition to Saudi Arabia, an alternative source for change in the region, bringing one large, powerful Arab state into the American camp, which could influence Iran via the Shi'ite community and the other Arab states differently than the money and influence from Rhiad. Taking American soldiers out of Iraq and into the Gulf States brought the U.S. back in the situation that seemed unsustainable after 9/11: being totally dependent on the conservative Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, to contain Iran and, maybe, even Iraq if the latter came under influence from Teheran. Did the ‘Arab Spring’ make such a difference that the U.S. foreign policy would be re-evaluated? As will be discussed in the following chapters, a political rapprochement of the United States and Saudi Arabia was clearly visible. But whether this proximity was such as wise choice remains to be debated.

The withdrawal from Iraq was concluded smoothly and rapidly. The U.S. and the Iraqi government signed an agreement to further supply Iraqi forces with matériel and to train some of the Iraqi security forces in the United States. But in Iraq, now that the government was on its own, Malaki immediately set out to strengthen his personal rule by sending the security forces after rivalling groups. The most prominent incident in that regard occurred when a warrant was issued for Vice President Hashemi, the leader of the largest Sunni party in Iraq. The time of power sharing in Iraq was over. Power would be centralised within the Prime Minister’s office, his clan and his confidants. As the crisis of the Syrian civil war would reveal, the United States could not count on Iraq in a regional crisis, neither did Iran’s influence on Baghdad diminish. Iraq, instead of serving as bridgehead for a further stabilisation of the

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943 U.S. Scales Back Diplomacy in Iraq Amid Fiscal and Security Concerns, New York Times Online, 22 October 2011;
944 U.S. Planning Troop Buildup in Gulf After Exit From Iraq, New York Times Online, 29 October 2011;
946 Obama and Iraqi Premier Signify Shift to a Postwar Partnership, New York Times, 12 December 2011;
949 See: Prime Minister Puts Power-Sharing at Risk in Iraq, New York Times Online, 21 December 2011; Exxon Spars With Iraq Over Lack of Payment, 22 December 2011;
region was at risk of being destabilised – both by paternalistic domestic politics as well as a deteriorating neighbourhood. While the military campaign in Iraq was – after painful lessons – successfully concluded, the results were lost politically.

5.2.3. Allies, Neutrals, Adversaries, and alternative Alliances

Switching from primacy to selective engagement would also mean to re-evaluate the web of alliances over the years. At the End of Bush’s term of office, the allies were, by large, allies of necessity to maintain the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, with the strategy shifting towards Asia, these alliances would be re-extremated.

There was little doubt that the U.S. would view China as a revisionist power and that the response to, or prevention of, Chinese revisionism was the main long-term goal. Issues as the South China Sea and Taiwan dominated bilateral talks from the start. The modernisation of the Chinese military apparatus was seen as an attempt to challenge global U.S. leadership, although only in the decades to come. Concerning governance, international trade and finances, China saw its position backed by the economic crisis, rather than giving in to American demands. And it was longer held secret that China pushed its catching-up policies with all available means.

There was more debate into what basket the Russian egg would belong. After a charm offensive by the new American administration, the so-called reset, undertaken especially to conclude a new strategic (nuclear) disarmament contract and based on the hope of the presumed reformist camp around the Russian President Medvedev, the American administration attempted to win over Russia to team up with the West. A shift in the missile defence architecture, a cause for constraints between the two, should show the U.S. willingness to engage with Russia.

But the American policy towards Russia was based on wrong assumptions about the political

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952 Xu, Gates Hold Talks Amid U.S. Concern Over China, Defense News Online, 27 October 2009;
953 Noch ist China militärisch keine Gefahr für die USA, Kooperation statt aktive Eindämmung bleibt für Washington die attraktivere Politik, Neue Zücher Zeitung Online, 03 September 2010;
956 Obama to Seek New Arms Control Deal in Moscow, New York Times Online, 06 July 2009; As Obama Visits, Russian TV Alters Take on U.S., New York Times Online, 05 July 2009;
957 As Obama Visits, Russian TV Alters Take on U.S., New York Times Online, 05 July 2009;

The other, minor contenders are quite known from the Bush administration. Ambitious Iran is worth keeping an eye on, as attempts to create a different regional order were at least in rhetoric extended to a strategic partnership of revisionist states.\footnote{Russia May Let NATO Use Airfield as Afghan Hub, New York Times Online, 14 March 2012; Chávez und Ahmadinejad bilden «strategische Allianz», Bündnisse in Politik, Wirtschaft und sozialen Bereichen angekündig, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 October 2010;} Rhetoric aside, Iran fought many conflicts on the internal as well as external arena. Whether or not it had the strength to impose its own hegemony onto the region may be disputed. But it tried, and the unwillingness of China and Russia to cease supporting Iran was contributing to the dilemma of the USA in the Middle East.

So who were to be the allies? In East Asia, the situation was clear and will be described in a later chapter. There was only one case to deliberate, i.e. what place Taiwan should have in the new architecture. During Bush’s term, Taiwan was managed through the bilateral relations
between China and the United States. Now, with a renewed emphasis on allies and their share of maintaining the current regional and world order, the question, which possibilities were to be given to Taiwan to defend itself, were of crucial importance. According to the logic of an offshore balancing strategy, Taiwan should receive the means to defend itself as long as possible. As no other power dared to supply Taiwan with arms, this task fell to the U.S. only. On the other hand, this would increase tensions with China and, moreover, would grant Taiwan the possibility to carry out confrontational policies on its own, such as a dedicated pro-independence agenda. This would, therefore, diminish Washington’s ability to manage the Taiwan Strait’s strategic situation.

Frankly, the United States did not give a clear answer to these issues. There was an intense discussion about several arms deals with Taiwan, but only very limited deals on F-16 modernisations and spare parts were concluded. Concerning Taiwan, the U.S. maintained its ambiguity and tried to preserve its freedom of action to react to a crisis at their wish.

The Pacific Pivot will be explained to a greater detail in chapter 5.3.1. The overall goals of the U.S. Pacific efforts for the first four years were described by Clinton in several speeches in the ASEAN Regional Forum: enhanced regional economic cooperation without excluding the Pacific East Coast (North- and Latin-America), multilateral solution of regional disputes, improving political and military ties to all allies in the region. This was a direct challenge of China’s approach of bilaterally negotiating regional issues, which amounts to confronting individual states with Chinese demands and expecting them to follow, as well as forming rather exclusive regional trade arrangements.

The question, which of the new emerging economies should become a partner, fell to India, basically for the same reasons as explained with the Bush administration.

In the Middle East, the situation was much more difficult. Iran was to be deterred from fighting the regional status-quo, like Iraq did in the 80s and 90s. As described below, the question, on which ally this deterrence should rest, was the most important determinator of the U.S. Middle-Eastern policy. Options were limited. Saudi-Arabia was was one possibility. Its geographic proximity to Iran made it a military favourite. On the other hand, Riyadh’s role in

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969 U.S. To Deny Taiwan New Jets, Offers AESA Radar in Upgrade for Older F-16s, Defense News, 15 August 2011;
970 Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands, New York Times Online, 23 July 2010; Clinton Tries to defuse Asian Tension, New York Times Online, 1201.2010;

242
Afghanistan, Pakistan and international terrorism was another story.\textsuperscript{971} Turkey was another option. The NATO member state was the most capable military power in the region, it had ongoing issues regarding the Kurdish Northern Iraq with the United States and the Erdoğan government – under the umbrella of the zero-problems policy – did not seem to be overly enthusiastic about playing a counterweight to any neighbour upon Washington’s demand.\textsuperscript{972} Iraq would have to be taken out of the equation, as it would conflict with the goal of retrenchment, because of the withdrawal from Iraq and the reduction of the amount of direct American involvement in the region. Hence, ultimately the United States picked Saudi-Arabia,\textsuperscript{973} with some severe consequences for the Arab spring and the Syrian civil war, to be discussed later on.

What about Europe? What role should the old continent have played in Obama’s foreign policy? Initially not a significant one. The financial crisis knocked out Europe as a strategic actor on the world-stage of international relations and ended the dream of a ‘soft-power’ Europe – putting even the regional role of the EU into question.\textsuperscript{972} Furthermore the erosion of Europe’s defence capabilities – if continued – could lead to a power-vacuum on the old continent that could be exploited by revisionist powers. After all, the European political establishment was reluctant to accept the end of the 90s-era strategic environment (permissive towards liberal interventionism, no tensions amongst great powers), and the rise of a confrontational pluri-centric international system.\textsuperscript{975} However the U.S. were reluctant to react on this situation in Europe and defined their policies on rather narrow economic interest concerning the management of the financial and economic crisis:

1. The danger that China might exploit its strong financial situation to win over some European states for the concept of economic revisionism.\textsuperscript{976}

\textsuperscript{971} Cash Flow to Terrorists Evades U.S. Efforts, New York Times Online, 05 December 2010; In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now, New York Times Online, 08 June 2011;


2. That the global and U.S. economy would suffer from a European recession.977
3. That Germany, at odds with American plans for recovery,978 would cultivate special relationships to other revisionist powers, especially Russia.979 A German Sonderweg would be a serious setback for the U.S. goal of winning over most economic powerhouses for the Western-liberal economic order.

Leaving Europe was not an option, at least economically. While European security in military terms was not an American business any more, European economic security grew to a new problem for American foreign policy. As described below, keeping Europe – in terms of the EU – intact and within the American orbit became an increasingly difficult, but important task. Compared to the early 2000s, what a change of attitudes!

5.2.4. The Role of an Offshore-Balancer

What kind of international role would the U.S. have to play as an offshore balancer in the medium term? After having accomplished a certain amount of retrenchment – withdrawing from Iraq, beginning the downsizing of U.S. forces in Afghanistan – the international role of the United States was to be re-invented. The Pacific Pivot, as described in chapter 5.3.1., almost came by default, since Beijing’s increasing assertiveness almost called for an American role. But a kind of repetition of the Nixon-Doctrine980 took place in other world regions, too. The primary responsibility for their own, and their regional, security rested in the hands of the local allies. The United States would support them, but it was up to them to find a diplomatic or even military solution for regional problems. The United States would not primarily force its vision of a regional order onto them. This was executed in Libya, where the U.S. facilitated an Anglo-French intervention,981 or in the Arab Spring countries, where the U.S. tried to bring about regime transition from the distance. This would reduce the American footprint in international relations and give local allies much more freedom of action. It would reduce the bur-
den the U.S. would have to bear, but also diminish direct control over what was actually going on on the ground.

Strategic cohesion was essential for such a strategy to work and, especially in the Pacific, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was busy consulting regularly with regional allies.982 But Asia was a rather easy theatre. A common threat perception facilitated communication. In the Middle East and in Europe it proved to be much more difficult to find common ground. Diplomatically and militarily the modus operandi of the executive apparatus had to be adjusted according to the new strategy. Intelligence sharing and support of allies grew in importance. Covert types of operation (drone strikes, etc.) would in many places replace direct involvement of conventional forces on the ground.983

The military apparatus would see the biggest changes. Essentially the Revolution in Military Affairs or the Defence Transformation were to be stopped and in many cases to be reverted.984 Not only that the Rumsfield Doctrine did not prevail in the then current wars, prevailing in COIN scenarios alone (or wide area security operations, as they were then called) would not be enough. Traditional inter-state war and military rivalry would still be an issue, and the U.S. armed forces would have to prepare for them.985 Even unconventional warfare would be a means of other states to deny the U.S. certain areas rather than an isolated phenomenon or mere weak spot in the international system.986 However the defence-apparatus had long opposed Rumsfield’s transformative ideas. Restructuring the armed forces and re-focussing on conventional threats therefore could also be a result of bureaucratic policies rather than a deliberate strategic choice by the administration’s top officials.

Next, instead of unilateral dominance, the military effort would have to be closely coordinated with allies. “The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behaviour and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”987 Interoperability was an issue and to improve it, the United States conducted a series of manoeuvres with allies around the globe.

And, last but not least, the United States would be open to cooperation with states that were not represented in the traditional web of alliances. While the attempt to win over some states,

982 Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands, New York Times Online, 23 July 2010; Clinton Tries to Defuse Asian Tension, New York Times Online, 12 January 2010;
983 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 86;
984 See for a good critique of RMA and “Defence Transformation”: Department of the Army, The Army Capstone Concept;
985 Department of Defense: Sustaining Global Leadership, p. 1ff;
986 Department of the Army, The Army Capstone Concept, p. 13;
987 Department of Defense: Sustaining Global Leadership, p. 3;
like Russia, may have proven illusive, the U.S. was and is open to re-evaluate its ties to states like Vietnam or Burma.

3.2.5. Domestic issues of U.S. foreign policy

Reflecting the many domestic issues that influenced Obama’s first term in office would be the task for another thesis. Indeed, the Obama-presidency seems to be one of the rather controversial presidencies in terms of domestic politics for many reasons. First because of the rise of a very aggressive populist wing within the Republican opposition. Sometimes the personal depreciation of the president by his opponents led to outright hysteria, like the “birther issue”, the suspicion that Obama was not born in the U.S. Second, because the president had a dedicated domestic agenda in terms of healthcare-plans and later the gun-control debate. Those issues steered up opposition, and the president was taking the bashing for issues congressmen would usually fight about.

Having a dedicated domestic agenda makes support from the legislative for the president pivotal. However in the Mid-term election 2010 Democrats lost six seats in the Senate to the Republicans, diminishing the lead to a margin and losing majority in the house of representatives. From then on, legislation proved difficult and especially the debt-ceiling of the U.S. federal budget was subject to an intense and polarised debate, absorbing the attention of the president. In a paralysed Congress, neither budget (and debt reduction), taxation, healthcare, nor oversight over financial markets could be dealt with effectively. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to comment on all those developments in detail. While the interests of the bureaucracy and special interest-groups stayed the same as in chapter 3.3.4., the domestic support for the president in terms of legislation worsened considerably. Dissatisfied with the performance of the old elites, protest-votes and actions strengthened the populist elements within the political system: the Tea-Party movement to the right and the “occupy” movement to the left of the political centre. While the system was far from real crisis, the embedded dysfunctional-
especially if the administration needed support in terms of legislation a fragmented, polarised house and a political discourse dominated by populists was anything but helpful.

5.3. Regional and Sectoral Policies

Now that the strategies, goals and overarching considerations have been explained, the level of implementation can be further elaborated. Unlike the Bush administration, there are hardly any ex-post reflections and books about Obama’s foreign and security policy – and in times of the electoral campaign those that exist, are more propaganda than substance – so that the data will be based mainly on newspapers and how to interpret these in the light of the scheme laid down in Chapter 2.

5.3.1. The U.S. policy towards East Asia and the Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region will be the centre of gravity of American foreign policy for the years to come. This is almost a common understanding of strategic analysts these days. “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationship with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region.”

But in the absence of a major direct confrontation, how to conduct a policy towards China that on the one hand does not bully China into confrontational action, but on the other hand is preparing the ground for the United States to successfully conduct this confrontation if necessary? “… a largely symbolic deployment of U.S. marines to Australia underscored the idea of a strategic pivot towards the Asia-Pacific, where a careful balancing of China’s rise could, it was hoped, be accomplished without provoking a destructive arms race.”

As mentioned above, the economic crises initially precluded any long-term policy, but dictated the necessities to cooperate solving the pending financial issues. This was especially true for the U.S. relations to China, the most important creditor to the United States. The U.S. budget deficit was rising and the U.S. Federal Reserve in desperate need for money to give

994 Department of Defense: Sustaining Global Leadership, p. 2;
995 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 86;
credits to the struggling financial sector, hence it was the top priority of the respective central banks, and an urgent need, to persuade Asian governments to buy bonds and conduce swap-agreements.\textsuperscript{996} There were severe challenges to regional security and order, like the second test of a North Korean nuclear bomb,\textsuperscript{997} still, there was not much appetite to deal with them yet. And, building on the good working relationship between the Bush administration and the People’s Republic of China, Obama considered Chinese informal approval or silent cooperation for a number of U.S. policies. “North Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Africa all required attention and suggested or demanded a degree of strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing.”\textsuperscript{998} However, for the time being, there was uncertainty how China would react to the American weakness and receive the new administration. To reinforce the impression of continuity, Obama kept a lot of the key personnel from the Bush administration for Asia and appointed a series of well-renowned experts for the region.\textsuperscript{999}

But both aims – continuity and the creation of allies – faced some challenges. In India, there was a sceptical reaction to Obama’s stand on nuclear weapons and global governance.\textsuperscript{1000} Regarding climate change India rather teamed up with China to block any attempt to impose binding CO\textsuperscript{2} reduction targets.\textsuperscript{1001} In Japan, after almost 60 years of LDP rule, a new government formed by the Democratic Party of Japan called for a more balanced policy between Beijing and Washington, a bigger influence on America’s policy in the West Pacific and a re-location or closure of some American bases in Japan.\textsuperscript{1002}

Despite the uneasy start, the United States could make considerable progress in achieving their goals: winning over or keeping allies in East Asia to eventually contain China as well as preventing, or mitigating the effects of, the foundation of an Asian regional economic order, excluding the United States. The reason with this was the Chinese behaviour rather than the U.S. policy.

While the West was tumbling economically, China still enjoyed substantial growth rates (8.8% in 2009),\textsuperscript{1003} became the economic centre and powerhouse not only of Asia, but of the global economy as such. Surpassing both Germany and Japan within a couple of years, new

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{996} François Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Continuity”, in: \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. 50, No. 1, January/February 2010, 8-24, p. 8-9;
\item \textsuperscript{997} North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test, New York Times Online, 24 May 2009;
\item \textsuperscript{998} Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009”, p. 10;
\item \textsuperscript{999} These were Robert Gates at the head of the DoD, General James Jones as security advisor, David Sedney as DoD Asia advisor, Kurt Campbell at State Department for East Asia, John Huntsman (Rep.) as envoy to Beijing, John Ross to Tokyo, and Jeffrey Bader for Asia point at the NSC; See: Ibid., p. 12;
\item \textsuperscript{1000} Ibid., p. 13;
\item \textsuperscript{1001} Ibid., p. 19;
\item \textsuperscript{1002} Ibid, p. 14-15;
\item \textsuperscript{1003} Lowell Dittmer, “Asia in 2009”, in: \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. 50, No. 1, January/February 2010, 1-7, p. 1;
\end{itemize}
assertiveness grew in Beijing to pursue Chinese interests more vigorously than in the past. First, China and Russia could not be persuaded to implement UN sanctions on North Korea and their open backing gave Pyongyang the courage to conduct another nuclear test. The next year, when North Korea sunk the South Korean corvette Cheonan, Beijing stuck to its suborn support of the North. This proved to be the best glue for the South Korean-American alliance, strongly reinforcing their military cooperation.

China began to question the dollar-based monetary system immediately after the crisis. China, on a global and a regional scale, tried to advocate a multi-currency basket as abstract reference. In an effort to diversify its monetary reserves, China invested heavily in other Asian currencies, commodities and stocks, pushing up prices and leading to inner-Asian disputes about exchange rates and currency reserves. Strengthening China in the IMF was not avertible, but done largely at the expense of Europe, not the U.S. China took over from Japan the leading role in the Asian Development Bank, further reinforcing its economic dominance of the region. In 2010 the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect, making China the production hub of the region. Many South-East Asian firms produced parts for Chinese TNKs, depending on Chinese exports to the West. Singapore and South Korea boomed as shipping and financing hubs of this kind of business. This made it increasingly difficult for Asian states, even Allies of the U.S., to confront China in trade and currency affairs, which were intensively disputed between Beijing and Washington. On the other hand, the Chinese economic domination of the region reinforced precaution and reservations towards Beijing.

Most dramatically, China reasserted its territorial claims and maritime boundaries on the expense of other countries. First, China claimed that the U.S. Navy were forbidden to enter the Chinese EEZ. Several harassment and close trailing incidents followed. In response, Hilary

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1004 Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009”, p. 22;
1005 Ibid., p. 7;
1006 Ibid., p. 20.
1008 IMF Approves China as Third-Biggest Power, Weakening Influence of Europe, Bloomberg Online, 23 October 2010;
1009 Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009”, p. 20;
1012 Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009”, p. 21;
Clinton strongly advocated the freedom of the seas at the ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Hanoi\textsuperscript{1013} and, indeed, a clear reassurance about American determination was needed. China started to step up its claims for the East China Sea\textsuperscript{1014} and in 2010 challenged Japan’s ownership of Okinawa and the Ryuku Islands.\textsuperscript{1015} When the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel was detained after ramming a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the Senkaku Islands, China reacted harshly, even imposing sanctions on Japan.\textsuperscript{1016} Not surprisingly, the Japanese government reverted its scepticism about the U.S. military presence in Japan and increased defence cooperation.\textsuperscript{1017} On the Indian border, China, disregarding ongoing negotiations with India,\textsuperscript{1018} closed the border for residents with Indian citizenship and started to reinforce its military infrastructure in the region.\textsuperscript{1019} China ceased the multilateral negotiations about the maritime borders with the ASEAN countries and started to enforce its claims by aggressively patrolling with fishery protection and maritime vessels.\textsuperscript{1020} Not surprisingly, those states sought closer relationships with the United States and tried to increase defence ties.\textsuperscript{1021} On the occasion of a visit to Indonesia in 2010, Obama re-opened military cooperation that had been suspended in 1999.\textsuperscript{1022} Vietnam reopened Cam Ranh Bay, the primary U.S. port to supply South Vietnam in the 60s and 70s, to foreign navies, including the U.S.\textsuperscript{1023} Cooperation with Australia and New Zealand was deepened and, by opening a small marine garrisons in Port Darwin, the first permanent U.S. military presence was re-established since the Pacific War.\textsuperscript{1024} “In sum, geopolitical irritants around China’s extensive rim are becoming a bonus to American diplomacy, whose relations with China are stalled and which has found difficulty in moving ahead than the preceding Bush administration.”\textsuperscript{1025}

The biggest success so far of the U.S. foreign policy seemed to be Burma. After decades of isolation and sanctions, the United States, by implementing a new engagement policy,\textsuperscript{1026} incited a new will for reform in President Thien Sein. Elections, although still not entirely open

\textsuperscript{1013}Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2010”, p. 13;
\textsuperscript{1014}Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009”, p. 21;
\textsuperscript{1015}Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2010”, p. 14;
\textsuperscript{1016}Ibid., p. 13-14;
\textsuperscript{1017}Ibid., p. 14;
\textsuperscript{1019}Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2010”, p. 12;
\textsuperscript{1020}Ibid., p. 12;
\textsuperscript{1021}Douglas Paal, “The United states in Asia in 2011”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 1, January/February 2012, 6-14, p. 8-9;
\textsuperscript{1022}Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2010”, p. 15;
\textsuperscript{1024}Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay Opens for Overseas Business, Defense News, 08 November 2010, p. 22;
\textsuperscript{1025}First U.S. Marines Arrive in Australian City of Darwin, New York Times Online, 04 April 2012;
\textsuperscript{1026}Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2010”, p. 15;
\textsuperscript{250}
and fair, were held with the participation of opposition candidates, political detainees were freed and a reform process was initiated.\textsuperscript{1027} The notice that Burma sought to escape Chinese economic and also political dominance was duly noticed in Washington.\textsuperscript{1028}

But the United States did more than exploiting the Chinese assertiveness. Following the various incidents in the waters sounding China, Obama sent a series of delegations to Beijing, trying to convince China to moderate its behaviour and preparing numerous high-ranking visits.\textsuperscript{1029} The most significant visit was a longer trip by the designated Chinese chairmen of the CPC, Xi Jinping, providing the opportunity to talk through the various issues before direct domestic pressure would be exerted on him.\textsuperscript{1030} Whether the visit influenced Xi Jinping thoughts about the West may be debated. But it showed the awareness of the U.S. administration for Asian affairs and its commitment to engage China on regional as well as global issues.

To counter the Chinese economic dominance, Obama succeeded in setting up the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement between the United States, South Korea, Brunei, Peru, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. Japan joined later.\textsuperscript{1031} China was not a party to the agreement, but offered to join if it would fulfil the requirements regarding monetary policies, intellectual property rights, etc.\textsuperscript{1032} This was a clear challenge to Chinese dominance and practices. And, regarding the dynamics unfolding in the ASEAN+China FTA, it was a well-placed counter-move to prevent the exclusion of the United States from the Western-Pacific economic sphere.

5.3.2. The US policy towards the Middle East

The Middle East is not only one of the trickiest regions for any policy maker, it also touches upon almost any domain of foreign policy: questions of political geography (Israel-Palestinians, maritime boundaries in the Persian Gulf, multiple border conflicts), the military structure (especially WMD proliferation, regional arms race), power structures (directly in the form of rivalries among Iran, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia for regional leadership and indirectly by internal conflicts about regimes, ruling elites and their alignment) and transnational interaction


\textsuperscript{1028} This regards especially the construction of a dam in northern Burma, constructed by Chinese enterprises, which would have produced electricity for the Chinese market first. But there were many other cases of Chinese economic penetration. Compare: Paal, “The United States in Asia in 2011”, p. 10-11;

\textsuperscript{1029} Ibid., p. 7;

\textsuperscript{1030} Ibid., p. 8;

\textsuperscript{1031} Ibid., p. 13;

\textsuperscript{1032} Lowell Dittmer, “Asia in 2011”, in: \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. 51, No. 1, January/February 2011, 1-5, p. 2;
are to be addressed. All these issues could be influenced from abroad, hence, the region can be debated endlessly. However, from the policy perspective, the issue can be split further: the non-proliferation issue is a policy of its own and will be discussed further below. Also the Arab Spring, the Libyan and the Syrian civil wars were hardly foreseeable, and were a test as to how the administrations could or would adapt to such unforeseen events. So this chapter will particularly focus on the classical Arab-Israeli conflict and the policies as intended by the Obama administration.

It has been mentioned already that Obama’s term started in a very turbulent phase of crisis management and muddling through, resulting in pragmatic case by case problem solving. The Middle East was no exception to this rule. In December 2008, Israel decided to strike against Hamas in the Gaza strip, after Palestinian activists had bombarded Israel with self-made rockets the month before. What was intended as retaliatory air strikes in the beginning, escalated in a more extensive ground offensive by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) into the Gaza strip. Israel’s goal was to politically and militarily weaken Hamas and destroy as much military infrastructure as possible. Rated as successful from a military perspective, the campaign turned out to be a PR disaster for Israel, under mounting criticism about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Especially in the UN, where Arab states pushed for a tougher stand on Israel, the war left a strained relationship between the two for years to come. Moreover, the war and the subsequent political struggle to legitimise what was seen as self defence in Israel contributed to a shift to the right in the political landscape and facilitated the formation of the second Netanyahu government in a coalition, including some very right-winged parties.

It would be this government that determined much of the policies – or non-policies – to come. In short, the situation was not comfortable. Despite this, Obama chose to deliver two addresses, in Istanbul and in Cairo, about the Middle East and the Western relations with the Muslim world. These speeches were in sharp contrast to the reality, therefore, they were

1033 IDF recommends major, but brief Gaza ground offensive, Haaretz Online, 2 January 2009; Israel decides to push on with Gaza op until ‘all goals reached’, Haaretz online, 2 January 2009;
1034 Shin Bet: Hamas has been hit by IAF’s Gaza offensive like never before, Haaretz Online, 31 December 2008;
1035 Clashes resume in Gaza City after 3-hour humanitarian truce, Haaretz Online, 7 January 2009; Disparan cohetes desde Libano sobre Israel, que responde de inmediato con misiles, La Vanguardia Digital, 8 January 2009;
1039 Egypt to Be Center Stage in Obama’s Address to Arabs, New York Times Online, 11 May 2009;
thought to be either visionary or naïve – depending on the ideological background of the commentator.\textsuperscript{1040} In short, Obama promised American support first for a Middle East peace accord, second to democratic reforms in the Arab world and third a peaceful solution of the pending conflicts in the region.\textsuperscript{1041} While at that time the first point caused much attention, it was the second one – even if unintended – that bore any strategic relevance. The Obama speech indeed broke with the Bush administration’s approach to the Middle East. While Bush wanted to address the parties from a position of strength after the most imminent security issues in the neighbourhood had been resolved and since he had the coercive power and credibility to force the parties towards an accord, if necessary, Obama tried to engage them rather directly, but not forcefully. In his view, Israel was the stronger side and, therefore, entitled to act first. Later, step by step, the conditions for an accord should be created. While Bush saw Israel’s fears driven by the insecurity of its environment, Obama saw Israel driving the security situation of its neighbourhood. By placing such an emphasis on an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, the administration put itself under a certain pressure. What if they did or could not deliver anything to the Palestinians? How would the Arab elites that were allied to the United States perceive such a standstill? And how would they be evaluated internally if their big ally promised so much, but delivered so little? While Obama’s speeches for sure pleased the Arabs in the street, one has to question what the Arab street ever decided or decisively influenced? As indicated before, Obama saw Israel as the party holding the initiative in the peace process. As the stronger power, Israeli reconciliation with the Palestinians had to come first. As the Palestinians demanded a stop to Israeli settlements as a precondition for talks and pointing out the shrinking of land for their use as the most immediate sorrow, the U.S. picked up the demand for a settlement freeze.\textsuperscript{1042} But this was as far as they could get. While Abbas’ government was submitted to increasing pressure from the street and the Palestinian youth, which were ready to escalate the conflict,\textsuperscript{1043} Netanjahu felt that Israel’s position could not afford retraction.\textsuperscript{1044} Thus, the negotiations basically faded without any results. The blame for this varies. There are some indications that the team around Abbas, fearing to phase out without any progress, was more willing to make concessions than previous Palestinian leaderships.\textsuperscript{1045}

\textsuperscript{1040} Varying Responses to Speech in Mideast Highlight Divisions, New York Times Online, 4 June 2009; 
\textsuperscript{1042} Israel and U.S. Can’t Close Split on Settlements, New York Times Online, 1 June 2009; Diplomatischer Zweifrontenkrieg Obamas, Die Presse Online, 19 May 2009; 
\textsuperscript{1043} Palestinians and Israelis Clash at Jerusalem Holy Site, New York Times Online, 27 September 2009; 
\textsuperscript{1044} Painful Mideast Truth: Force Trumps Diplomacy, New York Times Online, 19 October 2009; 
\textsuperscript{1045} Wall Street Journal: Palestinians make surprisingly large land offer to Israel, Palestinians deny claims that
In Israel, however, Lieberman found it difficult to make any kind of concession.\footnote{1046 Schwelende Koalitionskrise in Israel, Entfremdung zwischen Ministerpräsident Netanyahu und Außenminister Lieberman, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 July 2010; Netanyahu Says Some Settlements to Stay in Israel, New York Times Online, 24 January 2010; Abbas stellt Bedingungen für direkte Gespräche mit Israel, Noch eine Woche bis zum Treffen mit Obama und Netanyahu, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 27 June 2010; Jerusalem master plan: Expansion of Jewish enclaves across the city, The Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee is set to approve a master plan that calls for the expansion of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, Haaretz Online, 28 June 2010; Netanyahu und Abbas versprechen Kriegsfähigkeit in Washington, Obama «vorsichtig optimistisch, aber optimistisch» vor Nahost-Gesprächen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 September 2010; Abbas und Netanyahu Auge in Auge, Direkte Gespräche zur Beilegung des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 September 2010; Lieberman läßt Frieden für unmöglich, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online, 6 September 2010; Netanyahu Responds icily to Obama Remarks, New York Times Online, 19 May 2011; Das war einzig und allein der Wille der Amerikaner», Was die Nahost-Friedensgespräche so schwierig macht. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 8 September 2010; See: Polat, "Die Türkei unter Erdoğan", p. 22-43;} But despite various rounds of negotiations, no progress on borders, settlements or other timelines could be achieved.\footnote{1047} At the end, both agreed that the negotiations were held for the sake of the U.S. administration only.\footnote{1048}

But at that time – September 2010 – other events had long taken away the dynamics from the American foreign policy. Turkey, in which an ambitious Islamist prime minister succeeded in pushing the old Kemalist elites out of power,\footnote{1049} tried to advance the cause of regional leadership through confronting Israel. In late 2009 Erdoğan, on a trip to Lebanon and Syria, promised both countries political support and the perspective of integration, not specifying of course what that meant.\footnote{1050} He also reached out to Iran, unsuccessfully trying to negotiate the nuclear issue, much to the discomfort of the United States.\footnote{1051} Confronting Israel was an essential part of Erdoğan’s scheme. Only by doing so, he could win over the Arab world, of which he hoped to be the leader.\footnote{1052} The stopping of a fleet of Islamist activists, which left Turkey for Gaza, by the Israeli Navy, presented Erdoğan the opportunity to lash out against Israel and break all ties with the state that made Turkey suspicious to their southern neighbours.\footnote{1053} While the European protests were directed at the situation in Gaza itself,\footnote{1054} Erdoğan

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\footnote{1046 Schwelende Koalitionskrise in Israel, Entfremdung zwischen Ministerpräsident Netanyahu und Außenminister Lieberman, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 July 2010;} \footnote{1047} Netanyahu Says Some Settlements to Stay in Israel, New York Times Online, 24 January 2010; Abbas stellt Bedingungen für direkte Gespräche mit Israel, Noch eine Woche bis zum Treffen mit Obama und Netanyahu, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 27 June 2010; Jerusalem master plan: Expansion of Jewish enclaves across the city, The Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee is set to approve a master plan that calls for the expansion of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, Haaretz Online, 28 June 2010; Netanyahu und Abbas versprechen Kriegsfähigkeit in Washington, Obama «vorsichtig optimistisch, aber optimistisch» vor Nahost-Gesprächen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 September 2010; Abbas und Netanyahu Auge in Auge, Direkte Gespräche zur Beilegung des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 September 2010; Lieberman läßt Frieden für unmöglich, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online, 6 September 2010; Netanyahu Responds icily to Obama Remarks, New York Times Online, 19 May 2011; Das war einzig und allein der Wille der Amerikaner», Was die Nahost-Friedensgespräche so schwierig macht. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 8 September 2010; 
\footnote{1048 See: Polat, "Die Türkei unter Erdoğan", p. 22-43;}
\footnote{1050} Analysis: Turkey's Iran standoff role irks allies, Mainichi Daily News Online, 26 May 2010; Iran Dispute Strains U.S.-Turkish Ties, Defense News, 4 October 2010, p. 15; 
\footnote{1051} See: Eugene Kogan, "Is Turkey torn between the European Union and the Middle East?" in: zur Außen- und Innenpolitik der Türkei, Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik Wien, Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Reihe Studien, Vienna, November 2010, p. 11-21; 
\footnote{1052 Isreal Navy commandos: Gaza flotilla activists tried to Lynch us, Nine activists on board Gaza-bound flotilla killed in violent clashes when Israel Navy commandos boarded ships; 7 commandos hurt, 2 seriously, Haaretz Online, 31 May 2010; Türkischer Luftraum laut Bericht für Israel gesperrt, Reaktion auf Militäraktion gegen Gaza-Hilfsflotte, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 28 June 2010; 
\footnote{1053} Die EU drängt auf Lockerung der Blockade des Gazastreifens, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 15 June 2010; 
\footnote{1054} Erdogan

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exploited the situation to gain prestige in the region.\textsuperscript{1055} This emerging sympathy between Turkey, Syria and Iran was not only problematic for Israel, it was a direct challenge to Obama’s vision laid down in his Cairo speech. The notion of the clash of civilisations, denounced by Obama was quickly picked up by Erdoğan to legitimise his policies. Indeed, Erdoğan, until 2011, perceived world politics from an ‘huntingtonian’ world view.\textsuperscript{1056} This also meant that Ankara had to be crossed out of any plans for deterring or counterbalancing Iran, negotiating between Syria and Israel or being a bridge between the West and the Arab world, the reason why he endorsed the Turkish membership to the EU.

Erdoğan used his new-found popularity to further push for disputed religious laws at home,\textsuperscript{1057} delay its EU accession process\textsuperscript{1058} and to reach out to Lebanon. In a visit to Beirut, he implicitly promised (military?) assistance to Lebanon in the case of an Israeli attack.\textsuperscript{1059} The political rhetoric described a Turkey that detached itself from the West to become an independent leader of the Sunni Middle East. And this rhetoric was increasingly backed by facts: in the arms industry, Turkey sought technology and transfer, ultimately self-reliance.\textsuperscript{1060} In cooperation with Russia, Turkey set up an ambitious nuclear energy programme.\textsuperscript{1061} The question was, why did Turkey not turn to the West for much of its nuclear energy and tried to diversify its suppliers of armament technology? And why did it rely on non-Western partners for critical developments, such as Brazil for aircraft and South Korea for land vehicles? The Turkish behaviour makes sense if the political-strategic and, in the long term, even the military independence of Turkey is the driving force. In that sense, warnings about the strategic reliability

\textsuperscript{1055} Neue Front gegen Israel, Syrien und die Türkei wollen Ende der Gaza-Abschottung erzwingen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 20 July 2010; Irans Abgeordnete wollen Vergeltungsmassnahmen, Parlament billigt Gesetz gegen Fracht-Inspektionen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 20 July 2010;
\textsuperscript{1056} Sonar Cagaptay, Why Turkey will emerge as leader of the Muslim world, The AKP is setting the stage for a recalibration of Turkey’s global compass, Haaretz Online, 24 November 2010;
\textsuperscript{1057} Kopftuch-Streit in der Türkei flammt wieder auf, Harsche Kritik der Opposition, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 12 November 2010;
\textsuperscript{1058} Die Türkei verliert den Glauben an die EU, Ministerpräsident Erdogan kritisiert Brüssel Hinalletpolitik – der Konflikt um Zypern als grösster Zankapfel, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 November 2010;
\textsuperscript{1059} “Turkey won’t be silent if Israel attacks Lebanon, Gaza”. In Beirut, Erdogan says Israel cannot "enter Lebanon with the most modern aircraft and tanks to kill women and children.", The Jerusalem Post Online, 25 November 2010;
\textsuperscript{1060} This self-reliance incorporated almost every kind of armament: from handguns to UAVs, from MBTs to warships, missiles, munition, aircraft, sensors, etc. See: Turkey seeks Greater Procurement Self-Sufficiency, Defense News, 8 November 2010, p. 21; Their Goal: Self Sufficiency, Local Yards Aim To Build All Turkish Navy Ships, Defense News, 12 July 2010, p. 24; Turkey Expands Unmanned Efforts, Defense News, 7 June 2010; Indigenous Tank Top Priority for Turkish Army, Defense News, 19 April 2010, p. 19-20; Turkey Has Lofty Ambitions for Indigenous Aircraft, Defense News, 12 April 2010, p. 18;
\textsuperscript{1061} See: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East, In the shadow of Iran, IISS Strategic Dossier, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 65ff; Russia to build nuclear power plant in Turkey, Ria Novosti Online, 8 June 2010;
of Turkey were not empty.\footnote{Why Turkey will emerge as leader of the Muslim world, The AKP is setting the stage for a total recalibration of Turkey’s global compass, Haaretz Online, 24 November 2010;} When Erdoğan announced the development of medium-range ballistic missiles in Turkey in 2011,\footnote{Erdogan cites Iran for Turkish Missile Program, Defense News Online, 30 October 2011; Turkey Aims for Blend of Missile Defense and Deterrence, Defense News, 5. August 2013, p. 10;} the Turkish quest for strategic independence – including on the long run nuclear deterrence – was obvious. However, the United States did not react so far to this challenge.

The other big issue was Iran. The nuclear issue will be discussed below. Beside proliferation, Iran, in the eyes of the United States, emerged as the most capable challenger of the status quo in the Middle East. In Iraq, its political and military influence was long felt, especially in the support of radical Shi’ite fractions. In Afghanistan, Iran started to boost its support for Shi’ite insurgents to put more pressure on the United States to leave.\footnote{Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2010”, p. 17;} Via the Syrian government, Iran supported Hizbullah in Lebanon. The close cooperation and coordination had been suspected for a long time and finally exposed by leaked Wikileaks cables.\footnote{WikiLeaks cable exposes Iran hand in Hezbollah communication network, classified document dispatched by U.S. charge d’affaires reflects anti-Hezbollah sentiment that Iran was ‘taking over’ Lebanon by funding its fiber optic system, Haaretz Online, 6 December 2010;} If backed by nuclear weapons, Iran could use this political influence and transnational ties in a much more offensive manner. This again caused concerns among the neighbours, Israel and states close to the U.S. in the region.\footnote{Störfeuer aus Teheran, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online, 8 September 2010; Mubarak kritisiert Iran, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online, 6 December 2010;} Sorrows rose especially after the U.S. decided to leave Iraq and when Iran tried to mount military and political pressure on the new state.\footnote{Iran conducts secretive military exercise near the Iraqi border, Haaretz Online, 13 December 2010;} In an attempt to quell the regional concerns, the United States again moved closer to Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf States,\footnote{Cash Flow to Terrorists Evades U.S. Efforts, New York Times Online, 5 December 2010;} despite their more than doubtful role in financing terrorist and Islamist organisations around the globe.\footnote{See: Peter Rudolf, Sascha Lohmann, Amerikanische Iran-Politik unter Barack Obama, SWP-Studie, Berlin, August 2011, p. 23-30;}

Solving the issues related to Iran was not easy, especially as long as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were ongoing. Options ranged from sanctions to military strikes – at least against nuclear facilities.\footnote{Die USA vor ihrem bisher grössten Rüstungsdeal, Saudiarabien will US-Kriegsgerät im Wert von 60 Milliarden Dollar erwerben, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 13 September 2010;}

The problem with the escalatory scenarios was that, beside the danger that Iran might escalate Iraq and Afghanistan, the chaos and sectarian civil war in Iraq was one of the biggest boosts to the Iranian principalists, a coalition of conservative elites and the
radical religious proletariat, denouncing democracy and pluralism as the path towards anarchy. If a full invasion of Iran was not an option, would limited strikes strengthen the regime by presenting it the external enemy it constantly talked about?

Then again, as described in the non-proliferation chapter, it was unlikely that the nuclear issue and the issues concerning the regional order would or could be resolved with the current regime. But was there a chance for regime change? After the presidential elections of 12 June 2009, which saw Ahmadinejad remaining in power with the help of massive election fraud, angry street protests erupted, not quieting for months to come. Although regime change was not among the demands of the protesters, regime reform definitely was. And with the increasing amount of violence that was used to crack down on the protest movement, the Iranian regime toppled into a crisis of legitimacy.

Could the United States have exploited this situation? Why did the Iranian Green Movement not end up in the first incident of regime change in the Middle East? It is hard to judge this from today’s perspective, as many facts are not yet available. To keep up internal pressure by tightening sanctions on Tehran is a conclusive policy, especially when targeting those organisations that were primarily responsible for regime survival, i.e. the revolutionary guards. However, the impact of sanctions on internal political dynamics is not very predictable, and it might take decades for positive effects to materialise.

In the meantime, strengthening those states perceived as allies was all that was left for the United States. Then, in December 2010, the region and some key U.S. allies fell into a period of trouble and change that precluded anything close to longer-term policies.

5.3.3. The United States and Europe

Starting with the American involvement in World War One, decades of U.S. foreign policy were shaped by how the United States would act in or for Europe. This close attention to the old continent was abandoned after the new millennium, first for the Middle East, later for

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1071 See: Walter Posch, _Ahmedineschal und die Prinzipsalisten. Iran’s politische Rechte und die Perspektiven für einen neuen Elitenkompromiss_, SWP-Studie, Berlin, Dezember 2011, p. 12-17;
1072 See also: Anzari, _Iran under Achmedinejad_, p. 58ff;
1073 See: Walter Posch, _A Last Chance for Iran’s Reformists? The „Green Struggle“ Reconsidered_, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2010;
1074 Posch, _Ahmedineschal und die Prinzipsalisten_, p. 18ff;
1075 And given the fact that by boosting the economic role of the revolutionary guards and right-wing foundation, the Iranian regime tried to economically satisfy the camp of the „Hezb Allahis“, the radical-religious lower classes. See: Ibid., p. 12ff;
Asia. NATO enlargement 2004 was indeed the last big project that caught the full attention of the U.S. government. In the first years of the Obama administration, reducing the American footprint in the Middle East was the priority; later it became Asia. Europe was not thought to be a region that demanded the U.S. to act upon. But the Libyan civil war and the constant Euro crisis demanded more action than previously expected.

Like North America, Europe was affected by the credit crisis that was slowly growing into an economic crisis. Initially, only states with strong involvement in the American banking sector, like Ireland, or financially weak countries, like Greece, were troubled. And, moreover, Europe seemed able to deal with the crisis by itself. There was hope of strength in the core – Germany and France – as Merkel was re-elected in 2009 and the German economy seemed to grow again. (However these hopes were short-lived). The first sign of retreat from Europe were changes in the American missile defence programme, ordered in September 2009. Although the Obama administration said the new SM-3 architecture would be a better defence for Europe, an architecture based on such a small interceptor was either useless or demanded a considerable European contribution. In fact, no longer the U.S. would take on the burden of defending Europe without Europe contributing its share. The retreat from Europe was about to begin.

But the political dimensions of the financial crisis were getting visible throughout 2009/10. Europe was not only weakening financially, it lost political and social attractiveness and influence as well. First, the EU’s Eastern Partnership had a rough start and suffered from a very low budget. Months before, the EU declined to help the reformist Ukrainian government, battling both financial and economic sorrows during the crisis. American efforts to transform, democratise and stabilise the states east of the NATO/EU umbrella, especially concerning a possible Ukrainian and Georgian membership, met with sharp criticism by Russia and

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1077 See: Seal of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 11ff;
1078 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, p. 2;
1080 Hopes concerning this were placed on France and Germany in Particular. See: Sarkozy and Merkel Try to Shape European Unity, New York Times Online, 30 March 2009;
1083 See: Gressel, "Strategische Überlegungen zur amerikanischen Raketenabwehr", p. 20-21;
1084 EU-Aufienpolitik: Fehlstart für Ostpartnerschaft, Die Presse Online, 7 May 2009;
1085 Werbung für Osteuropa-Paket: Lopatka in Brüssel abgeblitzt, Die Presse Online, 10 February 2009;
pro-Russian states in Europe. A stable neighbourhood was considered more urgent to
Europe than the United States, therefore, Europe should take over this task. It was not willing
or able to do so, hence, the states in the East, especially Ukraine, found themselves in a stra-
tegic limbo for the years to come.

But Europe was not only weak in the periphery, the instability soon reached the very core. In
Hungary, a new conservative government started to redraw the constitution and was engaged
in reforms that frequently endangered democratic principles. Economic and political concerns made the formation of governments difficult for Belgium, Finland, and later also Italy and Greece. The expansion of NATO and the EU, although the latter could hardly be supported, was a key policy for the previous two American administrations. It was aimed at stabilising the transformation and democratisation initiated after the end of the Cold War. Did this policy fail due to the economic crisis? And what could the American administration do about it?

Although Europe and the United States were interested in overcoming the crisis, there were
many conflicting demands and interests involved that turned policy-making difficult.
European governments, especially those in favour of austerity policies, demanded a stricter
regulation of the international financial markets to diminish the short-term effects of speculat-
ive financial transactions. This was quite impossible for the U.S. to fulfil on the domestic
level, especially since the Democrats lost the majority on Capitol Hill. On the other hand,
Obama demanded a relaxation of the deficit rules, to allow European states to use financial
assets to re-start the economy – much like he introduced stimulus packages in the United

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1088 Justizreform: EU-Schelte für Rumänien und Bulgarien, Die Presse Online, 23 March 2010;
1090 „Wahre Finnen“ triumphieren, Deutscher Rechtsruck bei der Parlamentswahl in Finnland, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 April 2011; Finnische Parteien einigen sich auf Koalitionsregierung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 17 June 2011;
1091 Italienische Regierungskrise vorerst vertagt, Misstrauensvotum gegen einen Unterstaatssekretär von Berlusconi gescheitert, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 August 2010;
1092 Bestätigung für griechischen Reformkurs, Papandreou will nach Erfolg bei Wahlen nun offenbar doch bis 2013 regieren, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 15 November 2010; Ultimatum an Berlusconi, Die Lega Nord geht auf Distanz, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 June 2011;
1093 Obama sagt Unterstützung gegen Spekulanten zu, Griechischer Ministerpräsident Papandreou bittet Washington um Hilfe, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 10 March 2010;
1094 US-Demokraten kippen die Bankensteuer, Zugeständniss an die Republikaner, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 30 June 2010;
States. This again was declined by the European Commission and Germany, which were concerned about inflation and the credibility of the European financial framework.

Lacking agreement over how to deal with the crisis, the United States could only watch the internal debate on the situation in Greece and the reform of the European monetary system. The Americans, especially the Democrats, were displeased with the role Germany played in this regard. In their opinion, the restrictive financial politics that were imposed on the Euro countries would drive Europe into a “suicide by austerity”. In doing so, the American democrats totally misread the European financial crisis, even by Keynesian standards. The large deficits of Greece, Spain, Italy and others, with the notable exception of Ireland, were not primarily caused by the crisis, but by structural overspending even in prosperous times. The crisis only increased the lending costs caused by this behaviour. But anti-cyclic spending would not do any difference, because these were not cyclic but structural debts! It may be speculated if the US-German disagreement reinforced the German scepticism of America and its proximity to Russia or whether the ‘revisiting of Rapallo’ would have happened nonetheless.

There was another important shift in American policy that went almost unnoticed: while in the previous decades, NATO was at centre of the American policy regarding Europe – besides bilateral relationships, such as the one with the United Kingdom – and the EU was disregarded as a rather regional organisation without strategic significance, it became clear that now it was the Union’s task to solve the most urgent and important economic questions. Since the debate about the second Greek bailout, and in preparation of the G-20 Summit in Cannes, intense contacts of American financial and economic officials with their European counterparts were recorded, and the U.S. threw in their weight to persuade sceptical European governments.

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1095 Obamas Konjunkturhilfe erntet harsche Kritik, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 8 September 2010; Victory Brings Risk of Conflict With Merkel’s Allies, New York Times Online, 27 September 2009;
1096 EU-Kommission will Stabilitätspakt verschärfen, Die Presse Online, 13 April 2010; Europa muss sparen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 June 2010;
1098 Allin, Jones, Weary Policeman, p. 189;
1100 See: Carmen Reinhard, Kenneth Rogoff, This Time It's Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 17451, September 2009;
of the European rescue packages.\textsuperscript{1102}

This shift had its logic at least for the medium-term policy: as pointed out in the scheme, maintaining internal power is the key priority for any political elite. And given the dependence of the American recovery on the blessing of the European market\textsuperscript{1103} – and most importantly Obama’s dependence on the economy’s recovery for re-election – the priority of the economic policy over possible security concerns was understandable. Furthermore, as economic sanctions were the preferred tool to contain Iran, their implementation within the Union mattered most.\textsuperscript{1104}

But also America’s reliance on its allies within Europe shifted. The change in the missile defence architecture and the ceasing to put a further NATO enlargement or the security situation east of the NATO/EU boundaries on the agenda was a clear sign, that the ‘new Europe’ had fallen out of top priority. More remarkably, the traditionally cordial relationship with the United Kingdom cooled somewhat down to a more formal relationship, especially as Britain was starting to isolate itself within the European Union in the wake of the financial crisis.\textsuperscript{1105}

With the economy in severe trouble\textsuperscript{1106} and being politically isolated in the institution that mattered for the moment, Britain was of little use for Washington.

The opposite was true for France. After the bitter exchanges over Iraq, relations became better even under Bush, especially in the wake of the Hariri crisis in Lebanon. The French determination in Libya, although it revealed serious capability gaps in the European allies, proved France’s military determination.\textsuperscript{1107} The same was true for the Iran issue, where Sarkozy sometimes had a much tougher stand than Obama.\textsuperscript{1108} Economically, Hollande and Sarkozy were more in favour of stimulus packages than, for example, Germany, although Hollande did with a much stronger impetus.\textsuperscript{1109} To the United States, or at least Obama, those stimulus

\textsuperscript{1102} USA machen Druck auf die Skeptiker der Euro-Rettung, Die Presse Online, 14 September 2011;
\textsuperscript{1104} Obama Finds Oil in Markets Is Sufficient to Sideline Iran, New York Times Online, 30 March 2012;
\textsuperscript{1106} Double-Dip Recession in Britain, New York Times Online, 25 April 2012;
\textsuperscript{1107} Libyan War Goes a Long Way to Improve the Pentagon’s Views of France as an Ally, New York Times Online, 26 August 2011;
\textsuperscript{1108} This Time, the Hawks Are French, New York Times Online, 12 October 2009; The American in Paris, New York Times Online, 6 May 2012;
\textsuperscript{1109} President of France to Open New Term by Getting to Know a Neighbor Better, New York Times Online, 14 May 2012; Those Revolting Europeans, New York Times Online, 6 May 2012; France to Press Germany on Euro Bonds and Other Economic Measures, New York Times Online, 21 May 2012;
measures would bring the desired recovery. In the United States, he himself pushed for
growth through debts. Rescuing the single export market even at the risk of inflation and
increased sovereign debt was the goal of America’s policies in Europe. While the European Union enjoyed considerable attention from American politics, NATO, the
former cornerstone of the American politics towards the old continent, lost it. With the emerg-
ing Pacific focus of the U.S. grand strategy after 2010, the United States decided unilaterally
to withdraw all troops but one brigade from Europe. The decision caused many European
capitals to question American support of the transatlantic alliance. Indeed, after the planned
withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014, there would be no direct American interest to be
served by the Alliance. And with the European defence capabilities shrinking, it would be
doubtful if those states could play a future role in a possible American-Chinese confrontation.
After 2014 missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons would be the only topics for a struc-
tural dialogue on security matters within NATO between the United States and their European
allies. There might be contingencies where NATO again were needed – like Libya. But in
Libya the organisation was tasked with leading the mission after intervention had been de-
cided between Paris and London and was initially led by the U.S., and in Mali the support of
the French intervention was consulted bilaterally.

While the American rationale of relying on and assisting France stabilising Europe’s southern
frontier, the situation was different in the East of Europe. During the financial crisis, the de-
fence-budgets of all CEE-countries but Poland shrunk dramatically, weakening not only
Europe’s defensive capabilities but also reducing the influence of rather pro-American states
on Europe’s security policies. Sofar, the United States did not react to this development.

1110 Growth or Austerity? The Question Isn’t That Simple, New York Times Online, 16 April 2012;
1111 USA machen Druck auf die Skeptiker der Euro-Rettung, Die Presse Online, 14 September 2011;
1112 U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe, New York Times Online, 13 January 2012; Although
by the end of 2012 there were still two brigades left. But they did not field any heavy equipment such as MBT,
suitable for Article 5 operations. See: Adam Grisson, “The United States”, in: Clara Maria O’Donnel (Ed.), The
Involuciation of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members, Analysis Paper, Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C., July 2012, 24-29, p.25-26;
1113 Panetta and Clinton Seek to Reassure Europe on Defense, 4 February 2012; Amerika steht weiter an der Seite
Europas, Bekennnis zum transatlantischen Bündnis an der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, Neue Zürcher
Zeitung Online, 4 February 2012;
1115 Michael Taylor, “Europe’s Strategic Role in the Wake of the Euro-Crisis, The Impact on Central-East
European Defence”, in: Johann Frank, Walter Matyas (Eds.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2013, Chancen und Gren-
zen europäischer Integration, Böhlau, Wien, Köln, Weimar, p. 75-84;
Since the end of the Cold War, the discussion on multipolarity never silenced. Often brought forward rather as an expression of wishful thinking or as a disguise for attempts to counterbalance the United States, those discussions built on the notions that economic and political power was shifting and that, relatively, the predominant position of the United States would fade. However, contrary to the wishful thinking of America’s rivals, especially China and Russia, many of the new centres seemed not to choose counter-balancing from the start and their rise would have regional rather than global implications. Instead of a multipolar world, a pluri-centric one developed, and how the centres were aligned was still open to debate – and to politically influence! For the U.S. it was important to influence the behaviour of these new regional powers in order to manage the regional security and to preclude revisionist tendencies.

As described above, the attempt to re-launch the relationship with Russia was one of the major early attempts of the Obama administration and one of the most predictable failures. The United States offered a re-design in its missile defence architecture, the support of the Russian WTO membership and a new strategic arms reduction treaty, but also expected Russia to cooperate on Afghanistan and Iran as well as Russian acceptance of the American presence in Europe. Russia, in turn, expected America to accept its claims for an exclusive sphere of influence, in which Russia could do as it pleased, and to wholly accept the nature of the Russian regime, which in the mind of the Russian elites also applies to U.S. non-state organisations and their presence in Eastern Europe, which were to Putin all branches of the CIA. Russia did neither cease its hostile rhetoric against the United States, nor did it accept the American presence in Europe, including missile defence (see the respective chapter). Iran continued receiving Russian assistance, as did Syria. Attempts to win over Russia and to cease the Cold War-style rhetoric, which was regarded as the legacy from the Bush era, utterly failed.

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1118 Why the Reset Should Be Reset, New York Times Online, 12 December 2012;
1119 Shevtsova, Lofty Power, p. 282ff;
1121 In Its Unyielding Stance on Syria, Russia Takes Substantial Risks in Middle East, New York Times Online, 8 June 2012; For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old Bonds Run Deep, New York Times Online, 18 February 2012; As Nations Line Up Against Syrian Government, Russia Sides Firmly With Assad, New York Times Online, 27 January 2012;
The only minor success the U.S. reached was the opening of some Russian land routes and airspace for American supplies to Afghanistan, but that meant to some part that the United States depended on a minimum amount of goodwill from Moscow. Especially when relations with Pakistan were severely strained from 2010 onwards, the northern supply route was of critical importance. This situation had severe consequences for American politics with regard to the Russian periphery: there was no drive for any NATO enlargement towards the east, there was no American reaction to Janukowicz's access to power, his rapprochement towards Russia, the dismantling of the political opposition by him and the deteriorating military situation of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia. While American officials denied the existence of a Russia-first policy, the Russian officials rejected claims of spheres of exclusive influence, although the empirical evidence rather supports their existence. The United States regarded Russian concerns over American involvement in the region higher than the quest for security and political independence of the other CIS states. Although the U.S. revised their positive, or naïve, stance towards Russia due to Putin’s re-election and Russian behaviour later on, they never confronted Russia either. On the other hand, for an offshore balancer, the quest for supporting the Ukrainian or the Georgian transformation and independence is more a European than an American task. In the wake of the crisis and hindered by internal divisions and disagreements, Europe failed to deliver.

It is up to speculation, whether a more active U.S. policy towards the CIS – probably not supported by Western Europe – would have made a difference. In any case, the negligence of this region came at a price, but at that time few both in Europe and in Washington were aware that this price was high.

1122 Russia to Open Airspace to U.S. for Afghan War, New York Times Online, 3 July 2009;
1124 Der Preis für Moskaus Hilfe, Der Spiegel Online, 3 April 2009;
1127 There is basically a de-facto-embargo on Georgia by the United States and the EU as all requests for weapons delivery were turned down by them. See: Kogan, Armenia’s and Georgia’s Security Agenda, p. 108;
1129 Despite Kremlin’s Signals, U.S. Ties Remain Strained After Russian Election, New York Times Online, 6 March 2012;
1130 For a then controversial assessment of the danger of a revisionist or even fascist Russia see, Gustav C. Gressel, "Russland und die Türkei als Herausforderung für die europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik", in: Johann Pucher, Johann Frank (Eds.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2010, Das strategische Profil der Europäischen Union, Böhlau, Wien, Köln, Weimar, p.131-151;
Improving ties with India has been an important goal of the Bush administration. India was not only the largest democracy and an important emerging market, it was seen as a possible ally and a counterweight to an increasingly powerful and determined China.\footnote{Rothermund, “The USA and India”, p. 65-74;} Moreover, India supported the stabilisation of the post-Taliban Afghanistan, primarily through financial and economic aid.\footnote{Harsh V. Pant, “The Afghanistan Conflict, India’s Changing Role”, in: Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2011, p. 31-39;} As described, the attempts to improve relations with India culminated in deals on civil nuclear cooperation and arms sales. Obama sought to continue this policy,\footnote{Godement, “The United States and Asia in 2009”, p. 13;} although he added some profound irritants to the American policy regarding India: Obama’s memorandum signed with China in early 2009, giving the latter a role as a responsible power in Asia, while there are still disputes about the Indian-Chinese border, his remarks about ‘global zero’ and his attempts to strengthen arms control and nuclear test ban treaties, which were a challenge to India’s status as a new nuclear power, as well as the new drive for a renewed and stricter carbon emission treaty, which India regarded as unfair and harmful to its economic rise.\footnote{Shalendra Sharma, “India in 2009, Global Financial Crisis and Congress Revival”, in: Asian Security, Vol. 50, No. 1, January/February 2010, 139-156, p. 152-153;} These irritants raised doubts in New Delhi, whether the cordial relations with the U.S. under Bush would continue.\footnote{Ibid., p. 116-120;} Indeed, negotiations about the implementation of the nuclear deal, the cornerstone of Bush’s India policy, would last until late 2010 due to various complications on safeguards, liabilities and the IAEA’s role in supervision and verification.\footnote{Ibid., p. 120-122;}

It took Obama one invitation of Singh to Washington and a trip to India, the promise of supporting India as a possible new UN Security Council member, its introduction into the Nuclear Supplies Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime as well as lucrative arms deals to restore the confidence in the U.S.-Indian ties.\footnote{Dittmer, “Asia in 2010”, p. 1-4;} China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the border disputes with its neighbours,\footnote{Maya Chaddha, “India in 2011, The State Encounters the People”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 1, January/February 2012, 114-129, p. 126-127;} including India, was definitely helpful to the U.S. in this regard, as was the crisis between the U.S. and Pakistan after the killing of Bin Laden on Pakistani soil.\footnote{Ibid., p. 128;} China’s challenge of the legality of INS Airavat’s trip to Vietnam, when it travelled 45 nm off the coast of Vietnam in international waters, made India a strong supporter of U.S. core interests: the free navigation of the sea.\footnote{Ibid., p. 128;}

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States would have a potential ally that would dare to enforce this interest too!

However, beside the diplomatic rhetoric, the U.S.-Indian relations brought upon little tangible cooperation between India and the United States. India never became particularly enthusiastic about putting pressure on Iran (although India became more sceptical of Teheran after 2010), India never was part of any effort to manage regime-transition during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ (although many Indian immigrant-workers in Arab countries suggested a certain strategic interest in the region), and due to the rivalry with Pakistan India’s support for Afghanistan had to be limited to non-military means. However the U.S. foreign-policy community saw the improvements in U.S.-Indian relations as a long-term investment that would materialise beyond short- or medium-term policy gains. Future politicians will have to tell whether the result was worth the effort or not.

While the political relations with India were marked by controversially debated agreements and shaped by acts of power balance on a global scale, the U.S. policy towards other emerging powers remained out of the spotlight. One of them was Brazil.

Indeed, the Bush administration tried to reach out politically to Brazil, especially concerning renewable energies. The relations that resulted were economic, financial and in some cases technological, but lacked political substance. This was for various reasons: the Brazilian preference for South-South ties, scepticism towards a unilateralist United States and the U.S. policy towards Latin America as such was one reason. But also the United States observed regional integration in MERCOSUR and a deeper integration in UNASUR as an attempt to exclude the United States from South-American trade. And most importantly, for a long time after the End of the Cold War, Latin America did not really matter to world politics and, therefore, the U.S. did not pay much attention to the states of the region. Brazil’s claims of reforming the current world (economic) order were long declaratory politics only.

1144 Meyer, Brazil-U.S. Relations, p. 11ff;
The situation changed with the resurrection – better the persistent resurrection – of Latin American socialist revisionism and the escalation of the drug war in Central America. The latter already made the U.S. step up its efforts to support Mexico and Columbia, including the deployment of troops in the latter.\textsuperscript{1145} If destabilisation and criminal organisation would merge with socialist revanchism, the possibility of a lasting and structurally persistent destabilisation of America’s southern border region could arise. So the Obama administration tried to counter these tendencies by promoting more equal ties with the Latin American countries, especially the heavyweight Brazil, and by trying to promote the OAS as a forum of open political consultation with the U.S.\textsuperscript{1146} Reducing distrust and countering anti-American propaganda was the obvious aim of these moves.

Brazil’s growing industrial relationship with the Mideastern countries, which was highlighted by its joint proposal with Turkey on Iran’s nuclear issue,\textsuperscript{1147} was also a matter of concern. While technology transfer to Brazil was not regarded as a risk, it would become one if Brazil re-exported this technology or its products to other countries. However, while concerning India, the United States had a stringent policy, the policy attempts towards Brazil are much more sporadic, casuist and discontinuous. With the further escalation of the drug wars in Mexico over the year of 2012, the United States could be forced to a more conclusive policy on Latin America in the future. This could affect the further relations with Brazil too.

The description of the U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey is difficult to describe as well – not for its lack of substance, but for its complexity and often contradicting facts. In the official diplomatic language, Turkey is described as a long-standing ally, a bridge between East and West, as the role model for a democratic Muslim state with close ties to the West, that would be granted EU membership in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{1148} Yet, reality often is different than it looks like.

Critics of the AKP government pointed out that, while claiming to democratise Turkey, the AKP had used – and abused – its executive powers to permanently drive rivalling elite fractions, i.e. the military, the administrative elites and the Kemalist Western-oriented intellectuals, out of power and to have manipulated the electoral process to its advantage, thereby actually setting up another type of managed democracy.\textsuperscript{1149} Finally, after Erdoğan claimed total

\textsuperscript{1145} U.S. Widens Role in Battle Against Mexican Drug Cartels, New York Times Online, 6 August 2011;
\textsuperscript{1146} Tulchin, A New U.S. Policy Toward Latin America?, p. 2-3;
\textsuperscript{1148} Obama Pushes for Medeast Accord, New York Times Online, 7 April 2009;
\textsuperscript{1149} See: Polat, "Die Türkei unter Erdogan", p. 22-43;
power, breaking the influence of the secular arm within the judiciary, the police, the military, the media and the intelligentsia. Turkey's EU ambitions faded, as Turkey hid behind the Cyprus issue. After the EU accession process did its duty in providing the AKP with a reason to remove the old elites from power, Erdoğan had little interest in bridges to the West. Instead, re-inventing Turkey in the name of a new political, religious and historical concept became the core of Erdoğan's political ideology.

Sorrows about the Islamisation of Turkey were soon reinforced by Turkey's reaction to the Israeli offensive in Gaza and the Marvi-Marmara incident. Excluding Israel from air force manoeuvres and inviting Syria and China instead, pushing for independence in the arms industry, inviting Russia to a nuclear energy programme and, most importantly, shielding Iran's nuclear programme, gave the West an indication on the new, independent Turkish position. Shielding Iran in terms of countering American proposals concerning Iran's nuclear effort or demanding that the NATO missile shield would not be directed against Iran had its own reason: nuclear armament is the precondition for a position of political independence - as well as the role of the leader of the post-Ottoman space - and Turkey needs a reason to peruse it. Iran's nuclear programme will be that reason. Just as Erdoğan argued in December 2011 that Turkey needs to be equal with Iran in terms of ballistic missiles, Turkey will, one day, need to be equal in terms of nuclear armament.

Turkey's ambition in the region was revealed during the 'Arab Spring'. While Erdoğan opposed any NATO intervention in Libya for a long time, because Gaddafi shared not only economic ties with Erdoğan, both had a vision an Islamist future of the wider Middle East in-

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1150 For a good description of the Erdoğan system see also: Dexter Filkins, The Deep State, The New Yorker Online, www.newyorker.com/2012/03/12/120312fa_fact_filkins;
1152 See: Gustav C. Gressel, "Die strategischen Optionen der Türkei", in: Erich Reiter (Hg.), Sicherheitspolitische und strategische Aspekte eines Beitritts der Türkei zur Europäischen Union, LIT-Verlag, Wien, 2006, p. 23-65;
1154 Turkey, China in Exercise, NATO Blanches As Ankara Looks East, Defense News, 18 October 2010, p. 1, p. 8;
1155 Compare: Seufert, Außenpolitik und Selbstverständnis, ;
1158 Erdoğan cites Iran for Turkish missile program, Defence News Online, 30 December 2011;
1159 PM rules out NATO intervention in Libya, Today's Zaman Online, 28 February 2011; Note that today's Zaman is an Islamist newspaper associated with the AKP!; Libya: Turkey's troubles with NATO and no-fly zone, BBC Online, 25 March 2011; No longer Turkey vs. France, this is Erdoğan vs. Sarkozy, Hürriyet Daily News, 14 April 2011;
cluding Europe, but it was very quick in demanding the resignation of Mubarak in Egypt, where Erdoğan hoped to benefit from his closer ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, Turkey would turn into one of the most important supporters of the opposition forces, providing them with safe havens, arms, financial means and training. The presence of hard-core Islamist forces among the Syrian rebels was willingly accepted, although the funding of hard-line Jihadist groups was primarily done by Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf-States.

But if the situation with Turkey was that bad, why did Washington still stick to the old rhetoric as if describing the Kemalist Republic? Did it underestimate the problem? As long as Washington hardly could influence inner-Turkish developments, more confrontation would make things probably worse than they were. And the notion that Turkey drifted away was not ignored entirely, although economic reasons and a disappointment with the West were alleged as being the reasons for it rather than a cultural-ideological re-invention of Turkey. A possible alignment of Turkey with Russia was seen as the primary risk. To counter this development, the United States (both the Republican and the Democratic administrations) tried to push for a Turkish-Armenian normalisation in 2008/09. With Turkey supporting Azerbaijan and Russia Armenia, the deadlock left both as formal rivals, but still influential as long as both could maintain the status quo. If the situation on the Caucasus shifted, without Russia playing a major role in this shift, this would or could render the axis Ankara-Moscow useless. The policy was almost sound, however, it was not successful, as rapprochement did not take place.

Almost sound because it miss-estimated Turkey’s interest based still on the picture of a Turkey of the 90s. Ankara’s core interest was not in the Southern Caucasus any more, it turned to the Middle East. The Obama administration failed to foresee and see this, as it failed to find any answer to it but to blame Europe for having caused this development by not accepting Turkey into the EU.

1160 Turkish PM Erdoğan urges Mubarak to heed Egyptian outcry, Hürriyet Daily News, 1 February 2011;
1161 In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters, New York Times Online, 27 October 2011; Turkish Border Is Crucial Link in Syrian Conflict, New York Times Online, 29 July 2012;
1162 As War Drags On, Jihadists Take Bigger Role, New York Times Online, 29 July 2012;
1165 Migdalovitz, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views, p. 31-37;
1167 Robert Gates said after Turkey’s vote against Sanctions in the UNSC: “...if there’s anything to the notion that Turkey is moving eastward, it is in no small part because it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.... We have to think long and about why these developments in Turkey [are occurring] and what we might be able to do to counter them and make the stronger linkages with the West more apparently of interest and value to Turkey’s leaders.” Likewise, Obama was quoted
The non-proliferation policy, it was supposed, would be at the centre of Obama’s future policy, as he fiercely criticised Bush of having failed in this regard. His initial comments on total nuclear disarmament were sometimes seen as an attempt to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in world politics as such, trying to discourage further proliferation. There was a private elder statesmen initiative calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which Obama quickly tried to exploit for the campaign and which he later confirmed in his Prague speech. Germany used this to call on the U.S. to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons at least from Germany, if not Europe. This came as a shock to defence-minded Eastern European countries since it would dramatically alter Russia’s military options towards Europe. This initiative estranged France, which built its international status to a certain extent on its nuclear assets. The attempts to push for ‘global zero’ stopped quite soon, when a strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia was reached. The delicate debate on tactical nuclear weapons was terminated as well. Ultimately, they posed some tricky questions: the B-61 nuclear weapons – a free-drop dump nuclear weapon – were hardly a modern, useful weapons system. In fact at the time, the French ASMP was the only really useful tactical nuclear weapon in NATO’s arsenal. But who will develop a replacement and who will pay for it? And, as Europe’s defence capabilities were drastically reduced due to the economic crisis, it would increasingly have to rely on tactical nuclear weapons for credible deterrence. But if the system (the B-61) is not credible enough, what did it say about NATO’s effective deterrence?

in an Interview: “democratic confrontation inside Turkey ... is inevitably destined to impact on the way Turkish people see Europe. If they do not feel part of the European family, then obviously they’re going to look elsewhere for alliances and affiliations.” in: Migdalovitz, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views, p. 46;

1168 Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament, p. 9ff;
1169 See for their homepage: http://www.globalzero.org/en/; It is worth noticing that this initiative is a private venture and that, even if some active politicians take part in this initiative, it has not been adopted as an official policy anywhere.
1171 Ridding Germany of U.S. Nuclear Weapons, New York Times Online, 28 October 2009;
1172 Europe Lacks Plan on Nuclear Arms, New York Times Online, 3 May 2010;
1175 It may be noted that Obama during his second term authorised the adaptation of the B-61 physical package to modern precision-guided and extended range standoff kits. If completed, this would make the B-61 a modern weapon system again. However, as mentioned in the introduction, this thesis only covers his first term in office.
Outside Europe, Obama found an international environment that made effective non-proliferation policy quite difficult. The impracticability of military strikes against Iran, as long as the United States was still engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, was already explained. But in 2009, the debate about strikes was put forward by Israel, whose new conservative government felt increasingly cornered by regional isolation, hostile Turkey and hostile Iran. The Obama administration was not overly happy with that.\textsuperscript{1176} Due to the situation explained in 4.1.5, the Obama administration soon chose sanctions as the predominant means to slow down the Iranian nuclear programme. With the missile defence architecture changed and the ‘reset’ policy in place, Obama wanted to overcome resistance in Moscow towards stricter sanctions.\textsuperscript{1177} The mentioned joint communiqué with Hu Jintao, honouring China’s responsible role served for the same proposal. However, it did not quite work out, Russia never agreed to proposed American sanctions.\textsuperscript{1178} The Europeans, especially France, would rather raise the pressure on Iran.\textsuperscript{1179} 

Sanctions per se can only change the opponent’s considerations in the long run. They hardly ever produce immediate results. When sanctions fail, this is usually because they are not adjusted to a changing situation and because the sanctioned regime adapts to the static sanctions in place.\textsuperscript{1180} To distinguish a real policy based on sanctions from sanctions that were just imposed in pretence of having a policy at all, the adjustment of the Iran sanctions have to be evaluated. Because the first response to the sanctions by Iran was policy as usual, that is trying to negotiate to buy some time,\textsuperscript{1181} while expanding the nuclear and missile capabilities during that time.\textsuperscript{1182} 

In 2010 a computer virus accidentally escaped from the Iranian Uranium enrichment facility in Natatz, highlighting the covert cyber-activities of the U.S. secret services to spy on and...
slow down the Iranian nuclear programme. Those programmes, initiated under Bush, were scaled up under Obama and were considered as a vital intelligence tool. However it is hard to judge from outside how detailed the U.S. knowledge about Iranian nuclear activities was by then and how long it would actually take Iran to produce a nuclear warhead.

In July 2011, a series of assassinations took down key personnel of the Iranian nuclear and missile programmes. Whether this was an American or an Israeli campaign is unclear. However, it led to considerable nervousness amongst the Iranian leadership as well as amongst their North Korean supporters and preparations for conflict were detected. This was also the case with the delay of the completion of enrichment plants and, most notably, the missile programme. Shortage of propellant ingredients delayed the production and testing of solid-fuel propelled missiles and the attempt to substitute Chinese ingredients with self-made ones led to an explosion and the destruction of an engine test-site. The United States had touched a nerve, but yet there were no concessions from Iran.

In November 2011 a new IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear programme, clearly pointing out a possible military use of the Iranian programme, made the United States push for tighter sanctions. The sanctions should not only be focused on proliferation and dual-use goods by isolating the Iranian banking sector and cutting off oil exports, the economy as such should be brought to its knees. Having the latent internal instability of Iran in mind, such a downturn of the economic situation could bring about the desired regime change from within – which was necessary to solve the nuclear issue.

But first, the United States would have to win over other states to join them. As usual, Russia

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1183 Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, New York Times Online, 1 June 2012;
1184 Iran Confirms Attack by Virus That Collects Information, New York Times Online, 29 May 2012;
1186 Nordkorea hilft Iran mit Atomprogramm Gefährliche Hilfe aus Pjöngjang, Frankfurter Allgemene Zeitung Online, 23 August 2011;
1188 Atomprogramm Irans in Nöten? Mögliche Folge der Sanktionen, Neue Zücher Zeitung Online, 19 October 2011;
1189 Although China was still delivering supplies to the Iranian missile programme, they were now frequently intercepted in other ports, where the Chinese vessels stopped by. Iran: sanctions halt long-range ballistic missile development, IISS Strategic Comment, Vol. 18, Comment 22, July 2012; China never thought of implementing UN Sanctions!
1190 Explosion Seen as Big Setback to Iran’s Missile Program, New York Times Online, 4 December 2011;
1191 Iran verknüpft Angebot mit Forderung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 September 2011;
declined to even consider sanctions, openly disappointing the ‘reset’-advocates in the Obama administration. Israel and Saudi Arabia were both dissatisfied with Obama’s reluctance and concerned about the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme. When an additional, yet undisclosed enrichment facility was discovered, they tried to put pressure on the United States, by talking openly either about strikes, which could destabilise the region, or about counter-proliferation. Again the European Union followed the United States in considering the further tightening of economic sanctions against Iran.

Now, the Iranian position changed from defiance to at least agreeing on negotiations. But that did not necessarily make the task easy, as Iran first tried to mask its critical nuclear facility from inspections and did not respond to the enquiry regarding its rather military activities. Again, the United States had to engage in a two-front diplomatic effort to first soften Israel in its rhetoric, by actually pointing out that the IDF’s capabilities to stop Iran were indeed limited and, second, convince others to join. With Russia being left aside, China was approached and declined, followed by India and Japan. The latter chose not to follow the United States, thereby, irritating Washington. Obama also urged Israel to refrain from threatening Iran militarily, which was understandable, as the United States would have to bear the consequences of any Israeli action in the Middle East.

Lastly, in February 2012 the oil sanctions of the United States and the European Union came

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1194 Russia Dismisses Calls for New U.N. Sanctions on Iran, New York Times Online, 9 November 2011;
1195 Iran Trumpets Nuclear Ability at a Second Location, New York Times Online, 8 January 2012;
1196 As Powers Maneuver, Israel Says No Decision Yet to Attack Iran, New York Times Online, 18 January 2012;
1197 Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race, New York Times Online, 6 December 2011;
1198 European Union Moves Closer to Imposing Tough Sanctions on Iran, New York Times Online, 20 January 2012;
1202 Backers of Iran Sanctions Make an Appeal to China, New York Times Online, 13 February 2012;
1203 U.S. Exempts Japan and 10 Other Countries From Sanctions Over Iran Oil, New York Times Online, 20 March 2012;
1204 India Explores Economic Opportunities in Iran, Denting Western Sanctions Plan; New York Times Online, 9 February 2012; India Defends Oil Purchases From Iran, New York Times Online, 11 February 2012;
1205 ‘Loose Talk of War’ Only Helps Iran, President Says, New York Times Online, 4 March 2012;
into force, despite intense discussions about their economic effects. The United States still remained reluctant regarding military operations, although it effectively reinforced its military presence. Iran was under pressure, agreed to a new round of talks first in Ankara, then in Moscow. The West – i.e. the United States and Europe – demanded the complete dismantling of the enrichment facilities in Quom, a total stop of Uranium enrichment, the shipment of Iranian Uranium-fuel abroad, so that it would be enriched elsewhere, and last but not least full IAEA inspections of the entire programme. Iran, in turn, demanded exceptions for enrichment and inspections, calling for limitations to access and unannounced inspection rights for the IAEA. Along these lines, both parties continued the negotiation process.

Can this policy be regarded as a success? That is hard to tell. As long as the military campaign in Afghanistan continues, a military solution of the issue can be ruled out. And even if Afghanistan came to an end, the question would be, whether Iran can be disarmed by air strikes only or whether a full invasion of Iran will be needed. It was very unlikely that the American public would support an invasion – at least in the foreseeable future.

Surprisingly enough, the Obama administration resorted to the same policy on Iran (sanctions, military containment demanding a strong presence in the Persian Gulf and trying to enforce inspections) that ultimately led to the invasion of Iraq! Yet, all inspections and sanctions did not yield any results, although they might have slowed down Iranian progress considerably, but they could not stop it. The West imposed oil sanctions, the outcome of which is hardly predictable. Saddam Hussein actually managed to tighten his control over the Iraqi population

1206 White House Moves to Tighten Sanctions on Iran, New York Times Online, 6 February 2012; Iran Issues Threat to Oil Buyers in Europe, New York Times Online, 15 February 2012; Global Network Expels as Many as 30 of Iran’s Banks in Move to Isolate Its Economy, New York Times Online, 15 March 2012;
1209 Iran Agrees to Talks in Turkey, Ending Weeks of Friction Over the Site, New York Times Online, 8 April 2012;
with the help of the embargo and the food-for-oil programme. There are serious voices stating that the sanctions on Iran again would rather stabilise the regime, rally the population behind instead of stirring up a revolution. And last but not least, the United States again relied on Saudi Arabia and a large troop presence in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to secure their influence in the Middle East. Not a very long time ago, this was the primary reason for the spoilt, bored Saudi upper-class youth to wage a Jihad against the United States.

North Korea, the other big proliferation case, again proved its unpredictability, although this was hardly related to proliferation. The sinking of a South-Korean corvette and the shelling of South Korean islands were all related to the preparation of the power transfer from Kim-Jong II, who actually died in December 2011, to son Kim Jong Un. This escalatory behaviour further isolated the country, which did not have any allies left but China. Actually, there is a debate ongoing, to what extent China really controls North Korea, or put in another way, whether North Korea actually is a Chinese colony.

On the nuclear front, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009. This showed that the North would not stick to any agreed framework, regardless the deal it had with the United States. As mentioned in chapter 3.3.5.5., the United States was at some point optimistic that a compromise could be reached and that the North would give up its military nuclear programme. The second test put an end to this hope. But what could the United States do about it? Another Korean War was not feasible. As long as China remained a close ally of Pyongyang, such an attempt would be very risky. Should the U.S. try to negotiate again and be embarrassed by the North’s behaviour yet again? Unlike Iran, North Korea had hardly any possibilities to conduct offensive military or covert subversive action, in terms of stirring revolutions, etc. There was no real danger that North Korea would invade the South, the danger was rather that North Korea exported its nuclear technology (on behalf of Russia and China) to other revisionist states. Countering this, however, was rather a matter of approaching Russia and China not to use North Korea for their proliferation activities. So there was hardly any urgency to this. The United States decided not to ‘feed the troll’ and did nothing about North Korea for quite a long time – which was understandable.

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1214 Iranian Dissident Opposes Sanctions on Tehran, New York Times Online, 13 April 2012;
1215 U.S. Adds Forces in Persian Gulf, a Signal to Iran, New York Times Online, 3 June 2012;
1219 Pjøngjang will Atomgespräche wieder aufnehmen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 11 December 2009;
Of course, during the escalation following the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan, resulting in a higher alert status, the deployment of additional U.S. forces and manoeuvres by the two allies, North Korea threatened to enlarge its nuclear arsenal. The United States reacted with the deployment of conventional forces, but ignored North Korea’s nuclear threats and did not change the setting of the stalled six-party-talks or North Korea’s status as a terrorist nation. Deleting North Korea from the list of states sponsoring terrorism was one of North Korea’s preconditions for the settlement of the dispute over the nuclear programme. Concerns that North Korea might export nuclear materials and missiles, raised by the interception of such matériel to Burma, were made almost forgotten by the internal changes and the opening up of Burma. The other almost-colony of China changed sides, there was no reason for Beijing to reward it with missiles any more.

In March 2012 North Korea test-fired short-range missiles and for the 100th birthday of the ‘eternal leader’ Kim Il Sung another satellite was launched. And, like in 1998, 2006 and 2009, this attempt failed again, being an embarrassment to Pyongyang, which built its deterrence and bargaining power particularly upon its nuclear and missile capabilities. Not only did international protest soar, Pyongyang, eager to show new types of missiles on the parade honouring Kim Il Sung, lost some of its credibility. The fear that the North would try to make up for the lost face with another nuclear test has not materialised yet.

Hence, the U.S. non-proliferation policy, regardless of whom was in charge in the White House, basically failed when it came to North Korea. But U.S. options regarding North Korea are limited because of the Chinese support for Pyongyang, and as long as the Kim dynasty is happy with the status as a Chinese de-facto colony, this will hardly change. Should North Korea, like Burma, want to get rid of Chinese influence, opportunities for the U.S. policy towards the North might arise. Until then, just don’t feed the troll!

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1220 Nordkorea kündigt Verstärkung von Atomwaffenarsenal an, Beunruhigende Entwicklung auf der koreanischen Halbinsel. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 28 June 2010;
1221 Nordkorea vorerst weiter nicht auf Terror-Liste. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 29 June 2010;
1224 Probably R-17, Nordkorea testet zwei Kurzstreckenraketen, Abschuss von der Westküste aus. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 30 March 2012;
1226 U.N. Council to Expand North Korea Sanctions. New York Times Online, 16 April 2012; As China would probably never implement the sanctions, it may at least be qualified as protest.
1227 In First Public Speech, North Korean Leader Talks of Military Superiority. 15 April 2012;
5.3.6. U.S. Defence and Military Policy, general force planning

In foreign policy, especially in that of the leading world power, the armed forces play a special role. Building up the military apparatus takes a considerable amount of time, thus, shaping the armed forces is a very important task of any administration. As the means are tailored to the ends, analysing the means can give some clues about the ends if the administration does not address them. Last but not least, while in many regards the Obama administration continued numerous Bush policies, there was a radical break with the Bush Rumsfield visions of the armed forces!

One of the most important documents envisioning the change is the Army Capstone Concept from 2009. It initiated a radical break from the revolution in military affairs:

“In the 1990s, many argued that United States’ (U.S.) competitive advantages in communications, information, and precision strike technologies had brought about a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA). RMA advocates, however, neglected many of the continuities of armed conflict and did not recognize the limitations of new technologies and emerging military capabilities. In particular, concepts that relied mainly on the ability to target enemy forces with long range precision munitions separated war from its political, cultural, and psychological contexts. Some of this work focused on how U.S. forces might prefer to fight and then assumed that preference was relevant to the problem of future war. Literature describing the RMA and the movement known as ‘defense transformation’ was rooted in the belief that surveillance, communications, and information technologies would dramatically improve ‘battlespace knowledge’, eliminate surprise, and permit U.S. forces to achieve ‘full spectrum dominance’ through the employment of precision-strike capabilities. Concepts and ideas with labels such as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive operations, and shock and awe, entailed the application of ‘leap-ahead’ capabilities that would enable small ‘networked’ forces to win wars quickly and at low cost.”

Defence transformation was over. The break with the 90s and early 2000’s military ideology was not only because of it had miserably failed in the war on terror, also because the environment, in which the United States would have to fight their future wars was totally different from the 90s. While in the 90s the global leadership of the United States was almost uncontested, and the U.S. military was bothered rather with the maintenance work in the periphery of the international system, dealing with failing states, non-state actors or at best regional rogues, it now would face real challengers, who believed they could engage the United States. The concept does not pick any particular country as enemy nation, but the description of the future operative environment reads on a conflict with China and maybe another one with Iran.

1229 Department of the Army, The Army Capstone Concept, p. 6;
1230 Ibid., p. 9ff.
Wide area security operations, the kind of war the United States was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, would be only one of the missions of the Army. The other would be to fight a real inter-state war. As the National Security Strategy stated „shaping the future decisions of other powers“ was a key goal of the U.S. foreign policy. The armed forces would have to shape the future decisions by denying the other powers the ability to challenge the current world order, the United States or their allies militarily. “Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains – land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.” The problem was that the U.S. armed forces were now tailored to the needs of fighting irregular wars – or wide area security operations – in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of the equipment, such as drones, aircraft munitions, C² and navigation equipment, vehicles, such as the MRAP, were designed and fielded for battlefield-conditions of uncontested American air and space superiority. What to do with it, when China brings its anti-access assets to bear: large numbers of capable hackers, ASAT weapons, GPS jammers, etc.? Would they still work?

The Litoral Combat Ships (LCS), designed for the new expeditionary theatres and threats (pirates, stability operations, etc.) lacked the capability to operate in a contested environment for the Pacific. They are the first platform, where this is openly discussed, but other discussions will follow. Due to the prolonged landlocked, low-intensity warfare, some capabilities of traditional combined armed manoeuvre warfare were lost – or not trained for a long time. The Marine Corps’ amphibious capabilities had to be revived for the Pacific theatre. And the armed forces were focused on the land forces, with the air force and the navy been neglected over the years. Due to that, the submarine fleet, the carrier fleet, the number of primary surface combat ships, fighter squadrons and bombers will shrink over the decades to come, because the existing platforms are getting outdated, and replacement programmes cannot be afforded in the numbers required to keep the current level. Rebuilding those traditional capabilities will, however, cost money and while deep reductions have been wildly discussed

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1231 Department of the Army, *The United States Army Operating Concept*, p. 11-15;
1233 Department of Defence, *Sustaining Global Leadership*, p. 4;
1234 The following paper is typical for „defence transformation“ literature to describe the perceived advantages of the LCS in „new“ military contingencies: Robert O. Work, *Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C., February 2004. The paper lapidary concedes on page 144 that the LCS is much too vulnerable and lightly armed to fight in an highly contested scenario, as it was designed to be the „network centric“ littoral „information hub“ against „dump“ enemies. Now that the „network centric warfare“ and the perceived contingencies the LCS was planned for proved to be illusive, the whole ship is essentially useless – or a super-high priced patrol boat at best.
1235 U.S. War Games Finds Gaps in Navy, Marine Amphibious Ops, Defense News Online, 10 September 2012;
from 2010 onwards, there is no consensus on where these reductions have to be made.\textsuperscript{1237}

The following table\textsuperscript{1238} provides an overview of the then U.S. defence budget:

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<tr>
<td>(US$ million)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Base + Enhanced OCO</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supplemental Request</td>
<td>Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>157100</td>
<td>140131</td>
<td>16634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>293630</td>
<td>185307</td>
<td>109648</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>135917</td>
<td>104789</td>
<td>29375</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDT &amp; E</td>
<td>80234</td>
<td>80389</td>
<td>518</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>22577</td>
<td>15920</td>
<td>1399</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Housing</td>
<td>2267</td>
<td>2227</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4022</td>
<td>24817</td>
<td>1449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Department of Defence</td>
<td>695646</td>
<td>553623</td>
<td>159033</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Energy (defence-related)</td>
<td>18233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other defence related</td>
<td>7430</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total national defence</td>
<td>721309</td>
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Now strikingly the costs of personnel and operations and maintenance dominate the budget. If the United States could reduce their overseas contingency operations and the number of personnel needed to fight multiple stability operations, money could be saved again – or invested in needed platforms. However, unleashing a debate about personnel reductions in an Army that actually fights a war would be quite a blow to morale, as uncertainty of the future job-prospect would settle in especially among the lower ranks. On various occasions, the Joint Chief of Staff warned both defence secretaries (Gates and Panetta) about this effect.\textsuperscript{1239} It would not be a surprise if a debate on tangible numbers, missions, troop sizes and platforms surfaced after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

As the Obama administration pointed out, alliances would be pivotal for fulfilling the desired U.S. role in world politics, especially in Asia,\textsuperscript{1240} and ‘leading from behind’\textsuperscript{1241} became known as the guiding principle for operations not at the highest priority for the U.S., the United States still decided unilaterally in a number of important issues, like the redefinition of the missile defence architecture and the U.S. footprint in Europe.\textsuperscript{1242} This is an indication that, although emphasising alliances rhetorically, the degree to which the U.S. actually discussed strategic decisions with those allies varies. After all, there are European states that see the

\textsuperscript{1237} Ibid., p. 43-49;
\textsuperscript{1238} Data from: Ibid., p. 45;
\textsuperscript{1239} Ibid., p. 48;
\textsuperscript{1240} Department of Defence, \textit{Sustaining Global Leadership}, p. 3;
\textsuperscript{1241} Roger Cohan, \textit{Leading from Behind}, New York Times Online, 31 October 2011;
U.S. presence in Europe and the commitment to Article 5 as a vital element to secure their national security, and the unilateral dismantling of most of the European armed forces during the economic crises and the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from Europe is a threat to their security.

Nevertheless, many decisions also in terms of the American defence and procurement policy point towards a stronger emphasis of leading wars within an alliance. For example the purchase of the F-22 fighter had been stopped, and at least some of the F-22s to be purchased will be replaced by F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. The latter is offered to allies, too, and U.S. fighter wings equipped with this aircraft would achieve a greater degree of interoperability with them. In missile defence as well the United States in Europe shifted from the Ground-Based-Interceptor to the more versatile SM-3. While, as discussed below, the decision does not make sense in terms of protecting Europe, it enlarges the pool of missiles usable in the East Asian or Persian Gulf theatre. Moreover, the SM-3 is available for exports and the United States have invited other European countries to join the U.S. efforts in Europe.

5.3.6.1. Missile Defence

Many of the decisions that will re-shape the American force structure will be taken after the 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, a quite prominent one was made in late 2009 and can be evaluated in detail: the shifting of the missile defence architecture in Europe. On 17 September 2009 President Obama decided not to deploy the so called 3rd Site in Europe – 10 GBI interceptors in Poland and a GBR-B X-band radar in the Czech Republic. Instead, sea and land-based SM-3 interceptors would be deployed around Europe.

At the time, the President defended his decision: “This new approach will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems, and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program.” Further he noted: “First, we have updated our intelligence assessment of Iran’s missile programs, which emphasizes the threat posed by Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles, which are capable of reaching Europe. … But this new ballistic missile defense program will best address the threat posed by Iran’s on-

\[\text{Sources:}\]


1244 Final F22 Raptor Rolls Off Production Line, Defense News Online, 13 December 2011;

1245 See: Gressel, Kogan, *Missile Defence in Europe*, p. 21ff;

1246 Obama speech on missiles, Financial Times Online, 17 September 2009;
going ballistic missile defense program. Similar comments from Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that the new ‘phased adaptive approach’ would deliver a certain missile defence capability much earlier – 2011 instead of 2017 – with a much more suited and proven interceptor – the SM-3 – and better suited sensors. This decision was praised by the liberals in Western Europe, who hoped primarily for a relaxation of the tensions with Russia. However, there were a lot of flaws with this arguments that should be examined. The only argument to be proven is that Iran’s missiles, for the foreseeable time being, will not be able to reach Central Europe, but still pose a significant threat to the U.S. allies in the Middle East. Developing missiles beyond the current range – approximately 2,200 km – is not impossible though, but will need time beyond 2020.

If Europe were threatened, the Standard SM-3 would be hardly the capable interceptor to deal with such a threat. The missile was designed with the situation in the Pacific in mind and its proven test record was reached against target missiles with a range of 600 to 1,100 km. The missile’s ballistic envelope covers only a rough circle of 500 km radius. With sea-based assets it is impossible to cover the entire European continent. The further developed SM-3 Block II could be a more capable missile, if fitted with a very small kill vehicle. Yet, due to the lack of performance of the sensors, the AEGIS SPY-1 radar has a medium range, but is relatively inaccurate, while the TPY-2, based in Turkey, is accurate but has a far too short range to cover the whole interception process, the additional throw-weight gained with the extended booster will probably be used to propel a bigger, more capable – which means heavier – kill vehicle suitable for longer-ranged look-ons and target discrimination. The enhanced missile-seeker sensor will make the missile rather capable of fully acting within the current ballistic envelope, not beyond it. That means that the missile will be suitable for the Pacific theatre, that is South-Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Middle East, i.e. Persian Gulf, Israel, Egypt, but totally inadequate for the European theatre. There is a certain idea that those interceptors will be based in Europe, but they are actually intended to be deployed into other re-

1247 Ibid.;
1249 See for example: Fitzpatrick, “A Prudent Decision on Missile Defence”, p. 5-12;
1250 See: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, p. 91ff;
1252 Peter Sequard-Base, “Missile Defence for Europe: Comparison of Defence Concepts computed with the RAAB Model”, in: Peter Sequard-Base (Ed.), Workshop zur Raketenabwehr, vom 17 February 2010 in Wien, Schriftenreihe des Amtes für Rüstung und Wehrtechnik, 36-64, p. 49;
1253 Ibid., p. 40ff;
The shift in the missile defence architecture is a further indication that Europe as a region is not of much importance to the United States anymore. Missile defence is the only structured, permanent topic to discuss Article 5 in Europe – the core of the North Atlantic Treaty. What does it say about the seriousness of the American commitment if it is based on a rather doubtful architecture? It seems to be up to Europe to change that. France considers the development of an ingenious interceptor, tailored to the needs for defending Europe. Confronted with not only a military but a political withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe, the Europeans would have to make themselves relevant by their own means.

5.4. Policy Implementation, Unforeseen Developments and reactive Policies

Unforeseen developments may change the course of an administration’s foreign policy considerably. For Bush, the events of 9/11 considerably changed the course – even if they happened quite at the beginning of his term, hence, it is hard to guess what his foreign policy would have been like without them. What was called ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’ triggered a chain of unforeseen events for the Obama administration. Although considerably less dramatic than 9/11, it forced the administration to re-consider many aspects of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, as the revolutions in the Arab world were the most dramatic events in world affairs during Obama’s first term in office, it is highly possible that future generations will judge Obama’s foreign policy on the basis of the outcome of these events. As the events still unfold at the time of writing this thesis, only preliminary conclusions can be drawn. The following chapters will discuss America’s reaction to the revolutions in the Arab countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen – and the Libyan and Syrian civil wars.

5.4.1 The Arab Spring

The developments that were later termed ‘Arab Spring’ started with the eruption of country-wide, social protests in Tunisia. Such protests were nothing unusual as social and eco-

1255 See: Gressel, "Strategische Überlegungen zur amerikanischen Raketenabwehr", p. 20;
1256 There are few details known on the Aster Block II. See: www.mbda-systems.com/products/gbad/aster-block-2-bmd/2-2/;
1257 Soziale Proteste in Tunesien, Das Wohlstandsgefälle treibt auch die loyalistischen Gewerkschaften auf die
nomic misfortunes of the majority of the North African population were known, and the regime was confident to handle the protests. But the longer the protests lasted, the greater was the momentum pushing for political change – and not only marginal change: the resignation of Ben Ali and free and fair elections were demanded. Ben Ali, despite his authoritarian rule, had been regarded as friendly towards the West, especially because the omni-present security apparatus had successfully suppressed Islamist groups in the country. However this mattered more to France and other European Mediterranean countries than to the United States. For Washington, Tunisia was not that much of a priority, so that one would sacrifice American values to hold Ben Ali in power.

But the protests spread over to other countries in the region. And when Ben Ali fled to exile in Saudi Arabia, protests in Egypt gained momentum. Egypt was a pivotal ally of the U.S. in the Middle East. Winning Egypt over from the Soviet camp had been the cornerstone of the Nixon/Ford and the Carter administrations and Egypt was the key ally in facilitating the Middle-East peace process. To the U.S., what mattered was who would govern Egypt. And as Egypt was shook by religious strife before the Arab Spring, essentially with the Islamist mob lynching Coptic Christians, doubts arose about as to what the street-movement was and whether it could be trusted?

In January debates started in the U.S. whether the revolution in Egypt was another 1989 – the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe – or 1979 – the Islamic revolution in Iran – as more and more regimes came under pressure from protesters, moderates as well as hostile ones. In Jordan the protesters demanded reform, although they did not question the Hashemite Kingdom itself. The protesters in Tunis maintained their pressure on the government, so that not only heads would be changed in the old system, but to bring about a political change of the regime as such. In Lebanon, the moderate government under Hariri (junior) was dismissed and replaced by a government formed and dominated by Hizbullah affiliates, causing alarm in Israel and further street protests in Beirut. In Yemen, President Saleh came under pressure...
from street protesters. Yemen was a key theatre in fighting Al-Qa’ida, as many operators within the network were recruited there and the personnel expelled from Saudi-Arabia gained a foothold in this weakened country. A ‘Somalisation’ of the country could give similar organisations a next safe haven. In Iran, the government immediately resorted to violence as the first protests took place in Teheran.

The situation was a severe challenge to the U.S. administration, which faced more risks than opportunities. Domestically, the discussion whether it is possible to spread democracy in the Arab world never stopped since Bush’s invasion of Iraq. The protests were by then a regional development, not an isolated phenomenon. Eventually, the U.S. had at least verbally demanded democratic change throughout the region, thus it was hard to turn down the demands of the protest movement. The United States would lose the credibility as a promoter of Western values for the foreseeable future. Worse, if the United States supported the existing regime against the protesters and if they fell later on, which actually happened quite fast in the case of Tunisia, the United States would not only lose any influence in these states, but probably create a renewed hostility towards the United States in the then new leaderships.

So the United States adopted a position in favour of the protesters and tried – wherever possible – to manage the transition process in a way that would not promote the establishment of further theocratic regimes, like Iran in the region. This conclusion was not so much a result of the enthusiasm for the movements, but rather of a cost-risk-benefit calculation: even if the relations with many of the new leaderships became more difficult for Washington and even if regional policies could suffer, the risks of losing influence on the transition and definitely losing these states was greater than the chance to save these cooperative regimes from peril. However, managing transition would become difficult, and as few details about the recent developments are known publicly, it is hard to judge the extent of the role of the United States in depth. For the time being, the United States government as well as some private enterprises stayed silent about their role in the uprisings.

The first case of this transition management was Egypt. With no sign of the protest movement

Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 January 2011;
1266 Thousands in Yemen Protest Against the Government, New York Times Online, 27 January 2011;
1267 Iran Squelches Protest Attempt in Capital, New York Times Online, 20 February 2011;
1268 Indeed, already in January 2011 the preferred policy option for Egypt was leadership transition, so the United States had – from the beginning – little interest in or little illusions about keeping Mubarak in power. See: Sharp, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, p. 12ff;
to give in, the Egyptian Army was silently approached to manage the transition. The Army, whose top leaders were predominantly educated in American military schools and which is the biggest recipient of direct American foreign military aid, was probably the most trustful and known actor in Egypt for the U.S. at the time. It also was the only one that could play this role. Thus, on 11 February, Hosni Mubarak stepped down from his office, left Cairo and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Egyptian Army took over the responsibility of the interim government. Egypt’s new rulers first tied to calm the situation by reassuring external and internal actors: to the United States and Israel, it issued a statement, reassuring that Egypt would fulfil its international obligations, which means the peace treaty with Israel, to the protesters the military presented a 6-month plan for power transition to a civilian government and constitutional reforms.

Now that Mubarak was removed from power, the debate was opened what the new constitution should look like, who should draft it and what role the military should play in the new Egypt. The military’s attempt to restore order and resort to business as usual as quickly as possible raised doubts in the protesters, whether the military was serious about handing back power. On the other hand, the cheered return of Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an infamous Islamist, who had been banned from the U.S. for supporting anti-Coalition violence in Iraq, and his promises to shape the future of Egypt after the revolution, gave rise to another fear: that the so far secular protest movement would be occupied or exploited by the Islamists.

However, fear from the rise of the Islamists did not exclusively dominate the perception of U.S. policy-makers – as it did in Moscow for example. To Washington the chances to further develop the region had to be balanced against the risks of an Islamist-authoritarian setbacks. Regarding Egypt as well as other theatres, hope and fear alternatively pushed the debate in different directions. To make things even more complicated, soon more crises in other countries demanded U.S. attention, and the United States could not engage in all theatres with decisive force.

Meanwhile tensions between Shi’ite protesters and Sunni security forces in the small Gulf state of Bahrain escalated. This was especially embarrassing to the United States, as

1270 Egyptian Markets Fall as Protests Gather Support, New York Times Online, 27 January 2011;
1272 Uncharted Ground After Stunning End of Egypt’s Regime, New York Times Online, 11 February 2011;
1273 New Era Dawns in Egypt and Across the Arab World, New York Times Online, 12 February 2011;
1274 Military Offers Assurances to Egypt and Neighbors, New York Times Online, 12 February 2011;
1275 Egypt Army Sets 6-Month Blueprint, but Future Role Is Unclear, New York Times Online, 14 February 2011;
1276 Ibid.:
1277 After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt, New York Times Online, 18 February 2011;
1278 Clashes Erupt in Bahrain as Tumult Ripples Across Mideast, New York Times Online, 14 February 2011;
Bahrain hosted a larger U.S. naval base, including the Headquarters of the 5th Fleet. Regarded as relatively moderate, as compared to Saudi-Arabia, and pro-American, the Army’s harsh reaction to civil protest was a break with the previous image of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{1279} Since the King refused to make any political concessions, he promised only minor economic concessions to the protesters, the tense situation prevailed.\textsuperscript{1280} In this delicate situation, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates flew to Bahrain to convince the King to start real, tangible, political reforms.\textsuperscript{1281} He also made clear that the United States would not buy the Bahrain-Saudi version of the causes of the unrest, saying that the unrest was nothing more but an Iranian plot to destabilise their opponents\textsuperscript{1282} and that the United States would demand real changes in their ruling systems. It has to be noted that this was one of the rare occasions that the United States went openly head-on with one of the Gulf States. However, two days later, Saudi troops went across the causeway connecting the two countries to put down the unrest by resorting to violence.\textsuperscript{1283} Bahrain declared the state of emergency and, with Saudi assistance, started to forcefully prosecute the protesters.\textsuperscript{1284} This move caused at least temporary strains between the United States and Saudi-Arabia, which started to openly criticise each other: the United States blamed Saudi Arabia for their conservative positions and inability to cope with demands for political reforms and Riyadh criticised Washington for abandoning important allies, such as Egypt.\textsuperscript{1285} Indeed, the situation was a dilemma for the United States: the confidence in their support was shaken, and the case of Egypt was perceived as abandonment of an ally by many of the moderate or pro-U.S. governments. Would the Gulf States opt for more self-reliance in the wake of the distrust in Washington? Would this self-reliance include the purchase of Pakistani nuclear weapons to prevail in the face of a possible nuclear Iran, as had been speculated about? The United States had a hard time explaining that, while they would be with the Gulf States in the case of an external confrontation, with Iran for example, they do not see this guarantee as a reason to compromise on what they perceive as universal values, which include the right for peaceful protest as well as the right for political participation. However, regardless of the American protests, the opposition leaders were treated harshly after the crackdown on the protest movement.\textsuperscript{1286}

\textsuperscript{1279} When Armies Decide, New York Times Online, 19 February 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1280} Bahraini Opposition Refuses Money and Jobs Offers, New York Times Online, 6 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1281} Gates Tells Bahrain’s King That ‘Baby Steps’ to Reform Aren’t Enough, New York Times Online, 12 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1282} Arab Unrest Propels Iran as Saudi Influence Declines, New York Times Online, 23 February 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1283} Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest, 14 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1284} Two Protesters Dead as Bahrain Declares State of Emergency, New York Times Online, 15 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1285} Opposition Leaders Arrested in Bahrain as Crackdown Grows, New York Times Online, 17 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1286} Bahrain Tears Down Monument as Protesters Seethe, New York Times Online, 18 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1287} U.S.-Saudi Tensions Intensify With Mideast Turmoil, New York Times Online, 14 March 2011;  
\textsuperscript{1288} Bahrain Sentences 4 Protesters to Death, New York Times Online, 28 April 2011; Bahrain: Court Sentences
But the Saudi-American tensions did not last long, as cooperation in succession management was soon needed in the vicinity of the kingdom. In Yemen protests continued and the increasing use of violence to put them down raised the question whether Saleh could stay in power for the foreseeable future. He vowed to hand over power, but gave neither a timeline nor a plan regarding that promise. As Yemen hosted a Shi’ite insurgency – there are doubts on whether this insurgency receives much of support from Iran, but never the less in Saudi eyes it does – and a considerable amount of Al-Qa’ida operatives, who were hiding in the vast ungoverned countryside, both the United States and Saudi Arabia had their reasons to influence and manage regime transition rather than to simply let it happen.

As the intensity of the conflict in Yemen grew, the United States declared it sought for a retreat of Saleh from power. Negotiations in Rhiad between government and opposition groups were started to explore ways of a controlled hand-over of power. The plan endorsed to Saleh called for his resignation within 30 days and new presidential elections 60 days after. The United States made it clear to Saleh that they expected him to accept the offer. With the opposition gaining ground and with all neighbours as well as the U.S. and the EU endorsing his resignation, he had little choice but to accept the Saudi offer to grant him immunity and asylum after his retreat. Later, a unity-government was formed by former opposition tribes, to reassure the United States that the counterterrorism effort of the government would continue.

The situation seemed solved, but it was not. After several clashes and incidents with pro-Saleh troops, the ousted president thought he had rallied enough troops in the capital to manage a comeback. At the time, the security forces, especially, were split in those supporting the

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1290 U.S. Shifts to Seek Removal of Yemen’s Leader, an Ally, New York Times Online, 3 April 2011;

1291 Unruhen in Yemen weiten sich aus, Sicherheitskräfte schiessen auf Demonstranten, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 April 2011; Opponents of Yemen’s President Divided Over Deal, New York Times Online, 24 April 2011;

1292 Gulf Nations Offer Yemen’s Leader an Exit Plan, New York Times Online, 21 April 2011;

1293 Saleh akzeptiert Rücktritt innerhalb der nächsten 30 Tage, Einwände der Opposition – USA fordern zügigen Machtwechsel, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 April 2011; Opponents of Yemen’s President Divided Over Deal, New York Times Online, 24 April 2011;

1294 Clans and Tribes Forge New Yemen Unity, New York Times Online, 16 June 2011;

1295 Yemen General Says Opposition Will Be Ally Against Terrorism, New York Times Online, 22 June 2011;

new military governor Moshin al Ahmar and those supporting former president Saleh.\textsuperscript{1297} The latter returned to Sana at the end of September, re-establishing his rule at least around the capital.\textsuperscript{1298} The rest of the country collapsed in areas of tribal rules, as the local military commanders aligned themselves with various tribal leaders. Especially in the southern provinces, Al-Qa’ida could establish its own save havens. Saleh’s exit from Saudi-Arabia into Yemen raised the question, whether Saudi-Arabia was a trustful ally in managing those transitions. Nonetheless, the question was not raised publicly. In any event, the United States shifted their policy to hunting down Al-Qa’ida personnel in Yemen with drones, starting in Djibouti and having local CIA teams on the spot to support tribesmen against the radicals.\textsuperscript{1299} That Saleh bombarded soldiers disloyal to him, but fought Al Qa’ida alongside the CIA, cast further doubts on his character.\textsuperscript{1300} Later in October, Saleh announced that he would step back from power again, handing it over to his former deputy Mansur Al-Hadi,\textsuperscript{1301} but elections would not be held until in 2014. However, at the time, drones were more important to the U.S. than the cooperation with the reminiscence of the Yemeni state.

At the time Egypt, Libya, and Syria occupied more attention of U.S. officials. The United States would not be able to micro-manage every transition – it would be hard to influence even the one in America’s core ally: Egypt.

The protest movement that initially took Tahrit Square was a very heterogeneous mix of mostly young, secular and educated people. However, they were not politically organised or did not possess other organisational structures that could be turned into a party organisation quickly.\textsuperscript{1302} The only force that was properly organised, disciplined and ideologically coherent were the Islamists, foremost the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists.\textsuperscript{1303} The other problem was that the protagonists of the old regime would not easily cede power. The rushed referendum for constitutional amendments held on 19 March actually meant that the new elections, to be held in September,\textsuperscript{1304} would be held rather within the old framework – as opposed to the

\textsuperscript{1297} Waffenruhe in Jemen, Staatsfernsehen berichtet von Verhandlungen - Hartes Vorgehen gegen Demonstranten, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 September 2011;
\textsuperscript{1298} Yemen’s President Abruptly Returns From Saudi Arabia, New York Times Online, 23 September 2011;
\textsuperscript{1300} Luftangriff auf jemenitische Soldaten, Versuchen oder Stunfaktion gegen abtrünnige Einheit?, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 October 2011;
\textsuperscript{1301} Jemens Präsident Saleh kündigt Rücktritt an. Der jemenitische Präsident will seine Macht in den kommenden Tagen abgeben, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 8 October 2011;
\textsuperscript{1302} House of Coup, New York Times Online, 4 March 2011; Cairo Activists Now Struggle With Politics, New York Times Online, 18 March 2011;
\textsuperscript{1303} Islamist Group Is Rising Force in a New Egypt, New York Times Online, 4 March 2011;
\textsuperscript{1304} Ägypter sollen im September ein neues Parlament wählen, Militärrat gibt Termin bekannt - gestürzter
protester’s demand for a full constitutional overhaul. The Army, in the wake of the revolution, took the central stage in Egypt’s new system, and soon doubts arose whether it would give up its newly gained political power. For the United States, the Army was one of the few known actors in the game. In a visit to Egypt, the senators Kerry and McCain primarily talked to the Military Council to elaborate further American support for Egypt – as well as the planned transition to civilian rule.

The most urgent problems of Egypt’s emerging democracy were the slumping economy and the latent unrest. Security forces still treated protesters harshly at times, criminality soared and the Christian minority soon felt the pressure of the Islamists. The next wave of violence came when the Military Council presented the new election law and unilaterally set up the transitional government. This move was seen as an authoritarian behaviour on the part of the military and further strengthened the Muslim brotherhood as most credible anti-establishment force. But also Egypt’s foreign policy held some worries for the United States. The normalisation of ties with Iran and Hamas raised the question how Egypt would fit into further Arab-Israeli talks if they ever were to be resumed with willing participants.

More troublesome was the place Egypt would take in Turkey’s new assertive foreign policy. While the Arab Spring buried Ankara’s amicable ties with Syria, Iran and Gaddafi, Erdoğan, with his ties to various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, quickly adjusted his foreign policy after his election victory in summer 2011 to profit from the unfolding revolutions. In placing his vision of Islam and populism at the heart of a new foreign policy agenda, he envisioned Turkey as the new leader of the new Arab neighbourhood. But to find a way into the hearts of the Arab on the street and to bridge Turkish-Arab ethnic gaps by pan-Islamic feelings, he had to move against the perceived nemesis of the Islamic world: Israel. The leaking of the UN report on the Mavi Marmara interception to the press was the excuse to break

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1305 Euphoric, Egyptians Vote on Future, New York Times Online, 19 March 2011;
1306 Egyptian Leader Assures McCain and Kerry on Transition, New York Times Online, 26 June 2011;
1307 2 Protesters Killed in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, New York Times Online, 9 April 2011;
1308 Crime Wave in Egypt Has People Afraid, Even the Police, New York Times Online, 12 May 2011;
1309 Egypt’s Christians Fear Violence as Changes Embolden Islamists, New York Times Online, 30 May 2011;
1311 Ägyptens Militärrat erlässt neues Wahlgesetz, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 July 2011; Egypt: New Cabinet Sworn In, New York Times Online, 21 July 2011; March Against Egypt’s Military Collapses Into Violence, 23 July 2011; Egyptian Forces Roust Tahrir Square Sit-In, New York Times Online, 1 August 2011;
1312 March Against Egypt’s Military Collapses Into Violence, 23 July 2011;
1313 In Shift, Egypt Warms to Iran and Hamas, Israel’s Foes, New York Times Online, 28 April 2011;
1314 Unrest Around the Arab World Endangers Turkey’s Newfound Influence, New York Times Online, 4 May 2011;
the ties with Tel-Aviv, threatening even to use force against the Jewish state. At the same
time, a military and economic cooperation framework was signed with Egypt, intended as the
visible sign of Turkey’s new influence on the new Arab regimes. The joyful anti-Israeli
mood was immediately picked up by the streets of Cairo, storming and touching the Israeli
embassy in Egypt and without being prevented by security forces. Was Turkey the leader of
a new pan-Islamist dawn? Especially Tel Aviv was very concerned about these develop-
ments.
Washington refused to act upon the new developments in Turkey. There were and are many
officials in Washington who, with regards to Turkey, are guided rather by the geopolitical im-
perative of keeping good relations with Ankara for the sake of maintaining some, or probably
only the illusion of, influence on Turkey, instead of reflecting what this relations are about,
how deep that perceived influence is going and for what strategic purposes it was to be main-
tained. With regard to Israel, the United States warned the Jewish state that the growing
isolation was primarily their fault. While this might partly be correct concerning Israel and
the Arab states, the U.S. could not explain the Turkish assertiveness, including even military
threats, on Cyprus in the dispute on the exploitation of gas fields off the southern coast of
Cyprus. Erdogan’s endorsement of a secular state in Egypt has to be seen as a diverting
effort for the West, given his broad financial support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
and Islamist parties in Tunisia and Libya. And not to forget, while Egypt was battling for
its democratic future, Turkey was again turning the military on Kurdish separatists, thereby
breaking off negotiations with the PKK, and used the elastic counterterrorism laws to put
pressure on critical media. At the time, Ankara hardly served as role model for a peaceful
democracy!

1315 Turkey Expels Israeli Ambassador Over Flotilla Raid, New York Times Online, 2 September 2011; Amid
Tensions With Israel, Turkey Threatens Increased Naval Presence, New York Times Online, 6 September 2011;
1316 Turkey set to sign military pact with Egypt, after cutting trade ties with Israel, The alliance is not intended as
‘revenge’ against Israel; Erdogan’s intention is to extend Turkey’s influence to areas it has not reached in past
decades, Haaretz Online, 7 September 2011;
1317 Israelis Flee Cairo Embassy as Protestors Invade Offices, New York Times Online, 10 September 2011;
1318 Beyond Cairo, Israel Sensing a Wider Siege. New York Times Online, 10 September 2011;
1319 Kogan, „Is Turkey torn between the European Union and the Middle East“, p. 17.
1320 USA warnen Israel vor weiterer Isolierung. Verteidigungsminister appelliert an Kommunikationsbereitschaft
des Landes, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 October 2011;
1321 Türkei droht Zypern Entsendung von Kriegsschiffen an, Streit um geplante Ölböhrungen im Meer droht zu
eskalieren, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 September 2011;
1322 Turkey’s Elephant in the Room: Religious Freedom, New York Times Online, 28 September 2011;
1323 In the Arab Spring, Watch Turkey, New York Times Online, 5 January 2012; Turkey and Egypt Seek Alliance
Admid Region’s Uproar. New York Times Online, 18 October 2012;
1324 Türkiye und Iran gehen gemeinsam gegen PKK vor. Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 October 2011; Breit
angelegter Angriff kurdischer Rebellen, Mindestens 26 Toten auf türkischer Seite – Reaktion mit
Bombenangriffen im Irak, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 19 October 2011;
1325 Charges Against Journalists Dim the Democratic Glow in Turkey, New York Times Online, 4 January 2012;
Not surprisingly, in the field of foreign policy Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had been more constructive than Turkey. It tried to pressurise the Palestinians into unity and Hamas into moderation to become a more serious negotiation partner.\textsuperscript{1326} Egypt maintained working relations with Israel via the security services, even negotiating truces when violence on the Gaza Strip flared up.\textsuperscript{1327} For the time being, threats to cancel the peace treaty with Israel remained inner-party rhetoric in the Muslim Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{1328} However just like with Turkey, it was hard to guess how long this pragmatic approach towards Israel would last.

Of the new regimes formed in the Arab spring, Tunisia was first to hold free general elections in October 2011.\textsuperscript{1329} As expected, Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, won. This was the first electoral triumph of an Islamist party in North Africa that so far did not spark civil war, like in Algeria in 1992 and Gaza in 2006, and Ennahda’s leaders immediately pledged to guarantee societal and religious plurality.\textsuperscript{1330} However, their triumph sparked tumults when secular forces protested for their pluralistic agenda.\textsuperscript{1331} In any case, as Turkey has shown, Islamist parties are far more successful when implementing their political and societal agenda in small bits and pieces after having consolidated their power and not to try to turn over society and the state at once. One will have to watch over the coming decades, which course Tunisia will follow and whether the succeeding elections will be both free and fair. And in the case of Tunisia, this will be of interest more to Europe than the United States.

Egypt, however, would be of American interest. As Egypt’s Military Council agreed with the main parties on a schedule and a mode for a handover to a civilian government, elections and constitutional reforms,\textsuperscript{1332} the transitional process unfolded new political dynamics. The Egyptian military established bureaucracy and increasingly the Muslim Brotherhood, too, became critical of the organisations that supported the upraise. The first victim was Al Jazeera,\textsuperscript{1333} but the police soon closed American-backed pro-democracy organisations as well, detaining at least 16 U.S. citizens for various reasons.\textsuperscript{1334}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1326} Islamistic Victors in Egypt Seeking Shift by Hamas, New York Times Online, 24 March 2012;
\item \textsuperscript{1327} Waffenruhe zwischen Israel und Palästinensern, Ägypten vermittelt erfolgreich Feuerpause, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 13 March 2012;
\item \textsuperscript{1328} Egyptian Party Threatens to Review Treaty With Israel, New York Times Online, 16 February 2012;
\item \textsuperscript{1329} Tunisians Vote in a Milestone of Arab Change, New York Times Online, 23 October 2011;
\item \textsuperscript{1330} Moderate Islamist Party Heads Toward Victory in Tunisia, 24 October 2011;
\item \textsuperscript{1331} Fresh Post-Vote Clashes in Cradle of Tunisia’s Revolt, New York Times Online, 27 October 2011;
\item \textsuperscript{1332} Ägyptens Generale präsentieren Zeitplan, Wahlrechtsreform – Neue Verfassung – Präsidentenwahl bis Ende 2012, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 October 2011;
\item \textsuperscript{1333} Raid on Egyptian Al Jazeera Affiliate Seen as Part of a Broader Crackdown, New York Times Online, 11 September 2011;
\item \textsuperscript{1334} Egypt’s Forces Raid Offices of U.S. and Other Civil Groups, New York Times Online, 29 December 2011;\end{itemize}
With the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists winning in both rounds of the parliamentary elections and bringing power within reach, the Islamists joined the Military in their cautious approach to diversify governmental power, which included keeping an eye on the American activities in Egypt. The perceived new arrangement of the new Islamist and old bureaucratic elites sparked a series of demonstrations and clashes with the secular youth and the Christians.

The situation proved difficult to the United States to act upon. Guessing the results of the Egyptian elections, the United States tried to improve contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood and tried to reassure them that their participation in power would not endanger the U.S. support for Egypt. But given the long-term support for Mubarak it was hard to believe that the Brotherhood would quickly overcome their scepticism towards the U.S., if listening to them at all. Especially as senior members of the Democratic Party showed their sympathy for granting the Egyptian military political power that normally no military had in a democracy!

As the economic situation in Egypt deteriorated, the United States committed 770 million USD aid for Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. This should keep the new government from breaking with the United States. But concerning financial aid, the temporary suspension of the 2.5 billion USD military aid proved to be most effective to put pressure on the military to release the American citizens detained in the crackdown of pro-democracy-groups. Due to this aid,
the military continued to be the group the U.S. had most contact and influence upon, and it is quite likely that the future role of the military in the political system of Egypt would determine the amount of American influence in Egypt as such. It was no surprise that the U.S. advised in handling the transition primarily to the military. \(^{1344}\) Supporting a military government, as done during the Cold War on various occasions, had to be ruled out for normative reasons. The power struggles between the Muslim Brotherhood and the established administrative elites continue to this day. The administrative elites succeeded in forcing the Muslim Brotherhood to choose a relatively moderate candidate for the presidential elections by banning certain candidates from running. \(^{1345}\) The campaign had been largely dominated by the dispute about the role of religion in public life \(^{1346}\) and the election itself was won clearly by the Brotherhood, which made it clear that neither the old elites nor the secular forces would have any majority or large popular support in Egypt. \(^{1347}\) In an hazardous action, the Military Council forced the disputed Constitutional Council to sign the draft constitution just before the decisive election. \(^{1348}\) It was a desperate attempt to save the military’s vision of the future constitution from a broader revision by the Brotherhood. However, after their election, the new president moved quickly to re-install parliament, against the court rulings and the Military Council’s preferences, \(^{1349}\) and to name a new prime minister of its own choice. \(^{1350}\) Egypt’s Joint Chief of Staff admonished Clinton that the military would be the only insurance against a total
takeover of Egypt by the Brotherhood. Eventually, the new cabinet included six ministers from the old administrative classes, which was basically to show that the new government was inclusive and in order not to stir up violent opposition by those left aside. However, with the dismissal of Field Marshal Tantawi as the Minister of Defence and General Sami Anan as the Army Chief of Staff, President Mursi removed his sharpest critics and the most important figures of the military leadership. The signal was clear: the political power will not be shared with the military. There will be no guardian function of the Army, similar to the old Turkish Republic (1923-2002). Whether the Brotherhood will remain true to their democratic and tolerant promises still remains an open question, impossible to answer since the Army has turned to a policy of authoritarian restauration.

A path towards democracy was by far not guaranteed for Egypt. The Islamists too could have slowly (ab)use their power to fill all branches of the administration by fellow brothers, and erase the control of the government by bringing the judiciary, police, prosecution service, media, universities, etc. under strict party control? In Turkey this process of power centralisation lasted ten years, in Russia it happened slightly quicker. This suggests that the United States were in a loose-loose-situation. Every policy option chosen – including direct military intervention – incorporated more negative consequences than positive gains. Trying to manage regime-transition from the distance was actually a choice for one of two different kinds of ‘evil’. Any form of a more forceful, direct involvement would again commit the United States’ military and diplomatic apparatus in the Middle-East. It would preclude a more profiled policy towards East-Asia – the preferred strategic choice of the administration. Limiting involvement would limit U.S. influence over the outcome of regime transition and therefore the U.S. could soon face very unpleasant regimes in the region.

From this very recent perspective, trying to keep up the Mubarak regime seemed like swimming against the tide of history – there was a perception that it could not be achieved at any rate. And the attempt at transition management rather unveiled the limited influence of the United States on the developments in Egypt. Whatever the following generations will judge, this outcome – in the perspective of today’s observer – seemed quite inevitable.

In the following other cases, however, the U.S. choice did make a considerable difference and will be examined in more detail.

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1351 After Meeting With Clinton, Egypt’s Military Chief Steps Up Political Feud, New York Times Online, 15 July 2012;
1352 New Egyptian Cabinet Includes Many Holdovers, New York Times Online, 2 August 2012;
1353 Egyptian Leader Ousts Military Chief, New York Times Online, 12 August 2012; General bestreitet Konflikt zwischen Mursi und der Armee, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 August 2012;
5.4.2. The Libyan Civil War

In February 2011, the youth gathered on the streets in Libya to protest against the existing authoritarian rulers, like in many other countries in the Middle East. Unlike many other countries in the region, however, the centre of gravity of the protests in Libya was not the capital, but the eastern town of Benghazi, and the Libyan army from the onset relied on armed force to crush dissent. In the case of Libya, urbanisation and economic modernisation had not blurred the borders and geographic segregation of the tribes that inhabit the country. While Gaddafi’s rule was based on the loyalty of his western-based tribal ties around Sirte and Tripoli, the tribes of the Cyrenaica were marginalised and suppressed by his regime. Of course then, their eastern urban centre of Benghazi became the centre of the opposition movement. And, as the Libyan troops sent to crack down on them did not fight in an area where they had relatives, their methods lacked any usual restraints. It also was clear from the start, that Gaddafi wanted to break the rebellion as quickly as possible, using military means: government forces quickly encircled the pockets of resistance, cut off supplies and then assaulted them with heavy artillery and air support in the cities. The protesters started to organise themselves militarily, but the lack of organisation, training and equipment meant that they stood little chance against the regular Libyan army. It was quite clear, that without outside assistance the rebels would not survive and Gaddafi would restore his rule, although with considerable bloodshed.

Was there any interest in assisting the rebellion, and more specifically, were the United States interested in doing so? The international advocates that were in favour of an intervention included the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League. The push to remove Gaddafi came from the rather conservative Arab leaders, probably because Gaddafi’s aggressive revolutionary agenda had made him problematic for those regimes. Even if Gaddafi blended his once Socialist revolutionary ideas with Islamic internationalism, he was more a rival rather than a partner for the conservative pan-Islamist movements stemming from the Gulf States. France and the United Kingdom also advocated

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intervention, although for different reasons.1360 Here Gaddafi’s Islamist agenda, his past support of various terrorist groups, including separatist groups in the UK and in France proper, made him quite unreliable, although he officially renounced terrorism in 2003. Yet, there was little trust in him. Moreover, he used illegal migration to Europe,1361 not only as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West, but also as part of his strategy to spread Islam to Europe. For Sarkozy and Cameron, the world was for sure better without him than with him, although at that time it was not clear who and what the alternative to him was. But like the U.S. in Egypt, France and the U.K. could hope that by intervening they could influence or even shape the outcome of the power transition. In the case of France, domestic politics and upcoming presidential elections were regarded as most important reasons for the intervention. Even if so, there were compelling strategic reasons to do so. The Franco-British rationale would sound reasonable for the United States as well.

Nonetheless, there were important voices calling for constraint in Libya. Most striking was the Secretary of Defence Robert Gates.1362 In his official opinion, an additional ground campaign in Libya, next to Afghanistan and Iraq, was unaffordable, and a no-flight-zone or air strikes alone probably would not do the job. If (air) forces were committed, the danger of being dragged into another ground war loomed. The Afghan example was a clear warning, since ISAF, by then actually at war with the Taliban, had started as a simple assistance, training and support mission. And, last but not least, there was little known about the consistency and the motives of the rebels. The fact that Al-Qa’ida personnel was fighting together with the rebels in some groups gave reasons for caution.1363

The last of Gate’s arguments shed light on an aspect of secrecy in the former U.S.-Libyan relations: the prelude to Gaddafi’s abandoning his WMD programmes in 2003.1364 Gaddafi was internally challenged by Al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups since the 1990s,1365 which then drew support from Al-Qa’ida personnel and other Islamist organisations from the Arabian peninsula. Whether this was done with the approval and support of Saudi-Arabia and some Gulf States is has not been proven so far, but would not be surprising. Gaddafi’s internal security

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1361 Ghadhafis Schlepper im Visier, Bootsflüchtlinge als Kriegswaffe gegen Italien? Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 12 September 2011;
1365 The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – from Al Quaida to the Arab Spring, The Guardian Online, 5 September 2011;
forces were hunting down these organisations and, thereby, gained a lot of knowledge about the structures and operations of these groups, particularly in Yemen. It is rumoured that sharing this knowledge with the U.S. after 9/11 was the most important milestone to make the rehabilitation of Gaddafi acceptable to the Bush government. If so, the then chief of the CIA, Robert Gates, would have known about it, and it is conceivable that he would not gladly stab one of his former foreign sources in the back.

Obama was sceptical about the intervention, too. Like Gates, he worried about the costs, the duration and the further involvements in Libya. Given the almost inexistent direct interests of the United States in Libya, why should the United States bear the burden? And he was worried about his public image, actually having promised to end at least one major war, i.e. the one in Iraq, and not to start a new one. If the campaign dragged on, he might find himself compelled to send ground troops into Libya in an electoral year (2012), a nightmare for a presidency that was thought to rest on broad popular support.

On the other Hand, many Republican representatives advocated intervention themselves, along with the liberal press and the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. Convincing Hilary Clinton to accept the post of the Secretary of State was difficult for Obama, and she did not agree unless she was granted considerable freedom of action and independence from the rest of the administration. For her, the aim of taking the office was clear: she took over a high-profile job to raise her stakes in the race to become president after Obama. However, the years following the inauguration, foreign policy more or less a muddled through the economic crisis and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and she had no real opportunity to show her personal note in foreign policy. Now with the decision on whether to go to war in Libya, with the president still undecided and the nemesis in foreign policy, i.e. the Secretary of Defence, against the war, making the cause for an American participation in the military campaign in Libya was the first major issue where she could present herself and get out of the president’s shadow.

On 16 March, the Libyan Army, loyal to Gaddafi, surrounded the unofficial Capital of the rebels, Benghazi, bringing the rebel movement close to final destruction. Gaddafi’s son

1366 Files Note Close C.I.A. Ties to Qaddafi Spy Unit, New York Times Online, 2 September 2011;  
1367 Obama’s Choice: To Intervene or Not in Libya, New York Times Online, 5 March 2011;  
1368 See: Fiddling While Libya Burns, New York Times Online, 13 March 2011; See for an debate on then different opinions on a possible Libya-Intervention in the same newspaper: Should the U.S. Move Against Qaddafi?, at: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/01/should-the-us-move-against-qaddafi?ref=weekinreview;  
1369 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 26-31;  
1370 Ibid., p. 31;  
1371 Qaddafi Forces Mass Outside Rebels’ Western Stronghold, New York Times Online, 17 March 2011;
Saif-al Islam threatened the rebels with termination if they did not leave Libya within the next 48 hours. This made it quite obvious that if any alternative to the Gaddafi government had to be considered for Libya, action would have to be taken now. There would be no negotiated end or a sharing of power in Libya. At the time, the United Nations debated a Lebanese resolution on a no-flight zone in Libya. But it was already voiced by American diplomatic and military personnel that, in order to save the rebels from destruction, the air campaign would have to be expanded to ground targets. Later, Russia, especially, said that it was betrayed by NATO on Libya, but the Western intention was quite clearly articulated before the campaign was started. Indeed the text of the resolution itself was quite vague on the military details and did not authorise regime change. But it was communicated from the beginning, that the military intervention would be on behalf of the Libyan opposition forces to give them a leverage vis-à-vis the government forces. It was clear to anybody from the outset that either a negotiated settlement between the two parties or the removal of Gaddafi from power would be the outcome – with the latter being preferred. When Clinton convinced Obama to join France and Britain in a possible military effort, the resolution was passed on 17 March. Although the resolution was adopted, there was one notable abstaining vote: beside the usual suspects, Russia and China: Germany abstained from voting. The German voting revealed that even if the often quoted multilateralism was taken into account, the European allies would not be united and not be willing or able to participate in these missions. Later, the lack of European nations voting for, participating at all, and participating in ground attack missions drew heavy criticism from the United States, especially in Gate’s speeches. It has to be said that France and Britain were the primary European supporters of the mission and they intended to execute it without support of other European nations.

With the dices rolled for intervention, NATO started the air campaign on the next nightfall (18 March). Although in the official view, France and the United Kingdom led the attack, the air operations were led by the U.S. Africa Command. Moreover, the Allies had to rely

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on American expertise and equipment, especially concerning electronic intelligence, to locate
the command posts and air defence installations that were to be attacked first.1382 The active
role of the United States during these days became obvious when an F-15E Eagle strike
fighter crashed over Libya, the only aircraft lost during the campaign.1383

With the United States not very eager to take the lead of the operation, at least publicly, four
days after the beginning of the campaign a discussion on the transition of the operative com-
mand to NATO was started, especially pushed by France, which was eager to underline its
leading role.1384 However, the discussion soon stalled over the end state to be achieved in
Libya: while France had already diplomatically recognised the rebels as legitimate govern-
ment of Libya and, thereby, made regime change the official goal of the military effort,1385
Turkey ruled out any possibility of interfering in the internal power struggle itself. The mis-
sion should narrowly stick to the mandate and enforce the no-flight-zone only.1386 This situ-
ation was a particular dilemma for the U.S. government, as it agreed to back the intervention
without deliberating its goals in the operation. Now it was caught in an infight between the
NATO ally that pushed for any kind of intervention to achieve regime change (France) and
another NATO ally that objected to the intervention for this very reason. The United States on
their part just ruled out any participation in a ground-based campaign, although many U.S.
commentators at the time thought this would be necessary later on, because a no-flight zone
would hardly achieve any goals.1387 Later, Gates and Clinton admitted that they acted on
French and British urges, without having a set goal on their own.1388 But once they committed
forces, it was hardly possible to row back. How this crisis was overcome, is up to speculation.

On 24 March, NATO decided not only to lead the aerial campaign, but also that the strikes
would target ground forces threatening civilians – in fact the rebels – as such.1389 This meant
that NATO implicitly agreed to the Franco-British decision to intervene in the Libyan civil
war. The decision was accompanied by the announcement that Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates joined the air campaign.1390 It would be conceivable that influence from the Gulf

1382 Kommandoposten und Truppenmorale im Visier, Systematische alliierte Luftangriffe auf libysche Bodenziele,
Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 20 March 2011;
1383 American Warplane Crashes in Libya as Ground Fighting Continues, New York Times Online, 22 March
2011;
1384 Frankreich will Libyen-Einsatz politisch breiter abstützen, Nato zeigt sich zur Übernahme von Verantwortung
bereit, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 March 2011; Nato will gesamten Militäreinsatz in Libyen übernehmen,
Kampffjets greifen Stellungen um Tripolis an, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 March 2011;
1385 Allies Are Split on Goal and Exit Strategy in Libya, New York Times Online, 25 March 2011;
1386 Ibid.;
1387 Ibid.;
1388 Gates and Clinton Unite to Defend Libya Intervention, and Say It May Last Awhile, New York Times Online,
27 March 2011;
1389 NATO Set to Take Full Command of Libyan Campaign, New York Times Online, 15 March 2011;
1390 NATO Set to Take Full Command of Libyan Campaign, New York Times Online, 15 March 2011;
softened Erdoğan’s opposition. On the other hand, the contact group, the group of nations within NATO pushing for regime change in Libya, conducted its military and diplomatic liaison to the rebels in bilateral ties, too. Under this umbrella, additional support for them could be organised, regardless of the Turkish position.

However, despite NATO’s air support, the ground campaign proved to be anything but easy. The Libyan army did not back down vis-à-vis the air-campaign, although the fall of Benghazi could be avoided and the front stabilised. But the Rebels were poorly organised and trained, and in the open field, they could hardly withstand an assault of Gaddafi’s forces. The CIA sent clandestine personnel into Libya to improve the rebels’ military effectiveness, serving as advisers, C2 assets, trainers, etc., to gather intelligence about the various rebel factions and their motives and to identify and designate the targets for the air strikes. They were soon to be accompanied by French, British and Italian personnel. But as the situation of the rebels proved to be more disorganised and chaotic than anticipated, the military situation remained tense: they advanced in the immediate aftermath of air strikes and lost the ground as soon as Gaddafi’s troops returned. It took until May that the rebels were able to withstand Gaddafi’s troops, but before they had to abandon Ajdabiya and leave a besieged Misurata behind. This adverse course of the war was hardly anticipated. The U.S. switched to a supporting role as of 4 April, after NATO had taken over command of the mission, which

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1393 NATO Warns Rebels Against Attacking Libyan Civilians, New York Times Online, 21 March 2011;
1395 Britain Sending Military Advisers to Libya, New York Times Online, 19 April 2011; As British Help Libyan Rebels, Aid Goes to a Divided Force, New York Times Online, 19 April 2011; Francia, Italia y Reino Unido darán formación militar a los rebeldes en suelo libio, La Vanguardia Digital, 20 April 2011; France and Italy Will Also Send Advisers to Libya Rebels, New York Times Online, 20 April 2011;
1396 Rebel Leadership in Libya Shows Strain, New York Times Online, 3 April 2011; Rebel Leader Criticizes NATO Effort in Libya, New York Times Online, 4 April 2011;
meant that the bulk of the strike missions would be transferred to European air forces, and the U.S. would contribute their unique support capabilities regarding intelligence, air refuelling, situation awareness and reconnaissance. But the remaining European allies quickly had problems finding enough aircraft and later enough munition to continue with the strike operation at a rate that indeed made a difference on the ground.

NATO, on the other hand, tried to put up the pressure on Gaddafi himself, extending the military campaign to target the Libyan leadership in Tripoli, without success, and offering Gaddafi free exile, which he rebuffed. A discussion on whether to equip the rebels with heavy weapons came up, but was quickly turned down due to doubts on whether the rebels could really administer and track these weapons once delivered. But economic and financial aid was granted to the rebels, especially from European states and organisations.

But it was not until mid-May that the siege of Misurata was lifted, mid-June that the rebels could launch their first relevant offensives, gaining ground permanently. It took them until August to reach Tripoli, which was heavily embattled during this month, and until mid-October to take the last remaining strongholds of the Gaddafi regime, most notable his hometown Sirte, where he was finally shot and the tribal homes of his key security personnel. The NATO mandate ended at the end of October, hence, the war lasted eight months for NATO. The results were mixed. The use of ground forces could, with the exception of covert Special Forces teams, be avoided. That was a clear success and showed critics that, if local allies on the ground were available, a military intervention does not necessarily have to be a huge comprehensive wide-area security operation that has to last for decades. It also showed that leading from behind was possible and that the U.S. could achieve results

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1398 U.S. Moving to a Support Role in Libya, New York Times Online, 4 April 2011;
1401 U.S. and Allies Seek a Refuge for Qaddafi, New York Times Online, 16 April 2011;
1402 Inferior Arms Hobble Rebels in Libya War, New York Times Online, 20 April 2011;
1403 Development Coalition Looks to Aid North Africa, New York Times Online, 19 May 2011;
1406 U.N. Votes to End Foreign Intervention in Libya, New York Times Online, 27 October 2011; Rasmussen zum Ende des Nato-Einsatzes in Libyen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 31 October 2011;
cheaper if it had allies – both intervening and local fractions on the ground. On the other hand, it also showed the limitations of the European allies, who depended on U.S. support for conducting the operation. How could Europe be self-reliant in defence if a limited air campaign against a small northern-African dictator was beyond the reach of their military capabilities?

After the downfall of the Gaddafi-regime, the next big challenge was regime transition or transition management. As noted, there were indeed Islamist elements within the rebels, and if the intervention was to improve the strategic situation in North Africa, someone more reliable and much less of an internationalist-Islamist agitator than Gaddafi should take up the post. Already during the military campaign, the gamble about the future political order and internal power structure of Libya was on. Of course, Western diplomats tried from the start to influence this process, and their military support for the rebels gave them increasing information on the facts on the ground and some leverage in the process. The first and immediate goal was to restrain the rebels in lynching the affiliate families and tribesman of the Gaddafi regime, in order to avoid further vengeance and tribal warfare. The leader of the Transition Council, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, a former minister of Justice, was said to be cooperative. France, Britain and the U.S. put their trust in him exactly as in the later interim prime minister, Abdel Rahim al-Kib. But still, the rebel military apparatus was a quite loose organisation, bound together only by personal ties. To back the transitional government and to strengthen their influence on it, Cameron, Sarkozy and later Clinton travelled to Tripoli to go throw plans for the transition and the aid packages to be delivered to Libya. The transition plan foresaw the creation of an interim government and general elections within eight months.

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1407 Early military lessons from Libya, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 17, No. 34, September 2011;
1408 Islamists’ Growing Sway Raises Questions for Libya, New York Times Online, 14 September 2011; In Libya, Former Enemy is Recast in Role of Ally, New York Times Online, 1 September 2011;
1409 Rebels bereiten Stunde null in Tripolis vor, Gadhafis Regime scheint täglich schwächer zu werden, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 6 August 2011; After Uprising, Rebels Face a Struggle for Unity, New York Times Online, 22 August 2011; Rebels’ Assault on Tripoli Began With Careful Work Inside, New York Times Online, 22 August 2011;
1410 As Qaddafi Forces Retreat, a Newly Freed Imam Encourages Forgiveness, New York Times Online, 26 August 2011;
1411 Rebels’ Sudden Success Sends European Backers Scrambling, New York Times Online, 22 August 2011; Cameron and Sarkozy in Tripoli to Meet New Libyan Leaders, New York Times Online, 15 September 2011;
1412 Ein Geschäftsmann wird Chef der libyschen Übergangsregierung, Bis Ende November soll das temporäre Kabinett gebildet werden, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 31.10.2011;
1413 Cameron and Sarkozy in Tripoli to Meet New Libyan Leaders New York Times Online, 15 September 2011; Die Uno umarmt neue libysche Führung, Flagge der Rebellion weht in New York – Obama, Ban und Sarkozy wollen helfen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 September 2011; Clinton erstmals seit Gadhafis Sturz in Libyen, Amerikanische Aussenministerin stockt Millionenhilfe leicht auf, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 18 October 2011;
1414 Libyan Rebels Clarify Steps to New Rule, New York Times Online, 3 October 2011; Ein Geschäftsmann wird Chef der libyschen Übergangsregierung, Bis Ende November soll das temporäre Kabinett gebildet werden, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 31.10.2011; Libyen macht sich auf in demokratische Zukunft, Neue Führung verspricht
ternal attention shifted towards Syria, little is known of the backdoor work of France, Britain and the U.S. to secure transition. With Rahim al-Kib, a secular and former attendant of the University of Alabama, the United States had indeed someone trustful in charge. The general elections in Libya in August 2012, breaking the trend in the Arab revolution, saw the victory of relatively secular and moderate parties. It is open to discussion, whether this can be regarded as the success of Western support or as a natural reaction against the old government: as Gaddafi was pan-Islamist, they now voted secular, contrary to Egypt and Tunisia, where the former dictators were rather secular, which helped Islamist forces to assume power.

Concerning the U.S. policy towards the region, the intervention in Libya was quite an important decision. First, the U.S. did not commit major forces and did not engage themselves in a prolonged 'wide-area' security operation. This was in line with the aim of retrenchment and re-focusing of U.S. efforts explained earlier in this thesis. Second, the U.S. could or would not commit themselves to multiple new theatres of war. Engagement in Libya precluded U.S. military involvement in Syria. This has to be recognised, especially when debating the war below. It appears, that ultimately the decision to engage in Libya and not in Syria was rather taken in Paris and London than Washington. America's European allies had some reasons to do so: geographic proximity of the theatre of war was one. Then it was much easier to isolate the war-theatre from 'problematic' support emerging from Turkey and the Gulf States. Thus the chances for success were higher. But of course, in the overall struggle for the future political and social order(s) of the Middle East, Libya was a rather marginal battleground. Syria was rather at the core of these issues, but – as described below – a much more difficult theatre of war.

5.4.2. The Syrian Civil War

The last theatre of the turmoil that rattled the Middle East and proved to be a challenge for the U.S. foreign policy was the civil war in Syria. Unlike in Libya, the United States did not intervene in this war, at least to the time this paper was concluded. But like before, intervention was debated in the foreign policy circles.

The Syrian civil war was overshadowed by other events in the Region, especially the discussion about an intervention in Libya. In March 2011, protests and larger demonstrations were a daily routine in Syria and the regime already used security forces to put them down; but at

Wahlen binnen acht Monaten, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 22 October 2011;
1415 Election Results in Libya Break an Islamist Wave, New York Times Online, 8 July 2012;
that time the level of violence used was rather low. The government of Bashir al Assad pledged to initiate some reforms in order to satisfy the protesters, but those reforms remained mere announcements. As the protest movement could not be quelled, the use of force by the government became more brutal and frequent, and the confrontations turned harder and more intense over time. By the end of April, the fronts were hardened, with various opposition groups calling for regime change. The regime, however, was determined not to give up that power, whatever the costs. But there was no war yet.

There were considerations whether the United States were to act against Syria. But the task would not be easy. On the one hand, the government of Assad was a key Iranian ally, nurturing several terrorist organisations that acted against Israel. Peace negotiations with Israel had stalled long ago. On the other hand, a further escalation might destabilise Lebanon and Jordan, and the anti-Israeli rhetoric of Assad’s government was often understood as a move to satisfy the more radical religious opposition. It might be speculated, whether they would be swept to power by an intervention. When the Syrian government shut the connection to the outside world and the internet, information on the situation on the ground was largely obtained from refugees. As learnt from the Iraq campaign, this was not the most reliant source. French intelligence was said to be good, but at the time focussed on Libya, and later on West-Africa.

The international situation was different to the Libyan case, too. NATO was already committed to Libya, and as the war showed, the capacity of the European allies was stretched to the very limits. Any parallel operation against Syria would be a primarily an American operation. This would have to be concluded in parallel with the other operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. For a president who won his election with the credo that two wars were already one enough, waging four was not quite an option. Equally, Russia and China showed their discon-

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1416 In Syria, Tension and Grief After Protests and Official Retaliation, New York Times Online, 26 March 2011; Zwanzig Demonstranten bei syrischer Stadt Dama getötet, Sicherheitskräfte lösen Proteste in Damaskus auf, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 25 March 2011;
1419 In Syria, Protesters and Government Mobilize for Friday, New York Times Online, 21 April 2011; Zahlreiche Oppositionelle in Syrien verhaftet, Ruf nach Sturz des Regimes wird lauter, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 April 2011;
1420 See for these considerations: Unrest in Syria and Jordan Poses New Test for U.S. Policy, New York Times Online, 26 March 2011; Obama acusa a Siria de colaborar con Iran para reprimir las protestas, Bashar el Assad reprime de nuevo las manifestaciones de los reformistas en el país, Al menos 112 muertos en las revueltas del viernes, La Vanguardia Digital, 23 April 2011;
1421 Exiles Shaping World’s Image of Syria Revolt, New York Times Online, 23 April 2011;
tent with NATO’s interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1973 by vetoing any attempt to draft a somehow more critical resolution on Syria.\footnote{Keine gemeinsame Syrien-Erklärung. Länder des Uno-Weltsicherheitsrats können sich nicht einigen, 28 April 2011;} To act against Syria, the United States would have to act unilaterally, or the coalition of the willing would lack a U.N. mandate for an intervention. And given the previous discussion on Iraq this was to be avoided.

Since the Syrian government did not expect international pressure, the situation escalated by autumn 2011.\footnote{Zahlreiche Oppositionelle in Syrien verhaftet, Ruf nach Sturz des Regimes wird lauter, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 24 April 2011; Signs of Chaos in Syria’s Intense Crackdown, New York Times Online, 12 May 2011; Syrian Police Open Fire on Protesters, Killing 17, New York Times Online, 20 May 2011; Syrian Troops Retake Control of Rebellious Town in North, New York Times online, 12 June 2011; Violent Clashes as Thousands Protest in Cities Across Syria, New York Times online, 17 June 2011; Activists Using Video to Bear Witness in Syria, New York Times Online, 18 June 2011; Syria’s Ailing Economy Poses a Threat to Assad, New York Times Online, 23 June 2011; Syrian Troops Storm Town on Turkish Border, New York Times Online, 23 June 2011; Blunt Anthem Tells Syrian Leader It’s Time to Go, New York Times online, 21 July 2012; Death Toll Is Said to Double in Center of Syrian Revolt, New York Times Online, 4 August 2011;} As the situation got tense, the city of Hama grew into the centre of the military resistance against the Assad regime.\footnote{In Scarred Syria City, a Vision of a Life Free From Dictators, New York Times Online, 19 July 2011; Syrian Protests Build in Central City of Hama, New York Times Online, 1 July 2011;} The siege and the re-taking of Hama in July/August was the first time the Syrian army had to resort to a full-scale combined arms operation to crush the opposition.\footnote{Syrian Forces Renew Strike on Restive City of Hama, New York Times Online, 1 August 2011; Syria Forces Open Assault on Eastern City, New York Times Online, 7 August 2011;} Hama was not chosen by accident as the centre of gravity of the resistance, and the offensive on Hama became a turning point in many ways. The upraise of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 in Syria was also centred around Hama, which was subsequently destroyed by Assad’s father, leaving between 10,000 and 30,000 dead on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood.\footnote{Kathrin Nina Wiedl: The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences, Munich, 2007;} It was also the centre of radical Sunni Islam in Syria. And with the Hama offensive, the Syrian revolution turned towards a sectarian civil war: the Sunni took the centre stage of the opposition, vowing to turn down the Alevi government of Assad. The Alevis, which include most of the Syrian Kurds, the Christians and other minorities, who fear repression, if not extermination, in case of a Sunni victory, started rallying behind the government – not in support of the ruling family but rather to avoid the alternative.\footnote{New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria, New York Times online, 24 July 2011; Fearing Change, Many Christians in Syria Back Assad, New York Times Online, 27 September 2011;} Like in other sectarian conflicts, the level of violence increased considerably.\footnote{Syrian Troops Conduct New Raids Against Protesters, New York Times Online, 5 September 2011; Syriens Armei rückt mit Panzern in Homs ein, Sicherheitskräfte töten mindestens sieben Menschen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 7 September 2011; Syrisches Militär stürmt Grenzregion zur Türkei, Offenbar Hunderte von Soldaten an der Operation beteiligt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 September 2011; In Shift, Iran’s President Calls for End to Syrian Crackdown, New York Times Online, 8 September 2011;} And the violence gave the Sunni (and/or) Arab states a good pretence to make their cause. The Arab
League condemned the actions, and Turkey’s government pledged to unite and support the opposition forces fighting Assad. Turkey was eager to gain American support for the Turkish cause and, in September 2011, Turkish officials were quoted saying that Ankara and Washington were already planning the time after Assad. The United States and the European Union implemented sanctions against Syria, including an oil embargo. But as Russia and China vetoed any sanction against Syria in the U.N. Security Council, the Syrian government easily found substitutes for their lost customers, rendering the sanctions almost useless.

In Syria, deserting soldiers from the Syrian Army joined the ranks of the rebels, triggering further military retaliation against the rebels, committed by the core that remained loyal to the regime. Attempts to bring the two sides to the negotiating table were overshadowed by violence. Reluctantly, in December 2011, Syria agreed to observers sent from the Arab League, who reported to the U.N., too. The observers, however, did not change the facts on the ground and the U.N. Security Council still remained divided on the issue.

The appearance of suicide bombers to target persons and facilities of the Syrian regime in Damascus was a clear sign that the rebels received support by Islamist internationalists, such as...

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1429 Chef der Arabischen Liga verschiebt Syrien-Besuch, Erneut Tote bei Protesten gegen das Regime von Präsident Asad, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 7 September 2011; Arabische Liga für Aussetzung der Mitgliedschaft Syriens, Auch Jemen soll ausgeschlossen werden, Neue Zürcher Zeitung online, 20 September 2011;
1430 Planen für ein Syrien ohne Asad, Die USA und die Türkei wollen gemeinsam einen Bürgerkrieg verhindern, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 21 September 2011; Slapping at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters, New York Times Online, 27 October 2011;
1432 Europe’s Oil Embargo Leaves Syria Urgently Seeking New Customers, New York Times Online, 27 September 2011;
1433 UNO-Sanktionen gegen Syrien vorerst vom Tisch, Die Presse Online, 29 September 2011; Uno-Sicherheitsrat uneins über Gewalt in Syrien, Russland stellt sich quer - Botschafter verlangt erneut Untersuchung zu Libyen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 23 December 2011;
1434 «Gezielte Sanktionen müssen trotzdem erfolgen», Reaktionen nach Scheitern einer Uno-Resolution gegen Syrien, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 5 October 2011;
1435 Syrische Stadt Rastan von Asads Truppen zerstört, Viele Deserteure im Zentrum der Ortschaft verschlankt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1 October 2011; Key Syrian City Takes On the Tone of a Civil War, New York Times Online, 1 October 2011; Syrische Armee tötet «viele» Deserteure, Blutiger Kampf um die Ortschaft Rastan, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 2 October 2011; Massenfestnahmen ins syrischer Stadt Rastan, Sohn des Muftis von Syrien getötet, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 October 2011; Berichte über Tötung von Deserteuren, In Syrien sollen an der Grenze zur Türkei gegen 70 Soldaten umgebracht worden sein, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 20 December 2011;
1436 Syrien nimmt Friedensplan an, Abzug der Truppen versprochen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 3 November 2011; At Least 15 Are Killed, Activists Say, as Syria’s Stand on Talks Is Tested, New York Times Online, 4 November 2011;
as Al Qa’ida,\textsuperscript{1438} or, in other words, that the Gulf States exported their militant pan-Islamist fighters to Syria. An additional source of Islamist recruits was Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, whose experienced fighters joined the ranks of the rebels.\textsuperscript{1439} Later, increasingly religious militancy and pan-Islamist influences were recorded among the rebels.\textsuperscript{1440} Also politically, the Gulf States tried to increase the pressure on Damascus.\textsuperscript{1441} Turkey was most outspoken in favour of intervention, which with the backing of the Gulf increasingly supported the opposition with money and arms, provided training and safe havens for opposition forces.\textsuperscript{1442} Clashes with Syrian forces at the border and the shooting down of a Turkish reconnaissance plane by Syria further heated the tensions between Ankara and Damascus.\textsuperscript{1443} Turkey called upon NATO to discuss the incident, hoping to rally the alliance behind Turkey’s position. According to Turkey’s foreign minister Davutoglu, the plane was on a routine training flight and downed over international waters.\textsuperscript{1444} American information on the flight – the U.S. monitored the airspace along the Turkish-Syrian border – indicated that the Turkish plane was well in Syrian airspace, most probably conducting a reconnaissance mission.\textsuperscript{1445} As Turkey provided intelligence to the rebels, downing the plane seems reasonable to Damascus. Turkey, unable or insecure to act on its own in Syria, seemed to relatively bluntly try to rally NATO behind its interests. Such behaviour did not quite raise Ankara’s standing among the allies.

On the other hand, Iran was increasingly engaged to help the Syrian regime to survive.\textsuperscript{1446} The Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iraq, fearing an extension of Turkish influence, played an important role as interlink. Iraq itself seemed to be very tolerant to the shipments coming through its country.\textsuperscript{1447} The tacit support of the Alevi government of Syria by the Shi’ite government in Baghdad was another sign of the sectarian division in the region, which increased the danger of regional escalation.\textsuperscript{1448} With the American troops gone and the internal instability still

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\textsuperscript{1438} Syria Says Suicide Bombers Attack in Damascus, New York Times Online, 23 December 2011;
\textsuperscript{1439} Syrian Rebels to bound to Al Qaeda Play Key Role in War, New York Times Online, 8 December 2012;
\textsuperscript{1440} Sunni Extremists May Be Aiding Al Qaeda’s Ambitions in Syria, Analysts Say, New York Times Online, 15 February 2012;
\textsuperscript{1441} Katar fordert Entsendung arabischer Truppen nach Syrien. Forderung des Emirs - Zahl der Todesopfer steigt weiter an, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 January 2011; Araber können sich nicht auf Strategie für Syrien einigen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung online, 29 March 2012;
\textsuperscript{1442} Despite Bold Talk on Syria, Turkey Sees Limits of Its Power, New York Times Online, 16 March 2012; U.S. and Turkey to Step Up ‘Nonlethal’ Aid to Rebels in Syria, New York Times online, 25 March 2012; Türkei fordert harten Kurs gegenüber Asad, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1 April 2012;
\textsuperscript{1443} Turkey to Consult NATO Over Downing of Jet by Syria, New York Times Online, 24,06.2012; Turkey Says It May Target Any Syrian Forces Nearing Border, New York Times Online, 26 June 2012;
\textsuperscript{1444} Turkey’s frustrations grow with Syrian Civil War, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 18, No. 37, October 2012;
\textsuperscript{1445} Iran unterstützt laut USA syrische Führung mit Waffen, Obama berät sich mit Erdogan über Lage in Damaskus, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 14 January 2012;
\textsuperscript{1446} Iran Suppuling Syrian Military via Iraqi Airspace, New York Times Online, 4 September 2012;
\textsuperscript{1447} Syrian Conflict Poses the Risk of Wider Strife, New York Times Online, 25 February 2012; Syria’s Sectarian Fears Keep Region on Edge, New York Times Online, 28 February 2012;
\end{flushleft}
looming, the Situation indeed grew difficult for the Iraqi government. Baghdad was neither in a position to confront Iran, nor were Saudi Arabia or Turkey in such a position vis-à-vis Syria. Any prominent support for one side would threaten internal stability. Similarly, Iraq was not in a position to mediate, since neither Iran nor Turkey nor Saudi Arabia regarded it as strong or independent.

In the U.N. Security Council, Russia and China still blocked any attempt of putting international pressure on Syria. Russia continued supplying Syria with arms and munition and was not willing to accept any proposals that would remove Assad from power. Especially Russia’s new-old President Putin wanted to show the domestic audience that he would not give in to the West or be fooled by another no-flight zone. Furthermore, in Syria was the only port left for Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean. Although Russia had no commercial or security interest in the Mediterranean, it stuck to its naval presence to show the domestic audience that it was still a major power.

The situation was tricky, indeed. How should the United States act? In hindsight, the ‘window of opportunity’ to engage in the conflict without boosting radical Islamist fractions to power probably was in March to May 2011. At that time sectarian mobilisation was low, so was the Islamists’ influence within the opposition. But at that time, NATO’s involvement in Libya reached its climax. Both theatres could hardly be served simultaneously.

The Republican opposition wanted a stronger support for the Syrian opposition, calling upon the U.S. to support them with arms and military equipment. Their argument followed, unusually for Republicans, the cause for a humanitarian intervention, as Assad’s regime was accused of crimes against humanity. On the other hand, Republican politicians failed to explain how to forge an anti-Assad coalition without radical Islamist elements.

Within the U.S. government, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed to be most active on behalf of the Syrian opposition. Meeting regularly with their representatives and consulting
with Turkey, she managed to give financial support to the rebels. In attempted U.N. resolutions, the United States wanted to be critical of the Syrian government. But besides the question of how to condemn Assad, there was little more detail how to convince him to step down or how to proceed without him. In the wake of the Euro crisis and austerity policies in Europe, it is hardly imaginable that the European nations would join another air campaign against Syria. But particularly French intelligence services had deep insight into Syria, which is of crucial importance for managing the inter-fractional disputes and influencing the heterogeneous rebel forces. The support of French and British Special Forces and secret services in Libya was vital to strengthen those non-Islamist rebel groups that one intends to cooperate with later on. How to proceed without their help?

Moreover, the regional implications for the tense sectarian situation in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq increased the worries of the United States. With Turkey escalating military operations against the Kurds and the United States presumably on the side of Sunni insurgent forces in the neighbourhood, the Shi’ite leadership in Baghdad was everything but pleased. This again poses the question of how valuable would or should Iraq be in the American Middle East architecture? And which place would Turkey hold? After all of Erdoğan’s manoeuvres, could the U.S. still trust Turkey? Could a military operation and subsequent reconstruction effort rest on Turkey and the Gulf States? Or would such a move further escalate the sectarian tensions across the whole region?

This question has remained without answering until today. As the onslaught in Syria goes on and regional divisions deepen, the place of the United States in the new emerging order of the Middle East will be one of the most puzzling questions of the next administration.

5.5. Chapter Conclusion

Obama started essentially as a populist without having a particular vision for grand strategy. Making populist promises was the strategy for claiming power, and for a short time he seemed to have thought that this was the case also in foreign policy, that he could solve problems with capturing speeches. The Middle East is the perfect showcase that it takes more than words and speeches to solve the problem. The other strategic mistake made because of populist promises was to focus the discussion about retrenchment on the withdrawal from Iraq, while wasting

1456 Syrian War’s Spillover Threatens a Fragile Iraq, New York Times Online, 25 September 2012;
assets in Afghanistan. The administration knew from the start what kind of challenges it would face if it tried to win in Afghanistan. Of course the armed forces had a strong bureaucratic interest in not leaving the country as a vindicated force. But a president should make decisions beyond bureaucratic politics. If it is true that the United States knew of Osama's hideout in Pakistan when he came to power, a 'first out of Afghanistan strategy' could have been applied. It should be remembered that Iraq had a strategic perspective as an important future ally in the Gulf region: situated at the heart of the region, able to influence various sectarian and ethnic groups throughout the Middle East, resources on its own that could make Iraq influential for years to come. The struggle in Afghanistan on the other hand was for the sake of prestige at best. Al Qa'ida had long deployed their infrastructure to Somalia, Mali and Pakistan. The Taliban played on widespread dissatisfaction with the Karzai regime rather than on internationalist Islam to recruit their followers. To be fair, by not negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement beyond 2011, the Bush administration had laid the foundation for this strategic blunder! In Afghanistan proper, the president clearly missed a chance to remove one of the biggest obstacles for peace in the country – Hamid Karzai – after it became clear that the presidential elections in Afghanistan were manipulated in 2009.

Obama's 'reset' policy towards Russia was another failure, and the shift in missile defence probably another one in the making. Obama misjudged the nature of the Russian regime and the reasons for disagreements between the two states. However, this mistake is repeated in many Western countries, particularly in Germany.

But the president seemed to have learnt. Furthermore, the democratic elites that seized power with the president should not be dismissed as incapable. To refocus America's role as an offshore balancer that orchestrates alliances and plays the role of the tip on the balance of power takes off some of the burden of the United States. Particularly in Asia, this strategy works well: Obama's Asia policy is more sound and sustainable than Bush's. In Libya the U.S. showed the world that limited but well-planned military action, conducted with local and regional allies, can achieve similar results as large-scale 'wide-area security operations' following the 'comprehensive approach'. However, the costs differ vastly and favour the new policy.

The role of the U.S. as an offshore balancer (selective engagement) with a particular focus on East Asia was the consensus between the two big drivers of foreign policy within the U.S. ad-

1458 Allin, Jones, *Weary Policeman*, p. 77ff.
1459 The Western European assistance in rebuilding and restructuring the Russian arms industry and the armed forces has to be regarded as one of the most dangerous mistakes in this regard. (See: Russia aims to enhance cooperation with Italy, Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 January 2013, p. 20). If ('old') Europe feeds its own enemies, what can or should the U.S. do in this case?
ministration: the Department of Defence under Robert Gates and later Leon Panetta and the State Department under Hillary Clinton. Now that the strategic consensus bears fruit, both departments will be headed by new leaders. It is uncertain whether selective engagement will remain the strategy of choice for Obama’s second term, or whether the liberal arm within the Democratic Party will strike back. Additionally, the role of bureaucratic politics should not be underestimated regarding the Pacific pivot. The bureaucracy was particularly unhappy with Bush’s transformative agenda, and a Pacific pivot would require a totally different set of forces and military (and political) thinking – more suitable to the interests of the defence bureaucracies and some industries (aircraft- and shipbuilding). Hence not surprisingly the first critiques on focusing only on Iraq and Afghanistan came from within the military.

The president himself seems not to give that many impulses in foreign policy. As with the health care debate, the recent gun control debate\textsuperscript{1460} suggests that Obama’s ambition is rather to re-define the President’s role in domestic politics rather than defining his political role or ideological setting through foreign policy. Concerning East Asia, the new American role in the Western Pacific was facilitated by an increasingly assertive and aggressive China. However, in autumn 2012 a new generation of leaders claimed power in Beijing.\textsuperscript{1461} They may well reverse the course of the Chinese foreign policy, easing tensions with its neighbours in the future. This would make the U.S. role much more difficult: an assertive China rallies East and Southeast Asian states around Washington, while a more conciliatory China can make full use of the attractiveness of its market and economic power. Although very recent developments in the East China Sea indicate the contrary.

Concerning military affairs the Obama administration had much more realistic approaches to war and warfare. They stopped the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and re-focussed military procurement and R&D to platforms suitable for war. This re-arrangement in defence matters does not refer too much to budgetary changes, but to reshuffling R&D-targets, procurement priorities, armament-programmes, doctrines, training, and operational procedures. The armed forces should again become a suitable tool to shape the decisions of other state actors. In the long run, these reforms will probably enable the U.S. to wage the next hegemonic war. As mentioned before, one may debate whether the Obama-administration or the defence bureaucracy deserves the credit for this change of policy. At some occasions, even the bureaucracy may be right.

\textsuperscript{1461} Ending Congress, China Presents New Leadership Headed by Xi Jinping, New York Times Online, 14 November 2012;
On the other hand, in the Middle East the renewed reliance on Saudi Arabia and Turkey casts long shadows on the future American foreign policy. Both countries adhere to a revisionist Islamism – the first more radical than the latter – and it will only be a matter of time, until this alliance will lead to some friction. One will see how much damage to the Western world both parties will inflict while being allied with the United States. All the efforts by the Bush administration to change the patterns of reliance in the Middle East were reversed. Again the U.S. is dependent on the Gulf States in deterring Iran and keeping an eye on the Middle East. Although energy independence will grant the U.S. more political freedom in the future, the rest of the world will probably still be dependent on Mideastern energy for the time being. In a region with increasing sectarian tension, the one-sided dependence on radical Sunni states also means turning an increasing blind eye on the treatment of Shi’ite groups by those states, as in Bahrain or the sponsoring of extremist elements in Syria by Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar and Turkey. While Shi’ite groups in Syria and Lebanon receive Irani support, others in the region by large do not. But increasing tensions and repression could grant Iran the long-thought role of the protector of the Shiah Teheran always claimed to be. The U.S. either feed their enemies or play into the hand of their enemies!

The outcome of the Arab Spring is hard to judge these days. Here, too, political Islam is on the advance. Although the Obama administration could do little to prevent their rise, the situation will be tense for the years to come. Actually Libya, where the West intervened, seems to be the least problematic case – although in relative terms. The rise of Islamic revisionism will have severe consequences for Israel and for Europe, the latter already threatened by Russian fascism in the East. They will have to pay the price for the Pacific pivot – either by rearming themselves or by falling pray to revisionist forces.

Recognising a problem and finding tangible policies to solve them are two separate issues, and in the Middle East any future U.S. policy would require hard choices of which any would have certain downsides. But on the other hand, such difficult situations are those where a leader may show his talents: persuading a reluctant domestic audience about the cause, rallying elite factions and evaluators behind the new foreign policy. However Obama, preoccupied with domestic policies, seems not to be such a leader. Past foreign-policy initiatives – at least the sustainable ones, not happy speeches – emerged from the representatives of contending wings within the Democratic Party: Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta. Especially during his

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1462 American-trained and financed Tuareg-battalions in Mali joining Islamists overrunning the country for example! One may guess why the U.S. was tempted to train and finance tribes closely associated with the Islamist rebels, but enjoying ties to Rhiad? Panetta Says U.S. Still in Talks With French Over Mali Aid, New York Times Online, 15 January 2013; U.S. Sees Hazy Threat From Mali Militants, New York Times Online, 16 January 2013;
second-term, when Obama replaced those with people of its own choices, the foreign-policy profile of his administration dropped considerably.  

There have been considerable disagreements concerning the Middle-East policies amongst the Obama-administration. In the Pacific, the Secretary of Defence or State were more active or outspoken than the president. Obama removed those personalities from his administration in the second term, and replaced them with people who would hardly outshine him. He adopted a very harsh stand towards leaking administrative personnel\(^{1463}\) as well as criticism from within the administration. To the author, this suggests a rather narcissistic personality, if not outright arrogance. Governance is a team sport, and especially if the team consists of strong players, a team leader has to manage the differences and difficulties amongst those players. Referring to international relations theory, leadership personality still matters.\(^{1464}\)  

But beside the issues of leadership and intra-gouvernmental rivalries, the strategic design of the administration was sound. Both the shift of the centre of gravity towards the Pacific as well as the disengagement from the Middle East were understandable in a long-term perspective. Despite of considerable domestic pressure, the administration refrained from getting entangled in various internal power-struggles in the Middle East. It stuck to the concept of selective engagement and leading through rallying allied support. The examples of Libya and Syria – described earlier – illustrate the practical implications of this U.S. grand strategy – including its upsides and downsides. Furthermore, the United States cannot bare every burden in the international system. Balancing China, containing Russia, fostering political change in the middle East, disarming Iran and North Korea – all that cannot be achieved at once. To foster a consensus amongst allied nations to commonly address these issues was identified as an important task. Although, given recent discoveries on the extent of U.S. spying on allied nations, the administration might not do its strategy a favour. And indeed concerning some issues criticised above – the withdrawal from Iraq, the focus on Afghanistan, underestimating Russian fascism – the blame has to be shared with allies, not supporting the United States in mastering this difficult tasks.

\(^{1462}\) Another Chilling Leak Investigation, New York Times Online, 21. May 2013;  
\(^{1463}\) Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War, a theoretical analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 16-41;
6. Conclusion

Bush’s and Obama’s strategic designs had their merits and their follies. While Bush’s follies were visible on the short-term horizon, Obama’s will become visible in the decades to come. When analysing the long, medium and short-term thinking, every grand strategy had their inconsistencies. The relations to Taiwan are a prominent inconsistency by both administrations: both try to accomplish a sort of long-term military containment of China – Bush to a much lesser extent than Obama – but avoid increasing tensions with China by delivering advanced weapons systems to Taipei. While the pro-democracy rhetoric was much more prominent with the Bush administration, both administrations supported authoritarian regimes, where this was considered necessary: Bush in Pakistan, Obama in Saudi-Arabia. Then again, both let down key allies in the name of democracy, Bush with Musharraf in 2008, Obama with Mubarak in 2011.

The policy towards East Asia was judged a success for both presidents, although Bush’s economic policy towards China was hardly sustainable. Both presidents tried to reach out to Russia in the beginning, but later realised that outreach to Russia was illusive because of Moscow’s peculiar regime characteristics. Obama was rather willing to give in to Moscow, basically because Europe’s security would from now on be a European affair.

The big difference was to be found in the two administrations’ Mid-East policies. For Bush, the primary objective was to contain or defeat radical Islamist revisionism by reshuffling the regional order of the Middle East. The Obama administration had much more narrow goals in the region: containing Iran and avoiding a regional nuclear arms races. However, the Obama administration was confronted more with developments evolving in the region rather than being able to shape them by themselves.

Thus, obviously the biggest difference between the two administrations was caused by the time and the circumstances they were in power. Bush was the last U.S. president of the post-Cold War era, who could enjoy the unipolar moment to reshape world affairs. His actions to a certain extent contributed to the early end of this era: the costly and disputed invasion in Iraq, tax reductions and housing bills (to enable poor people cheaper access to housing mortgages, later to accumulate in a housing-bubble and banking crisis) massively increased sovereign debts and reduced the freedom of manoeuvre for any U.S. administration. The Obama administration was acting in a much more contested environment and had to weigh conflicting foreign and domestic demands against each other. The U.S. was shifting from promotive to pre-
servative adaptation – the first sign of the dawn of a polycentristic world. Despite of increasing domestic and international constraints, the president and its administration still have many choices in foreign policy. Many issues can be dealt with the one way or the other. Especially in the Middle East, these decisions are particularly tricky, as each policy variant has considerable side-effects. However, comparing the two leaders in person, one issue seems to be the biggest difference: Bush was very confident that the U.S. could manage adverse or unintended consequences of his decisions – sometimes he was overly confident in this regard. While Obama seems to be overly afraid of those consequences, therefore avoiding decisions. If then there are no other members within the administration to push for certain policies, U.S. grand strategy seems to tilt towards isolationism by default.

6.1. Verification and falsification of the Hypotheses

The hypotheses are verified and falsified with the help of the scheme described in Chapter 2 and added in appendix 7.1. Therefore all relevant fields in the table are filled with the results from chapter 3 and chapter 5 respectively. Then, distinguishing sources and levels of change according to Hermann,\(^{1465}\) the amount of change is categorised and counted.

![Change in U.S. Foreign Policy](image)

The table above illustrates the total amount of policy changes, categorised in sources and levels. The category X depicts an issue that is not directly related to strategic or policy de-

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\(^{1465}\) Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, p. 3-31;
cisions, mostly referring to changes in the international system or domestic society which are indicated in the scheme. Such changes are somehow addressed in further policies or strategic changes, but do not directly cause them. Other authors might call them policy-changes due to external shocks and refer to the respective fields only. Nonetheless, chapter 4 is about foreign-policy choice and tries to capture that even under harsh circumstances and external pressure, the president still has several choices to make. Consequently, a change within the strategic environment does not automatically pre-determine strategic or policy choices. If the national policy is changed and policy preferences within the presidential administration play a certain role in this adjustment, the decision is regarded as a decision by the presidential administration.

6.1.1. Hypothesis 1: Obama's successfully carried out “International Orientation Change” in U.S. foreign and security policy

International orientation change did occur (the respective fields in the table show it twelve times). But do they constitute an “International Orientation Change” of the United States’ foreign policy as such? Hermann, writing in 1990 on “international orientation change”, had collapsing communist regimes in mind, totally re-adjusting their entire domestic, economic, political and ideological foundations. Such a change did not occur in the United States. The author had to distinguish between normal changes of policy-goals (like changing the goals of the U.S. Asia policy) and decisions on further strategic goals that influence many or most other programme and policy decisions. The shift from primacy to selective engagement as preferred grand strategy had many consequences in regional policies, dealings with important individual states, goals and policies towards the international order as well as many regional orders, and the further development of the U.S. policy means (diplomatic apparatus, armament programmes, armed forces structures, etc.). Especially the U.S. Mid-East-policy was turned upside down. Direct military presence and direct drive for change (Mid-East peace, regime-reform or change, etc.) dominated U.S. Middle-Eastern policy since the end of the Cold War. Now, much like during the Cold War, the United States preferred an indirect approach, dealing with the region through allies and withdrawing their direct presence. Bush’s ‘Global War on Terror’ – the struggle against radical Islamic revisionism was at the hart of the entire grand strategy – was indeed the culmination of increasing U.S. engagement in the region. Obama set an end to this trend and tried to redirect U.S. foreign policy towards East Asia. Of course such a strategic shift could not be implemented overnight and took time to
materialise. But considering that events unfolding in Libya, Syrian and Egypt would have easily justified the continuation of the Mid-Eastern pivot, the strategic shift towards the Pacific exceeds mere “goal change”. The changes in domestic economic structures (especially those regarding U.S. energy policy) were considered too profound to be labelled goal-changes too. The United States became one of the most important energy exporters, able to shape regional energy markets by adding supplies (like Asia) and even influencing global energy markets with their domestic energy policy. Previously, the U.S. could influence global energy markets only via high-politics (militarily stabilising supply routes and regions baring strategic reserves). This was a major alternation of the U.S. in global economic structures. And even more important, it granted U.S. foreign policy certain freedom of action in world politics, reducing its dependence on the Middle East.

This changes are deeper and more profound than goal change in foreign-policy. However, it may be debated whether “International Orientation Change” can be attributed to the new foreign policy. As described below, despite of this profound changes, there still is a remarkable amount of continuity between the Bush and Obama administration. Therefore the hypothesis is rejected.

6.1.2. Hypothesis 2: Compared to Bush’s “grand strategy design”, Problem/Goal Changes are more frequent than Programme changes.

Yes they are more frequent. There are 34 programme changes and 63 problem/goal changes. They indicate that in most cases, the goals of certain policies were changed too, not just the means or procedures. On 24 occasions the presidential administration was main source of the change, external shocks account for the same number of problem/goal-changes. So far, the big picture indicates that President Obama brought upon considerable change in U.S. foreign policy.

But change should not be over-emphasised. First, many of the new goals the presidential administration has set were indirectly caused by shifts in the international environment. Of course in the particular situation the president could have decided in many ways, so he has to be credited (or criticised) for changing that particular goal. However, a revision of many regional policies were caused – among other things – by long term shift in the international environment the president would have to react upon – sooner or later.

Second, of the 181 policy issues directly related to governmental decisions, the administration did not change goals (by continuing a policy, changing only the quantity of the means or by
pursuing the same ends with new/different means) in 106 cases, while goals were changed in 75 cases. Consequently, despite of the significant amount of changes, a more careful analysis shows that continuity prevails in U.S. foreign policy.

6.1.3. Hypothesis 3: Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, leader driven change will outweigh change due to external shocks.

No, this hypothesis has to be falsified. 65 issues changed due to changes in the external environment, 51 due to demands and actions taken by the presidential administration. Of course one may argue that changes not directly related to decisions should not be included in the list. Setting up planning premises (the category where most DX are found) is part of a strategy planning process. Any administration has to analyse the respective international and domestic environment. By default this environment is subject to change over time. If the Obama administration has different premises than the Bush-administration, then this has to be noticed somewhere in the scheme. But these shifts in the international system as well as domestic societal and economic structures are not related or dependent on political choices by the administration (hence called ‘secular trends’). Whatever the ideological differences between Obama and Bush may be (and they are), the profound changes in the international system that occurred from 2000 to 2008 would have forced any president to rethink the premises of U.S. foreign politics.

6.1.4. Hypothesis 4: Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, leader driven change will outweigh bureaucratic advocacy.

Yes, the presidential administration was the bigger driver outlining the new grand strategy. As mentioned in 51 issues change and continuity was caused by the former. However with 43 issues referring rather to bureaucratic politics than to decision-making within the administration, the bureaucracy should not be underestimated. Decisions to a large extent influenced by the bureaucracy regard the use of covered interventions, such as cross-border drone-strikes, special-forces raids, etc. internet espionage and sabotage as well as wide-spread communication surveillance. They may also be responsible for keeping up the Guantanamo Bay prison camp. The president and most of his secretaries opposed these practices when they were in opposition or not having administrative posts. However once in power, they quickly learned that these problems were either of utmost importance for national security or that there were
profound administrative and legal hurdles to change or abandon them. This is a clear indication for bureaucratic politics. The bureaucracy tried to defend programmes, resources, competences and privileges, and in many ways, they got away with it.

Bureaucratic politics should not be underestimated when considering the changes in American defence policy. Rumsfield’s ‘new visions on defence’, circulating around network-centric warfare, effect-based approach to operations, revolutions in military affairs, etc. were highly controversial in the defence-establishment. Actually few people in the military ever supported them, they were rather pushed by external ‘experts’ and the defence industry. However, considering the feasibility and applicability of Rumsfeld’s visions, the bureaucracy was probably right. After this failures became obvious, the defence-bureaucracy faced little resistance reversing these ‘revolutions’ and getting back to normal (which sometimes meant success too).

Concerning missile defence, considerable bureaucratic and industrial interests have to be considered too. Actually Obama’s decisions regarding this issue were so errantly, that one can only suspect that ‘keeping missile defence alive somehow’ seemed to be the primary interests of U.S. Missile Defence policies. In his campaign, Obama was highly critical of missile defence. Coming to power he demanded changes. Changes were made, but they devalued the whole European arm of the undertaking without any gains for the United States. He probably wanted the system down, the bureaucracy wanted it to continue, so a system that exists but does barely work is the compromise.

Last but not least, the idea of the Pacific Pivot did emerge from within the Department of Defence and the State Department, not the president’s inner circle. The armed forces, especially the Navy and the Air Force were not particularly happy about fighting counterinsurgency-campaigns. They favoured a conventional enemy, and therefore regarded China and Russia as ‘reference-enemy’ when designing or planning new weapons systems or outlining long-term armament plans. Gates criticised his staffers for this on several locations. However once China behaved like a real military contender, the political elite suddenly accepted what the defence-bureaucracy was telling all the time: that the future world order and America’s place in the world will be defended or lost in the Western Pacific. Without China behaving this way, policy-changes would probably not have occurred – indicating “external shocks” as main driver.
6.1.5. Hypothesis 5: Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, domestic restructuring will outweigh change due to external shocks.

No, 41 policy-issues are primarily shaped by domestic changes. Domestic politics is the least important source of change (compared to 51 leader, 43 bureaucratic, and 65 external shock) – if bureaucratic politics are not included in domestic affairs. Actually domestic politics are the main source for continuity in U.S. foreign policy. Of these 41 issues 17 are labelled with continuity, seven with adjustment change (doing more or less of the same programme), and five with programme change (trying to achieve the same goal with different means). So 29 of 41 are on the conservative side, demanding at least the political goals to be maintained. Three have no direct impact on policies. Interests of domestic actors predominantly relate to trade, finances and armament-programmes (as these are important for regional labour markets, etc.). Despite of changing majorities in both houses, these demands stay relatively constant. This suggests that despite of all the bitter infighting and partisan battles over foreign policy, there still is some consensus about the role of the United States in world politics to build on. This of course rather refers to low-politics than high-politics, suggesting that those issues that touch the international audiences are still disputed domestically.

6.1.6: Hypothesis 6: Comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies, domestic restructuring will outweigh bureaucratic advocacy.

This hypothesis has to be falsified, although by a slight margin. In 41 items domestic restructuring was the main source of change and continuity, while in 43 it was bureaucratic advocacy. Again, in many cases, especially concerning the shape of the ruling apparatus or the allocation of means within this apparatus, the bureaucracy has much more interest in and is better suited to influence governmental decisions. Additionally the Bush administration has started several initiatives to reform both defence and foreign policy bureaucracy. After his departure, those fought back. As with domestic restructuring, the bureaucracy is on the conservative side (in terms of not changing programmes) too. In 34 of these 43 issues, the bureaucracy advocated continuity of the policy aims, in 26 cases the programmes as such too. The bureaucracy then is the biggest source of continuity amongst the players.
6.2. State of research

While the scope of the thesis was limited to Obama’s first term in office, world politics were not clam or static during his second term. Recent developments – especially in Ukraine – have validated the judgements and finding of this thesis (especially regarding the Russia-chapter in the appendix). Never the less, the thesis provides a preliminary assessment of the U.S. foreign policy in the beginning of the 21st century. Increasing information about the backgrounds of the decisions taken by President Bush as well as President Obama will further complete the mosaic of the strategies, intentions, goals and premises that guided this two leaders and their key administrative personnel. Either way, some key issues may be further debated.

6.2.1. The thesis’ contribution to the state of research

While the scope of the thesis was limited to Obama’s first term in office, world politics were not clam or static during his second term. Recent developments – especially in Ukraine – have validated the judgements and finding of this thesis (especially regarding the Russia-chapter in the appendix). Never the less, the thesis provides a preliminary assessment of the U.S. foreign policy in the beginning of the 21st century. Increasing information about the backgrounds of the decisions taken by President Bush as well as President Obama will further complete the mosaic of the strategies, intentions, goals and premises that guided this two leaders and their key administrative personnel. Either way, some key issues may be further debated.

The new scientific results brought forward by this thesis concern both methodology as well as the main issue of the research work:

1. Concerning methodology, comparison of non-contemporary foreign policies are of limited value, because the situations the different leaders or different states face account for most of the differences in their respective foreign policies.

2. Furthermore, the thesis proved that leaders may have more leverage in changing or shaping foreign policies if they carefully elaborate the existing alternatives or try to anticipate the consequences of their policies/actions. Implementation might prove more difficult than initially thought. If the government is aware of its alternatives, it might change course before too much resources are invested in futile causes. Furthermore in public debates, politicians often argue for their actions quoting that they “had no other choice”. The results of this thesis proved that it is not necessarily the most
useful way of communication. The author promotes that elaborating the alternative options and their perceived consequences – thereby explaining why they were not chosen – would be a far better promotion of the decision than sticking to the rhetoric of “zero-alternatives”.

3. The thesis proved that political leaders have a critical role in shaping foreign policy and bringing about change. Even if many changes are stimulated by external shocks or environmental developments (see hypothesis 3), leaders choose what they make of it in terms of politics. Domestic demands on the other hand, seem to call for continuity in most cases (see hypothesis 5 and 6). Therefore leaders need to mobilise their domestic audience for critical policies, which is an essential task of political leadership.

4. State bureaucracies have considerable leverage on in foreign policy decision making (see hypothesis 4 and 6). If visions of political leaders and bureaucratic interests align, policy-change will be implemented rather swiftly. If they do not, an administration might face an uphill battle, trying to influence or reform a large bureaucratic apparatus. This process is always time and labour intensive, which could inherently influence effective decision making. For a political leader, picking the right top administrative personnel able to lead and align the bureaucracy's goals with those of the government might be the even bigger test of the president's leadership skills than mobilising public opinion.

5. Regarding U.S. foreign policy as such, the thesis reviewed George W. Bush’s foreign policy beyond the emotional disappointments, bitterness, and partisan divisions that shaped the debate on U.S. foreign policy immediately after his departure. The dissertation verified that those issues that were thought to define the Bush-doctrine – like preemptive war, regime change, and enforced democratisation – were rather exceptions than the norm in his executed policies. Therefore they are seen as attempts to justify distinct moves (like the war in Iraq) but were not guidelines for general foreign policies.

The actual Bush-doctrine – enforcing peace in the Middle East from a position of strength – was a valid concept. Although when the Bush administration executed their policy they made a series of mistakes (e.g.: invading Iraq without proper plans or means for the post-invasion stages of the operation, insisting on election in the Gaza strip that propelled Hamas to power) that spoiled their strategic vision. The thesis is a contribution to a more nuanced and balanced discussion on U.S. foreign and security policies.

See for an elaborated critique of this kind of defensic behaviour: Ivan Krastev, In Distrust We Trust, Can Democracy Survive When We Don't Trust Our Leaders, TED Books, 2013;
policy during the Bush years.

6. As far as Obama’s foreign policy is considered, the author states that significant part of this thesis was written in 2012 and early 2013. At that time, the events in the Middle East were unfolding. The prediction, that the U.S. would hesitate to get involved in Syria because they can’t really trust the various opposition groups is conventional wisdom today, but was debated in 2012. The same is true for the U.S. “allies” in the region. The U.S. can rely neither on Turkey nor on Saudi-Arabia – as described in the thesis. Therefore a renewed containment policy against Iran is difficult to orchestrate. Regime-change is not a viable option for the U.S. for domestic reasons. Containment is very difficult to orchestrate, given the unreliability of regional allies. One of the remaining options is engagement. Obama has realised this and direct negotiations and détente with Iran is thought as an exit-strategy from the troubled Middle East. The thesis provides a lot of systematic considerations that may help explain recent decisions concerning the Middle East/Iran.

7. As events in Iraq unfold and sectarian clashes re-emerge, the thesis’ arguments (based on strategic reasons) against leaving Iraq were unfortunately proven to be right. Considering this, the immediate future will also tell how far progress could be made in helping Afghanistan being a rather self-reliant state, capable of managing its domestic affairs. Contrary to the bureaucratic debate, the thesis does not link success or failure in Afghanistan (considering the ambitious goals defined for the country) to troop levels or operational procedures, but to the state of the Afghan society as such. It provides a novel, unconventional approach, which should be considered for further scientific debates, especially if the outcome in Afghanistan meets the prediction of this thesis.

8. Additionally the thesis discusses the “Global War on Terror” not as an issue of terrorism, but outlines some broader thoughts on political revisionism. Al Qa’ida’s terrorism was a certain operational procedure of a certain Islamic-revisionist actor. Now that the strategic situation in the Middle East has changed, the Islamic revisionists have changed operational procedures (fighting for power in Arab states rather than the West). However, the revisionist thought did not disappear and still (or even more) poses a considerable risk for the West in terms of its relations with the Middle East. Now it would be about time to adjust Western Mideast policies and perceive the region beyond energy politics – rather debating according to which model the political and social order in Europe’s neighbourhood should be revised.
The thesis offers an alternative view on Russia’s role in world politics and the political order in Russia wants to enforce in Eastern Europe. Russia too, needs to be discussed beyond energy policy. At the end of the day, the political and social order matters. Will Russia enforce her vision on Eastern Europe? Or will Ukraine and other former Soviet countries be able to adapt an order offered by matured democracies of the West?

Last but not least, the cycles of ambition and cycles of restraint in U.S. foreign policy (described in chapter 3 and 5) do overlap with the structural distribution of military potentials (shown in the appendix 7.5.) in the international system. The thesis does not support that either ambition or restraint are caused by this structural features, but it indicates a certain relation of structural strength and ambition.

6.2.2. Suggestions for further research

Despite of the length of the thesis, there are several weak or blurred spots, that may be further elaborated by future research. First the role of domestic politics in those decisions is under-represented in the text. It is considered to a greater extent in the scheme, but yet there is a lot to be done. Time after time, there will be more literature available. And more important, more representatives of certain offices or legislative bodies will retire from politics and openly talk about their motives and interests. Today the reflection of the Bush administration in U.S. domestic politics is still dominated by partisan criticism. The biographies by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfield are more or less defensive pleadings. They are not meant to explain what actually happened. Obama’s administration is still in office.

The other big issue is the role of the bureaucracy. Again it has to be regarded as a very important factor in decision-making or policy development. But the actual role may only be assumed or indirectly deduced following vague hints and probable or likely assumptions. It will need even more time till the relevant documents are declassified and the respective roles of top officials and bureaucrats during the time treated in this thesis may be described with more certainty and detail than it was possible nowadays.

6.2.3. Possible use of the research work in practice

As mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, the scheme was first developed to compare grand strategies or foreign policies of different states. It might be used for example in regional security ana-
alysis to extract conflicting issues, discover blind-spots or missing facts in previous analysis or policy-papers. At least it should be a heuristic assistance to remind the researcher or field analyst of various issues and interests that easily escape the notice of the analyst.

The scheme may also be used the other way round: it could be used as a guide for policy development. Nowadays policies claim to be multidimensional or ‘comprehensive’. Such a scheme should be of some help developing ideas for different fields and branches of the bureaucracy. As the author is employed in a bureau responsible for policy development and guidance, he knows how little ‘comprehensive’, ‘pro-active’, and ‘foresighted’ those policies and programmes are, despite of their claims to be so. Bureaucratic interests, protracted practices and ‘copy and paste’ attitudes rather shape their content than strategic thoughts. This is especially true for small states with very limited interests in foreign policy like Austria. Structuring one’s thoughts might help a policy developer interested in creating something beyond the usual practice and the scheme might be assist structuralisation.

Concerning U.S. foreign policy, practitioners should not underestimate the amount of change and re-adjustments U.S. foreign policy has undergone since the end of the Clinton-Era. Many policy-makers in Europe are simply not aware that the role of the U.S. in world-politics as well as in Europe in particular is changing. On the negative side, the declining importance of Europe in U.S. strategic thinking means hat in many ways Europe will be left on its own. This regards Europe’s struggle with Russia (taking place in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova), the stabilisation of North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya), the Balkans and Africa (Mali, Central African Republic, Sudan, Chad). Except for the French, hardy any European capital has tangible plans what to do in Washington’s absence. Should the shale-oil and shale-gas revolution facilitate a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East (indeed the preliminary agreement with Iran may be interpreted as the beginning of such a withdrawal) the situation may become even more challenging for Europe. The old continent will neither become independent from Mideastern gas and oil nor will its dependency decrease. Europe can hardly afford to let other powers (particularly not China and Russia) order and reshape the region. Considering the spread of sectarian violence and regional rivalries, the Middle East may hardly be left alone. But again, Europe seems to be overcharged with the problems of this region.

On the positive side the once held American suspicion towards the European integration project has ended. By now the Americans know for sure, that the Euro will never replace the Dol-

lar as the global currency\textsuperscript{1468} and that the EU will not become a rival power to the U.S. Therefore U.S. attempt to undermine the European integration or European projects (like Galileo) or at least side-lining with the United Kingdom in their interest to undermine European integration has stopped. In Austria the actual or perceived U.S. scepticism towards European integration has led to pathological anti-Americanism within some branches of the bureaucracy. Now it should be about time to rethink this attitude towards the United States.

At the end, policy-makers both in Brussels and Washington need to be reminded that during the timeframe analysed in this thesis, no other allies supported U.S. policy – even the most controversial moves – like America’s European allies and no other world power is more committed to the economic and strategic stability of the old continent than the United States. Errors and strategic blunder occurred on both sides of the Atlantic. But despite of all the odds, the ‘West’ still is an international community who’s members depend on each other.

\textsuperscript{1468} This is not due to the Euro-crisis or any other economic reasoning as such. But the leading global currency usually tends to be the currency of the leading world power that is able to maintain and enforce the respective global economic order. And Europe just can’t do that, regardless its economic potentials. See: Robert Gilpin, \textit{Global Political Economy, Understanding the International Economic Order}, Princeton University Press, Princeton, Oxford, 2001, p. 234-260;
7. Appendix

To cut the length of the main part of the thesis, some chapters were moved to the appendix.

7.1. The analytical scheme as table

For detailed explanation of the categories and the underlying assumptions regarding the scheme see Chapter 2.2.

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<td>a. Systemic level</td>
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<td>1. Values of the ruling elite</td>
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<td>a. Structural goals (depending on the acceptance of the current status, oriented rather towards the status-quo or revisionist)</td>
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</table>
1. To influence the systemic level: system of independent states, mixed or pure pluri-centric/polar system, universal hegemony, dominions or empire, etc.;
2. To influence the regional level: independent states, regional bi or pluri-centric/polar systems, regional hegemony, dominance, empire, etc.
3. To influence the neighbourhood: independent states, sub-regional bi or pluri-centric/polar systems, sub-regional hegemony, dominance, empire, etc.
4. Own position in the international system

b. Goals concerning the international order (depending on the acceptance of the current status, oriented rather towards the status quo or revisionist)
1. To influence the hierarchy of the international order, corresponding to the structure of the international system (further differentiating – if possible – collective, parallel, universal or partial international order)
2. To influence the prevailing modes of interstate interactions (legal constraints on state behaviour)
3. Patterns of norms and guidances for the transnational interactions

II. Long-term guidance (strategies)

a. Long-term guidance to influence the international system structure
   1. Systemic level
   2. Regional level
   3. Sub-regional level (neighbourhood)

b. Long-term guidance to influence the international order
   1. Own (legal) position
   2. Development and promotion of own principles and legal opinions within the international order
   3. Development and promotion of principles and legal positions concerning the order of transnational interactions
   4. Development and promotion of views of the prevailing 'modus operandi' among the states

c. Long-term guidance to preserve the position in power of the ruling elite as well as survival and functional integrity of the internal political system
   1. Popularisation, recruitment and rejuvenation of the ruling elites
   2. Popularisation of the political regime

MEDIUM-TERM PLANNING

I. Interpreted objectives

a. Structural objectives
   1. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamic of the political geography (in the medium term)
   2. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamics of the international (power) structure (in the medium term)
   3. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamics of the military structure (in the medium term)
   4. Over the medium term achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamics of the structures of transnational interactions: in the neighbourhood, on regional or systemic level;

b. Objectives concerning the international order
   1. Legalisation of the structural objectives
   2. Objectives concerning the reimplementation of transnational interactions
   3. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses concerning the prevailing mode of interstate interaction ('modus operandi' of the international system)

II. Analysis of the potentials

a. Means: own, allied, neutrals’ vs. means of competitors
   1. Arguments, including legal arguments and legal positions
   2. Influence
3. Military potential
4. Potential pressure by manipulating transnational relations

b. Cost-benefit calculation for...
   1. applying means and potentials
   2. alliances
   3. applying/enforcing rule and influence

III. Calculation of options
a. Direct application of power
   1. Direct application of means/pressure
   2. Centre of gravity of the opponent
   3. Confrontation
   4. Détente
b. Indirect application of power
   1. Neutralisation/weakening of allies/proxies of the competitor(s)
   2. Strengthening of own allies/proxies
   3. Proxy-conflict/war

c. Capacity-building
   1. Build-up of own resources/means
   2. Compensation/decrease of the possible effect of competitor’s means/assets
   3. Influencing/supporting of capacity-building among allies

IV. Internal factors affecting foreign policy

a. Internal political situation
   1. Special interests of fractions or structural segmentation of the ruling elite/political class to be taken into account
   2. Special interests or structural segmentation of the evaluators
   3. Special moods or structural segmentation of the mass public to be considered

b. Internal policies and programmes to maintain political power for the ruling personnel or the ruling elite fraction
   1. Satisfaction, manipulation or repression of evaluators
   2. Satisfaction, manipulation or repression of the mass public

V. Policies/programmes: guidance for diplomatic interaction and routine programmes

a. Policies bound to a certain object
   1. Systemic level
   2. Regional level/towards a certain region
   3. Towards the neighbourhood
   4. Selective-bilateral

b. Cross-sectional policies
   1. Shaping/influencing political geography
   2. Gaining influence and shaping the international order
   3. Shaping/influencing the military structure and shaping the military order

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1470 The terms policies and programmes are sometimes used arbitrarily, although the German literature mixes up terms more often than the English counterpart (see: Werner Jann, Kategorien der Policy-Forschung, Speyer Arbeitshefte, No.: 37, Speyer, 1981; Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier, Policy-Analyse: Eine Einführung, Frankfurt, 1987). To make a clear distinction, policies define stances, opinions or reactions of the government towards certain cases (reactive behaviour that does not preclude a decision on the allocation of finances and services), whereas programmes guide various operative actions (projects and administrative programmes) to reach a certain goal in the medium term. While policies guide the reactive behaviour towards certain events or issues, programmes guide the allocation of services and goods for the accomplishment of certain goals.
4. Shaping the structures in various fields of public international transactions as well as the norms and rules governing them
5. Shaping the structures in various fields of transnational interactions as well as the rules and norms governing them

c. Programmes capacity-building
   1. Political-administrative (development of the bureaucratic apparatus)
   2. Military build-up (arms development and procurement, training, organisation of the armed forces, etc.)
   3. Economic (towards the economic structure and economic order)
4. Scientific (research, development, technology, and exploratory programmes)

d. Active programmes
   1. Diplomatic (for example: peace programmes/initiatives, mediation, conflict resolution, etc.)
   2. Military programmes (forward basing, preparation and training for operations, enduring warfare or larger military campaigns, etc.)
   3. Sub-conventional military programmes (terror, subversion, but also counterinsurgency, etc.)
   4. Programmes concerning transnational routine processes (communications and information programmes, foreign trade, investment as well as customs, economic and financial politics, transportation, migration, environmental programmes, programmes concerning the exploration of natural resources, etc.)
   5. Public sector routine programmes (diplomatic routine, military diplomacy, foreign military aid, intergovernmental information exchange, development aid, research and technology cooperation, education, etc.)

**SHORT-TERM PLANNING**

I. Analysis of the goals and challenges (concerning risks and chances)
   a. Category in which changes of behaviour or state of affairs are desired
      1. Political geography
      2. Influence
      3. Military potentials and options
      4. Structures in the various fields of public transactions and services
      5. Structures in the various fields of transnational transactions
   b. Target/recipient of the desired change in behaviour or state of affairs
      1. State/government
      2. Elite faction/court party
      3. Evaluators
      4. Mass audience
      5. Communal groups
   c. Type of change in behaviour or state of affairs desired
      1. Reversible
      2. Irreversible
      3. Particular features concerning implementation
      4. Particular features concerning verification or supervision

II. Parameters relevant to the implementation
   a. Potential reaction of the target/recipient
      1. Intention
      2. Potential
      3. Options or possible courses of action

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b. Environmental factors
   1. Geography, ethnography, cultural affiliations
   2. Restrictions by international law/current norms and conventions/orders
   3. Possible spill-over effects
   4. (Latent) interests, options and courses of actions of third parties

c. Own means
   1. Arguments
   2. Influence
   3. Military potential
   4. Potential to apply pressure (by manipulating public and private international transactions)

III. Possible Coalitions
   a. Own
      1. Allies
      2. States under own influence
      3. Gaining neutrals
   b. Influencing contending coalitions
      1. Neutralisation of allies of the contenders
      2. Coalition options of the contenders

IV. Internal Situation
   a. Ruling elite
      1. Unity of the ruling class
      2. Counter elites
   b. Evaluators
      1. Mood among the evaluators
      2. Contender’s influence among the own evaluators
      3. Influence or means of pressure to be applied on the evaluators
      4. Possibilities to satisfy the evaluators
   c. Communal groups
   d. Mass audience
      1. Mood and support for the ruling elites
      2. Segmentation, segregation → possible influence of contenders
      3. Revolutionary potential
      4. Chance of mass mobilisation

V. Planning of immediate actions
   a. Diplomatic action
      1. Proposals
      2. Pure demands
      3. Demands, underlined by proposing/threatening with positive or negative sanctions
      4. Demands, underlined by the execution of positive or negative sanctions
      5. Demands, accompanied by legal actions
   b. Military actions
      1. Threat/show of force
      2. Destabilisation/subversion

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1472 On the short-term and administrative level, the term programme comes up again. This time it describes a type of administrative process. There are projects and programmes: projects refer to instructions for a single, non-repetitive action (non-routine), while programmes refer to instructions for repeating, schematic actions (routine actions). See: Klaus Faupel, Memorandum zur Gestaltung der Mitwirkung akademischer und anderer externer Fachleute an der Politikentwicklung im Rahmen des Außenministeriums, 1983. (~ Memorandum for the incorporation of academics and other experts in foreign policy development, unpublished document for the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs);
3. Counterinsurgency
4. Direct military operations
c. Actions that grant benefits or apply pressure on others
   1. Promising benefits/rewards
   2. Promising to lift existing sanctions, restrictions or burdens
   3. Promising sanctions/punishment
   4. Granting benefits/rewards
   5. Lifting existing sanctions, restrictions or burdens
   6. Sanctions (political, economic, etc.)
d. Managing/implementing routine action
   1. Effects from changing patterns of own national administrative processes
   2. Effects from adjusting the own military structures/military routine, etc.
   3. Effects from changing the management of international public routine transactions
   4. Effects from changing the management of transnational routine transactions

7.2. The comparative amount of change: the table

To verify or falsify the hypothesis put forward in chapter 1, the respective ‘grand strategies’ of both the two Bush (jun.) and the first Obama-administration are compared with the help of the scheme from above. There are further remarks on the judgement of change at the end of the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparing U.S. Foreign Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analytical level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREMISES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Development of the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Systemic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Expected macro-structure of the international system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Structural goals and tendencies among other actors</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6
| 3. Main patterns of the future international order | Concerning interstate-relations: maintaining the current system of collective hegemony, but reforming it to increase the weight of the U.S. and its allies. In economic sphere: a strengthened universal liberal international order. | Concerning interstate-relations: dysfunctional collective hegemony in terms of the U.N. Inappropriate representation of emerging regional powers in current IO might lead to tensions → G20 attempt to integrate them into the world order. Increasing regional economic integrations, some to the liberal models, some rather mercantilistic. Weakening of the liberal international institutions. | DX |
| 4. Goals and political tendencies of other actors regarding the further development of the international order | Overwhelmingly compliance and obedience. International order seen as means by other actors to restrict the overwhelming power of the U.S. | Revisionist states will start to subvert the liberal international economic order first by fostering regional organisations shutting off markets from external influence. U.N. will still be used against the U.S., but circumvented by other actors. | DX |
| 5. Development trends among the internal regimes within the international system | Wave of democratisation sowed down, but not halted yet. Rejectionist tendencies in Russia and some Latin American countries. Revolutionary potentials in Eastern Europe as well as in the Middle East. | Wave of democratisation halted and in some cases reversed. Eastern European democracies under heavy Russian pressure, rollback in Ukraine. Middle Eastern revolutionary potential problematic due to strong position of Islamist organisations. | DX |
| b. State level |  |  |  |
| 1. Expected developments within the ruling class | Increasing partisan divisions since the 1990s. However traumatic events still may foster patriotic consensus. | Further increase of partisan divisions. Even major crises are no guarantee to foster some kind of patriotic consensus. | CX |
| 2. Expected developments of and within the own political system | Consensus on the system, no elite factions that try to get access to power by circumventing the system. | Still consensus on the system, no elite factions that try to get access to power by circumventing the system. | CX |
| 3. Expected developments of the societal structures | No change expected. Usually American social structures are relatively dynamic, people and families ascending or descending relatively easy (compared to Europe or Asia). | Regional and ethnic background of the Elites slowly changing. Diminishing European influence, increasing Asian and Latin-American influence amongst the Elites. | CX |
| c. Transnational level |  |  |  |
| 1. Development of the most important spheres of transnational interactions | America the undisputed economic and technological leader in the international system. Especially the electronic revolutions was thought to give the U.S. an innovative advantage for the decades to come. U.S. would transform into a tech- | Reversing the previous held premises on the economic development after banking & real-estate crisis: “service economy” does not work, de-industrialisation of the first world seen as a mistake. Developing economies | DX |
| 2. Development of the most important spheres of transnational interactions |  |  |  |
nology-based service-economy, with few key industrial capabilities in the highlight and armament branches. Asia, especially China and India would rise as offshore-work-banks for cheap manufacturing goods, thereby being economically dependent on their export markets in America and Europe. Dependency on energy imports was not large for U.S. but thought to increase. Dependency of other economic powers would increase more drastically in the decades to come.

| 2. Development of the organisations and networks that are active in these spheres | Liberal mainstream in the economic spheres. Concerning private, armed political organisations (terrorists, etc.) it was thought that they would not only penetrate the periphery of the international system, but also confront the first world with campaigns of disruptive attacks, emerging as new players in the field of organised violence. | Growing distress about TNC from competitors acting or investing in the U.S. Private armed political organisations (terrorists, etc.) were not that influential as previously thought. However their “private” character came into doubt as many of them seem to act on behalf of governments, contesting regional rivals or increasing the corresponding states’ interests. In the future they might be used as tool for “access denial” by revisionist states. |

II. Specific demands from the ruling elite fraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Values of the ruling elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American triumphalism &amp; liberal universalism. Strong believe in democracy, democratisation as a tool to secure U.S. influence and contain revisionist tendencies. Believe that the democratisation of the Arab world would decrease Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism and terrorism. Strong believe in globalisation, free trade and market liberalisation as a pacifying and modernising tool. Strong affiliation with the state of Israel and its security situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural relativism combined with liberal universalism. Fear of decline in many wings of the elite. Strong believe in democracy, democratisation as a tool to secure U.S. influence and contain revisionist tendencies. Believe in globalisation, free trade and market liberalisation as a pacifying and modernising tool. No consensus on the side-effect of globalisation. Strong affiliation with the state of Israel and its security situation. Generally Democrats are ideologically quite heterogenous. Obama had to pick representatives from different wings within the party to strengthen his (then) weak and new position within the party. There were liberal-internationalists, left-wingers, moderate-conservatives amongst the top-officials. This additionally complicated policy-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Values of the ruling class (societal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like above. Republicans at the base are more enthusiastic about democratisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like above. Globalisation, free trade and market liberalisation positive, but</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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C2

DX

D3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>fraction/group)</th>
<th>free trade, and liberalism as stabilising tool than those in top administrative posts.</th>
<th>there are concerns about the ecological and social implications too – at least among the left wing of the democratic party.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Preservation of the access to power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To preserve the power of the ruling elite fraction and the ruling personnel</td>
<td>Comprehensive tax reductions, easier access of lower classes to credits and mortgages.</td>
<td>Expansion of the welfare state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Maintaining the political system</td>
<td>Undisputed</td>
<td>Undisputed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Maintaining of the ruling apparatus</td>
<td>Undisputed</td>
<td>Undisputed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG-TERM PLANNING/STRATEGIC PLANNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Aims/Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Structural goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To influence the systemic level</td>
<td>Maintaining the uni-centrist structure of the international system as long as possible! Punish revisionist contendents. Increase U.S. influence and foster it for the long-term perspective by promoting democracy wherever feasible.</td>
<td>Accepting the pluri-centric system, but trying to secure a balance amongst the power blocks in U.S. favour. Contain revisionist contendents. Cease any active attempts to spread democracy but still cease any arising opportunity to promote democratic change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To influence the regional level</td>
<td>Dominate all strategic important regions: Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Enforce reform and peace in the Middle East. Harness global energy flows to prevent future revisionist states from becoming self-sufficient in a way they may retreat from the international economic order and openly challenge the U.S.</td>
<td>Secure the current system of alliances particularly in Asia. Manage regional conflicts and prevent regional domination by hostile states through alliances and strong proxies. Try to create good working relations with as many regional powers (India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, etc.) as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To influence the neighbourhood</td>
<td>Utterly neglected on a strategic level.</td>
<td>Neglected on a strategic level. Unconventional gas and oil exploration in Canada might elevate the importance of the northern neighbour in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Own position in the international system</td>
<td>Maintaining the position of the global lead-nation, even by acting unilaterally.</td>
<td>Maintaining the position of the global lead-nation through an alliance network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Goals concerning the international order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To influence the hierarchy of the international order, corresponding to the structure of the inter-</td>
<td>Maintaining the current world order, but reforming it to increase U.S. and allied influence. Prefer and strengthen those IGO that are</td>
<td>Maintaining the current world order in a more orthodox manner. Supplementing the current system with consultations amongst a wider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national system</td>
<td>directly committed to the maintenance of the liberal international order. Be cautious of those that could be used by contenders to contain or restrict U.S. freedom of action. Increase the weight of Democracies in IGO and use current organisations to spread democratic rule.</td>
<td>range of global and regional lead nations (G-20), regardless their political system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To influence the prevailing modes of interstate interactions</td>
<td>Largely Status-Quo oriented. However, loopholes and blind spots in international norms to reinforce controversial counter-terrorism policies (Guantanamo prison camp, covered detention centres, etc.) and ramp up espionage (especially in cyberspace), covered interventions (drone war) and sabotage (cyber-war).</td>
<td>Like to the left. However, the drone and cyber activities have been considerably increased. Guantanamo bay has not been closed, however there seems to be a decrease in covered abduction and detention practices. However, despite of campaign claims, the U.S. did not put forward any effort to close this loopholes in international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Patterns of norms and guidances for the transnational interactions</td>
<td>Strong commitment to universal liberal markets, open trade and free economy.</td>
<td>Strong commitment to universal liberal markets, open trade and free economy. This includes deregulated financial markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Long-term guidance (strategies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Long-term guidance to influence the international system structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Systemic level</td>
<td>Primacy! Deter revisionist states by setting a punitive example in Iraq from challenging U.S. leadership. Integrating others in the current world order to make them comply. Fight down extreme radical revisionist thoughts that challenge not only U.S. leadership but the Western way of life as such (i.e. Islamic radicalism) before these ideologies become influential in international relations. Prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons as it would give revisionist contenders the opportunity to challenge U.S. leadership or evade U.S. military presence.</td>
<td>Selective engagement. Foster a global network of alliances in order to deter revisionist states from openly challenge U.S. leadership or the current world order. The structurally most capable states are considered the most dangerous ones, not the ideologically most radical ones. Slow down nuclear proliferation and contain proliferating states though strengthened alliances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional level</td>
<td>Europe: Maintain or even expand the arc of stability (EU/NATO) towards the East and Southeast. Motivate Europe to contribute to U.S. efforts. Asia: Maintain alliance network. “Con- gage” China: integrate it into the world economy but on the other hand prepare to contain it if integration does not bring about political change in Beijing. Middle East: Enforce an Israeli-Palestinian peace process as well as regional change (reconciliation, demo-</td>
<td>Europe: Withdraw to retrench. Trust on European self-reliance especially concerning Russia. Shift attention from security to economy and from NATO to EU: Europe needed to manage the economic crisis and maintain the liberal economic order. Asia: Main effort will be to contain China (Pacific Pivot). Strengthen regional alliances, engage potential allies (India). Middle East: Slow retreat. To deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sub-regional level (neighbourhood)</td>
<td>Neglected on a strategic level. Only reactive policies, see further below.</td>
<td>Neglected on a strategic level. Only reactive policies, see further below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Long-term guidance to influence the international order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Own (legal) position</td>
<td>Generally oriented towards the status quo. But in defending the current world order and its core-values, the U.S. considered bending, re-interpreting and sometimes even breaking peripheral norms of the system.</td>
<td>Like to the left, although declared otherwise in official communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Development and promotion of own principles and legal opinions within the international order</td>
<td>Like to many Western post cold-war governments, the rights and privileges of the state is regarded second to fundamental rights of the individual. This position was somehow extended in the way that positions and rights of representative governments were regarded more important than those of non-representative ones. However, this principle was blurred and not followed rigorously.</td>
<td>No new position that is followed stringently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Development and promotion of principles and legal positions concerning the order of transnational interactions</td>
<td>Supporting, reforming, enhancing the universal liberal institutions, especially the WTO. Defending the interest of an industrialised nation to only selectively open up to global competition (protect own farming markets).</td>
<td>No new attempts to promote global economic integration. Demands by other countries on deeper regulations of financial services and regulations in CO2 emission rebuffed. Otherwhiles like to the left.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Development and promotion of views of the prevailing 'modus operandi' among the states</td>
<td>Using the loopholes and black spots in international law to reinforce controversial counter-terrorism policies (Guantanamo prison camp, covered detention centres, etc.) and ramp up espionage (especially in cyberspace), covered interventions (drone war) and sabotage (cyber-war).</td>
<td>Like to the left, but reinforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Long-term guidance to preserve the position in power of the ruling elite as well as survival and functional integrity of the internal political system</td>
<td>No problems worth noticing. Recruit-</td>
<td>No problems worth noticing. Recruit-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ment and rejuvenation of the ruling elites

C1

ment and rejuvenation still work within the known party system. Although the rather assertive rhetoric of the administration did strengthen the neo-conservative wing in the Republican party. This over time led to considerable problems for centrist or libertarian Republicans to gain support within the party, hence moved the Republicans off the centre of U.S. domestic politics.

Expansion of the welfare state. Popularity of the regime rests by large on economic success (in terms of welfare and employment) and on granted liberties. The first being a political concern, the second taken for granted.

Continuing radicalisation and internal disputes on the Republican side (see to the left) facilitated recruitment and popularization amongst Democrats.

2. Popularisation of the political regime

Comprehensive tax reductions, easier access of lower classes to credits and mortgages. Popularity of the regime rests by large on economic success (in terms of welfare and employment) and on granted liberties. The first being a political concern, the second taken for granted.

Expansion of the welfare state. Popularity of the regime rests by large on economic success (in terms of welfare and employment) and on granted liberties. The first being a political concern, the second taken for granted.

The economic crisis severely shattered the self-confidence of the American people and therefore a contest between different ideological approaches towards regaining strength would paralyse U.S. domestic politics.

MEDIUM-TERM PLANNING

I. Interpreted objectives

a. Structural objectives

1. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamic of the political geography

Undisputed concerning the own stock. Preventing a redrawing of political geography by force, especially in Asia, Europe and the Middle East: settle the issue about a Palestinian state by enforcing negotiations. Prevent China from unilaterally change maritime or land boundaries, push for multilateral diplomatic settlement. In the Middle East and Asia, force would be used if necessary. Prevent Russia from unfreezing the “frozen” conflicts and change boundaries unilaterally. Prevent revisionist radical Islamist organisations from acquiring self-controlled and governed territory through secessionist military campaigns.

Undisputed concerning the own stock. Prevent a redrawing of political geography by force in Asia. Delay or mitigate such attempts in the Middle East or Europe to the extent that the formal boundaries of states stay intact, while internal de-facto states will be accepted. Prevent revisionist radical Islamist organisations from acquiring self-controlled and governed territory through secessionist military campaigns.

2. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamics of the international (power) structure

Maintain the unipolar moment. Strengthen and expand regional alliances in Europe and Asia to contain Russia or China in case of revisionist behaviour. Further integrate China in the global economy (esp. WTO-membership, trade & investment initiatives) to increase the economic cost of hostile behaviour and reinforce domestic demands for political change. To prevent revisionist tenden-
cies, engage other independent states that could play pivotal roles in future alliance policies: like India, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan. Deepen relations with Turkey for the same reasons.

Expand U.S. influence through further expanding the Western zone of NATO and if possible EU. Maintain or strengthen relations with new European allies.

Redraw the order of the Middle East: removing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, thereby deterring Iran and Syria to spoil U.S. Middle East policies. Exploit the moment of change and position of strength to seek political changes in the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Iran, and others.

Stabilise Afghanistan after regime change by integrating it into Central Asia. Negotiate tensions with Pakistan to prevent Pakistani subversion in Afghanistan.

3. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamics of the military structure

Exploit the U.S. superiority in information technology to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in terms of RMA-ideology. The increasing military superiority of the U.S. should make the use (or threat) of force a more suitable tool for foreign-policy and secure primacy.

Prevent regional revisionist powers, especially Iran and North Korea, from acquiring nuclear weapons.

On proliferation: see above. Iraq should deter others (and did so in Libya). Isolating Iran economically as long as the U.S. have no chances for a stronger “hands on” approach (slow proliferation down). North Korea → making China a player through 6 party talks. Try to broaden pressure, renew the chance for an exit-agreement.

Ensure military supremacy of U.S. led alliances. Strengthen regional partners through a more permissive arms-export policy.

Slow down proliferation of nuclear weapons, Iran being the most important case. Tighten sanctions to – on the long run – achieve domestic unrest and regime change in Iran. Rely on containment and isolation.

North Korea: No influence, no chance of ceasing Chinese support for the North. Not reacting on North’s demands, strengthen military containment. (Don’t feed the troll).

4. Over the medium term achievable changes or sustainable relapses in the dynamics of the structures of transnational interactions: in the neighbourhood, on regional or systemic level;

Hard to harness directly for the purpose of foreign-policy. Maintain technical leadership → support U.S. hightech industry see programmes. Diminish U.S. trade deficit to Asia by trying to gain better access to Asian markets for U.S. products, and making U.S. financial market open and lucrative for Asian investment. The latter includes the government promotion of selling “high-value” goods such as nuclear power stations and aircraft.

Hard to harness directly for the purpose of foreign-policy. Securing short-term credits for the U.S. during the Banking crises. The exploration of unconventional energy resources is hoped to reshape trade balances and allow cheaper manufacturing in the U.S. → exploration was stepped up, the long-term effects need time to bare fruits. Try to convince Europe, particularly Germany, to pursue a more proactive, offensive recovery-policy (injecting more governmental money into the economy).

b. Objectives concerning
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>the international order</th>
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<th>C0</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Legalisation of the structural objectives</strong></td>
<td>The U.S. had no structural interests to be legalised. Such demands rather regarded the “modus operandi” of the international system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Objectives concerning the regulation of transnational interactions</strong></td>
<td>Push for the realisation of the Doha-Round in the WTO. Preventing regional economic integration in Asia that excludes the U.S. or its core allies. Increase direct U.S. influence and representation in economic institutions, to keep the aligned with U.S. free trade policy. Obstruct or refrain from emission-regulating regimes.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Achievable changes or sustainable relapses concerning the prevailing mode of interstate interaction</strong></td>
<td>Neglected. Countries are judged by results and effective policies, not by prestige and legal position. The concept of sovereignty is further eroded. To hunt down terrorists, the U.S. will intervene in states incapable or unwilling to stop them. Furthermore clandestine detentions and abductions of terrorist suspects are conducted even in allied states. Cyber-espionage is reinforced in all states as well. Controversial detainment policy of terrorists and terrorist suspects (Guantanamo-Bay prison camp).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>II. Analysis of the potentials</strong></td>
<td>Lip service to a more stringent respect of existing norms. However in effect, the policies mentioned to the left have been reinforced. Progress in technology (data storage capacity) allowed for the expansion of mass-communication surveillance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Means: own, allied, neutrals’ vs. means of competitors</strong></td>
<td>Like to the left. Despite charm offensive, the rejectionist camp grew in the Middle East. Arguments about preemptive defence were not officially removed, but never used again to legitimise U.S. politics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Arguments, including legal arguments and legal positions</strong></td>
<td>Representation in all meaningful international organisations, including UN, OSCE, OAS. However limited ability to convince other permanent members of U.S. positions. Rather those institutions are used to tie down the U.S. Arguments and legal proposals concerning the interference in domestic politics are rejected in many states: soft topics like human rights, democracy, etc. only in Russia, Central Asia, China, and large parts of the Middle East, but the “hard” topics like abductions or detention practices are not openly accepted at all (however the practices are tolerated). Arguments concerning preemptive defence were not accepted by the international society. They actually decreased</td>
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<td>A1/C1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the acceptance of U.S. policies conducted with this argument in mind and reinforced revisionist and rejectionist tendencies amongst other nations.

2. Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>China/Russia</th>
<th>Other regional Powers</th>
<th>Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Resting on both undisputed military and economic superiority as well as the reputation to use it, the U.S. enjoyed considerable influence and political weight. However, it diminished as soon as the U.S. got involved in protracted military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Increasing capabilities to influence weak neighbouring states, deciding many of their internal affairs. May provide economic/military assistance to other rejectionist states to permanently keep them away from U.S. influence.</td>
<td>Few influence beyond their borders. No common agenda of the emerging economic powers, therefore no common effort of these powers.</td>
<td>Diminished European influence. East Asian allies economically strong, but few incentives to bring this strength to bear in terms of international influence. Problem of division amongst those allies.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

3. Military potential

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>China/Russia</th>
<th>Other regional Powers</th>
<th>Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military potential</td>
<td>at the beginning military potential to handle at least one major war at a time. Due to possibilities of power projection, there were viable military options against almost every country. It could probably defeat any other power in the international system, aside from the risk of nuclear confrontation. However, after the entanglement in Afghanistan and Iraq, other countries doubted the U.S. would act militarily in other theatres.</td>
<td>Options for interventions and power-projection in the neighbouring region. For China also in Africa and serious access-denial capacities against the U.S. in a possible Asian regional conflict.</td>
<td>Few chances to defend itself against an U.S. assault. No conventional military options in the neighbourhood. But transnational ties may in many cases be harnessed to sponsor sub-state actors or internal factions in the neighbourhood that act on behalf of the regional power.</td>
<td>Decreasing military capacities and will amongst European Allies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
amongst French and British allies, increasing capabilities amongst former Eastern European countries.  
Islamists: Transnational organisations capable of both coordinated terrorist acts across the globe and insurgency campaigns in weak Islamic countries resting on private donations for financing as well as money from the Gulf. Great operational independence and freedom of action enjoyed by those organisations.

| 4. Potential pressure by manipulating transnational relations | USA: Difficult to harness economy for foreign policy due to WTO restrictions. However size and attractiveness of the market as well as leverage over defence- and high-tech-exports gave the U.S. Same accounts for foreign aid. China/Russia: For China the access to its own market (size and growth potential) was the primary token to influence industrialised states. In 3rd world countries, financial and technical aid, as well as providing cheap products secured considerable amount of influence. Russia could use its role as energy provider against European states. Other regional Powers: Some held considerable influence as energy-providers or financial leverage having invested large sums in Western enterprises (Gulf States). Others have a strong agricultural sector, being dissatisfied with Western trade policies — difficult to come to terms in economic policies. Allies: Considerable economic leverage of European and Asian allies. However in this field there is considerable competition amongst them. — difficult to coordinate policies in this field. Islamists: Considerable financial backing by Islamist countries, diaspora and attached criminal organisations. |
| Stronger relations and operational cooperation with Australia. Asian Allies will soon surpass Europe in terms of military strength, but little to no cooperation amongst them. Islamists: Operational network severely disrupted by U.S. counter-terrorism policy. Terrorist attacks only isolated incidents by independent but like-minded groups. Fighting arms in civil wars dependent on support by Gulf-State, Turkey, Pakistan or other Islamist states for operations bound to the foreign-policy goals of their neighbours. |

| b. Cost-benefit calculation for... |
| 1. applying means and potentials | Military means: thought to be low follow-on costs. Compared to the insecurity regarding the outcome of indirect actions and intending to permanently reshape entire regions, the use of direct military force seems justified. However costs in terms of diplomatic reputation, domestic politics, financial and military resources for stabilisation, the use of conventional military force to Considering the high costs of military interventions and the low reliability of the regimes created the costs for such actions seem to be too high. To put pressure on terrorist organisations, covered small-scale interventions and unconventional means seem to be more effective. However, the tacit tolerance of U.S. unconventional practices by |

| C0 | DX | DX |
| D2 | B2 | 16 |
bring about regime change was high. Low costs however in unconventional interventions (abductions, drone-strikes), as they are tacitly accepted by many local governments.

2. alliances

Alliances in Europe and Asia valuable to provide followers in expeditionary undertakings. Especially in Eastern Europe the willingness of former Communist countries to follow the U.S. is high. The investment in terms of commitments, deployed troops and training was considered worth the effect.

Alliances in Asia seen critical for containing China. Single regional allied states necessary to shift burdens to in the Middle East. However the heavy burden in terms of deployed troops, material and costs to maintain NATO is increasingly questioned as Europe seems to totally wind down its defences relying on the U.S.

3. applying/enforcing rule and influence

Domestic rule is undisputed. Influence abroad: reinforcing American position in the Middle East seems pivotal from both strategic and ideological point of view. Strategically the dominance of the region will prevent others from being able to wage a hegemonic war. Without enforcing reform and democratic change, the conflicts in the region will persist and continuously drag the U.S. into their dynamics. Ideologically this could further strengthen radical Islamism. Maintaining influence in Asia and Europe important to hedge against future revisionist policies by China and Russia and to gain allies in expeditionary undertakings.

Domestic rule undisputed. Influence abroad: As China is the only revisionist contender to be able to challenge the U.S. on the long term, influencing other Asian states to not align with it seems justified. The U.S. should be in the position to counterbalance Chinese moves. In the Middle East vast efforts have hardly produced results. Unconventional energy resources put strategic relevance into question. In Europe harsh Russian resistance seemed to outweigh the gains in terms of cooperation by countries further East of the EU/NATO borders.

III. Calculation of options

a. Direct application of power

1. Direct application of means/pressure

Theoretically possible in the entire system. Direct military means were applied to Iraq as punitive example. Iraq also matched following criteria:

- Hegemonic ambition in vital region
- Anti-American policy
- Allegedly pursuing nuclear weapons
- Repressive authoritarian rule
- Existing UN mandate on using violence

If Iraq proved to be a success, other states fitting the criteria might comply. Afghanistan: U.S. involvement in inner-Afghan civil war with limited resources was continuously scaled up. Initial (limited) goals of removing the Taliban and weakening Al-Qaeda evolved in more “comprehensive” efforts (see below).

Reluctance using military force or the military as an open threat. Direct economic pressure put on state suspected on proliferating WMD. Engaging Iran (both in terms of isolating it economically and engaging it politically) priority. Rather preferring indirect approaches on various issues (see below). Afghanistan: trend towards a more ambitious and direct engagement considerably reinforced, as were the means.
Pressure including sanctions and military threat was used against other regimes fulfilling the criteria (Iran, to a lesser extent North Korea). Direct pressure was also used upon states reluctant to comply with counter-terrorist cooperation or willingly harbour Islamist movements.

2. Centre of gravity of the opponent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>No clear centre. Vulnerable at export and supply routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller revisionist states</td>
<td>Proliferation networks. If they can acquire nuclear weapons, they might permanently escape U.S. military pressure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamists</td>
<td>Training and assembly-areas in Afghanistan, later Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China: alliance system. It will be hard to challenge the U.S. if China can only count on weak allies such as Russia, North Korea, etc. Smaller revisionist states: unchanged. Islamists: Infrastructure and training facilities moved beyond the reach of the U.S. (Pakistan) or dispersed to many countries in Africa and the Gulf.

3. Confrontation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confront Iraq militarily as one of the presumably most ambitious regional powers openly hostile to the U.S. Confront other states supportive of Islamist terror or reluctant to fight such organisations. In Afghanistan this was done directly, in Somalia indirectly, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Indonesia, Yemen, Pakistan the confrontation was limited to political and economic means. Pakistan, Yemen → later covered interventions too.</td>
<td>Avoided wherever possible. Governments incapable or unwilling to fight Islamist Terrorism were circumvented by covered sub-conventional interventions (more often than under Bush). Iran was confronted as a key proliferator, including the credible threat of militarily force. Libya was confronted militarily, although this was not a U.S. policy choice. Rather they followed the UK and France.</td>
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4. Détente

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>GWOT → rather emphasise cooperation than play on the differences. Hope that China will accept U.S. leadership if it sees the benefits. Russia: initial détente to ensure cooperation in Afghanistan. However short lived, relations deteriorated after 2004. Iran: chance for détente (Khatami) was dismissed.</td>
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</table>

b. Indirect application of power

1. Neutralisation/weakening of allies/proxies of the competitor(s)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan was temporarily brought closer to the U.S. again, however cool relations, reluctance in prosecuting Islamists and close ties with China were back again in 2008. Libya was negotiated out of isolation, preventing it bandwagoning with contenders. Indonesia was pressed into cooperating with he West against Islamists. Syria was engaged with France and a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was negotiated.</td>
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2. Strengthening of own

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expanding NATO to the East. Military</td>
<td>Reinforcing training and military sup-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allies/proxies</td>
<td>cooperation to train counter-terrorism units in many third-world countries. Military and economic aid to Pakistan in order to make it comply with U.S. Policies. Reinforcing defence ties with Asian allies, especially Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Proxy-conflict/war</td>
<td>Somalia → Intervention of East-African States. Insurgencies in the Philippines/Mindanao. Conflicts in the Sahel-Zone and in Sudan, although U.S. support for the non-Islamist parties was low (rather French affair). Drug-war in Columbia, inter-state tensions between Columbia and Venezuela. UN-Mission in Lebanon to stabilise the country.</td>
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<td>2. Compensation/decrease of the possible effect of competitors’ means/assets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Influencing/supporting of capacity-building among allies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV. Internal factors affecting foreign policy**

**a. Internal political situation**

| 1. Special interests of fractions or structural segmentation of the ruling elite/political class to be taken into account | Increasing partisan division of the political elite. Very conservative wings in the Republican party need to be satisfied because they are presumably popular. | Increasing partisan division of the political elite. Very heterogeneous demands from the different wings of the democratic party. | C1 |
### 2. Special interests or structural segmentation of the evaluators

| Hard to judge. Lobbying for Israel is a constant factor. Religious wing is very receptive for such undertaking. Diminishing the role of the defence bureaucracy through Secretary of Defence’s strong position within the administration. | Hard to judge. Lobbying for Israel is a constant factor. East-Coast wing of the DP very receptive for it. Defence and intelligence-bureaucracy trying to gain more influence. Liberal Press demanding actions in humanitarian catastrophes and brutal civil war contradiction to restraint and retrench. | C0/C1 |

### 3. Special moods or structural segmentation of the mass public to be considered

| North-South and urban-rural division of the electorate. At the time the rather conservative South seems to grow demographically and economically. | North-South and urban-rural division of the electorate. Urban vote tipping electoral balance towards the Democrats. The economic crisis and rejection of U.S. values in the Middle East led to a crisis of self-confidence amongst the U.S. population. On the medium-term this gave birth to radical movements like the Tea-Party, promising salvation by a very puritan, fundamentalist economic liberalism. | C3/C3 |

### b. Internal policies and programmes to maintain political power for the ruling personnel or the ruling elite fraction

#### 1. Satisfaction, manipulation or repression of evaluators

| Satisfaction: defence contracts part of the employment/regional policies. | Satisfaction: defence contracts part of the employment/regional policies. | C0/B0 |

#### 2. Satisfaction, manipulation or repression of the mass public

| The acceptance of the ruling class by the mass audience was by large due to economic benefits in terms of growth and employment. However, domestic migration and growth in specialised sectors could offset or damp short-term setbacks. Moreover post 9/11 patriotism overshadowed a ditch in the economy after the attacks. Satisfaction: granting access to cheaper mortgages for large parts of the population. Deception: exaggerating Iraq’s threat to regional and global security. Short-term explanation of taken measures. | In the wake of the crisis, public acceptance of the ruling class was tied to narrow gains or at least diminishing losses in terms of economic growth and employment. Society was more sensitive to short-term developments. There are rumours that official information on Bin Laden’s assassination or the Syrian civil war was deceptive, but they are rumours this far. Popularisation: creating expectations of change and rise again — rallied the public behind the new president but created enormous expectations. | C1/C2/A3/A3 |

### V. Policies/programmes: guidance for diplomatic interaction and routine programmes

#### a. Policies bound to a certain object

| See whole table. During mid-term planning, the GWOT received priority over other long-term structural considerations. | See whole table. During the first two years, retrenchment was top political priority. Avoiding direct entanglement | A3/D3/B3 |
Assuring or enforcing compliance was top priority. Reactive policies centre on support for democratic change and the promotion of freedom. However, the U.S. did not back their reactive demands with much force when occasions arise.

2. Regional level/towards a certain region

Europe: Expanding NATO and promoting EU enlargement to the East and Southeast. Built on the relationships to “new Europe” to strengthen American position within Europe. Maintain special relationship with the UK as a pillar of U.S. influence in Europe. Missile-Defence as means to maintain permanent military presence at times ground and air forces are needed elsewhere.

East-Asia: Ensure compliance to the GWOT amongst Southeast Asian states. Strengthen ties to transnational allies to incorporate them in expeditionary undertakings. Further integrate China in the world economy to raise costs of revisionist behaviour. (see below). Contain North Korea, try to integrate China in the containment effort. Co-management of the Taiwan-strait with China (US restrain Taiwan from moving stronger towards independence, China refraining from hard action). Support for the “normalisation” process in Japan.

Central Asia: Afghanistan centre of U.S. effort. Previous attempts for a low-profile policy in Afghanistan were discarded for a “comprehensive” effort to construct an Afghan nation-state and public administration. Other states were engaged to provide staging grounds for logistical or other installations.

Africa: Covered interventions around the horn of Africa to fight Islamist terrorists. Stepping up military and civilian aid to cooperative governments. Cooperating with the UK in East Africa.

Middle East: Topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq as a punitive example. Unacceptable behaviour: (1) supporting Islamic terrorism, (2) proliferation of WMD, (3) rejectionist stance towards Arab-Israeli peace. Credible military threat should in military theatres while retreating from the Middle East narrowed active as well reactive policies down to a minimum.

In the wake of the crisis, preserving the current world economic order (free trade, free flow of monetary transactions) deemed a priority. Defence against isolationist, regulative and restrictive demands from emerging countries.

After the first two years, the idea of the Pacific Pivot competed with other visions (more active role in Syria/Libya) amongst top-officials of the Obama administration. 

Europe: Retreat from Europe as it seems to be self-sufficient in security matters. On economic matters, it was important to gain Europe’s support for a deregulated global financial market (the UK at least vetoed any other position in Europe). However after that, little was done to secure Europe’s Eastern borders or join French efforts to stabilise North-West Africa.

East-Asia: (see above) A rising and increasingly assertive China soon succeeded economic issues as main concern. Fostering alliances and to motivate inter-allied cooperation was to be promoted. Instability on the Korean Peninsular also made a “militarisation” of U.S. Asia policy necessary. Containment policy towards DPRK unchanged. Support for the “normalisation” process in Japan.

Central Asia: In Afghanistan efforts were increased to reach the goals set on Petersberg. Attempts to integrate Afghanistan into the region stopped as the situation in Afghanistan became ever more tense and hard to control.

Africa: Stepping up covered interventions around the Horn of Africa. Other whiles retreat or neglect.

Middle East: Withdrawal from Iraq central undertaking in the first years. Transferring responsibility for regional security (=containing Iran) to local allies, esp. Saudi-Arabia and Turkey. U.S. intended a supportive role. However actions of these allies during the “Arab Spring” quickly showed severe disagreements amongst them.
make other States (Syria, Libya, Iran, Palestinians, Lebanon) comply. A strong US position should enforce change. Enforce Middle East peace and if possible democratic reforms. Gaza-withdrawal as trial-balloons for Palestinian statehood. Cooperate with France to bring Lebanon out of Syrian dependency.

| 3. Towards the neighborhood | Neglected to a certain part. Attempts to push for pan-American economic integration did not go far. Support of Columbia in the drug-wars. Adaptation of GWOT instruments to the drug wars. | Neglected to a certain part. There were attempts to play a larger role in helping Mexico fighting the drug war and counterbalance Latin-American Socialism with a more active policy towards Central and South America, but attempts did not go far. | B1/C1 |

| 4. Selective-bilateral | China: Like mentioned. Fully integrating China into the world economy and international market seen as temporary insurance against revisionist behaviour. Or at least it ensured no Chinese obstruction in the GWOT taking place. Issues concerning regional stability (North Korea) and diverse trade issues were dealt with in multi- or bilateral talks. | China: Like mentioned above. Integration in global markets did not diminish expansive aspirations. Chinese backing for North Korea was seen as disturbing. However, there was no consistent policy on how to deal with China aside from containment through alliances and case-to-case consultations. | D3 A1 A3 |
| | India: As India opened up economically, the U.S. tried to foster closer ties by providing access to arms materiel and nuclear reactors (nuclear deal) as well as joint military drills. However this had a considerable impact on Pakistan’s behaviour towards Afghanistan. | India: Continuation of the Bush-policy towards India. | |
| | Russia: Cooperation in Afghanistan and common goals in the GWOT seemed to ensure Russian cooperation. Topics at unease with the nationalistic circles in Russia should be discussed and confidence-building measures should bridge distrust. However lashing out against the West became the primary mean of popularisation of fascism in Russia. | Russia: Reset: attempt to re-focus on perceived common strategic interests and abandon or modify conflictive topics (de-facto ceasing to support West-orientation of Ukraine and Georgia, unilaterally modifying missile defence architecture in Europe, etc.). However, no results were achieved and policy changed towards indifference. | |

b. Cross-sectional policies

| 1. Shaping/influencing political geography | No big challenges/issues at the time. The Asian Sea borders was a latent issue, but there were hardly tangible measures taken by any nation to enforce their respective claims. Generally the U.S. government stayed (traditional U.S. position) rather supportive of ethnic self-determination. Reconsigning Kosovo or dividing Sudan was not a big issue. Commitment for a Palestinian was mentioned for the first time, although vague about actual borders. | South China and East China Sea disputes were winding up as a major issue. U.S. for negotiated settlements (the U.S. being in a difficult position as some of its allies had conflicting claims amongst each other). There is a broader issue concerning free navigation of the seas connected with it. The U.S. would in fact move against any attempt to “privatise” international waters. Other positions unchanged. | B2/A2 D2 |
| | | | |
| 2. Gaining influence and shaping the international order | Very blurred rhetoric. After 9/11 very assertive rhetoric (unilateralism, preemptive use of military force, demanding | In rhetoric, the Obama administration broke with Bush’s disputed practices and his demands for greater freedom | A2 B1 |
compliance to numerous policies, etc.) however the U.S. never lived up to the rhetoric and was behaving much more orthodox.

There were however very controversial practices, probably violating international law: the prison camp in Guantanamo bay, abductions of terrorist suspects in other countries, wide-range communication surveillance and covered interventions by drones and special forces. However the U.S. never thought to change the international order in a way to legalise their disputed practices.

One large attempt to reshape the International Order through a reform of the United Nations Organisation failed.

of actions in using military force. However the U.S. practically did not cease a single practice mentioned to the left but rather dramatically increased communication surveillance, cyberwar and covered interventions.

3. Shaping/influencing the military structure and shaping the military order

The information revolution should provide U.S. forces with clear superiority making use of the respective technical capabilities → see chapters on EBAO, RMA.

Decreasing U.S. strategic vulnerability to proliferation states by deploying operational missile defence systems → maintaining strategic freedom of intervention. Resting on superior U.S. space assets the U.S. was very sceptical on limiting the military use of space.

Stopping or slowing down proliferation by increasing supervision mechanism and informal cooperation in non-proliferation efforts (PSI).

Reversing failed RMA/EBAO trends in its own military apparatus. Refocusing on waging hegemonic wars to deter others from trying it out.

Continuation of missile defence efforts. Although greater emphasis on protecting U.S. regional allies and deployed troops than U.S. homeland → missile defence as nonproliferation tool.

Space assets increasingly used by potential foes → uncertainty how to proceed.

Preventing proliferation through traditional legal frameworks, although their effectiveness is eroding.

4. Shaping the structures in various fields of public international transactions as well as the norms and rules governing them

Orthodox defence of the status quo.

Orthodox defence of the status quo.

B0

5. Shaping the structures in various fields of transnational interactions as well as the rules and norms governing them

Promoting the completion of the Doha round. Expanding WTO, especially in Asia.

Defending current international economic order against demands of increasing state-supervision, regulation and regionalisation.

D1

6. Shaping the structures in various fields of transnational interactions as well as the rules and norms governing them

Promoting the completion of the Doha round. Expanding WTO, especially in Asia.

Defending current international economic order against demands of increasing state-supervision, regulation and regionalisation.

D1

1. Political-administrative (development of the bureaucratic apparatus)

“Transformational Democracy”: restructuring the diplomatic apparatus, putting more people in field missions.

Department for Homeland Defence: restructuring intelligence services.

Setting up supervision of corporate and private communications through the internet. Built up cyber-forces for espionage and sabotage through the internet.

No big changes or restructuring processes. However intelligence-sharing and cooperation with allied nations became a bigger part of the working routine of the bureaucratic apparatus.

B2

2. Military build-up (arms development and procurement)

“Transforming” the armed forces in light of the RMA/NCW ideology: introduce

Stopping RMA/NCW, using some experiences gained to further develop

B3

2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ment, training, organisation of the armed forces, etc.)</td>
<td>light, vulnerable, computerized, lightly armed vehicles and ships with superior sensor and communication equipment. Drive development, testing and deploying of unmanned systems. In light of the two major land wars: expanding the land forces, especially infantry and SOF. Postpone or cancel expensive naval or air force programs to free resources for the expansion of land forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3ISR and communications capabilities. Prepare for winding down land forces as pullout of Iraq is executed and pullout of Afghanistan is prepared. Pool COIN capacities with the SOF. Retrain the rest for conventional warfare. Re-evaluate naval and air force procurement programmes in light of Chinese anti-access efforts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Economic (towards the economic structure and economic order)</td>
<td>See above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Scientific (research, development, technology, and exploratory programmes)</td>
<td>Missile defence and other high level armament programmes as scientific challenge. Renewal of space exploration in the “new horizon” programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Diplomatic</td>
<td>NATO-Enlargement and contemporary strategic dialogue with Russia. Six Power Talks on halting North Korea’s nuclear programme and ensuring Chinese (and possibly Russian) support for containment of North Korea. Middle-East peace talks on basis of a two-states solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Military programmes</td>
<td>Military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, see respective chapters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Programmes concerning transnational routine processes</td>
<td>Executions of the goals mentioned above. Political issues usually treated within the WTO. Bilaterally only disputes are settled about conflicting issues (bans, restrictions, subsidies, regulatory issues, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Public sector routine programmes</td>
<td>Executions of the goals mentioned above. Economic aid usually linked to progress concerning the respect of human rights, democratisation, willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in GWOT. The latter is especially relevant for supporting moderate but authoritarian regimes in the Arab world.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the fourth column, the kind of change and the primary source is noted in a two-digit code. The first letter marks the primary source of change (or continuity) in U.S. foreign policy: (A) leader-driven (president or close officials in his administration), (B) bureaucratic advocacy, (C) domestic restructuring, (D) external shock. The second number notes the amount of change: (0) continuity, (1) adjustment change, (2) programme change, (3) problem/goal change, (4) international orientation change.\textsuperscript{1473} If there is an (X) in place of the second digit, this refers to environmental changes only (especially amongst the premises there are bullets that do not refer to any strategy or programme but only describe the perceived international environment). There is a code for every table element or every bullet in every table element, adding up to the amount of change that can be elaborated comparing Bush’s and Obama’s foreign policies. If there are two numbers next to each other divided by a slash it means that the respective change in policy is attributed to two or more sources. It may be that the amount of change each source contributed differed, as each source might be responsible for different aspects of that change. Moreover the author used the category “international orientation change” more freely. It was used when a change in goals and strategy was fundamental and did directly cause changes in five or more other issues. The results are discussed in the conclusion.

7.3. Terms and terminological remarks

Most of the conceptual and theoretic framework was originally developed in German. One might expect that, given the dominance of the English language in the field and the postulates of objectivity and intersubjectivity, there is not much of a problem simply switching the languages. But that was not the case.

As the contemporary fashion in international relations has surpassed both historical sociology and the English School, some remarks on terminology may help to clarify the author’s understanding of certain terms and concepts in international relations.

\textsuperscript{1473} See for the explanation of the respective categories in Chapter 1 (hypothesises) or for more detail at: Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, p. 3-31;
7.3.1. Foreign policy

When regular and substantial transnational interactions between different ruling systems constitute an international system, the entities try to take decisions on the regulations and management of these transnational systems. These sets of institutions do not necessarily have to be made into law – usually they consist of practises commonly accepted. In addition, conflicts that are restricted in space and objectives arise. This frequent interaction between the ruling systems to decide upon orders regarding these transnational interactions – and deciding on the international order after which further inter-state relations are governed – constitutes foreign policy, while the wider foreign relations refer to all sorts of transnational interactions. Politics of this type is related to collectively binding decisions regarding the social and political order. It should be noticed that occasions not relating to such decisions will not be treated as a political issue. For example certain post-modern writers try to define security policy in terms of ‘comprehensive security’ or ‘human security’, treating all sorts of dangers or risks to individual security as a political issue. However, floods and other natural or man-made disasters do not try to change the political or social order of a state. Neither do criminal organisations. They molest the security apparatus, but a collapse of the state would seal their business, too. So while being a risk to individual health and wealth, they are not an issue of politics per se. They may become a political issue if they combine their actions with political demands or finance other organisations that do so.

Equally, the author does not regard any transnational phenomenon as international politics, just because it or its consequences touch upon more than one state. Only actions that are aimed at influencing decisions about transnational physical or social systems are considered in this way.

According to Faupel, the objectives of foreign policy are divided into four categories: (1) the

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1478 Klaus Faupel, “Entwicklung als Politikbereich auf der Ebene des zeitgenössischen internationalen Systems”, p. 94-95.

structure of influence, hence structure of the international system and the international order derived from it, (2) political geography, (3) the military structure and (4) the orders and structure of transnational interactions. The first three categories are referred to as ‘high politics’, because they shape the international system as such, which then provides the framework for governing the other issues.

‘Low politics’, in turn, regulate transnational individual and mass communication, movement of goods, services, capital, workforce, transportation, ecological and human-biological effects as well as bureaucratic interactions between the ruling systems. Low politics occupy most of the daily routine in foreign policy and foreign policy administration. However, it depends on an overall international system or international order, which every state tries to influence in its favour. If the international system in general is unstable, transnational interactions will be certainly disturbed or distorted. Yet, disturbances or distortions of transnational interactions may not distort the international system. The high stability that the international system has enjoyed over the last decades – thanks to American leadership by and large – has misled many post-modern authors to think that now low level politics matters most and that decisions especially in the economic sphere will have much more impact on the international system than traditional struggles for political geography or the military structure. Nonetheless, it is naïve to believe that the international stability enjoyed now will last forever and that, on the eve of the next global hegemonic war, economic interdependence might save the day.

The wider concept of foreign relations then covers the actual transnational relations, the interaction of sub-state actors, the bureaucracies, and the management of these transactions (supervision, verification, etc.). Interactions of the bureaucracy, state-agencies, and administrative officials as well as public services or material transactions for other states (development aid, military aid, military training, guidance for administrative reforms, etc.) may be regarded as public transnational interactions as compared to the usual private ones mentioned above. They too belong to the category of “foreign relations”. However they are usually much easier harnessed for pursuing foreign-policy goals (in terms of influencing the other entities’ behaviour) than changing the rules for private transnational interaction or by manipulating their supervision and verification. Therefore they are relevant in discussing foreign policy and will be referred to more often.

This thesis is restricted to the description of foreign policy. And it is quite self-evident that the debate on strategy will focus on high rather than on low politics.

1480 Ibid., p. 488-489;
7.3.2. Power

Power is one of the most important – and controversially debated – concepts in foreign policy analysis.\footnote{See: David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in: Walter Charlssnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simons (Eds.), \textit{Handbook of International Relations}, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2005, p. 177-191; Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan, \textit{International Relations, The Key Concepts}, Routledge, London, New York, 2002, p. 253-255.} Power is central to the analysis of international relations, especially for realists. Even so, the concepts how to describe or categorise power have sometimes been quite blurred. Among the newer trends is distinguishing between what is termed hard power and soft power,\footnote{See for the concept: Joseph S. Nye, \textit{Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power}, Basic Books, New York, 1990; Joseph S. Nye, \textit{Soft Power, the Means to Success in World Politics}, Public Affairs, New York, 2004; See for the interdependence then: A.G. Kenwood, A.L. Lougheed, \textit{The growth of the international economy, 1820-2000, An introductory text}, Routledge, London, New York, 2006, p. 148-161; Raul Peter Das, “Europazentrismus am Beispiel der neuen „Aufgaben der deutschen Außenpolitik“ zu Asien, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Südasiens”, in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), \textit{Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2002}, Band 2, E.S. Mitthaler, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, 125-145, p. 135-136.} the latter of which simply covers all forms of non-coercive power (arguments and influence). From the analytical point of view, however, this distinction is too general and not very useful. The term soft power is used rather by post-modernists to highlight the importance of values, culture, economic interdependence, trade relations and diplomacy, as compared to military violence and economic sanctions. Nonetheless, this is misleading. Much of what is said about interdependence is related rather to the elites’ perception of interdependence and the perceived costs of confrontational behaviour. In World War I, for example, powers that highly depended on trade and economic relations went to war with each other.\footnote{The categorisation follows: Faupel, “Zum Stellenwert der Macht in der internationalen Politik”, p. 477-492; K.J. Holsti, \textit{International Politics, A Framework for Analysis}, Seventh Edition, Pearson Education, Enlewood Cliffs, 1995, p. 117ff.} At that time, economic interdependence did not preoccupy the minds of decision-makers. Moreover, advocates of soft power tend to forget that much of the respect for American values is based on the high costs that would be inflicted upon an actor by challenging them. Thereby, soft power ultimately stems – to a large extent – from hard power, and the boundaries between the two are blurred! The concept of soft and hard power is rather a political appeal than an analytical distinction. Today, given the West’s (especially Europe’s) preference for non-coercive forms of politics, soft power is over-represented in the minds of the politicians. However, this emphasis on non-coerciveness is not shared by all states and cultures.\footnote{In this thesis, the author follows another categorisation or concept of power. Power means to make others do or refrain from doing things they would not or would have done of their own volition. Power can be exercised with the help of a variety of instruments that can be categorised into:}

1. Arguments
2. Influence
3. Organised Violence
4. Application of pressure

Among the arguments, legal arguments may be distinguished from political arguments. They may make their points through logical consistency or normative judgements. Usually, arguments and judgements about other states influence the rulers’ prestige or domestic perception. Of course the international status and prestige of the one making the argument considerably influences the weight of the argument.

Influence is much more difficult to describe. Influence is not based on a tangible threat of exerting violence or any types of losses; neither it is based on the promise of benefits or alternation of one’s status. Influence is determined by the attitude the object has towards the subject. Influence determines whether and how the object will consider the preferences of the subject in its decision-making process. Direct influence is the results of complex transformation processes. It may be derived from large military or transactional potential, combined with a reputation for either severity or kindness, ideological, ethnic, religious, cultural or dynastic proximity or distance, similar regime type, historic experiences (gratitude for received benefits or fear based on bad experiences in the past), passive penetration or assumed interdependence. Lobbyists are tasked with placing the subject’s interests into the minds of the object’s decision-makers. There are also indirect ways to bolster one’s influence: influencing public opinion, evaluators, supporting the opposition or special interest-groups.

One side can force the other to obey to its demands by exerting organised violence: either directly through a classical military campaign or indirectly through clandestine military operations, guerilla warfare or terrorism. The same is true for one side supporting the other in its military struggle: alliances, granting military assistance or support in counter-insurgency-operations. It is important to notice that actual military power is not about military potentials, but about actual chances to exert military force on each other. High military potentials are useless if, for example, the respective societies are not willing to support their use or if these potentials cannot be brought to bear because of the distance, natural barriers, shortfalls in logistics and transportation capacities, etc. It is also worth noticing that for exercising military power, the military apparatus does not necessarily need to take action. If the object changes its behaviour because of the subject’s military options and without the subject having to take action, the job is done as well.

Last but not least, the most colourful, often used, but not necessarily most successful type of power: the application of pressure. It is achieved by the targeted manipulation of transnational interaction –

\[1486\] See appendix 7.3.5.
private as well as public – to pressure or support other governments. The administrative control of private transnational interaction (individual and mass communication, movement of goods, services, capital, workforce, transportation, ecological and human-biological effects) may be selectively executed to discriminate or prefer other actors. Discrimination has, at least, certain reciprocal effects on the discriminating actor’s societal spheres as well. And in most contemporary systems, the possibility to exploit private transnational interactions is severely limited by the granted freedoms of private individuals and non-state actors as well as the multiple free-trade and tax-reduction arrangement in the international system. But whenever other governments need concessions or support in this regard, positive or negative sanctions may be used as a threat or incentive.

On the other hand, public international transactions and the administrative control over the political geography, the international structure and the military structure may be used to discriminate or favour other actors. Negative or positive (supportive) comments and administrative actions affect the other’s interests regarding existence, territorial stock, status, and influence of other actors. Then again, only those states may be affected that have considerable difficulties within those fields. For example inviting Taiwan to an IGO violates Chinese interests in terms of political geography, inviting the leaders of Hamas is a signal against Israel’s interest to exist. Comments, donations, recognition, official receptions and so forth are examples of selective use of public transnational interactions to address one’s interests. They may be used as a diplomatic lever to reinforce demands or counter the demands of others. In the military domain, military operations or preparations may be conducted in a way to make life easier or more difficult for third parties. Military aid, foreign military sales, military diplomacy and consultations among military leaders and staffs – either as a supportive measure or by threatening to support the respective state’s adversary – may be used in the same way. The military apparatus, if used skilfully, may provide diplomacy with many levers, in addition to raw military options.

Power is often confused with potential. States with a large economy and a big military are mostly referred to as powerful. Other authors highlight the technological skills of some private enterprises within that country, especially in the field of computers and communication technology, as important potentials (not power), others certain cultural or pop-art creativeness (musicals, lifestyle, etc.) These are potentials, not power.

Again, power is the possibility to make others do things (or prevent them from doing so) they otherwise would not have done (on their own volition). Moreover, power is always a relative term, changing its dimensions respective to the state being the subject or object of the exertion of influence. Potentials may be used as abstractions for the possibilities of exerting power: without military po-
tentials, military power is hard to be brought to bear. But among other potentials, such as economic, cultural, lifestyle, etc. potentials, one has to look very carefully, whether the government even has the necessary administrative control over these potentials to manipulate them for the exertion of power! If not, one may only hope that they influence the object’s attitude towards the subject. But this is a very vague assumption, and it has to be questioned whether this attitude pays off in short-term disputes. It is very difficult to operationalise these factors for political purposes. Moreover, the adoption of certain lifestyle habits may not change the political and social attitudes of the people and decision-makers in particular!

Compared to power, potentials are easy to measure and to quantify. Military potentials, for example may be measured, described, and compared. However, they are not military power per se, as military power rests on options to apply this military potentials. Furthermore, the latent existence of these options create influence amongst other states (diffuse fear or perceived relive), which is even harder to measure and almost impossible to quantify. Measuring and quantifying power therefore is an extremely difficult task. Attempts to do so are not entirely satisfying, but there are at least proximities. However it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the very detail.

7.3.3. Types of international systems

The terms ‘system of independent states’, ‘hegemony’, ‘dominion’, and ‘empire’ are taken from the English School and have been sufficiently defined by Watson. If the states of the system are able to make their decisions within their system and within the international system independently of the others, a system of independent states is the system present. Self-imposed restrictions, such as rules, norms and binding treaties, do not affect this constitution. Hegemony exists if one or more powerful states define the rules for the external behaviour of the states. The internal situation of the other states is, however, left untouched. As hegemony is characterised by a relationship of leadership and partnership between the hegemon and the smaller entities, the smaller states do have rights to forward their interests at the expense of the hegemon or to take part in certain decision-making processes. Formally the smaller states are equal partners in these decisions (like all member-states in NATO), in practice they tend to respect the wishes of the hegemon and avoid opposing them.

Dominion exists if the dominant state(s) does (do) not only impose the external behaviour of the subjected states (in a more autocratic way than in a hegemony), but also interfere(s) with their in-

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1487 To the author the best attempt to do so is: Daniel Frei, Dieter Ruloff, Handbuch der weltpolitischen Analyse, Methoden für Praxis, Beratung und Forschung, Rüegger, Dissenhofen, 1984;
ternal affairs, especially regarding the decision on who holds the power. The Warsaw-Pact states for example were in effect Soviet (Russian) dominions, witnessing Moscow frequently interfering in their respective domestic affairs – most notably in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956.

An empire exists if the vassal states cease to exist as formally independent units and are incorporated into the administrative structures of the dominant states as colonies, directly administrated dominions or provinces. Hegemonies, dominions or empires may be universal stretching across the whole international system, or partial, thereby only covering a specific part of the known world.

This terminology may be further differentiated to describe the structure of the international system: Within a system of independent states a multitude of states coexists, with each state being equal to the others (no matter whether this equality exists within city states, territorial states or equal empires), without the dominance of a specific power, privileged spheres of influence or superior international authority. As mentioned, self-imposed restrictions, such as rules, norms, principles, and treaty obligations, do not collide with formal independence. In a pure form, this structural arrangement is rather an abstract possibility. In reality, there is a layered structure of multiple independence, in which states with different potentials and influence co-exist and compete for influence by way of changing coalitions and with rapid succession of states in leading roles.

If constant hegemonic or dominant relations amongst certain states verticalise the structure of the international system, centric or polar systems emerge. In case of a polar system, the poles play the dominant role in international relations, and relations among the subjected states or satellites are infrequent, of minor importance, and primarily shaped by the relationship between the poles. Dominions are more common in polar systems than in centric systems. Those systems are usually described according to the number of centres or poles: uni-centric/polar for one, bi-centric/polar for two and pluri-centric/polar for more than two centres or poles respectively.

In a mixed pluri-centric or mixed pluri-polar system, hegemonic subsystems and dominions exist next to independent states, whereas in a pure pluri-centric or polar system the whole international system would be divided into hegemonies or dominions. Usually uni-centric or uni-polar systems are mixed. If one power manages to subject the whole international system to its direct influence (or dominating power) the system is called universal.

The emergence of a universal empire or universal state, where the existence of the international

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1489 The author is thankful to Prof. Klaus Faupel for his comments on this distinction, especially for his idea to distinguish between polar and centric systems.

1490 The prefix pluri- is not common for international relation literature. Usually those systems are described as multi-polar or multi-centric. However, the Latin word multi as well its Greek counterpart poly means many in terms of more than one. This applied in international relations would include bipolar systems. Whereas the prefix “pluri-”, stemming from “pluriens” (multiple) means many in terms of more than two. Considering this, those international systems described as “multipolar” systems actually describe “pluri-polar” systems, as authors stress the differences to the old Cold-War era bipolar system.
system as such comes to an end when the dominant power integrates the whole known world into its ruling system, is not quite likely, although that often was the case in the past. The difference between state and empire is whether the rights of citizenship and political participation are equally or unequally distributed among the provinces.

These differences should be kept in mind, because certain states seek for a revision of the international order, and their visions of this order will be described using the terms above. Moreover, the international order usually resembles the structure of the international system and different ideas about shaping the international order usually reflect on different perceptions (or different interests in perception) of the international structure.

7.5.4. Structure and order

Structures are referred to as real, existing relationships, interdependences, chances and patterns of interactions that result from the real distribution of power and economic resources of the entities. They have to be distinguished from the order, which refers to the formal and informal rules, norms, conventions and guiding principals of the international system.

"Simply speaking, structural-functional analysis consists of nothing more complicated than phrasing empirical questions in one of the following several forms or some combination of them: (1) What observable uniformities (or patterns) can be discovered or alleged to exist in the phenomena studied? (2) What conditions (empirical states of affairs) resultant from previous operations can be discovered or alleged to exist in the phenomena studied? (3) When process (or action, i.e. changes in the patterns, conditions, or both depending on one’s point of view, are discernible between any two or more points in time) can be discovered (or alleged) to take place in terms of observable uniformities, what resultant conditions can be discovered? The first question asks, ‘What structures are involved?’ The second asks, ‘What functions have resulted (or have been performed?)’ And the third asks ‘What functions take place in terms of a given structure(s)?’"[149]

Further discussions and references will be provided in the subsequent chapters.

In determining the international order, the existing structures of the international system are formalised in legalistic and legitimistic terms. Among the international actors, the emphasis to do so is sometimes more and sometimes less pronounced. There are two different definitions of international order. One definition is ‘the’ international order or world order: „In the doctrine of international law, the notion of the ‘international public order’, ‘international ordre public’ has been

used to designate those principles and rules of international law that may be regarded as the fundamental basis of the legal system. Although the term has been used in a wider sense to describe the whole legal framework within which decisions with international effect are taken on the universal, regional and national level (...), it is mostly used in the more restricted sense. On the other hand, regime theory describes all conventions and norms that constitute a certain international institution as ‘order’. Those conventions and norms that regulate the exchange of all kinds of goods and products is described as order on trade, for example. Hence there may be different ‘orders’ as various fields may be regulated by different sets of norms and conventions sometimes based on different principles. Here, the thesis will use the term ‘orders’ in plural.

On the other hand, a given (power) structure in the international system may be transferred into different models of international (legal) order. Differences concern predominantly the range of the international rules and norms, the competences of the hegemons within the system, especially in their function to keep up the norms and rules within the system. Taking these differences into account, the international order can be further classified (these designations of the international order do not necessarily describe the underlining system structure): In the case of a collective order, the different centres or poles of the system jointly decide on the rules and norms, their application and their enforcement. Historic examples are: the Pan-Hellenic Alliance (337 BC), the Holy Alliance (1815), the League of Nations (1919), the United Nations (1945), and the European Community/Union (1957/1992).

In a parallel order every hegemon is responsible for a specific part of the international system, ruling it with specific rules and norms that are only applied and executed within their respective sphere of influence. For example, Spain and Portugal divided up the rest of the world and their role within it in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494.

Universal orders cover the whole known world, so the same system of order, in theory this could be a parallel one, is valid for the entire international system. Partial order, in the contrary, only covers a certain fraction of the known lands. The remaining territories are either periphery, barbarian lands or another international system that is not legally linked and recognised by the remaining states. For instance, the ‘dar al islam’, an international order that is only valid amongst Islamic states and societies, while the rest of the world is known as ‘dar al harb’, – in the traditional Islamic international law would represent such a concept. Of course, the prevailing tendency of partial systems has always been to universalise them – by conquest, spreading the religion, extension of

1493 See: Simons, Martin, “International Organizations and Institutions”, p. 192-211, especially p. 197ff;
1494 See: Khadduri, “International Law, Islamic”, p. 1236-1242;
influence, etc. – but it is worth making a difference between the attempt to universalise a certain order, on the one hand, and a real existing universal system, on the other.

These categories may be applied to the international order as well as other types of orders, including the order of military affairs, the territorial order or orders on the various types of transnational interactions and so forth. The order in the other fields does not have to follow the same patterns as the international order as such (for example the European economic order had different scopes and membership patterns than the military order), even though it is evident that the leading powers want to have their basic principles reproduced within all sectoral orders as well.

7.3.5. Evaluators

The “Evaluators” are those persons or circles that are not part of the ruling elite (fraction) or the political class as such, but the opinion of which matters in the political process and that might decide on who is in charge. In contemporary democracies they may be called opinion leaders, but the term has to be applied beyond the shaping of the public opinion as such. In some authoritarian regimes, the security apparatus, especially the secret services, while not being part of the ruling class, are of critical importance for the ruling class to remain in power. The same applies to clerics in pre-modern societies, but their access to the public opinion is better than for those of the secret service. As a preliminary sum of evaluators one may consider: chief editors and owners of large media enterprises, CEOs of big business, heads of important (corporate) interest groups (business, labour, etc.), heads of think-tanks and publicly recognised research institutes, heads of publicly recognised non-profit interest groups, clerical/religious leaders, key security personnel, etc.

7.3.5. International Society and international Community

In the public discourse the term “International Community” is frequently used to designate the sum of recognised states or at least the opinion of the majority of these entities. However, the term was lent from the English School and describes a more elaborated concept. As mentioned above, states constitute an international system if they divide the known space into territories and establish structured (frequent and regular) interactions. In this international system

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1496 See: Cooper, *The Post-Modern State and the World Order*, p. 45
rules and norms are established on how to interact and how to behave. This norms and conventions constitute the international order. Those states that are bound to a common international order and are behaving according to its rules are called ‘International society’. Rouge or pirate states are examples for states not part of such an international society. However such an international society is rather a technical, legal or contractual relationship. Its states may be quite heterogeneous, rival with each other, or have serve disagreements about certain issues. The contemporary international system is by large an international society – with the exceptions of North Korea and other rouge states.

An international community on the other hand is bound by more than just a contractual relationship. Common norms, values, historic, religious, or cultural bonds, dynastic proximities or similarities regarding the political systems forge a ‘we-feeling’, a community of states that rather supports and complement each other. Cooperation is much deeper, conflict is rather rare and war amongst them is absent. Such communities are rare in history, but they do exist: for example today’s West. In this thesis the author usually refers to the international society to designate the society of established, well-governed states, acting according to international law. The West is usually called the West.

7.4. Russia’s confrontation the West – narrative vs. reality

When Russia vigorously opposed NATO expansion or the deployment of U.S. missile defence assets in Europe, European as well as American policy-makers thought that the Russian opposition was the result of a misunderstanding concerning the aims and intentions of the West. However, there was more than just a misunderstanding between Russia and the West. Since the late 90s, the Russian regime had built up a narrative that portrayed the West – and particularly NATO and the U.S. – as the arch-enemy of Russia and the Russian people. The irrationality of Russia’s claims can be dealt with quite easily.\textsuperscript{1498}

The first issue that came up between the West and Russia was NATO’s engagement in the course of the Balkan conflicts. Russia opposed any split-up of Yugoslavia from the beginning. The central Russian narrative was that the West was eager to rip apart Russia’s ally Serbia. Exploiting Russia’s own weakness at the time, the West did nothing but unilaterally dismantle Serbia without consulting Moscow.\textsuperscript{1499} Yet, eventually quite the contrary was true.

The Secession Wars in Yugoslavia started in 1991 with the declaration of independence of Slovenia

\textsuperscript{1498} The following chapter was adapted from: Gustav C. Gressel, \textit{Ready for the Rumble, Remarks on military strengths and capabilities of NATO Europe compared to Russia}, Seminar paper at the Zryni Miklos National Defence University, handed in on 1 July 2009;

and Croatia on 25 June 1991. The declaration of independence was criticised not only by Russia, but also by all former Entente powers – France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, etc. In May 1991, when the crisis was imminent, Jacques Santer, head of the Council of Europe, and Jacques Delors, head of the European Commission travelled to Belgrade to assure Milosevic their support for the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{1500} The foreign ministers of the Entente powers stated similar opinions. Sympathy and international support initially were actually on Belgrade’s side! It was due to the action of the German government, especially Helmut Kohl, the then German chancellor, and Hanns Dietrich Genscher, the then German foreign minister\textsuperscript{1501} as well as due to the Serbian bloodshed in eastern Slavonia that the European Community recognised the states’ independence in December. Still, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Italy were sceptical,\textsuperscript{1502} and Lord Carrington – a British, not a Russian diplomat – was the most outspoken opponent of the independence of the two Balkan states.

In 1992 Bosnia declared independence. This time, Europe and the U.S. wanted to prevent another war by quickly recognising Bosnia. But the talks regarding the solution of the internal conflict in Bosnia were held in Geneva, under the umbrella of the United Nations – granting Russia veto power and influence on the negotiations. Direct involvement or an enforcement of any peace plan then was off the table, not only for Russia, but for the West, too. The Vance-Owen Plan, then the peace plan for Bosnia, was to be the basis for a solution through negotiations.\textsuperscript{1503} But the pictures of genocide, ethnic cleansing and utmost cruelties, mostly, but not exclusively, conducted by advancing Serbian troops and irregulars, turned the public opinion against Belgrade, the Entente’s former ally. UNPROFOR, a UN contingent with limited authority to help the suffering population, could do nothing to stop the bloodshed. Even worse, Serbian irregulars frequently provoked or humiliated the peacekeepers (by taking them hostages, etc.). The personnel involved in the region was disillusioned with Belgrade’s behaviour, and the U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke advocated more forceful action to stop the Serbs.\textsuperscript{1504}

When NATO finally intervened by way of air strikes – against the Russian veto in the UN Security Council – in March 1994, Milosevic had already lost any credibility in the West. But while the public opinion in the West turned towards a humanitarian intervention, in Russia it turned towards a ‘clash of civilisations’.\textsuperscript{1505} As the military tide slowly turned against the Serbs, in Russia their cause

\textsuperscript{1500} Rupnik, "Die Welt im Balkanspiegel", p. 462;
\textsuperscript{1501} Ibid., p. 466;
\textsuperscript{1502} International reactions and statements see: Ibid., p. 461-470;
\textsuperscript{1504} Rupnik, "Die Welt im Balkanspiegel", p. 470-473;
was portrayed as a struggle of the Slavic-Orthodox brothers against the Muslim and Catholic cultural enemies. Indeed, the war was fought church for church (or mosque) and monastery for monastery — and many nationalist Russians joined their brother’s cause in the war. From the 1993/94 period on, for Russia it was a war of the West and the Muslims against their own culture, and Serbia had to be supported unconditionally. Especially the Orthodox Church was a powerful force in mobilising nationalist circles and became more and more an instrument of propaganda for the Russian state, while the rise of the nationalists during the Balkan Wars in Russia cast a dark shadow on the future development of the Russian political system.

Eurasism, an ideology according to which Russia has to regain a position of predominance within the Slavic world to rebuff the Western enemy, became popular. In this way, the Balkan Wars gave birth to Russian fascism. Still, Russia was consulted and involved as much as possible. For Western policy makers, Russia seemed to be essential to make Milosevic agree on any peace accord or stop violence. The Dayton agreement, at least to Western eyes, would not have been possible without the combined pressure of NATO and Moscow.

Even more, the United States recognised Russia’s privileges and influences in Central Asia, believing that Russia could play a constructive role as facilitator of political and economic reforms. The then U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, lauded Russia on several occasions in the early 90s. However, the U.S. opinion changed over time as Washington recognised that the Russian engagement in the region was neither facilitating reforms nor stabilising.

Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Kosequenzen, 2. aktualisierte Auflage, Verlag der Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2007, p. 439-452;
1506 Rupnik, "Die Welt im Balkanspiegel", p. 469;
1508 Shevtsova, Lonely Power, p. 154-157;
1509 Eurasism is a political ideology that emerged after the October revolution and was created by very conservative Russians living in European exile. They rejected Western liberal-democratic ideas for the social, political and economic order, and stressed that, given her culture and history, Russia was something different. In its new form, neo-Eurasism contains the following ideological principles: (1) Rejection of Western democracy and liberalism. Russia needs a strong centre, ergo an authoritarian regime. Multi-party liberalism weakens national strength, undermines central authority, is unable to solve societal conflicts given the different Russian national character and leaves the country unprepared for international struggle. Russia is a cultural centre on its own, based on the tradition of the Orthodox Church, the glory of the tsarist and Soviet history. Russian soil is sacred; territories connected to Russia and Russian history have to be under Russian control. (2) Russia is the natural leader of the Slavic and Orthodox countries. The main enemy of pan-slavism — and Russia as such — is the United States. Russia is involved in an epic struggle against the USA over the fate of Eurasia. Russia has to be prepared for struggle and internal politics have to make concessions in economic and welfare programmes, as well as personal freedom and human rights to national defence. (3) The international order is generally an American order, unjust and created at the expense of Russia’s national interest. Russia has to reverse this order. See: John B. Dunlop, Aleksander Dugin’s “Neo-Eurasian” Textbook and Dimitri Trenin’s Ambivalent Response, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Spring 2001;
1510 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 294-296;
The next Russian myth is based on the U.S. breaking its promises regarding NATO enlargement. Russia claims that the four-power negotiations for the German reunification had been an unofficial concession by the then U.S. President George H.W. Bush that NATO would not “expand an inch” toward Eastern Europe. Still this is a Russian narrative, as Moscow simply was opposed to it and needed an excuse to demonise this development.\textsuperscript{1512} Russia has always perceived Russian-NATO relations in terms of military balances,\textsuperscript{1513} hence, the expansion meant a narrowing of the security glacis vis-à-vis the West.

However, just like the Russian narratives about the Western behaviour in the Balkans, also the Russian narratives concerning NATO enlargement contain some serious flaws. First, the Russian considerations about the security glacis would only be valid if NATO were a latent aggressor, directing offensive forces against Russia or preparing for offensive warfare in general. While NATO had – at least in theory – the military forces to wage a war of aggression against Russia, the probability of such an event is to be examined. Was or is there domestic political support by all NATO members to act aggressively against Russia? Given the close political ties Putin had forged with many Western European states, especially with Germany,\textsuperscript{1514} such a scenario is highly unlikely. There simply would be no consensus on such an operation! Discussions in Poland and the Czech Republic on the negative effects of deploying components of the U.S. National Missile Defence (NMD) systems\textsuperscript{1515} clearly indicated that a military escalation with Russia was to be avoided even by the NATO members most sceptical towards Moscow. These states feared Russian retaliation, especially given the prospect of an increasingly powerful and militarily capable Russia. But there was not the slightest indication of military adventures regarding Russia. Finally, militarism in Europe was at its all-time low and supporting a war of aggression against a major nuclear power seemed utterly unthinkable to any European politician! It was highly unlikely that NATO would become a threat to Russia. NATO, however, would still influence Moscow’s military consideration when it came to Russian offensive military actions against the former Soviet states – if Moscow wished to do so. Finally, as there are no Western records on that concession quoted above, it is highly conceivable that Russia made the story up to justify its anger towards the West.

How far did Russian behaviour influence the motivation of the Eastern European states to seek NATO and EU membership? As the Communist Party and nationalist forces achieved considerable

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\textsuperscript{1515} Tschechien erlaubt US-Raketenabwehr – Russland droht, Deutsche Welle Online, 8 July 2008; Polen schachert um US-Raketenabwehr, Besseres Angebot gefordert, Die Presse Online, 10 July 2008;
\end{footnotesize}
gains in the Duma elections in 1993 and 1995, many Eastern European nations feared a return of a more assertive nationalist Russia. Their drive towards NATO was accelerated by Moscow rather than being slowed down.

In 2003 the invasion of Iraq by the United States, together with the pre-emptive rhetoric of the Bush administration and their decision to go to war without a renewed U.N. mandate, further alienated Russia. Russia claimed that the policy of regime change would pose a threat to the Russian regime. But on the other hand, the opposition from the NATO members Germany and France to the Iraq invasion was equally outspoken. And the general public protest against the war in Iraq, even in those states whose governments had approved the war, should rather have assured Moscow that any offensive role for NATO is far beyond the spectrum of political and public support. And Russia itself once adopted preventive and pre-emptive warfare, even pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in her own security doctrine when dealing with the near abroad. Why should the US not deal with the rest of the world on Russian terms?

Another Russian double standard was Moscow’s constant complaining about the interference of NGOs, which in Moscow’s point of view were only extensions of the West’s secret services, with Russian internal affairs. On the other hand, the assassination of Alexander Litvinienko in London and obvious unwillingness of Russian authorities to cooperate with British investigators suggests that Russia does not necessarily follow such a strict interpretation of sovereignty by itself. More important, Russia has heavily interfered into domestic policies in the near abroad sponsoring separatism as a political tool to maintain influence in the new independent states. Even today Russia uses pro-Russian political and social organisations in Ukraine to undermine Kiev’s advances on Europe. In the Baltic states, the sudden eruption of Russian protests and the coincidental cyber-attacks by agencies operating from Russian soil also suggest a robust cooperation and coordination of Russian authorities and pro-Russian groups and NGOs abroad. If Russia wanted to make a point for non-interference into internal affairs as a principle of international law, it should have at

1516 Mommsen, Nußberger, *Das System Putin*, p. 55;
1517 Shevtsova, *Russia, Lost in Transition*, p. 263ff;
1519 Shevtsova, *Russia, Lost in Transition*, p. 241;
1520 Rummer, *Russian Foreign Policy beyond Putin*, p. 8; British ambassador hands Russia request for poisoning suspect’s extradition, Mainichi Daily News Online, 29 May 2007;
1521 A good summary of Russian activities in the 90s is provided at: Martin Malek, *Rußlands Politik im „postsowjetischen Raum“, Aktuelle Entwicklungen und Szenarien künftiger Konflikte*, download at: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/14_sr2_23_malek.pdf;
1522 See: Lada L. Roslycky, “Russia’s smart power in Crimea, showing the seeds of trust”, in: *Southeast European and Blacksea Studies*, Vol.11, No.3, September 2011, p.299-316;
1523 Estonia Computers Blitzed, Possibly by the Russians, New York Times Online, 18.05.2007; Cyberattack on Estonia stirs fear of ‘virtual war’, New York Times Online, 18.05.2007,
least tried to prove that it did act according to the principle as well.

The next step of the Russian escalating behaviour was the resumption of long-range bomber patrols over the world’s oceans in August 2007. While maritime aerial patrols in themselves are nothing to be feared, there was little reason to do so with strategic bombers and to resume the patrolling routes of the Cold War. The Russian argument was that by unilaterally retreating from the BMD Treaty and intending to deploy components of the National Missile Defence (NMD) System in Europe, the U.S. took up the strategic arms race itself.

Next, Russia retreated from the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty in December 2007. Again the Russian argument to do so was little convincing: Some NATO states did not ratify the amended version of the Treaty, so Moscow cancelled their commitment to the entire treaty. Moreover, Moscow refused to fulfil NATO’s demands of withdrawing its troops from the former Soviet Republics, still maintaining a military presence in Transnistria. By then, the armies of NATO’s 28 nations had a total strength of about 33% of the maximum CFE strength allowed for the NATO 16 in 1990. Claiming that NATO had violated the treaty is quite ridiculous. On the other hand, by prohibiting regional concentrations of NATO forces, the Treaty could have been of some value for Russia. To some analysts, this move already was part of a war plan in the southern Caucasus that would later be unleashed against Georgia. Russia did not want to have its conventional forces inspected because it already had offensive military plans for its neighbourhood.

Other escalating behaviour, such as continuing militarisation of the Kaliningrad district, directing missiles towards Poland and the Czech Republic as well as Putin’s New Cold War speech at the Munich International Security Conference were explained as Moscow’s response to the deployment of American Missile Defence in Europe. Whether the then planned ground-based interceptors may hit Russians ICBM or not was explained in Chapter 3.3.6.1. Independent research supports rather the American argument that this would not have been possible. Russia’s proliferation
policy, which will be explained later, rekindled the American desire to proceed with missile defence. As Russia had rejected all offers for confidence-building measures, settlements or package deals, especially rejecting Obama’s offer to cooperate in the case of Iran, Russia left the U.S. with few options but to proceed with missile defence. It might sound strange, but Russia created the contingencies upon which the West had to react and then claimed that the West’s reaction to Russia’s own actions was endangering Russia’s security. Those arguments are puzzling at best!

The preliminary apogee of Western-Russian tensions was the outbreak of the Georgian War in August 2008. Although some Western – particularly German – politicians were relieved that Saakashvili’s behaviour contributed to the escalation of the crisis, which then was used as an excuse to continue with business as usual with Russia. Russia provoked, had prepared for, and willingly accepted the war. The subsequent diplomatic isolation and economic downturn in Russia was a proof that Russia would peruse its geopolitical (i.e. expansive, imperial) interests in utter disregard of the economic consequences.

7.4.1. Realpolitik or ideological rift – explaining confrontation with Russia

“The Russian excuses for these actions insult the intelligence,” commented Frederik W. Kagan on Russia’s causes for the war in Georgia in August 2008. As mentioned above, this could be said about almost anything Russia does. Then again, political communication does not have to be analytically accurate. Its goal is to influence and convince its audience, not to make a logical argument – in the West just as much as in Russia. This requires assessments about Russia’s goals, intentions and strategies, which are hidden by a rhetorical fog of war that indeed “insults the intelligence”.

There are two strands or schools for the interpretation of the Russian behaviour:

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In secret letter, Obama offered deal to Russia, New York Times Online, 3 March 2009;
For the pro-Russian stand of the German elites – especially the left – see: Steinmeier: Vorwürfe Russlands gegen Georgien prüfen, Die Presse Online, 27. August 2008; ‘Keine gute Rolle’ Kritik an Merkels Kaukasus-Kurs, NTV Online, 28 August 2008;
For the Georgian war: Gressel, "Der Krieg am Kaukasus", p. 15-49;
Russland droht in der Kaukasus-Krise die Isolation, Asiatische Staaten fordern territoriale Integrität Georgiens, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 29 August 2008; La UE advierte del deterioro de la relación con Moscu, Francia teme que el Kremlin abra una nueva crisis con Ucrania o Moldavia, La Vanguardia digital, 28 August 2008; Russland hat Europa in der Hand, Die Presse Online, 27 August 2008; La UE planea aprobar sanciones contra Rusia por la crisis de Georgia, La Vanguardia Digital, 28 August 2008; Unruhe in Osteuropa über die Ossetien-Krise, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 12 August 2008;
Faupel, “Dimensionen der Souveränität”, p. 187;

1. Most analysts support the thesis that Russia pursues rational goals by irrational means. Russia wants its own sphere of influence and tries to defend its status as a major power. Sometimes its arguments and actions are self-defeating, but that is rather owed to incalculable circumstances, bad luck or improper execution.

2. The other, more drastic view regarding Russia is that its behaviour in foreign policy is inherently aggressive and irrational, because Putin has led Russia into a nationalist autocracy that, for ideological reasons, needs confrontation for regime survival.

The two options result in very different recommendations on how to deal with Russia. If Russia were a rational regime, seeking to maximise its interests in the near abroad, one might find a kind of deal on the conflicting interests, which would be satisfactory for both. If Russia were a fascist state, it would need confrontation for the sake of domestic politics and regime survival. It would be impossible to come to terms with Moscow.

Does Russia only desire a sphere of influence of its own? The notion that Russia perceives the area of the former Warsaw Pact and especially of the former Soviet Union as its exclusive sphere of influence is generally agreed. "Russian thinking in international relations is also concurrent with the idea that Russian security interests call for Moscow to maintain a security belt around its periphery, made up of satellites compliant with Russian policy preferences." The cordon sanitaire was conceived of for security reasons, but unlike the Russian propaganda, the term security does not refer so much to NATO’s offensive capabilities, but rather to problems of internal security. First, from Russia’s own transitory experiences, democratic revolutions are something chaotic and destabilising. It could trigger chaos, violence, nationalism or even internal warfare. In the worst case, the remaining Russian minorities in the post-soviet states would have to pay the price for nationalist awakening and will be a target of ethnic discrimination, violence or ethnic cleansing at worst.

Second, historical, cultural and often personal ties of the new states are very close to Russia. Languages are similar, Russian minorities are spread throughout the former Soviet Union. Russian is the lingua franca in many of these states, spoken by businessmen, scientists and political elites. Ideas, reports and ideologies cross borders easily. The Russian sovereign democracy claims to be tailor-made for Russia and the Russian people. But if the states of the former Soviet Union, especially the closely related ones, like Ukraine and Georgia, would successfully transform into West-

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1538 See: Zagorski, "Die strategische Orientierung Russlands zu Europa?", p. 30f; Rummer, Russian Foreign Policy beyond Putin, p. 25-28;
1539 Ibid., p. 25;
1540 See: Ibid., p. 25f;
1541 Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 167f;
ern-style democracies, this would definitely challenge the claims of the Russian elites that their rule is the only alternative to chaos and transformative turmoil. This especially applies to countries that are ethnically and culturally very close to Russia, like Ukraine and Belarus.

Third, there was the economic perspective. “Oil fuel and gas account for nearly 65% of Russian exports; ... 65% of Russian exports to the European Union are energy/mineral fuels; all other Russian exports pale in comparison with the energy trade between Russia and the EU.” Russian energy exports do not only boost Russia’s international role as an energy supplier and by enabling it to pay back its foreign debt. The question of energy and energy export has an internal dimension too. A central narrative of Putin’s regime is that he not only restored international prestige and dignity to Russia, but also gave Russia an economic perspective. “In 2006, the economy grew by nearly 7% – the eighth straight year of growth – and the federal budget had a surplus of 9% of GDP. During the previous five years, personal incomes grew by more than 12% in real terms; investment by 10% per year. Poverty declined steadily over the same period. Foreign currency reserves, as we have seen, currently stand at over $400 billion, and $22bn in debts to Paris Club creditor nations has been paid off. Inflation, at the end of 2006, stood at below 10%. The country’s ‘stabilisation fund’, set up by the government in case of future financial upheavals, contains over $100bn.” This economic boom, accompanied by rising living standards for at least the urban Russians, is responsible for Putin’s popularity and important, if not vital, for regime survival.

The boom itself relied on energy exports and the foreign currency reserves resulting from them. Therefore, maintaining control of the energy flow from Russia and its satellite states is critical for long-term regime survival. As state-owned Gazprom is the prime producer and supplier of gas, gas has short-term benefits to the regime too: friends and like-minded people can easily be satisfied with posts within the gas industry - although they may be incompetent, given the profits in this business, this does not matter. There is constantly money available for populist action. And the liquidity Gazprom is able to provide, may be used to take over every politically sensitive business inside and outside of Russia, from undisciplined media to lucrative private enterprises! After Gazprom proved its value in strengthening the domestic political system, it was used to acquire strategic assets in the near abroad. As long as Russia’s as well as the neighbouring states’ political systems are rather authoritarian and economically dependent on the small oil and gas sector, Russia’s state-owned energy giants would remain an easy tool to influence them.

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1542 Rummer, Russian Foreign Policy beyond Putin, p. 62;
1543 Ibid., p. 55;
1544 Sakva, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 300ff;
1545 Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 118ff;
1546 Ibid., p. 121ff;
1547 Ibid., p. 187-205;
Ukraine and Belarus are important transit corridors to Europe.\textsuperscript{1548} And although Russia seeks to expand its gas production by exploiting new fields in the Arctic and in Siberia,\textsuperscript{1549} rising domestic and foreign gas consumption will lead to an (at least) short-term deficit in gas production, which will have to be compensated by imports from Central Asia.\textsuperscript{1550} Russia’s intent to retain control of these areas or at least to see them governed by friendly regimes is absolutely understandable. It secures the political survival of its regime.

The other rational interest that might serve as an explanation is Russia’s interest in being perceived as a great power.\textsuperscript{1551} Russia is eager to point out that it is a major power in a multipolar world, and needs to be consulted and taken seriously. More precisely, great power refers to a status of parity with the United States.\textsuperscript{1552} Whatever the United States has or does, Russia claims the right to have or do the same.

From this point of view, a sphere of influence of its own – like the US enjoys in Europe or the Pacific – is pursued in order to maintain the status of a major power.\textsuperscript{1553} The same is true for special relationships to countries on other continents and geopolitically important regions: the close relationship to Venezuela, Syria and Iran are rather pursued for having a special relationship to any country in the Middle East and the Americas.\textsuperscript{1554} Although these close ties create some friction with the West in terms of regional conflicts or nuclear proliferation, Russia would not accept any action (sanctions or others) that would somehow lead towards regime change, because having the current regimes in place is crucial for maintaining Russia’s influence.

Russian activism in Africa or regaining military bases in the Mediterranean\textsuperscript{1555} serves similar purposes. Lacking political or economic interests, they are pursued to seek status and prestige only. Prestige and parity with the U.S. would also influence Russia’s military politics. Russia was keen on having nuclear parity with the United States. Although it could not afford to maintain a larger number of strategic weapons after the 1990s, it tried to limit the number of nuclear weapons of the U.S. on the level Russia could afford for itself – the Putin-Bush accord of 2002 limited the number of warheads to 1,700 and 2,200, respectively, instead of the 6,000 warheads limit of START I.\textsuperscript{1556} With

\textsuperscript{1549} See: Ibid., p. 22-23;
\textsuperscript{1550} Runmer, \textit{Russian Foreign Policy beyond Putin}, p. 63;
\textsuperscript{1551} Ibid., p. 24;
\textsuperscript{1552} Shevtsova, \textit{Russia, Lost in Transition}, p. 166;
\textsuperscript{1553} Runmer, \textit{Russian Foreign Policy beyond Putin}, p. 24;
\textsuperscript{1554} See: Ibid., p. 36-40
\textsuperscript{1555} Russia Sending Warships on Maneuvers Near Syria, New York Times Online, 12 June 2012; Russian Warships Said to Be Going to Naval Base in Syria, New York Times Online, 18 June 2012;
\textsuperscript{1556} Martin Malek, “Die postsowjetische Tangente des ‘Krieges gegen den Terror’”, in: Erich Reiter (Ed.), \textit{Jahrbuch für
regard to missile defence, Russia had a nuclear missile defence shield around Moscow – still originating from the Cold War era. But it has neither the economic nor the technological capability to develop and deploy a conventional missile defence system like the U.S. has. The U.S. missile defence system might not change the balance of threat between the U.S. and Russia, it surely changes the balance of status: the U.S. is capable of developing strategic weapons that nobody else can, or wants to, afford! As with nuclear weapons, the level of strategic armament that is fielded by a major power has to be limited to the size that Russia can afford. Therefore, there were no deals to make with missile defence.

But there are serious inconsistencies in Russia’s behaviour concerning these rational goals. As mentioned previously, Russia actually acted against its own perceived interest several times. Russia is not the first major power that has declined, lost its empire and allies, and had to adapt to a different role in international politics. The British Empire had lasted longer, but went down, as did the respective empires of Spain, France, Sweden, Austria, Portugal and the Netherlands before it. Germany and Italy accepted defeat after World War II and have not yet tried to re-establish their former territorial size and imperial possessions – although they tried to do so in the 1930s and 40s. There is no natural right to great power status and a sphere of influence. Many former hegemons simply abandoned this role. Why should Russia still be a great power then?

In addition, Russian politicians misjudged the role of great powers or hegemons throughout world history. Those empires or hegemons that persisted over a certain period of time did so by not only relying on their own will and power, but by achieving acceptance of their leading role by their allies. The United States are not just a great power because of their resources. They were asked to counterbalance a German, Japanese, Soviet and now a Chinese threat to Europe and Asia. Their economic prosperity, cultural attractiveness (of lifestyle) and desire to copy economic and political success played a major part in their international role – to some a larger one than their military might and technological superiority would suggest. For the very same reason nobody thought to counterbalance the United States after the end of Cold War. The world was still perceived to be better off with U.S. leadership than without it.

1557 See in general for: Paul Kennedy, *Aufstieg und Fall der großen Mächte, Ökonomischer Wandel und Militärischer Konflikt von 1500 bis 2000*, Frankfurt am Main, 1989;
This does not only apply to democratic systems. The increasing regional role of China in East and South-East Asia was derived from the increasing attractiveness of the Chinese market, the economic strength of China, its opening towards regional organisations and cooperation as well as its assistance to the region’s nations during the 1997 financial crisis.\textsuperscript{1561} Strikingly different to Russian behaviour, when in 1997 China helped these states regardless of their security policy. Thailand and the Philippines had very close relations to the U.S., both underlined by defensive agreements. The Philippines and China even signed an agreement for military cooperation – despite the fact that U.S. Special Forces were present on the islands.\textsuperscript{1562} As soon as China’s behaviour changed and resembled that of Russian – assertive, uncompromising, militaristic and nationalistic – it lost its regional influence to the U.S. again. The attempts of some states to expand their respective sphere of influence by military force, aggression and punitive submission in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century were rather short-lived. And this military conquest was accompanied by doubtful political ideologies! Even the Soviet Union – as dreadful as Stalin’s Communist rule was – had some political attractiveness in 1945. After many bourgeois or conservative regimes had collaborated with Germany during the Second World War, there were many volunteers who rejected bourgeois society and helped to establish a Communist rule. Soviet power was not only based on sheer terror and military might! Especially abroad, ideological, social and economic attractiveness were equally important.

Russia on the other hand, had little to offer to those states that should feel ‘blessed’ for having Russia as their hegemon. Russia’s economic boom – beside the fact that it was short-lived – was limited to some state-owned companies, the Russian bureaucracy and the urban centres where they lived: Moscow and St. Petersburg. It failed to deliver any blessing effects in the Russian hinterland, let alone the Russian dominions in Belarus, Ukraine and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{1563} Russia’s record as a peace enabler or security factor is even worse. The territorial conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova have not been solved so far. There has been neither a viable solution for the states facing secession, nor is there a viable solution granting stable independence to the secessionist countries.\textsuperscript{1564} Even South Ossetia and Abkhazia face serious internal as well as economical troubles.\textsuperscript{1565} If Russia seriously considers being a hegemon, is it really helpful to have gas disputes with Belarus and Ukraine? Or intervening politically in Ukraine’s elections,\textsuperscript{1566} having a war with Georgia and a political stalemate with Azerbaijan and Moldova? It is beyond the scope of

\textsuperscript{1561} Shambough, “China Engages Asia”, p. 64-99;  
\textsuperscript{1562} US, China vie for Philippine military influence; Asia Times Online, 20 September 2007;  
\textsuperscript{1563} Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 187-205;  
\textsuperscript{1565} ISN Caucasus Analytical Digest, 07/2009: Abchasia, p. 3f;  
\textsuperscript{1566} Shevtsova, Lonely Power, p. 158-160;
this paper to examine these conflicts in detail. But generally it is highly unlikely that in each case Russia did not have an alternative than to act as it did. No other hegemon is that much in conflict with the area it is presumably responsible for!

The rational interest pattern of explaining Russia’s behaviour is inconclusive, because it does not recognise the particular ideological preferences and blueprints of the Russian elites guiding their behaviour. Russian politics does not seem to follow the same patterns of the rational, cost-benefit calculations regarding power, influence, and wealth, the West would use to fight off or compromise on. To explain Russian behaviour, one ought to look into the inner-Russian political dynamics and developments to find explanations for Russian behaviour. Putin’s path towards authoritarianism did not happen by default. He, just like many other members of the Russian elites, had severe doubts as to whether democracy would work in Russia or whether Russia should seek other forms of political organisation, fitting its culture and history. These doubts were reinforced by the bitter experiences with transition in the 90s. During the time of transition, the Russian elite started to harness foreign policy for domestic purposes. To rally the population behind an increasingly unpopular elite, a ‘new patriotic consensus’ was sought, describing the West and its actions in Eastern Europe as main threats to Russia’s survival (instead of domestic political and economic mismanagement).

The confrontation with the West was not only a result of his authoritarian rule, it soon became its driving rationale. When Putin started to crack down on the oligarchs and the free media in 2001, the explanation to do so was that these free and independent societal actors would – by their selfish behaviour – weaken the state. And the state could not afford to be weak, because of his struggle with the West! Certainly, independent parties, free media and non-governmental actors were soon seen as agents of external powers bent on bringing down the Russian political elite and weakening Russia. The regime considered every policy – industrial, energy, education, infrastructure, communication, etc. – from the viewpoint of the ‘besieged fortress’ that had to prevail in the struggle against the West. “By mid-2007 there were signs that the authorities had begun trying out [ethnic] nationalism and great-power rhetoric as easy options for mobilizing society … Nationalism is a convenient way of retaining control of the revenue from natural resources, which has been privat-

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1567 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 396ff; For a broader historical discussion see: Leonid Luks, Der russische „Sonderweg”? Aufsätze zur neuesten Geschichte Russlands im europäischen Kontext, ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2005;
1569 Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 269ff;
1570 Mommsen, Nußberger, Das System Putin, p. 46ff;
ized by the ruling class.\footnote{1571}

A kleptocratic elite is, indeed, more comfortable running the country in a state of war. But in case of Russia, the confrontational rhetoric was more than convenience for the elites, it was conviction. The nationalist sentiments of the elites around Putin was reinforced by the reliance on the security forces and the secret services in the close circles of power\footnote{1572} and by the support of the Orthodox Church, demanding the protection of Orthodox brother-nations from Russia.\footnote{1573} A revival of militarism in the Russian society, promoted by volunteer fighters in the conflict in the near abroad,\footnote{1574} granted broad support for expansive state-sponsored militarism. This mix of authoritarianism, militarism, religious revitalisation and the 'blood and soil' mentality was a fertile ground for a political ideology soon to fit the Kremlin’s need for a unifying ideology and legitimisation of its rule: Eurasism.

By stressing the need for authoritarian rule to solve societal problems and preserve inner stability against democratic turmoil, by stressing historical justifications for expansion – linking the domination of historical territories to the core interests of the nation, cultivating a bogeyman to stress the notion that the nation is in constant danger in order to legitimise internal repression and harsh foreign actions: all that fulfils the definition of a well known political ideology: Fascism!\footnote{1575}

**Digression on Fascism**

In the contemporary debate in Fascism, there are two schools of thought, neither of which is helpful for the application of the concept of Fascism for contemporary political analysis. The first school describes Fascism as a temporary phenomenon of the early 20th century, restricting the term only to European right-wing regimes from 1922 to 1945.\footnote{1576} However they blur their strict understanding of Fascism by calling Nazi-Germany and all sorts of regimes or states allied to Nazi-Germany in Second World War Fascist regimes.\footnote{1577}

The second school tries to define Fascism not as the political fashion of a certain time.\footnote{1578}

\footnote{1571} Shevtsova, *Russia, Lost in Transition*, p. 88-89;
\footnote{1572} Shevtsova, *Russia, Lost in Transition*, p. 100-103;
\footnote{1573} Auer, "Die Rolle der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche", p. 96-104;
\footnote{1575} See for the definition of Fascism: Mario Einaudi, “Fascism”, in: David L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume 5, MacMillan London, New York, 1972, p. 334-341; Note that Soviet propaganda bent the term Fascism and excessively applied it to Hitler’s National-Socialist Germany. This was basically done to cover the Socialist roots of Nazism. As Einaudi correctly notices, the role-model for Fascism is Mussolini’s Italy and Italian fascist thought – which is much more similar to that what happens in Russia than to what happened in Germany in the 1930s.
\footnote{1576} See for example: Arnd Bauernkämpfer, *Der Faschismus in Europa 1918-1945*, Reclam, Stuttgart 2006;
\footnote{1577} Ernst Nolte makes the very same mistake by summing up National Socialism and Fascism under the same brand. (See: Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, 6. Auflage, Piper, München, 2008.). They shared a hostility towards Communism, despising Liberalism and were allied in the war, but there are important ideological differences between Fascism and National Socialism!!! Fascism lacked the socialist social agenda, the biologist racism, and the neo-paganist religious agenda of National Socialism. In the case of Austria, the 'Austro-' Fascist government of Dolfuss and Schuschnigg were at odds with National Socialism, resulting in a attempted Nazi coup against a Fascist government in 1934. For a more detailed description of the differences see: Gilbert Allardyce, “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Definition of a Concept”, in: *American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, 1979, p. 367-398;
but as a certain type of ideology that can be found in contemporary political life as well. Most commonly, Fascism is defined as an autocratic ideology comprising ultranationalism, personal, charismatic leadership and the concept of a cultural and political awakening or re-emergence of a past imperial epoch and might.\textsuperscript{1578} This very elastic definition is further stripped of its value by again confusing Fascism with National Socialism and applying it to all kinds of presumably right-wing movements: national-socialists, neo-nazis (imitating the symbolism of the Third Reich without knowing or reflecting on its ideology), historic revisionists, racist, xenophobic, or antisemitic groups (whatever the reason for being so may be), nationalists, populist-socialists, or other anti-establishment groups. Has fascism become a political swear-word to denounce unpleasant groups? Is it stripped of all meaning and simply used at will to express disagreements with certain political factions? Certainly not. Although there is no single book by Mussolini outlining fascist ideology, he left sufficient speeches, papers, laws and actions from which his ideological setting can be described.\textsuperscript{1579} And similar thoughts have emerged in other states, both contemporary to Italy (Austria 1933-38, Portugal 1933-57 and to a much lesser extent Spain 1936-45) as well as later regimes.

Fascism stems from conservative authoritarianism, but tries to adapt many socialist elements to incorporate the lower classes and to ensure presumably efficient economic production in times of confrontation and war. Fascism tried to preserve the private property and the social standing of the then elite, incorporating old political and social institutions (monarchy, the Church, etc.) into the regime. On the other hand, the regime is not run by the old elites themselves, but by social climbers predominantly from the security forces as well as the petit bourgeois, then providing new privileges for those groups, especially through expanding the bureaucracy and the armed forces.

Fascism was created after historic shocks or lost wars, in which parliamentarism and liberalism were identified as the main reasons for the country’s weakness and internal divisions. Therefore, representative democracy should be replaced by other forms of fake-representativeness: corporatism in Austria, Italy and Portugal, ‘managed democracy’ in Spain.

Etatism, common to conservative thought, is exaggerated: the state is perceived as an organism with its own demands and rules of higher regard than the individual rights and freedoms of its citizens. For the purpose of state security, the citizens are increasingly stripped off their civil rights. As every (organic) state has historic and cultural particularities, every state needs its own tailor-made political system. Universal norms or preferences for certain systems (like proposed by liberalism) are rejected. Indeed, historic and cultural particularities are quoted as an excuse not to introduce liberal democracy (it does not fit Italy’s, Austria’s, Russia’s, etc. demands). The exaggeration of national security and the goal to suppress or eradicate all sorts of subversive activity alien to the particular understanding of national culture and healthy (organic) society has two major consequences: first, the unchecked security services be-


\textsuperscript{1579} Especially: Benito Mussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism and Benito Mussolini, Four Speeches on the Corporate State; The author has grey copies of English translation in the form of a reader in political thought, Salzburg University, 2003;
come a state within the state, who’s preferences shape all social spheres, second, entire social or professional groups become suspicious and suppressed because of their alleged decadency or unfaithfulness: intellectuals, the arts, and people with different life choices. The well-being of the state and the preparation for war will also see the increasing interference of the state in economic affairs. While paying lip service to the preservation of private property, fascism prefers large state-owned enterprises, especially in sectors of strategic relevance such as heavy industries, energy, armament-industry, and banks. While (almost) preserving a market economy on the inside, Fascism is quite hostile towards free trade and foreign investment, usually emphasising autonomy, autocracy, self-sufficiency, protectionism, and mercantilism. The most distinctive feature of fascism is its militarism. While conservatism recognises the need to be prepared for competition and international struggle, fascism exaggerates patriotism to extensive nationalism and defence readiness to aggressive expansionism. Every aspect of the social, economic or political life is considered from the perspective of war-readiness and military efficiency. Military conquest and imperial expansion become the ultimate aim of the state (or human existence as such), to whose achievement all efforts have to be concentrated. The imperial vision, the restoration of the lost empire may be justified with all sorts of historic, religious or ethno-nationalistic reasons. There often is a doctrine of a historic mission or burden to dominate certain areas. Every aspect of social and political life will be judged from the aspect of militarism or struggle for survival. All restrictions of individual freedom ensure – at the end – that society is fit for war. Although Fascism is very vulnerable to racist or xenophobic sentiments, they are not an inherent part of the doctrine. Ethnic or religious minorities, if they subject to the state and the prevailing political order, may incorporate into the regime. Compared to National Socialism, fascism lacks the biologistic racism and antisemitism, the revolutionary socialism (abolishing private property, emphasising the importance of the German workers’ class, etc.), and the religious revisionism (replacing Christianity by Germanic neo-paganism and the Church by the order of the SS). Fascism, on the other hand, has to be distinguished from ordinary conservative authoritarianism or restorative authoritarian rule, where the old traditional elites resume to authoritarian rule to exclude certain fractions (mostly socialist or other left-wing labour movements) from the political process and by authoritarian rule try to prevent certain policies (land reforms, secularisation, etc.) from being implemented. Examples for such restorative authoritarianism were Spain from 1945 to 1975, Hungary under Horthy (1921-1944), Chile under Pinochet (1973-1990) and Argentina under the Junta (1976-1982). Even Yeltsin’s later years may be regarded as such.

The lack of a proper ideology or pragmatism of power was both attributed to Putin and Mussolini. This makes a comparison difficult, but one can compare the pattern of ideological thinking and regime performance in certain points. It needs to be stressed that Italy from 1922 to 1943 is taken for the reference. The later Republic of Salo (1943-1945) was a state born in war, totally dependent on Nazi-Germany for survival, therefore hardly comparable to an independent state at peace, trying to

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Mussolini’s Italy and Putin’s Russia resemble each other in the following categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Italian Fascism (Mussolini)</th>
<th>Russian Fascism (Putin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial idea</td>
<td>Re-establishing the Roman empire, conquering the mare nostro as an exclusive sphere of influence</td>
<td>Re-establishing the Soviet Union, dominating the post-Soviet space as exclusive sphere of influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired international order</td>
<td>Exclusive spheres, hierarchical order with Italy as the commanding centre in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>Exclusive spheres, hierarchical order with Russia as the commanding centre in Eurasia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of liberal (competitive democracy)</td>
<td>Responsible for losing WW I by weakening the Italian war efforts from within. Unsuitable for Italy; war and confrontation</td>
<td>Responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union, the turmoil and Russian weakness of the 90s, which have been abused by the West. Unsuitable for Russia and confrontation with the West.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian management of the most important social conflicts</td>
<td>The class struggle had to be administrated, therefore the cooperate state</td>
<td>The struggle for ownership of larger enterprises has to be administrated, therefore the economic bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for monopolising the political will</td>
<td>Communists and ‘Wall-Street agents’ would subvert Italy to weaken its will and ability to fight</td>
<td>American and Western agents would use it to trigger colourful revolutions in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyper-Etatism</td>
<td>Organic state</td>
<td>Dictatorship of the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of pseudo-representation</td>
<td>Corporate state</td>
<td>Guided democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organisation to rally society</td>
<td>Blackshirts, fascist party</td>
<td>Nashi, United Russia, Patriotic Front (?), Cossacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of the economy</td>
<td>Maintaining private property in principle, but nationalising or controlling all branches considered vital for the external struggle: arms, heavy industry, banks</td>
<td>Maintaining private property in principle, but nationalising or controlling all branches considered vital for the external struggle: big industry, banks, national resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal leadership</td>
<td>Il Duce</td>
<td>Putin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>Selectively against the political opposition</td>
<td>Selectively against the political opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to deal with the old political order?</td>
<td>Keeping the facade of the constitutional monarchy, while uniting all real powers in the hands of Mussolini, governing through pseudo-representative institutions (corporate state) and a politically guided judiciary; corrupting the (Catholic) Church using it as a propaganda tool</td>
<td>Keeping the facade of the presidential democracy, while uniting all real powers in the hands of Putin, governing through pseudo-representative institutions (guided democracy) and a politically guided judiciary; corrupting the (Orthodox) Church, using it as a propaganda tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a fascist state, external struggles are not conducted defensively – because other states might threaten one’s sovereignty, but they are a purpose for themselves. War and militarism strengthens the nation, purifies society and educates patriotism. Struggle, competition and the state of military alert prevent people and society from becoming lazy and decadent. Regardless of whether there are real enemies at hand, there have to be some. Mussolini championed nationalism, citing both com-
munist subversion as well as British military presence in the Mediterranean as a challenge to Italy’s ‘natural’ rights. Russian claims against the U.S. and perceived American expansionism serve the same purpose. Conspiracy theories, myths of American involvement in any sort of negative development are pursued to confront the Russian population with an enemy and keep society in a war-like mindset of eternal confrontation. Otherwise neither the authoritarian rule nor Russian expansionism can be justified; and scapegoats would have to be found within one’s own country.

For a fascist foreign policy, the own national historical rights and aspirations are more important than international consent, free will of the people (living in territories claimed by the nation under fascist influence), international law or good relationship to the nation’s environment. Italy’s right to conquer Abyssinia or Albania were derived from history and historic destiny, so neither the Abyssinian people nor the British were entitled to criticise Italy’s moves. It does not matter what the Ukrainians and Georgians think, feel, and want from Russia. The Russian historic destiny is bound to those nations: Kiev, the historical cradle of the Russian people has to be controlled by Moscow, Georgia, Orthodox brother-nation and birthplace of Russia’s admired historic leader Joseph Stalin, has to come home to Russia, just like Slavic Europe has to accept Russian leadership. If they fail to acknowledge that, punitive action follows. Putin’s ideas of an Eurasian order with an exclusive sphere of influence for Moscow, where other actors may only be present with Russian allowance and the limited sovereignty of the states of the former Soviet Union strikingly resembles Mussolini’s claims to the Mediterranean being a *mare clausum*, where Italy predominates and the presence of other powers requires Italian approval.

For a fascist state, the own history is to be glorified and reinterpreted to justify expansion. Mussolini was dreaming of the re-establishment of the Roman Empire. Does Putin dream of re-establishing the Soviet Union? His quote “Anyone who does not miss the Soviet Union has no soul and anyone who wants it back has no brain” says no. But on the other hand, critical examinations and analyses of the Soviet past are suppressed or even forbidden.

To a fascist leadership independent parties, free press, the civil society and NGOs do not understand the gravity of this struggle; they rather pursue their limited and unimportant goals at the expense of
the nation’s strength. Sometimes they are mere subversive forces of the foreign enemy. Therefore, the creation of the political will may not be left to the people and their parties – as they will be seduced or corrupted. The political will has to be prescribed by the government and its respective constitutions. In this respect Mussolini went further than Putin, introducing a corporate state. As the class struggle was believed to be the most important social conflict, the corporate state was an idea to organise labour and business interests beyond party politics – and most importantly under direct supervision of the state.\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 335-337; Mommesen, Nußberger, Das System Putin, p. 33-63, 82-114; Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 104ff; Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1590} However, for Putin, organising labour and business interests was not that important. It was more important to govern the distribution of the wealth generated from national resources and to immediately control the implementation of the people’s political will. Thus, tight control of popular media and guiding democracy – excluding all forces not loyal to the leader from politics – was the primary objective.\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103;} Both men share a sense for extreme etatism, which Mussolini called an organic state, holding its own interests above the individual freedoms and interests of its citizens,\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1592} and Putin called it the dictatorship of the law, to which all individual interests have to be subjugated.\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1593}

Here Mussolini’s and Putin’s fascism are similar. Both pretend to leave the old political order intact (in Italy the constitutional monarchy, in Russia the old Yeltsin system), while actually centralising all political power in their own hand. They both try not to topple over the habits of the bourgeois society (religion, private property, etc.) rather than to refrain their control of the private economy to sectors seen essential for national security (both with Mussolini and Putin) this sector grew from time to time.\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 335-337; Mommesen, Nußberger, Das System Putin, p. 33-63, 82-114; Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 104ff; Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1594} Not having a religious-social-revolutionary agenda, Fascism distinguishes itself from other, more radical authoritarian ideologies, such as National Socialism\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 335-337; Mommesen, Nußberger, Das System Putin, p. 33-63, 82-114; Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 104ff; Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1595} or Communism. Both fascist systems differ from these totalitarian systems in other ways, too: first, the ruling party is much weaker and not an instrument of power as such. Power is executed via the state authorities, not parallel party organisations. In Russia there are even many ‘parties of the rule’, as managed-democracy includes a patriotic opposition.\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 335-337; Mommesen, Nußberger, Das SystemPutin, p. 33-63, 82-114; Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 104ff; Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1596} Terror and prosecution are much weaker, basically concentrated on suppressing the opposition and dissents, and on managing disputes over properties and economic control.\footnote{Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 335-337; Mommesen, Nußberger, Das System Putin, p. 33-63, 82-114; Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 104ff; Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337; Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 138-141; See for Mussolini’s economic policies: Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337, see for Putin’s economic policies: Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 104-148; See for this ideology: Ebenstein, “National Socialism”, p. 45-50; An opposition that does not criticise the top leaders. See: Sakwa, Putin, Russia’s Choice, p. 102-109; Shevtsova, Russia, Lost in Transition, p. 97-103; 1597} Hence, terror on a large scale and for preventive or repressive purposes never quite materialized. Fascism suffers by comparison with the apocalyptic liquidations for
which Hitler and Stalin will be known to history. ... The will was lacking. Mussolini’s cynical boasting was nearly always accompanied by a most lively sense of his inadequacy. ... He had been a member of a democratic socialist party for too long to forget entirely the habit of doubt and scepticism. Hidden admiration for certain traditional forms of Italian culture stopped him from exercising his powers to the fullest extent. His ignorance made him avoid direct confrontation with established forms of conducting public business, which could therefore continue as before.”  

1598 This was said about the factors moderating Mussolini’s rule, and the very same can be said about Putin. It should not be forgotten that Putin worked in a very different international environment as compared to Mussolini, who would hardly allow or appreciate open bragging about the violent suppression of the opposition.

In recent times, Russian propaganda tries to depict the Russian-Western disagreements as results of Western insistence on the universal application of gay and lesbian rights. This attempt is equally ridiculous: amongst the EU-member states there is by far no consensus on these issues, and gay and lesbian rights are far from the core of Western-Russian disagreements. Russia’s authoritarian rule, the suppression of any kind of opposition and independent civil society, its aggressive and disruptive foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’, and its militaristic and hostile rhetoric against the West, particularly against the U.S. and NATO are the core issues. For two decades, the West had been soft and forgiving towards Russian erratic behaviour, hoping that at the end of the day reason will prevail and a compromise will be reached. This approach was illusive, and further U.S. or European attempts to repeat the same policy over and over again – may it be called “reset” or else – will remain futile.

7.5. Global Military Potentials and the United States

As described earlier, potentials are much easier to quantify than power. As military power did play a considerable role in George W. Bush’s strategy of primacy, and military power – in terms of military options – was meant to create other forms of influence, assessing military potentials as a crude guide for the assessment of military power may be dealt with some lines. However, as mentioned before, potentials should not be confused with power and the figures given below should be treated with caution.

The following tables depict the global military potentials in terms of land-forces battalions, air

1598 Einaudi, “Fascism”, p. 337-338;
1599 Data of all tables are from the respective issues of the IISS’s Military Balance (1988, 2001/02, and 2012 respectively).
1600 The graphic depicts only forces with combat roles: armoured-, mechanised-, infantry-, paratrooper-, marine-, cav-
force squadrons\textsuperscript{1601} and the average warship tonnage.\textsuperscript{1602}

The graphic above depicts the situation in 1988, at the very end of the Cold War. The conventional superiority of the Soviet Union in numbers is clearly visible. At the time, the West had to rely on tactical nuclear weapons to defeat a possible Soviet onslaught and to gain time for the mobilisation of reserve forces.

\textsuperscript{1601} The graphic depicts only forces with combat roles: fighter-, fighter-bomber-, ground-attack-, bomber-, reconnaissance-, ELINT-, AWACS-, transport-, maritime-patrol-, ASW-, attack-helicopter-, transport-helicopter-, multi-purpose-helicopter-, ELINT- and other combat-role-helicopter squadrons are depicted. Pure training, liaison, or VIP-transport units are excluded. To be counted as a squadron at least 8 equal or similar type aircraft have to be in the nation’s inventory. In case of very high value assets like AWACS, 3-4 planes may constitute a squadron. Each wing counts 4 squadrons automatically.

\textsuperscript{1602} Each ship is multiplied with a value representing a typical tonnage number for a ship of the respective kind: SSGN 10000t, SSN 6000t, SSG 1500t, CVA 90000t, CVE 2500t, CGN 18000t, CG 9500t, DDG 5000t, DD 3000t, FFG/FF 3000t, FS: 750t, PG/PF/PP 200t, MS/MH/ML 350t, LHD 20000t, LPD 15000t, LST/LSM 1500t, LCM/LCU/LCAC 500t, AUX 1000t;
The “modified” table tries to emphasise the technological differences and different professional skills between the respective nations by multiplying each country value with a certain factor. These factors are: 0,25 for a third world country with considerable domestic difficulties/civil war, 0,5 for a third-world country, where the full combat-readiness of the forces has to be questioned, 0,75 for a conventional manoeuvre army that fields mainly older, second-hand equipment, 1 for a conventional manoeuvre army, 1,5 for a conventional manoeuvre army that has some post-cold-war force multipliers (smart weapons, data-networks, drones, modern aviation, sophisticated C4ISR-equipment, etc.) in its inventory, 2 for a post-cold-war army that makes regular use of such means, 2,5 for a post-cold-war army that has some very expensive force multipliers (satellites, etc.), and 3 for a superpower that has the full range of all expensive force multipliers.
The 2001/02 dataset – the year of 9/11 – shows a very different picture. The demilitarisation of Europe has progressed considerably. The blue ‘Europe’-quarter now comprises all the nations of the former Warsaw Pact and European NATO nations! It is obvious, that the collapse of the Warsaw-Pact did not diminish Russia’s role in the global military structure but rather the collapse of the communist system in Russia and the implosion of the Soviet military apparatus through this collapse. The Warsaw Pact, Russia’s claimed zone of interest, significantly reinforced neither Soviet nor Western military power.
The technological differences reinforce the predominant position of the United States during the height of the ‘unipolar moment’. The Western command of the sea and the air is undisputed (although the military balance lists a lot of helicopter units in the Army’s inventory that explode the number of squadrons probably beyond the real proportion). Considering this, the temptation of the Bush-administration to use the armed forces to realise U.S. strategic ambitions in the Middle East may be understood. However, military potentials are by no way equal to military power and having by far the greatest military potential in the international system does not guarantee that the realisation of military options will be easy!

**Global Military Potentials 2012**

Battalions, Squadrons, avg. Tonnage (x 1000)

Now in 2012, at the end of Obama’s first term, the distribution of military potentials looks very different again. The Asian theatre failed to demilitarise after the end of the Cold War and the militarisation continued to grow. In Europe the financial crisis started to take its toll on the armed forces.
Strikingly, the inclusion of technological and organisational factors does not dramatically shift the balance of military potentials in favour of the West. In Asia and the Middle East, but also Russia and Latin America to a certain extent, armies have been qualitatively modernised too. Modern equipment and force multipliers are no more a privilege of the West.

In terms of naval and air forces, the United States still enjoys a considerable advantage. Baring in mind that the ‘North America’ quarter almost exclusively consists of U.S. forces (only Canada augments the U.S.), while almost all other quarters are comprised of multiple strong – at times even rivalling – states, the competitive advantage of the U.S. is still considerable. But it is diminishing slowly. The United States are able to guarantee the freedom of the seas and the sky, but in a continental land war, they are definitely dependent on allies. This again is part of the numerical rationale behind the new U.S. strategy of selective engagement.

The other rather homogeneous quarter is that of Russia and the CIS, consisting of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. This again should make Europeans think. Their shrinking share of global military potentials is – at least concerning the continental warfare – as big as the Russian. But to bring this potential to bare, Europe should be united and respond quickly to the challenge. Whether Europe is able to do that, may be disputed.
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (2006), *Comprehensive Political Guidances*, Endorsed by Heads of State and Government on 29th November 2006;


8.3. Author’s CV including major Publications

Professional experience


March 2007 till June 2007: Research Fellow, International Institute for Liberal Politics Vienna

October 1997 till September 2002: Service in the Armed Forces
Education and training

Since October 2008: Zryni Miklos National Defence University, Phd in „Strategic Studies“
June till July 2010: St. Petersbg State Polytechnical University, Summer-School, “Russia as a Business Environment”
October till November 2007: National Defence University, People’s Republic of China, International Symposium Course
October 2002 till March 2007: University of Salzburg, Institute for Sociology and Political Science

Publications

Monographs


Articles in Edited Volumes

2010, “Russland und die Türkei als Herausforderung für die europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, (Russia and Turkey – a Challenge to European Security Politics), in: Johann Frank, Johann Pucher (Eds.), Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik 2010, Das Strategische Profil der Europäischen Union, Böhlau-Verlag, Vienna, p.131-152
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Other Publications

17 Reviews in the Review Journal of the Bureau for Security Policy

7 Articles in DAVID, Jewish Cultural Magazine

3 Reviews in DAVID, Jewish Cultural Magazine

Teachings and Lectures

February 2014, Austrian Division for Armament and Military Technology, Iran's Ballistic Missile Programmes: Bureaucratic and Industrial Interests and Policies inside Iran

October 2013, International Institute for Liberal Politics, Austrian Interests in Eastern Europe: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova

February 2013, Austrian National Defence Academy, The strategic situation in East Asia, The strategic situation in the Blacksea area, Missile Defence and American Grand Strategy

February 2012, Austrian Division for Armament and Military Technology, Missile defence and pub-
lic opinion: Poland and Turkey
Summer Semester 2011, Theresan Military Academy, Current developments in world affairs: the
Blacksea region
March 2011, J.F.K. School of Government, Harvard University, The Military-Strategic Situation in
the Black-Sea-Region
February 2011, Industrieanlagen Betriebsgesellschaft (IABG), Missile Defence in Europe
February 2011, Austrian Division for Armament and Military Technology, Missile defence in
Europe and Austrian Security Policy
May 2010, Austrian National Defence Academy, Iran, proliferation, missile defence
October 2009, University of Fribourg, Academic Swiss Caucasus Network, The Russian-Georgian
War in August 2008
March 2009, Manfred Wörner Foundation, Budapest, 50 Years NATO, 20 Years Democracy, 10
Membership of Hungary – the Austrian Perspective
Winter Semester 2008/09, Theresan Military Academy, Introduction in international relations
March 2009, Manfred Wörner Foundation, Budapest, Threat Perception of the Austrian Public
April 2008, Austrian National Defence Academy, The strategic situation in East Asia
Winter Semester 2007/08, Theresan Military Academy, Introduction in International Relations
Winter Semester 2006/07, Theresan Military Academy, Introduction in International Relations
Winter Semester 2006/07, Theresan Military Academy, Current developments in world affairs, basic
facts and introduction

Research projects
2014, European Council on Foreign Relations, Project “A New Global Strategy for Europe”, man-
gaging the cooperation of the Austrian MoD with the ECFR regarding chapter IV: “Liberal
Interventionism at a Time of Austerity and Fatigue”
2012-2013, International Institute for Liberal Politics, Europe to the East of the EU: strategic situ-
ation and policy options for Europe; project management, budgeting, research-evaluation
Dialogue, Russia in 2020, Scenarios for the Future, Discussant, Representative of the MoD
and potential conflicts, and perspective for conflict resolution; project management, ana-
lysis and quantitative research
Languages

German (Mother Tongue)

English (C)

Spanish (B)

Polish (A2)