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**PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
HUNGARIAN FRONTIER READJUSTMENT LEAGUE**
VIII

**RESPONSIBILITY
OF
HUNGARY FOR THE WAR**

BY
Professor **EUGENE HORVÁTH** Phil. D.

BUDAPEST 1933

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
BY
Professor **EUGENE HORVÁTH** Phil. D.



2003 MT

BUDAPEST
1933

Az Országgyűlési Könyvtár
állományából törölve



1935. máj. Rev. Lye. ny.

To the memory of
Sir Robert Donald
to whom I am deeply indebted
for the revision of the text.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHARGE.

The responsibility for the War was brought forward by the Paris Peace Conference in the form of an accusation of war guilt against Hungary and a Special Commission was appointed on July 25, 1919 to report on the matter. As only one party was represented at the Peace Conference, it was impossible for the Commission to make a fair and impartial investigation and it had to rely upon arguments drawn from biased and one-sided sources. A comparison between the first editions of the books and reports which formed the basis of the Commission's deliberations and the later editions, published after the War which are supplemented by secret documents issued by official and unofficial bodies and persons, show how incomplete was the information on which the conclusions were founded. It should also be noted that some of the new material was drawn from the archives of the Governments represented at the Peace Conference. The verdict pronounced on March 28, 1919, was based, therefore, on partial and misleading evidence drawn from the first editions of the reports and books submitted to the Commission, all other material which could have been placed at its disposal having been passed over.

From the Hungarian point of view it should be mentioned that, although a separate Peace Treaty was drawn up for each of the Central Powers in Paris, both in the Austrian as well as in the Hungarian treaties, Austria-Hungary was named and held responsible for the outbreak of the world war. This statement should be accepted only to a certain extent. In July 1914, Austria and Hungary formed a single power known as Austria-Hungary. War was declared on Serbia by Austria-Hungary on July 27, 1914; but in view of the dual character of that power it is evident that the responsibility was also a joint one; individual responsibility of either Austria or Hungary, therefore, does not exist. A further objection to the text of the preamble to the Treaty of Peace is that the Austro-Hungarian

declaration of war on Serbia related to a war confined to Austria, Hungary and Serbia and could not be taken as meaning either an European or still less a world war. Had it not been for the intervention of Russia before the Serbian Government had handed in their reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum (July 24, 1914) an European War would not have been possible.

It is still uncertain whether the accusation of war guilt was levied against Austria in the Austrian Peace Treaty and against Hungary in the Hungarian Peace Treaty. If this was not the case, the charge against Austria and Hungary, individually, cannot be substantiated, as in 1914 these countries formed a dual power and the accusation can, therefore, only be brought against them jointly. This is a question of great importance to Hungary: — 1., because Hungary was not separately mentioned either in the preamble or in Article CLXI of the Treaty of Trianon; 2., because Hungary was not mentioned separately in the Report presented by the Commission to the Peace Conference; 3., and perhaps of greatest moment, Hungary was not mentioned in the Memorandum presented by the Serbian Member of the Commission. As Hungary and Serbia are neighbouring States and as the War broke out originally on the Hungarian-Serbian frontier, the fact that the Serbian Delegate had no complaints to make is remarkable to say the least. It is clear that neither Hungary nor the Hungarian Government were considered responsible for a separate Hungarian policy; in spite of this undeniable fact, however, an accusation of war guilt has been brought against them on the ground that Hungary formed part of the Austro-Hungarian State, the foreign policy of which was directed, not by a Hungarian, but by a dual Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office.

1. It may be claimed that the Hungarian Government was responsible for the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary to the same extent as was the Austrian Government. As a matter of fact, however, that was not the case. Austria and Hungary were two separate and sovereign states, provided with two different governments, responsible to two different parliaments. An Austrian-Hungarian Government did not exist; but three ministers — for Foreign Affairs, War and Finance — were responsible to Delegations of the two parliaments. These ministers, however, did not form a third parliament, but two delegations only, deliberating at the same time and at the same place, the meetings being held alternately in Vienna and Budapest, the two capitals of the Dual State. Officials in the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Service were forbidden to further the interests of their native countries without special instructions. A Hungarian, for instance, who entered the diplomatic

service was regarded as lost for Hungarian interests, the reason being that the dual Foreign Office was, in its constitution, the remnant of the old *Hofkanzlei*, representing everything in general and nothing in particular; it was the Ministry of the Imperial House, the service of the *Casa d'Austria*, the representative of the Austrian Power among the States of Europe. The German Chancellor, Prince Bismarck, was also of this opinion, and on September 30, 1886, in a letter addressed by the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Vienna, he clearly stated that he had no alliance with the Hungarian Parliament, but only with the Government of the Austrian Emperor as represented by the Foreign Minister of the Dual State.¹

On this showing, the balance of power within the frontiers of Austria-Hungary would appear to be uneven. In order to restore the equilibrium, it was often said that this, that or the other official employed in the Austrian-Hungarian diplomatic service was a Magyar by birth or origin. From two points of view, this statement can be regarded as an exaggeration: — firstly — officials in the Foreign Office were not permitted to act against their instructions, further the Hungarian Government never gave instructions to Austrian-Hungarian diplomats; and secondly — the majority of the diplomats described as Hungarians were not Magyars and, in certain cases even, they are known to have protested against the suggestion that they were nationals of Hungary.

2. It was not until several years had elapsed since the termination of the War that a further accusation was brought against the Hungarian Government. They were charged with the oppression of the minority nationalities within the borders of Hungary. This accusation, whether justified or not, was not mentioned in the Treaty of Peace. The Treaty of Peace, which was signed with Hungary at Trianon on June 4, 1920, was based upon the Austro-Hungarian Declaration of War. Not even the Serbian Member of the Commission, which had been formed to enquire into the question of war guilt, thought it advisable to mention „the liberation of the oppressed“ after the Serbian Minister, Pashich, had told the members of the Peace Conference that the Serbs of Southern Hungary enjoyed wide autonomy and were also represented in Parliament. The Serbian delegate confined himself, therefore, to the Declaration of War which was made by Austria-Hungary on July 27, 1914. This being the case, we consider ourselves entitled to deal only with the accusation of war guilt and not with any other charge that has since been brought against Hungary.

¹ Die Große Politik, Vol. V, Berlin, 1927. Pages 128—29.

The responsibility of Hungary for the War can, therefore only be dealt with in the form in which it was originally brought forward and upon which the Treaty of Peace was based by the Paris Peace Conference. We decline to accept a further charge unless the one now embodied in the Peace Treaty is declared to be insufficient for the moral basis of the Treaty of Trianon and for the heavy burden which it imposed on Hungary. The natural consequence of withdrawing the original accusation would be the negation of the Peace Treaty. Consequently we will confine ourselves to the original indictment, which as the result of the publication of secret documents is already regarded, even by the authors of the Peace Treaty, as being unfounded.

As a matter of fact it is quite possible that the new accusations were brought forward after the Treaty of Peace was signed because the insufficiency of the original one was already recognised.²

As to the charges formulated in the Peace conditions presented to the Hungarian Peace Delegation, the President of the Delegation, Count Albert Apponyi, had already pointed out in his Note of January 14, 1920, that these accusations were disproved by the documents appearing in the Red Book which had been published by the Austrian Government in 1919;³ but the Peace Conference adhered to the original indictment and insisted on the acceptance, by Hungary, of the peace conditions.⁴

If, therefore, the Treaty of Peace lacks a solid basis for the want of which it can be maintained, not by the moral strength of truth and justice, but by force of arms alone, Hungary cannot be held entirely responsible.

² For the later charges see the article of Jovan Jovanovich, formerly Serbian Minister at Vienna, published in the Serbian paper „Politika” August 30, 1930. Reprinted, together with two replies in the „Háborús Felelősség” Vol. II. Budapest 1931. pages 346—56.

³ Hungarian Peace Negotiations, Vol. I. Budapest 1921. Pages 17, 18.

⁴ The Millerand Letter of 6 May 1920 ran: „The Allied and Associated Powers cannot, indeed, as far as they are concerned, forget the portion of responsibility falling to Hungary as regards to the outbreak of the world-war and, in general, as to the imperialistic policy pursued by the Dual Monarchy” (Ibid. Vol. II. Budapest 1921. Pag. 545). — This second part was not mentioned in the peace treaty.

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST RUSSIAN INITIATIVE

1901—1906.

The first document in which the annexation of parts of Hungary by the neighbouring States of Serbia and Rumania was demanded appeared in a periodical published in Bucharest under the title „Pravoslavni Vostok — L'Orient Orthodoxe”, which was started in 1901, by Dragutin Ilich, a Serbian emigrant, with the aid of the Russian Legation, as a propaganda paper in favour of the Orthodox Eastern Church. The expansion of this Church was planned in connection with the extension of political frontiers. Russia appeared as the high protector of this propaganda and the Russian Orthodox Church showed a corresponding interest in the Ruthenian counties of North Eastern Hungary. The ecclesiastical, as well as the territorial aspirations of Holy Russia to obtain the extension of boundaries in order to obtain a united front were therefore already ascertained at the beginning of the Twentieth Century.⁵

The centre of this ecclesiastical-political propaganda was in Russia; but the left wing of the Russian line of expansion was the scene of great activity which was created by the Serbian emigrants and their propaganda paper. They turned against the Austrophil Obrenovich, who was forced to political inactivity by the peaceful policy of the Austrian-Hungarian Government. If a comparison be made between the attitude of the Dual State and that of the Russian Empire, it will be recognised that owing to the rigorous maintenance of European peace by the Government of the Emperor Francis Joseph — their great merit — the allied Serbian and Rumanian Kingdoms were forced to abandon the idea of liberating their kindred who were living under Turkish domination. On the other hand, they were bombarded by promises from Russian political circles referring not only to Turkish but also to Austro-Hungarian ter-

⁵ Pester Lloyd, 1901.

ritories if they would join Russia in overthrowing Turkish power and with it the established peace of Europe. These promises can be shown to have been made by documents revealed since the War. To Hungarians, the most important factor is that they were made at the cost of the integrity of the Hungarian State in time of peace and in the firm conviction that dismemberment of Austria-Hungary could only be effected by a war and that a victorious one with the help of armed intervention by Russia on behalf of Serbia and Rumania. The importance of the foregoing is increased by the knowledge that the Memorandum, handed to the British Foreign Office on April 15, 1915, by the Czech emigrant, Professor Thomas H. Masaryk, for the proposed partition of Hungary embodied practically the same frontier line. The present frontiers were drawn by the Peace Conference according to the suggestion contained in this Memorandum; therefore it is not far from the truth to say that the Paris Peace Conference acted on the lines demanded by Russian propaganda in 1901 and that they were both in agreement with the principle of secret treaties and negotiations, the execution of which were to be enforced by force of arms for the purpose of eliminating a plebiscite.

The agitation of the Serbian emigrants in Bucharest was not an isolated action. Simultaneously Prince Peter Karageorgevich presented himself as a pretender for the Serbian throne. On his ascension a change was effected in the Serbian Government in accordance with the ideals of the propagandist party. The way was also pointed out in an article published in the „*Birshevija Viedomosti*“ demanding the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina from Austria-Hungary by Serbia. This permits the supposition that the transfer was to be brought about with the help of armed intervention by Russia. That Macedonia was claimed by and promised to Bulgaria, which had pursued a Russophil policy since the beginning of 1895, at the same time, can be proved by an article published in a Sofia newspaper, „*Nova Borba*“, to the effect that Serbia's promised land would not be Macedonia but Bosnia and Hercegovina.

After this preliminary propaganda had been started the Grand Duke Alexander Michailovich accompanied the Russian Fleet to Varna, in Bulgaria, and to Constanza in Rumania, where he was received by the Russophil Bulgarian Prime Minister, Dragan Danev, and by the Russophil Rumanian Minister, Jonel Bratianu. Shortly afterwards (October 4th 1901) Danev had a meeting with the Russophil Serbian Prime Minister, Michail Vuich at Belgrade; but he was unable to bring the three Balkan States under the Russian protectorate. Neither Vuich nor Bratianu having been supported by their sovereigns, Danev's action resulted in failure. At the same time Count

Goluchowsky, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was unable to bring together Greece and Rumania in an anti-Slav combination under Austrian-Hungarian protection. The two sovereigns met at Abbazia, but they parted without an agreement having been reached. He tried to check the Russian advance by renewing the Rumanian Treaty of Alliance at Bucharest on April 17th 1902.⁶

After it had been signed by King Carol and seen by the Rumanian Foreign Minister, ad interim, Jonel Bratianu, it was locked up in the writing desk of the King. A fortnight later, another treaty of alliance was signed between Russia and Bulgaria which opened with the statement that it was provoked by the secret treaty which had been signed at Bucharest.⁷

There is no document to show how the existence of the Treaty of Bucharest became known to the Russian Government; but the capital of Rumania was undoubtedly as important to the fate of Europe in 1902 as it was in 1914.

Towards the end of 1902, a Russian delegation was taken by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich to the Shipka Pass in Bulgaria, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1877 Campaign. Count Ignatiev, formerly Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, invited all Slavs to join Russia in order that their aspirations might be realised. He addressed the crowds from the balcony of the Russian Legation, but further action was prevented by the bad news from the Far East. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorff, came in person to request the Balkan Governments to refrain from any action which might, involuntarily, draw Russia into serious complications during her war in the Far East.

The Macedonian rising, which was organised by the Bulgarians, and the murder of King Alexander Obrenovich may be regarded as consequences of the Russian initiatives of 1901 and 1902. There is no proof of any relationship between the Russian Government and the Serbian and Bulgarian events; but it may be said without exaggeration that the Bulgarian hopes in regard to Macedonia and the Serbian ones, relative to Bosnia and Hercegovina were the principal objectives of the great project for promoting Russian interests in South Eastern Europe. There is also every reason to believe that the Bulgarian action was only stopped by the intervention of Russia.

⁶ Published by A. F. Pribram: *Les traités politiques secrets de l'Autriche-Hongrie, 1879—1914*. Vol. I. Paris, 1923. Pages 118—21. See also „*Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914*“. Vol. XVI. 2. Berlin, 1927.

⁷ M. Boghichevitch: „*Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 1903—1914*“. Vol. II. Berlin, 1929, Pages 3—5. „*Vorliegendes Uebereinkommen ist nur als Gegenaktion zu der zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Rumänien abgeschlossenen Militärkonvention gedacht.*“

The Austro-Russian agreement relative to Macedonia (known as the Mürzsteg Programme of October 1903) was somewhat in the nature of an armistice which had been made necessary by the Far East imbroglio, but on the other hand it is quite clear that Tcharykov, the then Russian minister at Belgrade eagerly watched the Belgrade plot from behind his blinds.⁸ Peter Karageorgevich was greeted as a Russophil king and the Russophil radicals were invited to form a government. As this government remained in power for a long time, the „May Revolution“ can be regarded as the beginning of a new period in Serbian history. The Serbians undoubtedly, recognised that they had been out-manoeuvred by the Austrian Alliance with the Obrenovich and they saw, with increasing alarm, that while they gained nothing by this alliance, the Russian one held great promise for Bulgaria. About this time serious trouble arose between the Serbs and the Bulgarians over the Macedonian question (the affair of Bishop Firmilian) when the first Serbians crossed the Turkish frontiers in order to start disturbances among the Serbs of the neighbouring vilayets, and a Serb-Bulgarian war was only averted by bringing the two countries together under Russian protection.

A new programme for Serbian action was worked out by the Russophil radicals under the leadership of Milan Pashich — a programme that could only be worked out with the aid of a foreign power. That power was Russia and the working out of the programme resulted in her own destruction. There is not the slightest doubt that it was anti-Austrian and that it resulted in the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁹ To Europe, it was the road leading to catastrophe and undoubted decline; to the world it was the overture to a general war. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to find out who bore the real responsibility.¹⁰

The programme of Serbia's new government consisted: — (a) of an alliance with Bulgaria and through Bulgaria with Russia; (b) of an attack against Austria-Hungary.¹¹

The alliance with Bulgaria was undoubtedly the most important part of the new programme and steps were taken for its realisation. Shortly after the May Revolution, a paper

⁸ H. Vivian: „The Serbian Tragedy“ London, 1904. Page 113.

⁹ For particulars see „Enquête des Balkans“ (Carnegie Endowment) Paris, 1914. Page 23; G. P. Gooch: — „History of Modern Europe, 1878—1919“ London, 1923, Page 417; D. A. Lontscharewitsch: „Jugoslawiens Entstehung“ Vienna, 1929, Page 332; „Nova Evropa“ (Zagreb) quoted in the „Contemporary Review“ Vol. CXXXIV, London, 1929, Page 305; R. W. Seton-Watson: „Sarajevo“ London, 1926, Page 27.

¹⁰ See the various works written on the question of war guilt.

¹¹ The programme was published in the „Pester Lloyd“ April 28, 1908.

was started in Belgrade advocating closer union with Bulgaria, the fortunate ally of the Russian Empire. Its title was „Uyedinyenye“ (Union) and it was printed in both the Bulgarian and Serbian languages. The publication of this newspaper was followed by direct negotiations between the two Governments and meeting also took place between the Serbian and Bulgarian sovereigns — at Nish on May 14, 1904; at Sofia on October 30, 1904; at Belgrade on December 29, 1904. These negotiations resulted in a Serb-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance, signed on March 30, 1904 by the execution of which Serbia became an ally of Russia's ally, Bulgaria.¹²

The alliance (another treaty was signed on April 25, 1904) was complemented in July 1905 by a Serb-Bulgarian Customs Union (*Zollverein*) which ultimately led to a Customs War (*Zollkrieg*) with Austria-Hungary.

The foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was in the hands of Count Goluchowsky. He was the colleague of Bernard von Bülow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since 1897, when he was Minister at Bucharest. It may, therefore, be taken for granted that his foreign policy was conducted in harmony with that of the German Empire. This collaboration was often criticised; but in view of their former co-operation, there is every reason to believe that the two diplomats were of one opinion with regard to the organisation of an enemy front by a Russian-Serbian-Bulgarian combination and that they were supporters not only of the Triple Alliance but also of the Austro-German Alliance of 1879. They were both convinced that without Russian aid there was no danger from the side of the Balkan States and they regarded the agreement of Mürzsteg as an important guarantee of European peace.

There was only one point on which the policy of Germany and Austria diverged, a point which has not yet been thought worthy of consideration. That point was the German *Zollgesetz* of 1902 by which duties on agrarian imports were considerably increased, commercial treaties denounced and the balance in Eastern Europe reversed, thereby seriously endangering the international situation. At the beginning of her war with Japan, Russia revised her fiscal policy and recognised the German *Zollgesetz* in a treaty of commerce which was signed between the two countries on November 28, 1904. Austria-Hungary, not being included in this treaty was left between the German

¹² See M. Boghitschewitsch op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin 1929, pages 5 & 6 „jedes Land hat dem andern gegenüber zwecks Einfuhr der Erzeugnisse desselben seine Grenzen zu öffnen: beide Länder haben den obigen Ländern gegenüber eine gleiche Zollpolitik zu führen wobei angestrebt sein soll diese Politik durch den Anschluß eines Zollvereins zwischen beiden Staaten zu krönen.“

Empire on the one hand and the agrarian Balkan States of Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania on the other and she had to face a militant Serb-Bulgarian *Zollunion*, supported by Russia, into the bargain. The result was that a *Zollkrieg* broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia for which the Hungarian agrarians were generally held to be responsible.

It will be gathered from the foregoing that this allegation cannot be accepted without question. For one thing, the Hungarians only formed a fraction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (and who did not enjoy a free hand even in the direction of their own affairs) and for another there were far greater forces than them in the Empire. There is also direct evidence that the frontiers towards Serbia were closed by order not of the Hungarian Government — a gesture in this direction having already provoked the intervention not only of the dual Foreign Office but also of the King-Emperor but of the dual Minister of Foreign Affairs with the assent of both the Austrian and Hungarian Governments after approval by the King — Emperor — which is quite a different matter. The closing of the frontiers towards Serbia was, therefore, not a Hungarian, but an Austro-Hungarian act involving the responsibility not of one government but of the Dual Monarchy as a whole.

It is not necessary to go further into the defence of the Hungarian point of view as a natural explanation is provided by the fact that agrarian Hungary defended herself, not against the importation of healthy animals, but rather against an invasion of sick ones. Hungary made this protest also at a time when her animals were not permitted to cross the German frontiers. When the frontiers of Hungary were broken down by the Paris Peace treaties, the stock of animals in Southern Hungary were destroyed owing to the free importation of infected animals from the Balkan Peninsula.¹³

It is also surprising to note that the Serbian Prime Minister „insisted upon buying guns from Messrs Schneider because Bulgaria had done so last year, and he considered it important that the weapons of the countries should be as nearly the possible the same and the ammunition interchangeable in order to facilitate combined action in certain eventualities”.¹⁴

This, therefore, can be accepted as the defence of the Hungarian Government which was exercised in order to protect Hungarian interests against invasion by Serbian animals at a time when Hungary had no export towards the Western States.

¹³ Cf. the particulars published by *Lontscharewitsch* op. cit.

¹⁴ Belgrade, November 14, 1906, Report of the British Minister, J. B. Witehead, to Sir Edward Grey, *Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. V, London, 1928. Page 159.

But according to a Serbian explanation the war was fought in a greater measure against industrial Austria than against agrarian Hungary and it was further considered that when orders for making guns in Austria were stopped and sent instead to Creusot, that country suffered a defeat.

We can now turn our investigations from the economical to the political difficulties, and basing our statement on Serbian sources, say quite definitely that the alliance made between the Serbian and the Bulgarian governments was planned with the ultimate object of securing a closer union with Russia. This was clearly proved by the drawing up of a great Serbian programme which that country would have been unable to carry out without exterior aid. It has also been proved that Serbia looked for alliance with Russia as a means of completing this programme and also that the Serbian Government furnished its army with the same weapons as were used by both the Bulgarian and the Russian armies, by stopping orders for guns at the Austrian Skoda Works in Bohemia and passing them to Creusot. Interchange between Austria-Hungary and Serbia became impossible; but it was facilitated between Serbia, Bulgaria and Russia, Turkey and Rumania being left for a time to the Central Powers.

It should also be remembered that according to the Serbians themselves the new regime in Serbia was anti-Austrian and that it was this policy which had resulted in the stoppage of the order for guns from Austria and the transference of the order to a rival power. The Customs War was, to a great extent, a political rather than an industrial rupture, a point of view which was undoubtedly held by the British Chargé d'Affaires when he reported that Pashich desired „to free Serbia from Austrian influence, both politically and economically and the present occasion offers him his first opportunity of forcing his policy on the country and at the same time making it appear that no other alternative was open to him”.¹⁵

Simultaneously, Pasich accepted a French Loan, and according to Judgment No. 14, XVI Session, Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague (published in 1929) „a law promulgated on December 14—27, 1906, authorised the Serbian Government to contract a loan of a nominal account of 95 million francs in gold, destined for the construction of railways and acquisition of war material”. With the help of this loan, Serbia entered a new phase of her existence and one from which there was no withdrawal. The French historian was

¹⁵ Belgrade, July 2, 1906. Report of W. G. Thesiger to Sir Edward Grey. *Gooch-Temperley*, op. cit. Vol. V. London, Page 155.

right when he said: „*La Serbie achète au Creusot son matériel de campagne. De cette époque date régénération.*“¹⁶

This regeneration, from the Serbian point of view, or rather from that of the project of 1903, was nothing less than the union of all Serb lands under the Serbian Government a national union not differing in its ultimate form from that of the Union of French, Italian and German lands under one government — Switzerland. From the broader aspect, the regeneration of Serbia was not restricted to the Serb lands alone; but it was also closely connected with the liberation of Serbs living under Turkish, Austrian and Hungarian domination. It was impossible to attain this goal without foreign aid and a general war. That not only Serb territory was aspired to is proved by the fact that when the project was eventually carried out in the way indicated, Serbs only formed minorities in many of the territories which were annexed, as for example those which were taken from the Kingdom of Hungary.

It would be a one-sided accusation to say Serbian policy was directed against Austria-Hungary on the ground that no alliance existed between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia. Even the statements of Serbian politicians should be documented because it was not Serbia but Austria-Hungary which was made responsible for the war that was declared between them and not vice-versa. We object to the standpoint of the Paris Peace Conference, however, on the ground that it is not right that the unrepresented party should be stamped with a crime the origin of which is to say the least, dubious as well as very complicated. Consequently Serbian ambition in regard to Austro-Hungarian territory must be revealed, documentarily stated and presented to the world for further consideration.

A young Serbian student made his name memorable by holding a meeting in 1896 in Paris as a demonstration against the Millenary festivities (1896—1897) which were being held at the time in Hungary. No importance was attached to the incident.¹⁷

Three years later, however, Miroslav Spalaikovich came into the limelight by publishing a book in which he openly

¹⁶ J. Aulneau: *Histoire de l'Europe Centrale*, Paris 1926, Page 297. Dushan A. Lontscharewitsch in his excellent work „*Jugoslawiens Entstehung*“ (Vienna 1929) begins with *Serbiens Kampf um seine wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit* and continues with *Nationale Einigung der südlichen Slaven* (Chapters IV & VI, but he begins Chapter IV with 1905 and Chapter VI with 1903.)

¹⁷ Documents preserved in the Archives of the Hungarian Government 1896. Nos 8151, 8224, 8481: — The only work in which the meeting was described is B. Jancsó's work on the history of Rumanian irredentism. (Budapest, 1920.)

demanded the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina on the ground that these were purely Serb countries.¹⁸

This was at once contradicted by the Croats, who found vigorous support in Austria, but none at all in Hungary (the book was not even mentioned in Hungarian reviews) which unfortunately at the time was taking a strong stand against Croat nationalism. The point of view which was considered by the Peace Conference was not included in the Serbian programme prior to 1903, but as a matter of fact, Spalaikovich, after the May Revolution, became one of the leading figures in Serbian politics and he also helped to obtain the French Loan. His name is frequently mentioned in Austrian diplomatic documents by means of which it would be possible to write a vivid, if one-sided, picture of the character of this ardent Serbian patriot. It is not our object, however, to write a history of the Austro-Hungarian controversy and consequently we will restrict ourselves to the discussion of the only point at which Spalaikovich himself discerned a difference between Austria and Hungary — he did not attack the one and spare the other; but whenever he demanded the disintegration of both he always spoke of Austria and never attacked the Hungarian Kingdom.

In his Paris book, he declared that there were Serbs in Hungary and in Croatia-Slavonia; but he demanded Bosnia and Hercegovina only on the ground that they were purely Serbian provinces. According to his interpretation, Austria-Hungary had no sovereign rights in Bosnia and Hercegovina and they held the provinces under an European mandate and a mandate for a fixed period only into the bargain. This would correspond with England's position in Egypt at that time. When, however, Spalaikovich protested against the eventual annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Vienna Government, he demanded annexation by the Serbian State and not reunion with Turkey from which they had been torn away in 1878. As he was one of the contractors for the French Loan in 1906, which was granted „for the acquisition of war material“, the supposition that he planned the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the co-operation of Russia and Bulgaria, in the event of the right of self determination being granted to these provinces, cannot be far wrong.

He demanded the right of self-determination with the ultimate object of providing the majority of the two provinces with a ground to break away from Austria-Hungary and the

¹⁸ M. Spalaikovich: „*La Bosnie et L'Hercegovine*“. Étude d'histoire, diplomatique et de droit international. Ouvrage couronné par la Faculté de Droit de Paris, Paris, 1899. Fully treated by the Croat, Pilar in his work, written under the pseudonym L. von Südland: „*Die Südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg*.“ Vienna, 1918.

Powers with a reason for the revision of the Berlin Treaty of 1878.

From the Hungarian point of view, the demand that was made shortly afterwards for the self-determination of Croatia-Slavonia was much more important. This was a bold move towards the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, because if there existed only a Croat minority in the occupied provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina, there was only a Serbian minority in Croatia-Slavonia. The question was all the more important because Croatia-Slavonia was *Partes Adnexae* of the Hungarian Crown; it follows therefore, that the demand for self-determination on a part of a State must be regarded as an attack against the territorial integrity of that State. This demand, if put forward by a foreign government, is an infraction of international law — it is interference in internal affairs. It is curious to note that this impasse was avoided by leaving out the sentence referring to the demand from the document, and it was not known until the end of the war that the self-determination of Croatia-Slavonia was already broached in 1905. The Croat publicist, who made the revelation, stated that it was done by the private advice on the part of the Serbian Government by whom it was accounted a great success.

The Croats did not abandon their protests against Serbian ambition and in this respect they enjoyed the full support of the Vienna Government. Hungary, however, remained aloof, an attitude that was regarded by Benjamin Kállay as lamentable. Kállay before his death also expressed the opinion that the neglect of the Croats by Hungary and the alliance with the Serbians would undoubtedly be the source of inevitable difficulties.

The Hungarian-Croat antagonism was utilised by the Serbian Government which was in secret communication with some of the Croat leaders. These men, however, were not Croats imbued with memories of a common past of Hungary and Croatia. One of them, Franjo Supilo, who has often been praised for his patriotism, is described by secret documents, which were revealed before but only published after the war, to have been an agent employed by the Serbian Government and entrusted by it to facilitate the annexation of Croatia-Slavonia.

In 1901, he fled from the Austrian authorities of Dalmatia to Fiume and found an asylum on Hungarian territory. His paper „*Novi List*” was started there and on October 3, 1905 the Resolution of Fiume was drawn up with his collaboration. At their Fiume Conference, the Croats of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia decided to ally themselves with the Hungarian opposition parties. Their decision was welcomed in Hungary; but

according to the Croat Pilar that part of the Resolution referring to the right of self-determination of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia was cautiously neglected in the translation.¹⁹

The right of any nation to claim self-determination cannot, of course, be denied; but in respect to the Resolution of Fiume, documents have been published which proved that Supilo was in the pay of the Serbian Government.²⁰ Even if these documents could be proved to be forgeries, as the defenders of Supilo declared during the Friedjung trial,²¹ there is no doubt at all that Supilo proposed the annexation of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia by the Serbian State to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, in the autumn of 1914.²² It must be left to the Croats themselves to decide whether he was or was not a patriot.

We have not the intention to renew the accusation which were put forward against the Serbian-Croat Coalition by the Austrian Centralist, Henry Friedjung, who did the same with Hungary, but it must be noted that the demand for self-determination for Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia-Slavonia was an integral part of the Serbian project of 1903, and that it was eventually realised by incorporating all the provinces into the Serbian State without a plebiscite.

The Croats were fully right in stating that the Hungarian Government supported the Serbs and presented itself as the protector of the Serb minority in Croatia-Slavonia. On the other hand, Croatisation of the minorities living in Croatia-Slavonia was often veiled by propaganda against Magyarisation. It is not generally known that when in 1868 the three counties between the Drave and Save rivers — Pozsega, Szerém and Veróce — were demanded by Croatia (by the compromise known as Article XXX of the Hungarian and Article I of the Croatian Laws of 1868) the Hungarian Government desired to make this cession by means of a plebiscite, because it was sure that about 80 per cent of the population (Serbs, Magyars and Germans) would vote for Hungary. The three counties, however, were ceded without a plebiscite by the intervention of the Archduke

¹⁹ L. v. Südland, op. cit. Pages 638—664. The sentence was omitted in R. W. Seton-Watson's „The Souther Slav Question.” London, 1911. In a letter addressed by Professor R. W. Seton-Watson to the author (1933) „Pilar would be the first to-day to agree with me. As for the text he complains of, it was published at Split by Milich before the war and can be referred to.”

²⁰ Published in the appendices of R. W. Seton-Watson's work.

²¹ Particulars *ibid.*

²² Published by F. Stieve: „Iswolsky im Weltkriege 1914—1917”, Berlin, 1925. Documents preserved in the Archives of the Hungarian Government are mentioned below. They were all laid *ad acta* and neither of them formed objects of discussion in the Hungarian Cabinet Councils.

Albert, leader of the Military Party at the Court of Vienna. From that time onwards, the Hungarian Government regarded the defence of the minorities, sacrificed to the Croatian majority eager to assimilate the three minorities which formed, however, in their own counties a large majority, as a sacred duty. Count Julius Andrassy and his successors at the head of the Hungarian Government pursued a Serbophil policy. They were even inclined to assist Serbia in her ambition in regard to the Turkish province of Bosnia and Hercegovina.²³

When they were occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops in 1878, Croatian aspiration found vigorous support in Austria, and there is a probability that this was partly the cause of the Serbophil policy, which was carried on by Benjamin Kállay and Stephen Burián during their governorship in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1882 to 1915. This attitude provoked the anger of the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand who in his plans for the foundation of a great and united Austria, leaned on the Croats.²⁴

Consequently the Serbian government had no right to attack Hungary. Even if one admits that the right of self-determination was the general demand of the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia-Slavonia, it must be added that they were annexed by the Serbian Government without a plebiscite. If the Serbs maintain that the result would have been the same had a plebiscite been held, it is a pity they did not hold one because they would have been able to show the world a powerful argument in their favour. They also avoided having a plebiscite in those parts of Hungary which had never belonged to Croatia-Slavonia, viz, in the Muraköz and in the counties of Southern Hungary — Baranya, Bács-Bodrog, Torontál and Temes, — which were annexed without a plebiscite, and against the will and interest of the population. This annexation formed the object of a sharp attack on the Serbs by the Rumanians at the Paris Peace Conference. It is curious to note that on this occasion the Rumanians referred to the Hungarian statistics which had formerly been attacked by them in Transylvania, while the Serbs argued that they had had a dominating position in the Banat during the Hungarian domination. The occupation was effected by force of arms and amidst the protests of nearly all nationalities including the Serbs against the Rumanians and the Rumanians against the Serbs, a proof

²³ See particulars in R. W. Seton-Watson's article: Les relations de L'Autriche-Hongrie et de la Serbie entre 1868 et 1874. „Le Monde Slave”. Vols II & III. Paris, 1926.

²⁴ See Particulars in Chlumetzky's work on Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, Vienna, 1929.

that the right of self-determination was not exercised by the governments of either Serbia or Rumania when the territory was annexed in December 1918 and January 1919.

Whatever may have been the secret motives of Serbian ambition with regard to Hungarian territory, Serbia in 1905 did not command an army large enough to obtain the partition of the Austria-Hungarian Empire by force of arms. It was Russia, the chief customer of Creusot, from whom assistance was required and who had promised her support to her Serbian brothers. But Russia was then bleeding in the Far East; as a matter of fact she often offered her neutrality to Austria-Hungary in the event of the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Vienna Government.

The Serbian *grand dessein*, therefore, turned out to be impossible to execute. After the Russian power collapsed, Bulgaria determined to leave the Serbs alone, principally because they had begun to enter Macedonia where they posed as enemies of the Bulgarian cause.

CHAPTER III.
THE BOSNIAN CRISIS
1906—1910.

It will always remain an open question as to whether the Serbian project of 1903 was fully appreciated or not by the Russian Government. Its realisation without Russian aid was impossible; but this does not imply responsibility on the part of either the Serbian or Russian governments. Serbian ambition was checked by want of Russian support, and the Russian initiative was abandoned. When in 1906 it was resumed the furtherance of Serbia's aim had no part in it.

Sir Edward Grey, in his reminiscences, says that in March, 1906 he received a visit from the Russian Ambassador who showed him a letter written by his Turkish colleague referring to an alleged guarantee given by the British Government to the Turkish Government. Sir Edward was surprised and he assured the Russian Government that „the supposed guarantee of Turkey has never been mentioned . . . if it is possible to make a denial more categorical than this I am quite ready to make it”.²⁵ The letter presented by Count Benckendorff was a forgery; but Grey's assurance encouraged the Russian Government to direct its attention towards the Turkish problem. Shortly afterwards the expulsion of the Turks from Europe was demanded by the Balkan Committee which had been formed in London. This Committee included some important Slav politicians among them being Paul Miliukov. In addition to asking for the expulsion of the Turks, they also demanded that Turkish power should be replaced by that of the Balkan Slavs. This demand was stressed by the holding of a Balkan Exhibition in London in 1907, which was in fact a Serb-Bulgarian-Montenegrin exhibition to which even the Serbs in Hungary had been invited to contribute in order that all Serbs should be represented.

²⁵ *Sir Edward Grey: „Twenty-five years, 1892—1916”, Vol I, London, 1925. Chapter X.*

Documents relating to the propaganda which was carried out by various Belgrade circles in order to achieve this end are in existence.

The Russian Government held itself completely aloof from this agitation and restricted itself to the Turkish problem in relation to the opening of the Straits. The new Foreign Minister, Iswolsky, learned with great satisfaction that the integrity of Turkey was not guaranteed by the Liberal Government which stood on the Gladstonian platform of 1880. After the great Asiatic problems had been solved, in 1907, he turned his attention to the Balkan peninsula.

There is no proof that Iswolsky was anti-Austrian from the beginning nor that he was in favour of the demand for the revision of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 which had been put forward by the Balkan Committee. He however did not openly express disapproval and he appeared to welcome the slavophil propaganda which was carried on by the influential Committee. Judging by the annual reports of the Committee, vigorous and successful propaganda was pursued even in the British Parliament, and through Parliament, in the immediate surroundings of Sir Edward Grey. Had it been only the solution of the Macedonian question which was urged by the Foreign Office, Turkey alone would have been affected by the consequences; but the demands referred to other parts of the Berlin Treaty. As to Turkey, the agitation led to action which was called by Professor Gooch „a bold initiative”.²⁶

On December 18, 1907, Sir Edward Grey addressed a letter to the French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, in which he declared the Macedonian reform action insufficient. Its greatest value was indeed, not in the reforms put forward by the two Powers, but in their agreement to work in harmony. With their collaboration at an end Russian and Austrian interests once more confronted one another, and the Balkan crisis again stepped into the foreground. As the result of Russian propaganda in this respect when the Balkan Committee demanded revision of the Berlin Treaty, the Serbian and Russian members understood a revision relative not only to Macedonia, but to Bosnia and Hercegovina.

This assumption is indicated by a speech delivered on February 27, 1907, by Franjo Supilo, who had been a member of the Croatian *Sabor* at Zagreb since 1905, in which he demanded the transfer of Bosnia-Hercegovina from Austria-Hungary to Serbia. This speech provoked a protest from the

²⁶ G. P. Gooch: „History of Modern Europe 1878—1919”. London, 1923. Page 404: — „At the end of 1907, Sir Edward Grey boldly resumed the initiative”.

side of the Croatian majority;²⁷ but its boldness revealed the intimate connection of Supilo with Serbian interests. On September 11, 1907, the Foreign Minister, Baron Aehrenthal, informed the Hungarian Prime Minister that Supilo had had a private interview with the Serbian General, Atanatzkovich, at which the question of the transfer of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Macedonia according to the Serbian project of 1903 had been discussed.²⁸

On December 6, 1907, the Minister for Foreign Affairs again informed the Hungarian Government that Supilo had demanded 100,000 gold francs from the Serbian Government for Serb propaganda in Croatia-Slavonia.²⁹ The Austrian-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade reported an appeal to the same effect. The information was communicated by Vienna to the Hungarian Prime Minister on October 9, 1907, on the ground that Supilo was a Hungarian subject.³⁰ During the course of the Friedjung Trial, these documents were proved to be forgeries; but it should be noted that (a) they were not communicated to the Hungarian Government as forgeries; (b) their contents were generally proved to correspond with the facts (an opinion which was expressed by Gustavus Gratz in the „Pester Lloyd“ in 1930); and (c) the letters of the Minister for Foreign Affairs were consequently laid *ad acta*. The Hungarian Government did not regard itself as competent to deal with the question and had nothing to do with the Friedjung Trial.³¹ The documents which had been published by Heinrich Friedjung on March 25, 1909, formed the ground of

²⁷ Quoted by L. V. Südländ, *op. cit.* page 663.

²⁸ Archives of the Hungarian Government 1907, No 4944. Letter of the Foreign Minister dated September 11, under No 1323, registered on September 12. *Ad acta*.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 1907, No 5767. The same dated December 6 under no 1755, registered on December 7, 1907.

³⁰ *Ibid.* No 5373. The same, dated October 9, under No 1623, registered on November 11, 1907.

³¹ As a matter of fact the Zagreb Trial held at the same time had nothing in common with the Hungarian Government but was concerned entirely with the Austrian-Croat interests. It was held at the order of the Banus Baron Rauch who was not a *persona grata* in Hungarian Government circles. The Coalition Government of Alexander Wekerle was supported by an Independent majority which was closely connected with Franjo Supilo and his friends without, of course, knowing anything about his Belgrade connections. The charge was formulated in the Croat nationalist sense (party leader, Frank). The fifty accused persons — among them the brothers of the Serbian Major Milan Pribichevich — were condemned to 184 years imprisonment for high treason. They were charged with working for the establishment of a Great Serbia including the Southern Slav territories of the Dual Monarchy, an ideal which was fulfilled after the war.

the Friedjung Trial.³² Friedjung, himself, was a well-known Austrian Centralist and associated with anti-Magyar propaganda.

As regards Baron Aehrenthal, on whom the responsibility fell, it should be noted that he would not have known the documents were forgeries, otherwise he would not have handed them to the Hungarian Government, which was not subject to him or to the Foreign Office. In his opinion, therefore, they were genuine; let us ask ourselves what any other Minister for Foreign Affairs would have done had he received confidential documents of a similar character disclosing high treason? and if they were forgeries it is more important that they are now accepted in full and there exists no doubt relative to their contents.

Whatever the secret of these documents, it did not interest the Hungarian Government who left the case in the hands of the Foreign Office. In fact their only importance at all lay in the anti-Serbian tendency of the Vienna policy, a tendency which was always regarded in Budapest as an unfortunate one. Among the accused at the Friedjung Trial was Friedrich Funder, an intimate friend of the Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand. The attention of the Crown Prince was consequently attracted and he was induced to pay great attention to the unrest which was taking place among the Southern Slav nationalities of the Dual Monarchy — Croats and Serbs. Every one who hoped for advancement under the future ruler shared his interests. He was informed that while the Croats were to be trusted the Serbs had a secret understanding with the Magyars whom he openly disliked. Thus the Austrians and the Croats on the one hand, and the Serbs and the Magyars on the other were divided the ones against the others, as the result of the Friedjung Trial which was held in Austria. There are neither facts nor documentary evidence by which it can be connected with the Hungarian Government.

Baron Aehrenthal was under the impression that the Serbians were encouraged in their attitude by the *Balkan Committee* and he turned against the British Government. Sir Edward Grey's note of December 18, 1907, was the cause of an unbridled outburst against him on the part of Aehrenthal who was under the impression that it was either the result of an Anglo-Russian understanding engineered by M. Paul Cambon, or of a promise extorted from Sir Edward by Cambon, on behalf of his Russian colleague, Count Benckendorff. He was convinced that a free hand for Russia would result in a Russian advance in the direction of Serbia, Montenegro and

³² Cf. the particulars published by R. W. Seton-Watson in his work „The Southern Slav Question“, London, 1911.

the Adriatic. He foresaw the dissolution of the Austro-Russian Agreement which had bound the two powers together since the Eastern Crisis of 1897. This dissolution actually took place on March 24, 1908, and it was therefore not caused by the Turkish Revolution which occurred later in the same year; but it was the direct result of Russia's desire to have a free hand in the Balkans. This desire was realised when the Mürzsteg Programme came to an end.

Austria-Hungary was left in the dark. Baron Aehrenthal was anxious to find some way out — not because he was anti-Russian; but being an expert in Russian politics, he was convinced that Russia would not go only half-way. He was also in possession of reports relating to Russian propaganda in the Balkans and he wanted to know to what extent this propaganda was countenanced by the other Powers. This was the hidden reason of his speech to the Delegations which he delivered on January 27, 1908, and in which he declared his intention of building the Sandzhak Railway from the Bosnian frontier to Mitrovitza.

In spite of the alarm which this proposal created, it should be noted: — (1) that the plan for extending the Bosnian railway had already been mentioned some ten years previously in the Annual Reports of the Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary, which were published regularly and can still be read in the columns of the contemporary press, in view of which their intention can hardly be regarded as a secret, and (2) that a counter project of a Danubian Adriatic Railway had already been discussed by the several governments concerned, a statement that can be proved by reference to the British Documents on the Origin of the War²³ and (3) that Baron Aehrenthal did not really intend to build the line — he merely wanted to know what the position of Austria-Hungary would be if he boldly produced a proposition similar to that of Sir Edward Grey.²⁴

The result of his speech was not favourable, but it served its purpose in one way as it soon became apparent that there was an understanding between Russia, Serbia and Italy in the South and another between Russia, England and France in the North, which amounted practically to diplomatic isolation of the Central Powers.

There is a great deal of documentary evidence relating to events on the Northern line of interest as, for instance, the meeting at Reval of King Edward VII and the Tzar, and the agitation of the *Balkan Committee* as well as to incidents which

²³ *Gooch-Temperley*, op. cit. Vol V. London, 1928.

²⁴ *R. W. Seton-Watson*: — „Sarajevo“. London, 1926. Page 29.

occurred on the Southern line representative of the intimate relations that existed between the Karageorgevich. King Peter of Serbia was the son-in-law of Nikita Petrovich, Prince of Montenegro and brother in law of the King of Italy. Vienna feared that the two Serb States would combine with Russia and Bulgaria — which ultimately came to pass when the Agreement of Racconigi was signed in 1909. Austrian political circles turned against Italy. Baron Chlumetzky directed attention to the Adriatic policy and General Conrad prepared military plans against Venice and Lombardia. Those incidents provoked serious criticism on the part of the Hungarian Government, because public opinion in Hungary was openly in favour of Italy, the historical ally of the Hungarian nation. Baron Aehrenthal joined the Magyars in their opposition to the warlike schemes of the Crown Prince, who was an Este and who was planning a descent over the Alps to the Plains of Lombardy. The Foreign Minister, however, did not change his attitude towards the British Government, identifying it in his mind with the *Balkan Committee* — an error in which he persisted. His opposition to plans for war with Italy was combined with a point of view in regard to British politics which was much regretted in Hungarian political circles. Unsuccessful mediation was attempted several times from the Hungarian side, not only between Baron Aehrenthal and the British Ambassador, but even the German Emperor was asked to change his attitude towards England. Austria-Hungary was closely allied with Germany and it therefore suffered from the detrimental consequences of an Anglo-German controversy.

Apart from this Baron Aehrenthal's foreign policy was successful. He was faced with the dissolution of the Austro-Russian understanding and he averted the plan to declare war on Italy as a consequence of her individual action within the Triple Alliance. He was confronted by a Russo-Serbian combination and he countered it by detaching Bulgaria. His actions were thoroughly approved in Austrian military circles but the officers were mostly of opinion that he was actuated by the desire to conquer Serbia. General Conrad has himself described the plans he made in connection with a descent on Italy which were however frustrated by the joint opposition of Baron Aehrenthal and the Hungarian Government, which realised with an ever increasing anxiety that an extension of the Austrian interest to the Croats and Rumanians would result in an Austro-Croat-Rumanian Alliance against both Serbs and Magyars. The Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand, had his own government in the Belvedere Palace, preparing as it were for his accession on the death of the King-Emperor, Francis Joseph. His ideal was a united Austria which would include

Hungary as an Austrian province. The first obstacle to be removed in order to achieve his aim was the negation of Hungarian independence. Two methods by which this could be brought about were considered: — the one was the occupation of Hungary by Austrian troops, the other was to prepare for the amalgamation of the two States (which had been united by the compromise of 1867) by granting general suffrage which would sweep away the historic governing classes of Hungary, their place being taken by the masses acclaiming the Emperor of a *Volkskaisertum*. The Hungarian Government has often been reproached for its staunch opposition to this form of democracy, but as a matter of fact, it was really dictated by the knowledge of the inevitable results of such an action. It was aware, for instance, that the propaganda in favour of general suffrage was directed by the Czechs³⁶ who were especially interested in supporting the crusade of the Crown Prince. At first, this interest was supposed to be due to the Czech wife of the Archduke, but later on it became evident that the Czechs were counting on a Slav majority should the granting of universal suffrage result in the union of the two States. As a matter of fact, Austria had a German minority and Hungary had a slight Magyar majority — by taking the two countries together there would have resulted a German and Magyar minority and a Slav majority. The introduction of general suffrage would therefore, have resulted in an advantage to the Czechs as it would have permitted the incorporation of Hungary into the Austrian State, the natural consequence of which would have been a Slav majority and a Czech domination of the Habsburg Empire. The introduction of universal suffrage in Austria in 1906 resulted in the creation of a Slav majority, governed by a German Court, a German army and a German minority. From that time onward it was merely a question of how long it would be before the power and imperium if not the Government was transferred from the minority to the majority — from the Germans to the Slavs — an event which would have been exceedingly disappointing to the Crown Prince who had hoped for the establishment of a thoroughly German State, supported by the German Empire.

³⁶ Archives of the Hungarian Government 1909. No 6. Registered on January 6, 1909; Letter to the Dual Foreign Minister, dated December 31, 1908 under No 2977, transmitted to the Hungarian Minister of the Interior on 11 January 1909. Czech propaganda relative to the introduction of universal suffrage in Hungary. No. 34 registered on January 3, 1909. Letter from the same, dated January 2, 1909, under No. 16, transmitting a letter of the Serbian Consul General of Budapest informing his government of a demonstration held in favour of universal suffrage with the aid of the Serbian Consulate.

The introduction of universal suffrage in Austria must be regarded as an internal matter and one with which the Kingdom of Hungary had nothing to do. The Hungarian Government was always strongly opposed to the idea of the country being governed by a non-Magyar minority supported by a non-German Austrian majority and this was the real cause of the Archduke's anger against Hungary. Civil war would most certainly have broken out had he ascended to the throne. This, at least, was the impression of the German Government, represented by Bethmann Hollweg, when the latter remarked to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand, would have to clear up his position in regard to Hungary after his accession.³⁶ What the Czechs themselves hoped to obtain from this democratisation may be gathered from the statement made by Benesh during the War that „Universal suffrage would have completely deprived the Magyars of their predominance”.³⁷

This aim could have been achieved even without the introduction of universal suffrage by incorporating Hungary into the Austrian State and balancing the Magyar majority of the Hungarian Kingdom against the Slav majority of the Austrian *Gesamtmonarchie*.

The Crown Prince wished to extend the frontiers of his future Empire to both Serbia and Rumania by including them in a *Zollunion*. The idea of creating wider customs territories in Europe was a sound one; but it was accompanied by the unsound ambition of using the Customs Union for the purpose of political annexation, and it was this side of the project that was opposed by the Hungarian Government. Annexation of Serbia by extending Austro-Croat control over all the Southern Slavs was no less a danger for Hungary than would have been the annexation of Rumania by granting Transylvania to King Carol and elevating him to a rank within the Austrian Empire similar to that which was then occupied by the King of Bavaria. In this way both the Magyars and the Serbians were thrown together.³⁸

This then was the situation, when on September 16, 1908, Iswolsky appeared at Buchlau and offered Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary in return for the opening of the Straits. The offer was accepted by Baron Aehrenthal who thus

³⁶ 1912: „Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871—1914”. Vol. XXXI. Berlin, 1927. Pages 442—443.

³⁷ E. Benesh: „Bohemia's Case of Independence.” London, 1917. Page 44. ned unaffected was proved by documents preserved in the Archives of the Hungarian Government.

undoubtedly scored a victory over the Serbian plans and secret propaganda. After Iswolsky left, on September 29, 1908, letters to the various Sovereigns announcing his intention to annex the two provinces were signed by the Emperor, Francis Joseph. The Austro-Hungarian embassies received instructions to hand in the letters on October 5, on which day a manifesto was to be issued by the King-Emperor announcing the annexation as a *fait accompli*. The Ambassador in Paris, however, handed his letter to the French President at noon on October 3, consequently the French Government was informed of the *fait accompli* two days before it taken place. This date, from the Hungarian standpoint, is important, because the whole question was not discussed by the Hungarian Cabinet Council until late that night when it was already public knowledge in Paris. According to the minutes of the Cabinet Council, the Hungarian Government regarded the annexation as an infraction of the Berlin Treaty and resolved that the responsibility should rest entirely with the dual Foreign Minister and not with the Hungarian Government.³⁹

This decision was naturally displeasing to Baron Aehrenthal and it is curious to note that the protocol of the Council was not signed by the King-Emperor until March 22, 1909. This was the first time that such a delay had occurred in the lifetime of the Emperor, Francis Joseph, who was a pedant bureaucrat, and the only explanations for it are either that he withheld his signature or that Baron Aehrenthal did not present the protocol to his sovereign for signature until after the Bosnian crisis was over.⁴⁰

They both took the secret with them to their graves; but the knowledge that the Hungarian Government protested against the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and that it was carried out without their consent, remains.

It cannot be denied that the agreement of Buchlau is of great importance when the question of responsibility for the

³⁹ „Der Ministerrat erwägend die Besorgnisse des Herrn Ministers des Innern hält gewisse Konsequenzen dieses wichtigen Schrittes unberechenbar, trotzdem in der gegebenen Lage und Umständen, mit Vertrauen auf den Herrn Minister des Aeusseren und auf den Herrn Ministerpräsidenten, die die gegenwärtige aussenpolitische Lage in jeder Richtung und in jeder Einzelheiten kennen, stimmt er seinerseits der Vorlage des Herrn Ministerpräsidenten bei. Diesen Beschluss des Ministerrats hat nachträglich der wegen seiner Krankheit abwesende Herr Handelsminister in seinem ganzen Umfange angenommen.“

⁴⁰ Archives of the Hungarian Government at Budapest. 1908. M. T. The speeches of both the Minister for the Interior, Count Julius Andrássy, and the Minister for Public Worship and Education, Count Albert Apponyi, were unfavourable to the annexation which was only accepted on the ground that the matter was already a *fait accompli*.

war is under consideration, if only because it removed the moral ground of Russian aid for Serbia's ambitions. The Hungarian Government cannot be held responsible for the fact that in reality it was a breach of international law.

Iswolsky on leaving Buchlau visited several of the capitals of Western Europe and attention was directed towards another Russian statesman, Paul Miliukov, the leader of the Russian cadets. The retirement of the Russian Government was not publically known in Russia and certain political circles, notably even the one to which Miliukov belonged, were kept in ignorance. At the time of the annexation he was in Serbia, where the occurrence was regarded as a declaration of war on behalf of the Vienna Government. Everybody looked to Russia because none knew of the Buchlau agreement. Even Miliukov, when he visited the office of the Serb paper *Srbobran* at Zagreb, accompanied by the Belgrade Professor Mile Pavlovich and Milan Pribichevich, knew nothing of the private understanding between Iswolsky and Baron Aehrenthal. They had a conference with the Editor and the question of the transfer of Bosnia and Hercegovina to Serbia was discussed.⁴¹ This is a clear proof that Serbia was supported in her ambition by various Russian circles. The letter in which the Hungarian Government was informed of the Conference which had been held at Zagreb and two letters from the dual Minister for war relating to the prosecution of the Serb papers „*Nova List*“ and „*Zastava*“ were forwarded without instructions to the Banus of Croatia-Slavonia.

During the Bosnian crisis (October 5, 1908, to March 22, 1909) the Hungarian Government maintained strict neutrality, the only action taken during the controversy was the attempted mediation of Count Andrássy between Baron Aehrenthal, the British Ambassador and Germany.⁴² This neutrality was pursued in spite of reports of Serb agitations in Southern

⁴¹ Archives of the Hungarian Government 1908 No. 4869. Letter of the Dual Minister of Finance to the Hungarian Prime Minister, dated September 26, 1908, under No. 1499 Praes, registered on October 30, 1908, relative to the visit made by Miliukov, Pavlovich and Pribichevich in Zagreb transmitted to the Banus of Croatia on November 1, 1908. Ibid, Nos 4884 and 5747, Registered October 31 and December 1. Two letters of the Dual Minister of War, dated October 30 and December 15, 1908, under Nos 9670 and 11,914, demanding the prosecution of the Serb papers *Novi List* and *Zastava*.

⁴² For particulars see *Count J. Andrássy: „Diplomacy and the World War“*, Hungarian edition, Budapest 1921, Page 80. For the divergence between the standpoint of the Austrian and Hungarian Government in respect of the annexation see *Gooch-Temperley*, op. cit. Vol. V. 1928, Page 372.

Hungary⁴³ and of frontier incidents⁴⁴ to say nothing of the attitude of the Serbian Consul, General Petkovich who used the Serbian Consulate at Budapest as a centre for enemy propaganda.⁴⁵

⁴³ Documents preserved in the Archives of the Hungarian Government; 1908. No 845. Registered on February 23, 1908. Letter of the dual Minister of War dated February 21, 1908 under No. 958, regarding Serbian agitation in the Bachka in Southern Hungary, transmitted to the Minister of the Interior on March 6, 1908. No. 1924. Registered on May 1, 1908. Letter of the dual Minister of Foreign Affairs dated April 30, 1908, under No. 533. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade regarding Serbian agitation on Hungarian territory.

⁴⁴ Documents of the Hungarian Government: 1909. No. 1455. Registered on March 17, 1909. Letter of the Banus of Croatia-Slavonia to the Hungarian Prime Minister. Dated March 16, 1909, No. 1087. Praes. informing him that on the night March 9—10 Serbian Frontier Guards fired across the River Save to Croatian Territory. Transmitted to the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 25, 1909. No. 1525, registered on March 20, 1909. Letter from the same to the same, dated March 19, 1909, under No. 1164, announcing that Croatian workmen were fired at by Serbian frontier guards from the Serbian bank of River Save. Transmitted to the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 23, 1909.

⁴⁵ Archives of the Hungarian Government, 1909. No. 34. Registered on January 3, 1909. Letter addressed by the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Hungarian Prime Minister, dated January 2, 1909, under No. 166, transmitting a report sent by the Serbian Consul General at Budapest, Petkovich, to his Government announcing that a demonstration of workmen organised with the help of financial aid of the Serbian Government had taken place at Budapest. Transmitted to the Minister of the Interior on January 4, 1909. No. 257. Registered on January 4, 1909. From the same to the same, dated January 13, 1909, under No. 128. Secret, informing the Hungarian Government, that Budapest is the centre of the Russian and Slav agitation. Transmitted to the Minister of the Interior on January 17, 1909. No. 358. Registered on January 21, 1909. Letter of the dual Minister for War to the Hungarian Prime Minister, dated January 16, 1909, under No. 177, informing the Hungarian Government, that secret Serb reports are addressed from Ujvidék, Temesvár, Nagybecskerek, Mostar and Sarajevo through Budapest to the Serbian Government. These reports were handed over by the Serb barrister Gavrila, to the Serbian Consul General Petkovich, therefore it can be taken for granted, that the Serbian Consulate General at Budapest was transformed into a centre of Serbian agitation on Austro-Hungarian territory. Transmitted to the Minister of the Interior on January 25, 1909. No. 426. Registered on January 25, 1909. From the same to the same, dated January 24, 1909, under No. 755, giving the Hungarian Government information concerning the frequent interviews of Franjo Supilo with the Serbian Consul General Petkovich at Budapest. Transmitted to the Minister of the Interior January 30, 1909. No. 1193. Registered on March 3, 1909. From the same to the same, dated March 2, 1909, under No. 2401. Praes. informing the Hungarian Government, that the Serb members of the Croatian Sabor and of the Hungarian Parliament, Supilo and Medakovich were asking for 6000 gold dinars from the Serbian association Slovenski Jug, through Consul General Petkovich on behalf of expenses incurred with their efence in the Zagreb trial and that the money had been promised. Ad acta on March 17, 1909. No. 615. Registered on February 5, 1909. Letter from the same, dated February 1, 1909, under No. 1345. Praes., confidential report respecting the Serb agent, Gavrila, a barrister resident in Budapest. Transmitted to the Minister

On October 9 a second loan amounting to 150 million gold francs was granted to Serbia in Paris „for the construction of railways and the completion of the stock of war material“.⁴⁶ Iswolsky who had promised Bosnia and Hercegovina to Serbia, did not open the Straits and engineered instead a second treaty of Alliance with Bulgaria, turning his ally against Austria-Hungary. Hartwig was transferred from Teheran to Belgrade and instructed to open a new campaign against the Dual Empire. In 1909 the Agreement of Racconigi succeeded in detaching Italy from the Triple Alliance owing to the Balkan question.⁴⁷ It was, therefore, upon Serbia that Iswolsky built his plan for revenge. Bulgaria was again drawn into the sphere of Russian interest by the Russo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance which was signed in December 1909. This alliance was described by contemporary diplomatic documents as a promising one, a great factor for the future and the natural beginning of a Balkan alliance under Russian protection. The Russian Minister at Teheran was transferred to Belgrade in the interest of this important work and Hartwig became the apostle and strong pillar of the new combination.⁴⁸ Iswolsky went to Paris. He

of the Interior February 19, 1909. No. 1604. Registered on March 24, 1909. Letter from the dual Minister for War to the Hungarian Prime Minister, under No. 3442., transmitting a report referring to a secret meeting held at the Serbian Consul General at Budapest. Ad acta No. 1767. Registered on March 31, 1909. From the same to the same, dated March 30, 1909, under No. 4180. Praes., demanding that the Serbian Coonsul General Petkovich should be recalled. Transmitted to the Hungarian Minister of the Interior on April 24, 1909. No. 2147. Registered on April 19, 1909. Letter from the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Hungarian Prime Minister, dated April 18, 1909, under No. 1601, relating to the recall of Consul General Petkovich. Reply to the dual Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 23, 1909. Nos. 2713, 2722 and 3016, registered on May 18 and 19 and on June 4, 1909. Two letters from the dual Minister of Finance to the Hungarian Prime Minister, dated May 28, 1909, under No. 7905, referring to the expulsion of Dr. Gavrila from Bosnia and Hercegovina. No. 3294. Registered on June 21, 1909. Letter from the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Hungarian Prime Minister, dated May 19, 1909, under No. 7487. Praes., respecting the same matter,

⁴⁶ Judgments No. 14., XVI. Session, Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, 1929.

⁴⁷ „Art. V. Die Verwirklichung der hohen Ideale der slawischen Völker auf der Balkanhalbinsel, die dem Herzen Russlands so nahe stehen, nur nach einem günstigen Ausgange des Kampfes Russlands mit Deutschland und Oesterreich-Ungarn möglich ist“ M. Boghitschewitsch op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin. 1929. Pages 118—22.

⁴⁸ According to the official Serb historian of Modern Yugoslavia, Hartwig „übernahm die Leitung der Verhandlungen und so wurde Belgrad das Zentrum des neuen christlichen Balkanbundes. Sowohl Paschitsch als insbesondere Milowanowitsch, der mit Hartwig täglich zusammen kam, liehen dem russischen Gesandten alle Unterstützung“. D. A. Lontscharewitsch op. cit. pages 440—441. On the French loan to Serbia see the remark made by the French publicist Ernest Lémonon in his book entitled L'Europe et la

was succeeded by Sasonov, a weak and already a sick man, who at the end of 1910 was nearly detached from his western allies by Germany. The renewal of Prince Bismarck's *Dreikaiserbundnis* was broached, but after his return to Petrograd, the author did not ratify the agreement. According to the Russian Baron Taube, this was the beginning of the end."

politique britannique. Paris 1910, quoted by *Miss Edith Durham*: "it seems indispensable to give Serbia the means to arm and to raise herself, for a strong Serbia would be a dagger in the flank of Austria." (*Contemporary Review*)

²⁰ *Baron M. Taube: Der grossen Katastrophe entgegen, 1904—17. Berlin, 1929. Pag. 232—33.*

CHAPTER IV.

THE CULMINATION

1911—1914.

1. The Settlement of the Balkan Question.

The difference between the second (1906) and third (1911) initiatives of the Russian Government lay in the divergence of their aspirations and practical methods. In 1908, Russia demanded the aid of Austria-Hungary only in order to help her in regard to the Straits. In 1911, she prepared the way for the dissolution of the Dual Empire so that she could obtain arbitral power in South-Eastern Europe. Whatever the secret cause of the Austro-Russian controversy during the preceding decade (1901—1910) the Russian Government did not support the Serbians in their designs on Austro-Hungarian territories. They were invited to join Russia in 1901; in 1902, they saw their Bulgarian rival conclude a military alliance with the Russian Empire. In 1903, the Austrophil, Obrenovich, was deposed and a Russophil Government came into power in Serbia. The following year Serbia became allied with Bulgaria: in 1905, a customs union was concluded between them and in 1906, a French Loan made it possible to buy Serbian guns from the same place as Bulgaria and Russia purchased theirs. The Austro-Russian Accord however was dissolved 1907—09. Iswolsky in return for Austrian assistance in the Straits question gave Bosnia and Hercegovina in return for this support, and in 1909 Serbia was surrendered by him. In 1910, however, Iswolsky — owing to the double failure he had sustained by abandoning the Serbs and not opening the Straits — was removed to Paris and his successor was invited to undertake the task of restoring harmony between Russia and her Western neighbours. Sasonov, however, failed to ratify the Potsdam agreement. Convinced that he was an important neutral he fell an easy prey to the desinging intrigues which grew up about that time in the European States.

One of the incidents which formed the basis of future entanglements, the restoration of the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance, has already been mentioned. This Alliance was skilfully engineered by the Russian Minister at Belgrade, Hartwig. He was ably seconded by the new Serbian Minister at Sofia, Miroslav Spalaikovich. Iswolsky went to Paris as Russian Ambassador where he waited for an opportunity to retrieve his failures. Whatever the individual attitudes of Sasonov, Hartwig and Iswolsky, not to mention Spalaikovich, were, they all waited for the same thing — a change which would be unfavourable to the Central Powers and favourable for decisive intervention on the Middle Danube.

The ball was set rolling by France who occupied Morocco in the spring of 1911. She was joined by Spain, anxious not to lose her share in the dismemberment of the Sherifian Empire. Italy seized Tripoli and in a few days the Turkish-Italian War extended to the Balkan Peninsula. By attacking Turkish Power in the Balkans, Italy touched on a question of interest to both Russia and the Balkan Christians. Accounting the moment favourable for a reckoning with the Turks, Iswolsky hastened to utilise the occasion in favour of his own government. He demanded the Straits, ostentatiously as a compensation for, and as a consequence of the occupation of Morocco and Tripoli; but his real reason was to prevent the Bulgarian from entering and occupying Constantinople — the key to Russia's advance to the Mediterranean.⁵⁰

A combined Italian-Russian action, with the assistance of the Balkan States, which would ultimately be united under the central of the Russian Government, was projected in the event of the town being abandoned by the retiring Turks.

This was a *grand dessein* — the last crusade of the Christian Powers against the infidels who had set foot in Europe in 1360 — a crusade to be led by Holy Russia in alliance with the Powers other than those who preferred to join the infidels: — viz: the Central Powers. An opinion backed by a great moral force was created and cautiously applied, veiling the truth that the war was originally organised by the Habsburg Empire, the great barrier of European civilisation against Eastern Aggression. Even the French were under the impression that the *Balkan League* was directed against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the idea of liberating the Balkan Christians from Turkish oppression carried the day. A war broke out, the ostentatious object of which was to expel the Turks from

⁵⁰ On the connection between the above events of the reminiscences of Prince Bülow and Poincaré, and the correspondence of Iswolsky.

Europe and to lay the Cross on the Hagia Sophia which for four and a half centuries had been used as a mosque.

The European Powers, however, were far from forming a united front against the Crescent. Disunion among them also did not correspond exactly with the frontiers of the two rival groups known as the Central Powers and the Entente, leaving the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente which were then in existence, entirely out of the matter. In reality, Europe was at this time partitioned into two groups — the Slavs and their enemies represented by Austria-Hungary and Italy, although the position was scarcely recognised because Austria-Hungary led the way and Italy remained in the background, waiting for the end of her struggle against her rivals. After Austria-Hungary had been destroyed by war, Italy hoped to be able to defend herself against the Slavs without the barrier formed by her old rivals on the Middle Danube. Thus Italy and Russia headed, even in 1911, two different if invisible groups; although the Racconigi agreement of 1909 was in itself a great step towards Russo-Italian collaboration, the Russian initiative destroyed any hope that may have existed that Italy would join.

The Italian Government had full cognisance of the secret negotiations which had been carried on in the Balkans since the termination of the Bosnian crisis and they were also aware that a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance had been prepared with the active co-operation of the Russian Government. There is documentary evidence of the organisation of the Balkan Slavs under Russian protection that took place after the Spring of 1909 which proves that it was the intention of the Slavs to make a great move in the direction of the Adriatic, the *mare nostrum* hitherto so carefully protected against Austrian domination. Russia by making the Orthodox Eastern Church her powerful vanguard, succeeded in bringing together Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, leaving Italy the alternative choice of either Austria-Hungary or a powerful Slav Empire formed in close proximity to her frontiers. She decided to join neither of them, acting instead with unrivalled skill by inciting the Dual Empire against the Slavs and utilising the opposition of Austria-Hungary to incite Slav aggression. In this way, she preserved her strength until Austria-Hungary was destroyed by the Slavs, and Russia, owing to her own disruption, was unable to reach the Adriatic.

It was the Serb-Bulgarian Alliance which formed the basis of a greater alliance after the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War. This war was not merely a surprise to Hungary — it was also a source of anxiety. Two of her allies were weakened and the place they had occupied was threatened by a militant Slav alliance directed against Central Europe. That this anxiety was

justified was proved at the first meeting of the Serbian and Bulgarian Prime Ministers on October 11, 1911, on which occasion Milovanovich told Geshov that their alliance should have for its goal the acquisition by Serbia and Rumania of the Southern Slav and Rumanian portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁵¹ As this was undoubtedly the aim of these countries during the war, Milovanovich, by reason of this declaration, assumed heavy responsibilities in regard to the hostilities, a fact that was acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace.

The opinion of M. Raymond Poincaré, the French Prime Minister that the Balkan League, based on the Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance, was dangerous not only to the peace of Europe but also to the Dual Empire of Austria-Hungary is proved by the observations he made at the time to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sasonov.⁵²

It was the Russian Minister at Belgrade, Hartwig, who demanded the inclusion of Rumania in order that the Balkan League should comprise all the neighbouring States of Austria-Hungary. In this way, not only would a strong barrier be formed against eventual intervention on the part of the Dual Empire, but the way would be open for united Serb-Rumanian aggression. An outbreak of Russian disturbances was planned to occur simultaneously in the North-Eastern parts of Austria and Hungary; Bucovina was destined as the centre of similar action in the North-Eastern counties of Hungary, while Eastern Galicia was already undermined by Russophil propaganda.

A Ruthenian peasant was converted to the Russian Church and sent back as a Russian monk in order to persuade his fellow countrymen to join the Orthodox Church so that they would be ready to welcome the Russian Tzar when he crossed the Carpathians. Several people, including this monk, Father Alexej (Kabalyuk), were prosecuted for high treason. An article in the „*Nowoje Wremja*” stated, in 1912, that three hundred Ruthenian peasants were detained in Hungarian prisons on account of their religious belief. This, however, was a gross exaggeration. The Russian Count Bobrinsky who was the patron of Father Alexej, went to Serbia in 1910 and visited the arsenals. On his return he resumed his propaganda among the Ruthenians and tried to extend the Russophil agitation to Slovakia in order to get into touch with Bohemia where the Czech professor, Thomas Masaryk, was already engaged in forming a Slav concentration, and acting as the advocate of Serbian interests in various trials connected with Serbs. The

⁵¹ I. E. Geshov: *L'Alliance balkanique*. Paris, 1915. Page 27.

⁵² Documents diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. I. Paris, 1922, Page 38. R. Poincaré: *Au Service de la France*. Vol. II. Paris, 1926. Pages 114—115.

object of his activities was to secure a Slav majority in Austria-Hungary so that the charge of high treason could be removed by general dissatisfaction rather than by a revelation of the original and foreign source. The journeys of Masaryk to Belgrade followed a new line of Russian interest — across Western Hungary — as it was believed that in the event of the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany would be satisfied with the cession of the German provinces of Austria. In this way, Hungary would have been encircled by a Russian, Czech, Serbian and Rumanian ring which would have rendered her unable of opposing the Russian advance towards the Mediterranean and the Adriatic.

It is not possible for us to follow the history of the *Balkan League* and its wars with the Turks in all its details, and it will be sufficient for us merely to draw attention to the numerous documents containing statements and instructions given by responsible statesmen — in a period of perfect peace and without population of the areas concerned having any idea of the proceedings — in which parts of Hungary were promised to Serbia and Rumania. It should also be noted that these promises were made at a time when Austria-Hungary was observing so strict a neutrality that its conduct escaped criticism even by its enemies, and, further, its intervention in the Albanian question was only made with the full consent of an European Conference which demanded the evacuation of Albania by the Serbian troops.⁵³

⁵³ The following statements and instructions regarding promises given at the cost of Hungary are known to have been made between October 11, 1911 and December 21, 1913: 1. October 11, 1911, Transylvania offered to Rumania by the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Milanovich, i. e. Geshov: „L'Alliance balkanique” Paris 1915, page 27. 2. Belgrade, November 12, 1912. Report of the German Minister, Baron Greisinger; according to the Rumanian Minister, Filality, Transylvania was offered to Rumania by Hartwig. *M. Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin, 1929, pages 304—05. 3. Belgrade November 12, 1912. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Minister, *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. IV. Vienna, 1930. Page 851. 4. Bucarest, November 24, 1912, Meeting held in private rooms of Take Jonescu at Bucarest. *A. Marghiloman*: Note politique, Vol. I. Bucarest, 1927. Page 130. 5. Belgrade, December 1, 1912. Report of the Austrian-Hungarian Minister, *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. V. Vienna, 1930. Page 14. 6. Belgrade, December 21, 1912. Remark made by the Prime Minister Pashich. *M. Boghitschewitsch*, op. cit. Vol. I. Berlin, 1928. Page 273. 7. Bucarest, December 21, 1912. Report of the Serbian Minister. *Ibid.* Page 273. 8. Belgrade, April 12, 1913. Report of the Austrian-Hungarian Minister, *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VI. Vienna, 1930. Page 118. 9. St. Petersburg, May 6, 1913. Sasonov to Hartwig. *M. Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin, 1929. Page 409. 10. St. Petersburg, May 12, 1913. Report of the Serbian Minister. *Ibid.* Vol. I. Berlin, 1928. Page 331. 11. St. Petersburg, August 2, 1913. The same. *Ibid.* Page 373. 12. Belgrade, September 10, 1913. Report of the German Charge Bethmann-Hollweg. *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914*. Vol. XXXVI. Berlin, 1926. Pages 363—64. 13. St. Petersburg, December 6, 1913. Report

Close examination of such of these documents show clearly that Russia had the intention of invading Austria-Hungary in a time of peace, although by them Russia is not represented as being uniquely responsible for involving the Dual Empire in a war against the other's wish. A comparison between the attitude of the Hungarian Government and Russian aggression will also be helpful.⁵⁴

The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, was accused by Sasonov as being responsible for the second Balkan War (June 1913) in which Serbia was invaded by the Bulgarian. The accusation also forms part of the indictment brought against Hungary in connection with the war of 1914.⁵⁵

Sasonov was, undoubtedly, desperately afraid that his *Balkan League* would be dissolved owing to the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1913, and feared he would be held responsible for the fratricide committed during the Serb-Bulgarian War of 1913.

The attitude of the various Powers during the Balkan crises of 1912—1913 is interesting because it shows clearly that Austria-Hungary was forced to follow two lines of contradictory policy. When the first Balkan War broke out in October 1912, Austria-Hungary was warned not to allow a change to take place in the *status quo of the Balkan Peninsula*.⁵⁶ Probably this was owing to the fear of a possible Turkish victory, but shortly afterwards, when it became evident that the Balkan allies would be the victors, the same Powers forbade Austria-Hungary to oppose the change which had been effected in the Balkan Peninsula.⁵⁷ Austria-Hungary agreed and acted against her own interest and during the first period of the war maintained and during the second period acknowledged the change

of the Foreign Minister, Sasonov to the Tsar. Documents diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. III. Paris, 1923. Page 32. 14. Bucarest, December 6, 1913. Report of the French Chargé, Dard; Ibid. Page 95. 15. Vienna, December 9, 1913. Report of the German Ambassador von Tschirschky. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette. 1781—1914. Vol. XXXVI. Part. I. Berlin, 1926, Page 421. 16. St. Petersburg, December 1913. Report of the Serbian Minister. *M. Boghitchewitsch* op cit. Vol. I. Berlin, 1928. Pages 404—05.

⁵⁴ There are documents in existence referring to incidents on the Serbian frontier for which the Hungarians did not demand satisfaction. Archives of the Hungarian Government 1913. Nos. 2209, 2342, 2990, 3204, 5020, 6255. Correspondence of the Banus of Croatia-Slavonia with the Hungarian Government. *Ad acta*.

⁵⁵ The accusation was repeated by R. W. Seton-Watson „Sarajevo“ London, 1926. Pages 47, 48 and by Professor Emil Bourgeois „Manuel historique de politique étrangère“ Vol. IV. Paris, 1926. Page 598.

⁵⁶ *M. Boghitchewitsch* op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin, 1929. Page 241.

⁵⁷ Speech delivered by the British Prime Minister, M. Herbert Asquith on November 9, 1912. Report of Hartwig, Belgrade, November 9, 1912, Ibid. Page 298.

in the *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula. This obedience was undoubtedly interpreted as a sign of weakness; on November 18, 1912, however Count Tisza declared in a speech, delivered at Arad that both lines of policy were in accordance with the traditions and interests of the Hungarian nation: — firstly because it would have been perilous for Europe had they refused to maintain peace in the most dangerous spot on the continent, and secondly, because Hungary's interest lay in assisting people in their struggle for freedom and independence rather than in maintaining slavery. On June 16, 1913, Count Tisza became Prime Minister of Hungary and assumed responsibility for the Hungarian Government. On June 19, 1913, in the Hungarian House of Commons, he declared that he was of opinion the Balkan peoples should be allowed to settle their internal questions without interference on the part of foreign powers. This declaration was in complete agreement with that made by the British Prime Minister on November 9, 1912. That he was contradicted afterwards by Sasonov merely shows that it was to the latter's interest the Balkan peoples should not be allowed to decide their internal questions for themselves but submit to dictation by foreign powers. Sasonov accused Count Tisza, not because he denounced the intervention of Russia; but because he encouraged the Bulgarians to attack their enemies. It was however well known, and to none other better than to Sasonov, that the Serb-Greek Alliance into which the original Balkan Treaty of Alliance was forcefully converted, was signed on June 1, 1913 — that is six days before Count Tisza became Prime Minister and eighteen days before he delivered the speech in Parliament referred to above. If Sasonov stood on the basis outlined by Mr. Asquith on November 9, 1912, he had not the right to be indignant; but if he desired to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Balkan peoples he had every occasion for indignation.

The second charge brought against Count Tisza is that he desired an alliance to be made with Bulgaria. In this connection it should be remembered that there was a general desire in Austria-Hungary for an alliance with Bulgaria, although there was a great divergence of opinion as to its ultimate aim. In Vienna it was desired as an excuse for an invasion of Serbia, and in Budapest as a means of checking aggression on the part of Rumania. The importance of this difference is not generally recognised; but it is a difference that should not be neglected as it can be proved from competent sources and by historical facts.

There are several important documents in existence referring to Count Tisza's attitude in regard to the Serbian question. Partition and the dismemberment of Serbia were never de-

manded but always opposed by the Hungarian Government, on the ground that increase in the Slav population was not a matter of Hungarian interest. This is quite clearly shown by Austrian documents and by articles written by Austrian statesmen and soldiers, who argue that Hungary was always the stumbling block when it came to settling the Serbian question in accordance with Austro-Croatian interests. The Prime Minister, Count Tisza, in the dual Cabinet Council, which was held in October 1913, openly declared that he could not assent, in the name of the Royal Hungarian Government, to an invasion and annexation of the Serbian Kingdom. He reiterated this statement in July 1914, and there is no documentary evidence to show that he had altered his standpoint in the matter. Even the idea of a Customs Union with Serbia was opposed by the Hungarian Government as it was feared that it would lead to a political union.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Various projects put forward in connection with the Serbian Kingdom at Vienna in 1913 and 1914. 1. Project of a union of Serbia and Austria-Hungary by way of a *Zollunion*. Mission of the Austrian politicians, Baernreither and Joseph Redlich. cf. *Joseph Redlich: Joseph M. Baernreither. Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuches*, Berlin 1928. Pages 168, 196—97. Joseph Redlich was known to the Serbs as a Czech. Serbian article in the review *Nova Europa* and in the *Kriegsschuldfrage*. Vol. VI. Berlin, 1928. Pages 756—57. 2. Plan of occupation and annexation of the Serbian State. This standpoint was reviewed by *General Conrad* in his book: „Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906—18“ Vols. II. and III. Berlin, 1922—23. August 11, 1913. Memorandum of Count Tisza on the Balkan Question. *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna, 1930, pages 112—114, placed before King-Emperor on August 13, 1913. Ibid. Pages 130—131. August 25, 1913. — Second Memorandum of Count Tisza on the Balkan Question. Ibid. Pages 198—201, placed before the King-Emperor on August 28, 1913. Ibid. Pages 219—221. — October 3, 1913. Dual Cabinet Council at Vienna. Ibid. Pages 397—403., c. f. on the two Dual Cabinet Councils of October 3 and 13, 1913. *General Conrad: „Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906—18.“* Vol. III. Vienna 1922. Pages 460—61., 464—65., 724—46. When on February 21, 1909 Friedjung demanded a Customs Union with Serbia, Baernreither replied: „Das Ganze wegen Ungarn undurchführbar“. (It would be impossible to carry out the idea on account of Hungary) *J. Baernreither* op. cit. Pages 166—107. As to Rumania, the visit of the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand to Sinaia in 1909 was made in order that a separate understanding might be reached between him and King Carol against the Magyars. The result of such an understanding would have been according to the plans put forward by the Crown Prince: a) Customs Union with the Rumania, b) Political union with Rumania, by offering Transylvania to King Carol who would further receive a rank corresponding to that of the King of Bavaria in the German Empire. c) military agreement offering Transylvania to the Rumanian Army in the event of a war with Russia., d) cessation of upkeep of the fortification on the frontiers of Transylvania towards Rumania., e) appointment of Count Ottokar Czernin, the intimate friend of the Crown Prince, as Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucarest., f) Maintenance of the accusation that the Rumanians in Hungary were illtreated and oppressed by the Magyars, g) to demand their liberation by the Austrian Government and stir up Austro-Rumanian antagonism against Hungary; h) Appeal to Germany for support

Up to the present no thorough investigation has been made in regard to the mass of published documents concerning the Balkan Crisis which began in October 1911 and ended with the suspension of arms brought about by the Treaty of Bucharest which was signed in August 1913. It can however be said without fear of contradiction that the *Balkan League* was formed with the object of replacing Turkish Power by that of the allied Balkan States. The League enjoyed the protection of Russia which was anxious to obtain compensation for the large territorial acquisitions of its Western allies in North Africa. The anticipated compensation was the revision of the Straits Question; but as a matter of fact Russia was unable to become the mistress of either the Straits or the Balkan road to Constantinople. The loss of Bulgaria was a heavy loss for the Russian cause a new *Balkan League* to include Rumania, which was not a Slav but a Latin state was projected, the idea being that if Bulgaria could be replaced by Rumania, the way from Russia to Serbia would be assured and Russia thereby given a direct means of communication by way of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro (the two last named countries were to be united under a Serbian hegemony) towards the Adriatic. The disappearance of the Turkish terror reduced the importance of Bulgaria; while that of Rumania was enhanced by the letter written to Hartwig by Sasonov on May 6, 1913,⁵⁹ and the statement of the Serbian delegate, Spalaikovich at the Bucharest Peace Conference in August 1913 to the effect that the turn of Ausaria-Hungary had now arrived.⁶⁰

2. The Settlement of the Austro-Hungarian Question.

That the Serbian Government was determined to bring the Austro-Hungarian question to a head in January 1914 is clearly proved from Serb sources.⁶¹ Whether it was an initiative or the reply to an initiative on the part of Russia however is not clear.

State documents which have since been published in various directions prove conclusively that three conferences were held at St. Petersburg, Bucharest and Belgrade, in accordance with

of the Crown Prince's plan. King Carol declared that Transylvania would be acquired by peaceful measures. Count Tisza replied by seeking closer understanding with the Rumanian National Party in Hungary. This rapprochement was checked to do more for the Rumanians than the Hungarians could.

⁵⁹ *M. Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin, 1929. Page 409.

⁶⁰ *Documents Diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques, 1912—14.* Vol. II. Paris, 1922. Page 248.

⁶¹ According to the „*Nova Evropa*“ (Zagreb) quoted in the *Contemporary Review*. Vol. CXXXIV. London, 1928. Page 309.

the new front of the alliances that had been concluded between Russia, Rumania and Serbia and which faced the frontiers of Austria-Hungary. It is not possible to ascertain definitely from these documents whether the conferences were convoked or whether they were held without convocation, but their importance is fully revealed. The first one was held in St. Petersburg at the end of January and the beginning of February, 1914. There were present Sasonov, Pashich and Veniselos, the Bulgarian and Rumanian ministers, while journeys to and fro of members of the Rumanian, Serbian and Grecian dynasties made the Conference a centre of interest.

The second meeting took place at the beginning of February at Bucharest. There were present Pashich, Veniselos and Bratianu and the Russian Minister Poklewski-Koziell. The third conference which was held shortly afterwards at Belgrade was attended by Pashich, Veniselos and the Russian Minister, Hartwig. It is fairly clear therefore that 1: — the meetings were held at the instigation of Russia and 2: — of the second *Balkan League*. Bulgaria was left out of the second and third conferences either because she was not satisfied with the propositions that were brought forward or because they had not been realised.

It is therefore feasible to suppose that it was agreed at these conferences 1: — that Bulgaria had to be satisfied in order that Rumania and Serbia could have a free hand against Austria-Hungary, 2: — that these two states should be backed at any rate by Greece, 3: — that they should prepare aggression against Austria-Hungary, and 4: — in the event of Serbia's consent being obtained that she should be supported by Rumania, where since January 1914 a Liberal Government with the Russophil Jonel Bratianu as Prime Minister had been in power.

The result of these conferences was the mobilisation and the transfer of Russian, Rumanian and Serbian troops towards the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy, towards the Carpathians in Rumania and to the Save-Danube Line in Serbia. In this way, responsibility for any aggression would be transferred from Russia and Rumania to Austria-Hungary. Complaints regarding the oppression of nationalities and a demand for their liberation were to be brought against the Dual Monarchy, plots organised in Russia, Rumania and Serbia but carried out by Austro-Hungarian subjects were arranged for, while various revolutions were to be fermented with the help of foreign interference in order that the Dual Monarchy might be swept away by its own internal weakness. We will however only deal with the results of the conferences in as far as they concern the Kingdom of Hungary.

1. Mobilisation in Russia, Rumania and Serbia as well as the transfer of troops towards the Hungarian frontiers. Several diplomatic reports in this connection are to be found among the Austro-Hungarian War Documents.⁶²

2. Methods: — Report of the Serbian Chargé Tadich.⁶³

3. Execution of the methods. Complaints alleging oppression of the various nationalities.⁶⁴

The method and its execution can be best illustrated by the following cases, both of which relate to Hungary: — A. The Ruthenian Trial. The trial of some Ruthenians in Máramaros County (the so-called Trial of Máramaros) had its origin in the agitation against the Ruthenian monk, Father Alexej (Kabalyuk) with whom several Ruthenian peasants were also arrested and brought before the Court at Máramarossziget in North-Eastern Hungary. The monk was charged with high treason. He was accused of persuading the Ruthenians to join the Russian Church, giving as the reason that the Tzar did not intend to disarm (the Russian Army had been mobilised in 1912 and troops were concentrated near the Galician frontier) but instead, he would cross the Carpathians and his troops would occupy the North Eastern counties of Hungary. Russia, he said „will not demobilise until her flag is unfurled over the Carpathians“. The trial is memorable, not for the sentence which was passed upon the monk, but for the treatment which was meted out to his Russian patron, Count Bobrinsky, who appeared in Court in defence of his friends. He was prosecuted by the Austrian authorities, so he travelled, not through Galicia or Bucovina, which were Austrian provinces, but through Rumania into Hungary. Count Bobrinsky was well received at Máramarossziget and he left protesting his friendship for Hungary. Kabalyuk was only a victim, the real criminal was Count Bobrinsky who received a *salvus conductus* and who could not be punished for the statements he ultimately made. From the standpoint of war guilt, the journey of Count Bobrinsky to and from Hungary is interesting. Before he started, Sasonov thought it necessary to tell the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador that Bobrinsky was innocent⁶⁵ and that the anger of the Russian

⁶² These documents were published by *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna, 1930 cf. especially Pages 927, 943, 948, 956.

⁶³ *M. Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. I. Berlin, 1928. Page 382: „Unser Standpunkt ist der folgende: die Schuld an den Ereignissen von uns abzuwälzen und sie Europa als unwissentlich Schuldigen und Oesterreich als dem bewusst Schuldigen in die Schuhe zu schieben.“

⁶⁴ c. f. especially the various complaints put forward by the Rumanian Prime Minister Bratianu in 1914.

⁶⁵ Cf. especially the report of the Austrian-Hungarian Chargé, Count Czernin, dated St. Petersburg, February 7, 1914. *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna, 1930. Page 838. For the report of the decoration of

Government would be provoked were he to be arrested. That this was an unusual warning given in the interest of an alleged criminal before he appeared in Court was later on pointed out to Sasonov himself.⁶⁶

Shortly before he left for Hungary, Count Bobrinsky had published anonymously, the text of a Serbian-Rumanian Treaty referring to the partition of Hungary although he made a reference to it in an article he wrote for the „*Novoje Vremja*“. This Treaty was afterwards declared to be a forgery but the partition it foreshadowed became a *fait accompli* in 1918—1920.

The most important part of Count Bobrinsky's journey through Rumania was his meeting with Catarau, a Russian in Rumanian employment. He was born in Bessarabia, which was at that time a Russian province and was then acting as lecturer in the Rumanian Military Academy. He had formerly been a pupil of Professor Nicolas Jorga, acting Secretary of the irredentist association. *Liga Culturale*, which was subsidized by the Russian Legation on a large scale. Professor Jorga published a pamphlet in 1913, protesting against the erection of a Magyar Uniate Church in Hungary and predicted a Rumanian rising which however did not break out. His former pupil, Catarau, came to an understanding with his Russian countryman, Count Bobrinsky that they would help the oppressed Rumanians of Hungary to rouse themselves and also that they would strive to bring the trial of the accused Ruthenians to a happy conclusion. After Bobrinsky had left Rumania, Catarau and a friend, a seaman from the famous Russian ship „*Potemkin*“ which had been disarmed in a Rumanian harbour in 1905, borrowed two Rumanian passports and went to Czernowitz in Bucovina. They sent a small box by post to the Magyar bishop who was in residence at Debreczen, together with a letter which had been written for them by a Hungarian girl asking him to accept it as a present. The two Russians, armed with their Rumanian passports, registered themselves at their hotel as Rumanians, but they left immediately for Bucarest and were no longer on Austrian territory, when on February 17, 1914, the office of the Bishop was blown up by means of the infernal machine which had been concealed in the little box. Several casualties were caused. That same day the negotiations between the Hungarian Government conducted by Count Tisza and the Rumanian National Party ended in a rupture owing to the private intervention of the Crown Prince. The moment had come when according to the hopes entertained by Bobrinsky

Count Bobrinsky by Tzar Nicholas II. see same dated March 28, 1914. Page 1014.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Page 838.

and his friend Catarau-Katarov, a Rumanian revolution should break out as the result of the Rumanian attentat of Debreczen, an event that would have been aided by the interruption of the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations, a fact which however was not known by Bobrinsky who was already in Russia or by Catarau, who had fled with the assistance of the Rumanian authorities. Everything in Hungary remained quiet and the Rumanians were more disturbed by the plot than were the Hungarians because they were under the impression that it had been carried out by a Magyar in order that they might be held responsible for the breakdown in the negotiations. The Rumanians of Hungary at once entered a protest to which the Hungarian Government replied saying that they had not, for one minute considered the Rumanian citizens of Hungary capable of so great a blunder. The Rumanian Government was disturbed by the fact that the two visitors to Czernowitz had been provided with Rumanian passports; but stringent enquiries proved that they were Russians. King Carol told the Austro-Hungarian Minister that Catarau had acted in the Russian interest⁶⁷ and he also told his friend Alexander Marghiloman that it had been extremely difficult to prevent Catarau from being detained by the Austro-Hungarian authorities.⁶⁸ As a matter of fact, the machine was prepared at Bucarest in Rumania, Catarau was saved by the Rumanian authorities, and neither his Rumanian friends nor the Hungarian girl, who wrote the letter to the bishop, himself a Hungarian subject, were handed over to the Hungarian authorities.

It is evident from these two cases alone that general aggression was planned against Hungary and it was prepared according to the instructions of Sasonov so that the responsibility should rest with Austria-Hungary.

Kabalyuk was sentenced by the Máramaros Court on March 3, 1914, and a new ground for Russian intervention arose.

This was foreshadowed by an article in the Russian paper „*Svjet*“ holding Count Tisza responsible for the verdict and furthermore declaring that the attentat of Debreczen was the beginning of a general revolution. The „*Svjet*“ did not know

⁶⁷ King Carol said to the German Minister: „*Die beiden der Tat verdächtigen Personen seien Russen. Es sei nicht richtig, dass einer von ihnen rumänischer Ursprung sei.*“ Bucarest, March 30, 1914. Report of von Waldthausen. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin, 1927. Pages 482—83.

⁶⁸ „After the attentat of Debreczen, the murder of Hungarian policemen and injuring the Arpad monument, which were doubtless provocations on the part of Russia, I was told by Pisoschi that Catarau was saved by our Navy“ etc. A. Marghiloman: Note politice. Vol. I. Bucarest, 1927. Page 557, ad October 8, 1915.

that the Rumanians were protesting against the allegation that it was a Rumanian plot; Russian public opinion was also kept in ignorance of the facts. The „*Sujet*” predicted the downfall of the Dual Monarchy, thus providing further evidence of the responsibility of Russia in the coming events.⁶⁹ The „*Kölnische Zeitung*” printed some information concerning Russian armaments; on the following day (March 4, 1914) the same news appeared in the French paper „*Liberté*”. A little later, a Russian officer of high rank told a correspondent of the Rumanian paper „*Romanul*”, published at Arad in Hungary, that the Russian Army had been mobilised after the attentat of Debreczen as a Rumanian rising was anticipated in the wake of the Russian bomb.⁷⁰ Count Bobrinsky also predicted a war between Russia and Germany and added that he was sorry for Hungary where he had been so well received as she would undoubtedly be partitioned between her neighbours. A project relating to the partition of Austria-Hungary was also published in the „*Romanul*” accompanied by the remark that it was taken from the Russian paper „*Novoje Vremja*” (March 20, 1914). At the end of March Rumania was invited to join Russia, the inducement being that in this way might be able to acquire large Rumanian territories then included in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

Taking these incidents into consideration, Count Tisza's proposal (March 15, 1915) that an alliance should be made with Bulgaria in order to render Rumanian aggression impossible can be regarded as fully justified. He was of opinion that such an alliance was necessary because the Hungarian frontiers were not fortified and also because Rumania urged onward by Russia would be a great danger for the safety of the Hungarian kingdom.⁷¹

Count Tisza's anxiety was confirmed from various sources.

The Russian Government bore full responsibility for allowing Count Bobrinsky to speak in its name and publish various

⁶⁹ „*Das ungarische Urteil (von Máramarosziget) kann jedermann davon überzeugen, was von der ungarischen Regierung zu erwarten ist. Diese Unterdrückung des Rechtes und der Wahrheit wird einen derartigen Ausbruch des Zornes oder die Politik der Gewalt nach sich ziehen, dass das Kabinett Tisza unfähig sein wird, seinen Platz zu behaupten. Die Politik hat bereits das Debrecziner Attentat provoziert, und man wird in allen Teilen der zusammengeklüfteten Monarchie noch viel bössere Erscheinungen des Terrors erleben. Die verurteilten dreissig unglücklichen Ruthenen sind ein Sühnopfer, und es wird kein vergebliches sein, wenn im selben Augenblick der Zerfall der von Russland in 1849 geretteten Monarchie beginnt.*” Translation made by the *Pester Lloyd* March 9, 1914.

⁷⁰ „*Romanul*”, March 17, 1914.

⁷¹ The full text in German was published by *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna, 1930. Page 974—79.

plans and treaties referring to the partition of Austria-Hungary. At the same time, a Czech delegation arrived in Eastern Galicia in order to demonstrate in favour of the accused in the Máramaros trial and also of the Russians.⁷²

After the occupation of the town during the war, the Russians searched carefully for the judges of the Máramarosziget Court, as well as among the Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia. The Russian Consul, General Priklonskij permitted a pamphlet to be published which was written by a Budapest Jew who had as a prisoner of war enjoyed his favour. This man had also been employed first during the occupation of the Rumanian troops in Budapest and also by the Russian Soviet in Rumania.⁷³

This then was the strange position of affairs when in 1914 the Hungarian Independent Party announced their intention of visiting the Russian capital. They were however stopped by the news that they were to be invited to a conference which would also be attended by the leaders of the non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary under the aegis of the Russian Foreign Minister and that one of the items to be discussed would be the organisation of a new form of government for Hungary under Russian control.⁷⁴

The Russian point of view in regard to Austria-Hungary is perhaps more clearly represented by the private journey of Sasonov to Transylvania. He accompanied the Tsar to Constantza and went to Sinaia in the Carpathians via Bucarest; whence on June 16, 1914, he crossed the Hungarian frontier accompanied by Baron Schilling, the Rumanian Prime Minister, Bratianu and the Rumanian Minister for St. Petersburg, Diamandi. They had no passports and they asked the Austrian-Hungarian Minister Count Ottokar Czernin, an intimate friend of the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, for permission to enter the country. The Minister forgot to inform his Government of the incident.⁷⁵

⁷² „*Pour les encourager dans la lutte*”. *Le Temps*, February 7, 1914.

⁷³ Cf. his biography in *Gulyás: Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon*. Vol. I. Budapest, 1927, pages 579—81.

⁷⁴ The non-Magyar delegates were to be invited „*zwar als Sachverständige über die ungarischen Verhältnisse, damit in Petersburg darüber unter russischem Präsidium beraten werden könne*” (*Pester Lloyd* April 18, 1914).

⁷⁵ Documentary history of the journey of Sasonov and Bratianu to Transylvania on June 16, 1914. 1. Budapest, June 14, 1914. Count Tisza to the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold informed that he was surprised to hear that Sasonov intended to visit Transylvania, with „*Entrüstung über diese Taktlosigkeit. Es ist direkt eine Aufreizung unserer Rumänen und ein provozierendes Zurschauftragen russischen Interesses für Siebenbürgen*”. *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930, page

There is no doubt that Sasonov offered Transylvania to Bratianu of Rumania would join Russia in its action against Austria-Hungary. On the conclusion of his visit the Russian Minister at Bucarest said „Autriche ne compte plus“.⁷⁶

Twelve days later, the Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand, was murdered at Sarajevo by some young Bosnians, who had been trained in Serbia and provided with Serbian bombs. A Rumanian paper, printed at Bucarest in commenting of the affair said that the hand and the method were the same as those employed at Debreczen.⁷⁷

146. 2. Vienna, June 15, 1915. Count Czernin was asked by Count Berchtold for particulars of the proposed visit of Sasonov to Transylvania. Ibid. Page 147. 3. Bucarest, June 17, 1913. Count Czernin told Count Berchtold that the visit was made with his permission: „Herr Bratianu hatte meine Erlaubnis zur Fahrt eingeholt, die ich schwer zu verweigern im Stande war.“ Ibid. Pages 150—51. 4. This statement is contrary to the one he made in 1919, when he was not aware that the Austrian Government had the intention of publishing the secret documents: „Ich erfuhr von dieser erst nach erfolgter Tat.“ Count O. Czernin: *Im Weltkriege*. Berlin, 1919. Page 146. 5. Bucarest, June 17, 1914. Report of Count Czernin to Count Berchtold. *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930. Page 152. 6. Vienna, June 17, 1914. 7. Vienna, June 19, 1914. Report of the German Ambassador, von Tschirschky on Sasonov's trip to Transylvania. *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914*. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin, 1927. Page 520. 8. Sasonov on his trip to Transylvania (*Sasonov: Les Années fatales*. Paris, 1927. Pages 122—23.) 9. Diamandy's story of the trip „avec l'autorisation du gouvernement austro-hongrois“. (C. J. Diamandy: *La grande guerre vue du versant oriental. Revue des deux mondes*. Vol. XLIII. Paris, 1928. Page 133.) 10. According to Diamandy the following conversation took place between Sasonov and Bratianu. Sasonov: „Nous avons que vous êtes liés à la Triple-Alliance par un traité. Mais que ferait la Roumanie au cas où l'Autriche-Hongrie attaquerait la Serbie? Le casus foederis jouera-t-il?“ Bratianu: „La Roumanie agirait conformément à ses intérêts“. Ibid. Pages 134—34.

⁷⁶ Article by Charles Rivet: „Le jour où les Roumains prendraient une attitude agressive, étant donné de voisinage de la Serbie et les sympathies que les deux peuples ont chez leurs frères de la monarchie Austro-Hongroise, la situation de cette dernière serait très sérieusement menacée. Les Roumains comme les Serbes se rendent un compte exact aussi que le temps travaille pour eux; qu'un jour viendra où tous leurs compatriotes seront réunis sous le sceptre de leur rois. Pour ces problèmes de demain on comprend à Bucarest comme à Belgrade le rôle qu'aura y jouer la Russie.“ *Le Temps*, April 1, 1914.

⁷⁷ „Das in Bukarest erscheinende parteilose Tagblatt „Seara“ führt an leitender Stelle aus, dass die Debreczener Bombe über Rumänien, die Sarajewoer über Serbien von russischer Hand geschickt wurden. Gestern richtete sich der Anschlag gegen das Leben des Hajdudoroger Bischofs, heute ist der Thronfolger das Opfer. Das Blatt warnt das rumänische Volk von der Politik einer intimen Freundschaft mit Russland“ (*Pester Lloyd*, July 12, 1914.) „Bukarester Tagblatt: Die Tat von Debreczen war der bescheidene Anfang jener Propaganda der Tat, die in dem Morde von Sarajevo ihren entsetzlichen Gipfelpunkt fand, und mittels deren, wie es sich zeigt, all jene Gruppen und Strömungen, die man unter dem Gesamtnamen Pan-Slawismus zusammenfasst, ihr Werk der Zerstörung und des Umsturzes in Oesterreich-Ungarn zu vollenden hoffen.“ (*Pester Lloyd*, July 12, 1914.)

3. The Russian War.

Austria-Hungary was responsible neither for Debreczen nor for Sarajevo. The Russian Government of that day will never be absolved of either crime. A third responsibility must also be added to her count; as soon as the road to Serbia was opened — according to Sasonov this occurred when Rumania had received Russia's promise in regard to Transylvania — Russian aggression was imminent. After Sarajevo, Serbia received an ultimatum, and Russia immediately began to march against Austria-Hungary.

As it is now generally known, Count Tisza was on his estate far away from either Vienna or the Hungarian capital on the day on which the Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand, was murdered. Budapest informed him of what had taken place at Sarajevo. It was on a Sunday. On Monday (June 29, 1914) Count Tisza stopped at Budapest on his way to Vienna where he met Count Berchtold and General Conrad, who had already been in communication with each other for two days during which time they had arrived at a decision which was not communicated to the Hungarian Prime Minister until June 30. He was therefore unable to enter a protest until July 1, on which day he presented a Memorandum to the King-Emperor in which he opposed the idea of a war with Serbia; firstly because there was no proof that the Serbian Government was responsible and secondly because a war with Serbia would undoubtedly mean the intervention of Russia. This Memorandum was not published by the Austrian Government until 1919.⁷⁸

It should be remembered it was not generally known that Count Tisza had addressed a Memorandum to the King-Emperor. Had this not been the case enemy propaganda would not have been directed against Count Tisza nor would he have been accused of responsibility. As it appeared on the surface so was he judged and it was commonly believed that it was he who insisted the war should be declared against Serbia. On the same day, July 1, 1914, André Tardieu sent an article to *Le Temps* containing a declaration made by the leader of the Hungarian Independent Party, Count Michael Károlyi who happened to be in Paris en route for America. The article which was published on the July 2, 1914 contained the following remark: — „dans la politique extérieure nous sommes les plus redoutables semeurs de discorde aux Balkans“. The statement was at once repudiated by Count Tisza (dated Budapest July 13, 1914, published in „*Le Temps*“ July 14, 1914), for all that

⁷⁸ The full text of this memorandum is to be found in *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Pages 248—49.

it was regarded as bearing a great similarity with the Russian endeavour to throw the responsibility on Austria-Hungary a supposition that was strengthened by the Russophile attitude of its author.⁷⁹

There is further an interesting article written by a correspondent of the „*Birshevijska Vjedomosti*“ who happened to converse with Count Tisza just before the Sarajevo murder. Count Tisza then expressed an earnest desire for a better understanding with Russia.⁸⁰ A fortnight later Sasonov called him a fool.⁸¹ It is possible that Sasonov was influenced by the

⁷⁹ For Tardieu cf. the following documents: 1. his relations with the Russian Embassy at Paris (*Colonel Converset: Les trois ans de diplomatie secrète qui nous amenèrent à la guerre de 1914*. Paris, 1914. Pages 121, 122, 132, 133). His lecture given at Bucarest, March 6, 1914, under the title „*L'essor de la Roumanie et la politique européenne*“ mentioned the invitation tended to the Rumanians to turn their attention of Transylvania which he called the Alsace-Lorraine of Rumania. Cf. the report of the German Minister at Bucarest, dated March 12, 1914. „*Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871—1914*“, Vol. XXXIX. Berlin, 1927. Page 483 (part of the diary of Alexander Marghiloman, ad March 7, 1914; A. Marghiloman op. cit. Vol. I. Bucarest, 1927. Pages 213—14.). King Carol remarked that Tardieu wanted to help the Russians; „*Bezüglich der gegenwärtigen hiesigen Liebeswerbungen äusserte Seine Majestät, die Franzosen wollten hier den Russen helfen und ihnen einen Dienst erweisen.*“ 3. Article by André Tardieu published in „*Le Temps*“ July 2, 1914. 4. Another article by André Tardieu published in the *Journal des Balkans* on July 3, 1914, in which he invited Rumania to follow the lead given by the French and Russian Ministers at Bucarest (Bucarest, July 3, 1914.). Report of the German Charge, *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914*. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin, 1927. Pages 528—29.

⁸⁰ *Pester Lloyd* July 1, 1914.

⁸¹ According to documents not only the Russian press but Sasonov himself were influenced to a great extent by the Serbian Minister, Spalaikovich. On June 24, 1914 he declared in the Russian paper „*Vechnye Vremja*“ that the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand was the victim of a Bosnian revolution and this point of view was generally accepted by the defenders of the Serbian cause. (St. Petersburg, July 3, 1914.) Report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé Count Otto Czernin. *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930. Page 281. On July 10, 1914 Count Czernin stated that the Russian Press was influenced by Spalaikovich. *Ibid.* Page 389. On July 21, 1914, before the Ultimatum was handed to Belgrade, Sasonov told the German Ambassador that the dangerous policy of Austro-Hungary was directed by two men one of whom was Count Tisza „*der ein halber Narr sei.*“ (*Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*. Vol. I. New Edition, Berlin 1927. Page 126.) St. Petersburg, July 22, 1914. Report of the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan: „The Serbian minister . . . said that Count Tisza is inflaming Austrian public opinion so as to force the hands of the aged Emperor.“ (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London, 1926. Pages 61, 62.) According to a statement dated St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. Spalaikovich told the German Ambassador, that the war would not be a war fought between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but a European war. (Serbian Blue Book No. 36.) It is difficult to believe that after Count Portalés left the room of Sasonov and Spalaikovich followed him that he expressed an opinion different to the one he had given to the German Ambassador.

Serbian Minister who was regarded as an expert in all matters connected with Serbia in the Austro-Hungarian question.

It is undoubtedly true that Count Tisza played a far greater role in July 1914 than has hitherto been recognised by his defenders and attention can be directed to available sources without us expressing an opinion as to his attitude.

1. The following documents are available regarding his negotiations with Count Berchtold who was persuaded by General Conrad to declare war with Serbia: — 1: — A letter written by Count Berchtold to General Conrad informing him that „*Tisza sei gegen den Krieg mit Serbien und besorge, daß Rußland gegen uns losschlagen und Deutschland im Stiche lassen würde.*“⁸² The full story of Count Tisza's attitude is revealed in these few lines; he protested against the war with Serbia because he was sure that it would involve Russian intervention and that it would be dangerous to his own country even after he had assented to the ultimatum he did not change his opinion as he was convinced of the coming Russian aggression; he gave his assent because Germany had declared herself ready to endorse the *casus foederis* in the event of this occurrence. General Conrad was never a friend of the Magyars and he was a great opponent of Count Tisza, but he was an honest and upright man who at all events told the truth and he told it because of his mutual interest with the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold. 2. A letter written by Count Berchtold to General Conrad informing him that owing to the opposition of Count Tisza he would appeal to the German Emperor.⁸³ 3. A memorandum written on the same day (July 1, 1914) by Count Tisza to the King-Emperor.⁸⁴ 4. Count Berchtold demanded report on the military situation in the Balkan Peninsula which was duly forwarded to him by the chief of the general Staff on July 2, 1914.⁸⁵ This report is important because in it General Conrad for the first time, renounced the idea of military co-operation with Rumania and demanded the fortification of the Transylvanian frontiers. This change of attitude was probably brought about by the desire to win Count Tisza over to the idea of a war with Serbia and also to secure a defence against Russian aggression by fortifying the Rumanian frontier. 5: Count Berchtold's meeting with the German Ambassador, von Tschirschky. The letter to the German Emperor drafted by Count Berchtold.⁸⁶

⁸² *General Conrad* op. cit. Vol. IV. Leipzig, 1923. Page 34.

⁸³ *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930, pages 246—47.

⁸⁴ Published *ibid.* Pages 248—49.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Pages 268—70.

⁸⁶ The second group of documents relating to Count Tisza show that the draft of the letter King Emperor's letter to William II. was sent to Count Tisza, but when his answer was received in Vienna the special

The Memorandum of Count Tisza dated March 15, 1914 and redrafted was chosen as an enclosure to the letter which was sent to the German Emperor. The letter which is now known as „the June Memorandum“ in its final shape was completed on June 28, 1914.⁸⁷

The letter of the King-Emperor, Francis Joseph was handed to the German Emperor on the same day at 1 p. m.⁸⁸ with the result that the amendments suggested by Count Tisza could not have been considered.

The suggestion that the letter received by „William II was Count Berchtold's document as amended by Tisza“⁸⁹ as well as „the motive given by Tisza for the change on purely tactical grounds“⁹⁰ can be proved to be inaccurate by comparing the document in its original form with the version prepared by Count Tisza whose amendments were greatly in favour of Serbia.⁹¹ Consequently it is quite clear that the *casus foederis* which was granted by Germany was based entirely on Count Berchtold's letter and not upon Count Tisza's amendments.⁹²

The third group of documents refer to the attitude of Count Berchtold and General Conrad after the *casus foederis* had been granted by Germany. On July 6, Count Berchtold received a communication referring to the matter from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin.⁹³ He immediately informed Count Tisza⁹⁴ as well as General Conrad.⁹⁵ It is clear from these communications that Count Tisza's anxiety was still centred on Russia and Rumania and not on Serbia and that both Count Berchtold and General Conrad tried in vain to

delegate Count Hoyos has already left for Berlin. It was despatched from Budapest on July 5, 1914 at 11.50 a. m. The letter of Francis Joseph has handed to the German Emperor on the same day at 1.00 p. m.

⁸⁷ The letter was published *ibid.* Page 250.

⁸⁸ According to the diary of an aide-de-camp of Emperor William II. published by Kurt Jagow (*K. Jagow: Der Potsdamer Kronrat. Süddeutsche Monatshefte. Munich, 1928, August 1928, page 781.*), the letter of the King-Emperor Francis Joseph was handed to the German Emperor „kurz um 1 Uhr“, but according to a report of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Szögyény-Marich, it was handed in at 11.30 a. m. (*Bittner-Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930. Page 782.*) Should this latter hour be correct the letter of Francis Joseph was handed in before Count Tisza's telegram, reached Vienna. At all events his amendments did not find the original at Vienna, because it was already despatched to Berlin on July 4, 1914.

⁸⁹ R. W. Seton-Watson: Sarajevo. London, 1926. Page 174.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* Page 174.

⁹¹ Text of the letter in *Bittner-Uebersberger cit. Vol. VIII. Page 316.*

⁹² The documents in this matter were published *ibid.*

⁹³ Berlin, July 6, 1914. Szögyény-Marich to Count Berchtold (*ibid.* Page 329.).

⁹⁴ Vienna, July 6, 1914. Count Berchtold to Count Tisza. *Ibid.* Page 329.

⁹⁵ Vienna, July 6, 1914. Count Berchtold to General Conrad. *General Conrad op. cit. Vol. IV. Leipzig, pages 55,56.*

relieve his mind. On July 4, Count Tisza received a letter from the dual Foreign Minister referring to the private visit of Sasonov to Transylvania⁹⁶ with the result that this fear in this direction was augmented.

The Austrian-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl, was sent by Count Berchtold to Count Tisza; he became convinced that the Hungarian Prime Minister would not change his point of view.⁹⁷ He also told the Russian Minister, Hartwig, that this was his opinion on July 10, 1914, much to the satisfaction of the latter.⁹⁸

The fourth group of documents refer to Count Tisza's unchanged opposition. This was confirmed at the meeting of the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet Council held on July 7, 1914⁹⁹ by the context of the second Memorandum which he presented to the King-Emperor on July 8, 1914;¹⁰⁰ and also in the declaration he made at the Hungarian Cabinet Council on July 9, 1914.¹⁰¹ He repulsed every attempt which was made to induce him to change the attitude he had adopted¹⁰² and when the Viennese newspapers endeavoured to publish information referring to the Hungarian Government he assured the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs that Hungarian ministers did not reveal the secrets of the Cabinet.¹⁰³

The fifth group refer to the „conversion“ of Count Tisza.

Count Tisza is accused of changing his opinion on July 14, 1914,¹⁰⁴ that is to say he is alleged to have altered his original standpoint as outlined in the Memorandum he addressed to the King-Emperor for a fortnight only. The allegation is that there is evidence to show that on July 14, 1914, Count Tisza joined

⁹⁶ The original document bearing the laconic remark of Count Tisza „lättem“ (seen) is in the Archives of the Hungarian Government at Budapest.

⁹⁷ Baron A. Giesl *op. cit.* Pag. 256. It should be noted that Count Tisza rather than declare war on Serbia would have preferred to retire from political life.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* and also Baron Giesl's reports published by *Bittner-Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930.*

⁹⁹ Published *ibid.* Pages 342—51.

¹⁰⁰ Published *ibid.* Pages 371—74. Note written by King Emperor „ad acta Franz Joseph“.

¹⁰¹ Unpublished. Original in the Archives of the Hungarian Government at Budapest.

¹⁰² Reports of the German Ambassador von Tschirschky, dated Vienna, 7., 7. and July 10, 1914 (*Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch Vol. I. Berlin, 1927, pages 35—36.*). Count Berchtold to Count Tisza dated July 8, 1914. (*Bittner-Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930, pages 370, 71.*)

¹⁰³ Budapest, July 11, 1914 Count Tisza to Count Berchtold (*ibid.* page 406.).

¹⁰⁴ The accusation is to be found in practically all books referring to the matter. Cf. especially Professor Fay *op. cit.* Vol. II, New York, 1929, pages 239—43. Professor Schmitt, *op. cit.* Vol. I. New York, pages 352—57.

Count Berchtold and General Conrad in their action against Serbia which had also received the approval of both the King-Emperor Francis Joseph and the Emperor William II.¹⁰⁶

One of the most important arguments against this change of opinion on the part of Count Tisza is that he was known to be a thoroughly earnest and rather obstinate man who rarely, if ever, changed his original point of view, even in minor matters. It would have been incompatible with the character had he changed it in one so important as arose in July 1914. There is, however, documentary proof that he did nothing of the sort, and that he maintained his point of view until the rupture.

Count Berchtold, in his report dated July 14, 1914, to the King-Emperor says „Count Tisza has given up his objections to an ultimatum because I showed him the military difficulties that would arise from delayed action“. This in itself would be sufficient to show the difficulties which could be expected would not be entirely caused by Serbia who otherwise would have been no match for Austria-Hungary in the event of a localised action. However great the sacrifices that the Dual Monarchy might have been called upon to make, there was but one fate in store for Serbia — occupation and annexation according to a carefully elaborated military plan. If this had not been the result hoped for by the other powers, Russia would not have moved her armies towards the Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

The next sentence in Count Berchtold's Report is even more convincing. He was well acquainted with the obstinacy of his friend who had opposed the idea of war with Serbia not only in July 1914 but also in October 1913. He realised that he could not be turned from peace to war and this knowledge is the meaning underlining his words that „even after the mobilisation a peaceful arrangement might be possible if Serbia gives way in good time“. He tried to convey the impression that the ultimatum even if followed by mobilisation could not lead to war.

Documentary evidence of the foregoing is to be found in the report of Count Tisza's speech in the Hungarian Lower House on July 15, 1914, in which he declared that „the Government is fully convinced of the importance of maintaining the peace and it does not think there will be a war“.

Supplementary evidence is also provided by Count Tisza's

¹⁰⁶ Vienna, July 14, 1914. Report of Count Berchtold to the King-Emperor (*Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930, pages 447—48.). Vienna, July 14, 1914. Report of the German Ambassador (*Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, Vol. I. Berlin, 1927. Page 70). Vienna, July 14, 1914. The same, pages 71, 75, 76.

letter to Count Berchtold dated July 17 in which he protested against the warlike tendency of the news furnished by the General Staff to the Press¹⁰⁶ — a proof that even the Chief of the General Staff, General Conrad considered that the way leading to a military campaign was now open. Count Tisza however thought otherwise.

Another document with the same bearing is, the protocol of the Dual Cabinet Council which was held at Vienna on July 19, 1914, on which occasion Count Tisza invited the Ministers to „declare unanimously that the action against Serbia was not in any way connected with plans of aggrandisement on the part of the monarchy“. The ministers, who happened to be all Austrians declared their readiness to accept Count Tisza's proposal with certain reservations. But „the Royal Hungarian premier declared that he could not accept these reservations and must ask, in consideration of his responsibility as Hungarian Premier, the Conference to vote unanimously for his point of view“. The following was thereupon placed before the Council and voted unanimously. 1: that there would be no annexations; 2: that this decision was to be communicated to the foreign powers.¹⁰⁷ The result was duly reported to Berlin by the German Ambassador¹⁰⁸ and if it was not passed on to the other Powers it was certainly not the fault of Count Tisza. On July 22, he again declared in the Hungarian Lower House that „the position of affairs was not such as to justify the conclusion that a serious turn for the worse was either certain or even probable“.¹⁰⁹

There is also Count Tisza's letter to Count Berchtold in which he informed the dual Minister for Foreign Affairs that he intended to instruct the Press with the object of letting it be known that peaceful solution was still possible.¹¹⁰

The declaration made by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Lower House on July 24, and his surprise when he heard on July 25, that the Austrian-Hungarian Minister had been recalled from Belgrade are further proofs that he did not change his original point of view. Baron Giesl telephoned to him from the railway station at Zimony (Zemun in Yugoslavia) and told him that he had left the Serbian capital. Count Tisza replied:

¹⁰⁶ Published *ibid.* Page 484.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, page 484.

¹⁰⁸ Vienna, July 20, 1914. *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, Vol. I. Berlin, 1927., page 109.

¹⁰⁹ Budapest, July 23, 1914. Report of the British Consul General, Vienna, July 23, 1914. Report of the British Ambassador (*Gooch-Temperley*, op. cit. Vol. XI. London, pages 68, 69, 109, 110.).

¹¹⁰ *Bittner-Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna, 1930. Page 592.

— „*Mußte es denn sein?*“¹¹¹ It is therefore quite clear that he was expecting an agreement and not a rupture.

Since his last speech was delivered in the Hungarian Parliament on October 22, 1918, many statements referring to his opinion of the declaration of war against Serbia have been published. It would be useless for us to enumerate them. On October 31, 1918, Count Tisza was assassinated by men who accused him to his face of responsibility for the World War and that in consequence he must die.

Proof can also be obtained from the documents referring to the reasons why Count Tisza did not retire after he had assented to the Ultimatum.

On the day of his alleged „conversion“ General Conrad wrote to Count Berchtold and told him that Count Tisza was still anxious in regard to Transylvania.¹¹² This is an important document because clearly shows that he opposed the war with Serbia as he was convinced it would be followed by aggression on the part of Russia. He openly expressed the same anxiety at the meeting of the Dual Cabinet Council which was held on July 19, 1914.

He was fully justified in his point of view by the attitude of the Russian Government, when on July 24, 1914 Sasonov proposed and the Russian Cabinet accepted the plan of armed intervention. Serbia appealed to him and he sent for the Rumanian Minister, Diamandi who accompanied him to Transylvania which was then offered to the Rumanian Prime Minister, Bratianu. Diamandi himself reveals the fact that he was sent for by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs saying that „*en 1914 la Russie avait besoin de mon pays*“.¹¹⁴

These documents reveal the fact that the importance of Rumania was foreseen and appreciated by Count Tisza alone. He knew that Russia could not invade Austria-Hungary without including Rumania. He was under the impression that arrangements to this effect had been concluded during the private visit to Transylvania; consequently he opposed war with Serbia to the utmost and only gave his consent to it after Germany had undertaken the heavy obligation of guaranteeing the safety of Hungary against Russian aggression. He was convinced that the plan of attack had already been prepared by way of Rumania, therefore he desided to prevent Russia being given an excuse to march against Austria-Hungary by refusing to agree to the punishment of Serbia. He only agreed when Russia

¹¹¹ *Baron Giesl* op. cit. Page 271.

¹¹² Correspondence of Count Tisza, Budapest, 1924, also German and French translations Berlin, 1928 and Paris, 1931.

¹¹³ *General Conrad* op. cit. Vol. IV. Leipzig, 1923. Page 80.

¹¹⁴ *Revue des deux mondes*. Vol. XLIX. Paris, 1929. Page 794.

according to the interpretation of Sasonov, was entitled to intervention.

Although Bratianu had formerly acted in conjunction with Russia, he declined to join forces with the Russian when events had reached this stage. He was not at all convinced of the superiority of Russia and he was afraid that France would be defeated by Germany. He thereupon turned his attention to the British Empire, believing that if it entered the war, victory would be assured. The Crown Princess of Rumania went to Transylvania on July 21, 1914, in order to visit the Rumanian Minister at Berlin who was taking his holidays at Brassó. Beldiman's information was not satisfactory.

In the meantime Take Junescu who was in close touch with the Russian Legation at Bucarest — *even his remittances were published by Marghiloman* — went to London. On July 21, he visited Sir Edward Grey who told him that: — „I want nothing but peace, and I work for nothing but peace“.¹¹⁵ He realised that the Russian initiative might be stopped by the peaceful attitude of the British Government, but he found an able assistant in the person of Henry Wickham Steed, who started propaganda in the Russian interest.¹¹⁶

Bratianu suspended his activities until the decision was arrived and August 3, 1914, the Rumanian Crown Council decided that Rumania would remain neutral. On August 4, 1914, England entered the War and Russia was left to march without her Rumanian allies.

For the third time in its glorious history, the Kingdom of Hungary was faced with great danger. In 1241, it had submitted to the Mongolian invasion, in 1526 to that of the Turks and it was shadow of the fate that might be awaiting his country that Count Tisza who from the very beginning had realised the danger, did not retire. He waited for the great forces of Russia to operate in the same manner as did the President of the French Republic and the King of the Belgians.

¹¹⁵ *Take Junescu*: „Some personal Impressions“. London, 1919. Page 103.

¹¹⁶ Particulars given by *H. W. Steed*: *Through thirty years, 1892—1922*. Vol. II. London, 1924.

APPENDIX I.

Chronological Tables.

I.

- 13 January 1901. Meeting at Nish of King Alexander of Serbia and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria.
 February 1901. Russophil Government in Bulgaria (Karavelov-Danev).
 April 1901. Russophil Government in Serbia (Vuich).
 12 July, 1901. Grand Duke Alexander Michailovich at Varna in Bulgaria, 15 July at Constanza in Rumania. The Russian fleet received by Danev and Jonel Bratiansu.
 4 October, 1901. Meeting at Belgrade of King Alexander of Serbia and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Negotiations between Vuich and Danev.
 January 1902. Danev Bulgarian Prime Minister. Proclamation of Peter Karageorgevich at Geneva, presenting himself as pretendent to the Serbian throne.
 17 April, 1902. Treaty of Bucarest. Treaty of alliance between Austria-Hungary and Rumania renewed.
 May 1902. Treaty of Alliance between Russia and Bulgaria.
 June 1902. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria at St. Petersburg.
 October 1902. Fall of Vuich and of the Russophil Government in Serbia.
 May 1903. Fall of Danev and of the Russophil Government in Bulgaria.
 11 June 1903. Assassination of King Alexander of Serbia. Peter Karageorgevich proclaimed King of Serbia. Beginning of the Russophil Government.
 11 February 1904. Milan Pashich Serbian Foreign Minister.
 30 April 1904. Treaty of alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria.
 14 May 1904. Meeting of King Peter of Serbia and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria at Nish, on 18 June 1904, at Belgrade, on 30 October 1904 at Sofia, on 29 December 1904 at Belgrade.
 2 December 1904. Pashich Serbian Prime Minister.
 July 1905. Serb-Bulgarian Customs Union.
 3 October 1905. Resolution of Fiume.
 6 July 1906. Customs war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
 12 November 1906. First French loan granted to Serbia.

II.

- 18 December 1907. Circular of Sir Edward Grey.
 28 January 1908. Plan of the Sandzhak Railway announced by Common Foreign Minister Baron Aerenthal.
 24 March 1908. Mürrsteg Program denounced by the Russian Government.

- 9-10 June 1908. Meeting at Reval between King Edward VII. and Tsar Nicholas II.
 15 September 1908. Annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina offered by the Russian Foreign Minister Iswolsky at Buchlau to Austria-Hungary.
 29 September 1908. Relative letters to the Powers signed by the King-Emperor.
 3 October 1908. The letter handed at Paris by mistake at 1.00 p. m.
 3 October 1908. Hungarian Cabinet Council held in the night leaves the responsibility with the Common Foreign Minister.
 5 October 1908. Annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina proclaimed by the King-Emperor. Independence of Bulgaria proclaimed.
 6 October 1908. Mobilisation in Serbia.
 7 October 1908. Protest of the Serbian Government.
 12 October 1908. Serbian War Credit voted.
 30 October 1908. Serbian Crown Prince and Pashich at Petersburg.
 2 January 1909. Warlike speech held by the Serbian Foreign Minister Milovanovich.
 31 March 1909. Declaration of the Serbian Government promising good neighbourhood to Austria-Hungary.
 24 October 1909. Agreement between Russia and Italy signed at Racconigi.
 28 September 1909. Hartwig appointed Russian Minister at Belgrade.
 March 1910. King Peter of Serbia at Petersburg.

III.

- February 1911. King Peter of Serbia at Rome.
 March 1911 to July 1913. Spalaikovich Serbian Minister at Sofia.
 September 1911. King Peter at Petersburg.
 29 September 1911. Italy declares war to Turkey.
 30 September 1911. First negotiation between the Serbian and Bulgarian Governments. Southern Hungary claimed by Serbia, Transylvania promised to Rumania.
 October 1912 to March 1913. Serb-Bulgarian negotiations conducted at Sofia by mediation of the Serbian Minister Spalaikovich.
 November 1911. King Peter of Serbia at Paris.
 13 March 1912. Serb-Bulgarian treaty of alliance signed at Sofia. Foundation of the *First Balkan League*.
 May 1912. Danev at Livadia.
 June 1912. Pashich at Petersburg.
 1 September 1912. Pashich Serbian Prime Minister.
 21 September 1912. Danev at Nish.
 17 October 1912. War declared by the *Balkan League* to Turkey.
 December 1912. The Albanian State constituted and recognised by the London Reunion. Evacuation of Albania by the Serbian troops. Controversy between Serbia and Bulgaria. Serbia demands, Bulgaria opposes revision of the original treaty of the Balkan Alliance.
 10 December 1912. Grand Duke Michail at Bucarest.
 January to June 1913. Negotiations conducted between Serbia and Greece at Salonika, in the interest of a Serbo-Greek treaty of alliance against Bulgaria. Beginning of the *Second Balkan League*. Russian efforts made for the accession of Rumania.
 9 May 1913. Protocol of the Petersburg Conference. Silistria allotted to Rumania. Rumania joins the *Second Balkan League* and replaces Bulgaria.
 25 May 1913. Revision of the Serb-Bulgarian treaty officially demanded by Serbian Government.
 1 June 1913. Serb-Bulgarian treaty of alliance signed at Salonika.

- 6 June 1913. Count Stephen Tisza Hungarian Prime Minister.
 13 June 1913. Danev Bulgarian Prime Minister.
 19 June 1913. Speech held by Count Tisza demanding independence of the Balkanic nations.
 28 June 1913. Serbian troops attacked by order the Bulgarian army command.
 2 July 1913. The decision of 28 June revoked by Bulgaria.
 4 July 1913. Rumanian mobilisation.
 6 July 1913. Spalaikovich revoked from Sofia. Rupture between Serbia and Bulgaria.
 10 July 1913. Rumania declares war to Bulgaria, 14 July 1913. Turkey begins military operations against Bulgaria.
 16 July 1913. Danev replaced by Malinov, and on 17 Malinov by Radoslavov. Bulgaria appeals to Austria-Hungary.
 10 August 1913. Treaty of Bucarest. Treaty of Peace signed between the Bulgaria and her enemies (Turkey and the *Second Balkan League* composed by Serbia, Rumania and Greece).
 3 and 13 October 1913. Prime Minister Count Tisza opposes to the plan relative to Annexation of Serbia by Austria-Hungary.
 November 1913 to 1917. Spalaikovich Serbian Minister at Petersburg.

IV.

- January 1914. Invasion of Austria-Hungary decided in Serbia. — Jonel Bratianu Rumanian Prime Minister.
 30 January to 6 February 1914. Rumanian, Serb, Bulgarian and Greek delegations at Petersburg. — The Serbian Crown Prince at Petersburg, the Greek Crown Prince at Belgrade and Bucarest. — 2 February 1914. Pashich received by Tsar Nicholas II. Veniselos arrived at Petersburg. — 3 February 1914. Veniselos received by Tsar Nicholas II. — Conference held at Petersburg by Foreign Minister Sasonov, Pashich and Veniselos, the Rumanian and Bulgarian Ministers.
 5 February 1914. Count Bobrinsky at Máramarossziget.
 9—10 February 1914. Conference held at Bucarest by Bratianu, Pashich and Veniselos, and the Russian Minister.
 12 February 1914. Conference held at Belgrade by Pashich, Veniselos, the Russian Minister.
 17 February 1914. Rupture of the negotiations conducted between the Hungarian Government and the Rumanian National Party. — Attentat of Debreczen.
 3 March 1914. Verdict of Máramarossziget.
 March 1914. The Rumanian Crown Prince at Petersburg.
 13—14 June 1914. Tsar Nicholas II. at Constanza.
 15 June 1914. Secret trip of Sasonov and Bratianu to Transylvania. Transylvania offered to Rumania.
 24 June 1914. Prince Alexander Regent of Serbia.
 28 June 1914. Attentat of Sarajevo.

V.

- 1 July 1914. Count Tisza against the proposal of Count Berchtold and General Conrad.
 2 July 1914. Berchtold and Conrad decide to appeal through King-Emperor Francis Joseph to the German Emperor William II.
 4 July 1914. Letter of Francis Joseph despatched to Berlin.
 5 July 1914. The letter of Francis Joseph at Berlin. Handed to the German Emperor before Count Tisza's amendments reached Vienna.

- 6 July 1914. Count Berchtold receives information from Berlin that the letter of Francis Joseph received a favourable answer. — Meeting of Count Tisza and the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl, at Budapest. Count Tisza protests against warlike policy. Letter addressed by Count Berchtold to Count Tisza.
 7 July 1914. Common Cabinet Council held at Vienna. Count Tisza protests against warlike policy.
 8 July 1914. Second Memorandum of Count Tisza to the King-Emperor. Protests against warlike policy.
 9 July 1914. Hungarian Cabinet Council held at Budapest. Count Tisza's attitude approved.
 10 July 1914. Belgrade: Russian Minister Hartwig informed by Baron Giesl according to his informations received from Count Tisza.
 14 July 1914. Count Tisza surrenders under the two conditions, that 1) territorial status of the Serbian Kingdom will be guaranteed, 2) Russian aggression will be averted by the German Empire.
 19 July 1914. Common Cabinet Council held at Vienna. Count Tisza demands maintaining the territorial statusquo of the Serbian Kingdom. It was after a reluctance, but unanimously voted by the Ministers.
 23 July 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum handed over to the Serbian Government by Baron Giesl.
 24 July 1914. Russian mobilisation decided *in principio* by the Russian Cabinet Council. Serbia appeals for help to Russia. Rumania invited to join.
 25 July 1914. Rupture of the diplomatic relations with Serbia. Indignation expressed by Count Tisza.

APPENDIX II.

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APPENDIX III.

Documents.

I.

The Russian Aggression. 1911—1914.

The Armed Alliance.

- Formation of the First *Balkan League* (1911—1912) as an armed alliance against both Turkey and Austria-Hungary:
 Belgrade, 11 October 1911. The Serbian Prime Minister Milovanovich to the Bulgarian Prime Minister Gueshov: „Si, en même temps que la liquidation de la Turquie, la désagrégation de l'Autriche-Hongrie pouvait survenir, la solution serait grandement simplifiée: la Serbie obtiendrait la Bosnie et l'Hercegovine, comme la Roumanie obtiendrait la Transylvanie, et nous n'aurions pas à redouter une intervention de la Roumanie dans notre guerre avec la Turquie" (I. E. Geshov: L'Alliance balkanique. Paris 1915. Pag. 27.). — Note of the Editor: Rumania had a treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary regularly renewed since 1883.
 Negotiations of the Hungarian Government with the Rumanian National Party in Hungary appreciated by the King of Rumania: „Der König zollt den Grafen Khuen und Tisza Anerkennung, betont, dass es selbstverständlich sei, dass die ungarländischen Rumänen und ihrer Religion an der Idee des ungarischen Staates festhalten" (Bittner-Pribram-Uebersberger: Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, 1908—1914. Vol. III. Vienna 1930. Pag. 221.).
 Vienna, 6 December 1911. Common Cabinet Council. The Hungarian Prime Minister Count Khuen-Héderváry declares: „... Der königlich ungarische Ministerpräsident dankt dem Vorsitzenden (Aussenminister) für dessen Auseinandersetzung, die einen vollen Einblick in die äussere Situation gegeben (hat). Für ihn sei von besonderer Wichtigkeit die Erhaltung des Friedens und die Tatsache der Aufrechterhaltung der bisherigen Basis unserer Politik, das ist des Dreibundes, was er als Chef der ungarischen Regierung nur billigen könne. Ein zweites erfreuliches Moment sei eine gewisse Fühlungnahme mit Russland in der orientalischen Politik" (Ibid. Pag. 646.).
 Sofia, 13 March 1912. Treaty of alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria signed: Article III: „Dans le cas où l'Autriche-Hongrie attaquerait la Serbie, la Bulgarie s'engage à déclarer immédiatement la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie et à envoyer ses troupes, fortes de 200,000 hommes, sur le

territoire serbe et à mener les opérations contre l'Autriche-Hongrie offensivement et défensivement en commun avec l'armée serbe. Ces obligations de la Bulgarie en faveur de la Serbie restent opérantes aussi pour le cas où l'Autriche-Hongrie après entente ou sans entente avec la Turquie, sous un prétexte quelconque, ferait pénétrer ses troupes dans le Sandschak de Novi-Bazar et forcerait par là la Serbie soit à déclarer la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie, soit à envoyer ses armées dans le Sandschak pour y défendre ses intérêts en quoi faisant la Serbie provoquerait un conflit avec l'Autriche-Hongrie". (*M. Boghichevich: Les causes de la guerre. Paris 1924. Pag. 195. Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 1903—1914. Vol. I. Berlin 1928. Pages 206—13.*)

The alliance was placed under the protectorate of the Russian Government. — The French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré at Petrograd, August 1912: „Traité serbo-bulgare. — Je demande à M. Sazonoff des éclaircissements sur les conventions serbo-bulgare et gréco-bulgare. Je ne lui cache pas que je ne m'explique pas bien pourquoi ces actes n'ont pas été communiqués à la France par la Russie. M. Iswolsky m'a dit ne pas les connaître, mais il m'a donné l'assurance qu'ils avaient pour objet le statu quo. Or, il paraît invraisemblable qu'on ait mis tant de temps à rédiger des conventions destinées simplement à garantir le statu quo. Il est probable que la partie la plus importante de ces accords contient, en réalité, un partage éventuel. M. Sazonoff en convient. Il ne connaît pas encore, me dit-il, le texte de la convention gréco-bulgare, qui, du reste, ne détermine pas, quant à elle, une ligne frontière; mais il me communiquera le texte de la convention serbo-bulgare et la carte annexée. — Revu M. Sazonoff. Il a en main le texte de la convention serbo-bulgare, en russe. Il me le lit en le traduisant. Il n'y est parlé du statu quo pour prévoir le cas où il serait troublé. En Bulgarie et la Serbie s'engagent réciproquement à tâcher de concerter leur mobilisation. Si l'une croit devoir mobiliser, elle prévient l'autre; si l'autre refuse de l'imiter, on a recouru à l'arbitrage de la Russie. L'arbitrage de la Russie apparait, d'ailleurs, à chaque ligne de la convention. Le traité contient donc, en germe, non seulement une guerre contre la Turquie, mais une guerre contre l'Autriche. Il établit, en outre, l'hégémonie de la Russie sur les deux royaumes slaves, puisque la Russie est prise comme arbitraire dans toutes les questions. Je fais remarquer à M. Sazonoff, que cette convention est, à vrai dire, une convention de guerre. Il reconnaît que le ministre de Russie à Sofia, en transmettant cette convention à Pétersbourg, l'a lui-même qualifié de convention de guerre" (*R. Poincaré: Au service de la France. Vol. II. Paris 1926. Pag. 38.*). — Comments of Seton-Watson: „The Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was reached very largely under the influence of Russia and especially its minister at Belgrade, Mr. Hartwig. It is important to note that Serbia made a condition of her adhesion the promise of Bulgarian military support on her Northern frontier in the event of Austria-Hungary's intervention, obviously in the calculation that then Russia would also become involved and make Serbian resistance possible" (*R. W. Seton-Watson: Sarajevo. London 1926. Pag. 39.*). — Comment of the official Serbian historiography: „Den erhaltenen Instruktionen entsprechend hatte Gesandter Hartwig zunächst alle seine Kräfte eingesetzt, um den von Iswolsky angestrebten grossen Balkanbund zustande zu bringen. (Er) übernahm die Leitung der Verhandlungen und so wurde Belgrad das Zentrum des neuen christlichen Balkanbundes. Sowohl Paschitsch als insbesondere Dr. Milowanowitsch, der mit Hartwig täglich zusammenkam, liehen dem russischen Gesandten alle Unterstützung." (*D. A. Lontscharewitsch: Jugoslawiens Entstehung. Vienna 1929. Pagg. 440—41.*). — Another Serbian comment: „Da bei Hartwig die fixe Idee bestand, dass Russland eines Tages mit Oesterreich-Ungarn werde zusammenprallen müssen, begann er als Gesandter in Belgrad vom ersten Tage an, eine Politik auf eigene Faust zu führen. Entweder musste Hartwig sich vollkommen dem serbischen Aussenministerium oder das Ministerium musste

sich ihm unterordnen. Wer die selbstbewusste und ehrgeizige Natur Hartwigs kennt, dem wird die erste Möglichkeit gar nicht in den Sinn kommen. Es blieb also die zweite Möglichkeit, dass Hartwig das serbische Aussenministerium in seine Hand nahm, und das tat er auch sehr bald, ohne sich im geringsten um die Proteste der europäischen öffentlichen Meinung zu kümmern." (*Article of Marco, a pseudonym for the Serbian Colonel Simich, in the review Nova Europa, No. of 26 April 1928. German translation published in the Kriegsschuldfrage. Vol. VI. Berlin 1928. Pagg. 745 and seq.*)

Before the victory of the Balkan League over the Turks, on 5 October 1912, an ultimatum was handed to the Austro-Hungarian Common Foreign Minister Count Berchtold protesting against „aucune modification au statu quo territorial dans la Turquie d'Europe". — After the Balkan League reported a definite victory over the Turks, on 9 November 1912, the British Prime Minister Asquith warned Austria-Hungary not to deprive the Balkan Allies, the Allies of Russia, of the territories occupied by them. — Both ultimatums were accepted by the Vienna Government.

Turning the scale against Austria-Hungary. — Petersburg, 9 November 1912. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov to the Russian Ambassador at London: „Die Verluste Bulgariens und Serbiens während des Krieges gefährden im voraus den Erfolg bei einem Zusammenstoss mit Oesterreich" (*M. Boghichevich op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin 1929. Pag. 300.*). — Belgrade, 12 November 1912. Report of the German Minister Baron Griesinger: „Der rumänische Gesandte (Filality) hat dem österreichischen Gesandten und mir von einer Unterredung mit Herrn von Hartwig erzählt. Russland beabsichtige, aus Serbien eine slawische Vormacht zu schaffen, welcher Bosnien, Herzegowina und die südlichen Teile Ungarns einverleiben werden müssten. Rumänien handle gegen seine Interessen, wenn es treu zu Oesterreich-Ungarn halte. Denn es brauche gegebenenfalls nur zuzugreifen und sich Siebenbürgen zu nehmen" (*Ibid. Pagg. 304—05.*). — Petersburg, 18 November 1912. Letter of the French Ambassador George Louis: „Mon collègue de l'Autriche m'a raconté qu'il y a quelques jours le Ministre de Russie à Belgrade, M. de Hartwig, avait dit à un de ses collègues: „L'affaire de la Turquie est faite. Maintenant c'est la tour de l'Autriche" (*E. Judet: Georges Louis. Paris 1925. Pagg. 200—01.*). — Bucarest, 19 November 1912. Report of the German Minister von Waldthausen: „Herr Majorescu hat sich zu mir bei dem heutigen Diplomateneingang sehr entschieden gegen den russischen Gesandten in Belgrad, Herrn von Hartwig, geäußert, der dort eine lose Sprache führe und die Serben in ihren Präntensionen bestärke. Der Konseilpräsident findet, dass die russische Regierung einen eine solche Sprache führenden Gesandten bei der gegenwärtigen ernsten Lage nicht in Belgrad belassen dürfte" (*Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIII. Berlin 1927. Pag. 396.*). — Belgrade, 12 November 1912. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Minister: „Streng vertraulich. Mein rumänischer Kollege teilt mir mit, dass Herr von Hartwig kürzlich ihm gegenüber ganz offen eingestanden hat, Russland werde die Serben bestimmt nicht im Stiche lassen. Jetzt wird die Türkei aufgeteilt, bald wird dasselbe Los Oesterreich-Ungarn treffen. Rumänien täte gut, sich auf diese Eventualität gefasst zu machen. Er sprach von einem mächtigen serbischen Reiche, das auch Montenegro, Bosnien und Süd-Ungarn umfassen würde. Rumänien könnte seinen Teil in Siebenbürgen nehmen. Mein russischer Kollege scheint aus der bisher noch teilweise beobachteten Reserve herausgetreten zu sein und betreibt lebhaft die Agitation gegen uns" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. IV. Vienna 1930. Pag. 851.*). — Sofia, 24 January 1913. Report of the Serbian minister Spalajkovich: „Da Serbien die Hilfe Bulgariens brauchen werde, wenn es um Bosnien und die Herzegowina mit Oesterreich Krieg führen wird, so sollte Serbien an Bulgarien jene Gebiete abtreten, die ihm (Serbien) nicht vertragsmässig zugeteilt sind" (*M. Boghitschewitsch op. cit. Vol. I Berlin 1928. Pag. 290.*). — Petersburg, 1 February 1913.

Report of the Serbian minister Popovich: „(Sasonow sagte:) Das dürft ihr nicht tun, denn ihr habt die Frage der Abgrenzung Albanien in die Hände der Grossmächte gelegt,“ worauf ich erwiderte: „Alles muss eine Grenze haben.“ Darauf sagte er: „Dann werdet ihr ganz allein mit Oesterreich-Ungarn Krieg führen müssen“ (Ibid. Pag. 294.). — Petersburg, 13 February 1913. The same: „(Sasonow said:) Besser sich mit den gegenwärtigen grossen Errungenschaften zufriedenzugeben, das neue Serbien zu organisieren, um dann später, wenn die Zeit gekommen sein wird, das österreichisch-ungarische Geschwür aufzuschneiden, welches heute dazu noch nicht so reif ist wie das türkische. Eine Nation, die so hervorragende Eigenschaften gezeigt hat wie die serbische, muss siegen.“ „Dies sind Sasonows eigene Worte.“ (Ibid. Pag. 299.). — Petersburg, 6 May 1913. Russian Foreign Minister Sasonow to Russian Minister Hartwig at Belgrade: „Serbien hat erst das erste Stadium seines historischen Weges durchlaufen, und zur Erreichung seines Zieles muss es noch einen furchtbaren Kampf aushalten, bei dem seine ganze Existenz in Frage gestellt werden kann. Serbiens verheissenes Land liegt im Gebiete des heutigen Oesterreich-Ungarns und nicht dort, wohin es jetzt strebt, und wo auf seinem Wege die Bulgaren stehen“ (Ibid. Vol. II. Berlin 1929. Pag. 409.). — Petersburg, 12 May 1913. Report of the Serbian minister Popovich: „Wiederum sagte mir Sasonow, dass wir für zukünftige Zeiten arbeiten müssen, da wir viel Land von Oesterreich-Ungarn bekommen werden“ (Ibid. Vol. I. Berlin 1928. Pag. 331.).

The first *Balkan League* was broken up owing to the circumstance that Serbia and Greece were obliged to evacuate Albania and that they allied against Bulgaria, by demanding a revision of the original treaty of alliance. Bulgaria was abandoned by the Russian Government to which Serbia was more important — with regard to the war planned against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Since January 1913 a new *Balkan League* was formed by uniting Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, for which the Russian Government was eager to assure the co-operation of Rumania. This was accordingly invited and won by the Petersburg Protocol of 31 March 1913, by which Silistria, part of Bulgaria was given to it.

Russian agitation in Rumania.

Russian agitation in Rumania was started by the association *Liga Culturale*, directed by Professor Nicolae Jorga. It was an irredentist association supported by Russian money, by which new agitators were gained against the neighbour monarchy. Diary of Alexander Marghiloman: Saturday, 24 November 1912. „Goga (Octavian Goga, a Rumanian émigré from Transylvania — Note of the Editor) veut memorandum, intervention de Bucarest pour que l'empereur accepte, congrès national; il n'a pas peur de la violence et il ne dédaigne pas le rouble russe! Grosse alarme: déjeuner chez Bratianu, conférence chez Take. Filipescu ayant eu vent les a convoqué chez lui et devant Goga a parlé qu'il fallait s'unir à la Russie et faire l'irredentisme contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. Mihaly (member of the Rumanian National Party of Hungary — Note of the Editor) abassourdi a refusé de prendre part à toute discussion. Il s'est exprimé très clairement là-dessus“ (A. Marghiloman: Note politique, 1897—1924. Vol. I. Bucarest 1927. Pag. 130.).

The first Russian offer. — Bucarest, December 1912. Visit of the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas Michailovich. 19 December 1912. Report of the German minister von Waldthausen: „Nach Abreise des Grossfürsten hat russischer Gesandter Majorescu direct gefragt, ob Rumänien sich im Falle eines Krieges zwischen Russland und Oesterreich neutral verhalten würde, worauf Ministerpräsident ausweichend antwortete, indem er Krieg zwischen beiden Ländern als ausgeschlossen hinstellte“ (Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXX. Berlin 1925. Pag. 585.).

Take Jonescu won over by the Russians. — Bucarest, 21 December

1912. Report of the Serbian minister Ristic: „Ein Vertrauensmann von Take Jonescu stellte uns den Beitritt Rumäniens zum Balkanbund für die nahe Zukunft in Aussicht“ (M. Boghitschewitsch op. cit. Vol. I. Berlin 1928. Pag. 273.). Remark made by the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pashich to the above report: „Herr Ristic ist zu schreiben, dass unserer Ansicht nach Rumänien (würde) einen unermesslichen Fehler ergehen, wenn es mit Gewalt oder mit Drohungen irgendwelche territoriale Abtretungen von Bulgarien erzwingen würde, denn damit würde Rumänien seine späteren Aussichten auf viel bedeutenderen nationalen Gewinn verlieren“ (Ibid. Pag. 273.). — Bucarest, 27 December 1912. Report of the same. Take Jonescu said to him: „Wir werden mit euch gehen. Wir werden uns besuchen, uns kennenlernen und den Zeitpunkt abwarten, in welchem zur weiteren Verwirklichung unserer nationalen Ideale, welche sich sowohl für uns wie für euch auf derselben Seite befinden, gearbeitet werden soll“ (Ibid. Pag. 279.).

Rumania joins the second *Balkan League*. — Bucarest, 14 March 1913. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Minister: „Bei einer meiner letzten Unterredungen mit Herrn Maiorescu kam dieser spontan auf die serbischen Anbieterungsversuchen zu sprechen und teilte mir gleichzeitig mit, dass sich der serbische Gesandte ihm gegenüber beim letzten Diplomatenempfang in sehr durchsichtigen Andeutungen über die Möglichkeit eines intimen Anschlusses Serbiens an Rumänien ergangen hätte“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. V. Vienna 1930. Pag. 953.). — Athens, 1 March 1913. Report of the German Minister von Quadt: „Einer meiner rumänischen Bekannten, welcher kürzlich aus Bukarest hier eingetroffen ist, erzählte mir, es sei sehr auffallend, in welcher Weise die Russen in letzter Zeit mit allen Mitteln daran arbeiteten, um Rumänien vom Dreibund zu trennen. Die russische Propaganda dehne sich bis in die untersten Schichten der Bevölkerung aus“ (Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin 1926. Pag. 431.).

The mediator Spalaikovich. — Belgrade, 12 April 1913. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Ugron informing Common Foreign Minister Count Berchtold on the agitation of Miroslav Spalaikovich (then Serbian minister at Sofia) in the interest of a Serbian-Rumanian alliance. An article inspired by Spalaikovich ran: „Ausserhalb der Grenzen Rumäniens 2—3 Millionen Rumänen leben, das Land also wichtige nationale Aufgaben zu lösen hat; und ebensolche Aufgaben bestehen für Serbien selbst nach Niederwerfung der Türkei noch weiter“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VI. Vienna 1930. Pag. 118.). — Bucarest, 2 December 1913. Report of the French Chargé d'Affaires, on a declaration made by the Serbian delegate Spalaikovich at the Bucarest Peace Conference in August 1913: „La Bulgarie consisterait à s'associer étroitement à la Serbie et à la Roumanie pour aider ces deux puissances à réaliser leurs aspirations nationales aux dépens de l'Autriche-Hongrie. M. Spalaikovich exposait tout haute cette politique à la Conférence de Bucarest“ (Documents Diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. III. Paris 1923. Pag. 95.).

Effect of the Russian agitation. — Petersburg, 3 May 1913. Report of the German Ambassador Count Pourtalès: „Der rumänische Gesandte Herr Nano hat sich einem hiesigen Diplomaten gegenüber vertraulich dahin geäussert, dass gegenwärtig Rumänien von Russland sehr der Hof gemacht werde. Er habe die Empfindung, dass man sich hier bemühe, Rumänien davon zu überzeugen, dass es seinem Interesse entsprechen würde, sich von Oesterreich-Ungarn abzuwenden und Anlehnung an Russland zu finden“ (Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin 1926. Pag. 435.). — Bucarest, 6 July 1913. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Minister Prince Fürstenberg on the demonstrations directed against Austria-Hungary connected with an alleged Rumanian mobilisation against Austria-Hungary (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VI. Vienna 1930. Pag. 828.). — Vienna, 11 July 1913. Protest of Common

Foreign Minister Count Berchtold against concentration of Rumanian troops on the Hungarian frontier (Ibid. Pag. 869.). — Petersburg, 28 July 1913. Report of the French Ambassador Theophile Delcassé: „Le peuple roumain a maintenant les yeux fixés sur la *Transylvanie*“ (Documents Diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. II. Paris 1923. Pag. 277.). — Bucarest, 3 August 1913. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Minister Prince Fürstenberg relative to warning of the Serbian delegate Spalaikovich who protested against the intention of the Rumanian Government to return the benevolent neutrality of Austria-Hungary by a better relation with the Dual Monarchy (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 36—37.). — Paris, 9 September 1913. Take Jonescu to the French President Raymond Poincaré: „On New Year's Day you asked me a question which I could not answer: I will give you your answer to-day. If war breaks out you will not find the Rumanian army in your enemies camp“ (Take Jonescu: Some personal impressions. London 1919. Pagg. 5—6.). — 8 September 1913. Third loan acquired by the Serbian, with help of the Russian Government, amounting to 250,000,000 gold francs and completing the Serbian loans placed at Paris to a sum of 495,000,000 gold francs.

The bishopric of Hajdudorog.

In 1913 a pamphlet was published in French at Bucarest, written by Professor Nicolae Jorga, Secretary General of the *Liga Culturala*, announcing that in a short time a revolution will break out among the Rumanian peasants of Hungary provoked by the injustice caused by subjecting Rumanians to jurisdiction of a Magyar bishop. The newly erected bishopric was created at the demand of and for 150,000 Magyars of the United Greek Church until that time subject to Rumanian and Russian (Ruthenian) jurisdiction and governed in their own state by foreign ecclesiastical authorities. According to the Statistical Abstracts the newly created Bishopric of the Magyars belonging to the United Greek Church comprised 183,833 souls, among them 146,476 Magyars, and its Transylvanian vicariate 19,495 souls, among them 16,845 Magyars. When asked by a Rumanian member of parliament, Prime Minister Count Stephen Tisza declared on 6 December 1913: „Nach der extremen Behauptung der Herren gibt es im Hajdudoroger Bistum 20 bis 24 Gemeinden nicht-ungarischer Zunge. In den Diözesen rumänischer Zunge aber gibt es viele tausend Gläubiger ungarischer Zunge. Wenn es die Herren so schmerzlich empfinden, dass Gläubiger rumänischer Zunge zu einer ungarischen Diözese gehören, dann wollen sie auch die andere Seite der Medaille aus demselben Gesichtspunkte betrachten und dann müssen wir mit gemeinsamem Willen trachten, dass das Schicksal, das Ungarntum derjenigen griechisch-katholischen Gläubiger ungarischer Zunge, gesichert werde, die einer rumänischen Diözese angehören, dass wir entsprechende Garantien gegen jede weitere Rumanisierung erhalten.“ — According to the Rumanian Disescu (a Rumanian of Bucarest and not of Hungary) cause of the rupture of the negotiations conducted between the Hungarian Government and the Rumanian National Party of Hungary since 1911, was the creation of a Hungarian Uniate Church. His article was published on 3 May 1914 in the *Paris Temps*, which paper already remarked on 25 February 1914: „cet eveché catholique grec de rite hongrois avait été institué pour empêcher les Roumains sujets magyars appartenant à la religion grecque unie de fréquenter les églises roumaines. Et cette création avait videment ulcéré les Roumains.“ — According to Count Kuno Klebelsberg, then Secretary of State, the rupture was due to intervention on behalf of Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, and thus both Magyars and Rumanians were absolved from a direct responsibility for the rupture of negotiations.

Project of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

Intention of the future King-Emperor was to replace the Dual Monarchy by a centralised Austrian Empire, by incorporating the Hungarian into the Austrian State, by including Serbia by way of a Customs Union, and Rumania by Transylvania to King Carol who was to continue as a king under the Austrian Emperor Francis II.

Protest of the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Stephen Tisza against incorporation of the Serbian State. — Vienna, 3 October 1913. Common Cabinet Council: „Der königlich ungarische Ministerpräsident nimmt ganz entschieden Stellung gegen eine staatsrechtliche Angliederung Serbiens an die Monarchie, weil die Sache praktisch unmöglich sei und sich ganz Europa auf die Seite Serbiens stellen werde. Die Sache wäre aber auch von Nachteil für die Monarchie, Serbien sei ein unangenehmer Nachbar, damit müsse man sich eher abfinden, aber man brauche es nicht gleich verschlucken.“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 397—403., General Conrad: Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906—18. Vol. III. Vienna 1922. Pagg. 460., 724—46.). — Vienna, 13 October 1913. Common Cabinet Council. Count Tisza declared: „Käme es zur Mobilisierung und würde daraufhin Serbien beigegeben, so könne der Krieg immer noch vermieden werden, wenn Serbien die Kosten rückersetze, die uns dadurch erwachsen wären. Bei Graf Tisza trat stets Besorgnis darüber hervor, was nach Niederwerfung Serbiens zu geschehen hätte, er hatte nur die Demütigung, nicht aber die Aufteilung Serbiens im Auge“ (Ibid. Pagg. 464—65.).

Opposition of the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza to cession of Transylvania to, and its incorporation in the Rumanian State. In October 1913 the friend and private counsellor of Francis Ferdinand, a neighbour-landowner to the Archduke in Bohemia, was appointed Austro-Hungarian minister at Bucarest with the veiled intention to prepare the way for a union of Austria-Hungary and Rumania. He told in his memories published in 1919 as follows: „Meine Ernennung (3 October 1913) zum Gesandten in Bukarest erfolgte auf Initiative des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinands. — Wie bereits erwähnt, war das Hindernis wirklich enger Beziehungen zwischen Bukarest und Wien die grossrumänische Frage, d. h. der rumänische Wunsch nach nationaler Vereinigung mit den „Brüdern in Siebenbürgen.“ Diesem Wunsche stand selbstverständlich der ungarische Standpunkt schroff gegenüber. Es ist nun interessant und für die ganze damalige Situation bezeichnend, dass mir bald nach meinem Amtsantritt in Rumänien der später so berüchtigt gewordene Kriegshetzer Nikolai Filipescu den Vorschlag machte, Rumänien möge mit Siebenbürgen vereint werden, und dieses ganze vereinigte Gross-Rumänien möge sodann zu der Monarchie in ein Verhältnis treten, ungefähr wie Bayern zum Deutschen Reiche. Ich gestehe offen, dass ich diesen Gedanken mit beiden Händen aufgegriffen habe, denn wenn er von einer Seite lanciert wurde, welche von jeher mit Recht als die der Monarchie feindlichste angesehen wurde, so war gar kein Zweifel, dass die gemässigten Elemente Rumäniens ihn mit noch grösserer Genugtuung ergriffen hätten. Leider scheiterte dieser Gedanke schon in seinem allerersten Stadium, an dem schroffsten und schärfsten Widerstande Tizas. Kaiser Franz Joseph stellte sich vollständig auf den Standpunkt des Grafen Tisza, und es war ganz ausgeschlossen, mit Argumenten etwas zu erreichen. Ich tröstete mich über meine misslungenen Bemühungen damit, dass ich der festen Hoffnung war, dass dieser grosszügige Gedanke unter der Regierung des Erzherzogs Franz bestimmt Wirklichkeit werden würde“ (Count O. Czernin: Im Weltkrieg. Berlin 1919. Pagg. 103., 107—08.). — Count Czernin's attitude: Prime Minister Count Tisza declared in the Hungarian House of Commons on 21 November 1913: (Vom Grafen Ottokar Czernin) kann angenommen werden, dass er, wenn er eine Betrauung übernommen hat, sie auch loyal erfüllen wird, indem er sich der Politik des zuständigen verantwortlichen Leiters der äusseren Politik folgt, nicht aber seiner eigenem Poli-

tik, denn Gesandte können ja keine Politik machen. Tut er das, dann kann gegen sein Wirken in der Zukunft keine Einwendung erhoben werden. Sollte er sich aber dagegen in irgendeiner Richtung vergehen, dann wird natürlich die Zeit gekommen sein, wo der ungarische Ministerpräsident seine Pflicht kennen wird." — On 11 December 1913. Count Apponyi remarked in the Lower House: „Wenn einmal Graf Czernin beim rumänischen auswärtigen Amte auch über das Treiben der in Rumänien bestehenden und die rumänische Irredenta in Ungarn unterstützenden Vereines beschwerte, er die mit Augenzwinkern erteilte Antwort erhalten werde: „Schon gut. Wir werden freilich alles tun, aber wir verstehen uns ja. Sie vertreten doch in ihren Brochüren denselben Standpunkt wie diese Vereinigung." — Bucarest, 7 December 1913. Report of Count Ottokar Czernin: ich erklärte Bratianu „eine innere Frage dürfe niemals in den Kreis der äusseren Politik gezogen werden, worauf mir Herr Bratianu lächelnd antwortete, ich hätte in meiner letzten Herrenhausrede über diese Frage anders gesprochen." (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 625.). — Vienna, 18 December 1913. Instructions to Count Ottokar Czernin: „Was die politische Situation der Rumänen in der Monarchie und speziell in Ungarn anbelangt, auf die Euer Exzellenz vor allem die Misstimmung in Rumänien gegen uns zurückführen, möchte ich das Eine hinzufügen, dass ich die in Bukarest zutage tretende Tendenz, eine etwaige wenig freundliche und mit dem Bundesverhältnisse nicht im Einklange stehende aussenpolitische Handlung Rumäniens uns gegenüber gewissermassen anticipande mit innerpolitischen Verhältnissen der Monarchie begründen oder entschuldigen zu wollen, schon deshalb nicht als berechtigt anerkennen könne, da die Situation der Rumänen in Oesterreich-Ungarn sich seit vor Jahresfrist erfolgten Erneuerung des Bündnisses gewiss nicht ungünstiger gestaltet hat, sondern im Gegenteile, speziell in Ungarn, wie Euer Exzellenz bekannt, seither die eifrigsten Bemühungen einer Verständigung initiiert wurden und mit zielbewusster Konsequenz fortgeführt wurden" (Ibid. Pagg. 664—65.).

A charge against Count Tisza.

After the Serbo-Greek negotiations ended with formation of a Serbo-Greek alliance (negotiations January to May 1913, Serbo-Greek treaty of alliance signed on 1 June 1913), and this alliance was joined by Rumania eager to occupy the Bulgarian territory promised to her by the Petersburg protocol of 31 March 1913, Bulgaria was confronted by a triple alliance backed by the Russian Government. She determined to defend her interests with a preventive war which broke out on 28 June 1913, dissolving the union of the Slav States of the Balkan Peninsula. The Russian Foreign Minister Sasonow charged Bulgaria with a treachery of the Slav interest and in the eyes of the outer world threw the responsibility on the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Stephen Tisza, who on 19 June held a speech on the foreign relations in the Hungarian Parliament. This charge was accepted in the west (R. W. Seton-Watson: The Austro-Serbian dispute. The Round Table. No. 16. September 1914., Sarajevo. London 1926. Pagg. 47—48., *E. Bourgeois*: Manuel historique de politique étrangère. Vol. IV. Paris 1926. Pag. 598.), but as a fact, the speech does not contain an invitation to warlike measures: it only protested against Russian intervention in the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, and by that way provoked the revenge of Sasonow. — In his memorandums addressed to the King-Emperor on 11 and 25 August 1913 Count Tisza proposed a closer co-operation with the Russian Empire in the Eastern Question (Ibid. Pagg. 112—14 and 198—201.).

Sasonov enters.

After Sasonow threw the responsibility for the Serbo-Bulgarian war on Austria-Hungary, he went farther and prepared the punishment of the

rival power. His method was forwarded to Belgrade in a report of the Serbian Chargé on 9 September 1913 as follows: „Unser Standpunkt ist der folgende: die Schuld an den Ereignissen von uns abzuwälzen und sie Europa als dem unwissentlich Schuldigen und Oesterreich als dem bewusst Schuldigen in die Schuhe zu schieben" (*M. Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. I. Berlin 1928. Pag. 382.).

On 6 December 1913 he said to Tsar Nicholas II.: „La Serbie ne peut realiser le grand idéal de l'union de tout le peuple serbe que si la Russie agit avec elle" (Documents Diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. III. Paris 1923. Pag. 32.). — The same: „La question des Détroits peut difficilement faire un pas avant autrement qu'à la faveur des complications européennes. Aux Balkans, nous pourrions compter sur la Serbie et peut-être sur la Roumanie" (*R. Marchand*: Un livre noir. Vol. II. Paris 1921. Pag. 371.). — 20 December 1913. Petersburg. Conference for the renewal of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance in the interest of a common war against Austria-Hungary: „Sowohl Serbien wie Bulgarien verfügen beiläufig über je 400,000 Bajonette. Im Zwiespalte stünden diese Bajonette einander gegenüber und würden die einen die anderen vernichten; vereint repräsentieren sie hingegen eine Stärke von 800,000 Bajonetten, welche zum gegenseitigen Wohle beider Länder dienen könnten. — Bulgarien habe in der Dobrudscha, in Thrazien und in einem Teile Mazedoniens Aspirationen, welche es niemals aufgeben wird. Serbien dagegen habe viel ausgedehntere Aspirationen: Bosnien, Herzegowina, Dalmatien, Kroatien, Slawonien. Um die Aspirationen Serbiens und Bulgariens verwirklichen zu können, sei eine vereinigte Arbeit erforderlich. Damit eine solche ermöglicht werde, müssten die Aspirationen Bulgariens in irgendeiner Weise befriedigt werden. Gäbe Serbien z. B. Bulgarien das linke Ufer des Wardars, so würde Bulgarien unter dieser Bedingung Serbien behilflich sein, seine Aspirationen im Westen und Norden zu verwirklichen" (Ibid. Pagg. 404—05.). — Sasonow's memorandum to the Tsar on the importance of the Serb-Bulgarian action in *Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. II. Berlin 1929. Pagg. 484—85.).

The three conferences.

War against Austria-Hungary decided. — According to the Serbs „at the beginning of 1914 (we) drew up a plan definitively to prepare our people for the armed conflict with Austria" (*Nova Evropa*. Zagreb, quoted in the Contemporary Review. Vol. CXXXIV. London 1928. Pag. 309.).

The Petersburg Conference. — The Serbian Prime Minister Pashich at St. Petersburg. Rectification of frontier in Macedonia promised by Pashich to the French Ambassador Delcassé (Paris, 31 January 1914. Circular of the French Prime Minister Doumergue. Documents Diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. III. Paris 1923. Pag. 186., Belgrade, 30 January 1914. Report of the German Chargé relative to the same matter. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXVIII. Berlin 1927. Pag. 322.). — Petersburg, 2 February 1914. Report of Prime Minister Pashich on his audience. Alliance to be made with Rumania. Tsar Nicholas remarked: „il y avait en Autriche-Hongrie trois millions et demi des Roumains désirant s'unir à la Roumanie". Pashich demands from the Tsar arms and ammunition and said „que nous étions bien heureux que la Russie se fut bien préparée; cela nous inspire de la sécurité et l'espoir d'un meilleur avenir." — „Pour la Serbie, nous ferons tout", was the answer of the Tsar (Published in several publication. At length, in *Boghitschewitsch* op. cit. Vol. I. Berlin 1928. Pagg. 414—21.). — Result of the Petersburg Conference (Russian Foreign Minister Sasonow, the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Greece, Pashich and Veniselos, the Bulgarian and Rumanian ministers) as told by Doumergue (op. cit. above): „M. Delcassé a vu M. Pashitch qui lui a confirmé les efforts du gouvernement russe en

vue d'une amélioration des rapports serbo-bulgares, fut-ce au prix de la cession d'Istip et Kotchana à la Bulgarie. Le Président du Conseil serbe n'écarte pas absolument cette éventualité, qui ne pourrait se justifier que pour empêcher les Bulgares de se joindre à l'Autriche dans le cas où de graves difficultés se produisaient; il compte, d'ailleurs, surtout sur la Roumanie, si cette hypothèse se réalisait".

The Bucarest Conference.— 16 January 1914. Government formed by the Liberal Jonel Bratianu. Bucarest, 24 January 1914. Report of the Russian minister Poklewski-Koziell: „in der hiesigen öffentlichen Meinung ist ein bedeutender, ja vielleicht ein entscheidender Umschwung zugunsten Russlands eingetreten" (*B. von Siebert: Benckendorffs diplomatischer Briefwechsel, 1907—14. Vol. III. Berlin 1928. Pag. 249.*). — Bucarest, 28 January 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Count Otto Czernin: „Streng geheim. Soeben verlässt mich der Ministerpräsident, Herr Bratianu, nach anderthalbstündigem Besuche. Um den Charakter unserer streng geheimen Unterredung richtig zu beleuchten, muss ich vorausschicken, dass ich mit *Bratianu auf einer Art Freudenachtsfuss stehe*. 1) Bratianu erklärte, er habe die allerschlechtesten Nachrichten über den Fortgang der ungarisch-rumänischen Verhandlungen, der Abbruch stehe unmittelbar bevor und (wir stehen) damit an dem Beginne einer vollständig neuen Phase der Politik überhaupt. Denn die öffentliche Meinung ganz Rumäniens werde sich mit elementarer Gewalt gegen uns kehren und unser Bündnis sei damit de facto wertlos geworden. Es würden sich antiösterreichische Demonstrationen wiederholen und an ein Zusammengehen sei dann nicht mehr zu denken. — 2) Ich sei auch der Meinung, dass der Abbruch der Verhandlungen ein sehr unfreundliches Ereignis wäre, müsste ihn aber aufmerksam machen, dass eine erneuerte feindliche Haltung des hiesigen Volkes vor Allem gefährlich für Rumänien selber wäre. Das Bündnis sei nicht wertvoller für uns als für Rumänien, wir könnten ja auch eine andere Politik machen, ebenso gut wie die Rumänen. — 3) (Er sagte), ich solle bedenken, dass Russland und Frankreich deutlich auf das Scheitern hinarbeiten, der russische Gesandte habe ihm vor Kurzen gesagt: „nous le savons vous n'êtes pas libre" mit dem Hinweis, er hoffe, diese „Freiheit" werde bald eintreten. — 4) Der grosse Irrtum des letzten Jahres sei gewesen, dass die Monarchie nicht eingesehen hätte, dass bei dem grossen Umsturz am Balkan Rumänien etwas erhalten würde. — (Bratianu) meinte zu wissen, die Ungarn, denen meine Ernennung ein Dorn im Auge sei, verlangten meine Abberufung, um so mit dem Scheitern der Ausgleichsverhandlungen und meiner gleichzeitigen Abberufung den Beweis zu liefern, dass der Curs im ungarischen Sinne geändert werde. Der Minister meinte, er könne dies nicht glauben, denn „er und ich" wir würden doch wohl einen Weg finden, die Sache wieder irgendwie einzurenken, — während meine Abberufung eine Deutung erfahren müsste, dies kritisch sei" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 790—92.*). Notice to the above: the negotiations conducted by the Hungarian Government with the Rumanian National Party in Hungary was in course; a rupture was in the interest of the Russian Government eager to turn Rumania against Austria-Hungary.

Pashich and Veniselos despatched by Sasonow to Bucarest in order to negotiate with Prime Minister Bratianu. — Bucarest, 9 and 10 February 1914. Bucarest Conference held in the rooms of Bratianu and at the Russian legation. — Petersburg, 5 February 1914. Report of the French Chargé Doulcet: Sasonow „a l'impression qu'un accord très étroit existe entre la Grèce et la Serbie. Avec la Roumanie les liens sont moins étroits, mais le passage de M. Veniselos à Bucarest tendre à les resserrer" (*Ibid. Pag. 112.*). — Belgrade, 10 February 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Baron Giesl: „In hiesigen politischen und diplomatischen Kreisen wird als wahrscheinlich angenommen, dass die Begegnungen in St. Petersburg kein abschliessendes Ergebnis zeitigten und dass Pasic und Veniselos

alle Anstrengungen machen dürften, um die Finalisierung in Bukarest zu sichern. Rumänien ist der ausschlaggebende Faktor in dem Ringen um die Uebermacht zwischen den zwei Staatengruppen des Balkans. Es wird seine Freundschaft einmal sehr teuer verkaufen können. Die serbischen Politiker bekünden den bevorstehenden Anschluss Rumäniens an die neue Balkan-Confoederation" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 849—50.*). — Belgrade, 11 February 1914. Report of the French Minister Descos: „M. Patchou me dit que, d'après des informations de Bucarest, le Cabinet Bratianu serait beaucoup plus déterminé et plus hostile à l'Autriche que le précédent ministère et la Serbie est absolument sure de la Roumanie. Il n'y a pas encore un traité signé, ce serait sans doute la faute du Roi Charles" (*Documents Diplomatiques. Les affaires balkaniques. Vol. III. Paris 1923. Pag. 113.*). — Athens, 22 February 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Szilassy: „Mein deutscher Kollege sagte mir, Herr Veniselos habe ihm gesagt, dass er und Herr Pasic in Bukarest den Abschluss eines Defensivbündnisses der drei Königreiche beantragt hätten" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 903.*).

The Belgrade Conference — on 12 February 1914, between Pashich, Veniselos, the Rumanian and Russian ministers. — Belgrade, 23 February 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Baron Giesl: „Als erreichtes Resultat seiner Reise berichtete Herr Pasic die volle Solidarität Rumäniens, Griechenlands und Serbiens." (*Ibid. Pag. 909.*).

Bobrinsky and Catarau.

Summary of the events of February 1914: trial of the Russian agent Alexej Kabalyuk and his associates before the Court of Máramarossziget. The Russian Count Bobrinsky described as protector of the Russian agents who declared that „Russland wird nicht demobilisieren, ehe die russische Fahne über den Karpathen wehen werden." (*Pester Lloyd*). — 5 February 1914. Count Bobrinsky appears before the Court provided with a *salvus conductus* granted to him by the Hungarian Government. He admits that he provided his confidants from Hungary with Russian passport, and on 6 February he leaves for Rumania, avoiding Austrian territory where a warrant for his detention was published. Petersburg, 7 February 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé Count Otto Czernin on the rejection of Sasonow's intervention on behalf of Count Bobrinsky (*Ibid. Pag. 838.*). — Meeting of Count Bobrinsky with a Rumanian professor of Russo-Rumanian extraction, Catarau-Katarov, sometime a pupil in the school of Professor Jorga, on Rumanian territory. — 17 February 1914. Rupture of the negotiations conducted between the Hungarian Government and the Rumanian National Party (as later it was revealed by Count Kuno Klebelberg, the rupture was made by Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand). — 19 February 1914. Arrival of Czernowicz, provided with false Rumanian passports, of Catarau and Kirilov, a Russian seaman of the cruiser *Potemkin*. — 20 February 1914. Rupture of the negotiations with the Rumanian National Party announced by Prime Minister Count Stephen Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament. Catarau and Kirilov return to Rumanian territory, after they sent by the post a small present to the bishop of the Hungarian Greek Uniate Church, in the name of a Hungarian girl, her Hungarian letter being included in the parcel. — 23 February 1914. Speech held by the public prosecutor at Máramarossziget. — 24 February 1914. The small packet received by the bishop explodes in his rooms at Debreczen, two persons died and several being injured. — According to King Carol of Rumania, the attentat was a Russian complot: „Das Attentat in Debreczin führte der König auf russische Umtriebe zurück. Die beiden der Tat verdächtigen Personen seien Russen. Es sei nicht richtig, dass einer von ihnen

rumänischer Ursprung sei. Als eine Tatsache, die ganz geheim gehalten würde, teilte mir Seine Majestät mit, dass man einen der beiden hier seinerzeit verhaftet habe, aber aus Mangel an Beweisen wieder habe freilassen müssen. Es sei vielleicht so besser; denn wenn sich etwa herausgestellt hätte, dass die Betreffenden Rumänen korumpiert hätten, so würde wieder grosse Erregung entstanden sein." (Bucarest, 30 March 1914. Report of the German minister von Waldthause. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX, Berlin 1927. Pagg. 482—83.). — Note of the Rumanian statesman Alexander Marghiloman on his interview with the same King Carol: „After the attentat of Debreczen, the assassination of Hungarian policeman and injuring the Arpad monument, which were doubtless provocations on behalf of Russia, I was told by Pisoschi that Catarau was saved by our navy. As the Hungarian detectives followed him he was removed from Cairo. Later on he was taken back to Europe by our navy and this all was thanked by King Charles as it had been very unpleasent if Catarau had been detained by the Austrian police as this half-naturalised Russian colonel was protected by the Bratianu Government" (A. Marghiloman: Note politice. Vol. I. Bucarest 1927. Pag. 557.). — 6 March 1914. The Russian agent Kabalyuk and his associates sentenced by the Court of Máramarossziget. Comment of the Russian paper Svjet: „Das ungerechte Urteil kann jedermann davon überzeugen, was von der ungarischen Regierung zu erwarten ist. Diese Unterdrückung des Rechtes und der Wahrheit wird einen derartigen Ausbruch des Zornes über die Politik der Gewalt nach sich ziehen, dass das Kabinett Tisza unfähig sein wird, seinen Platz zu behaupten. Die Politik hat bereits das Debrecziner Attentat provoziert, und man wird in allen Teilen der zusammengeflickten Monarchie noch viel bössere Erscheinungen des Terrors erleben. Die verurteilten dreissig unglücklichen Ruthenen sind ein Sühnopfer, und es wird kein vergebliches sein, wenn im selben Augenblick der Zerfall der von Russland in 1849 geretteten Monarchie beginnt" (Pester Lloyd, 9 March 1914.). — The attentat of Debreczen was made in the interest to intimidate the Court and to introduce a rising of the Rumanians of Hungary after the rupture of their negotiations with the Government. But the Rumanians protested against the accusation of the Russo-Rumanian propagandists that they fought with similar weapons, and thus the provocations failed to provide the justification of the secret mobilisation and transfer of Russian, Rumanian and Serbian troops to the frontiers of Hungary.

The mobilisation.

Bucarest, 1 March 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Count Ottokar Czernin announcing mobilisation in Russia (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 927.). — 8 March 1914. The same announcing mobilisation in Rumania (Ibid. Pag. 943.). — Craiova, 16 February 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian consul announcing transfer of troops to the Hungarian frontier (Ibid. Pag. 956.). — Several reports announcing transfer of Serbian troops from Macedonia to the Hungarian frontiers. —

Object of the Russian action: to turn the attention of Rumania to Transylvania. — Bucarest, 6 March 1914. Lecture delivered by André Tardieu at Bucarest declaring Transylvania part of the Rumanian State. Remark made by King Carol of Rumania to the above: „die Franzosen wollten hier den Russen helfen und ihnen einen Dienst erweisen" (Bucarest, 12 March 1914. Report of the German minister von Waldthause. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin 1927. Pag. 483.).

Bucarest, 11 March 1914. Filipescu's offer presented by Count Czernin to Count Berchtold: „Wenn wir ganz Rumänien der Monarchie anglie-

dern würden, so würde (die uns trennende siebenbürgische Frage) entfallen. Philipescu stellt die Sache nun folgendermassen in friedlicher Lösung vor, dass wir Siebenbürgen an Rumänien abtreten würden, dafür aber das ganze Rumänien der Monarchie staatsrechtlich einverleiben und die hiesigen Hohenzollern unter unsere Dynastie kämen — also nach dem Muster Bayerns oder Sachsens mit dem Deutschen Reiche. Ich habe übrigens diese Idee vor einigen Jahren selbst vertreten (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 952—53.).

Counter-project of Count Tisza.

The territorial integrity of Hungary being menaced by a Russo-Rumanian attack, Prime Minister Count Tisza proposed to mediate an alliance between Rumania (the ally of Austria-Hungary) and Bulgaria (the enemy of the Russo-Serbian coalition (by binding together the two inquiet Balkan States by an alliance in order that Rumanian aspirations may be bound down by Rumania and Bulgarian unrest placed under the control of the Rumanian ally of the Central Powers (Budapest, 15 March 1914. Memorandum of Count Tisza addressed to the King-Emperor. Published *ibid.* Pagg. 974—79.). — Many reports relative to the agitation of the *Liga Culturala*, provided with Russian money, against the Dual Monarchy (*ibid.*).

The Russian plan.

The *Novoje Vremja* wrote in March 1914: „Rumänien muss jetzt zwischen der Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Erfolges der oesterreichisch-ungarischen und russischen Armee wählen. Da in Rumänien jeder davon überzeugt ist, dass das österreichisch-ungarische Heer schlechter sei als das russische, und dass bei einem Zusammenstoss diese beiden Armeen ein für Oesterreich-Ungarn ungünstiger Ausgang Rumänien teuer zu stehen käme, hat nun Rumänien beschlossen, mit dem Dreibund kein näheres Verhältnis einzugehen, sondern sich auf die Tripelentente zu stützen, die im Falle eines glücklichen Ausganges des Krieges mehr zu bieten imstande ist als der Dreibund, das heisst, sie kann Rumänien die 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ Millionen ungarländischen Rumänen geben" (Pester Lloyd, 2 April 1914.). — The same and other rumours of a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary appeared, on ground of informations received from Bucarest and from Russo-Rumanian circles, in the paper of the Rumanian National Party, published at Arad in Hungary (March and April 1914.).

Petersburg, 12 April 1914. Report of the Serbian minister Spalajkovich on a declaration of War Minister Suchomlinow relative to preparation of a war by the Russian Government (A. Heyrowsky: *Neue Wege zur Klärung der Kriegsschuld.* Berlin 1932. Pag. 41.).

Berlin, 18 April 1914. Foreign Secretary von Jagow to the German Ambassador at Vienna, von Tschirschky: According to a statement made by the Rumanian minister Beldiman „im Volke arbeiten russische Agenten und der russische Rubel. Der Ministerpräsident Bratianu hat Herrn Beldiman gesagt, seiner Schätzung nach verfüge der russische Gesandte in Bucarest über einen Fonds von etwa einer Million zu Agitationszwecken" (Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin 1927. Pag. 498.). — Petersburg, 27 March 1914. Letter of the French publicist Charles Rivet published in the *Paris Temps* of 1 April 1914 under the title: „Russie et Roumanie. Lettre de Pétersbourg." — „Le jour où les Roumains prendraient une attitude agressive, étant donné de voisinage de la Serbie et les sympathies que les deux peuples ont chez leurs frères de la monarchie austro-hongroise, la situation de cette dernière serait très sérieusement menacée. Les Roumains comme les Serbes se rendent un compte exact aussi que le temps travaille pour eux; qu'un jour viendra ou tous leurs compatriotes seront réunis sous le sceptre de leur rois. Pour

ces problèmes de demain on comprend à Bucarest comme à Belgrade le rôle qu'aura à y jouer la Russie.

Declaration of the Russian minister at Sofia, Savinskij: „L'hégémonie dans la péninsule balkanique est passée maintenant du côté de la Roumanie qui sera à la tête de l'alliance balkanique sous le protectorat de la Russie. Des vues ont été échangées à ce sujet à St. Pétersbourg et on est tombé d'accord sur les points essentiels" (Sofia, 15 May 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Tarnowski. *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 40.)

Secret link with the Czechs: Count Bobrinsky encouraging his Ruthenian agents to make a link with the Czechs through Northern Hungary (Slovakia). Action of the Czechs in the trial of the Russian agents: „Le congrès ruthène russophile de Lemberg a voté un nombre de résolutions affirmant le caractère russe de la Galicie orientale, de la Bukovine et de la Hongrie septentrionale, remerciant ces Russes leurs secours à leurs frères de race pauvres de Galicie, protestant contre le procès monstre de Máramaros-Sziget. Les autorités de police ont interdit aux russophiles de conduire en cortège à la gare les députés tchèques venus les encourager dans la lutte" (*Le Temps*, 7 February 1914.). — Protest of the Russian Consul General of Budapest, Priklonskij, against the trial of the Russian agents. History of the trial of Máramarosziget written by an agitator at the expense of Priklonskij. The judges of the criminal court of Máramarosziget searched after by the Russian military authorities during the Russian occupation of Máramarosziget in 1914. — Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand in the centre of the Russian-Czech interest. Petersburg, 26 May 1914. Report of the Serbian minister Spalaikovich: „Russland hat in Erfahrung gebracht, dass der Thronfolger Franc Ferdinand an den bosnischen Manövern teilnehmen wird. Russland erwartet von Serbien die Kriegsursache." (*A. Heyrowsky* op. cit. Pag. 42.). — Belgrade, 28 May 1914. The Bosnian conspirators start from Belgrade to Sarajevo.

Constanza and Brassó.

Budapest, 14 June 1914. Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza to Common Foreign Minister Count Berchtold: „Soeben erfahre ich, dass Herr Bratianu mit Sasonow einen Ausflug nach Brassó machen wird. Ich habe veranlasst, dass ihnen von unseren Behörden Entgegenkommen erweisen werde, muss jedoch meiner Entrüstung über diese Taktlosigkeit Ausdruck geben. Es ist direkt eine Aufreizung unserer Rumänen und ein provozierendes Zurschautragen russischen Interesses für Siebenbürgen. Es wäre sehr erwünscht, dies in entsprechender Form in Bukarest fühlen zu lassen". (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 146.)

Vienna, 16 June 1914. Count Berchtold to Count Czernin: „Graf Tisza telegraphiert mir unterm 14. d. M. wie folgt: „Soeben erfahre ich, dass Herr Bratianu mit Sasonow einen Ausflug nach Brassó machen wird. Ich habe veranlasst, dass ihnen von unseren Behörden Entgegenkommen erweisen werde, muss jedoch meiner Entrüstung über diese Taktlosigkeit Ausdruck geben. Es ist direkt eine Aufreizung unserer Rumänen und ein provozierendes Zurschautragen russischen Interesses für Siebenbürgen." Ich kann vorläufig nicht recht daran glauben, dass Herr Bratianu den als offiziellen Gast in Rumänien weilenden russischen Minister auf unser Territorium führt, ohne sich vorerst hierüber mit der k. u. k. Regierung oder Euer Exzellenz verständigt zu haben. Wenn sich diese Nachricht bestätigen sollte, müsste ich mich der Ansicht des Grafen Tisza anschliessen und das Vorgehen Herrn Bratianus als eine gröbliche Ausserachtlassung aller internationalen Usancen bezeichnen. Euer Exzellenz wollen sofort die Richtigkeit obiger Meldung feststellen und im bejahenden Falle die Sache bei Herrn Bratianu in entsprechender Weise zur Sprache bringen" (*Ibid.* Pag. 147.).

Count Czernin told in his Memoirs, published before publication of the relative secret documents: „Als der Zar in Konstanza war, unternahm (Sasonow) gemeinsam mit Bratianu eine Spazierfahrt nach Siebenbürgen. Ich erfuhr dieses erst nach erfolgter Tat" (*Count O. Czernin: Im Weltkrieg*. Berlin 1919. Pag. 146.).

This is contradicted by the following report of Count Ottokar Czernin, dated Bucarest, 17 June 1914: „Herr Bratianu hatte meine Erlaubnis zur Fahrt nach Siebenbürgen eingeholt, die ich schwer zu verweigern im Stande war. Fahrt gestern zirka fünf Uhr schon über die Grenze in Begleitung des ungarischen Polizeihauptmannes Burg stattgefunden. Bericht folgt" (*Ibid.* Pagg. 150—51.). — Bucarest, 17 June 1914. The same: „Im Nachhange zu meinem Telegramm Nr. 203. von heute beehre ich mich, Euer Exzellenz zu berichten, dass Herr Bratianu am vorigen Mittwoch den 10-ten im Laufe einer Discussion die Bemerkung hinwarf, er würde mit Sasonow einen Automobilausflug in die Berge von Sinaia machen, dabei „eventuell" auch „die Grenze irgendwo überschreiten, wahrscheinlich in Predeal" und das Ersuchen stellte, ich möchte dafür sorgen, dass den Automobilen an der Grenze keinerlei Schwierigkeiten bereitet würden. Obwohl ich die Absicht Bratianus, mit dem russischen Minister Siebenbürgen zu befahren, sehr tactlos fand, und dies in meinem Erstaunen auch Bratianu gegenüber zum Ausdruck gekommen sein dürfte, — so hatte ich doch keine Möglichkeit, die Herren an ihrer Absicht zu hindern und verständigte daher die Grenzbehörde von dem erwarteten Besuch. Donnerstag den 11-ten wurde mir aus gut informierter Quelle mitgeteilt, die Herren hätten die Absicht, die Grenze zu überschreiten, aufgegeben und würden ihre Fahrt nur bis Predeal ausdehnen. Damit hielt ich den Zwischenfall für erledigt und unterliess eine weitere Meldung an Euer Exzellenz. Gestern hat die Fahrt, wie ich telegraphisch gemeldet habe, nun doch in Begleitung des Grenzpolizeihauptmannes Burg stattgefunden, die sich circa 4—5 Kilometer über die Grenze erstreckte." (*Ibid.* Pag. 152.).

Budapest, 17 June 1914. The *Budapesti Hirlap* reported: „Brassóból jelentik: Délelőtt féltizenegy órakor érkezett Szasonov orosz külügyminiszter Bratianu román miniszterelnök kíséretében különvonaton Predealra. Az állomáson a román hatóságok fogadták őket és Burg Kornél magyar határrendőrségi kapitány, a kit a román miniszterelnök bemutatott Szasonovnak. Bratianu megkérdezte Burgot, hogy átléphetik-e a magyar határt. A kapitány előzékeny válaszára automobilba ültek és a vadregényes hegyi ösvényen egészen Felsőtömösig hajtottak, majd onnan visszafordultak és vonatra szállva elutaztak Szinajába".

Vienna, 17 June 1914. Count Berchtold to Count Tisza: „Streng vertraulich. Ich hatte Euer Exzellenz Telegramm Nr. 1261 vom 14 d. M. mit folgendem Auftrage an Grafen Ottokar Czernin weitergegeben: „Ich kann vorläufig etc. . . . zur Sprache bringen." Graf Czernin antwortet unterm heutigen wie folgt: „Herr Bratianu etc. . . . Bericht folgt." — Berchtold." (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 153—54.).

Vienna, 19 June 1914. Report of the German Ambassador von Tschirschky: „Wenn auch Herr Bratianu dem Herrn Sasonow einen Ausflug nach Siebenbürgen hinein vorgeschlagen hätte, so würde ihn, den Grafen Berchtold, dies nicht so sehr wundern. Denn Herr Bratianu sei schliesslich Minister nur eines kleinen Staates, dem Rücksichtnahme auf die feineren Interessen der grossen Politik vielleicht ferner lägen. Dass aber der russische Minister des Auswärtigen, der zu offiziellem Besuche in Rumänien weilt, von dort aus mit dem rumänischen Minister des Auswärtigen in ein fremdes Land geht, und gerade auf das heisse Terrain von Siebenbürgen, trotzdem er sich sagen musste, dass er damit den irredentistischen Strömungen auf beiden Seiten der Grenze Vorschub leiste, das sei nicht zu verantworten und so gegen jede internationale Höflichkeit, dass er, Graf Berchtold, die ganze Nachricht für kaum glaublich halte" (*Die Grosse Poli-*

tik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin 1927. Pag. 520.)

The excursion described by Sasonov: „Dans quelle mesure pouvions-nous compter sur M. Bratianu à lier leur sort au notre? — Bratianu me conduisit sur la frontière même. Après un instant d'arrêt, notre automobile traversa rapidement la ligne frontière à la stupeur du poste douanier, et nous pénétrâmes de quelques kilomètres en territoire hongrois. Je suppose que, dans le moment où nous passâmes en Transylvanie, la même pensée traversa notre esprit: nous venions d'entrer dans un pays roumain qui attendait d'être libéré du joug magyare et réuni à ses frères. — Cette excursion fut l'expression non préméditée de la solidarité politique naissante de la Russie et de la Roumanie!" (S. Sasonov: Les années fatales. Paris 1927. Pagg. 122—23.). — The excursion described by the Rumanian minister at Petersburg, Diamandy: „avec l'autorisation du gouvernement austro-hongrois jusqu'à Temesh (*recte* Tömös — Note of the Editor), à travers les forêts" (C. J. Diamandy: La grande guerre vue du versant oriental. Revue des deux mondes. Vol. XLIII. Paris 1928. Pag. 133.).

A secret agreement.

Result of the Constanza meeting and of the conversations between Sasonov and Bratianu summed up by the Russians. — Bucarest, 22 June 1914. Report of the British minister Akers-Douglas: „M. Sazonov is reported to have said that, from conversations with the Rumanian Prime Minister, he has gained the conviction that nothing would in the future disturb the friendly relations between Russia and Rumania, who were united by common interests and the same policy of peace" (*Gooch-Temperley: British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898—1914. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 3.*). — Bucarest, 19 February 1915. Letter of the Russian councillor of legation, B. Arsenije, to Sasonov: „Rien désormais ne pouvait vaincre l'attraction irrésistible qu'exerçaient sur tout le peuple roumain la Russie et la France qui s'étaient élevées contre l'Allemagne et qui seules étaient en état de permettre la réalisation du rêve historique ardent de la Roumanie, à savoir l'annexion des provinces austro-hongroises peuplées par des Roumains" (*Archives secretes de l'Empereur Nicholas II. Paris 1928. Pag. 103.*).

The secret accord revealed. — Petersburg, 26 or 27 July 1914. Diary of Baron Schilling: „Baron Schilling, reminded Mr. Diamandi of the latter's own words addressed to himself, Baron Schilling, at the time when they were travelling through Hungarian territory near Predeal six weeks ago, viz. that the interests of Serbia and Rumania were completely identical, and compel Rumania to stand firmly at the side of Serbia in the event of any attempts upon the latter on the part of Austria. The Rumanian Minister did not attempt to deny having spoken thus" (*How the War began. London 1925. Pag. 41.*). — In the said excursion took part: Foreign Minister Sasonov and Baron Schilling, Prime Minister Bratianu and Diamandy. — Petersburg, 28 July 1914. Sasonov to the Russian minister at Bucarest, Poklewski-Koziell: „der rumänische Gesandte in Berlin, Beldiman, soll erklärt haben, dass sich die Möglichkeit ergebe, dass (Rumänien) seine ganzen Kräfte gegen Russland wende. Wir möchten diesen Nachrichten keinen Glauben schenken, denn, falls sie sich bestätigen sollten, würde Rumänien als beispielloser Betrüger entlarvt sein" (*A. von Wegerer: Das russische Orangebuch von 1914. Berlin 1925. Pag. 70.*).

Consequences of the secret accord. — Secret reports reached the Russian Government (from its Bohemian confidants) that at the meeting of Crown Prince Ferdinand and Emperor William II. an attack on Serbia was resolved at Konopischt (12—13 June 1914); after Sasonov returned from Constanza-Bucarest (14—16 June 1914) with the accord relative to

opening of the way for the Russian troops toward Serbia *via* Rumania, the instructions to murder the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand were given in order that Serbia should be attacked by Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Government may intervene in order to save Serbia and to effect the partition of the Dual Empire. According to the Russian plan mentioned above Bosnian youth (Austro-Hungarian subjects) have been selected and trained by Serbian officers in Serbia to commit the attentat in order that Serbia should not be accused with the murder.

The Russian plan proved a failure. — Failure of the Russian plan was effected by the following consequences: 1) the supposition that the murderers being Austro-Hungarian subjects and the attentat the result of an internal dissatisfaction became untenable by the fact that the murderers were, according to the Serbs, trained by Serbian officers, provided with arms constructed in Kragujevatz and despatched from Belgrade to Sarajevo, and that one of the training Serbian officers, Major Tankoshich disappeared while the other, Colonel Dimitrievich was sentenced to death by a Serbian Court Martial on the ground that he was responsible for the murder of the Archduke; 2) that the reports of the Russian confidants acting in Bohemia proved false because at the meeting of Konopisht an attack was not planned against the Serbian State, and consequently the Russian Government acted on the ground of a false report; 3) that after the secret approbation received from Petersburg (revelations of the Serbian Professor Stanoyevich and the Serbian Minister Lyuba Jovanovich) the Serbs acting in the interest of selfdefence, against an alleged attack to be led by Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, they acted in the conviction that in case of a revenge on behalf of Austria-Hungary they will be fully assisted by the Russian Government; 4) that in the decisive hour the Rumanian Government did not allow to transfer the Russian troops to the rescue of Serbia through Rumanian territory or to join the Russo-Serbian army to attack Austria-Hungary which would be effected by nearly 60 army corps against 18 and would result a short and hopeful campaign for the partition of the Habsburg Monarchy.

II.

A Hungarian White Book 1914.

Attitude of the Hungarian Government during the crisis of 1914, based on official documents and commented by documents relative to attitude of the Russian, Serbian and Rumanian Governments.

28 June 1914. Sarajevo. Murder of Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand. — Telegram addressed by the Court Marshal to the Royal Hungarian Government relative to the death of Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo, due to an attentat committed against the high persons. Registered in the Archives of the Hungarian Government on the same day of 28 June 1914 under No. M. E. 4857. Laid *ad acta* on 29 June 1914.

— The Memorandum addressed by the Hungarian Prime Minister to the King-Emperor on 15 March 1914 receives its definitive form. Alterations effected by the Foreign Office: Bulgarian dissatisfaction to be utilised not in the interest to binding down the attitude of Rumania, but against the Serbian Kingdom, according to demand of General Conrad, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

29 June 1914. Vienna. First pourparlers of General Conrad and Foreign Minister Count Berchtold relative to a punitive expedition against Serbia. — Budapest. Prime Minister Count Tisza arrived from his estate in Bihar County and leaves for Vienna. — Budapest, 29 June 1914. Letter

of the German Consul General dated 28 June 1914. No. 1153. received by the Hungarian Government, announcing his leaving to his summer holiday. Registered under No. 4858. M. E. Laid *ad acta* on 1 July 1914.

30 June 1914. Vienna. Prime Minister Count Tisza arrives and informed by Count Berchtold on the accord of the latter and General Conrad relative to a punitive expedition he declares that he does not give the assent of the Hungarian Government to a war against Serbia.

Belgrade, 30 June 1914. Report of the Russian minister Hartwig informing Sazonov about detention of the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Gligorje Jeftanovich, by the Austrian authorities (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarischen und Provisorischen Regierung. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pagg. 42—43.). — As Jeftanovich was the father-in-law of the Serbian minister at Petersburg, Miroslav Spalaikovich, an interview was given by this latter to the Russian paper *Novoe Vremja* warning the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from complications leading to fateful consequences: „this detention could lead to very important consequences, this reveals an open war and could lead to great and unexpected possibilities“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 281—82. Petersburg, 3 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé Count Otto Czernin).

1 July 1914. Vienna. Memorandum addressed by Count Tisza to the King-Emperor: „The first opportunity which offered for speaking to Count Berchtold was after my audience of Your Majesty, and I did not till then learn his intention to make the horrible deed of Sarajevo the occasion for reckoning with Serbia. I have not concealed from Count Berchtold that I should consider this a fatal mistake and would certainly not share the responsibility. In the first place we have not sufficient proofs to be able to put the responsibility of the crime upon Serbia and to evoke a war, if the Serbian Government gave satisfactory explanations. We should have the worst *locus standi* imaginable and would be considered by all the world as the disturbers of peace, besides beginning a great war under the most unfavourable consequences. In the second place I consider the present moment, when we have as good as lost Rumania, without having been able to replace it, whilst the only state on which we can rely, to with Bulgaria, is completely exhausted, as most unpropitious. . . . As to Rumania I believe that the only chance of getting it back will be our alliance with Bulgaria.“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 248—49.). — Vienna, 1 July 1914. Count Berchtold to General Conrad: „Tisza sei gegen den Krieg mit Serbien und besorge, dass Russland gegen uns losschlagen und Deutschland im Stiche lassen würde“ (General Conrad op. cit. Vol. IV. Vienna 1923. Pag. 34.). — The same to the same on his intention to address the German Government (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 246—47.), and demands a report on the military situation in the Balkan Peninsula which was duly submitted to him by General Conrad on 2 July 1914. — Count Tisza for a better understanding with Russia. According to the *Pester Lloyd* (Budapest, 1 July 1914) Count Tisza declared to a correspondent of the Russian paper *Birshevijsa Vjedomosti* that he knows himself as an „überzeugter Anhänger guter Beziehungen zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Russland. Beide Regierungen seien durchaus friedliebend und bestrebt, die Ruhe Europas zu wahren. Ja, sie betrachten das als ihre Hauptaufgabe. Es gäbe kein Grund zu ernstern Missverständnissen zwischen beiden Regierungen. Der Balkan für die Balkanstaaten, wobei Oesterreich-Ungarn deren Entwicklung absolut nicht stört“ (this declaration was given before the attentat of Sarajevo). — Vienna, 1 July 1914. Report of the Russian Ambassador Sebeko: Kaiser Franz Joseph „hat nach Ansicht der Aerzte nicht den Gesundheitszustand wiedererlangt, den er vor der Erkrankung besass, und kann ihn auch nicht mehr wiedererlangen. Und deshalb bedeutet das Her-

annahen des Winters eine ernste Gefahr, und der Eintritt des kalten Winters kann für ihn verhängnisvolle Folgen haben“ (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pag. 54.). — Budapest, 1 July 1914. Report of the Russian Consul general Priklonskij. Ibid. Pagg. 55—57.).

2 July 1914. Budapest. Declaration made by Count Tisza in the Hungarian House of Commons: „Das Attentat ist geschehen. Die Untersuchung ist im Gange. Die Regierung und alle für die auswärtige Politik der Monarchie verantwortlichen Faktoren müssen ihre Pflicht in jeder Richtung kennen; sie müssen Pflicht kennen vom Gesichtspunkte jener grossen Interessen, die sich an die Aufrechterhaltung des Friedens knüpfen, sie müssen ihre Pflicht aber auch von dem Gesichtspunkte der grossen Interessen kennen, die sich an die Existenzbedingungen und an das Prestige der Monarchie knüpfen. Die Regierung wird die Tatsache nüchtern erwägen und in jeder Richtung ihre Pflicht erfüllen“ (*Pester Lloyd*). — Paris, 2 July 1914. Article published in the *Paris Temps* signed by André Tardieu containing an interview he had with Count Michael Károlyi, leader of the Independent Party *en route* to America, who declared that he and his party are sincere friends of France and added — according to his interpreter — the following: „dans la politique extérieure, nous sommes les plus redoutables semeurs de discorde aux Balkans“. For the connexion of Tardieu with the Russian Ambassador Iswolsky and his lecture held at Bucarest see above. — Vienna, 2 July 1914. Letter received from Common Foreign Minister Count Berchtold, dated Vienna, 1 July 1914. No. 3021, relative to the excursion of the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov to Transylvania. Remark made by Count Tisza (his handwriting): „Lättam“ (Seen) on 4 July 1914. Returned to Count Berchtold, on July 1914. — Vienna, 2 July 1914. General Conrad to Count Berchtold transmitting a report on the military situation on the Balkan Peninsula (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 268—70.). Count Tisza's anxiety relative to the attitude of the Rumanian Government in the first time accepted by the Chief of the General Staff: „Die möglichen Folgen einer mit dem Dreibundkriege zusammenfallenden Feindseligkeit Rumäniens — die Gefahr einer militärischen Besetzung des nationalen Aspirationszieles Siebenbürgen — die zwingende Notwendigkeit ergibt sich alle aus Rumänien in die Monarchie führenden fahrbaren Kommunikationen durch permanente Befestigungen zu sperren, um eine unaufgehaltene Invasion nach Siebenbürgen zu verhindern“. That was the conversion of General Conrad who shortly before favoured the transfer of Transylvania to Rumania for a closer union of this latter with Austria (see above). — Vienna, 2 July 1914. Count Berchtold reproaching the German Ambassador for the one-sided favour afforded by Germany to the Rumanian Hohenzollerns during the Balkan War of 1913 (Ibid. Pag. 278.). — Vienna, 2 July 1914. Draft of a letter transmitted by King-Emperor Francis Joseph to Emperor William II. (Published *ibid.* Pagg. 250 and seq.).

3 July 1914. — Petersburg. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé Count Otto Czernin on a declaration made by the Serbian minister Miroslav Spalaikovich in the Russian paper *Vecherna Vremja* on 29 June 1914: „Ich glaube die Ermordung des Erzherzogs ist die Folge der äussersten Gereiztheit, welche gegen ihn in Bosnien herrschte. Dort bestand schon lange nationalistische Organisation, deren Tätigkeit gegen den Erzherzog gerichtet war, nachdem er höchst unpopulär war und für einen Anhänger der Annexion galt. Ich wiederhole, dass alles auf dem Boden der lokalen Unzufriedenheit entstanden ist“ (Ibid. Pag. 281.). — Uscub, 3 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Consul relative to transfer of the Serbian troops from Macedonia to the Austro-Hungarian frontiers (Ibid. Pag. 366.). — Paris, 3 July 1914. André Tardieu writes in the *Journal des Balkans*: Rumania invited to follow the direction given by the French and Russian

ministers Blondel and Poklewski-Koziell (Report of the German Chargé von Waldburg. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871—1914. Vol. XXXIX. Berlin 1926. Pagg. 528—29.). — Bucarest, 3 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Count Ottokar Czernin: „Ministerpräsident teilt mir, Herr Sasonow habe ihm gesagt, dass Russland bei einem Kriege zwischen der Monarchie und Serbien nicht ruhig bleiben könne, sondern uns den Krieg erklären müsste“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 278.). — Count Tisza invites Foreign Minister Count Berchtold to convoke a conference of the Common Ministers in order to discuss the attitude to be taken by the Vienna Government (B. E. Schmitt: The coming of the war. Vol. II. New York 1930. Pag. 271.). Count Berchtold intends to do it after an answer to be received from the German Emperor. — According to a report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé at Petersburg, Count Otto Czernin, the Russian press and public opinion in Petersburg is directed by the Serbian minister Spalaikovich (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 285.). — Petersburg, 3 July 1914. Instructions given to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, Sebeko: „der hiesige serbische Gesandte hat an uns die Bitte gerichtet, das Schicksal seiner Verwandten Jeftanowitsch und des Dr. Srschkitsch aufzuklären, die sich in Bosnien befinden und verhaftet worden sind“ (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pag. 77.).

4 July 1914. — Vienna. Count Hoyos leaves for Berlin, on a special mission, taking with him the autograph letter addressed by Emperor Francis Joseph to Emperor William II. — Count Berchtold's letter relative to the excursion of Sasonov and Bratianu to Transylvania, seen by Count Tisza. — Received the letter of the German Consul General, dated 2 July 1914. No. 1183, announcing his return to Budapest. Ad acta on 7 July 1914. — Petersburg, 4 July 1914. Report of the Serbian minister Spalaikovich: Sasonov said that by the Serbian atrocities in Bosnia the sympathy of Europe will be assured for the Serbs (Serbian Blue Book published in No. 14.).

5 July 1914. — Budapest, 5 July 1914. Telegram addressed by Prime Minister Count Tisza to Foreign Minister Count Berchtold relative to the draft of the letter to be addressed by Emperor Francis Joseph to Emperor William II. The telegram arrives at 11.50 a. m., when Count Hoyos was already at Berlin and the letter of Francis Joseph was handed to William II. at 1.00 p. m. — Modifications demanded by Count Tisza: „Allerhöchstes Handschreiben an den deutschen Kaiser. Um Berlin nicht kopfscheu zu machen, rate ich dringend, im vorletzten Alinea anstatt „als politischer Machtfaktor am Balkan ausgeschaltet wird“ zu sagen „genötigt wird, seine aggressive Tätigkeit aufzugeben“ und im letzten Alinea die Worte: „dass an eine Versöhnung des Gegensatzes, welcher Serbien von uns trennt, nicht mehr zu denken ist, und“ wie auch das Wort: „ungestraft“ wegzulassen“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 316.). — The text of the imperial letter changed, according to Count Tisza's modifications:

„Dieses wird aber nur dann möglich sein, wenn Serbien, welches gegenwärtig den Angelpunkt der panslawistischen Politik bildet, als politischer Machtfaktor am Balkan ausgeschaltet wird. — Auch Du wirst nach dem jüngsten furchtbaren Geschehnisse in Bosnien die Ueberzeugung haben, dass an eine Versöhnung des Gegensatzes, welcher Serbien von

„Dieses wird aber nur dann möglich sein, wenn Serbien, welches gegenwärtig den Angelpunkt der panslawistischen Politik bildet, genötigt wird, seine aggressive Tätigkeit aufzugeben. — Auch Du wirst nach dem jüngsten furchtbaren Geschehnisse in Bosnien die Ueberzeugung haben, dass die erhaltende Friedenspolitik aller europäischen Monarchen

uns trennt, nicht mehr zu denken ist, und dass die erhaltende Friedenspolitik aller europäischen Monarchen bedroht sein wird, solange dieser Herd von verbrecherischer Agitation von Belgrad ungestraft fortlebt.“

bedroht sein wird, solange dieser Herd von verbrecherischer Agitation von Belgrad fortlebt.“

According to a statement of R. W. Seton-Watson „what William II. received was Berchtold's document as amended by Tisza“ (R. W. Seton-Watson: Sarajevo. London 1926. Pag. 174.). This statement must be modified according to the above as Tisza's telegram arrived 1.5 hour earlier to Vienna as the autograph letter of Francis Joseph was handed to William II. at Berlin, the original having left Vienna in the evening of the previous day. On the events at Berlin cf. K. Jagow: Der Potsdamer Kronrat. Süd-deutsche Monatshefte. Munich 1928, August. Pag. 781.). — Vienna, 5 July 1914. Report of the Russian Ambassador Sebeko: „Weder Jeftanowitsch noch Srschkitsch ist verhaftet worden“ (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pag. 97.).

6 July 1914. — Vienna. 6 July 1914. Count Berchtold to Count Tisza: „Streng geheim. Kaiser Wilhelm liess unserem Allergnädigsten Herrn melden, dass wir bei einer eventuellen Aktion auf die volle Unterstützung Deutschlands rechnen können. Nach Kaiser Wilhelms Ansicht sollen wir mit einer Aktion gegen Serbien nicht mehr zuwarten. Wir sollen den jetzigen günstigen Moment nicht unbenutzt lassen. Russland sei heute nicht kriegsbereit und Deutschland stehe in voller Bundestreue an unseren Seite“ (Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 329.). — Vienna, 6 July 1914. Count Berchtold to General Conrad: „Tisza ist gegen den Krieg, er hat Angst vor einem rumänischen Einmarsch in Siebenbürgen“. — Remark made by General Conrad to the above: „Graf Tisza's stete Sorge für Siebenbürgen veranlasste mich, die geographischen Verhältnisse dieses Gebietes darzulegen. Die vom Grafen Tisza verlangte Aufklärung über die Chancen, im Falle eines Krieges gegen Russland, Rumänien, Serbien und Montenegro gab ich dahin, dass die Chance für uns nicht günstig wären. — Tisza sei überzeugt, dass Rumänien gegen uns vergehen würde“ (General Conrad op. cit. Vol. IV. Vienna 1923. Pagg. 55—56.). According to Count Tisza's opinion Hungary was menaced by a Russian, Rumanian and Serbian combination, while General Conrad hoped to avoid a war with Russia or at least with Rumania. — Budapest, 6 July 1914. Received by the Prime Minister: a confidential letter addressed to him by the Hungarian Minister of Interior, dated Budapest, 4 July 1914, No. 1164. Reserv. relative to the investigations made in connection with the attentat of Sarajevo, on Hungarian territory. Ad acta on 18 November 1920. — Vienna, 6 July 1914. The secretary of the Russian Embassy at Vienna, Prince Gagarin, despatched by Sebeko to Sarajevo to make an inquiry in the case of Jeftanovich (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Pag. 228. Report of Sebeko, dated 16 July 1914.).

7 July 1914. — Vienna, 7 July 1914. Report of the German Ambassador von Tschirschky: a secret conference held by Foreign Minister Count Berchtold, the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary, and the German Ambassador on the report of Count Hoyos. Report of Count Hoyos rejected by Count Tisza (eventual partition of the Serbian State). Deutsche Dokumente. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pag. 35.). — The Austro-Hungarian minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl writes in his memories: „Graf Berchtold hatte mich beauftragt, den ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten, der mit dem Resultate der bisherigen Besprechungen nicht einverstanden war, umzustimmen. Graf Tisza erklärte mir in seiner konzisen Ausdruckweise, er billige einzelne unserer Forderungen nicht. Es müsse alles vermieden werden, was

die Souveränitätsrechte Serbiens verletzen und vielleicht in weiterer Folge zum Kriege führen könne. „Wenn man aber diesen wolle, dann müsse sich der Kaiser (Tisza sagt König) einen anderen Minister suchen. — Seine Stimme hatte dabei einen verärgerten Klang. . . . Diese Haltung Tiszas festzulegen, bin ich seinem Andenken schuldig“ (*Baron W. Giesl: Zwanzig Jahre in nahen Orient. Berlin 1927. Pag. 256.*). — Minutes of the Common Cabinet Council held at Vienna on 7 July 1914: „The President (Count Berchtold): The logical result would be to get in advance our foes. . . The Royal Hungarian Premier . . . would never consent to a surprise attack upon Serbia without a previous diplomatic action, such as he is afraid is being intended and he is sorry to hear, has been discussed about by Count Hoyos in Berlin. . . It is absolutely necessary that we address demands to Serbia and if these are rejected we must make out an ultimatum. Our exactions may be hard, but such that they cannot be complied with. If Serbia accepted them, we should have a splendid diplomatic success. . . If our demands are refused, he would also vote for a warlike action, but he must call attention to the fact that by a war we could reduce the size of Serbia, but we could not completely annihilate it. Russia would fight to the death before allowing this and he, as Hungarian Premier could never consent to the Monarchy's annexing any part of Serbia. — It is not for Germany to decide whether we ought to go to war with Serbia just now or not. Personally he holds the belief that it is not absolutely necessary to begin a war at the present moment. We must remember that agitation against us in Rumania is exceedingly busy just now and that in view of the excited feelings of the population we should almost certainly have to look forward to a Rumanian attack and we should doubtless have to protect Transylvania by a strong force to intimidate the Rumanians. The accession of Bulgaria and Turkey to the Triple Alliance may outbalance Rumania and Serbia and perhaps induce Rumania to return to the Triple Alliance. The Royal Hungarian Premier calls the attention to the terrible calamity of a European war. A lengthy debate on the question of the war followed. The result of the discussion may be reassumed as follows: 1. That all present wish for a speedy decision of the controversy with Serbia. . . . 2. that the council of ministers is prepared to adopt the view of the Royal Hungarian Premier according to which the mobilisation is not to take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Serbia and after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent. — All present except the Royal Hungarian Premier hold the belief that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless and that therefore such stringent demands must be addressed to Serbia, that will make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened. — Count Tisza remarked that he was anxious to meet the others halfway and was prepared to concede that the demands addressed to Serbia should be hard indeed, but not such as to make our intention of raising unacceptable terms clear to everybody. Otherwise we should not have a lawful basis for our declaration of war. The text of the note must be composed with utmost care and he should very much beg to be allowed to see it before it is sent. He must also clearly state that if this point of view was disregarded, he would draw the inevitable consequences“ (English version of the Austrian Red Book published in 1919. German original published by *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 343—51.). — At a private conference held after the Common Cabinet Council Count Tisza declared against the standpoint presented by Foreign Minister Count Berchtold: (*Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pagg. 35—36.*). — Petersburg, 7 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé Count Otto Czernin: the Russian press influenced by the Serbian minister Spalaikovich, Sasonov himself admitting the tactless attitude of the Serbian minister (*Ibid. Pagg. 337—38.*).

„Ich wurde heute zu einer Besprechung zwischen Graf Berchtold und den beiden Ministerpräsidenten zugezogen, in der Graf Hoyos die Berichte des Grafen Szögyény verlas, die dieser über die vorläufige Antwort Seiner Majestät nach Lektüre des kaiserlichen Handschreibens und des Promemoria sowie über die darauffolgende Besprechung mit Ew. Exzellenz (the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg — note of the Editor) hierher erstattet hat. Ausserdem verlas Graf Hoyos eine Aufzeichnung, die über ein Gespräch mit dem Herrn Unterstaatssekretär in gleicher Sache aufgesetzt hat. — Zu letzterer Aufzeichnung darf ich bemerken, dass sowohl Graf Berchtold, als insbesondere Graf Tisza ausdrücklich hervorgehoben wissen wollte, dass alles, was Graf Hoyos in dieser Besprechung mit dem Herrn Unterstaatssekretär gesagt habe, nur als dessen rein persönliche Auffassung anzusehen sei (Diese Feststellung bezieht sich insbesondere darauf, dass Graf Hoyos geäussert hat, es werde hier eine völlige Aufteilung Serbiens ins Auge gefasst)“. — Budapest, 7 July 1914. The Hungarian paper *Az Est* writes: the Serbian Prime Minister Pashich declared to a correspondent of the paper at Belgrade as follows: „Serbien sei an dem Attentat nicht beteiligt. Das Attentat sei von österreichischen Bürgern, ja nicht einmal von Bürgern, sondern von wahnsinnigen Kindern verübt worden“ (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 377.).

8 July 1914. — Vienna, 8 July 1914. Report of the German Ambassador: „Es haben sich in bezug auf das Vorgehen gegen Serbien zwei Strömungen geltend gemacht. Die eine, diejenige des Grafen Berchtold und des Auswärtigen Ministeriums, will den Anlass des Vorgehens direkt aus der durch die gesamte serbische Politik und deren im letzten Attentat gipfelnden Wühlereien gegenüber der Monarchie geschaffenen Lage herleiten, während die andere, vom Grafen Tisza vertreten, es für erforderlich hält, zunächst konkrete Forderungen an Serbien zu stellen. Ich habe den Eindruck, dass Berchtold den Grafen Tisza als retardierendes Element betrachtet. Letzterer wird seinen Standpunkt noch in einem Memorandum niederlegen, welches Graf Berchtold erst heute Abend kurz vor seiner Abreise nach Ischl erhalten wird. Graf Berchtold meinte, es würde seinem Kaiser, falls sich dieser der Ansicht anschliessen sollte, raten, dass zunächst Forderungen an Serbien zu stellen seien, jedenfalls raten, die Forderungen so einzurichten, dass deren Annahme ausgeschlossen erscheint“ (*Deutsche Dokumente etc. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pagg. 35—36.*). — Vienna, 8 July 1914. Count Berchtold to Count Tisza: „Tschirschky has just left me, who told me that he had received a telegram from Berlin, by which his Imperial master instructs him to declare emphatically that in Berlin an action of the monarchy against Serbia is fully excepted and that Germany would not understand why we should neglect this opportunity of dealing a blow. — My remark that in taking a decisive resolution we should consider it of the greatest importance to know how far we could rely upon Germany's influence being used in Rumania, and what result we might hoped for, was answered by the ambassador to the effect that Berlin thinks it is altogether out of question that Rumania would in this case act against the monarchy. Emperor William has already addressed a letter on the subject to King Carol and we might be very sure that it left nothing to be desired in plainness of speech! — The ambassador's further remarks showed me that Germany would consider further negotiating with Serbia a confession of weakness on our part, and this would damage our position in the Triple Alliance and might influence Germany's future policy. — Tschirschky's remarks impressed me so much, that I thought they might in some degree influence your ultimate decision, and for this reason I am informing you without delay and begging you, if you are of the same mind, to telegraph to me (in cypher) while I am at Ischl, where I stay all to-morrow and shall be glad to be your interpreter with His Majesty“ (English version published in the Austrian Red Book of 1919. Vienna. Vol. I. Pag. 34. —

German original in *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 370—71.). — Budapest, 8 July 1914. Second memorandum addressed by Count Tisza to the King-Emperor. It concludes: „I have taken the liberty to give my impression of the situation at length. I am aware of the heavy responsibility which all are obliged to bear in these critical times, who have the honour to possess Your Majesty's confidence. Knowing well that the burden of responsibility will be equally heavy, whether we decide for acting or for leaving this alone, I have, after painful consideration of all the arguments, which come in question, the honour to advise a middle road, which does not exclude a peaceful arrangement and to a certain degree improves our chances of war — should war be unavoidable. — It will be my duty in to-morrow's council of ministers to cause the Hungarian cabinet to declare itself. In the meantime I can only declare in my own name that notwithstanding my devotion, I could not share the responsibility for an exclusive aggressive solution of our difficulties" (English version given in the Austrian Red Book of 1919. Vol. I. German original in *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 371—74.). By the hand of Emperor Francis Joseph: „Ad acta. Franz Joseph." Enclosure to Count Tisza's Memorandum: „Beilage. Kräfteverhältnisse in einem Kriege gegen Russland, Serbien und Rumänien nach Angabe des Chefs des Generalstabes" (Published *ibid.* Pagg. 374—75.). — Budapest, 8 July 1914. Speech of Prime Minister Count Tisza in the Hungarian Lower House. Diplomatic reports relative to the peaceful character of his declarations: Budapest, 13 July 1914. Report of the Russian Consul General Priklonskij (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pagg. 183—85.), Vienna, 15 July 1914. Report of the Russian ambassador Sebeko (*Ibid.* Pagg. 211—14.), Budapest, 14 and 17 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller (*Gooch-Temperley: British Documents on the origin of the War.* Vol. XI. London 1926. Pagg. 55—59., 66—68.), Vienna, 13 and 16 July 1914. Report of the British ambassador Sir M. de Bunsen (*Ibid.* Pagg. 43—44., 51.). — Sarajevo, 8 July 1914. Report of the Russian secretary of embassy Prince Gagarin to ambassador Sebeko: the report of the alleged detention of Jeftanovich proved false (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pagg. 233—34.).

9 July 1914. — Hungarian Cabinet Council held at Budapest. Resolved: „I. A miniszterelnök úr jelentést tesz a külügyi helyzetről s a szerajevói merénylet folytán tervbe vett intézkedésekről. Ismerteti azt a legalázatosabb jelentést, a melyet e tárgyban Ó Felségéhez intézett. — A minisztertanács a miniszterelnök úr által előadottakat helyeslőleg tudomásul veszi, álláspontjához hozzájárul és felhatalmazza, hogy a magyar minisztériumot az 1867. XII. t. c. 8. §-a értelmében megillető befolyást az általa jelzett alapon és irányban érvényesítse" („I. Der Ministerpräsident stattet Meldung über die auswärtige Lage und über die infolge des Attentats in Serajevo geplanten Verfügungen ab. Er gibt die Meldung, die er in dieser Angelegenheit Seiner Majestät erstattet hat, bekannt. — Der Ministerrat nimmt diesen Vortrag des Herren Ministerpräsidenten gutheissend zur Kenntniss, pflichtet seinen Standpunkt bei und ermächtigt ihn, dass er den dem ungarischen Ministerium im Sinne des 8. § des Gesetz-Artikels XII. vom Jahre 1867 zukommenden Einfluss in der durch ihn besicherten prinzipiellen Grundlage und Richtung zur Geltung bringe"). Original in the Archives of the Hungarian Government at Budapest. Ministerratsprotocolle 1914. No. XVIII. — Vienna, 9 July 1914. Sections chief of the Common Foreign Office, Ritter Friedrich von Wiesner despatched by Count Berchtold to Sarajevo. — Budapest, 9 July 1914. The *Pester Lloyd* writes: „Das in Bukarest erscheinende parteilose Tagblatt „Seara" führt an leitender Stelle aus, dass die Debrecziner Bombe über Rumänien, die Sarajewoer

über Serbien von russischer Hand geschickt worden. Gestern richtete sich der Anschlag gegen das Leben des Hajdudoroger Bischofs, heute ist der Thronfolger das Opfer. Das Blatt warnt das rumänische Volk von der Politik einer intimen Freundschaft mit Russland."

10 July 1914. — Budapest, 10 July 1914. Received by the Hungarian Prime Minister a confidential letter of the Hungarian Minister of Interior, dated 7 July 1914, No. 1184. Reserv., relative to made to his investigations in relation to the attentat of Sarajevo. Registered in the Archives of the Hungarian Government under No. 5133. M. E. Ad acta on 11 July 1914. — Budapest, 10 July 1914. Received by the Hungarian Prime Minister a letter of the Serbian Consul General at Budapest, dated 8 July 1914, inviting the Hungarian Government to a thanksgiving service to be performed on the anniversary of King Peter of Serbia. Reply to the Serbian Consul General on 10 July 1914. Registered in the Archives of the Hungarian Government under 1914. No. 5159. M. E. — Vienna, 10 July 1914. Report of the German Ambassador von Tschirschky: (Count Berchtold) „klagte wieder über die Haltung des Grafen Tisza, die ihm ein energisches Vorgehen gegen Serbien erschwere. Graf Tisza behaupte, man müsse „gentlemanlike" vorgehen" (Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pagg. 36.). — Belgrade, 10 July 1914. The Austro-Hungarian minister Baron Giesl to his Russian colleague, Hartwig: „Ich kann Sie bestimmt versichern, dass die Souveränität Serbiens nicht angetastet werden wird, und dass bei eigenem guten Willen der serbischen Regierung die Krise eine, beide Teile befriedigende Lösung finden wird". Declaration made on the ground of the conversation of Baron Giesl with Count Tisza. Sudden death of Hartwig (Baron W. Giesl op. cit. Pagg. 258.). — Bucarest, 10 July 1914. The Austro-Hungarian minister Count Ottokar Czernin reported: King Carol on the Russian minister Poklewski-Koziell: „Das ist wirklich empörend, ich sehe schon, mit diesem Menschen wird es hier nicht gehen, er macht sich ja ganz unmöglich" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 389.). Note to the above: Poklewski remained on his place and King Carol died on 10 October 1914.

11 July 1914. — Budapest, 11 July 1914. Count Tisza to Count Berchtold: „Vertraulich. Nachricht über ungarischen Ministerrat im „Neuen Wiener Tagblatt" ist eine Kombination des Korrespondenten, wie solche nach Ministerräten oder Audienzen oft vorkommen. Ich garantiere, dass von Seiten der ungarischen Minister nichts in die Presse kommt und beschränke mich konsequent auf die Erklärung, dass Alles, was die Blätter schreiben, jeder positiven Information entbehre, der Wahrheit nicht entsprechende Kombinationen sind. Ich komme Montag früh Wien an." (*Ibid.* Pagg. 406.). — Vienna, 11 July 1914. Report of the German ambassador von Tschirschky: Count Berchtold told him that he invited Count Tisza to Vienna for the 14th July 1914 (Deutsche Dokumente etc. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pagg. 53.). — Budapest, 11 July 1914. Report of the French Consul General D'Apchier le Maugin on the peaceful declarations made by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament on 8 July 1914. (*A. von Wegerer: Das französische Gelbbuch von 1914.* Berlin 1925. Pagg. 29—30.). — Berlin, 11 July 1914. Report of the Russian Chargé Bronewski: according to a communication made to him by the Serbian Chargé Austro-Hungarian troops are secretly contracted on the Russian and Serbian frontiers. The report was transmitted by Tsar Nicholas II, on 13 July 1914, to the Russian minister of war Suchomlinov (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pagg. 171.). — Budapest, 11 July 1914. Received by the Hungarian Prime Minister a confidential letter of the Minister of Interior, dated 21 June 1914., No. 1048. Reserv., relative on the Russian propaganda conducted on Hungarian territory. Ad acta on 20 January 1915. Registered in the Archives of the Hungarian

Government under No. 1914. No. 5162. — Bucarest, 11 July 1914. The Rumanian minister at Vienna instructed by his government to demand from Count Berchtold that Count Czernin should not be replaced by another diplomat (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 400.). — Bucarest, 11 July 1914. Report of the German Chargé von Waldburg on his audience: „Als ich erwähnte, dass hier vielfach der Glaube bestehe, Siebenbürgen werde in nicht zu ferner Zeit Rumänien zufallen, meinte Seine Majestät, Er trete dieser Auffassung hier scharf entgegen, und habe offen ausgesprochen, dass er sich zu einer Eroberung Siebenbürgens niemals hergeben werde. Nach der Tafel kam das Gespräch nochmals auf diese Frage, wobei der König, zum Prinzen Ferdinand gewendet, erklärte: „Wir werden das ja nicht mehr erleben, Dein Sohn vielleicht“ (Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pag. 60.).

12 July 1914. — *Pester Lloyd* writes: „*Bukarester Tagblatt*“: „Die Tat von Debreczen war der bescheidene Anfang jener Propaganda der Tat, die in dem Morde von Sarajevo ihren entsetzlichen Gipfelpunkt fand, und mittels deren, wie es sich zeigt, alle jene Gruppen und Strömungen, die man unter dem Gesamtnamen Panslawismus zusammenfasst, ihr Werk der Zerstörung und des Umsturzes in Oesterreich-Ungarn zu vollenden hoffen.“ — Budapest, 12 July 1914. Received by the Hungarian Prime Minister, a letter of the Common War Minister dated Vienna, 12 July 1914, No. 5686 Praes., relative to a visit of Rumanian officers to island Ada Kaleh in the Danube, belonging to Hungarian territory. Ad acta on 13 July 1914. Registered in the Archives of the Hungarian Government under No. 5191 M. E. 1914.

13 July 1914. — Budapest, 13 July 1914. Report of the American Consul General Mallett ((Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. 1914. Supplement. World War. Washington 1928. Pag. 16.). — Sarajevo, 13 July 1914. Report of Ritter Friedrich von Wiesner on the attentat of Sarajevo. — Petersburg, 13 July 1914. Report of the German Ambassador Count Pourtalès: mentioning „den unversöhnlichen Hass des Ministers (Sasonov) gegen Oesterreich-Ungarn, ein Hass, der überhaupt hier mehr und mehr jedes klare und ruhige Urteil trübt“ (Deutsche Dokumente etc. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pag. 75. — Count F. Pourtalès: Meine letzten Verhandlungen in St. Petersburg, Ende Juli 1914. Berlin 1927. Pag. 83.). Sasonov added: „Hass entspricht nicht meinem Charakter, ich hege daher auch keinen Hass gegen Oesterreich, aber Verachtung“ (Petersburg, 25 July 1914. Report of Count Pourtalès. Ibid. Pag. 105. Cf. the Serbian report communicated to Sasonov by the Russian Chargé at Berlin on 11 July 1914.).

14 July 1914. — Reply of Emperor William II. to King-Emperor Francis Joseph (Deutsche Dokumente etc. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pagg. 43—44.). — Vienna, 14 July 1914. Confidential conference at Berchtold's. The Wiesner Report read by the Foreign Minister convincing Count Tisza on the necessity of the intervention owing to the „in ihrer Anmassung geradezu unerträgliche Sprache der serbischen Presse und der serbischen Diplomaten“ (his own argumentation). — Vienna, 14 July 1914. Immediate report of Count Berchtold to the King-Emperor: „Count Tisza has given up his objections to an ultimatum with so short a term, because I showed him the military difficulties which would arise from delayed action. I also argued that even after the mobilisation a peaceful arrangement might be possible if Serbia gives way in good time. Count Tisza most decidedly declared that he would give his consent to the intended action, if before the ultimatum is sent, a council of ministers of Austria and Hungary votes the resolution that the monarchy is not striving to acquire territory by the war, except what might accrue from small regulations of the frontier lines“ (Version given by the Austrian Red Book of 1919. Vol. I. Pag. 48., German original in *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930.

Pagg. 447—48.). — Vienna, 14 July 1914. Report of the German ambassador von Tschirschky: „Graf Tisza suchte mich heute nach seiner Besprechung mit Graf Berchtold auf. Der Graf sagte, er sei bisher stets derjenige gewesen, der zur Vorsicht ermahnt habe, aber jeder Tag habe ihn nach der Richtung hin mehr bestärkt, dass die Monarchie zu einem energischen Entschlusse kommen müsse, um ihre Lebenskraft zu beweisen und den unhaltbaren Zuständen im Südosten ein Ende zu machen. Die Sprache der serbischen Presse und der serbischen Diplomaten sei in ihrer Anmassung geradezu unerträglich. „Ich habe mich schwer entschlossen,“ meinte der Minister, „zum Kriege zu raten, bin aber jetzt von dessen Notwendigkeit überzeugt, und ich werde mit aller Kraft für die Grösse der Monarchie einstehe.“ (Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pag. 70.). — Vienna, 14 July 1914. The same: „Nachdem mich Graf Tisza verlassen hatte, bat Graf Berchtold mich zu sich, um mir einerseits das Ergebnis der heutigen Besprechung mitzuteilen. Zu seiner grossen Freude sei allseitige Uebereinstimmung über den Tenor der an Serbien zu übergebenden Note erzielt worden. Graf Tisza sei seiner, des Ministers, Auffassung in erfreulicher Weise entgegengekommen und habe sogar in manchem Punkte eine Verschärfung hineingebracht“ (Ibid. Pag. 71.). — Paris, 14 July 1914. Count Tisza's answer, in an article signed by André Leval, to the article of André Tardieu published in the *Paris Temps* on 2 July 1914: „Nous, des semeurs de discorde? Nous, qui sommes la puissance qui n'a et ne peut avoir aucune idée d'aggression, et dont le seul intérêt est de garantir sa propre sécurité en assurant l'indépendance et le libre développement des peuples balkaniques? L'Autriche-Hongrie a été la première à émettre le principe: „Les Balkans aux peuples balkaniques“ et je le dis avec fierté: ce sont les hommes d'État hongrois, dirigeant la politique de la monarchie après le compromis de 1867, qui ont introduit ce principe dans la politique européenne. Voilà l'idée de notre politique aux Balkans. Elle répond à nos intérêts et nous rend amis de la paix et de tous les États qui ne nourrissent aucune mauvaise intention à notre égard. Cette politique est la seule possible pour nous parce qu'elle seule répond à nos intérêts. Le même ordre d'idées nous à faire conclure l'alliance avec l'Allemagne, puis avec l'Italie. C'est une alliance purement défensive; elle ne menace pas la paix et ne met aucun obstacle à nos bon rapports avec les autres puissances. Les sympathies pour la France et le désir sincère de vivre en paix et amitié avec ce grand pays sont répandus chez nous dans toutes les partis politiques. Le comte Károlyi se trouve en contradiction avec la vérité comme avec les intérêts de sa patrie en voulant se poser lui et son parti comme les seuls amis hongrois de la France.“ — Later comment of Count Tisza on his „conversion“: Budapest, 5 November 1914. Count Tisza to the German Ambassador von Tschirschky: „Vorerst sei es betont, dass wir vor Einleitung unserer serbischen Aktion mit Deutschland zu Rate gegangen sind und auf die direkte Ermunterung und auf die Erklärung der deutschen Regierung, dass dieselbe die jetzige Situation für die droher werdende Abrechnung günstig erachte, die Demarche in Belgrad vollzogen haben“ (Complete Works of Count Stephen Tisza. Hungarian Edition. Fourth Series. Letters. Vol. II. Budapest 1924. Pag. 267. — Graf Stephan Tisza: Briefe 1914—18. Vol. I. Berlin 1928. Pag. 104.).

15 July 1914. — Vienna, 15 July 1914. General Conrad writes: „Der mir zugekommene Budapestbericht meldete auch erneuerte Besorgnisse des Grafen Tisza für Siebenbürgen im Kriegsfall“ (General Conrad op. cit. Vol. IV. Vienna 1923. Pag. 80.). — Budapest, 15 July 1914. Declaration made by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Lower House: „Die Regierung ist nicht der Ansicht, dass dies zu einer kriegerischen Verwicklung führen müsse“ (*Pester Lloyd*). — Vienna, 15 July 1914. Report of the French ambassador Dumaine: Count Tisza reproached by the Vienna paper *Neue Freie Presse* for the moderate tone of his speech delivered in the Hungarian Par-

liament (*A. von Wegerer: Das französische Gelbbuch des Jahres 1914. Berlin 1925. Pag. 30.*). — Vienna, 15 July 1914. Two reports of the Russian ambassador Sebeko on the moderate speech held by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament (Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pagg. 211—15.).

16 July 1914. — Vienna, 16 July 1914. The same on the same (*Ibid. Pagg. 238—39.*). — Berlin, 16 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Count Szögyény-Marich: „Herr von Tschirschky reports that Count Tisza came to see him during his last stay at Vienna and assured him that he had given up the scruples, which he had certainly at first entertained and that he now considered an energetic action necessary; besides Count Tisza had said as much in his declaration in the Hungarian Parliament the day before, as Herr Jagow had learnt to his satisfaction“ (English version given in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book of 1919. Vol. I. Pag. 51. — German original in *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 458.*). — Budapest, 16 July 1914. Report of British Consul General Max-Müller: „I am assured on good authority that Count Tisza is exerting his influence to moderate the tone of the newspapers“ (*Gooch-Temperley op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 65.*). — Vienna, 16 July 1914. Report of the British ambassador Sir M. de Bunsen on the speech of Count Tisza (*Ibid. Pagg. 51—52.*).

17 July 1914. — Address of a deputation of the Bosnian Serbs, led by the vice-president of the Bosnian *Landtag*, Dimovich, to Count Tisza: „Ew. Exzellenz! Im Namen der serbischen nationalen Partei erlauben wir uns Ew. Exzellenz für die ungarischen Parlamente über die Lage und über die einzuhaltenden politischen Richtlinien Bosniens und der Herzegowina abgegebenen Erklärungen unseren innigsten und tiefempfundenen Dank auszusprechen. Infolge des abscheulichen Attentats und infolge der darauffolgenden Devastierungen des Vermögens unschuldiger serbischer Bürger, serbischer Schulen und Kirchen, hat sicher eine düstere Stimmung des serbischen Volkes in Bosnien und der Herzegowina bemächtigt. Die Rede Euerer Exzellenz hat wie ein Lichtstrahl gewirkt. Aus der Rede Euerer Exzellenz haben wir Worte verurteilsloser staatsmännischer Klugheit, Worte edler Gerechtigkeit vernommen, welche auch in der ärmsten serbischen Hütte in Bosnien und Herzegowina einen freudigen Wiederhall gefunden haben. Diese Worte wird das serbische Volk in Bosnien und Herzegowina mit tiefstem Dank in Erinnerung behalten.“ — Count Tisza replied: „Er sei sehr, ja äusserst angenehm von der Tatsache berührt, dass seine Worte auf so fruchtbaren Boden gefallen seien und so dankbaren Wiederhall gefunden habe. Es ist notwendig, in diesen Zeiten sich ein kühles und gerechtes Urteil zu bewahren. Die bis jetzt als richtig anerkannten politischen Richtlinien werden beibehalten. Es soll nach dem Grundsätze der Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit gegen alle drei Hauptkonfessionen in Bosnien vorgegangen werden. Alle drei Konfessionen sollen in friedlicher Eintracht im bosnischen Staatsleben zum Wohle beider Länder und zum Ruhme der beiden Staaten der Monarchie herangezogen werden. Für diese Grundsätze werde ich überall meinen Einfluss geltend machen. Sie können sicher sein, dass Sie in mir einen Freund haben, der sich für Sie mit kühlem Verstand und warmen Herzen einsetzen wird, wenn Sie sich bei der nächsten gemeinsamen Arbeit überzeugen werden.“ — Budapest, 17 July 1914. Count Tisza to Count Berchtold: „Streng geheim. Pester Lloyd erhält wiederholt die Sachlage tendenziös entstellende, alarmierende Nachrichten aus dem Generalstab naheliegender Quelle. Ich habe Publikation vereitelt, bitte aber um gründliche Abhilfe. Tisza“ (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 484.*). — London, 17 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Mensdorff-Pouilly on the effect of the peaceful speech of Count Tisza in London (*Ibid. Pag. 480.*). — Budapest, 17 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller on the peaceful speech

held by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament (*Gooch-Temperley op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pagg. 67—68.*). —

18 July 1914. — Paris, 18 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Széchen on the effect of the peaceful speech of Count Tisza (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 489.*).

19 July 1914. — Vienna, 19 July 1914. Common Cabinet Council held at Vienna, Count Berchtold being in the chair. „The Royal Hungarian Premier begged the council to vote the resolution, of which he had spoken at their last meeting, and from which the Royal Hungarian Government made the whole action depend. The council of ministers must express unanimously that the action against Serbia was not in any way connected with plans of agrandisement on the part of the monarchy, and that not any portion of Serbia should be annexed, except slight frontier regulations, imposed by military considerations. Hemust absolutely insist that such a resolution be voted unanimously by the council. — The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) declared that he could not accept the Royal Hungarian Premier's point of view without certain reservations. In the present political situation, he was also opinion that, would it come to war with Serbia and we were the victors, we should annex no part of this country, but by making it surrender large portions of its territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, eventually to Rumania, reduce its size so much that it would cease to be dangerous. The situation in the Balkans may change; he must, as manager of the foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary reckon with the possibility that after the war there might be circumstances which would make it impossible for us to renounce all annexation, if we are to improve our frontiers. — The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) declared that he could not accept these reservations of Count Berchtold and must, in consideration of his responsibility, as Hungarian Premier, ask the conference to vote his point of view unanimously. He asks this not only from reasons basing on our home politics, but more particular, because he is firmly convinced, that Russia could not resist a outrance if we were to insist upon the complete annihilation of Serbia, and because he believes that the best card we hold for improving our international situation is to declare to the powers as early as possible, that we have no intention of annexing any territory whatever. — After this the following resolution was unanimously voted: „The Common Council of Ministers at the propositions of the Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) votes that as soon as the war begins, the monarchy declares to the foreign powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom contemplated. Of course the strategically necessary corrections of the frontier lines, or the reduction of Serbia's territory to the advantage of other states or the unavoidable temporary occupation of Serbian territory is not precluded by this resolution“ (English version given in the Austrian Red Book of 1919. Vol. I. Pagg. 53 and seq., the German original was published in *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 511—15.*).

20 July 1914. — Vienna, 20 July 1914. Report of the German ambassador von Tschirschky: „in den gestrigen Besprechungen sei, besonders auf Drängen des Grafen Tisza, der hervorgehoben habe, weder ihm noch irgendeiner ungarischen Regierung könne eine Stärkung des slavischen Elementes innerhalb der Monarchie durch Angliederung serbischer Gebietsteile zugemacht werden, beschlossen worden, von jeder dauernden Einverleibung fremden Gebietes abzusehen“ (Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pag. 119.). — Constantinople, 20 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Marquis Pallavicini: according to a declaration made by the Serbian minister Ristich the peaceful declarations of Count Tisza made a good impression in Serbia (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 536.*).

21 July 1914. — Budapest, 21 July 1914. Private letter of Count Tisza to his daughter-in-law, Countess Stephen Tisza jun.: „Wegen der unverschämtheit der Serben müssen wir ernsthaft auftreten, denn es ist ganz unmöglich, diese einfach einzustecken. Die Sache kann ohne Krieg ablaufen; gebe Gott, dass dem so sei, volle Beruhigung kann ich Dir jedoch nicht geben, dass es unter keinen Umständen zum Kriege kommen wird. Vertrauen wir auf Gott, dass soir dieser Prüfung entgehen werden, sollte er sie uns jedoch trotzdem auferlegen, dann lass uns mit doppelter Kraft auf ihn vertrauen.“ (*Berliner Monatshefte*. Vol. X. Berlin 1932. Pag. 286.). — Vienna, 21 July 1914. Report of the British ambassador Sir M. de Bunsen: „reports from Budapest speak of Count Tisza communicating to the Council of Ministers the text of the note to be presented“ (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 72.). — Note of the Editor: the note was presented by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Cabinet Council of 23 July 1914. In the only Cabinet Council held between 9 and 23 July 1914, in that of 16 July 1914, there was no mention relative to the affair. — Petersburg, 21 July 1914. According to a report of the Austro-Hungarian Chargé, Count Otto Czernin, Sasonov described the Serbian minister Spalaikovich as a „déséquilibre“ (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 568.), according to another report sent by the German ambassador Count Pourtales, Sasonov declared that politics of Austria-Hungary are directed by a „fool“, Count Tisza (*Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*. Vol. I. Berlin 1927. Pag. 130.). — London, 21 July 1914. The Rumanian Take Jonsescu meets a cool reception at the British Foreign Office. He turns from Sir Edward Grey to Henry W. Steed.

22 July 1914. — Vienna, 22 July 1914. The Note communicated by Count Berchtold to the German ambassador von Tschirschky (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 575.). — Budapest, 22 July 1914. Count Tisza to Count Berchtold: „Ich beabsichtige hiesige Presse derart zu informieren, dass unsere Forderungen zwar sehr stark, aber vollkommen berichtigt und notwendig seien; ein Verhandeln über dieselben sei ausgeschlossen. Dies schliesse aber die Hoffnung auf Erhaltung des Friedens umsoweniger aus, da wir ja nur die Erfüllung der elementaren Nachbarpflichten von Serbien fordern“ (Ibid. Pag. 592.). — Budapest, 22 July 1914. The same to the same: „Streng geheim. Note an Serbien. Baron Giesl bitte anzuweisen, die Uebergabe der Note auch mir direkt sofort mitzuteilen, damit ich, im Falle dass private Meldungen kommen sollten, authentische Informationen besitze“ (Ibid. Pag. 592—93.). — Vienna, 22 July 1914. Instructions to Baron Giesl: „Ueber Wunsch Graf Tizas bitte ich Uebergabe der Note unverzüglich ebenso wie anher auch dem ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten direkt von Belgrad und Semlin bei Verwendung der Euer Hochwohlgeboren für den Verkehr mit dem ungarischen Ministerium des Innern zur Verfügung stehenden Chiffres mitzuteilen. Telegraphämter in Semlin und Anschlussämter werden angewiesen, Sendungen dortiger Gesandtschaft in nächster Zeit mit grösster Beschleunigung und unbedingtem Vorzug zu expedieren. Berchtold.“ (Ibid. Pag. 574.). — Vienna, 22 July 1914. Report of the French ambassador A. Dumaine: according to his informations 8 Austro-Hungarian army corps were directed against Serbia, but they were not allowed to march owing to an intervention of Count Tisza (*A. von Wegerer: Das französische Gelbbuch von 1914*. Berlin 1925. Pagg. 35—36.). — Petersburg, 22 July 1914. Memorandum addressed by the Serbian minister Spalaikovich to Foreign Minister Sasonov informing him that as according to the declaration made by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament possibility of an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia may not be regarded excluded, asked for the protection of the Russian Government (*Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*. Reihe I. Vol. 4. Berlin 1932. Pagg. 288—91.). — Petersburg, 22 July 1914. Report of the British ambassador Sir G. Buchanau:

„Serbian minister told me yesterday after repeating to me all that his Government had done to show their readiness to meet any legitimate demands that Austria might address to them, he said that Count Tisza and Count Forgách were inflaming Austrian public opinion so as to force hands of aged Emperor“ (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pagg. 61—62.). — London, 22 July 1914. Leading article published by the Times against Austria-Hungary. According to the reminiscences of H. W. Steed it was written by him after and on the ground of his conversation with Take Jonsescu.

23 July 1914. — Vienna, 23 July 1914. Report of the British ambassador Sir M. de Bunsen: moderate tone of the Note may be supposed on the ground of speech held by Count Tisza on 22 July 1914 (Ibid. Pag. 73.). — London, 23 July 1914. Notice made by Sir Edward Grey: „M. Cambon tells me that the Vienna Minister of War has ordered preparations to be made for mobilising 8 army corps — but on the advice of M. Tisza this measure has been postponed.“ (Ibid. Pag. 71.). — Belgrade, 6.00 p. m., 23 July 1914. The Note handed to the Serbian Government. — Budapest, night of 23 July 1914. Hungarian Cabinet Council. „L. A miniszterelnök bejelenté, hogy a belgrádi osztrák-magyar követ ma délután 6 órákor nyújtotta át a szerb királyi kormánynak a magyar fordításban ezen jegyzőkönyvhöz csatolt jegyzéket, melynek értelmében a cs. és kir. kormány legkésőbb szombaton, folyó hó 25-én este 6 óráig várja a szerb királyi kormány választát. — Tudomásul vétetik.“ — German translation: „I. Der Herr Ministerpräsident meldet an dass der Belgrader öst.- ung. Gesandte heute nachmittag um 6 Uhr der k. serbischen Regierung die in ungarischer Uebersetzung diesem Protokoll angeschlossene Note überreicht hat, laut welcher die öst.- ung. Regierung die Antwort der kön. serbischen Regierung bis spätestens Samstag, den 25. d. M. 6 Uhr abends erwartet“ (Original in the Archives of the Hungarian Government at Budapest. Minutes of the Cabinet Councils, 1914. No. 20.). — Budapest, 23 July 1914. Two reports of the British Consul General Max-Müller on the speech held by Count Tisza in the Parliament on the previous day (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pagg. 69 and 109—10.). „Count Tisza stated that the position of affairs was not such as to justify the conclusion that a serious turn for the worse was either certain or even probable; the foreign situation was still uncertain, and could be solved by peaceful means, though he could not overlook the possibility of serious conflict“. — Vienna, 23 July 1914. Report of the British ambassador Sir. M. de Bunsen (Ibid. Pag. 68.).

24 July 1914. — Vienna, 24 July 1914. Instructions sent by Count Berchtold to Baron Giesl at Belgrade: he should send a telegraphic message from Zimony to the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 620—21.). — Budapest, 24 July 1914. Count Tisza declared in the Lower House of the Hungarian Parliament: „Es ist überflüssig eingehender darzutun, dass der Schritt, den wir gestern unternommen haben, kein aggressiver Schritt ist. Alles, was wir in der Note wünschen, ist ja nichts weiter als die Erfüllung der Nachbarspflichten, die jeder Staat seinem Nachbar schuldet und deren Erfüllung sich, unserer Ansicht nach, nicht entziehen darf. — Den heutigen Zustand betrachte ich nicht im mindesten noch als einem Kriegszustand oder als einen solchen, der die Gefahr eines Krieges notwendig heraufbeschwören müsste. Die Monarchie sucht den Frieden, sie ist bestrebt gewesen, auch inmitten der sie nahe berührenden und oft kritischen Wendungen der rings um uns stattgehabten Weltereignisse den Frieden zu erhalten. Niemand kann gegen uns die Anklage erheben, dass wir den Krieg suchen, doch sind wir uns selbstverständlich aller Konsequenzen dieses Schrittes bewusst. Und in der Ueberzeugung, dass wir eine gerechte Sache vertreten, in der Ueberzeugung, dass die Lebensinteressen der Monarchie und der ungarischen Nation die Durchführung dieses Schrittes erheischen, werden

wir dessen sämtliche Konsequenzen tragen" (*Pester Lloyd*). — Budapest, 24 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller on the peaceful character of the declaration made by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pagg. 332—33.). — Vienna, 24 July 1914. Report of the British Ambassador Sir M. de Bunsen on the same subject (*Ibid.* Pagg. 159.). — London, 24 July 1914. Result of the action of H. W. Steed. Report of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Mensdorff-Pouilly: „Tyrrell sagte Lichnowsky, es sei undenkbar, dass Serbien annehme. Oesterreich-Ungarn unterschätze Serbien und werde sich dort verbluten; Haltung Rumäniens würde voraussichtlich sehr feindselig sein" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 638.). — Petersburg, 24 July 1914. Conference held at the French Embassy. Present; Sazonov (Russian Foreign Minister), Paléologue (French ambassador), Buchanan (British ambassador): „decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia". — Sazonov „personally thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilise" (*Diary of Baron Schilling, German Edition, Berlin 1924. Pag. 6.* — *Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 80.). — „Towards the close of our interview we were joined by the Rumanian Minister, with whom Minister of Foreign Affairs had a private conversation" (*Ibid.* Pag. 81., *Diary of Baron Schilling, English Edition, London 1925. Pag. 30.*). — The Rumanian minister Diamandi added: „la Russie avait besoin de mon pays" (*Revue des deux mondes, Vol. XLIX. Paris 1929. Pag. 794.*). — Russian Cabinet Council: „it was decided in principle to mobilize four military districts (Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, Kazan) and the two fleets (Baltic and Black Sea) and to take other military measures should circumstances so require. In this connection attention was turned to the fact that all military preparations were clearly and exclusively directed with a view to the possibility of a conflict with Austria-Hungary, and could not be represented as unfriendly actions with regard to Germany" (*Diary of Baron Schilling, English Edition, London 1925. Pag. 30. Minutes of the Russian Cabinet Council published by R. C. Brinkley in the Current History, New York, January 1926.*). — That was the Russian determination to frustrate localisation of the war and to enlarge it to a European one by intervention in the conflict arisen between Austria-Hungary and Serbia by assisting Serbia against Austria-Hungary and by inviting Rumania to join after the Russian mobilisation was in principio accepted.

25 July 1914. — Budapest, 25 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller relative to the speech held by Count Tisza in the Hungarian Lower House on the previous day (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pagg. 96 and 159.). — Petersburg, 25 July 1914. Mobilisation in principio approved by the Tsar. — Sazonov to Poklewski-Koziell: „Wir rechnen auf die Solidarität mit Serbien" (*Diary of Baron Schilling, German Edition, Berlin 1923. Pag. 11., English Edition, London 1925. Pagg. 91 and 96.*). — Zimony, 25 July 1914. Baron Giesl writes: after the rupture and after arrival from Belgrade to Zimony „im Bahnhofs in Semlin wurde ich an den Fernsprecher gerufen. Graf Tisza fragte aus Budapest: „Musste es denn sein?" Ich antwortete kurz: „Ja." (*Baron W. Giesl* op. cit. Pag. 271.). Telegraphic message addressed by Baron Giesl to Count Tisza (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 660.).

26 July 1914. — Petersburg, 26 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 106.). — Petersburg, 26 July 1914. *Diary of Baron Schilling*: „The Rumanian Minister informed Baron Schilling that in reply to this telegram to Bucarest sent at the request of S. D. Sazonov, Bratianu had replied that owing to the limited time available he regretted he could not accede

to this request. Here Baron Schilling reminded M. Diamandi of the latter's own words addressed to himself, Baron Schilling, at the time they were travelling through Hungarian territory near Predeal six weeks ago, viz. that the interests of Serbia and Rumania were completely identical, and compel Rumania to stand firmly at the side of Serbia in the event of any attempts upon the latter on the part of Austria. The Rumanian Minister did not attempt to deny having spoken thus" (*Diary of Baron Schilling, English Edition, London 1925. Pag. 41., German Edition, Berlin 1923. Pagg. 13—14.*). — Petersburg, 26 July 1914. Sazonov to Poklewski-Koziell: „Wir sind überzeugt, dass alle Sympathien und alle Zukunftshoffnungen Rumäniens in den Weg der Interessengemeinschaft mit Serbien weisen. Wenn heute Oesterreich über Serbien mit der Beschuldigung des Irredentismus herfällt, so wird morgen Rumänien dasselbe Los treffen, oder es wird selbst gezwungen sein, für immer auf die Verwirklichung seiner nationalen Ideale zu verzichten" (*A. von Wegerer: Das russische Orangebuch von 1914, Berlin 1925. Pag. 30.*). Report of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador relative to Russian mobilisation (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 760—61.).

27 July 1914. — Budapest, 27 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 126.). — Petersburg, 27 July 1914. Sazonov to the Russian ambassadors at Paris and London: „Wenn die Rede davon sei, irgendeine mässigende Einwirkung in Petersburg auszuüben, so wiesen wir sie von vornherein ab." (*A. von Wegerer* op. cit. Pag. 45.). — Bucarest, 27 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian minister Count Ottokar Czernin: according to report of the consulate of Jassy „Militärzüge wurden nach Palanka an der ungarischen Grenze expediert" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 780—81.).

28 July 1914. — Received by the Hungarian Prime Minister, a letter of the Hungarian Minister of Interior, dated 25 July 1914, No. 127, 687, relative to violation of the Hungarian frontier by Rumanian soldiers. Registered under No. 5599. M. E. of 1914. Transmitted to the Common Foreign Minister on 3 August 1914. — Petersburg, 28 July 1914. Foreign Minister Sazonov invited by the Serbian minister Spalaikovich to punish Austria-Hungary for its declaration of war to the Serbian Kingdom (*Serbian Blue Book of 1914. No. 47.*).

29 July 1914. — Russian mobilisation. — Petersburg, 29 July 1914. Sazonov to Poklewski-Koziell: „der rumänische Gesandte in Berlin, Beliman, soll erklärt haben, dass sich die Möglichkeit ergäbe, dass (Rumänien) seine ganzen Kräfte gegen Russland wende. Wir möchten diesen Nachrichten keinen Glauben schenken, denn, falls sie sich bestätigen sollten, würde Rumänien als beispielloser Betrüger entlarvt sein" (*A. von Wegerer* op. cit. Pag. 70.). Petersburg, 29 July 1914. Sazonov to Poklewski-Koziell: „stellen Sie an (Bratianu) Ihrerseits die kategorische Frage über die Stellungnahme Rumäniens, wobei Sie ihm zu verstehen geben können, dass wir die Möglichkeit von Vorteilen für Rumänien nicht ausschliessen, falls es am Krieg gegen Oesterreich an unserer Seite teilnehmen sollte" (*Ibid.* Pag. 87.). — Odessa, 29 July 1914. Report of the Austro-Hungarian Consul General on transfer of Russian troops to the Rumanian and Hungarian frontiers (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger* op. cit. Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 883.).

30 July 1914. — Budapest, 30 July 1914. Report of the British Consul General Max-Müller (*Gooch-Temperley* op. cit. Vol. XI. London 1926. Pag. 224.). — Petersburg, 30 July 1914. Sazonov to Spalaikovich: answer given to the letter of Spalaikovich dated 22 July 1914: Russian assistance assured to the Serbian Kingdom (*Serbian Blue Book of 1914. No. 48.*). — Petersburg, 30 July 1914. Sazonov to Poklewski-Koziell: „We are ready to support the annexation of Transylvania to Rumania" (*Diary of Baron*

Schilling. German Edition. Berlin 1923. Pag. 30. English Edition. London 1925. Pag. 67.) — The same: „Streng vertraulich! Wenn Sie es für möglich halten, an eine konkrete Festlegung jener Vorteile heranzutreten, mit denen Rumänien im Falle der Teilnahme am Krieg auf unserer Seite rechnen kann, so können Sie Bratianu ausdrücklich erklären, dass wir bereit sind, den Anschluss Siebenbürgens an Rumänien zu unterstützen" (*A. von Wegerer: Das zaristische Russland im Weltkriege*. Berlin 1927. Pag. 164. — French text in *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes*, 1914—17. Paris 1928. Pag. 167., and in *Le Monde Slave*. Vol. V. Paris 1928. Pag. 426.). — Bucarest, 30 July 1914. Diary of A. Marghiloman: „Le soir Poklewsky me montre un télégramme à communiquer à Bratianu, que le gouvernement russe n'acceptera pas l'écrasement de la Serbie" (*A. Marghiloman op. cit.* Vol. I. Bucarest 1927. Pag. 228.). — Bucarest, 30 July 1914. Report of Count Czernin: „Vizekonsul Sulina teilt mir mit, rumänische Monitore seien nach Turn-Severin dirigiert worden" (*Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit.* Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pag. 916.). — London, 30 July 1914. Prime Minister Asquith gained over by the efforts of H. W. Steed (*H. W. Steed: Asquith's place in World History*. Current History of April 1928. Vol. XXVIII. New York 1928. Pag. 42.).

31 July 1914. — Vienna. Common Cabinet Council. Count Tisza proposed to accept British mediation „on the condition that our operations in Serbia be continued and the Russian mobilisation stopped. — After Baron Burián had also expressed agreement, the proposal of Count Tisza was unanimously accepted and the fact established the inclination was to accept the English proposal on the conditions formulated by Count Tisza." (English version given in the *Austrian Red Book of 1919*. Vol. III. Pagg. 72—73., German original in *Bittner, Pribram, Uebersberger op. cit.* Vol. VIII. Vienna 1930. Pagg. 976—79.). — Petersburg, 31 July 1914. Sasonov to Poklewski-Koziell: „Wir wären einverstanden, unsere Unterstützung zur Erwerbung Siebenbürgens durch Rumänien zu versprechen" (*A. von Wegerer: Dass russische Orangebuch von 1914*. Berlin 1927. Pag. 135. — How the War began. London 1925. Pag. 99.). — Bucarest, 31 July 1914. Poklewski-Koziell to Sasonov (*A. von Wegerer: Das zaristische Russland im Weltkriege*. Berlin 1927. Pag. 165. — French text in *Le Monde Slave*. Vol. V. Paris 1928. Pag. 428.).



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