

The Hungarian Theory of Just War Based on the Idea of the Holy Crown

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Abstract

Warfare ideologies are as old as human civilization. By now, they have grown into an important and extended research field, as many works were written in the near past, including for example ones analyzing the justification of war in ancient Indian epic literature, empire-building techniques in the Chinese antiquity, the warfare ideology of Islam or Buddhism in Sri-Lanka. Similar works concerning Hungarian historical ideologies are not without attempts, but a comprehensive survey remains to be seen. In this paper I present a special Hungarian warfare ideology which is based on the idea of the Holy Crown, with the help of the concepts of the just war theory.

Keywords: just war theory, idea of the Holy Crown, Hungarian warfare ideology

The theory of just war

Every country, state, or empire applied in the past, applies, and is presumably going to use theoretical constructions by which these countries seek to justify their military activities. These theoretical constructions can be analyzed as warfare ideologies. One of them is the just war theory, which is one of the most detailed and elaborated warfare ideologies.

We can trace the origin of this theory back to the ancient times, and its development has been more or less persistent ever since. According to the most recent form of the theory, the question of justice can be raised regarding the preparation for, unleashing of, waging of and abandoning warfare. The different parts of war are related to the different questions of justice,

like warfare preparation to *ius ante bellum*, starting warfare to *ius ad bellum*, waging war to *ius in bello*, and abandoning fighting to *ius post bellum* (see Lucas 2015, 45-132, Johnson and Patterson 2015). These different forms of justice have various parts as well. For example, the justice of preparation includes problems of the moral nature of commanding hierarchy or the method of recruitment; justice of unleashing a war contains questions of the just cause of war and the related intention, and the legitimate authority who has the right to judge the nature of the cause; the justice of waging war includes problems like the discrimination between combatants and non-combatants; and finally, the justice of abandoning fighting is related to ideas, like reparation and punishment.

Points of view of warfare justice, which emerged along with the development of just war theory from the antiquity, can be distinguished from the content of the special warfare justice of just war theory (Frowe 2011, 50). For example, according to Augustine of Hippo and other authors in the Middle Ages, punishment is the main just cause for war, however, today it is commonly thought that the protection of rights is better grounded as a just cause (if punishment has any significance at all). This difference in the content, however, does not affect the applied formal feature, the just cause of war, which is a morally important point of view to make moral judgement on the justice of war. Consequently, formal features emerged during the European history of thinking on just war, but they are relevant to other theories of warfare justice as well as analyzing tools.

The Hungarian theory of just war

The principal aim of this paper is to analyze a special – Hungarian – form of warfare theory, the idea of the Holy Crown, with the help of the formal feature of just war theory. After the analysis we will find the Hungarian warfare theory has the same formal categories as the just

war theory. For this reasons, we can call this theory as the just war theory based on the idea of the Holy Crown, or Hungarian just war theory.

Just war theory based on the idea of the Holy Crown is a theoretical construction, which, in this form did not appear at all in Hungarian history. Hungarian state leaders, political thinkers or historians, however, did use some forms of this theory, and in most of the cases with the same core content. Therefore, what I propose in this article is to collect the different references to the idea of the Holy Crown in connection with warfare or foreign policy, and to elaborate these mentions into a coherent theory.

The idea of the Holy Crown has its origin in the Christian Middle Ages. The King's crown had some symbolic role as early as the period of the early Árpád's (11-12th centuries), but at that time the Holy Crown did not exist (Árpád was the founder of the first ruling dynasty of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Middle Ages, he lived in the second half of the 10th century). We do not know any documents in which there is a reference to the King's crown in connection with wars, however, in a 11th century piece of written work of the style of Mirrors of King, which is attributed to (Saint) Stephen I (who was a descendant of Árpád, and the founder of the Christian Hungarian kingdom at 1000/1001), there is a reference to the King's crown as the communal and God-required standards of domestic politics (Szent István 2014, ch. 1.). Stephen conducted Christian, holy-war style campaigns against the pagan and Byzantine Christine warlords of some Hungarian tribes, which one could naturally consider at that time as having the communal and God-required standards as well. But, since we do not have any primary documents to base this reasoning, we cannot claim that Stephen's holy wars are justified by the idea of the Holy Crown.

(Saint) Stephen I was canonized in 1083, under king (Saint) Ladislaus I, who likewise was canonized in 1192 under king Béla III. At the end of the 12th century a new idea was created based on the canonizations, the idea of 'the clan of the saintly kings', which did not refer to

single kings but to the whole Árpád dynasty. Partly under this idea Béla III took the cross and swore an oath to lead crusade to the Holy Land, which was kept by his son Andrew II in 1217-18 who took part in the first phase of the fifth crusade.

By the 13th century the genealogical line originated from Árpád had weakened and confused, and to be a king one had to prove his kinship with the ruling dynasty and had to hold the king's crown. This is because the king's material crown, in that time it was already the Holy Crown constructed possibly under the reign Béla III, gained a new role. It was seen as the crown of (Saint) Stephen I and (Saint) Ladislaus I and which was bearing the authority for the Hungarian throne: who had the Holy Crown, had the right to rule the country.

Hence we can observe the early development of the idea of the Holy Crown as the Hungarian form of just war thinking at the end of the 14th century in the Hungarian military history. The idea had gained a more definitive form by the end of the 19th century, since when it has been referred to as the doctrine of the Holy Crown (and not just 'idea'). The doctrine, which looked back to the other expressions of the idea of the Holy Crown as its predecessor proposed, first of all, the inclusion of the basics of the Hungarian public law theory. The public law of Hungary had some connections with the foreign policy of the state, however, it primarily gave theoretical shape to the relations of king, citizens, and state, so it hinted at domestic politics (see Péter 2003).

The idea of the Holy Crown developed with a double nature from the origin: on the one hand it claimed universal Christian justification for the political activity of political leaders; on the other it gave particularly 'national' justification for political activity which targeted the parts of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary and its direct surroundings. This can be the implication of the undertaken mission of the young Hungarian Kingdom ('the young plantation of Christianity' as the Hartvic legend reads (Hartvic 2000: 381)) on the periphery of Christian Europe. (Saint) Stephen I, the first king of Hungary, defined this role as converting this part of

Europe into Christianity and maintaining it in Christianity. Hence the mission of Hungary involves a special peripheric territory and the universal idea of Christianity, and this mission descended to the idea of the Holy Crown.

Below I pay less attention to the public law dimension of the idea of the Holy Crown, and endeavor to emphasize the foreign policy- and warfare-related aspects. To do this I am relying on the theory of the famous just war theoretician of the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas.

Just war theory in the Middle Ages: the summary of the theory of Thomas Aquinas

The theory of Thomas Aquinas is only one of the summaries in the 13th century (Russell 1975, 218-224, Barnes 1997), but without doubt, it has the greatest influence. According to Aquinas, a war is just if it started on the command of the sovereign with legitimate authority; it is started by the sovereign for a just cause; and the intention of the sovereign is right, that is the intention to go to war is to promote the good and impede the wrong (Aquinas 2013, 177).

The rule of legitimate authority lays down the scope of the person or group of people who are morally speaking eligible to start a war. According to Aquinas the sovereign prince has the legitimate authority, his role in unleashing a war comes from his responsibility for the common good. On this responsibility, only the sovereign prince has the right to protect the common good, private persons do not. Since external enemies, as much as internal rebels, can jeopardize the common good, the sovereign has the same right to encounter both internal rebels and external enemies (Johnson 2003, 7-13).

The rule of just cause, which is the most important rule nowadays, is on the second place in the theories of the Middle Ages, so we find it in the theory of Aquinas as well. According to Aquinas, among the many possible causes of war only those are just which are in connection with the wrong committed by the enemy. The enemy, for this reason, deserves to be attacked.

Aquinas' just causes include the punishment of those who committed wrong, or the restoration of what is seized unjustly.

Finally, it is also important that the just warring party, waging a war with right intentions, so to speak the sovereign's intention, should tend to peace, and should abstain from greatness, cruelty, or vengefulness. Aquinas distinguished two meanings of right intention, the positive meaning of endeavoring for Christian peace (based on the virtue of charity – love of God and the neighbors – and including concord (Aquinas 2013, 171-175)), and the negative meaning of evading evil motivations. One ground of this distinction is the difference between *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*, because endeavoring for peace is part of the requirements of *ius ad bellum*, but evading evil motivations is part of *ius in bello*.

Hungarian just war theory

We can find the details of Hungarian just war theory in historical documents. These details are mostly analyzable with the help of the *ius ad bellum* requirements of just war theory, so I am going to use Aquinas' *ius ad bellum* expectations: legitimate authority, just cause and right intention. Regarding the right intention requirements, I am going to apply only the *ius ad bellum* part of it.

Legitimate authority of unleashing war: king, nobility, king and nobility, king and national community, governor and Parliament

According to the Hungarian just war theory the legitimate authority of unleashing a war changed with the political sovereignty in the course of history. For the first time the idea of the Holy Crown appeared in the second half of the 14th century as a justification of wars, in János

Küküllei's work on king (Great) Louis I (Angevin) of Hungary (Küküllei was a notary in the Royal Chancellery in the second half of the 14th century). Based on this text we can claim that the Hungarian kings of the Angevin dynasty (first of all (Great) Louis I) had the legitimate authority to make decisions on starting a war, because Küküllei's work referred to the Holy Crown when describing Louis' wars (Küküllei 2000, 30-31).

After the Middle Ages, the Hungarian political power changed in several occasions, on which the theoreticians of the idea of the Holy Crown, like István Werbőczy, Péter Révay, Ákos Timon or Kálmán Molnár, responded. Their theories usually focused on the problem of the person who was (or should have been) the holder of political sovereignty in Hungary, and indirectly, who had (or should have had) legitimate authority for unleashing a war. Below I examine their theories based on the former aspect, supposing at the same time that the owner of political sovereignty has the right, and consequently the legitimate authority to start a war.

In the 15-16th centuries, due to social changes, the king's formerly held political power significantly decreased in line with the accession of the political power of the nobility. The work of István Werbőczy, a legal expert and a royal jurist, at the beginning of the 16th century, expressed this change. According to Werbőczy the king can refer to the Holy Crown as a justification of his actions (like starting wars), because the nobility „... *and then was transferred by the community, out of its own authority, to the jurisdiction of the Holy Crown of this realm and consequently to our prince and king, the right and full power of ennoblement, and therefore of donating estates ... , together with the supreme power and government*” (Werbőczy 2005, 51). Werbőczy thought the king ruled the country and exercised the royal rights (including the right of unleashing war) because the nobility had previously elected him to be king. Therefore, the real sovereign is not the king but the nobility, who nevertheless transferred its ruling rights to a king by the coronation (Werbőczy 2005, 229).

One hundred years after Werbőczy, at the beginning of the 17th century, a new turn on the idea of the Holy Crown appeared in the work of Péter Révay (who was the *főispán* (*comites*, sheriff) of Turóc County and Keeper of the Holy Crown at the beginning of the 17th century). Révay more or less agreed with Werbőczy regarding the significance of the nobility, but he emphasized the importance of the king as well (Révay 1979, 228). According to Révay, the Holy Crown was the personified incarnation of Providence (God) which had virtues like piety, honesty, justice, loyalty, and austerity. These virtues of the Holy Crown were the common standards for the king and the nobility in ruling the country. When previously the governing powers had not adhered to these standards, for example when there had been partisan struggle in the kingdom, the Crown left the country, and the country became demolished. As the Crown came back, the order of the country was restored, and the country prospered again. There were several Crown-comebacks in the Hungarian history, the latest for Révay happened when the King of Hungary (Habsburg) Matthias II regained it at the beginning of the 17th century. This comeback of the Holy Crown symbolically settled the war between the king and the nobility, and the intervention of the external enemy (that of the Turks in the Fifteen Years War, a.k.a. Long Turkish War (1591-1606)) (Révay 1979, 206., 211., 227-228).

Werbőczy's idea of the Holy Crown was quite popular and vivid even at the very beginning of the 20th century, with some new insights in the work by Ákos Timon, a jurist and historian of law. According to Timon, the idea of the Holy Crown, or as he called it, the 'mystery of the Holy Crown', expresses the special Hungarian political spirit, the communality, which was featuring the Hungarian political thinking from the early Middle Ages (Timon 1907, 5-6). Therefore, Timon saw the king and the Hungarian nation together as the political sovereign, and thought the members of nation are the 'whole Hungarian nation', who had privileges in Hungary at that time. Werbőczy also discussed the Hungarian 'nation', but in the sense of nobility, emphasizing the ideology that all members of the nobility are equal in political rights,

and so constitute the 'nation'. Timon extended the membership of the nation, and incorporated all the Hungarian residents into it.

Finally, the idea of the Holy Crown between the two world wars turned once more in line with the change of political sovereignty. After the First World War the form of Hungarian government remained monarchy, but without king, and was headed by admiral Miklós Horthy, the regent. Kálmán Molnár, a public lawyer of that age, accepted the idea of the Holy Crown of Timon's version as a starting point, but referring to the nation-part of political sovereignty he narrowed it to Parliament, and modified it by replacing the king with the regent (Molnár 1927, 10-11).

Summing up the legitimate authority rule of the Hungarian just war theory we can say that parallel with the changes in the political sovereignty the legitimate authority also changed during the Hungarian history: in the Middle Ages it was the king who held this authority, then the nobility, and finally some composition of the king/ regent and nation/ Parliament.

Just cause for starting war: conquering, repressing rebellion, defending country, reconquering, insurrection and war for independence

It is commonly held that starting a war is offensive in nature, however there is at least one significantly different approach as well. According to Clausewitz it is not the attacker who starts the war, because he would not fight if he had other ways to achieve his (for example) territorial purposes. The beginner of war is the defender, because he starts to counter the attacker and begins to fight (Clausewitz 1989, 370). We can take either of these approaches as the narrow meaning of starting a war, and together these two represent the broad meaning. I understand starting a war in the broad sense, so I take attacking (conquering), starting defense, rebelling, insurrection (and repressing these), and reconquering as forms of it.

The idea of the Holy Crown was usually used for justifying defensive wars, however, some offensive claims were offered as well, as one can find in Péter Révay's work. According to Révay the Holy Crown „... *in the same century waged victorious wars on purpose with savage peoples for faith and salvation; by Its dignity It defeated or held in check the Venetians, the Greeks, the Russians, the Sarmatians, the Cumans and other nearby peoples*” (Révay 1979, 203). From Révay's list it is worth underlining the wars against Venice for Croatia and Dalmatia (at the turn of the 11-12th centuries), and the war of Andrew II in Halych-Volhynia ('Russia'). In these wars the beginning of the Hungarian conquest appeared as the nobility of Croatia, Dalmatia, or Halych-Volhynia called in the Hungarians into their country, offering it to submit to the Kingdom of Hungary. For example (Saint) Ladislaus I was called in Croatia by a party of the Croatian nobility in 1091 who then crowned Koloman I in 1105; or the Dalmatian cities Trau and Spoleto voluntarily joined the Kingdom of Hungary in 1105, and a party of the nobility of Halych-Volhynia freely requested Andrew II to help them in the internal chaos (Bárányi 2012, 344-345, 350). The cause of conquest in these occasions was the request for support by the local nobility, but according to Révay the Hungarian justification of the conquest could be based on the Christian dignity and highness of the Holy Crown, because of which other people would have liked to submit themselves to the Kingdom of Hungary. According to Révay, the Holy Crown is the incarnation of Providence (God), so it bears the dignity and highness of Providence (God), and it has its influence on other people's political thinking.

Apart from some example, however, the idea of the Holy Crown was not applied to justify offensive wars, but only other types of warfare. One of these was repressing rebellions. János Küküllei, speaking generally on life of (Great) Louis I, emphasized that the king „*began to thinking and to chew over in his soul how and on what way He would set back and restore, trusting in the help of the God, those rights of the country, which ... the rebels and infidels, with reckless dedication, snatched and usurped with causing harm for the Holy Crown*” (Küküllei

2000, 11). This quotation shows that the key point of the idea of the Holy Crown in the Middle Ages was the principle that ‘the territories of the country are the territories of the Holy Crown, of which voluntary detachment from the country is a rebellion and infidelity, against which the legitimate authority has the right to fight’. Based on this principle Louis I waged wars in Wallachia, and Croatia.

The logic of justification of defensive and reconquering wars was based on the same track, with a special reference to the external enemy, instead of the internal rebels. Küküllei applied the idea of the Holy Crown in justifying the defense of Halych-Volhynia and Lodomeria (Küküllei 2000, 30). We can find justification for reconquering warfare in Küküllei’s work as well, e.g. the war against Venice for Dalmatia (1356-57), but this type of warfare (claims or campaigns) featured more the 19-20th centuries, and paradigmatically the age before the First World War, and the beginning of the Second World War.

Before the First World War, in the so called Age of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the claims of reconquering concerned the side-countries of the Kingdom of Hungary, like Croatia, Galicia, Lodomeria, Cumania, Wallachia, Bessarabia, Bulgaria. These claims suited well the international legal thinking of that age, because according to Emer de Vattel, a state can acquire new territories only with a just war, and cannot with an unjust war or precriptively (Vattel 2008, 388). These countries were conquered by the Kingdom of Hungary, or became vassal states of the Kingdom in the Middle Ages. During the Turkish wars (1521-1718) Hungary lost most of these territories, which finally became parts of the Habsburg Empire (Dalmatia, Croatia, Galicia, Transylvania, Határőrvidék (*militärgrenze*)), or independent states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina). Hungary did not regain these territories, with the exception of Bosnia and Hercegovina, yet the reconquering claim, partly based on the idea of the Holy Crown, was expressed (Unnamed author 1901, 1-2).

Contrary to these, the claims between the two world wars were aimed not at the previously owned countries, but to those former territories where the majority of the local population was Hungarian. These territories (Upper Hungary, Subcarpathia, Southern Territories, and Transylvania) were detached by the Treaty of Trianon at the end of the First World War. At the beginning of the Second World War the Kingdom of Hungary regained these territories, which acts were justified by the idea of the holy Crown, as the acts on the reannexations show (Lemkin 2005, 144-153).¹

Finally, the idea of the Holy Crown was used not only to justify repressing rebellions, but also to justify insurrections and wars of independence. During the 17-19th centuries the proclamations of Hungarian insurrections against the Habsburg Empire and wars of independence referred to the recovery of the “ancient freedom of Hungary”, by which at first a special political status was requested, and after the refusal of this claim, full independence. Direct reference to the idea of the Holy Crown, however, can be found only in the middle of the 19th century, in the work by Béla Szabó, a public lawyer of that age. Szabó expressed the claim for the special political status of Hungary in the Habsburg Empire in 1848. According to Szabó, the Habsburg kings were not: concerned with reattaching the territories regained from the Turks (Transylvania, Dalmatia, Határőrvidék (*militärgrenze*)); ruling Hungary in accordance with the Hungarian laws, customs and wills of Hungarians; and giving opportunities to the national movements. There are two and a half solutions to these problems for Szabó: *„we have two ways to cease the unlawful status quo, there is not a third one, and out of which we*

¹ Act XXXIV November 12, 1938. on the Reincorporation into the Country of the Territories of Upper Hungary, Returned to the Hungarian Holy Crown (a Magyar Szent Koronához visszacsatolt felvidéki területeknek az országgal egyesítéséről); Act VI of June 22, 1939. on the Union with the Country of the Subcarpathian Lands Reincorporated into the Hungarian Holy Crown (a Magyar Szent Koronához visszatért kárpátaljai területeknek az országgal egyesítéséről); Act XXVI 1940. on the Reincorporation into the Country of the Eastern and Transylvanian Territories Returned to the Hungarian Holy Crown (a román uralom alól felszabadult keleti és erdélyi országrésznek a Magyar Szent Koronához visszacsatolásáról és az országgal egyesítéséről); Act XX December 27, 1941. on the Reincorporation of the Recovered Southern Territories into the Hungarian Holy Crown and their Unification with the Country (a visszafoglalt délvidéki területeknek a Magyar Szent Koronához való visszacsatolásáról és az országgal egyesítéséről).

have to choose one: the first is 'association in every relationship'; – 'autonomy, independence, in every relationship' is the second. ... [N]ow I attempt in – this age of – the general endeavor to nationalism and perfection of the social state, suggesting that way on which I think the status quo can be ceased ...” (Szabó 1848, 88-89). The half solution is Szabó's own one, the core of which is the claim that the Holy Crown (and its 'members') is 'who' has the right of ruling Hungary, so the Habsburg kings do not rule but just govern the country (*országol*), in other words, the king is not the owner of Hungarian sovereignty, but only its holder. Because of this, the person of the king is 'inviolable and saint', but he does not have absolute authority, and has to adhere to the laws and will of the Hungarian nation. According to Szabó, the Hungarian nation comprises the nobility and every resident of the country (Szabó 1848, chp. III-IV). This theory apparently touches upon the problem of legitimate authority, however, the quoted words foreshadowed the series of warlike and actually wartime events of 1848 and 1849 (see Bona 1999). Szabó listed two solutions besides his own to the raised problems, one is the full submission of Hungary to the Habsburg Empire, and the other is gaining independence for Hungary. Therefore, according to Szabó, if the Habsburg kings do not consider the Hungarian (actually Szabó's) claims based on the idea of the Holy Crown, then the Hungarians can resolve the problems via insurrection and a war of independence, namely build their action upon the idea of the Holy Crown.

In this section I claimed that the idea of the Holy Crown was used to justify many forms of warfare in the Hungarian history, and it also worked well when it had to secure the intactness of the territories of the country. In latter cases, the just causes came from the wrong committed by the adversary, for example rebellions or territories unjustly detached. Therefore, the idea of the Holy Crown was strongly connected to the actual or previous territories of the Kingdom of Hungary, and just faintly regarded as a sound reason for offensive warfare, just in cases when one could refer to the dignity and highness of the Holy Crown. However, because dignity and

highness in this case are a form of holiness of God, instead of justice, this justification is not a form of a just war theory at all, but that of some Christian holy war ideology.

Right intention of unleashing war – striving for peace: rule of virtuous king, Christian peace, Hungarian civilizing mission

The third aspect of the medieval just war theory is the right intention of unleashing war. According to the theory, the just cause determines the immediate cause of war, but right intention defines the farther goal. This farther goal is a just peace, and the right intention of starting a war establishes why the peace after the war will be good for the defeated adversary.

In the framework of the Hungarian just war theory one can distinguish three kinds of right intention according to the different peace-conceptions in the Hungarian history. Right intention implies, according to János Küküllei, making the adversary become a vassal or a subject of the Christian Hungarian king (and the part and member of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary); according to Péter Révay, turning them into a part and member of the harmony of the Christian Kingdom; and finally, according to Béni Kállay, making them become part and member of the Hungarian civilization.

In the Middle Ages the recurring formula of János Küküllei was that the defeated rebel returns to the ‘obedience and loyalty’ or ‘gets back into the grace of’ (Great) Louis I and the Holy Crown (Küküllei 2000, 17). The vassal’s obedience and loyalty on one side, and the king’s grace on the other are those virtues, which connect the core and peripheral territories of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary into a wholeness. The vassal makes vow and helps his king in wars and in other areas of political administration and representation, in exchange the king treats him with grace (wisely and generously) (Küküllei 2000, 33-34).

At the beginning of the 17th century Péter Révay thought there are two farther goals of the wars. The first one is a clearly defensive goal and had an outstanding significance to Révay. The goal reads as the war should secure (Christian) protection and redemption for the members of Hungary (for the nobles) and in connection with this ‘not to disrupt into parties of nobility’, or ‘not to buffeting and sink in the sea of rebellion’. Instead, the state has to be integrated and in harmony with the internal political goal, and not only to be subjugated to a virtuous Christian king. This harmony is saved if the leaders of the political parties regard to the incarnation of Godly Providence, hence to the Holy Crown and the standards defined by Its virtues (Révay 1979, 228). When the political leaders did not respect these standards, then the Holy Crown left the country and it merged into civil war (Révay 1979, 203; 208).

The second farther goal of wars is offensive and had less value for Révay, that to secure the protection and redemption for other nation than Hungarian, who, at least in some cases, recognized themselves to be in need for protection. Of course, according to Révay this goal had had more significance when the Kingdom of Hungary was expanding, in many cases with the ideologies of fighting the heretics on the Balkan peninsula or converting heathens in Halych-Volhynia), for example earlier in the Middle Ages (in the 11-13th centuries), but after the expansive period the defensive goal became important only.

Finally, in the second half of the 19th century, in connection with the military and political (re)occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Béni Kállay (who was Minister of Finance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Governor of Bosnia, and the Member of the Hungarian Academy Sciences in the second half of the 19th century) emphasized the double purpose of the annexation: a civilizing mission and national surplus. According to Kállay: „... *as the consequence of setting the civilized circumstances the province fiscal capacity increases soon, so by proper administration certain surplus will appear in some years, which can apply to necessary investments*” (Kállay 1914, 266). Before the years of the occupation, Bosnia was

suffering from an ethnically and religiously determined war. Kállay, who was the governor of the occupied province from 1882, expressed the idea of civilization of Bosnia, and for this reason to produce the Bosnian nation on political grounds, instead of ethnicity. With this concept of Bosnian nation, Bosnia was supposed to transcend the problems of ethnical and religious conflicts.

Summing up we can state that the peace-conception which featured the Hungarian history and so the right intention of Hungarian just war theory was first of all a Christian mission-related idea. It was openly Christian before the second half of the 19th century, and in the second half of the 19th century it was Christian too, but obliquely, because Hungarian civilization was Christian in character (at least partly).

Conclusion: war for mission is a war for justice

In this paper I examined and elaborated the historically based Hungarian just war theory, which is the just war theory based on the idea of the Holy Crown. This theory was an outstanding form of the Hungarian warfare ideologies from the 14th century to the middle of the 20th century. Its core claim is the principle that ‘it is just as a mission to secure the protection and redemption for the members of the territories of the Kingdom of Hungary as evolved by the 14th century’.

Many just war theories base their justification on state (community) rights or human rights, or on deserved punishment for wrongdoing. These clear ideas of justice (right and deserve) do not necessarily stand conceptual connection with the concept of mission. In the antiquity and Middle Ages, however, and other, and more mission-centered form of just war theory appeared. This theory explored the claim of justice in the concept of mission to care about others who are in some form of need (cf. Ramsey, 1978: 13-14).

We can read thus Aristotle saying that it is just for the Greeks to fight the Barbarians in order to master them partly for the good of the Barbarians (if the Barbarians refuse the peaceful attempt to do this). On this interpretation Barbarians need the slave-master relationship with the Greeks and to ground this relationship is the natural duty of the Greeks. Similarly, according to Saint Augustine it is just for Christian princes to fight the heretics for their own good partly (if heretics refuse to listen to the peaceful Church). Heretics truly need redemption, but due to their misconceptions and sins in theoretical and practical matters they miss it, so to attain redemption for them is the religious duty of Christian princes. Aristotle (and his successors in the early modern period) emphasized the concept of mission which is directed beyond the border of the city state (*polis*) and so it is offensive in nature; and Saint Augustine delivered the idea of mission inside Christian empire which contained the whole known world, which is so a form of policing.

Contrary to these approaches, Hungarian perception of mission of just wars had bearing on special territories which basically belonged to the Christian Kingdom of Hungary from the very beginning, or which were conquered earlier in the Middle Ages under the ideology of conversion and fight the heretics. The mission was not entirely natural or religious, but partly religious and partly 'national' or political for the reason it directed to territories with more or less definite borders and which had belonged to Christian Kingdom of Hungary. This sort of mission is (mainly) defensive in character.

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¹This paper was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences