






## Article

# The Role of Sports Policing and Tourism Safety at the Summer Olympics

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**Abstract:** The study examines the Summer Olympics from the point of view of sports policing and tourism safety. Held every four years, the Summer Olympics are the world's biggest sporting events, posing a significant challenge for tourism and law enforcement professionals. Billions of people watch the Olympic events on television, and hundreds of thousands of people are simultaneously present at the venues. Ensuring the safety of tourists and athletes on-site is the host country's responsibility. In many cases, the target of terrorists is the tourism sector, which in some countries, accounts for a significant share of annual revenue. An attack could therefore have significant economic and social consequences. This study uses crime statistics and economic data to analyze and comment on each Olympic venue. The data comes from international databases, police, and embassy sources. The study seeks to answer the question of whether it is possible to host a safe Olympic event and whether there is a link between the money spent on Olympic security and safety.

**Keywords:** Summer Olympics; sports safety; tourism safety; law enforcement; crime index



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## 1. Introduction

The study approaches the issue from the perspective of two concepts, each of which is a well-researched topic at the international level: tourism safety and sports policing. However, the combination of the two concepts can be classified as a less-researched area. The study first provides a conceptual definition of the two disciplines and their relationship. It then analyzes the venues for the Summer Olympics from the 2000 Sydney Olympics onwards. The time interval examined is limited to the last two decades only, as this is the period when there has been a significant change in security at a global level due to the 9/11 attacks [1]. On the other hand, the longer time interval carries a much higher error probability when comparing criminal statistics data, as it is difficult to compare data (due to, e.g., changes in legislation, changes in global criminological trends, etc.).

The concepts of tourism safety and sports policing are inseparable [2,3]. One of the most important international events for sports tourism, drawing the largest crowds, is the Summer Olympics, held every four years, and posing a severe challenge to sports policing [2]. The study primarily looked for correlations between safety, the amount of money spent, and the number of live protection personnel employed. Securing the Olympics with the police force is challenging [4] because the games are attracting more and more crowds, and at the same time, more athletes are taking part in them. On the other

hand, terrorism and extremism are becoming more active internationally. Today, not only traditional criminals can pose a threat to an international sporting event, but cybercriminals can paralyze an event from thousands of miles away [5].

The authors of several studies have emphasized the outsized role of live defense in the provision of sporting event security [6]. The authors were primarily motivated to look for correlations between some aspects of security, since many published studies assert that the safety of an Olympic game mainly depends on how much is spent on security [7]. To prove or disprove this, the authors performed calculations used in law enforcement science to show whether there is a correlation between the factors mentioned above. The study hypothesized that the security of the Summer Olympics is not primarily determined by the number of forces involved in policing and the amount spent on maintaining security, but by the general security situation in a given country.

The authors hypothesize that live defense and security spending prior to the Olympics will reduce the number of crimes committed. However, in countries where the number of crimes impairs the subjective sense of security, high levels of crime are expected, even during the Olympic Games.

## 2. Materials and Methods

The theoretical foundations of the study are based on previous international literature on sports policing and tourism safety. Due to the nature of the topic, the proportion of reports obtained from Hungarian and international journals, databases, and news agencies is significant. The researchers made written requests to each country's Olympic committees and police bodies, as well as the International Olympic Committee, regarding the crimes committed during the Olympic Games and the personal and material aspects of the insurance of safety. Unfortunately, they did not always receive a reply that could have been used in the study. In many cases, the requested authorities sent data that was not substantially comparable with data from other countries (partly due to the different methods of registering crimes and the different legal environments). Because of the incomplete answers, the authors made written requests to the Hungarian embassies and cultural institutes and the foreign embassies in Hungary. Most of the answers they provided helped with the writing of the study. One of the methodological problems is that there is no database including foreigners who have been injured during the Olympic Games. The police authorities refrained from providing the data, so it was only possible to trace the scale and structure of the crimes committed from the daily newspapers published during the Olympic Games.

The examined time interval (2000–2022) would have been challenging to expand. On the one hand, there has been a different perception of security since the 9/11 attacks, which makes it difficult to compare the past few Olympic venues with those of previous Olympics (e.g., the amount spent on security, the number of people covered, the number and level of security). The authors were also faced with the complicated problem of obtaining the necessary data, and the solicited authorities could not send most of the desired data. If the authors had wanted to analyze data from Olympics prior to 2000, they would have had even fewer data.

Significant changes have occurred in the last two decades, and some criminological trends have also changed (partly due to different legislation). This would also have caused problems when comparing criminal statistics. This study is based on quantitative analysis that can be reproduced later. Data that is available to everyone has been used. Prior to writing the study, the authors collected data and sent inquiries to police, embassies, and Olympic committees. After obtaining the data, the authors analyzed the data and compared them. In the course of the analytical work, frequency indicators were calculated, which are often used in law enforcement. These make it possible for two territorial units to be substantially compared.

### 3. Literature Review

As mentioned above, sports policing and tourism safety are areas of extensive research, each with significant studies in the literature. However, it should be noted that neither of these areas has a long history. Tourism safety has been researched since the early 2000s. This is the period when mass tourism emerged. Initially, the most important literature on the subject came from [8,9]. The most important concepts were clarified in these studies, and the destinations important for tourism safety were presented. Later, more and more publications were published in the field of tourism safety, and researchers from several countries wrote on the topic, one more thematically studied the field [10–12]. Particular attention has been paid by [7] to the link between terrorism and tourism. Research has been given new impetus by the growing throng of tourism and the study of the pandemic [13,14].

Literature on sports safety has also been published in large amounts since the 2010s. This is the period when sports tourism played an increasingly important role. Fans travel en masse to foreign countries to watch sporting events. This, in turn, has generated serious security risks that have challenged both the city and the country hosting the sporting match [15,16]. Ensuring the safety of the Olympics is one of the most challenging tasks. This area of sports safety is well researched, with several articles on the subject [17–19]. On the other hand, the published articles show that sports policing is approached primarily from the legal point of view, and not from the law enforcement side [20,21].

As seen from the above, the two areas hold significant literature separately (especially tourism safety). However, tourism safety and sports policing together are unique topics. No publication has studied this issue in depth. The safety of Olympic law enforcement is approached only by the authors. Furthermore, tourism professionals look at the issue of tourism safety.

#### 3.1. Sports Policing and Tourism Security: The Role of Sports Policing in Tourism Safety

Order is a fundamental value for any society. However, fully guaranteeing security is a utopian idea, as it is not feasible. Nevertheless, the organizers of sporting events must strive to achieve the fullest possible safety [22]. Security must be “provided”, and one of the main goals of those involved in sports policing must be to prevent crime [2]. Maintaining order, and creating a sense of security for athletes has been a growing challenge for those working in sports policing. One reason for this is that the top events of both team and individual sports have become mass events (e.g., football matches, tennis competitions) [20]. Many elite sporting events move tens of thousands of people before, during, and after the sporting event. Sporting events have been enriched with show elements that also create new safety demands. Sports policing can be described as “tracking mode.” Extraordinary events and terrorist acts result in a constant rethinking of the definition of security in theory and practice. More people are appearing at sporting events, making sports policing a more significant task, and it has become increasingly challenging to ensure security [4].

The state’s primary task at sports events and the venues connected to them is to maintain and restore public safety [23]. The state can accomplish this task with the help of law enforcement agencies. In addition to law enforcement agencies, sports organizations, as organizers, are obliged to take necessary measures to ensure participants’ personal and property security during sporting events [24].

Currently, a safe organization is one of the essential requirements. Organizing and conducting sporting events imparts organizers with increasingly diverse tasks, especially during major international events (e.g., the Olympic Games, world championships). However, organizers need to find a balance between safety and the expectations of fans (tourists), i.e., that the increasingly lengthy safety measures do not discourage spectators from attending sporting events (e.g., clothing and package inspections) [3]. Among sporting events, the Summer and Winter Olympics, held every four years, are the ones that pose the most significant challenge to sports policing, as they have the largest number of participants and spectators, spread across a large area. The individual locations are sometimes hundreds of kilometers apart, making safe coverage of the area by the police force challenging [25].

Sports policing is a service, and is therefore constantly evolving to provide the highest possible level of service. In almost all major world competitions, we can find innovative solutions to make safety as complete as possible while ensuring only minor inconveniences to spectators.

Therefore, sports policing and tourism safety are closely linked to public safety. More and more people are currently taking part in sports tourism, so ensuring their safety requires effort from those working in sports policing [26]. Thus, there is a need for better knowledge and collaborative research in the two areas and the dissemination of good practice worldwide.

### 3.2. *The Role of Tourism Safety in Sports Policing*

The role of tourism safety has increased in direct proportion to the increase in the number of participants in tourism [10]. If we talk about today's tourism, security has become an inseparable part of it, which has grown into an independent field within the science of tourism. Its literature is becoming more critical, and its components are constantly expanding. The international literature distinguishes seven components of the field: public safety, transport safety, the safety of the natural environment, health safety, technical safety, consumer safety, and the safety of orientation/orienteering [27].

Due to the choice of topic, the study does not have the task of analyzing each factor separately at each Olympic venue, and this could even be the subject of independent research. Of course, it is not fair to rank each factor in order of importance. However, in the classical sense, security is one of the biggest attractions a tourist destination can have (e.g., a tourist is not robbed on the street or his valuables are not stolen while on holiday). The public safety component is closest to sports policing, which is one of the essential factors in tourism safety.

Sports policing is limited to a narrower area than tourism safety, as the task of sports policing is to maintain public order in the area of sports events and their immediate surroundings and handle the extraordinary events that can take place [23]. The point of connection between the two areas is to be found when sports tourists travel to a particular destination specifically to watch a sporting event. After the event ends, tourists leave the sports facility, ending the task of sports policing [28]. The tourist then uses various services (e.g., using means of transport, buying goods in a shop, eating food), encountering other types of risks that could endanger his safety. The police are responsible for maintaining public order and public safety [4]. Based on the above, it can be seen that the two areas cannot function properly without a better understanding of each other's research results and closer cooperation in the future.

## 4. Results and Discussions

### 4.1. *Key Safety Indicators*

The amount of money spent on the Olympics alone cannot be an indicator of security because safety is also affected by other factors (e.g., the general state of public safety, the degree of activity of extremist groups), and the cost of the event is highly dependent on the existing sports infrastructure in a given country [19]. In countries with functioning facilities, or where the infrastructure is available, there will be lower costs for the organization, and more money can be spent on security. Regarding the cost of organizing, it is worth noting that there are significant differences in the costs of the Olympics. This is because there is no uniformity about which developments are counted for the Olympics and which are not [4]. Similar findings can be made regarding the cost of security. For many countries, the amounts given do not represent a complete security expenditure, as there are also costs incurred by, for example, the police or the military (e.g., the United Kingdom, where intelligence costs were not included in the costs of the Olympics).

The number of athletes participating in the Olympics has been virtually unchanged over the past six Summer Olympics. An increase in the number of athletes does not pose an additional safety risk, as shown in Table 1. The number of domestic and foreign

tourists attending the Olympic Games was, in any case, over a million people, which poses a significant crowd and security risk. Exceptions to this are the Beijing Olympics (which attracted 3.9 million visitors, mostly Chinese tourists) [29] and the Tokyo Olympics, which were held behind closed doors, so neither Japanese nor foreign tourists could attend the event.

**Table 1.** Data related to the security of Olympic venues and the number of visitors and competitors.

Olympic Year (Place)	Number of Tickets Sold (USD Million)	Number of Competitors (Person)	Number of Police Officers and Soldiers Involved in Insurance	Budget (Amount Spent on Security) (USD Billion)
2000 (Sydney)	6.7 m	10,651	4900 police officers, 4000 soldiers	5.026 (0.25)
2004 (Athens)	3.8 m	10,625	70,000 (police officers, soldiers)	8.5 (1.3)
2008 (Beijing)	6.5 m	11,028	150,000 police officers	6.810 (1.5)
2012 (London)	8.0 m	11,060	13,000 police officers, 17,000 soldiers	14.957 (2.14)
2016 (Rio de Janeiro)	6.15 m	10,293	65,000 police officers, 20,000 soldiers	4.557 (0.4)
2020 (2021) (Tokyo)	-	11,090	21,000 police officers	12.7 (0.8)

Source: Hungarian Embassies in Sydney, Athens, Beijing, London, Brasilia, Tokyo, and dailies [25,29–32] and answers from the Hungarian Embassies in Sydney, Athens, Beijing, London, Brasilia, Tokyo.

The number of people providing protection and the amount spent on security portray the security trends in the world and the appreciation of tourism security. At the Sydney Olympics, less than 10,000 police officers and soldiers took part in securing the events alone, and the amount spent on security was just USD 0.25 billion. Despite the seemingly small amount, the Australian Army armored vehicles, Black Hawk helicopters, and Australia's Special Forces were on standby. In addition, there were 30,000 private security guards and thousands of government officials and security intelligence agencies from other countries who took part in the security arrangements, and several U.S. Navy ships were anchored off the country's coast during the games [33].

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, most countries re-evaluated the concept of security, resulting in a significant increase in security detail at the world's largest sporting event. The significant increase was primarily due to changes in world politics and the global emergence of terrorism. The number of security forces at the Athens Olympics was more than seven times, and the amount spent on security was more than five times that of the 2000 Olympics (USD 0.25 billion → USD 1.3 billion). The higher security costs were also justified because the Greek capital was facing serious public security problems (see terrorist attacks) [33]. A Directorate for the Security of the Olympic Games (D.A.O.A.) has also been set up within the Greek police. Despite the absence of an extraordinary event during the Olympic Games, several shortcomings in the security system have been identified.

Ensuring safety became one of the most important factors after 2001; thus, the number of people participating in the security of the later Olympic Games was extremely high. The Beijing and Rio de Janeiro Olympics highlight that 150,000 police and soldiers took part in the security in Beijing and 85,000 in Rio. The Beijing Olympics also placed a significant emphasis on security compared to previous Olympics. It is also confirmed that the authorities deployed 300,000 surveillance cameras at and near the Olympic venues, and there were anti-aircraft missiles near the Bird's Nest (China's national stadium). Those who reported any security risk to the police during the Olympics received between CNY 10,000 and 500,000 (five times the amount previously given by the police) [34]. Four hundred

thousand volunteers helped direct the work, which is also unique, and since 2001, USD 6.5 billion has been spent on various security investments around Beijing [34].

The amount spent on Olympic security was also remarkably high at the London Olympics (USD 2.14 billion), but extremely low in Rio, where USD 400 million was spent. It should be noted, however, that the bulk of security expenditures are for technical improvements and not human wages. Several security innovations were introduced despite the relatively lower security costs at the Rio Olympics. One such structure was the Israeli satellite EROS-B, which tracked and monitored the event. There was also biometric access to Interpol at international airports and a frequency blocker (using SCE-0100-d devices), an iRobot bomb control robot, and mini robot cameras. Nevertheless, unfortunately, more crimes were committed during these Olympic Games than during the same period in previous years (according to the Hungarian Embassy in Brazil).

A calculated indicator in law enforcement is the so-called police density. This can be calculated as the quotient of the population and the number of police officers. The number of visitors to a particular Olympic city is an important indicator. However, it is not possible to clearly define the purpose for which a tourist arrived in the city hosting the Olympics. The majority go to watch the Olympics, but there were undoubtedly those who arrived for other purposes and left the city after their arrival. However, these tourists are not included in the statistics. The number of tickets sold is, therefore, a more accurate indicator of the number of visitors to the Olympic city. Therefore, in the present research, police density was calculated based on the number of tickets sold (spectators) and the number of competitors.

The budget for the Olympic Games comes from several sources (support from the International Olympic Committee, sponsorship money, host country support), while the revenue coming from ticket sales belongs to the host country [34]. Therefore, to make money, as many spectators as possible must visit the venues of the competitions. From our research's point of view, knowing the number of tickets sold is required to calculate the police density. Information on the resulting revenue is irrelevant, mainly because the revenue coming from ticket sales is not directly related to the budget or the amount spent on security. The amount spent on security must be pre-financed by the host country. However, it is worth mentioning that the planned ticket revenues are included in the budget calculations of the Olympics, and the necessary security expenditures and measures will also be determined based on the expected number of spectators/ticket sales.

Tourists had the fewest police officers and soldiers protecting them at the Sydney and London Olympics, with only one police officer/soldier per 752 and 266 spectators, respectively. The highest police densities were in Beijing (one per every 43 people) and Athens (one per every 54 people). The number of competitors was almost the same in each Olympics (10,000–11,000), so the calculated value also gave almost the same result as the indicator calculated based on the number of tickets sold. The Australian metropolis also has the lowest value (one per every 0.8), and Beijing's highest (one per every 13.6). In addition to Athens, however, the Rio values are also remarkable, with 8.3 police officers/soldiers per athlete. Both calculated indicators well illustrate the magnitude of live protection. However, the role of the direct police presence is currently declining. Technical security solutions (e.g., cameras, sensors, predictive software) play an increasingly important role [18].

The share of security spending in the Olympic budgets also shows that security plays an increasingly important role in the Olympics. At the Sydney Olympics, security spending was less than 5% of the budget, rising to 15.29% at the following Olympics (Athens), and then the highest percentage in Beijing, where more than a fifth of the budget, 22.03%, was spent on security. However, it is also worth noting that in countries that previously had fewer security devices (e.g., cameras, security gates, drones), these devices had to be purchased because of the Olympics, yielding a significant increase in spending [35]. The second-lowest security expenditure was for the Tokyo Olympics (6.3%). However, the Japanese capital was already highly developed and well-equipped with security equipment

before the Olympics. The lack of spectators and tourists also resulted in significant savings (in other areas, it resulted in a loss) [36].

The security expenditure per viewer can be calculated as the security expenditure and the viewership quotient. There are differences in the order of magnitude between the values obtained. While London (USD 267.5) and Beijing (USD 230.8) had more than USD 200 in security spending per visitor (with 8 million tickets sold at the London Olympics and 6.5 million tickets at the Beijing Olympics), in Sydney, it was less than USD 50 (USD 37). In Rio, it was just over USD 65 (Table 2). However, the study emphasizes that the calculated indicators described above should be evaluated as a whole in all cases, and that technical protection should also be taken into account.

**Table 2.** Calculated indicators for Olympic security.

Olympic Year (Place)	Number of Spectators per Police Officer/Soldier (Person)	The Number of Police Officers/Soldiers per Competitor (Person)	The Security Release per Viewer (USD)	The Proportion of Security Spending in the Olympics Budget (%)
2000 (Sydney)	752	0.8	37	4.97
2004 (Athens)	54	6.6	342	15.29
2008 (Beijing)	43	13.6	230.8	22.03
2012 (London)	266	2.7	267.5	14.3
2016 (Rio de Janeiro)	72	8.3	65	8.78
2020 (2021) (Tokyo)	-	1.89	-	6.3

Source: Based on the authors' calculations.

The security measures of the Athens Olympics were heavily criticized during the games. Someone dressed as a reporter placed a package at one of the competition venues that did not catch the attention of anyone for days. A person named Robert bin Laden also managed to get a person close to VIP guests (9).

The worst publicity for a tourist destination is when a crime occurs [11]. This is because crime causes a great deal of inconvenience to tourists, especially if they have to spend days travelling to get their stolen travel documents, go to the police, or perhaps require medical treatment for having been the victim of physical assault. According to many criminologists, robbery and homicide have the most significant impact on a tourist's subjective sense of security [37], so it is also appropriate to investigate these two crimes in the cities hosting the Olympics. It is also worth looking at how safe people feel and how afraid they are in a given city. This is what the crime index and the safety index indicate.

Among the Olympic cities studied, robbery is the most common in Rio de Janeiro. This figure is 491.0 per 100,000, compared to 125.8 in London in 2019. The frequency of robberies in Tokyo illustrates that the magnitude of these values is only 3.3. The Brazilian data alone is exceptionally high, but several sources note that the latency is also very high in the South American country. This already high value may be much higher in reality [38]. The crime of homicide shows nearly the same value at five Olympic venues, while the value of 30.5 per thousand in Rio is outstanding. Compared to a value of 0.2 in Tokyo, the difference is more than 150 times higher, meaning that one is 150 times more likely to be a victim of homicide in a major Brazilian city.

The crime index and the safety index examine the subjective sense of security of the population based on a series of questions common to criminology [39]. The crime index is the highest in Rio de Janeiro (77.63), Athens (56.2), and London (53.21) and lowest in Tokyo (23.51). The difference between the cities with the highest values is relatively small, although there are significant safety differences between the municipalities. This can be explained by the fact that the survey mainly involves residents, who generally do not consider their place of residence extremely dangerous, as they have little basis for comparison with other cities.

The safety index uses two indicators to measure how safe local people feel. Rio has the lowest value for safety (22.37), while Tokyo has the highest value (76.49). The high values of Beijing (66.53) and Sydney (66.34) are surprising, especially given the fact that both cities have relatively low crime rates (Table 3).

In connection with the table, it is worth mentioning why the two crimes presented and the crime and safety index was not given in the year of the Olympics, but for 2019 and 2022 only. From a methodological point of view, this was justified because the criminal values can be compared substantively if the period/year of the comparison is the same. On the other hand, we should also mention that criminological trends have changed in recent decades [40], which justifies the provision of criminal values for the same period (rather than the year of the Olympics).

**Table 3.** Crimes in the Olympic cities, and Crime Index and Safety Index.

Olympic Year (Place)	Robbery (2019)	Homicide (2019)	Crime Index (2022)	Safety Index (2022)
2000 (Sydney)	50.0	0.8	33.66	66.34
2004 (Athens)	36.7	0.7	56.2	43.86
2008 (Beijing)	18.4	0.6	33.47	66.53
2012 (London)	125.8	1.2	53.21	46.78
2016 (Rio de Janeiro)	491.0	30.5	77.63	22.37
2020 (2021) (Tokyo)	3.3	0.2	23.51	76.49

Source: <https://www.numbeo.com/crime/>, accessed on 1 July 2021.

#### 4.2. Olympic Venues from Sydney to Tokyo

As shown in Table 4, at each of the six most recent Summer Olympic Games, both before and after the Olympics, there were solitary or group terrorist attacks that could have taken place even during the Games. These are quite difficult to prevent or predict. The table mentions only five incidents per city. However, there have been far more crimes of similar nature in each city, and, of course, terrorist attacks have already taken place in all of the former locations (before Sydney). Most terrorist acts can be linked to extremist Islamic organizations, but lone perpetrators are also present in most major cities and are even more challenging to detect than terrorists. These individuals are mostly not members of extremist organizations or radical religious groups, and some are well-integrated with above-average IQs. There are very few big cities where there have been no terrorist incidents in recent decades [41]. However, the urban environment and way of life contribute to anonymity and success of these attacks everywhere. The larger the city, the easier it is to target, so an attack cannot be ruled out anywhere [42].

**Table 4.** Highlighted crimes and Olympic venues.

Sydney	<b>15.12.2014.</b> A professed Muslim man takes 17 people hostages in a coffee shop (3 people died).	<b>2.10.2015.</b> With the help of a 22-year-old Islamist, a 15-year-old boy killed a police officer.	<b>13.7.2016.</b> A man drove into the police parking lot with his car loaded with gas cylinders.	<b>3.11.2016.</b> Two Islamist men were detained on suspicion of terror.	<b>13.8.2019.</b> An Islamist man wounded several people with a knife.
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Table 4. Cont.

Athens	<b>3.5.2004.</b> A bomb was blown up at the Athens police headquarters.	<b>27.12.2009.</b> A bomb explodes in downtown Athens (perpetrator: a far-left group).	<b>17.12.2018.</b> A bomb exploded in front of a cathedral; one policeman was injured (perpetrator: far-left or anarchist group).	<b>07.09.2021.</b> A drug addict injured 4 people with a knife.	<b>07.07.2021.</b> A drug and alcohol addict injured 4 people with a knife.
Beijing	<b>8.8.2008.</b> A Chinese man with a knife attacked 2 American tourists and their tour guide (1 person died).	<b>17.7.2013.</b> Near a mall, a man stabbed an American tourist and a Chinese woman to death.	<b>21.7.2013.</b> A man with a knife injured four people in a Beijing store.	<b>28.10.2013.</b> Uyghurs drove into pedestrians by car for 500 m (6 persons died—2 of them tourists—40 injured).	<b>26.7.2018.</b> A homemade bomb exploded at the U.S. Embassy (1 person wounded).
London	<b>7.7.2005.</b> British Muslim men killed 56 people and injured 700 in a series of explosions.	<b>3.6.2017.</b> The perpetrators linked to the Islamic State drove a van into passers-by and then stabbed several people (8 people died, 48 injured).	<b>15.9.2017.</b> A bomb hidden in a plastic bucket exploded in a London underground (29 people injured)	<b>29.11.2019.</b> A knife attacker with an Islamic background killed 2 people in the city center and injured 3.	<b>2.2.2020.</b> A person linked to the Islamic State stabbed 3 people, and the perpetrator was shot.
Rio de Janeiro	<b>29.11.2005.</b> A gang of drug dealers set fire to a scheduled bus service (15 people died).	<b>30.10.2013.</b> Ex-football player Joao Rodrigo was abducted, and he was decapitated.	<b>7.10.2015.</b> A gang killed a couple who were accidentally guided to the Caramujo favela area by GPS.	<b>16.13.2018.</b> Politician Marielle Franco and his driver were killed in his car with head shots.	<b>6.5.2021.</b> Shooting between police and drug dealers (at least 25 people died).
Tokyo	<b>20.3.1995.</b> Members of Aum Shinrikyo sect carry out gas attack on subway trains (12 people died, 1050 injured).	<b>8.6.2008.</b> A young man drove a truck into the zebra crossing (3 people died) and then stabbed 4 to death (10 injured in total).	<b>1.1.2019.</b> A car was driven into pedestrians (1 person killed, 9 people injured).	<b>6.8.2021.</b> A man stabbed ten people on a Tokyo train.	<b>31.10.2021.</b> A man attacked passengers on the Tokyo subway with pesticide and a knife (10 people injured).

Source: [32,43–54].

At the Olympic venues (and in other parts of the world), we have seen a significant percentage of terrorist crimes committed by radical Islamic organizations and individuals (e.g., Sydney, London, Madrid, Paris) over the past two decades. Their activity has declined over the past four to five years; however, this favorable trend could easily change as the international political situation changes. There are many lone perpetrators (“lone lunatics”) whose motivations are incredibly diverse, many of whom struggle with alcohol, drugs, and mental health problems. Far-left and anarchist groups also pose an existing threat, e.g., the assassinations in Greece, as shown in Table 4. According to Manuel Navarrete, director of the European Counter Terrorism Center, in 2019, the number of terrorist acts perpetrated by left-wing organizations was higher than the number of jihadist-motivated acts [55].

The study examined the success of the Olympics in terms of tourism and sports safety at each Olympic venue. Accurate statistics on crimes committed during the Olympics were

not available in the databases, and the police and statistical offices that were contacted did not respond. It was only possible to obtain data from newspapers reporting crimes about athletes and how many tourists had been injured during the Olympics.

#### 4.2.1. Sydney

The Sydney Olympics met expectations, with no extraordinary events disrupting the games. This big city can be considered peaceful in terms of the frequency of crimes. Terrorism with Islamist roots intensified in the Australian metropolis after 2010 [56]. Before that, there were no significant crimes committed against athletes or tourists during the 2000 Olympics.

#### 4.2.2. Athens

The first venue of the modern Olympics was again the site of the Summer Olympics in 2004. Historical roots required the Greek capital to host the Summer Olympics one more time. However, the venue posed several security risks. György Nógrádi, a security policy expert, referred to Athens as an “unprotected city” because of the country’s geographical location. This is also shown by the fact that the Greek government asked NATO for help due to a possible chemical and biological attack. However, the North Atlantic Alliance also controlled Greek airspace and helped control the coastal areas [57]. There have been many terrorist organizations in Greece for decades, which were also very active during the Olympics [58]. The IOC illustrated the precarious situation by effecting insurance for the first time in the history of the Olympics for the Athens Games. Nevertheless, it was also a warning sign that three bombs had exploded in the Greek capital a hundred days before the Olympics [59]. The proportion of crimes per 100,000 people significantly impairs the subjective sense of security of both the population and tourists (e.g., pickpocketing, robbery, fraud/over-billing). Risk factors, which are part of the health security issue, include air pollution (high concentrations of ozone and other pollutants), which has caused and continues to cause severe problems in Athens [60]. Despite the above, there was no extreme event in Athens; the Greeks successfully organized the Olympics.

#### 4.2.3. Beijing

There were also many concerns about the Beijing Olympics, even before the event. The study does not address issues of a political nature. However, it is worth mentioning that politically motivated acts of terrorism were expected from the Uyghurs, which many security experts considered a real threat [61]. Air pollution was also a much more severe problem than in the Greek capital four years before. Factories were shut down, and vehicle traffic in the city was restricted to improve air quality around Beijing. According to Chinese sources, Chinese law enforcement paid particular attention to maintaining security, which led to a reduction in the number of crimes in the city during the Olympics. Of the average of eight years prior to this time, Beijing had the lowest number of crimes in 2008. Among the crimes most influencing tourists’ subjective sense of security, the number of thefts, robberies, and homicides has also decreased. During the Olympics, 482 people (40 foreigners) committed property crimes. According to the news, no crimes were committed at Olympic venues (e.g., stadiums, hotels, media centers). In a place frequented by tourists, a Chinese man with a knife attacked the father-in-law of the coach of the American volleyball team, who died of his injuries [62].

#### 4.2.4. London

The London Olympics took place in benign conditions, but after announcing the venue for the 2012 Olympics (7 July 2005), the British capital was shaken by four bombings. This was seen by many as an expression of displeasure by a terrorist organization against the IOC’s decision. With these attacks, they wanted to express that they could paralyze even an international sporting event [63], but this did not happen. The London Olympics took place without any significant extraordinary events.

During the London Olympic and Paralympic Games, a 6% decrease in crime was recorded compared to the previous year [64]. Leading up to the Olympics, 1700 people fell victim to pickpockets, mainly from Romania, Lithuania, and South America [65]. A total of 100 people were detained, including a teenager, on suspicion of terrorism [66]. Hence, the police feared pickpocket activation during the Olympics, but this did not happen.

#### 4.2.5. Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro was an incredibly bold choice by the International Olympic Committee in 2009, as the host of the Olympics was judged to be one of the least secure countries in the world. There was no major terrorist organization in the country, and Islamic-based terrorism is almost unknown. However, despite the organizers' promises, Rio de Janeiro did not become much safer during the Olympics, with attacks on many tourists, competitors, and sports leaders. However, there are significant activities of local drug cartels and rival gangs, as well as armed conflicts between police and gangs, in which civilian casualties often occur. The dangers foreseen for the Rio Olympics in the year before the opening could be divided into two major groups: (1) public safety and (2) health risks. Approximately one year before the start of the games, another health risk emerged: the Zika virus. To avoid postponing the Olympics, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes, said during a press conference that no one was infected with the Zika virus during the Olympics [18].

During the Olympics, 17,255 crimes were committed in Rio de Janeiro, a higher number than that during the same period of the previous year (according to information from the Hungarian Embassy in Brazil). Moreover, in the daily news, one could regularly read that several athletes and many tourists had been victims of crime (even theft in the Olympic Village), and Felipe Seixas, the Olympic security chief, was abducted after the opening ceremony [67]; the Brazilian security forces were thus unable to deliver the promised secure Olympics, even though there were nearly twice as many security forces that those at the London Olympics.

#### 4.2.6. Tokyo

The Tokyo Olympics was unusual in that sporting events were held without spectators. The Tokyo Olympics was held behind closed doors; not even the locals could attend. There were no extraordinary events during the 17 days of the Olympics. The Olympics were overshadowed by a new kind of risk, the COVID-19 virus, which caused the Games to be postponed by one year.

There were no data on crimes committed during the Olympics. However, as shown in Table 4, non-ideological perpetrators have repeatedly committed brutal acts in the island nation. Physical attacks have also been largely avoided in the island nation, but cyberattacks have reached unprecedented proportions. During the Olympics, 450 million cyberattacks were launched against computer systems, two and a half times more than those registered at the London Olympics in 2012 [68]. This shows that much greater emphasis needs to be placed on the protection of IT systems in the forthcoming Olympics.

The study shows that the venues of the Summer Olympics carried the possibility of terrorist acts being committed. Table 4 indicates that all Olympic venues had previously engendered acts that threatened public safety. Unfortunately, the vast majority of these acts also claimed casualties. None of the events occurred during the Olympics. However, the potential danger was present at each Summer Olympics venue.

By comparing the present study with the literature on the subject, it can be concluded that safety has not yet been analyzed from this aspect by comparing Olympic venues. The safety of each Olympic Games has been analyzed [15], compared to the safety risks of previous Olympic Games, including technical developments [29]. Especially after 2001, a large number of articles examining the relationship between the Olympic Games and terrorism were published [53,58,68]. However, from a law enforcement point of view, this area has not yet been examined by using calculated indicators. In the case of the present study, this can be considered unique. One of the most important findings of the research is

that the security of the Olympics does not necessarily depend on the size of the security expenditure of the Olympic Games. The security of the Olympics is most affected by the level of public safety in a given country.

## 5. Conclusions

Based on the findings, whether a safe Olympics can be held in terms of tourism safety and sports policing is a legitimate question. Is a safe Olympics an illusion? The answer to this question is worth approaching from the perspectives of the two disciplines, sports policing and tourism safety. Examining the Summer Olympic venues so far (from Athens to Tokyo), we can see that a specific attack on athletes (physical violence) only occurred in an Olympic sports complex in Munich. From today's point of view, the attack was highly banal. Eight Palestinian terrorists climbed over the fence of the Olympic Village and took Israeli athletes hostage. This would be unthinkable given today's defense systems. The Munich Olympics was thus the first time that an extraordinary event occurred that exposed the Olympic Games' safety deficiencies, showing a significant risk to tourism safety, even though no tourists were injured at the time. Apart from this Olympics, athletes have not been attacked in a private facility and, thanks to increasingly stringent safety standards, are unlikely to be anytime soon. However, an attack could occur outside the protected facilities, despite an increased police presence. Tourists can also fall victim (see Beijing 2008), along with athletes, if they leave private facilities. From the point of view of tourism safety, it can therefore be said that it is not possible to organize a safe Olympics in all respects. The hypothesis was correct, as it has been proven that the safe running of an Olympic Games does not depend solely on the number of security forces and the amount spent on security.

In the case of the three most recent Olympics, we can say that the amount of money spent on security was significant compared to the previous Olympics (Athens, Beijing, London). However, there were neither extraordinary events nor statistics on the significant increase in the number of crimes. In the case of the three Olympics (Sydney, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo), relatively little money was been spent on security. There were no extraordinary events at the Sydney Olympics, and competitions were held in Tokyo without spectators. In the Rio Olympics, we can state that the amount spent on security was low, and the number of crimes was high. However, the crime index is high in Brazilian cities anyway, and we do not know what would have happened if a multiple of USD 0.4 million had been spent on security. It also has to be declared that the significant number of live defenses does not necessarily guarantee a low number of crimes during the Olympics either (e.g., Rio de Janeiro). Based on the above, we can state that a safe Olympics can be organized with a low security budget and a small number of live defenses (Sydney). Many live defenses did not guarantee that the Olympics (Rio de Janeiro) would be safe.

In addition to sports facilities, the amount of money spent on security reduces the chances of a crime being committing. With today's security procedures, a person who commits a terrorist offence can be virtually 100% prevented from entering a protected area. In particular, the general situation of a country's public security and its political system are the factors that guarantee the security of areas outside protected sites. An example is Rio de Janeiro, where far more people were involved in policing and security than in previous Olympic venues. Yet, the organizers were unable to meet their safety commitments.

The area of a city outside sports facilities can be subject to increased security controls during a sporting event, but it is not possible to prevent all types of crime with a police force. This is also shown by the statistics that examine the targets of terrorist attacks. Means of transport are typically areas virtually impossible to cover by the police force (between 1991 and 2001, 42% of terrorist attacks were committed against buses and rail vehicles) [69].

We can, therefore, refute the assumption that the security of an Olympics largely depends on how much is spent on security spending [19], nor has it been confirmed, as Zimbalist [6] argues, that live defense can significantly increase the security of the Olympic Games.

This research is novel in that it examined the safety of the Olympics from the perspective of tourism safety. The study used crime statistics and economic data to analyze and comment on each Olympic venue. Based on the research results, we can conclude that today, a large number of police, military, and private security forces cannot provide the most significant protection at a sporting event. It is clear that robust protection contributes to security and improves a tourist's subjective sense of security. However, in a city hosting a sporting event, security depends primarily on the general public safety situation in the city. It can also be confirmed that granting security for sports events lies in intelligent devices (e.g., predictive policing, sensors, cameras, robots).

We can conclude that modern security devices in the Olympic facilities make it possible to prevent those present from severe attacks. Near the facilities, increased police presence, facial recognition cameras, predictive software, and other security devices can also help prevent significant attacks by a large percentage. However, the deactivation of suicide bombers and lone insane perpetrators linked to terrorist organizations is no longer possible in the vicinity of the facilities. Moreover, most security policy experts believe that it is impossible to defend against suicide bombers, as their sacrifices significantly reduce the effectiveness of even the most modern security systems (17).

Entertainment venues, hotels, and other tourist destinations farther away from the competition venues are also more intensely covered by the police force during the Olympic Games. However, the actions of terrorists groups are complicated, as unreasonable decisions and unlikely criminal behavior cannot be predicted, even by preventive (predictive) software.

In the case of the Summer Olympic (and Winter) Games so far, we can say that the Olympics (except for the Munich and Atlanta Olympics) have avoided significant acts of terrorism, suicide bombings, and other criminal acts. According to the study, it is precarious to commit any kind of violation near an Olympics, so considering the risk of arrest, various known criminal groups do not commit pre-planned crimes here. Based on the data, the chances of a direct physical attack at the next Olympics are low. It is primarily an attack on IT systems that is more likely to cause a problem.

In several cases, the authors were faced with the impossibility of obtaining accurate crime statistics. In the absence of this, some safety-related calculations could not be performed. The police authorities contacted either stated that they could not send the data (for legal reasons), or they could not filter the data for the time interval in question.

Comparing the Summer and Winter Olympics in the field of tourism safety and sports policing raises a number of research questions. The topic offers opportunities for further research in the field. The authors see the possibility of continuing the research, mainly in the study of the Winter Olympics, for example, 2002: Salt Lake City, 2022: Beijing. A larger time interval is not worth researching, as safety perceptions and technical possibilities were different for the pre-2000 Olympics than for the post-2000 Olympic Games.

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