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The role of national security services and police in civilian crisis management, with a special focus on the EU's role in Afghanistan

Theses of the doctoral (PhD) dissertation

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CONTENTS

Introduction	2
Identifying the research question.....	3
The research objectives.....	4
Hypotheses.....	4
Research methodology	5
Summarized conclusions.....	6
New scientific results	12
Recommendations, practical use of new research results	13
Relevant publications of the author.....	13
Curriculum Vitae	14

„However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.”

Winston Churchill

Introduction

In the recent period, Hungary's involvement in international crisis management missions and peace operations has increased significantly. On the military side, mainly as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commitments, but in parallel, civilian (police, experts) involvement is also becoming more and more prominent. While the professionalism of the civilian experts deployed to the crisis zone is first-class internationally, it is not matched by almost any national security training. The national security services, both from the intelligence and counter-intelligence sides, almost completely ignore our professionals involved in civilian crisis management operations. In my opinion, the situation is ripe for change. On the one hand, our country's advocacy requires information held and obtainable by the experts participating in the missions, and on the other hand, in the current threat environment, it is inconceivable that the personnel participating in the various missions operate without national security protection. These two requirements demand that the national security services carry out a thorough national security training of the persons deployed in crisis management operations and maintain continuous contact with them throughout the mission. It is also a current trend, that military crisis management operations are taking a civilian direction, as the development of the security sector cannot be limited to increasing military capabilities in a crisis area, but also requires support for the law enforcement and public administration sectors. The role of NATO Training Mission –Afghanistan - NTM-A in the NATO International Security Assistance Force - ISAF / Resolute Support Mission – RSM mission can be a good example for this. These capacity building projects cannot do without the involvement of the national security services.

In the domestic context of crisis management, we cannot ignore the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Centre. Since its inception, its tasks have included the rescue and securing of Hungarian citizens in distress abroad. This task can be even more exponentially occurs in crisis zones, where during a rescue operation of any intensity the cooperation with law

enforcement and public administration professionals officially on duty in the area is essential. It is fortunate if this cooperation or contact does not take place after a conflict has taken place.

Identifying the research questions

Since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), security and defence policy documents have clearly set out the ambition levels of the European Union and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) fully regulates the strategy, objectives and modus operandi of crisis management operations. The information support - meaning support from national security and intelligence services - at the political and strategic level, is provided, but at the operational level this is almost exclusively the case for military activities. In the civilian missions, formal information support is not sufficient, either at the organisational level or at the domestic level.

The civilian crisis management operations are an unknown field for the Hungarian national security services, with little or no involvement in terms of training, liaison or even support. There are no established principles and guidelines as to what information the professionals involved in this kind of activity would need in order to be successful and, above all, safe, and what information they could provide to the domestic services that would not jeopardise their operational activities and would not violate the guidelines and mandate of the international organisation.

Domestic - and even international - organisations ignore Non Governmental Organisations NGOs and international business enterprises active in the field. Their importance lies both in the information they possess and in the security risk their presence poses.

The research objectives

The aims of the author's research are the following:

1. To provide a scientific basis for the national security training of civilian experts deployed in civilian crisis management missions and operations, specialising in the type of the mission and the expert's post.
2. To make recommendations, based on scientific research, on the role of national security services in crisis management operations and on civilian experts served in crisis management.
3. To propose, supported by international examples and evidence, the creation of an inter-service task force for the domestic national security services to support crisis management operations.
4. Making suggestions to the organisations concerned on measures to improve the safety of civilian experts.

Hypotheses

In accordance with the aims of the research the dissertation examines the following hypotheses:

1. There is a need for a paradigm shift in the way domestic national security services support crisis management operations, which will bring new challenges and opportunities. Information support to operations is the primary challenge, both in terms of security and the planned developments and programmes, and the opportunity is an untapped source of information.
2. In many cases, national security services do not take advantage of the opportunities offered by NGOs operating in crisis zones, or do not take into account the security risks posed by their presence.

3. The protection of civilian experts in crisis zones is unthinkable without the daily cooperation and exchange of information between domestic agencies and foreign partner services, international organisations. A prerequisite for this is that the domestic services maintain regular contact with the civilian experts concerned and receive information from them on their activities, based on a formalised arrangement

4. All these tasks require even closer cooperation between Hungarian security services.

Research methodology

„Scientific research is the human activity, carried out in a planned manner and based on existing scientific knowledge in a given place, time, discipline and level of investigation, which aims to establish or generate new data, relationships, effects or interactions of general applicability in a given field, in the long or short term, related to (complementing, generalising or replacing) the existing body of knowledge.”¹

According to this formulation and in order to achieve the research objectives described above, I used the following tools and methods:

I have gathered all the knowledge I have acquired in my previous studies on the subject. I have also applied this knowledge in practice in my duties in crisis management operations. I also applied the criminal intelligence knowledge and skills I had acquired in my previous work and assessed their applicability in the international operation.

I have analysed the direct experiences, reached successes and failures what i had gathered in civilian crisis management operations with scientific rigour on the basis of the theoretical knowledge I have acquired, trying to draw conclusions in each case. Success and failure are both can be traced back to causes, and their analysis can add value.

On the basis of the knowledge gathered from these two sources, I assessed the limits of my objective and, in order to broaden them, I attended training courses held by national and international organisations, where the problems were raised and possible solutions were

¹ Paczolay Gyula: A tudományos kutatás néhány elméleti és módszertani kérdései. In Bóna E. – Farkas J. (edit.): A tudomány néhány elméleti kérdése. Academic Publishing House, Budapest, 1970. Cited by: Dr. Gócze István: A tudományos kutatás módszerei. Military Science Review, Budapest, 2011/3. p.157-158.

presented by professionals with strategic experience at international level. I have participated in EU and NATO courses, conferences and crisis management exercises. Examples include the EU's Missions and Operations Strategic Planning course, NATO's Comprehensive Approach Awareness Training, or the annual NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX). In these forums I have been able to discuss what I have experienced in practice, so I have not only my own opinion on them, but also other approaches.

I have studied the international literature available in Hungarian and English, scientific articles, doctoral theses, official publications of international organisations, educational materials, legal materials, related policy statements and relevant materials published in the press. I analysed the documents I found and compared the information they contained with my own experience.

I have held consultations with the relevant domestic experts, both on the foreign affairs side and on the military and law enforcement side. I have consulted with representatives of the domestic preparation, organisation and supervision organisation in the field of international crisis management, as well as with those involved in crisis management operations.

Using the knowledge thus gathered, I analysed, compared and contrasted the information acquired using simple logical procedures, and as a result I was able to draw a conclusion, which in my case means the confirmation of my hypotheses and the birth of scientific results. I have continuously published the results of my research and presented at scientific conferences.

I completed the research for the dissertation at the end of June 2021. Information generated after that date is no longer included in it.

Summarized conclusions

The security strategies of our country and the European Union, the challenges the world is currently facing, such as environmental change due to climate change, or the diminishing resources, all point in the direction of crisis management becoming a determining factor not only for the past and present, but also for the future. The various international organisations carry out these activities independently of each other or in cooperation with other bodies. It is now also clear that it makes no sense to talk about military and civilian crisis management separately and in isolation from each other. Even the most serious military intervention will not

achieve its goal if it is not accompanied by the restoration of civilian life and internal order. These tasks can be done in many different ways. The crisis management organisation itself can take the lead and implement its own conception, or it can simply provide advice and resources to help the local system to become stronger. In the political and cultural climate of the past decades, this solution has apparently proved more popular. However, the longest and most costly crisis operation in Afghanistan in the 21st century has also shown that this is not necessarily the way to go. The initial encouraging results seem to be fading with the departure of the international community, and the country is slowly sinking back to its pre-2000 state. The question arises, therefore, whether the international community has always followed the best solution and whether it has actually used all the information that influenced its activities or could have influenced its activities.

It is also observed that most conflicts cannot be resolved by an international military operation. In the case of countries becoming independent or freeing themselves from an oppressive regime, a year or two of international presence is sufficient for stabilisation to take place, but historically rooted territorial disputes and ethnic conflicts within countries cannot be resolved, and in such cases the international community must settle in the area in question for a very long time. I would mention the Middle East, Cyprus, or the India-Pakistan Kashmir dispute, where there have been international observers for decades, and without their presence, conflicts would erupt almost immediately. And a long-term resolution requires strengthening civilian crisis management. Given that the UN was the first to launch such operations, it is only natural that the principle of a comprehensive approach was first introduced here. This is evidenced by the fact that the military participation rate of nearly 94% in 1995 has decreased to 68% in 2000². NATO introduced the comprehensive approach principle in its crisis management system after 2010, but also tried to compensate with the civilian side mainly with military personnel, which led to a further reduction in the proportion of civilian experts.

In my point of view, protracted crisis management operations, despite the fact that a mission is initially focused on only one or two focal points at the outset, necessarily involve a tasking of the entire security sector reform. I see the reason for this in the fact that deep-rooted conflicts in society cannot be solved by symptomatic treatment, but that the mindset of society needs to change. In these cases we are always talking about the introduction of Western norms and values. There are things to be welcomed in this, such as the introduction of democratic

² Center for International Peace Operations https://www.zif-berlin.org/sites/zif-berlin.org/files/inline-files/2020-21%20ZIF%20Plakat%20Weltkarte_EN_700KB.pdf Downloaded: 2021. 03. 18.

principles, equal rights for women, the modernisation of the justice system, but the introduction of a set of values with which a large part of society cannot identify because of its upbringing and culture is doomed to failure. In other words, it is useless for many international organisations to spend countless amounts of money and energy on training adults in policing, law and the military if the training of young people, which defines their identity, is carried out according to the traditions of the country in question.

In parallel, I must mention the problem of different organisational cultures. In a military mission, operations are based on commonly agreed doctrines, but a civilian mission only has a strategy and its standard operation procedure, the training and cultural background of the professionals serving there can be radically different. In the case of a European Union mission, all participants come from the same cultural background, and although there may be differences, the basic understanding of the task given and the goal to be achieved is the same. The same is already problematic in a UN mission, where experts from radically different cultures are trying to operate on the basis of different knowledge and different attitudes. The best solution to this problem is for a country not to send individual applicants, but to send a full contingent, so that experts in a particular workstream are not left to validate their opinions alone.

In case of long-term missions, I also see the issue of development as a possible problem sources. The crisis management organisation uses international funds and donations to carry out a significant amount of development or even to pay the salaries of the reformed organisation (as was the case in Afghanistan), but it has little control over the use of these funds, as this would be tantamount to interfering in the country's politics. Just as in the Cold War years, local conflicts saw the emergence of support for opposing power blocs and created proxy wars between them, aid in crisis management also became a tool for geopolitical advocacy. Since the geopolitical interest of an organisation's member states can vary, support from self-interest also can work against the international effort.

It is also an emerging fact that crisis management organisations need trained professionals from both the military and civilian sides. The representativeness of a country in an operation also affects its advocacy capacity. From the military side, our country has recognized this, but on the civilian side there is almost only token activity. This is particularly true when compared to our country's previous involvement in civilian crisis management. In the years when we had a civilian staff of around 80-100 people, in several cases we had Hungarian specialists in the position of regional commander or even head of mission. The lack

of higher mission positions is not due to a lack of expertise, but to a decline in international relevance. In my experience, domestic civic experts have always been perceived well in the international environment, so one of the tools for Hungarian advocacy could be to strengthen civic engagement and, at the same time, to gain more high-level positions. It is also a problem that, in the Hungarian context, missionary work and career development are rarely seen together. In other words, people with leadership experience are rarely allowed to serve on mission by the commanders, and in a minority of cases people with mission experience are promoted to leadership positions, which is a requirement for applications for higher positions. Even if not our officially seconded civilian experts, companies and NGOs are constantly active in the crisis zones. Most of these are neither officially known to the public - and worse - nor to the Hungarian authorities. At the same time, it is an understandable citizen's wish that the country should do all it can to help our compatriots in trouble abroad. The existing dichotomy needs to be resolved.

I have done my research with these ideas in mind. I have studied the crisis management systems of the largest international organisations, from the decision-making chain to the missions carried out. I paid particular attention to the activities of the European Union and to Afghanistan. So I have introduced Afghanistan, the structure and functioning of the local security forces, the international crisis management operations since 2001 and their activities towards the law enforcement agencies. I also paid attention to local cultural influences. I specifically discussed what I believe to be the country's biggest negative international impact - the production and manufacture of drugs. On the basis of these facts, I had to conclude that the money and energy invested by the international community in the missions in Afghanistan was wasted. I make this statement on the basis of law enforcement professionalism, the political side probably will find its own proof of success. I have noted one of these myself, that the demographic data presented show that Afghan society is on the road to development. It is ageing, breaking with the rural countryside, with many people moving from agricultural work to industry and services, and with the value of the gross domestic product increasing many times over as a result of international investment. Unfortunately, it is questionable whether after the withdrawal of international forces will not reverse this process back to the pre-2001 trend.

Clearly seen, there have been some serious obstacles to development efforts. The first is that, in the initial period, each organisation only pushed its own agenda, neither negotiating with each other nor with the Afghan side. It was this realisation that led indirectly to the

adoption of NATO's new strategic concept, the Comprehensive Approach, adopted in Lisbon in 2010. This of course did not solve the problems. A good example of this is the fact that after the demise of EUPOL, many police units were reorganized into the armed forces because there was no longer anyone as an international actor to argue for the strengthening of the civilian sides .

It is not unheard of in history, that the Afghan population and official bodies to accept financial aid from abroad, but not to ask for advice. This suggests that, once crisis management operations are over, the functioning of the security sector will take a major turn.

I described the difficulties of police development and the pervasive corruption. These facts were known when EUPOL was in operation, but these information did not leave the mission and did not reach the decision-makers in Brussels. For the past fifteen years, the international community has provided the financial resources for the security sector, but has not had the courage to intervene in the development of the system in an executive capacity, beyond advising. An often-heard justification for US troop withdrawals is that lots of soldiers who are risking their lives in Afghanistan were not even born at the time of the World Trade Center terrorist attack. The same is true on the Afghan side: young people join the army or the police, who were born after the international intervention, or at least started studying after it. If the international community had been invested some of its resources in the education of young people (not just by providing equipment) and had got involved in education, the generation entering the workforce would no longer be unfamiliar with Western attitudes, would know their world and would certainly have a lower illiteracy rate. But without this intervention, the main problem of police training has always been how to teach illiterate people legal skills and report writing. There are many examples - including those that I have personally experienced - which show that even if we have achieved partial results through a mass of training, we have not influenced the fundamental attitudes and approach of society in the slightest.

As I have also described, crisis management is also used by the states to advance their own geopolitical interests, so they have necessarily acted against each other's will. America feared more international terrorism, than it feared the Afghan heroin, so it did not make any significant substantive efforts in the counter-narcotics field. With the withdrawal of the international crisis management forces, all the options - I have mentioned as possible tools in the fight against drugs - even will also lose their theoretical chance. The agricultural programs remains only, that directly support the population, but these cannot commensurate with the profits generated by drugs. It is also expected that the geopolitical void left by the pullout of allied forces will not remain unfilled for long.

It is possible that, in the first period, the Taliban forces will to some extent adapt to the compromise negotiated at international conferences, but in the long term I see Afghanistan moving back in the direction it was in before 2001. Civilian crisis management in Afghanistan is therefore a thing of the past, but it would be unwise to repeat the same mistakes in the future.

With regard to the European Union, I have determined that it is constantly developing its own security strategy, adapting to the ever-changing security environment, and that its role in maintaining international order and preventing conflicts has always remained a priority.

Involvement in the Balkans is a long-term task for the EU, has been taking over the operations of several previous organisations (NATO, UN). There is also a strong EU presence on the eastern side of Europe in conflict-ridden Ukraine and Georgia. In addition to this, there is a growing involvement in Africa. As stated in EU - and national - security strategies, it is appropriate and justified to manage conflicts where they arise. The role of Africa, with its social and natural problems, in increasing migration processes is a factual. Therefore, tackling the problems locally is at least as important to curb the process as operations against illegal migration in the Mediterranean. At the same time, its operations are advisory in nature, and in many civilian missions an executive mandate is not even desirable, thus demonstrating that the EU does not interfere in the internal affairs of the country concerned. In many cases, the advice without executive power is inadequate and leads to a waste of invested energy, effort and resources.

As regards intelligence capabilities, I found that they are not fully exploiting the possibilities available to them, especially in the area of information from crisis zones. While in military operations the use of information support, and thus intelligence, is a self-evident capability, in the civilian field it is not, often on the grounds that it would be interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned. I have proposed two possible solutions, exploring the advantages of each. My view is that change at EU level could only be achieved by delegating analytical capacity to the missions, and until a common European intelligence organisation is in place - and there is no outline of one at the moment - intelligence gathering in the operational field can only be discussed at national level.

Finally, I presented information operations, their place and role in civilian crisis management operations. I have also shown how international organisations involved in civilian crisis management operations implement these. I outlined the situation in Hungary, revealing its shortcomings. I have outlined a possible operational structure to ensure the flow of

information. Considering that in the course of the research I have consulted with the staff of several organisations - law enforcement agencies, national security services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - and listened to their experiences and asked for their opinions, I can say that the operational concept I have outlined does not contradict the views of the experts consulted. After describing the possible operating mode, I have presented the information that can be displayed through the system, the type of information and the expected benefits of communication, as well as its dangers.

The situation in our country is not one of an intelligence community, but rather of competing national security services. In the current situation, I do not see the reality of the operation structure I have outlined being implemented as soon as possible. However, it would be urgent and desirable to start the process, in line with our country's National Security Strategy.

New scientific results

My dissertation contains the following new scientific results:

1. I have explored the structure of the Afghan security sector, its advantages and disadvantages, and I have shown the efforts of the international community, including our country, to reform the system. I have identified the reasons, factors and influences that have led to the lack of success of the development reforms.

2. I have demonstrated that the current state of information support for civilian crisis management is not sufficient and that national security services should play a more active role. I have explored what the assistance of national security services means for the services of a given state. I have also demonstrated that information support for civilian crisis management is a priority for civilian organisations operating in crisis zones, as they have neither the training, nor the preparation, nor the instruments to protect themselves compared to civilian law enforcement personnel.

3. I worked out ways to reduce security risks by defining the way and content of information flows.

4. I developed a new operational system that would allow closer cooperation between national security services in civilian crisis management.

Recommendations, practical use of new research results

The literature on international crisis management is substantial, but the evaluative description of the engagement in Afghanistan is unique and incomplete in the domestic literature. I recommend my scientific achievements primarily to military and civilian crisis management professionals and officers of national security services. I also recommend it to military commanders who conduct their crisis management activities in a NATO, EU or other international organisation operation following the principle of a comprehensive approach. I think it is very important that in their military service they understand the possibilities, problems and operational procedures of the civilian side. I also recommend it to all students of police, military or security studies who are interested in international crisis management, the functioning of the European Union's crisis management, the situation in Afghanistan and the wealth of experience accumulated in Afghan crisis management. I highly recommend it for professionals and officers who are preparing to serve or work in crisis zones or for international organisations. The hypotheses presented and their proof can be a teaching issue or a topic of discussion in the National University of Public Service's courses on National Security , Military and Law Enforcement, as well as in the internal training of law enforcement agencies and national security services. Finally, I would recommend it to anyone with a deeper interest in what has happened in Afghanistan over the last twenty years, beyond the daily news.

Relevant publications of the author

1. Peter Dely: The National Police of Afghanistan I. – Internatioanl missions for police development in Afghanistan in: National Security Review MMXV/II. (2015) p.37-51
2. Peter Dely: The National Police of Afghanistan II.- The strusture of the afghan police, and the challenges of the development in: National Security Review MMXV/III. (2015) p. 4-19
3. Peter Dely: The National Police of Afghanistan, or bureaucracy in the premodern society in: National Security Review MMXIV/Special edition II. (2014) p.66-76

4. Peter Dely: - Strategic Planning of EU Crisis Management Missions in: Military Science, and the XXI. century (2018) p. 15-37.
5. Peter Dely: Drug abuse in Afghanistan in: Home Affairs Review 64/3 (2016) p. 5-15
6. Peter Dely: Information Support for Civilian Crisis Management Missions and Operations in: Hungarian Law Enforcement XVII. (2018) p.113-127

Curriculum Vitae

After college graduation, Peter Dely started his careers as a professional member of the Police in 1992. Until 2010 he worked in the criminal, and criminal intelligence field, and after that in training and education. Between 2004 and 2010, he served three tours of duty in Afghanistan as an instructor at the Kabul Police Academy and as the EUPOL-Afg's Chief Advisor on Counter-Narcotics. In 2006, he served as a trainer in the OSCE mission in Georgia. Between 2013 and 2015, he obtained a degree in National Security Expertise from the National University of Public Service, and continued his studies at the Doctoral School of Military Science. In his research, he combined his experience in crisis management with his experience as a criminal intelligence officer. His publications have focused on crisis management, Afghanistan, terrorism and counter-terrorism. He has attended NATO and EU crisis management courses in connection with his studies. In addition to his day-to-day training, he regularly lectures at conferences and to students at the National University of Public Service. He has C1 English and a B1 Russian language proficiencies.