

The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century



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IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY

Edited by
János Besenyő – Viktor Marsai

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Introduction

After decades of civil wars, state collapses, famines and genocides, Africa experienced significant developments in the new millennium. Booming economies, the spread of good governance and democracy and the end of armed conflicts were the benchmarks of the new era. Many scholars and politicians are speaking about the *African century* which will bring unimaginable development in the continent; if we have a look at the statistics and examine the living conditions of ordinary people the change is obvious.

Nevertheless, there is still another side of Africa. On this side we find the prolonged conflicts of Sudan and Somalia, the challenges of peacekeeping in the Central African Republic and Mali, and the increasing tensions of Northern Nigeria and the Maghreb. Observing these parts of Africa, one can have an impression that the aforementioned areas remained in the 1990s, the *black decade* of the continent, and that they were not capable to learn from their own mistakes. Furthermore, we can hardly see the light at the end of the tunnel in case of Mali, the Boko Haram insurgency or the spread of radical ideologies in the Sahel.

Therefore, contrary to many optimistic works, this book will concentrate on the dynamics of conflicts and challenges in Africa – not only armed struggles, but other aspect of crises, too. To achieve their goals, the editors asked Hungarian and foreign experts to contribute to the book by the examination of different challenges of the continent. Some of the thirteen articles will explore wider regional or continental issues (*Concerted Development Strategy for Africa, BRICS in Africa and the Brazilian approach*) while others will focus on more local issues (*Black Holes of Insecurity – the North of Mali, The Border Dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea*). It is important that the papers describe not only the problems but also the best practices which could contribute to the lasting solution to the crises.

The success or failure of the African development will determine not only the fate of the continent but the whole world. Therefore, it is a must to help the stabilisation and peace-building process of Africa, even if it requires sacrifices not only from the locals, but also from the outsiders. The editors believe that we can achieve our aims only by common efforts. Therefore, this book represents a small, but significant example of cooperation from Cameroon to the United Kingdom to help the better understanding and, perhaps, the solution of African woes.

Budapest, 27 December 2017

The Editors

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The Use of Local Non-State Armed Groups in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism – Examining the Case of Mali

Cyprian Aleksander Kozera

Abstract

The following study is devoted to the use of local non-state armed groups in counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorist (CT) operations conducted by a state actor. The case study focuses on Mali and the use of tribal (Tuareg) militias in the Northern Malian provinces following recent Islamist uprising in the region. The author analyses advantages and disadvantages of employing local militias in COIN and CT both by the country's government and France, as a foreign actor. The analysis leads to conclusions that, while it is a cost-effective tool, it entails significant risks and challenges, and is prone to misuses and abuses. Therefore, employment of local non-state actors requires sensitivity to local environment and long-term engagement and strategy (including e.g. demobilisation) in order to avoid a situation in which costs outweigh benefits.

Keywords: *non-state armed groups, tribal militias, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, Mali, the Tuareg*

Introduction

Terms such as target or collateral damage, eliminate or neutralise are invented in order to *positively dehumanise* warfare – to exclude humans from the battlefield. People should no longer be a part of war. They should no longer die, at least. These notions coined by specialists and members of general staffs serve as magic spells to change the reality, at least verbally. Soldiers should have no fear or doubts of killing innocents and civilians – as they are now referred to as *collateral damage* – or even enemy, who became a *target to neutralise* via means of a *kinetic operation* (i.e. a deadly mission). Such approach to military language reveals a broader, multi-domain attempt (especially in the domain of technology) of removing death from the battlefield and the news' titles, especially the death of *our soldiers*.

Contemporary Leonidas¹ most likely would be still highly acclaimed by their society, yet even more probably their superiors would have done everything in order to prevent modern Thermopylae from happening. Troops from democratic states should not die in battle. Hence faceless private contractors, less-scrutinised allies and unknown to the media local militias are being hired in order to do the job that for regular soldiers might be too risky, dangerous, or sometimes inappropriate.

Laconic “*molon labe*” (μολὼν λαβέ, ancient Greek for “come and take [it]”) said by Leonidas, that duly characterised past conflicts (which required direct physical contact between warring parties), was replaced by an indirect and remote tactic of “hunting them down” – as said by George W. Bush in September 2001 when he referred to those responsible for World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.² With technological breakthroughs, especially such as developments of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, a.k.a. drones), overseas military involvement and operations became much easier, cheaper and therefore widespread. Such tactic was adopted after the 9/11 attacks as a response to rising Islamist terrorism threat – counterterrorism missions were since conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Barack Obama, since assuming office in 2009, escalated such operations, primarily through an increase in unmanned drone strikes³ yet also through an expansion of US special operations *kill or capture* missions.⁴ Yet some counterterrorism efforts need much greater involvement than just a squad of several elite soldiers. In case of bigger missions, when realised overseas, the need for local support increases. Thus, search for credible partners begins, and outsourcing of local actors – as examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and Somalia prove – tends to be a tempting solution. This approach – of employing local non-state armed groups or tribal militias⁵ as a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tool, with a special attention paid to the recent French–Malian experience – is being analysed in the following article.

¹ Leonidas I was a king and military commander of Sparta who defended the Thermopylae passage (and thus the Greek land) against the Persian invasion in 480 BC. He decided to sacrifice his three hundred elite Spartans (and a few hundreds of auxiliaries) in order to slow down the Persian army pace (modern estimates give the numbers at around 70,000–300,000 Persians) and buy the time for the Greeks to organise their troops. Being outnumbered at least by 1:40, he fought and died in the battle alongside his men. On a request by the Persians to lay down their arms, the Spartan commander is believed to have famously replied: “come and take [it]”.

² Literally: “the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible”, vide: “George W. Bush delivers his first public speech after 9/11 attack”. *YouTube*, 5 September 2011. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QP-1K84iRZPo>, Accessed on 22 January 2017; “President Bush’s Second Speech on 9/11 from Barksdale”. *YouTube*, 10 November 2008. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bwgqmaeV7o0>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³ More on use of UAVs in counterterrorism operations, vide: Byman, D. “Why Drones Work. The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice”. *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013. 32–43; Cronin, A. K. “Why Drones Fail. When Tactics Drive Strategy”. *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013. 44–54; Freedman, L. D. “The Drone Revolution”. *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2016. 153–158; Shaw, I. and Akhter, M. “The Dronification of State Violence”. *Critical Asian Studies* 46/2. 2014. 211–234.

⁴ Master, J. “Targeted Killings”. *CFR Backgrounders*. Council on Foreign Relations. 23 May 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁵ It must be noted that despite the fact that, on the ground, both terms often refer to the same actor, they are slightly different in meaning: even if every tribal militia is a local non-state actor, not every local non-state actor has tribal character (e.g. it might be a multi-tribe group bond by the common ideology or goal).

Few Words on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

The phenomenon of terrorism, despite being widely discussed in the academic world and the media, lacks a common definition.⁶ Despite its popularity, there is no consensus regarding the concept, and thus over a hundred of academic definitions exist.⁷ The reason is that terrorism remains a notion that is highly politicised, for “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” – as a known cliché says.⁸ Indeed, “[t]his relativism is central to the impossibility of finding an uncontentious definition of terrorism” – as Charles Townshend points out.⁹ There is, however, a certain compromise among most of the scholars and experts regarding the core three elements constituting what terrorism is. These elements are: 1. the use of violence, or the threat of violence, 2. against civilians or non-combatants,¹⁰ 3. in pursue of political or ideological goals (whereas ideology often reflects hidden political agenda). There is a risk, although, that representing too reductive stance on the definition of terrorism – such as “the use of violence for political ends” – brings us too close to the Clausewitzan definition of war, and thus renders such explanation of terrorism useless.¹¹ It is therefore proposed – at least for the purpose of this article – to understand terrorism as any wilful targeting of non-combatants with violence or the threat of violence for political purposes by a non-state actor.¹² The fourth element (a non-state actor) is necessary to add in order to differentiate between an act of terrorism and that of terror – where the latter is usually understood as a state-organised form of unlawful violence.

Consequently, counterterrorism (CT; or antiterrorism – as differences between these two have blurred recently and both terms are used interchangeably) would be – again to merge some definitions together – the whole of a government’s holistic approach that aims to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism.¹³ Military response is included in the scope of counterterrorist efforts. It can limit itself to a deadly drone strike, special forces operation (*kill/capture* missions) or even a full-scale armed intervention – although the latter

⁶ More on challenge of defining terrorism vide: Schmid, A. P. “Defining Terrorism.” In Wither, J. K. and Mullins, S. (eds), *Combating Transnational Terrorism*. Sofia: Procon Ltd, 2016. 1–16.

⁷ Laqueur, W. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 5.

⁸ Or “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” – a saying popularised by Ronald Reagan during a radio speech on 31 May 1986 (“Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism”), yet already known before – in literature on the subject at least since 1970.

⁹ Townshend, Ch. *Terrorism – a very short introduction*. New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 4.

¹⁰ The notion of *non-combatant* refers to every person (whether civilian or not) who do not take part in hostilities (armed conflict). Therefore, a non-combatant is not only a military medic or chaplain (as stated by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, more vide: International Committee of the Red Cross, “Rule 3. Definition of Combatants”. *Customary International Humanitarian Law*. 2017. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule3, Accessed on 22 January 2017) but also a military officer who finished his work at a military base and returns home, or even a soldier who, despite being stationed at a military base, is outside recognised battlefield.

¹¹ Townshend. *Terrorism – a very short introduction*. 6.

¹² Based upon a definition presented by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Russell Howard at the NATO’s Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara on 7 April 2014.

¹³ Wither, J. K. “The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism”. In Wither, J. K. and Mullins, S. (eds), *Combating Transnational Terrorism*. Sofia: Procon Ltd, 2016. 131; Townshend. *Terrorism – a very short introduction*. 117–118.; Petraeus, D. (ed), *Glossary: Counterterrorism*. U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 3–24). Old Saybrook: Konecky & Konecky, 2006. 250.

might often be seen as overreaction. In the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11 military approach became the dominant element of the US counterterrorism strategy, even leading to the emergence of such a controversial concept as the *Global War on Terror*. Despite the fact that “[h]istory is filled with cases of overtly military responses to terrorism that have alienated public opinion and undermined support for the government’s CT campaign” (e.g. the French campaign in Algiers in 1960) – as James K. Wither claims – in some cases a military intervention seems to be the last resort to contain serious terrorist threat.¹⁴ Such was the case of the French CT military intervention in Mali in 2013 that might have saved the Malian state from total collapse after the Jihadist invasion.

When counterterrorism requires a military involvement, it has to equal with the ultimate gravity of the situation. A risk of massive atrocities, threat to international peace and order, state destabilisation, establishment of a terrorist safe haven, etc. – these might be excuses to send military to deal with terrorists. In such cases, the potential of terrorists’ manpower also must be significant, equalling rather to that of a small irregular army than of a single terrorist cell. Thus, the intervening side frequently finds itself engaged in a protracted armed conflict against an irregular opponent fighting an asymmetric war. In such situations counterterrorism becomes in fact counterinsurgency (COIN) and the latter term is understood as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes”.¹⁵

Although these terms cannot be used interchangeably and much has been done in the academic world in order to disassociate both notions (especially when, anecdotally, the first CT military manuals were the basically copy/paste versions of the COIN manuals), in specific cases counterterrorism means counterinsurgency. Fighting transnational Islamist terrorism might often require such an approach. The aim to overthrow the existing political order and replace it with a competitive one (e.g. introduction of the sharia law and reestablishment of the caliphate), the militant and armed character of Islamist groups, high potential of violence, insurgency tactics, global links between organisations (channelling ideology, know-how, finances and foreign fighters), and common ideology requires recognition of the Islamist terrorism as the *globalized Islamist insurgency* – argues David Kilcullen.¹⁶

Thus, when fighting terrorism one often finds himself fighting an insurgency. In such cases, it is critical to understand that, contrary to what some *scorched-earth* supporters claim upon inaccurately analysed historical examples,¹⁷ the protection and well-being of the local population is the crucial element of a successful COIN campaign. This approach

¹⁴ Wither. “The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism”. 131–132.

¹⁵ *Joint Publication 1-02*. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Term. 8 November 2010. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf [As Amended Through 15 February 2016]. 53.

¹⁶ Kilcullen, D. *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 165–186. Similarly, Islamist terrorism is considered (global) insurgency by e.g. Max Boot (Boot, M. *Invisible Armies. An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*. New York–London: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013. 547–549.) and Morris, M. F. *Al-Qaeda As Insurgency*. USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2015.

¹⁷ Kilcullen. *Counterinsurgency*. 5–7; Boot. *Invisible Armies...* 19–25, 541.

is named the population-centric counterinsurgency.¹⁸ It was elucidated by a classic COIN expert and practitioner, David Galula in his opus vitae *Contre-insurrection. Théorie et pratique. (Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice)*,¹⁹ and other classic writers on the topic including i.a. Charles Callwell, T. E. Lawrence, and Robert Thompson.²⁰ Their ideas have been recently refreshed and reaffirmed by Kilcullen who presents two fundamentals of successful COIN operation: local solutions and respect for non-combatants. The latter means “putting the wellbeing of non-combatant civilians ahead of any other consideration (...) developing genuine partnership with them, demonstrating that we can protect them from the guerrillas (...) because insurgents cannot operate without the support – active, passive, or enforced – of the local population”. The former advice focuses on understanding the drivers of the conflict and “the need to constantly update that understanding as the environment shifts, to develop solid partnership with reliable local allies, to design, in concert with those allies, locally tailored measures to target the drivers that sustain the conflict and thus to break the cycle of violence.”²¹ It is clearly visible that both underline the need to keep close to the population and search for local allies. When the aforementioned need to avoid (own) casualties and eagerness to cooperate with local allies are brought together, the use of local militias becomes an option to consider.

Employing Local Militias in COIN/CT Operations – The Malian Case

While discussing the phenomenon (of employing local tribal militias in COIN/CT operations) the academics of the US Naval War College²² pointed out to the author of this text that one of the most important challenge in conducting a successful CT (or COIN) armed intervention is to find a credible, stable and competent partner in the region. Preferably, it would be a state i.e. a regional power capable of projecting its force in the region. A foreign entity (as it lacks necessary legitimisation on its own) should not, in principle, engage in

¹⁸ It also warns to avoid excessive use of force and encourages to advance effective governance through the application of non-military COIN measures, as James K. Wither explains (Wither. “The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism”. 131); more on that in Petraeus, D. (ed), *U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. 33–41; cf. Boot. *Invisible Armies...* 562–563.

¹⁹ Galula, D. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. 81, 83.

²⁰ Boot. *Invisible Armies...* 540.

²¹ Kilcullen. *Counterinsurgency*. 3–4.

²² Consultations were held in March 2016 at the US Naval War College premises in Newport (Rhode Island, USA) with the following academics: Laurence McCabé (Professor of National Security Affairs), Marc A. Genest (Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups), Nicholas A. Glavin (Assistant at the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups), Christopher Jasparró (Professor of National Security Affairs, expert on African Studies and Irregular Threats), Jeffrey Landsman (Professor at the War Gaming Department), Andrew A. Michta (Professor of National Security Affairs). They insisted not to attribute any statement to a specific person, though agreed on listing all the names of experts who contributed to the research. Hereby, I would like to express my thanks for their kind reception at the US Naval War College as well as for the candour and valuable consultations. Further in the text findings of the research will be referred to as “US Naval War College Consultations. 31 March 2016”.

a foreign intervention, unless it has such partners (either state or non-state actors).²³ According to one of the experts, in case of engagement on the African continent, finding regional allies is highly challenging as numerous African states are either instable or undemocratic (and often both), and do not represent the interests of their citizens but only those of narrow circles of political elites. Collaboration with governments and armed forces of such states entails a risk of legitimising dictatorships and their inhuman policies, what in consequence, not only undermines the legitimacy of the intervening party, but also jeopardises the entire CT/COIN effort. While specifically referring to the situation in Mali, in recent years one of the interlocutors with diplomatic experience on the continent described possibilities of collaborating with the Malian government as “a laugh-worth fiction”.²⁴

Naval War College experts expressed their criticism towards possible cooperation with the regional organisations as e.g. the African Union (AU) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) remarking that these international entities act slowly, are characterised by the internal inertia and tend to support authoritarian regimes. The incapability of the AU to contain massive and brutal human rights violations by the Muammar Gadhafi regime in Libya in 2011 might serve as a recent example. Similarly, two years later, when the Malian crisis was escalating, ECOWAS agreed on deploying a military contingent to northern Mali that might have become operational in the Autumn of 2013. It was in January 2013, though, when the Jihadists entered into the central regions of Mali and threatened to attack the capital – had it not been for the French instant intervention in the same month, by the following Autumn the state of Mali might have not existed. Due to these very reasons the Naval War College academics distanced themselves from positively assessing the regional international organisations’ conflict resolution capabilities.²⁵

In such context, an intervening foreign state might find itself in need of entering into cooperation with local non-state actors (either hostile to the host state, either pro-governmental), that possess some kind of authority, or – acting from the position of power capable of managing often conflicting interests between hostile parties – both the government and non-state actors – as it was in case of the French involvement in Mali with the 2013 operation codenamed *Serval*. Furthermore, the government itself may use non-state actors when and where it lacks sufficient authority or legitimisation – such was the case of Bamako elites incorporating *divide et impera* ruling style over the Malian northern provinces long before and after the 2013 crisis; this will be discussed later.

Strategy of employing local non-state actors, here: tribal militias, in order to counter Islamist insurgency, in this case al-Qaeda and allied armed groups, was introduced in Iraq during the U.S. stabilisation period and employed in Yemen by its government since 2012. The experiences and lessons learnt were collected by a former U.S. intelligence officer and presently an academic, Norman Cigar, in a monograph entitled *Tribal Militias: An Effective Tool to Counter al-Qaeda and its Affiliates?* issued in 2014.²⁶

²³ Cf. Boot. *Invisible Armies...* 563–564; Petraeus (ed), *U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. 33–34, 39–40.

²⁴ US Naval War College Consultations. 31 March 2016.

²⁵ US Naval War College Consultations. 31 March 2016. Cf. Buyoya, P. “The Recurrent Security Crisis in Mali and the Role of the African Union”. *Prism: a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 5/2. 2015. 60–71.

²⁶ Cigar, N. *Tribal Militias: An Effective Tool to Counter al-Qaeda and its Affiliates?* Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014.

The analysis conducted by Norman Cigar is structured according to the patron type, and thus he presents two models: first in which an outside entity is the patron, and second where the national government realises this role (a foreign entity might still support the government). The Model 1 refers to the Iraqi example (between 2006 and handing the responsibility to the Iraqi Government through December 2008 – April 2009) while the Model 2 to the Iraqi situation after April 2009, and the Yemeni case since 2012. Despite the fact that both these Middle Eastern countries and their societies are different for obvious reasons, the tribal component is strongly visible in both conflicts which constitutes grounds for a comparative analysis. Consequently, conclusions and lessons learnt drawn from the analysis may be useful in any conflicts where the tribal and Islamist elements appear.²⁷

The research thesis proposed by Cigar states that “the capabilities which tribally-based militias provide may be one of the most efficient and cost-effective tools against al-Qaeda”, reducing the need or number of regular troops deployed, or the scope of their engagement. However, tribal militias are a part of complex socio-political environment and therefore might be a two-edged sword if their potential is exploited unskillfully. In order to achieve most positive results, Norman Cigar proposes to employ the following recommendations.²⁸

Firstly, the task confined upon militias has to be realistic, feasible and must be tailored to capabilities and limitations (not only operational) of non-state armed groups. On their land, local militias have unique and often excellent knowledge of both the physical and human terrains – their members not only operate there for years, yet often live for generations. This provides them with unique knowledge of co-habitants of the territory – they not only know the people, but they have deep ties to them and sustain political relations with local prominent figures, as well. It comes obviously with unique acquaintance with tribal languages, local dialects, customs, habits, and traditions. It could facilitate establishing or deepening the existing relationship between the patron and the local people, and also allow to quickly identify any foreigners or outsiders – as they will be pointed to the militia by their local contacts. A foreign entity, even with the broadest and deepest possible network of human intelligence sources would never possess the equal potential. Moreover, as stated, they share the land with local people, and thus their presence is permanent and nothing abnormal to the locals. Being constantly present among the population is crucial to any counterinsurgency operations (in order to effectively provide security), this quality allows tribal militias to ensure security with much less effort and, very frequently, smaller forces as they are generally not opposed by their countrymen. Furthermore, tribal militias might cooperate with the state police or military in mixed patrols to increase the efficiency and legitimise the outsiders’ presence and role on the ground. This allows such groups to perform sensitive tasks as searching houses of local people with minimal chances of abusing them on grounds of cultural differences. On the other hand, such groups lack the necessary training and equipment to conduct bigger-scale operations especially in cooperation with other militias or regular troops. Furthermore, their structures are not always clear and internal hierarchies tend to be complicated, what has an impact on discipline and might hinder potential cooperation. Moreover, the potential of tribal militias is limited to their

²⁷ Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 1–5.

²⁸ Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 1–2.

native land as when operating outside of their original territory they lose a lot of their capabilities (i.a. knowledge of the human and physical terrain) and are more prone to abuse local population by plundering or other misdeeds.²⁹

Secondly, as non-state armed groups frequently lack resources (financial and material), they need to be supported by provision of necessary goods (arms, munitions, petrol, food etc.), as well as non-material (e.g. sophisticated technology intelligence) and operational (e.g. logistic) support. To convince members of the militia, attract new recruits and ensure their loyalty, salaries are necessary and should be paid on a regular and long-term basis, as well. Cigar mentions the Iraqi example in which material and social services ensured positive Sahwa support. Yet also the experience of the ISAF troops in Afghanistan proved that any cooperation with local actors required offering *gifts* such as petrol – as the author’s source claimed. Despite the fact that for the westerners it might seem as corruption or illegal disposition of goods, such *exchange* is a necessary step to show respect and acquire support for the local actor. Social projects and infrastructure development on tribal lands might have positive effects as well, as it proves that the patron remains committed in the long-term to the well-being of the group and its tribe. The patron must be aware, though, that such a relation is a form of clientelism, thus the support should be stable and long-term – as one of the Naval War College expert summed up: “you can’t buy allies, but you can rent them”, emphasising the fragility of such a cooperation.³⁰

Protection provided for the leaders of militias is the third fundamental element of successful cooperation with local non-state armed groups. Upon joining a common counterinsurgency effort, especially with a foreign patron, local militias are more exposed to hostilities from their opponents and consequently their leaders become main targets of such hostile attacks. The reasons for this move seem obvious: a group that loses the leader, at least temporarily, loses the capability to act. Also the morale of the group may drop and their attractiveness for new recruits might diminish if the group becomes the target as the front partner of an unpopular patron (whether foreign or national). Consequently, nobody would like to join the group that is the main target of hostile forces, as the chances to get killed in targeted attacks soar. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to organise the security of the partner-group, and especially their leaders, in a manner which ensures their security not only during the common effort yet also – when the foreign patron is involved – after the end of foreign deployment. The partner-group must be ensured that their and their families’ security will not be jeopardised after the foreign forces leave the country or the area of operation. Frequently, it is the duty of the national government to provide protection after the foreign troops’ withdrawal and thus the government not only must be convinced to do so but also equipped with proper means to realise this task.³¹

While conducting a common counterterrorist effort with a local non-state armed actor, there is also a challenge to direct whole political and military potential of the group to the CT task. The partner-group potential should not be wasted on inter-tribal rivalry, as it weakens the group overall capability. To achieve this, a platform of dialogue between armed groups (or tribes) may be established in order to facilitate cooperation and understanding of

²⁹ Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 1–2, 60.

³⁰ Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 61. Interview with the Polish commander of an ISAF base by the author, War Studies University, Warsaw, 02 March 2017. US Naval War College Consultations, 31 March 2016.

³¹ Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 61–62.

bigger threats to the well-being of their people (as terrorism and its consequences pose) than the inter-clan rivalry. Despite the fact that it might seem obvious, it is not: the deeply rooted and ancestral rivalry between tribes could hinder any cooperation. As Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin put it: “[b]y supporting one individual or group, an outside actor is invariably picking sides, often without fully understanding the dispute that divides them”.³² An information campaign designed to reach major ethnic groups and tribal representatives could not only improve the cooperation between the various ethnicities, increase the exchange between local groups and the patron, but also commit to build a counter-narrative against e.g. Islamist extremist propaganda on national level. It should not be overlooked, though, that hatred of local tribes towards e.g. al-Qaeda or the Taliban may be as strong as their hostility towards the US or any foreign forces. Lack of awareness in such delicate matters as inter-tribal animosity or simple ignorance of a foreign actor might be terrible in consequences – “[t]o become a player in local politics can create enemies without creating friends” – as Norman Cigar summed it up.³³

Was it not challenging enough, the foreign actor engaging into cooperation with a non-state armed group shall take all the necessary steps in order to avoid undermining the government’s authority. After all, strengthening the governmental authority should be considered the most important long-term goal for any counterterrorism effort. Focusing solely on short-term gains such as combating insurgency while ignoring the authority of the central government might seriously blow back in the future, causing more harm than good, as lack of a strong governance produces power vacuum that might be easily filled up by violent non-state actors. Sergiusz Sidorowicz, a UN expert on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration consulted for the purpose of this study, points out that such external support creates an important local military power that becomes dominant on the ground and is capable of challenging other groups (not specifically terrorists), violently imposing its dominance or undermining the state authority (as it happened in Iraq – Sidorowicz suggests), and this only increases the violence instead of deescalating the conflict. The expert also notes that as loyalties and conformism on sub-national level are hard to comprehend, they might be misleading, as well. Referring to the Yemeni case, Sidorowicz shows that most anti-Islamist groups might fight for, not against, (sic!) the Islamists if they are well paid. In Somalia, on the other hand, the system of alliances is so much sophisticated and complicated that it allows a group to fight on the side of al-Shabaab on one day, and on the governmental side the other day. In Iraq Sunni groups that were supported by the US, later, dissatisfied with the Bagdad Shia-dominated government, turned to the terrorist organisation Daesh. “[Such] groups are extremely opportunistic” – the Naval War College academics added. Simplifying, Sergiusz Sidorowicz concludes, changing sides is typical in the tribal system.³⁴ Thus – as Pezard and Shurkin state – “the most important dynamic to

³² Pezard, S. and Shurkin, M. *Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali. Approaches to Engaging Local Actors*. Rand Corporation 2013. 9. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR296/RAND_RR296.pdf. Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³³ Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 62.

³⁴ These thoughts are the private opinion of Mr Sergiusz Sidorowicz, expressed in an e-mail exchange with the author on 22 May 2016, and do not represent the stance of any institution. The conversation will be further referred to as: “Sergiusz Sidorowicz, 22 May 2016”. US Naval War College Consultations. 31 March 2016. Cf. Cigar. *Tribal Militias...* 63–64.

take into consideration is the trend of traditionally subordinate groups attempting to raise their stature while traditionally dominant ones strive to preserve their primacy”.³⁵ In Mali, for example, clashes between various tribal armed groups occur on the grounds of traditional vassal relationship (e.g. Lamhar and Imghad versus the Kounta and Ifoghas) overlapping with control over the drug smuggling routes.³⁶ Similarly, the impact of such *militarisation of tribes* is harmful towards the development of the civil society. Thus the state authority, at least on provincial or local levels, should therefore be included in all dealings between the foreign and local actors. The patron ought to weigh and balance potential gains from supporting a tribal militia against disadvantages of harming the governmental authority and the civil society. The inclusive policy, nonetheless, seems to be the most beneficial.

An academic of the Naval War College summed the aforementioned arguments up with noting that cooperation between a foreign and local actor is possible only where there are converging interests of the parties involved. In reality, this might mean a temporary cooperation (as interests shift), even if foreign patrons always try to convince local partners that they intend on the long-term to stay on the ground. The cooperation must be planned in the long-term scope on both the military and financial grounds as in case of a sudden rupture of cooperation, the local partner – either conformist or feeling betrayed – might turn against its former patron. The perception of interests of local militias is definitely much more short-term than that of a state actor. Such cooperation – especially referring to the Sahel–Saharan region whose economy is known of being reliant on illicit activities such as smuggling of goods (drugs and arms included) and human trafficking³⁷ – might require from the external patron to turn a blind eye to some illicit activities of a partner-group.³⁸ Even when the patron provides its local partner with necessary financial support, the non-state actor may be unwilling to renounce its illicit activity – not to “lose the market”. It seems realistic in such a case to use the superior position of the patron and force the local group to stop the heavy crime activity such as drug and human trafficking. It may come, however, at the expense of accepting smuggling of legal-goods (cigarettes, petrol, etc.) since total rejection of illicit economic activity in the region does not seem feasible as there are few other opportunities (no tourism due to kidnappings of Western nationals, severe droughts that obstruct agriculture). In this context, politicians of northern Mali are even less strict regarding such concessions – as Wolfram Lacher notes: “[m]any politicians in the north [of Mali – CK] believe a temporary alliance with drug traffickers commanding armed groups is unavoidable if the Jihadist elements controlling northern cities are to be defeated”.³⁹ In such a case the patron has to carefully weigh losses and gains, and define the priorities accordingly – whether it is fighting terrorism, strengthening the central government power or dismantling trafficking networks.

Last, but not least, the end-goal of cooperation between a foreign patron and a local non-state actor has to be planned in advance. This – providing the COIN/CT effort is suc-

³⁵ Pezard and Shurkin. *Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali...* 7.

³⁶ Lacher, W. “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Saharan Region”. *The Carnegie Papers*, Middle East, September 2012. 12; Pezard and Shurkin. *Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali...* 7.

³⁷ Vide: Lacher. “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Saharan Region” or Lacher, W. “Organized Crime and Terrorism in the Sahel. Drivers, Actors, Options”. *SWP Comments*, January 2011.

³⁸ US Naval War College Consultations. 31 March 2016.

³⁹ Lacher. “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Saharan Region”. 9, 17.

cessful – should be the demobilisation of the local militia members. Here, collaboration with the host state's (central or local) government is also necessary in order to meet the needs of the local population (to whom the members of the local militia belong) and conduct successful demobilisation by providing training and creating job opportunities. Incorporation into the state army is often the solution of choice as it solves the problem in areas where the economy is struggling. It also ensures (to some extent) that the militants will not use their military potential and know-how against the state anymore. The newly incorporated troops should not be marginalised or discriminated within the army (e.g. based upon ethnicity or religion) yet at the same time it is risky to create separate battalions of members of former militias as in a time of crisis they may rebel against their military leadership. It happened in Mali in 2006 when previous peace deals between the Tuareg and the central government in Bamako were considered not fully implemented and the Tuareg unit within the army (former rebel militia) took arms against the government.⁴⁰

The success of demobilisation efforts depends not on efficiency of antiterrorist campaign (as most of the local non-state armed groups emerged due to other reasons) – as Sergiusz Sidorowicz warns – it depends on addressing the causes that contributed to the emergence of these groups. Furthermore, armed fight against extremists will be based upon a strong ideological factor and perception of fighting for a just cause, and this only increases the demands among the members of the partner group. Such militants will have much higher expectations in the demobilisation process than those who are being demobilised as a result of protracted unresolved conflicts – they will rather seek a reward than reintegration into the *normal* population (as it happens in Libya). Thus, despite the fact that the perception of fight against Islamist terrorism as a just cause that helps in countering terrorism, it also poses a challenge to future demobilisation of the partner group members.⁴¹

Since the beginning of the 20th century France, as the foreign colonial power, exploited the potential of local Malian auxiliaries in pursuit of the French interests, closely cooperating with the Kel Adagh Tuareg tribes, especially their elite clan of Ifoghas. In exchange, Kel Adagh earned a dominant position in the north of the country and, by suppressing their countrymen's riots (1916–17, and the 1920s), captured their herds and secured more political power. It also contributed to the emergence of the legend of allied, *the noble warriors of the desert* among the French society and in consequence it might have an impact on, however ancient, animosity between the northern Tuareg and Arabs nomad populations and the Black south. Similarly, during the French operation Serval in northern Malian territories of Adrar des Ifoghas (*Mountains of Ifoghas [people]*), the French Army employed the Tuareg militias (most probably from the secular National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA) as guides. MNLA is based mostly on Ifoghas tribesmen, to whom the area traditionally belongs, and thus they have the knowledge of the territory and hideouts

⁴⁰ Grémont, Ch. *Le Maghreb dans son environnement régional et international: Touaregs et Arabes dans les forces armées coloniales et maliennes. Une histoire en trompe-l'oeil*. Note de l'Ifri, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2010. 15, 19. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gremont_touaregs_et_arabes.pdf, Accessed on 22 January 2017. More on recent Malian history and conflict vide: Stewart, D. J. *What is next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, 2013 and Pringle, R. *Democratization in Mali: Putting History to Work*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006.

⁴¹ Sergiusz Sidorowicz. 22 May 2016.

of Islamist terrorists with whom MNLA previously cooperated in a rather unsuccessful attempt to create an independent Tuareg state in the North (Azawad).⁴² Despite previous, colonial time records, present non-military cooperation between the French and the Tuareg seems beneficial for both sides, contributing to the ultimate counterterrorism goal and not undermining the Malian government authority, as the latter's army is being re-introduced into rebellious Northern provinces and conducting mixed patrols with the Tuareg.

History of the Malian Government's cooperation with local Northern non-state armed groups is much more complicated and murky. In the 1990s, the central authorities intended to suppress the northern rebellion with the use of a tribal militia: they supported the black Songhai militia (Ganda Koy) against the *white* (Arab and Tuareg) population of the North. In the late 2000s, the Malian leadership entrusted the control of Kidal smuggling routes to the vassal tribe of Imghad, intending to undermine Ifoghas' positions in the region.⁴³ As one of the author's sources within the Malian armed forces claimed, even the Malian Army was used to secure the trafficking routes in the North. More recently, the Malian Government is allegedly supporting the Platform/GATIA groups (consisting mostly of Imghad Tuaregs) to counter Ifoghas position and their pro-independence ambitions. The author's source within the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pointed out that: "GATIA involved in the Anefis battle [14–17 August 2015 – CK] was equipped with brand new vehicles (surprisingly the same Korean vehicles that [the] Malian forces [had] recently received). We can also assess that GATIA involved in the battle of Menaka (27 April 2015) and then in the battle of Anefis did not lack ammunition... And were allegedly logistically supported by FAMA [i.e. Malian Armed Forces – CK], but as stated before, without clear evidence. And each time we deal with this issue with the Malian authorities, they claim that it is not the truth at all...". The fact that the Malian leadership supported pro-governmental Northern militias was also confirmed by the author's source within the Malian military, yet without giving concrete evidence.⁴⁴

Lacking resources and the will to resolve the conflict in the North peacefully, the Malian Government employs *divide et impera* strategy in order to fragmentise and weaken the Irredentist movements in the north. The elites in the South used, and most probably will continue to do so, local Northern tribal militias in order to sow discord among the Northern population and thus exercise control over the territory. Bamako also exploited its links to organised crime groups and allowed its allies to engage in and profit from illegal activity. Yet "[i]t eventually lost control over the conflicts this generated, while the rule of law and the legitimacy of state institutions were eroded through complicity with organized crime".⁴⁵ The central government's policy towards its Northern foes and allies hinders any peaceful settlement of the long-lasting conflict, deeply undermines intercommunal relations, builds

⁴² Grémont. *Le Maghreb dans son environnement régional et international*... 4–9; Pezard and Shurkin. *Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali*... 8. Interview with Col. Michel Goya par Christine Muratet (RFI): «Mali: 'Le risque, c'est que l'on s'engage dans un combat extrêmement long'». *Radio France Internationale*, 20 February 2014. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130220-mali-le-risque-est-on-s-engage-combat-extremement-long/>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁴³ Pezard and Shurkin. *Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali*... 4; Lacher. "Organized Crime and Terrorism in the Sahel". 3.

⁴⁴ Both sources asked to remain anonymous. The interviews were conducted in Mali (August–September 2015) and via e-mail (04–05 November 2015).

⁴⁵ Lacher. "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Saharan Region". 11.

resentment based upon socio-political exclusion and ethnic background, and serves as a catalyst for further escalation of violence.

Cooperation with local armed groups is cost-effective and saves lives. It is not a panacea to terrorist threat, though: its use is limited and a foreign patron must beware of changing local power dynamics. Furthermore, as the example of employment of non-state actors in COIN/CT operations in northern Mali illustrates, the tool is prone to misuses and abuses. While the Malian Government's exploitation of tribal militias brought only severance of the situation in the north, and serves as an example to avoid, the more reserved, though inclusive, French approach seemed to be more beneficial for both counterterrorism and peacebuilding efforts. The Tuareg incorporated into the struggle against Islamist terrorists might prove their good will and such inclusive approach will not marginalise them in further peacemaking processes. At the same time stronger support from the French towards the Tuareg would strengthen the latter position in negotiations at the expense of the Malian state, possibly undermining peace processes. Thus, the case of Mali illustrates numerous negative outcomes that the (ab)use of non-state armed groups might cause. And finally, it should not be forgotten that non-state actors, local armed groups and tribal militias are not a *tool* that can be used against one's foes and put aside without consequences.

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Christianity and Africa

János Besenyő

Abstract

In recent years, as a researcher of African history and society, I came across with a statement which emphasized that Christianity is completely averse from the black continent, clinging only as the religion of the colonisers, or a sort of weed to the soil of Africa. During the African peacekeeping missions I served on, and the visits I paid to a number of African countries, I realized that this statement does not entirely fit reality. Not only because Christianity is one of those religions, which deeply influenced and still influences African affairs in general, but simply because it had also been present before Islam arrived to the continent. Though it is hard to deny that many negative events should be linked to empires and dictators who considered themselves Christians, Christianity brought many positive factors into Africa, so we cannot squarely condemn or talk about it only in a negative context. Since the last decade the fault-line between the two biggest and most intensively growing world religions, Christianity and Islam, has become deeper, it is also important to raise the question: does it generate more bloody conflicts? To prevent and settle these conflicts is a task for all actors of the international system. In my argument, I would like to demonstrate the historic tracks, the present-day activities and the role of Christianity in Africa.

Keywords: *Christianity, Africa, Islam, Egypt, Ethiopia*

Early Christianity in Africa

Dogmas of Christianity had already appeared across the African continent almost immediately after the death of Jesus Christ; this fact is affirmed by different references of the New Testament. Based on this, it is for sure, that more African people could experience the activity of Jesus and the apostles, than they report after their homecoming. When Jesus was crucified, for a short time his cross was carried to the Golgotha by Simon of Cyrene.¹ Cyrene is located in Northern Africa. We know nothing about the later fate of Simon, he had probably returned to the city of Cyrene. As the Act of the Apostles describes, when the Holy Spirit was outpoured, not only people from Cyrene, but also Egyptians were in

¹ Luke 23:26.

the mob, who listened to the Gospel preached in their own language; later they returned home with the messages of *miracles* observed in Jerusalem.² So far it is only assumable, that these experiences facilitated the spread of Christianity in Northern Africa. According to the Bible, at that time one of the office-bearers of the Ethiopian (in fact the Meroean)³ queen consort became Christian.⁴ As a result, Christianity quickly gathered ground in the region. Later, Africans became Christians following Paul, the Evangelist and they proved their faith in the new religion at once.⁵ According to other sources, members of the numerous Jewish community that lived in Alexandria showed the Gospel to local residents.⁶

Although the leaders of the Roman Empire considered the early Christians a group of the Jews, from A.D. 64 to 311 they prohibited all religious activities of the Christians, furthermore sometimes they persecuted them and from time to time organised bloody pogroms. Persecutions did not achieve the expected result, as Christianity spread fast in Northern Africa in the 1st Century – due to the large-scale prosecution – where such prestigious seats had formed as Carthago, Hippo and Alexandria.⁷ Gnosticism, which influenced the religious life of the 4th Century also emerged in Africa, but most of the scripts of the movement were classified as heresy and they had been left out from the canon.⁸ But the tradition of the baptism of children and the doctrine of predestination emerged in Africa as well, and this was also accepted by the Catholics. In spite of the persecution, Christianity in Northern Africa progressed steadily until the 7th Century, when Islam arrived; moreover preachers were sent into the internal parts of the continent and many other Christian communities had been formed in order to serve them.

² Although Egyptians often advert, when he was a child, Jesus worked wonders in Egypt, which made many people accept Christianity. However, this statement is unverifiable; furthermore Jesus had started his duty later, so Christianity *came to stay* later in Egypt. Act of Apostles 2:1–11.

³ The late Kingdom of Meroe was located on the territory of Sudan.

⁴ Acts of Apostles 8:26–39. See also Bowers, P. “Nubian Christianity: The neglected heritage”. *Africa Journal of Evangelical Theology* 4/1. 1985. 3–4.

⁵ Christianity similarly to Islam is a *proselytizing* religion, which cannot be monopolized by a community, but it can be receptive by everyone who accepts the basic Biblical Truths. Although a significant part of the early Christians had Jewish background, they felt that they had to introduce the Teachings of Jesus to everyone, and enlist more and more people to the Christians. So they spread effectively Christianity using the opportunities granted by the Roman Empire (road network, free movement, safety, etc.).

⁶ Sawyer, K. and Youssef, Y. “Early Christianity in North Africa”. In Ogbu U. Kalu (ed), *African Christianity: an African Story*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007. 49.

⁷ Isichei, E. *A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present*. Grand Rapids, Mich: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995. 30–35.

⁸ Finneran, N. “Saved from the compost heap, rescued texts illuminate the African context”. *Christian History Magazine* 105. 2013. <https://www.christianhistoryinstitute.org/magazine/article/saved-from-the-compost-heap/>, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

Christianity became dominant in Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Nubia, but in other Northern African regions it did not strike permanent roots,⁹ and it could moderately influence only the people on the South. Hereinafter I would like to briefly introduce the major centres of Christianity.

Egypt – The Coptic Church

Coptic people consider themselves the descendants of ancient pharaohs, and they consider Egyptian Muslims invaders. The Church, seated in Alexandria, is hardly a considerable issue from the Middle Eastern Christianity's point of view. Until the Council of Chalcedon, which turned out to be a watershed, Egyptian Christians played an important role in the development of Christianity, and they also had main positions during the first Christian councils. Nowadays they are one of the most significant Christian minorities in the Middle East: they represent 10% of the Egyptian population.

The Coptic Church was founded as a result of the service of Mark, the Evangelist in Alexandria.¹⁰ It became strong rapidly, became the national religion and then the Coptic Church had sent missionaries into the surrounding countries.¹¹ They acquired influence beyond Egypt in Ethiopia, Jerusalem and Cyprus.¹² Coptic people established famous schools in the 2nd century, where the Christian religion and the Bible were taught to make the students fulfil all requirements of baptism. The institute was open to everyone without any differentiation based on age, culture or other background. Further on, the school hosted a more and more vivid scientific life, not only in a religious manner: scientists of religious

⁹ Many people think that due to the fact that in the Northern African communities the Church used the Latin language, therefore the local citizens considered it less their own, so it could not become *national* as it did in the above-mentioned states. For example, Christian Berbers living on the current territory of Maghreb depended on Rome, thus they were not able to gain strength or become independent. The Coptic Church could be successful because in the 1st century Greek language was spoken in the Church of Alexandria, later in the 2nd century the Church used the language of the local population which made its operation more effective. It was also a problem that Church Latin was spoken and the Bible was not translated into the languages used by native inhabitants (Berber, Punic). So among them Christianity became less important. If the Bible would have been translated into Berber, familiarized with the natives, probably the Islam would have not been able to wipe Christianity away without a trace in Northern Africa. The status of Christian communities is indicated by the following numbers: in 500 A.D. the number of Christians was around 8 million according to the estimations, which reduced to 5 million around 1000 A.D., 2.5 million in 1200 A.D. and 1.5 million in 1500 A.D. Sawyer and Youssef. "Early Christianity in North Africa...". 73.

¹⁰ Mark had Jewish ancestors from Cyrene, who moved to Jerusalem after a nomadic attack. The Apostle was a literate, besides Hebrew, he masterfully spoke Greek and Latin. His house in Jerusalem had an important role in the Bible: the Last Supper was consumed by Jesus and the Twelve Apostles here and the Apostles also gathered here after the death of Jesus. At Pentecost, when the Holy Spirit came to the Christians, this also happened in his house. But Mark's real importance is hidden in his African activity. In connection with this, as I referred earlier, there are only a few authentic sources: the Coptic tradition is based on the works of Eusebios Chritian, historian from the 4th century and on *Acts of Mark* which is an apocryphal work. Meinardus, O. F. A. *Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1990. 28–29.

¹¹ Egyptian Christian communities influenced deeply by the gnostic dogmas, were named after the Coptic language.

¹² Hamilton, A. *The Copts and the West 1439–1822: The European Discovery of the Egyptian Church*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 25–26.

and moral philosophy or experts in secular sciences (jurisprudents, orators, litterateurs) also found their place there.¹³ Monastic communities, which later dispersed in Western Christianity, were firstly founded inside the Coptic Church. These communities promoted the existence of the Coptic language, culture and history.

In the history of the Church of Alexandria, two turning points can be highlighted. The first one is the Council of Chalcedon in 451, which led to the separation of the Coptic Church from the unitary Christian community.¹⁴ The second important turning point – considering the events of today – is Egypt's Arabic occupation in the 7th century, which was accepted with minimal resistance because of the Byzantine subjection.¹⁵ In the last almost 1400 years, one of the most significant fault-lines was the relationship among Copts and Muslims, that should be characterized both by peaceful coexistence and aggressive Muslim conversion. Due to the strong conversion, a bigger part of the Coptic population adopted the Islam in the 10th century, and strong Arabization of the society began. Muslim rulers treated the issue according to their temper, although most of them subjugated the Copts. Their status was the best under the rule of the Shia Fatimid Dynasty (969–1171), who let them practise their religion freely and access high public positions.¹⁶ In this period Coptic people acquired control over financial matters, and they kept this influence with short pauses until the 19th Century.¹⁷ Under the rule of the Fatimid Dynasty, in the time of Pope Christodoulos (1047–1077) the base of the Coptic Church moved to Cairo from Alexandria.¹⁸ In the decades of the Crusade Wars, the Copts supported the Arabs, because Western Christianity considered them heretics and fought against them just like they did against the Muslims. After the Mamelukes rose into power in 1250, the situation of the Copts deteriorated. Positive change came only in 1517 when the Ottomans conquered Egypt. Despite all, most of the limitations (building and renovating churches, super-tax excised on Christians, etc.) were maintained.¹⁹

¹³ Malaty, T. Y. *Introduction to the Coptic Orthodox Church*. Alexandria: Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, 1987. 38–39.

¹⁴ The Church was influenced measurably by Gnosticism, which made the Copts to shove off the mainstream Christianity, then they entered into a debate with their new rival, the Roman Catholic Church. The episodes of the Council of Chalcedon were both theological and political. The theological debate was about the issue of Christology, which was an important question of the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus. In fact, during the Council of Chalcedon, the biggest clash of views happened between Roman Pope Leo I and Alexandrian Pope, Dioscorus. Dioscorus was unwilling to support the dogmas written in Leo's letter about the nature of Christ. As an answer, the Pope of Alexandria was exiled to the Black Sea, and all those who did not want to accept Leo's theory were considered heretics.

¹⁵ Besenyő J. and Gömöri R. "A kopt kereszténység és diaszpórái: Magyarország mint a kopt migráció lehetséges útvonala". *Seregszemle* XI/4. 2013. 126.

¹⁶ Malaty. *Introduction to the Coptic Orthodox Church*. 139–140.

¹⁷ Hamilton. *The Copts and the West 1439–1822*. 28.

¹⁸ Gabra, G. *The A to Z of the Coptic Church*. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2009. 4; Meinardus. *Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity*. 65.

¹⁹ Besenyő and Gömöri. "A kopt kereszténység és diaszpórái...". 128–129.

The Ethiopian Church

The Ethiopian (Aksumian) Church functioning for more than 2000 years in Ethiopia, which is the oldest independent state on the continent, and which – excluding a five-year period – was never colonized by any of the Western powers. Numerous Jewish communities aided the spread of Christianity here who were in a *daily* connection with Jerusalem, so the first Christians probably came from among them. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was formed until the 3rd century due to the influence of the Coptic (Frumentius) Church and thanks to the activity of missionaries coming from Western Asia; then King Ezana (330–356) became an adherent of Christianity. The Church did not fall closely under the subservience of the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria. Although its leader was appointed by the Egyptian Copts, it functioned mainly as an independent national church, even before the Roman Empire officially turned to the Christian faith. As a consequence of the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the Church of Ethiopia shoved off Rome and became independent. When the Islam appeared, Christianity had already been the state religion of the Kingdom of Aksum, which influenced all the important parts of everyday life. Although the surrounding countries were occupied and Islamized by the Arabs, Aksum remained Christian.

The structure and operation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was similar to the Coptic and Syrian Orthodox Churches. They have their own patriarch as well, and the religious orders played an important part, their cloisters were the only depositaries of studies. Due to the monasteries, Ethiopian traditions and historical facts were saved which led to the emergence of a common Ethiopian identity.²⁰ The uniform church had always been the most important pillar of the Kingdom, symbolizing the unity of the State and the struggle against Muslim conquerors.

Nubia

Today, the territory of Nubia is located in Sudan, where several Christian kingdoms existed before. The most important was Meroë. Its queen, Kandake was mentioned in the Bible, too, since her treasurer was baptized due to the testimony of Apostle Philip in Israel.²¹ In those times the first Sudanese (Meroë) Christian community emerged, but nowadays we have only a few pieces of evidence about this.²² The country was taken by the Ethiopian (Aksum) ruler in 350, later, on the ruins of Meroë, three new states (Alwa, Makuria and Nobatia) came into existence, whose leaders Christianized after 540 as an effect of Copt and Greek influence.²³ In these states – led by military nobilities – the Coptic Church strengthened, though there were some who accepted the Byzantine Rite Christianity. Christian churches were built and dioceses were organised in the new-sprung states, but they did not become

²⁰ In the 5th century, 9 monks arrived from Syria, who translated the Christian texts into Ge'ez language, and they also established the first monasteries.

²¹ *New Testament*, Act of Apostles 8:26–39.

²² Besenyő J. *Szudán: országismertető*. Székesfehérvár: MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, 2010. 64.

²³ The significant part of lower classes of the society became Christian earlier, since the Nubians were in close economic and cultural relationship with Egypt and Ethiopia. See Bowers. "Nubian Christianity...". 6.

independent as churches, instead they came under the authority of the Coptic patriarch.²⁴ After the reception of Christianity, among the kingdoms, Egypt and other Christian states of the Mediterranean region, flourishing cooperation started from which every party benefited. Coptic priests were committed to copying the Holy Bible and other religious literatures in Nubian (old Nubian) language; they built cloisters, churches and schools, where the children of local elite were educated. Literacy was quite widespread in that time and not only the nobles, but also a significant part of the common people learned reading and writing.²⁵ Christian Nubian kingdoms achieved their golden ages in the 9th and 10th centuries, despite the fact that they were continuously attacked by Arabs who conquered Egypt in 640. In that time Copt and Nubian missionaries appeared in the present-day Darfur region, where, as a result of their work, many people were baptized. When Arabic tribes under the leadership of Ed-Eddin Ibn Abial-Sarh attacked the Nubians in 642, they were forced to sign a peace treaty after a humiliating defeat. After that the Muslims occupied a large part of Northern Africa, the three kingdoms became isolated from the Western Christian countries, and as a consequence, left alone. Therefore, they fought for centuries for their survival, and they even defeated the army of the famous Saladin in the 12th century.²⁶ Since the Mameluks were not able to defeat the Christian Nubian states, they sent a crown and a silver cross to the king in Dongola in 1323, who accepted the treasures and along with the presents he accepted the dependency from Egypt as well, but he was not forced to make an oath.²⁷

The troops of the confederation led by the Arabic Juhayna tribe (Kababish, Baggara and Shukrija tribes) blasted and conquered Makkura in 1400. After they executed the members of the Christian leadership, they abolished Christianity and cooperated with the local citizens, who quickly converted their former religion to Islam.²⁸ After that only the distant and secluded Alwa was able to keep its independence for more than a century.²⁹ Alwa was captured in 1504 by the Funj tribes led by Abdullah Jamma and Amara Dungas, after they destroyed the settlements and exterminated the Christian population, then established the Kingdom of Funj with Sennar as its capital.³⁰ According to particular researches, some isolated Christian community survived until the 18th century.³¹

Except for the above-mentioned groups many other Christian communities existed for shorter or longer periods of time in Northern Africa, that left some impacts (oral tradition, etc.) behind and fixed memories in several places.³² Africans gave several church scholars and philosophers who influenced Christianity until nowadays³³ and whose cultural influence

²⁴ Lobban, R. A., Krammer, R. S. and Fluehr-Lobban, C. *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan*. London: Scarecrow Press, Third edition. 2002. 64–66.

²⁵ Bantu, V. "The Decline of Nubian Christianity under Islam (641–1517 CE)". *Africanus Journal* 8/2. 2016. 15. <http://www.gordonconwell.edu/resources/documents/AfricanusJournalvol8no2erevised.pdf>, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

²⁶ Gray, R. *The Cambridge History of Africa: Vol. 4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 75–79.

²⁷ Sawyer and Youssef. "Early Christianity in North Africa...". 71.

²⁸ Fadlalla, A. M. H. *Short History of Sudan*. New York: Universe, 2004. 19.

²⁹ O'Fahey, R. S. and Spaulding, J. *Kingdoms of the Sudan: Vol. 1*. London: Methuen, 1974. 19–22.

³⁰ Fadlalla. *Short History of Sudan*. 21.

³¹ Bowers. "Nubian Christianity...". 7.

³² Finneran. "Saved from the compost heap, rescued texts illuminate the African context...". 8–13.

³³ Tertullius, Lactanius, Athanasius, Origen, Agustinus, Pachonius, Marius Victorinus, Didymus, Ticonius, Cyprian, etc.

still can be experienced. Unfortunately the African Christians took part actively in different dogmatical debates,³⁴ which led to the division and weakness of Christianity. The expansion of Islam and the impatient Church policy of the Byzantine Empire led to the suppression (whole disappearance in certain areas) of Christianity in Northern Africa.³⁵ With the exception of the Coptic and Ethiopian Churches almost all Christian groups have vanished or became Muslim. The Islamic conquest eliminated almost totally the former Christian territories with military, administrative (tax reliefs for those who left their former religion for Islam) and cultural means, where the Christians reappeared after centuries. Of course, Christianity did not disappear, moreover, four hundred years after the Arabic conquest, Christian communities existed in some areas of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.³⁶

The reappearance of Christianity on the African continent happened in the 16th century, when European explorers (Portuguese, Spanish, British, Danish, Dutch, French, etc.) sailed along the Atlantic Coasts of Africa, then intruded deeper and deeper into the continent.

The Kingdom of Kongo and Christianity

The emergence of the Congolese Christianity was triggered by the Portuguese who sailed around Africa with commercial aims, looking for a direct seaway towards Asia. In the meantime, they established colonies on Cape Verde, in the Gulf of Guinea and on the parts of present-day Angola, Mozambique and Kenya. Besides the revival of commercial shipping, the Portuguese advanced the spread of Catholicism significantly, as they supported the work of missionaries. The members of these missions applied similar tactics to those which were used by Muslims on the Western African territories. First they tried to convince the local elite to the conversion, since they thought, after their conversion people who lived under their rule would also accept the new religion. This strategy was the most spectacular in the Kingdom of Kongo.³⁷ When ruler Nzinga a Nkuwu Christianized, he sent his freshly baptized son, Nzinga Mbembe to Portugal where he received Catholic education. After his homecoming the new king (1506–1543) assumed the name Alfonso, then he established close commercial and cultural relations with Portugal, and although his whole realm did not become Christian, a significant number of Congolese people baptized. His son, Henrique was the first bishop of Kongo with African ancestors, who made his father's policy successful through the help of Capuchin monks from Europe. The cooperation between the two countries – based on mutual benefits – was windswept as the slave trade became stronger and stronger, so the strength of the Kingdom shortly ceased. This situation was undesirable

³⁴ Arianism, Gnosticism, Manicheism, Nestorianism, Donatism, Marcionism, Pelagianism, etc.

³⁵ In the first period, the Muslims, who were less powerful militarily, were more tolerant with the Coptic Christians, than the Byzantines, who considered the Copts heretics, so a significant part of the Egyptian Christians supported the conqueror Arabic tribes against the Byzantines. Although the Byzantines' army were stronger than the Muslims, the local population turned against them which led to the rapid loss of Northern African territories.

³⁶ Prevost, V. "Les dernières communautés chrétiennes autochtones d'Afrique du Nord". [The last native Christian communities of North Africa.] *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 4. 2007. 461–483. <http://rhr.revues.org/5401>, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

³⁷ This Kingdom involved the present-day Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and the bigger part of Angola.

for the Congolese Catholics, who – referring to a vision – wanted to restore the independence of the Kingdom with the leadership of Beatrice Kimpa Vita. They drew the Catholic priesthood’s anger on them when they created a new, Christian-tinged community, but it was sold off by the Portuguese within a few years.³⁸

Christianity and Slavery

Regrettably in the era of colonialism, Christianity was shamefully and impermissibly merged into the notion of slavery. The Christian Churches did not raise objection against slavery, but they legalized it with rules that obligated slave-traders to baptize the African slaves captured during slave-huntings, and even worse, the traders received financial support from the income of the churches. Not every Christian agreed with this practice,³⁹ but their number was pretty marginal. Notwithstanding, leaders who fought for the abolition of slavery were also Christians (mainly Quakers), who regarded the people forced to be slaves as their brothers and sisters, and these slaves also became real Christians. Some of these slaves were moved back to Liberia, where they established a Christian state in 1822. The first President of the country, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, was born in the United States as a slave. Later several missionaries from the historical denominations served in Africa and joined those who fought for the abolition of slavery. One of the most famous was Anne Mary Javouhey (1779–1851), who established a sisterhood (the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny). The members of this cloister also fought for the abolition. Mary, who was labelled as *the mother of the slaves* by the local people, considered slavery one of the barriers of conversion of Africans, and, until her death, she struggled against it. The most famous person among the Protestant missionaries was David Livingstone (1813–1873), who fought with at least such a determination for the abolition as the above mentioned lady.⁴⁰ In Congo which was the personal domain of Leopold II of Belgium, protestant missionaries were committed to the uncovering of the cruelties. As a result of the atrocities, the European public opinion forced out changes regarding the treatment of Africans.⁴¹

³⁸ This young lady inspired the seceders and taught, that the Virgin Mary was African, Jesus was born in Kongo and he was baptized in the Congo River. Although the group did not deny the supremacy of the Roman Pope and the Church, they created a liturgy of their very own wherein they used beliefs from the time before Christianity, they played African music, danced and ordained Africans preasts. In one word, they “Africanized” the church. Moreover, they wanted to build up an independent African church from the whites’ church. The new community became extremely popular among the Congolese population, so in 1706 the Portuguese eliminated with the support of the church, and burnt Vita to death as a heretic.

³⁹ Several Christian leaders openly expressed their doubt about the assumption that the Bible would support slave-trade and the institute of slavery. Nevertheless the Churches never took actions against the inhuman treatment, therefore they had become silent partners of the slave-traders. Manala, M. J. “The impact of Christianity on sub-Saharan Africa”. *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae* 39/2. 2013. 285–302. <http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/13139/Manala.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

⁴⁰ Milbrandt, J. “Livingstone and the Law: Africa’s Greatest Explorer and the Abolition of the Slave Trade”. SSRN, 20 August 2012. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2132668> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2132668>, Accessed on 13 July 2015.

⁴¹ Strayer, R. “Mission History in Africa: New Perspectives on an Encounter”. *African Studies Review* 19/1. 1976. 10. <http://www.joaoferreiradias.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Mission-History-in-Africa-New-Perspectives-on-an-Encounter.pdf>, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

African Christianity in the 19th Century

At the beginning of the century, Christianity had a solid base only in a few places, such as Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique. However, this quickly changed in the time of colonialization of the continent, because most of the Africans had been Christianized, so at the beginning of the 20th century, 40% of the population considered themselves Christians. This fast growth was due to the fact that local people tried to take as much advantage as possible from the colonizing powers, and these aspirations were supported by the Churches which were in good relationship with the colonizing powers; besides, they opened the door for social advancement through different opportunities (education, knowledge of languages, etc.). This happened in Chad, where the Christianized Sara people had more opportunity to prevail than the other tribes and through their active participation in education they monopolized all those positions in the colonial administration that were maintained for the local people.⁴² Similar occurrence happened in South Sudan, where the black tribes (Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk, Azende, etc.) expected protection from the missionaries and the British colonized the territory against the Arabs who overwhelmed them. This protection was granted for them by the *Closed District* regulation.⁴³ Naturally, these processes were supported by the colonizing powers, since, many times, the missionaries were considered allies. They thought, those Africans who adopted Christianity could be more easily controlled and would support the colonizing powers against other African ethnic groups.⁴⁴ Accordingly, they supported the missionary activities of different religions with all available tools, which denominations used these support while they sent thousands of missionaries to the black continent. In the Christian Churches, a reformation movement was launched, and within this framework, they encouraged the followers to return to the Biblical grassroots, while they also proposed to reevangelise the world.⁴⁵ These intentions activated the societies, that intensively supported the missionary activities of the Catholic and Protestant churches in Africa both with financial and ideological means. Although most people are aware of the activity of the Catholic convents and the Protestant churches – some of them have African roots⁴⁶ – they are represented in a more significant number. Missionaries in order to reach their goals learned the local languages and translated the Bible, or some parts of it, and they played an important role in the creation of literacy of several ethnic groups. Although most of them considered the African culture primitive, they helped the transmission of this culture by writing scientific, informing books. We have information about some indigenous groups only from their description. Besides, they taught the languages of the colonizers (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese,

⁴² Besenyő J. et al. *Csád: országismertető*. Székesfehérvár: MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, 2010. 49, 65–66.

⁴³ Besenyő. *Szudán*. 42–43, 84–85.

⁴⁴ According to some scholars the colonizing powers operated their African colonies not in the light of religious (Christian) values, but they followed political interests and created new and new alliances. Protecting missionary organisations was fit into this policy, but it was not an obligation. However, many times the missionary organisations tried to separate themselves from the administrative bodies of the colonising powers, they even came up against the administrative bodies in favour of African Christians. Strayer. "Mission History in Africa". 8–11.

⁴⁵ Manala, M. "The impact of Christianity on sub-Saharan Africa". 3. [unisa.ac.za http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/13139/Manala.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/13139/Manala.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), Accessed on 11 May 2017.

⁴⁶ Such were the African Episcopalian Methodist and the black Baptist communities.

Italian) in elementary and intermediate schools to many of the African children and opened the world for them; not to mention, that they also taught the upper classes of the new-born and independent African states.⁴⁷ The missionaries also took part in business, agriculture and the development of road network, moreover, they founded hospitals and did medical activity among local citizens. One of the famous missionaries was Albert Sweitzer, who spent a large part of his life in the African wilderness as a missionary and physician. In spite of all, many Africans are criticizing the activity and achievements of the missionaries. Last time Jacob Zuma, the president of South Africa criticized them in his inaugural speech, when he claimed that they had destroyed the African traditions.⁴⁸

Otherwise the cooperation of the colonial administration and the churches was not so advantageous everywhere, as several times the churches – as early representatives of human rights – demanded more humane treatment of Africans, which resulted in a clash with the colonial leadership. It led to the foundation of *state* educational systems to decrease the influence of missionaries in local communities.⁴⁹ On the territories with significant Muslim population clashes also occurred, since the administration tried to *supervise* the missionary organisations to avoid putting in jeopardy their cooperation with the local Muslim upper classes. This is why stronger Christian communities did not emerge in Northern Africa or in those Western and Eastern African countries where the population was Muslim.

“Africanization” of the Church

Though among the people living on the continent many followers of the historical (missionary) Christianity can be found from the earliest times, those who spread Christianity were not always accepted because they were not indigenous. The case of the Congolese Beatrice Kimpa Vita proves this theory, who successfully questioned the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and created an *African* Christian community, which was more acceptable for the indigenous people than the pure *white* Christianity. Not only in Congo, but across different parts of the continent more and more Africans turned their back on the communities led by missionaries and created their own Christian communities with African characteristics.⁵⁰ These communities, known as the *African Independent Churches*, were quite diverse, and they had different points of views about different questions. They had only two things in common:

- they did not recognise the supremacy of the missionary organisations

⁴⁷ Nunn, N. “Christians in Colonial Africa”. [yale.edu](http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/Nunn_Paper.pdf). 2011. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/Nunn_Paper.pdf, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

⁴⁸ Smith, D. “Jacob Zuma blames Christianity for breakdown of South African traditions”. *The Guardian*, 21 December 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/21/jacob-zuma-blames-christianity>, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

⁴⁹ Manala. “The impact of Christianity on sub-Saharan Africa”. 6.

⁵⁰ Strayer. “Mission History in Africa”. 7.

- they considered themselves coequal, independent communities and they claimed more respect to the African culture, parts of which were incorporated in their liturgy⁵¹

At the end of the 20th century, more than 7,000 communities operated on the continent. They belonged to two bigger alliances called the Independent Church of Ethiopia⁵² and the Zionist Independent Church.⁵³ These communities – although they were different from each other in many aspects – organically included some parts of the former animist cultural and religious traditions and the *liberation theology* into their religious activities. Simultaneously, they also supported the church service and carrier of women, and they gave space to the different spiritual experiences, annunciations. Nowadays, these communities are growing the most rapidly in Africa.

Conclusion

Though many claimed that as African colonies became independent Christianity disappeared from the continent, their expectations did come true, as in the 20th century Christianity continued to expand, which process, according to some theologians, is similar to the events of the 1st century.⁵⁴ At the beginning of the 1900s there were only 10 million Christians on the continent, whose amount grew up to 143 million in 1970, then it reached 393 million in 2000.⁵⁵ According to a study, 41% (550 million) of the population followed

⁵¹ The creation of their own communities could be based on several reasons. For example, white people believed in those racist theories, that black people do not reach neither in an intellectual, nor cultural way the level of the white people. Therefore, for a long time, local citizens were not allowed to be ecclesiastical leaders, they were not allowed to receive higher education, etc. Moreover, Europeans totally declined the African cultural traditions and beliefs, and ignoring the above mentioned, they tried to introduce the Biblical principals in a European way. These approaches were disproved by the successfully operating and dynamically growing African Christian churches. Despite all this, it is a real danger that such habits prohibited by the Bible will be naturalized in these communities, which stem from African animist religions. More about this in Lindhardt, M. "The Ambivalence of power: Charismatic Christianity and occult forces in urban Tanzania". *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society* 22/1. 2009. 37–54. <http://tapir.pdc.no/pdf/NJRS/2009/2009-01-3.pdf>, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

⁵² The name of the church is amusing, because its communities do not function in Ethiopia, but in South and Western Africa. Its name came from the Bible, where the name of the country is mentioned several times, so the choice of the name is showing us the special relationship between God and the Church, which was created by such people, who left the *missionary churches* because of the above mentioned reasons. This is why the doctrinal system is not different from the previous churches, the only difference being that its leaders were Africans, not missionaries (outsiders). The first communities were founded in Nigeria at the end of 1800s under the leadership of Mojola, Agbebi and Samuel Ajayi Crowter.

⁵³ These communities are called *spiritual churches* because their movements are significantly influenced by the Holy Spirit, the pre-Christian activities and traditions which are also playing an important role. The prestige of the Prophet is quite big, African music, dance and singing have an emphasized role during worship, and the recoveries due to the Holy Spirit are also important. Many of their traditions (clothing, resting on Saturday, etc.) are coming from the traditions of the Old Testament.

⁵⁴ Walls, A. "The Mission of the Church Today in the Light of Global History". *Word & World* XX/1. 2000. 17.

⁵⁵ Maxwell, D. "New perspectives on the history of African Christianity". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 23/1. 1997. 141.

one of the Christian religions, and 22,800 people became Christians on a daily basis.⁵⁶ Christianity not only influenced their personal lives positively, but through the educational programmes, it also improved their living conditions,⁵⁷ and social situation, where it became widespread. It also changed positively the healthcare and the social status of women.⁵⁸ More and more Christian humanitarian organisations work in the region, and these bring very important developmental and humanitarian projects to specific areas.⁵⁹ In political aspects the assessment of Christianity is not squarely positive – despite the fact that the leaders of freedom fights received Christian higher education – since occasionally it was considered the pillar of the colonizing powers.⁶⁰ Although Christianity has recently weakened in the Western World, its growth on the African continent seems to be uninterrupted,⁶¹ all across the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Christian confessions of the Western countries rediscover Africa, where they perform at an enhanced pace by shorter or longer missionary and humanitarian activities, which make more and more people join the historical or modern (Neo-protestant) streams of Christianity.⁶²

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⁵⁶ Gifford, P. “Trajectories in African Christianity”. *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 8/4. 275–289. <http://princetonollywood.weebly.com/uploads/6/7/7/5/6775629/gifford.pdf>, Accessed on 11 May 2017. 276.

⁵⁷ Nunn. “Christians in Colonial Africa”. 22.

⁵⁸ Miles, C. A. “The Church versus the Spirit: The Impact of Christianity on the Treatment of Women in Africa”. ASREC/ARDA, 2009, *Working Papers Series*. www.thearda.com/workingpapers/download/Church%20vs%20Spirit%20Miles.pdf, Accessed on 11 May 2017.

⁵⁹ Such organisations for example the World Vision International, the Catholic Relief Services, the Lutheran World Federation, the Christian Aid, the DanChurchAid, the Cordaid, the Trocaire, the Misereor, the Salvation Army World Service Organisation (SAWSO), the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), or the Bread for the World.

⁶⁰ Manala. “The impact of Christianity on sub-Saharan Africa”. 5.

⁶¹ Walls. “The Mission of the Church Today in the Light of Global History”. 17–18.

⁶² Gifford. “Trajectories in African Christianity”. 277–278.

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Concerted Development Strategy for Africa – Development Possibilities and Development Strategies in Africa

Emmanuel Kamdem

Abstract

One can ask why Hungary is dealing with security policy issues of Africa. To try to answer such a question, I would say that poverty is a canker worm, its impact is deeply felt regardless of where it strikes, therefore innovation and concerted development in Africa should bother those who are concerned about the situation of this rich-poor continent. The paradox however is that Africa is a continent with strong potentials that engender hope but whose resources are either plundered and/or badly exploited. Moreover, although Africa is beginning to experience appreciable economic growth, it is still worrisome that the fruits of this growth do not benefit the mass of the poor who, for the greater part, live below the poverty line. The main factors blocking the African development are:

- The weak administrative structures leading to political violence;*
- Non-adapted education system conducting to unemployment;*
- Corruption and tribalism, strong factors against development;*
- Lack of coherent and inclusive development strategy causing inefficiency.*

This paper will be concentrated on five points, namely:

- 1. Development potentials of Africa*
- 2. Development possibilities in Africa*
- 3. Overview of development strategies in Africa*
- 4. Advocacy for more appropriate development strategies in Africa*
- 5. Concerted and decent development strategy for positive sustainability in Africa*

Keywords: *development strategies, Africa, sustainability*

Development Potentials of Africa

In his recent book *Quelle Afrique à l'horizon 2050?*¹ Paul K. Fokam indicates the important potentials existing on the continent which can contribute to boost African development:

¹ Fokam, P. K. *Quelle Afrique à l'horizon 2050?* Yaoundé: Afrédit, 2014.

more than one billion of consumers, housing sector to be developed, enterprises promotion, etc... Among others, the analysis shows the following potentials:

- *The available natural resources*
Researchers show that Africa is the continent with more natural resources than any other continent. Logically, Africa does not need to import natural resources for its development. It is a shame to see the continent importing eggs, meat and so on.
- *Internal and Diaspora human resources*
In order to develop, you need human resources and today the importance of population dividend is a very good potential for the continent. The African Diaspora of today is very concerned with the development of their country of origin.
- *Investment potentials*
Nowadays, the micro-finance institutions are rapidly spread in all African countries. Even if the quality of services is often weak, the improvement can enable the boosting of SME (Small and Medium-size Enterprises), factor of employment creation.
- *The place of external contributions to African development*
Self-financing economy is the guarantee for a drive to external funding. In many African countries the domestic capital is very high. Classified at the 26th ranking position worldwide, Nigeria is today an important financial market.

Development Possibilities in Africa

Africa has tremendous possibilities for its development. However, the continent needs to reform its education, administrative and governance systems. Therefore:

- Education, training and information should be the leitmotiv of the development;
- Selected industrialization in Africa, using available natural resources should be prioritized;
- Creation of decent employments using abundant and available natural resources will not only contribute to reduce the illegal migration, but even drive the Diaspora willing to return home;
- The win-win partnership with other continents through creation of joint venture enterprises could facilitate to boost development in Africa;
- Founding many inter-African groups like Afriland First Bank, Ecobank are better ways for the South-South cooperation;
- Promoting informal economy to modern economy mostly through social economy is an appropriated possibility. This was the case in other countries like Germany, Canada, and so on.

Overview of Development Strategies in Africa

Many internal and external initiatives were experimented in Africa and they were generally imposed to the African population. Let us go through some of these strategies.

- *Ujamaa of Julius Nyerere*
In the 1960s, many Africans undertook different strategies aiming at boosting development in Africa. One of the most recognized was the Ujamaa project because it was not only a theory, but was tried in practice by the first president of Tanzania. The concept in the Arusha Declaration of February 5, 1967 was based on self-reliance, bringing together different ethnic groups with equal rights for all. Unfortunately, the strategy showed its limits for the African Development. The initiator recognized it personally, since after ten years of its practice the country remained exploited and economically dependent. For me, there were two major weaknesses: strategy imposed to populations and lack of appropriate education system.
- *Basic needs satisfaction strategy*
In 1973, the former president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, recognized that the development strategy based solely on economic growth was a disaster in the social and human aspects. He personally said that the initial *top-down* modernization strategies of the 1950s and 1960s, which equated economic development with economic growth and relied on the directed expansion of industry and commerce to generate more income for the whole country, had not been generally successful. Therefore, it was foreseen that the *bottom-up* strategy was to be followed based on basic needs with the human being in the centre of development: nutrition, health, education and lodging. Here, the strategy remains imposed on the population who should be empowered.
- *Washington Consensus (Structural adjustment program)*
At the beginning of the 1980s, the international and national communities recognized that the last decades were lost for development. The 20 years of debts to finance big projects by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund became too high and new solutions needed to be found to enable countries to pay back their debts: many non-governmental organizations were created to replace the state bureaucracies. Once more, the concept came without consultation with the real stakeholders, the African populations who were not part of the decision-making.

The list of development strategies is long but all led to failures. Facing these failures, many authors today are trying to advocate for new strategic approaches.

Advocacy for More Appropriate Development Strategies in Africa

In his recent book entitled *L'Afrique peut enfin bien partir*. [Africa can finally start well.], Michel Tchotsoua tells us how to have a mastered development using geostrategic and geomatic strategy. His analysis shows him that the fight for African development is first of all an African issue. Defining partnership with other continents should be in focus. To do so, the reorientation of African universities should be a priority.²

² Tchotsoua, M. *L'Afrique peut enfin bien partir*. Genève/Yaoundé, PIPD/Presse de l'Institut Panafricain pour le développement, 2015.

Another Cameroonian author, Paul K. Fokam, emphasizes the important role of human and financial resources and their two important elements: appropriate financial system and training of human resources.³

After noting the failure of African development strategies, Jean Emmanuel Pondi gives a similar analysis and concludes that rethinking the development should come from Africa.⁴

Concerted and Decent Development Strategy for Positive Sustainability in Africa

Today, Africa has on one hand a lot of potentials and possibilities for development and, on the other hand a lot of challenges for development. In order to efficiently use these potentials and possibilities and overcome the challenges, a new conceptual framework involving all development stakeholders, as well as those at the continental level and the countries' level becomes unavoidable. The present chapter aims at presenting a new development strategy that takes its roots in the concertation theory.⁵ This theory becomes gradually imperative in the entire human action aiming at respecting human dignity. Concerted, decent and sustainable development is a development that respects human dignity and safeguards biodiversity and the atmosphere.

Conceptual Framework for an African Charter for Concerted, Decent and Sustainable Development

The process leading to design an appropriate development strategy needs three steps, namely the assessment, the think tank and the setting up.

Field assessment leading to the White Report

This step shall start with the search to have a deep knowledge of the development potentials in terms of challenges, potentials, possibilities and limits.

This is to be done through action-research that involves the representatives of all stakeholders from the five African regions and the Diaspora, which forms the sixth region according to the African Union. To do so, stakeholders should comprise grassroots and top-level actors, mostly scientists from all disciplines. The outcome of this field research is what we can name the *White Report*, the working document for the next step. This step should help to compare the concept of sustainable development as formulated today, to the African needs that should include cultural, political, financial and legal aspects. The White Report will focus on four main points:

³ Fokam, P. K. *Et si l'Afrique se réveillait?* Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2003.

⁴ Pondi, J. E. *Repenser le développement à partir de l'Afrique*. Yaoundé: Afrédit, 2011.

⁵ The concertation theory in *Concertalism, Concertocracy and Social Economy*, written by Emmanuel Kamdem, says that "For any group of actors, any decision stemming from concertation motivates more than a decision taken unilaterally". Kamdem, E. *Concertalism, Concertocracy and Social Economy*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012.

- Global concept of sustainable development within African specify;
- Explaining the paradox of rich, but poor African continent;
- Hope for an African revenge in the 21st century;
- The three related aspects of sustainable development in Africa through training, action-research and support-consultancy.

Think Tank leading to the Gray Report

In an international forum on African development think tanks, development stakeholders will sit together to think about the future of the continent. The White Report and independent experts will bring together knowledge in the forum. Facing incessant global changes and increasing African marginalization, the legitimate ambition of a concerted and decent development of the continent requires the development of new and innovated skills, capable of rendering operationally, in a concerted manner the concept of sustainable development in Africa. The think tank should lead to the Gray Report with concrete recommendations on African development strategy. This Gray Report shall include recommendations to be used to formulate the African Charter for concerted, decent and sustainable development.

Setting up the African Charter for concerted development

Africa needs a coherent strategy document for its development, made in Africa by all development stakeholders forming a framework for its development. All concerned groups shall participate in the conception and implementation of such a strategy in order to give it more chance for success. The outcome of this step shall be the African Charter for Concerted Development. The Charter should be adopted by the African governments together with the civil society representatives as well as the private sector representatives.

The countries' strategy for Concerted Development

To insure a good implementation of the African Charter for Concerted Development each African country should design its concerted development strategy. The conception of such strategy should be based on the grassroots concerned. Therefore, following steps at local, regional and national level:

- Field assessment to identify the real needs of the population;
- Local and autonomous workshops without any external influences;
- Designating local representatives to a regional step;
- Regional workshop including representatives of the local authorities, civil society, private sector and other NGOs using the reports of different local workshops;
- National workshop with all stakeholders at national and international level including the Diaspora, civil society, private sector, development partners, namely the UN agencies.

Conclusion

After more than fifty years of African underdevelopment based on the top-down strategies, it is time to rethink the development of the continent of Africa, using a concerted approach. The suggestion in this paper is to go from an African development framework within the African Development Charter to the countries' development strategy that should involve all the stakeholders including the government, civil societies, the private sector and the Diaspora. The involvement of all stakeholders should not be limited only to the conception of the strategy, but should also concern the implementation.

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Black Holes of Insecurity – The North of Mali

Cyprian Aleksander Kozera

“[We are living] in a period of unprecedented instability worldwide. (...) Simultaneously huge swaths of global territory are dominated by populist unrest, anger, and effective loss of state control.”¹

Zbigniew Brzezinski,
US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter,
June 2014

Abstract

This article is the result of a study devoted to the examination of Adrar des Ifoghas (a mountainous massif situated in northern Mali and southern Algeria) in the context of the Global Black Spots (GBS) theory. The author employs the aforementioned theoretical approach in order to explain the role of this cross-border territory as a main criminal, rebel, and terrorist safe haven in the western part of Sahel–Saharan Africa; and as well to diagnose the threat posed by illicit actors operating there (Islamists terrorists, transnational organized crime, non-state armed groups, etc.).

Since the independence of Mali in 1960, the area of Adrar des Ifoghas has repeatedly been a conflict hot spot and has been serving a safe haven for rebels, smugglers, and most recently: violent extremists; also, all the Tuareg-led rebellions of the north against the central government broke out there, and so was the last one of 2012. It is therefore crucially important to consider the role what this territory plays in ensuring security to northern Mali and the broader Sahel–Saharan region. The GBS approach serves as a tool to do so. In the article, after discussing the theory of the GBS itself, the author focuses on the case study of the discussed area.

Keywords: *Mali, Adrar des Ifoghas, black spots, terrorism, transnational organized crime*

¹ Rothkopf, D. “A Time of Unprecedented Instability?” *Foreign Policy*, 21 July 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/21/a_time_of_unprecedented_instability_a_conversation_with_zbigniew_brzezinski, Accessed on 28 July 2017.

Introduction

Studying the phenomenon of terrorism, we quickly understand that while it serves ideological and political purposes, every terrorist attack requires a lot of pragmatism, especially on the planning stage. Therefore, there is a need for a place or even an infrastructure where it can be prepared: just a room, a base, a training camp, or perhaps a vast region in a vulnerable country, serving as the safe zone for illicit undertakings. Such place must be outside law-enforcement agencies and media attention, preferably in a non-accessible remote area: the world should not know about these locations – discretion is as much important for the planners of terrorist attacks as publicity for executioners. These areas of obscure activities are preferred not only by terrorists but primarily by organized crime groups, especially human, drug and weapon traffickers. Never mind how atrocious dealings such individuals undertake they all have the basic human need for a safe resting place. Sharing the common need for a safe port, they start to collaborate, exchange their knowledge, experience and build contacts to gain more, to threat us more – the nexus of organized crime and terror arises. And the zones where they operate undisturbed become similar to astronomical black holes: impenetrable places that let out very few information² and where no one can enter or exit. While astronomical black holes are capable of bending the light by their very powerful gravity and suck in grand objects – here the difference lies – these territories *bend* the security in the region and emit global threats. Although the territories occupied by such entities are geographically known to us (they are not white spots on the map anymore), the shady activities undertaken there are unknown, thus, they are more like black spots on the map.

Recognizing the threat of such zones and deficiency in research, the necessity of investigating these areas by academics arises. Not only to better understand the phenomenon of terrorism itself, yet to counteract it more efficiently on the initial stage, planning level; to prevent rather than to cure. Following that need and combining it with my research interest and education, I decided to pursue studies on Saharan black spots. In the preliminary research, I recognized that the name of a mountainous rage on the frontier of Algeria and Mali is far too often evoked in a context of kidnapping, trafficking, armed struggles, and terrorist sanctuaries – it can only guide to one conclusion: that the region could be a black spot. Therefore, the following study is devoted to a case study of Adrar des Ifoghas in the context of the Global Black Spot theory. The theoretical approach was complemented by a research in Mali, including consultations i.a. with Malian army officers and humanitarian workers operating in the northern part of the country.

The Black Spot Approach – Beyond Westphalia: States and Quasi-states

The predominant approach to security studies during the Cold War period was based on the neorealist paradigm, that was focused on threats posed by states and *excluded security challenges from non-state actors* such as transnational organized crime, terrorist organ-

² I.e. Hawking radiation. See more on the black holes, Hawking radiation and the *information paradox*: Aron, J. “Stephen Hawking’s new theory offers black hole escape”. *New Scientist*, 24 January 2014. <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24937-stephen-hawkings-new-theory-offers-black-hole-escape.html?full=true#.VCLjqFcvqz4>, Accessed on 5 July 2017.

izations, etc.³ The need to look beyond the Westphalian system was indicated initially as early as in the 1970s by the Harvard theorist, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. They noticed that after World War II, non-state actors consequently were becoming more and more visible at the scene of international relations, and they could not be disregarded any more. The prominent authors pointed out that the *classic paradigm* focused on states relations “was becoming outdated and inappropriate in accounting for the reality of world politics”.⁴ It was also partially due to emergence of non-state actors that had their own goals, often contradictory to states interests.⁵ Therefore, they proposed a broader definition of world politics “as all political interactions between significant actors in a world system in which a significant actor is a somewhat autonomous individual or organization that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with other actors across state lines”.⁶ This very practical definition was founded on *de facto* and not *de iure* approach to the status of actors – it encompassed not only states as *players* on the international stage, but also any other entity that is capable of participating in international relations. Keohane and Nye said – what not later than a few decades became visible to every policymaker – that certain actors cannot be ignored due to lack of internationally recognized status.

Yet, the recognition of importance of non-state actors does not necessarily lead to abandonment of state-centred perspective. States, and states solely, are considered responsible for their territories. The question arises, whether states do have such capability. Theoretically, they do, or at least – they should. Yet the reality is drastically far from it.

According to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, that introduced the standard definition of state under international law, the state is defined by possession of four qualifications: “(a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”⁷. It also reaffirmed the notion of sovereignty by a provision prohibiting intervention in domestic or foreign affairs of another state.⁸ A requirement to possess *a defined territory* is met by virtually every presently existing state. Yet the meaning of this passage, together with the third qualification (a government) and the general idea of the convention, i.e. the reaffirmation of sovereignty in international relations, implicitly entails that states should not only possess but also exercise control over their territories, because nobody else can substitute their power or interfere in their internal affairs. This example of the international law confirms

³ Stanislawski, B. H. “Black Spots: Insecurity from beyond the Horizon”. PhD dissertation defended at Syracuse University, May 2006. 24.

⁴ Stanislawski. “Black Spots: Insecurity...”. 23.

⁵ Keohane, R. and Nye, J. S. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973. XVII.

⁶ Keohane and Nye. *Transnational Relations...* XXIV.

⁷ Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), Article 1: “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” The integral text can be accessed on the Council on Foreign Relations website: www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897, Accessed on 22 June 2015.

⁸ Montevideo Convention, Article 8: “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another;” and also in the Reservations: “Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.”

that the state is the only actor that has a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force (violence) on its territory.

The reality tends to be different. Especially in the case of many African countries (but not only), which predominantly possess only *juridical statehood* – as Robert Jackson put it – “derived from a right of self-determination—negative sovereignty—without yet possessing much in the way of empirical statehood, disclosed by a capacity for effective and civil government—positive sovereignty”.⁹ They were created by outside powers and granted nominal features of states such as anthems and embassies, yet they do not reflect the grass-root need for the state; they lack effective state institutions, control over their territories, even national self-identification of their peoples – these states have state symbols but lack the substance.¹⁰ Such states are called *nascent, pseudo or quasi* states, since they are not capable of exercising the full role of the state.¹¹ “They are defined and supported externally by the institutional framework of sovereignty regardless of their domestic conditions”¹² – they basically exist due to international *courtesy*.¹³ Those are *de iure* rather than *de facto* states; and since they constitute only the façade of statehood, they only *pretend* to be a state, they are more like *as-if-states*.¹⁴

There are also entities that have contrary features to *as-if-states*. They are territories within clear borders with state-alike and effective institutions that represent a distinctive population or even a nation; and with their own symbols such as flags, emblems, national anthems, etc. – those entities have all the features of a *real* state but one: they lack international recognition. They are mostly separatist entities like the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, the Palestine Territories within Israel or Transnistria (in Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), etc. Some of these *almost states* – as we can name them – strive for independence, but others – as some scholars claim – do not really want to be recognized as independent states since that would entail not only profits but also duties. Some such irredentist territories prefer to stay somewhere in between full statehood and subordination – in a fertile sphere outside legal frameworks where the elites can establish “mutually beneficial illicit business cooperation” founded on an unwritten agreement that, in exchange for a share from criminal activities, such status of quasi-independence is not challenged by a legal government.¹⁵

Next to states, that have all the necessary regalia and perform all state functions, there are the *as-if-states*, that are internationally recognized but are not capable of performing basic internal state duties (such as territory protection and control for instance); and *almost states*, that on the contrary exercise state functions but do not enter into official relations with

⁹ Jackson, R. H. “Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: International jurisprudence and the Third World”. *International Organization* 41/4. 1987. 529.

¹⁰ Stanislawski, B. H. “Mapping Global Insecurity: The Black Spots Approach”. In Pedziwiatr, K., Kugiel, P. and Danda, A. (eds), *Current Challenges to Peacebuilding Efforts and Development Assistance*. Kraków: Tischnier European University, 2011. 86.

¹¹ Bull, H. and Watson, A. (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 430 as quoted in Jackson. “Quasi-states...”. 528.

¹² Jackson. “Quasi-states...”. 528.

¹³ Bull and Watson. *The Expansion of International Society*. 430.

¹⁴ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 86–87.

¹⁵ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 88.

other states (on an equal level); there are also other entities that were already mentioned, but not introduced: the Black Spots.

Black Spots

Territories “that are: (1) outside of effective governmental control; (2) dominated by alternative, mostly illicit, authority structures (criminals, warlords, terrorist organizations); and (3) are capable of breeding and exporting insecurity (e.g. illicit drugs, conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist operatives, illicit financial flows, strategic/sensitive know how) to faraway locations” are called Black Spots (BS) by Bartosz H. Stanisławski.¹⁶ The author of the term adds that, in order not to confuse Black Spots with the aforementioned *almost states*, the notion should not be attributed to a zone that exhibits separatist/independence tendencies or are fields of an armed conflict.¹⁷ A Black Spot would not be then equivalent to a failed (failing, fragile, weak, etc.) state, yet can be a part of it; nevertheless Black Spots can also be found in developed countries, even in Western European ones.¹⁸ Furthermore, “such locations are not ungoverned in any sense of that word” – Stanisławski stresses. There is no power vacuum; they have governance, though it is basically illegal and non-democratic.¹⁹

Table 1.
*Differences between states, quasi-states, and Black Spots*²⁰

<i>States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots</i>		International recognition	
		present	absent
Predominant territorial control by the authorities	present	<i>states</i>	<i>almost states</i>
	absent	<i>as-if-states</i>	<i>Black Spots</i>

Understandably, Bartosz H. Stanisławski was not the first one who pointed out the existence of illegally self-governing areas within states – even though he was the first one to treat that subject exclusively and extensively in an academic manner. Some indicative approaches were previously done by other scholars in the last fifteen years. In 2001 Charles King used the term of *informational black holes*,²¹ interestingly pointing out that such locations are very poorly known, diffuse almost no information on themselves to the outside world and

¹⁶ Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 83.

¹⁷ Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 89.

¹⁸ Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 83.

¹⁹ Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 89.

²⁰ Source: Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 90.

²¹ King, Ch. “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”. *World Politics* 53/4. 2001. 550.

want no state or media attention to be focused on them.²² A term of *terrorist black holes* was proposed by Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt (2005) and refers to the very same phenomenon as the Black Spot theory yet focuses on terrorist capabilities of such areas.²³ The notion of *black holes* is also used by the *practicians* themselves, who smuggle drugs and weapons through the US–Canadian border to denote places where the control of the border is very weak and allows them unbothered crossings, like in the case of St. Regis Mohawk Reservation (state of New York) – as denounced by Sarah Kershaw, the New York Times reporter.²⁴ Such areas, that are favourable for criminal and terrorist activity, are also called *dark corners of the world*²⁵ – black, dark, obscurity: these terms clearly describe conditions under which criminal non-state actors operate and conduct their businesses.²⁶

The astronomical metaphor seems also very suitable to describe such a phenomenon. The black holes are hard to see or cannot be seen and their presence is deduced by gravitational anomalies that occur around them; also what enters a black hole, most probably does not exit or if it does, it comes out in an alternated form. “These places [i.e. BS] represent the geographical equivalent of astronomical ‘black holes.’”²⁷ Not to confuse, though, these two different domains of science – B. H. Stanislawski decided to use the term of Black Spots – in a contrary meaning to *white spots on the map* that used to be undiscovered and unexplored territories. Black Spots are discovered but sometimes forgotten, at least by the legitimate government and international community.

Global Black Spots

The term of Black Spot is therefore very well founded – it combines features of all aforementioned notions to better express the reality that lies beyond; the abstract meaning of *blackness* is also important as it denotes invisibly such areas and obscurity of activities that are undertaken there. To stress the threat that black spots pose, Stanislawski added a *global* adjective to the term, thus making the Global Black Spot (GBS). In a globalized world,

²² Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 88.

²³ Korteweg, R. and Ehardt, D. *Terrorist Black Holes: A study into terrorist sanctuaries and governmental weakness*. Den Haag: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005.

²⁴ Kershaw, S. “Drug Traffickers Find Haven in Shadows of Indian Country”. *New York Times*, 16 February 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/national/19smuggle.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

²⁵ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 88.

²⁶ They also remind us of Joseph Conrad’s 20th century literature classic *Heart of Darkness* (born as Józef Teodor Konrad Korzeniowski). The book was published in 1902, though the story had appeared in parts already in 1899). Conrad describes a story of a trade factory in the Belgian Congo (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) which was governed by Kurtz, a revolting tyrant, worshiped by the local community, who held ultimate power over the factory territory. He was a threat to the neighbourhood, and was not looking for any recognition nor publicity – he was comfortable with his position and *status quo*. The heart of darkness – if this name was to describe the Kurtz ruled area – could serve as a model case of a Black Spot, of course, in the 19th century, when the globality of threats were much lower. Moreover, “his [Kurtz’s] mother was half-English, his father was half-French. All Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz...” – this sentence could induce us to ask about the impact of Western policies on emergence of Black Spots. (Conrad, J. *Heart of Darkness*. Project Gutenberg: Etext #526, PDF32.)

²⁷ Stanislawski, B. H. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. *The National Strategy Forum Review* 19/4. 2010. 2.

where people need only hours to cross continents and information milliseconds to travel around the globe, a threat that seemingly is only local can indeed produce global outcomes.

Stanislawski provides us with three distinctive scenarios of undertaken and successful terrorist attacks of the last two decades that very clearly denounce the globalization of ties, and – more significantly – the importance of GBS as the *source* of terrorist threats.

1. *“On March 17, 1992, and July 18, 1994, a non-state actor (Hezbollah) executed sophisticated, pre-planned attacks. Targets: the Israeli Embassy and Argentine–Israelite Mutual Association building, located in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Predominant planning and staging location: Ciudad del Este, a border city located at the epicenter of the so-called tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina.”*
2. *“On September 11, 2001, a non-state actor (Al-Qaeda) executed a sophisticated, pre-planned, and highly coordinated series of attacks. Targets: symbolic locations within the U.S. mainland. Predominant planning and staging location: Afghanistan, with significant back-up and support centers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Until the present day, the FATA remains a jurisdictional nightmare and a hub of insurgent and terrorist activities.”*
3. *“On November 8, 2002, a non-state actor (a Somali group linked to Al-Qaeda), executed sophisticated, pre-planned attacks. Targets: a Boeing 757 of the Arkia Israel Airlines during its takeoff from Mombasa’s Moi International Airport was fired upon using surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and, 20 minutes later, an Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa was hit by a SUV loaded with explosives. Predominant planning and staging locations: the Somali fishing village of Baraawe, which today has become one of ‘pirate capitals’.”²⁸*

In the first case, a Lebanese Shia terrorist organization (and a political party), Hezbollah planned an attack in a Paraguayan city that lies on the border of three states (an important factor to be discussed later) and executed it in Argentina against an Israeli target – four countries from different continents were somehow (directly or indirectly, yet rather unwillingly) involved in the attack. In the second and third case the background is similar: a non-state entity plans an attack in a remote safe haven and executes it against (citizens of) another state. It depicts the globalized relations between all countries. Yet the most important factor is that all the places where the attacks were planned are considered Black Spots, Global Black Spots – to be precise.

These Black Spots – since the reader is already acquainted with the terminology of Black Spots and its global imprint, I shall use the terms of Black Spots and GBS interchangeably – are highly different in size, location and scope of activities they host: the first is a second largest city in Paraguay (321,000 inhabitants), rather stable Southern American country, with a wide scope of criminal activity due to its location on the border of three states; the second location, FATA, is a Pakistani border area of 27,000 km² and 3 million Pashtun population situated on the frontiers of Afghanistan and Pakistan, known of harbouring Taliban fighters; and the third one is a port-town of ca. 33,000 inhabitants situated in southern Somalia – a country for many years consecutively declared a failed state and famous of modern piracy. Each of these GBS is different in size: from a small fishermen

²⁸ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. 1.

dominated port-town in the Horn of Africa, a medium-size city in Southern America, to a district-region of a country in Central Asia – yet all have something in common: they allowed terrorists to hide there for a long period of time and plan their attacks undisturbed.

The size of GBS should not deceive in terms of threat it can pose. Moreover, smaller areas within crowded cities can be even harder penetrated by the intelligence community, than vast unpopulated territories, and thus harder to assess the real challenge. Let us take a look on a western European Black Spot, located in Italy – two districts of Naples: Scampia and Secondigliano. It is a cliché already that Camorra rules Naples and Mafia governs Sicily, yet the alliance of terrorist groups and organized crime, that can be observed in the discussed case is less known but still very disturbing and capable of producing dangerous outcomes. Camorra, that allocated itself in these districts of the southern Italian city, sold weapons to ETA,²⁹ and provided shelter on its territory within Naples for dozens of al-Qaeda operatives from North Africa.³⁰ Despite the small size of its territory, the global links are visible and the threat of a terrorist attack on European soil realized due to such assistance should not be underestimated. Furthermore, Stanisławski points out that in this case “a state-level analysis of Italy would not have been helpful in understanding the reality, dynamics, and informal governance of these two districts in Naples”³¹ – we must look beyond and deeper to discover the realities of the ground level. Similarly, in case of Somalia – if the Somali state is perceived to be failed, the problem of piracy cannot be any longer a problem of Somalia (which virtually does not exist as a state save for Mogadishu or some state buildings within the capital city), and therefore Somalia should not be regarded as an actor to deal with. The problem is much “more localized and requiring in-depth understanding of reality at the village level”.³²

Beside size and possible impact, there is also another feature of Black Spots worth considering – it is *visibility*; related to its activity. As Stanisławski writes, *international invisibility* is a part of characteristics of GBS, yet every activity, no matter how minor it is, always leaves a trace. Thus, some BS remain invisible during almost all period of their existence (as the so called *Leticia-Tabatinga Corridor* on the border of Colombia, Brazil and Peru), but others are pulsing or dormant in their nature – i.e. their activity pattern changes in time, sometimes they are more, sometimes less active; or they can exist for a while, then vanish, just to reappear again after some years (like for example: the Chu Valley on the border of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the city of Encarnación in Peru, the *Little Wahhabi Republic* in Russian Dagestan).³³ The pulsating, dormant, or permanent character

²⁹ The Congressional Research Service’s 2002 report *The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferation, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*. Loc. gov. www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf, Accessed on 30 May 2017, as quoted in Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. 4.

³⁰ Some even speak about numbers exceeding a thousand, though that assessment seems to be exaggerated. Hesterman, J. L. *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups*. Boca Raton–London–New York: CRC Press, 2013. See also BBC News “Pakistani Al-Qaeda Suspects Held in Italy”. *BBC*, 31 January 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2712607.stm>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

³¹ Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. 4.

³² Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. 4.

³³ Stanisławski. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. 2 and Stanisławski, B. H. “Global Black Spots: Threats from Governance without Governments”. *The National Strategy Forum Review* 20/3. 2011. 2.

of a black spot is an important factor to be investigated and determined during research in order to avoid delusion about disappearance of a given BS.

According to the research project *Global Black Spots – Mapping Global Insecurity Program* conducted by the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Syracuse University,³⁴ by the year 2011 there has been up to 400–600 GBS existing all over the world, 140 of which has been identified, and 75 described.³⁵ Some of them were mentioned above, and on others they are already papers published³⁶ – but the majority is to be investigated yet. This paper is dedicated to one of them.

“Research conducted so far suggests that Black Spots may serve as nodes for a global network of transnational criminals and terrorists. We believe that that transnational non-state actors use Black Spots as locations between which they can operate undisturbed and out of sight of international law enforcement and security agencies” – points out Stanislawski in his most recent publication,³⁷ showing the importance of the problem and of further investigation on the topic of GBS. The research, however, should not focus only on discovering or revealing Black Spots, yet, more importantly, on monitoring them constantly, in order to track the movements of illicit actors, their finances, weapons, and other such as skills and expertise.³⁸ At the end, an attempt to find global connections between different Black Spots should be realized.

Identification and monitoring of Black Spots provide us with the perspective of illicit actors, allow us to see through their eyes – instead of looking from “*state-to-state* view that we have been taught”.³⁹ Furthermore, the intelligence acquired from such a *first-hand* source, as a Black Spot is, can be critical “for threat interception and the prevention of the escalation of insecurity”⁴⁰ – for it is always better to prevent than to cure.

Adrar des Ifoghas – Case Study

Adrar des Ifoghas is a low-mountain massif in Western Sahara on the border of Mali and Algeria. The plateau, divided between the territories of these two states, occupies an area of 250,000 square kilometres (the size of Great Britain). Among the peaks of granite rocks that elevate up to 890 metres (but usually have ca. 600 m), there are wide and shallow valleys, and countless natural caves and hideouts. The highest temperature reaches 40 °C in June (sometimes exceeds 45 °C) and the lowest 5 °C in February. Rain occurs only during

³⁴ Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University. Maxwell, 2013. <http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/gbs/Welcome/>, Accessed on 22 January 2017

³⁵ Recorded lecture: Black Spots: Identifying Growth Areas for Terrorist Cells and How to Combat Them. *The National Strategy Forum*. The Standard Club, Chicago 11 November 2010. <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/296540-1>, Accessed on 27 March 2013 and Stanislawski. “Global Black Spots...”. 2.

³⁶ “Black Spots: Breeding Grounds for Terrorism and Transnational Crime”. *The National Strategy Forum Review* 20/3. 2011 which is dedicated to research on GBS and contains articles on following cases: El Arish in the Sinai Peninsula, Guinea Bissau, Wa State in Burma, FATA in Pakistan, Scampia and Secondigliano, the Akwesasne Mohawk Reserve in the USA.

³⁷ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 83.

³⁸ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 83.

³⁹ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity”. 2.

⁴⁰ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 83.

the wet season (July–August) with an average annual rainfall of ca. 150 mm; the hot, dry and dusty *Harmattan* wind blows in the dry season and can cause sandstorms. Though this desert territory lacks rainfall, underground layers of water can be found in the wadis. These underground aquifers allow the growth of vegetation characteristic to more southern regions (Sahel); the Saharan vegetation grows on the higher parts of the massif. The surrounding area is dry and rocky, therefore unsuitable for agriculture, yet acceptable for herding. Arui sheep (also known as the Barbary sheep) can be seen in the mountains.⁴¹

The region is scarcely inhabited by the Tuaregs of Kel Adagh and seasonally, in its northern Algerian part, by Kel Ahaggar. Kidal (ca. 25,700 people) is the biggest city in the neighbourhood and the capital of the region; a town named Tessalit (ca. 5,700 inhabitants), due to its location on the route to Algeria and its proximity to the border, serves as a border post – both these cities have local airports (airstrips); Tinzaouatène (Tinzawatène) is also an important typically border trade town, yet located more remotely in the heart of Adrar.

Claims, made by the French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, that Adrar des Ifoghas is “a West African Afghanistan”⁴² might seem a bit exaggerated, though they are not without any foundation. The plateau is much lower than the Tora Bora mountains (where Osama Bin Laden was presumably hiding) and less abundant in water (though hosting some wells), therefore easier to penetrate and harder to hold. However, according to the specialists from the French (FR) and Malian (ML) military “the terrain is vast and complicated” (Col. Michel Goya, FR) and “it’s a sort of observation tower on the whole of the Sahara” (Gen. Jean-Claude Allard, FR) with innumerable caves “where you can spend six months without going out, for there are sources of water inside” (Lt. Col. Souleymane Dembélé, ML).⁴³ Furthermore, harsh climate conditions requires soldiers to drink up to ca. 10 litres of water per day, what constitutes a logistical issue – as stated by the French Commission on National Defence and Armed Forces in the report on operation Serval in Mali.⁴⁴ A Stratfor intelligence report points out that while high mountains obstruct trafficking, this relatively small massif “contains many small paths that facilitate the movement of small groups and obscure them from observation”. The report suggests that a drug-trafficking route leads

⁴¹ Rybinski, A. *Tuaregowie z Sahary. Tradycyjna kultura Tuaregów Kel Ahaggar na przełomie XIX i XX wieku.* [The Tuaregs of Sahara. Traditional Culture of Kel Ahaggar Tuaregs at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Century.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 1999. 72–73; Information Report by the National Defence and Armed Forces Commission. [Rapport d’information déposé en application de l’article 145 du Règlement par la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées en conclusion des travaux d’une mission d’information sur l’opération Serval au Mali et présenté par MM. Christophe Guilloteau et Philippe Nauche, députés.] *Assemblée Nationale*, 18 July 2013. 42–52. www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1288.pdf, Accessed on 30 July 2016.

⁴² Jacinto, L. “Strange bedfellows: The MNLA’s on-again, off-again marriage with Ansar Dine”. *France24*, 05 June 2013. <http://www.france24.com/en/20120605-mali-strange-bedfellows-mnla-ansar-dine-al-qaeda-aqim-islamists-tuareg/>, Accessed on 20 August 2015.

⁴³ Nossiter, A. and Tinti, P. “Mali War Shifts as Rebels Hide in High Sahara”. *The New York Times*, 10 February 2013. 1; Dembélé, I. B. “Adrar des Ifoghas: A natural sanctuary for the outlawed. [Adrar des Ifoghas: Un sanctuaire naturel pour les hors-la-loi]”. *Mali Actu*, 08 March 2013. <http://maliactu.net/adrar-des-ifoghas-un-sanctuaire-naturel-pour-les-hors-la-loi/>, Accessed on 20 August 2014.

⁴⁴ *Information Report*. 42.

through or near the Tigharghar massif – in the western part of Adrar des Ifoghas.⁴⁵ It is consistent with the records of ancient caravan routes that passed through the region.

The illicit potential posed by Adrar des Ifoghas should not be underestimated: for years it has successfully served the same purpose as the Afghan mountain range – it has been a hideout and stronghold for traffickers, renegades, militants, and terrorists. Geographical isolation, proximity of borders, harsh climate conditions, inaccessible and uninhabited desert location – all that were very useful in constituting a sanctuary for illicit actors. Moreover, “there was certainly the desire to make it a base for international actions” – as Jean-Yves Le Drian concluded in one of his interviews.⁴⁶

Operation Panthère IV

In February 2013, one month after deploying troops to Mali during the operation code-named Serval, the French and Chadian units, supported by the Tuareg secular–nationalist group called National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad⁴⁷ (MNLA), quickly moved north and surrounded the Jihadists in the mountainous region situated between Kidal and the Algerian border⁴⁸ – Adrar des Ifoghas. “The hideout of terrorists and all bandits active in the area” – as the French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian called the area.⁴⁹ The siege took place mostly in the area of Adrar Tigharghâr in the Ifoghas massif and lasted roughly between 18 February and 25 March 2013, with its core battle waged in Amettetaï valley between 26 February and 4 March.⁵⁰ The terrain of Tigharghâr, described as the AQIM stronghold, consist of a chain of mountains with four valleys situated on the area of ca. 60 kilometres long and ca. 30 km wide.

In an interview published by the French embassy in the U.K., Jean-Yves Le Drain described the operation in the following words:

“We carried out a pincer movement on the whole Adrar des Ifoghas [mountainous area] and the Ametetaï Valley in particular. And it’s not over, because after the Ametetaï Valley there are other valleys; it’s a very large territory. The French know the Adrar des Ifoghas: it’s as big as the Massif Central, so it’s huge; and it’s a place where people can slip away, there are caves, there are steep valleys, so it’s very difficult to gain access to. Given

⁴⁵ “Malian Militants’ Mountain Hideout”. *Stratfor Special Report*, 22 February 2013. Accessed via mailbox subscription on 20 August 2015.

⁴⁶ Diallo, T. “Al-Qaeda rebels wanted Mali as base for global attacks: France”. *Reuters*, 8 March 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/08/us-mali-crisis-france-idUSBRE9270CC20130308>, Accessed on 20 August 2016.

⁴⁷ Azawad is the Tuareg name given to the north of Mali (consists of regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal).

⁴⁸ Adrar des Ifoghas continues further north into Algeria, yet the French troops could not intrude into Algerian territory.

⁴⁹ Fr.: *Réduit de djihadistes et de toutes les bandes qui sont dans le secteur* as quoted in Bache, D. “Mali: France started the battle of des Iforas. [Mali: la France a lancé la bataille des Iforas]”. *Le Figaro*, 21 February 2013. www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/02/21/01003-20130221ARTFIG00543-mali-la-france-a-lance-la-bataille-des-iforhas.php, Accessed on 30 July 2015.

⁵⁰ Adrar means *mountain*; Adrar Tigharghâr is the western part of the mountainous massif Adrar des Ifoghas; the Amettetaï valley is situated north of the Mount Tigharghâr; “Battle of general Barrera in Amettetaï. [La bataille de l’Ametettaï du général Barrera au Mali]”. *La Croix*, 28 May 2013. www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/La-bataille-de-l-Ametettaï-du-general-Barrera-au-Mali-2013-05-28-965781, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

the violence of the fighting under way in the region over the past fortnight, we're clearly talking about a haven."⁵¹

Two thousand French soldiers were mobilised for the operation called Panthère IV (with 1200 on the ground), while ca. 130 took part in regular battles waged in Adrar Tigharghâr. About 500–600 Jihadists were simultaneously surrounded by the French (from the west) and Chadian forces (from the east) in Adrar des Ifoghas. They had no other place to hide, therefore they defended firmly their positions. In consequence, ca. two hundred fighters belonging to AQIM and its affiliated groups were killed. Among the killed was Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (also known as Mohamed Guedir), *one of the principal chiefs of AQIM*.⁵² The French lost three soldiers; the Chadians 27, while 70 of their soldiers were wounded.⁵³ In the area there were discovered training bases, twelve bomb production sites, small dug caves and corridors; and more than fifty stocks of arms (several dozen tons [*sic!*] of ammunition), including: Russian-made artillery (type D30/122 mm) and rocket-launchers (BM-21 *Grad*), heavy machine guns with ammunition (of all calibres), tons of mortar shells, suicide bomber's belts, hundreds of kilograms of explosives (nitrate, an ingredient of improvised explosive devices); computers with sensitive data (such as lists of combatants), passports, and even a surgical set.⁵⁴

Seven French hostages kidnapped by Islamists extremists in Niger and Mali in 2011–2012 were most probably kept in that region of the massif, according to the French Defence Minister.⁵⁵ It was also believed that Iyad ag Ghaly, wanted by the French forces, was taking

⁵¹ "Defence Minister interviewed on Mali, hostages and budget". Mali – Interview given by M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence, to BFM TV (excerpts), 5 March 2013. <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Defence-Minister-interviewed-on>, Accessed on 3 August 2015.

⁵² Abou Zeid was allegedly killed by an airstrike and artillery fire on 22–23 February, between the city of Aguelhoc and the Assemal (Asamal) valley. His position was revealed due to activity of his satellite phone. Chapleau, Ph. "Abou Zeid: confirmed or believed dead? [Abou Zeid: confirmé ou réputé mort]?" *Lignes de défense*, 8 April 2013. <http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2013/04/08/abou-zeid.html>, Accessed on 3 August 2017.

⁵³ *Information Report*. 9 and 63.

⁵⁴ Thibault, G. "Mali: in the massif of Tigharghar the French military finds hide-outs of AQIM. [Mali: dans le massif de Tigharghar, les militaires français ratissent les caches d'Aqmi]". *Radio France Internationale*, 26 March 2013. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130326-mali-massif-tigharghar-militaires-francais-ratissent-caches-aqmi/>, Accessed on 3 August 2015; and "The last days of war in Adrar. [Les derniers jours de la guerre dans l'Adrar au Mali]". *France Info*, 25 March 2013. <http://www.franceinfo.fr/emission/Unknown%20token%20emission-type-url/noeud-diffusion-temporaire-pour-le-nid-source-930107-05-05-2014-11-47#>, Accessed on 5 June 2017; "Death of chief jihadist Abou Zeid confirmed. [La mort du chef jihadiste Abou Zeid confirmée par l'Élysée]". *Radio France Internationale*, 23 March 2013. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130323-mort-chef-jihadiste-abou-zeid-confirmee-belmokhtar-elysee-hollande-deby/>, Accessed on 2 June 2017; Adrar des Ifoghas: discovery of heavy arms. [Adrar des Ifoghas: découverte d'armes lourdes]". *Maliactu*, 5 March 2013. <http://maliactu.net/ladRAR-des-ifoghasdecouverte-darmes-lourdes/>, Accessed on 10 June 2017; *Information Report*. 53.

⁵⁵ "Mali: hostages could be near to Kidal according to Le Drian. [Mali: les otages seraient près de Kidal, selon Le Drian]". *Le Parisien*, 31 March 2013. <http://www.leparisien.fr/international/mali-l-armee-francaise-bloquee-a-kidal-par-une-tempete-de-sable-31-01-2013-2527975.php>, Accessed on 10 May 2017.

refuge in the northern part of Adrar des Ifoghas on the Algerian side in the proximity of the border town Tinzaouten.⁵⁶

The infrastructure discovered, the diversity and amount of captured equipment, resistance and death toll among Jihadists, death of an AQIM chief and possible presence of the European hostages forcibly indicate that Adrar des Ifoghas was not just a regular or temporary rebels' hideout – it was clearly their long-time base: the sanctuary of criminals and terrorists.

Conclusions – A Black Spot in Adrar des Ifoghas

Adrar des Ifoghas is situated in a remote cross-border and non-accessible location. It lies on a trafficking route and it has served a safe haven for rebels during the Tuareg uprising. It was the starting point of these revolts, used to be a sanctuary for GSPC/AQIM and other terrorists, and finally hosted their stronghold with huge caches of arms and other facilities. It all suggests that the aforementioned mountain range is not a typical location as many in the region, on the contrary: its features allow us to consider it as a black spot, and even, due to its impact on the security of other countries and regions, a global black spot.

Yet to be a black spot, a territory should have four already discussed features. Firstly, it must be outside of effective governmental control. The core part of Adrar des Ifoghas lies within the Malian northern province of Kidal, and the other within remote Algerian wilayas of Adrar and Tamanrasset. Here, only the Malian part is considered due to illicit activities that seems to be predominantly undertaken on this side of the frontier, though terrorists and traffickers do not recognize the borders, therefore most probably the black spot lies on the territory of both states. The region of Kidal, as said, is economically and socially deeply neglected, and the central government's power is either not seen or is widely contested by the local militant groups that control the major towns in the region.

Secondly, the area must be dominated by alternative, mostly illicit authority structures (criminals, warlords, terrorist organizations, etc.). The settlements are under control of ethnic militias (mostly Tuareg but also Arab, Songhai and Fulani), and sometimes under the rule of the nexus of politicians and traffickers; for several months (June 2013 – January/February 2014) the territory was under direct control of Islamist terrorists of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, Al-Murabitoun, etc.). The mountainous area was basically not controlled, and this was exploited by traffickers. Bamako had no authority over that land, and those who have, could be defined as criminal, and most certainly non-state armed groups.

Thirdly, the region is capable of breeding and exporting insecurity (illicit drugs, weapons, terrorist operatives, etc.) to faraway locations. Not to mention the Tuareg rebellions, it is enough to recall the Islamist *reign of terror* that spread all over northern Mali and threatened the south. The mountains have served as a hiding place for the kidnapped Western tourists; and as trafficking route for arms and drugs, sometimes even on an

⁵⁶ Just opposite the border, on the Malian side, there is a settlement called Tinzaouatène; “Mali: Iyad ag Ghaly hides in Algeria according to the French secret service. [Mali: Iyad Ag Ghaly se cache en Algérie, selon les services français]”. *Jeune Afrique*, 27 January 2014. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2768p008.xml0/>, Accessed on 22 May 2017.

industrial scale. The facilities discovered in the mountains indicate that it was a centre for producing improvised explosives; finally, it was the stronghold for all illicit actors in the area where they could undergo training and plan attacks on Western targets.

Yet fourthly, a black spot ought not be a zone that exhibits independence tendencies or a field of an armed conflict. The point is not to confuse *freedom fighters* with warlords interested in power or economic gain. In this case, it seems that Adrar des Ifoghas, and broadly Azawad, as the Tuaregs call the area of northern Mali, cannot be considered a black spot since it exhibits separatist tendencies and, quite regularly, is a field of revolt. Nonetheless, I would dismiss this condition as a superficial argument. Adrar des Ifoghas was a black spot despite armed struggle, and even in time of peace. It not only served the noble independence purpose of self-determining the Tuareg fate, but also the traffickers and terrorists who had nothing to do with the Tuareg irredentism. Furthermore, possibly this territory, due to its unique characteristics, could constitute a black spot even after the potential independence of Azawad. The various activities, that are undertaken in the area, and their intensity indicate that this black spot is characterized by a pulse character and produces a panoramic variety of threats.

In consequence, considering all the above discussed specifics of the region of Adrar des Ifoghas, and mentioning the European concern over developments in Mali and the French intervention over there, all these constitute the proof that the insecurity flown out of northern Mali had or could have global reach and impact; it is legitimate to term Adrar des Ifoghas the global black spot, and the Amettetaï valley its *heart of darkness*.

The case study of Adrar des Ifoghas proves its features completely characteristic to the general requirements of a global black spot. However, further studies on other locations of terrorist and criminal hot spots within the Sahel region are required as for example the possibility of the existence of another GBS in the neighbourhood or the broader region (in the east of Gao in the wadi of Inaïs; the Salvador corridor in Niger, the proximity of Ghat and Ghadames in Libya, Tibesti in Chad, etc.), yet also deeper investigation into the significance of Adrar Tigharghâr and Amettetaï valley; GBS influence each other and their interaction on local, regional and global level.

Characteristics of a Tentative Model

Though it would be desirable to research upon other GBS in the region in order to create a model of the Sahel–Saharan global black spot, analysing the characteristics of already known GBS of Adrar des Ifoghas can bring us closer to creating such a draft-model.

Therefore, a global black spot in the Sahel–Saharan region: 1. is situated in remote non-accessible desert and/or mountainous area; 2. the area is outside governmental control; 3. and might be situated on a cross-border territory or in the proximity of a border. The region is economically neglected and there are very limited possibilities of gaining legal and stable income. Trafficking routes/hubs cross through the zone or are situated in the neighbourhood. In case of the Sahara it is desirable to check the historical routes and centres of caravan trade – they do not change too frequently over the centuries. Illicit activities were most probably recorded in the past in the area, especially kidnappings of foreigners. The area is likely uninhabited, yet may be controlled by a local people/tribe/clan/

militia that prevents others from intruding into the zone (or charge for it) – it is important to localize the traditional *owner* of the land (like people of the Tuareg Kel Adagh tribes, mostly the Ifoghas in the studied case). The region is inhabited by a Muslim population, and therefore provides ground for Islamist extremism (though being a Muslim does not make anybody Islamist, nor extremist). In the core of the area (safe havens, bases) there might be dozens or hundreds of individuals living permanently or occasionally – what is abnormal to scarcely inhabited areas outside town – it is impossible to stock that much water in the dry season. The territory, though might be lacking rainfalls, has to possess oasis, system of wells or underground water sources – locating them is crucial in order to localize the GBS (oasis are visible via satellites and on detailed maps, while hydrogeological maps can provide information on underground sources).

Moreover, in order to detect other GBS it is worth bearing in mind that the area sometimes undergoes constructions (e.g. deepening of caves, drilling of wells) – any special construction equipment imported into the area, especially by individuals non-related to construction industry should be investigated. Due to the need for contact and tendency of going into *low-tech* among criminals and terrorists (using simple instruments and technically not-sophisticated methods in order to avoid SIGINT surveillance; compare: cause of Abou Zeid's detection), the mobility may be increased. There are very few routes in the region, and remote territories possess none, therefore the emergence of new routes or paths for all-wheel drive vehicles conducting into *nowhere* could suggest that some atypical activities are occurring in the area (paths and routes can be surveyed via satellite images as showed above). Such areas due to their remoteness and high insecurity are presently not visited by foreign tourists. Therefore, appearance of foreigners (such as Europeans, Tchetchenians, Saudis, etc.) especially of young age in neighbouring airports and towns could indicate that they are foreign fighters arriving at a recruitment/training facility.

Assessing the Threat

The threat posed by such illicit entities as the GBS in Adrar des Ifoghas was clearly visible when the Tuaregs sparked another rebellion, and their irredentist movement was hijacked by the Islamist elements gathered around al-Qaeda leadership and ideology. The coalition of violent radical groups introduced their brutal vision of the *sharia* law on conquered territories that extended to the whole three Northern provinces of Mali.

The terrorists of such movements as AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and regional traffickers were allowed undisturbed existence for many years, while the north of Mali was totally neglected by the central government in Bamako; and its problems pushed aside by former Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré, or even abused by his entourage.⁵⁷

Such state of affairs was highly desirable by those who wanted to avoid public and international attention, yet consequences were far too serious for Mali itself, and the interim

⁵⁷ Vide: Lacher, W. "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region". *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, September 2012; Frintz, A. "Drugs: the new alternative economy of West Africa". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2013. <http://kit.mondediplo.com/spip.php?article6698>, Accessed on 30 July 2016; Leymarie, Ph. "The Sahel falls apart. [Comment le Sahel est devenu une poudrière]". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 2012. 8–9.

government was forced to ask France for help – without this significant external military support, the capital of Mali itself would have been threatened by direct Islamist invasion. Not only the state of Mali could collapse, but also almost six thousand Europeans living in Mali would have been directly threatened.⁵⁸

When the French and Chadian armies penetrated the region of Adrar des Ifoghas the discoveries that followed allowed French Defence Minister to claim that there was a “real will [among the terrorist] to export the terrorism beyond the Malian borders” and if the French would not had intervened, there would have been attacks in France.⁵⁹ Yet it was not only France that was threatened, but every EU and NATO member state, since the al-Qaeda ideology is directed explicitly against all the West. If the Islamists were not stopped, and thus were basically given green light for their actions in the Sahara, rather sooner than later they would grow strong and reach operational capacity sufficient to hit the West again, and commit another atrocity on civilians.

To sum up, the Global Black Spot of Adrar des Ifoghas was instrumental for Sahelian terrorists and criminals in order to conduct freely their illicit activities that indirectly undermined international stability (people and drug trafficking, arms proliferation, undermining state institutions, etc.); threatened the existence of the Malian state and in consequence could possibly destabilize the neighbouring Western Sahel or Northern African states. Furthermore, Adrar des Ifoghas GBS would have been crucial for planning and/or conducting terrorist attacks against Western targets, especially on European soil due to geographical proximity; yet primarily against the thousands of Europeans (not to mention other non-Salafi Muslims, Christians, and others) living in Mali and other countries of Western and Northern Africa.

Counteracting the Phenomenon

While describing general threats of global black spots, Bartosz H. Stanisławski pointed out on some policy recommendations and suggestions that, in his opinion, should be introduced and respected. The author of the approach emphasises potential risk of intercommunication between GBS situated in different parts of the world, the complicated systems of threats that lie behind these relations, and therefore possible inability to counteract them successively one-by-one. Moreover, he stresses that if a GBS is compromised by open initiative of security agencies, it will not be a GBS anymore and the core of criminals could move to another location – and yet another time-consuming effort will be needed to spot and penetrate a new one. Therefore, he points out, “attacks against criminal or terrorist individuals within Black Spots should be highly selective and broadly coordinated so as to arrest as many key people and potential leaders as possible in one operation all over the world” – the author of GBS theory opts for a virtually simultaneous operation against all GBSs worldwide. Finally, following the so called *smart security* approach, B. H. Stanisławski indicates that we can

⁵⁸ There were 4758 French citizens, and almost 1000 other Europeans, living in Mali in 2013 according to: *Information Report*. 22.

⁵⁹ Interviews given on 3 April 2013 and 20 February 2013, as quoted in: *Information Report*. 53.

as well take advantage of the very existence of GBS: as surveillance of them can produce useful intelligence.⁶⁰

In case of Adrar des Ifoghas it seems, though, that such an approach has been verified negatively. Freely using astrophysical nomenclature, the black hole reached critical mass and it exploded: not only it threw insecurity out in the form of another Tuareg revolt (what was quite commonly observed in the past), but also excreted a much more dangerous threat of international terrorism. The lesson learned is the following: the action against GBS should have been taken earlier, before it erupted. The military action on a level proportional to the threat – as seen in the case of Operation Serval – was indispensable. Yet every military intervention works on a short-term but cannot solve the root-causes.

As the Operation Barkhane – led by the French in five Sahel countries – and the multidimensional UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) indicate, transnational efforts are indispensable to ensure security to the region. Only then the equal economic development of the neglected north provinces could and should be introduced by the central government in Bamako to improve the life quality of the northern population. As well, a more inclusive governance system in the three Northern provinces would not let the nomad population of the Tuaregs and Arabs feel alienated, and on the other hand would induce the highly divided Northern communities to constructively focus on a common effort of development of Azawad within the framework of the Malian state.

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⁶⁰ Stanislawski. “Mapping Global Insecurity...”. 91–92.

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BRICS in Africa and the Brazilian Approach

Dávid Vogel

Abstract

The end of the Second World War served as a new start in many areas of life, new systems were introduced in order to better regulate and coordinate the interactions among people, countries and other entities. However, during decades, these systems were too rigid to react to the changes, positive and negative developments reorganised and reshaped the actors; thus specific systems were not favourable for certain players any longer. After the turn of the millennium, developing countries – especially those with vast areas and large populations – that were at a totally different stage in their lifecycle at the end of World War II, started to feel uncomfortable and initiated certain changes to the system. Upon failing to reach their proposed aims, these countries found each other as natural partners to transform existing structures, or in case they are still found to be too rigid, to make their own ones in particular areas. The aim of the study is to offer an overview of such an initiative, BRICS, the cooperation of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and to give a special focus on one of the most popular, though very complex target areas, Africa and the approach how Brazil has been dealing with the continent, parallel to its fellow BRICS-member states.

Keywords: *Africa, BRICS, Brazil, economics, neo-colonisation, trade, foreign relations*

Introduction

When talking about Africa nowadays, what comes into most people's minds are expressions like poverty, unstable or failed states, armed struggles in most parts of the continent: just the everyday challenges of staying alive. In a more historical context, one might think of colonization or colonial powers but only as a fact of the past that has already ended in the 1960s in most parts of Africa. Even though the effects of the colonial period are still very vivid – just think of borders and tribal rivalry or even the exploitation of areas of vast resources ranging from petroleum through coal till ores like iron or gold – the whole idea of foreign countries coming from afar and taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of the African states or the gap between the levels of development just seem to be rather far-fetched.

With slightly different memories in mind, African countries – even in the best case scenario – do have mixed feelings towards European states. If we zoom out of the continent,

we can easily find other countries that are not satisfied with Western states either, and especially with the world system that was produced mostly by these states at the end of World War II. These emerging countries in question – since around the turn of the millennium referred to as BRICS, meaning Brazil, Russia, India, China and a bit later on South Africa – were mostly in a totally different situation after the Second World War (probably with the exception of Russia/USSR). Due to their political, later on economic changes, they have gradually become regional powers and now are trying to get to a higher level and become real world players; doing so they are strongly challenging the Western world order.

These are: four continents (with Russia being a transcontinental country) and five countries with an area¹ of more than 38,309,501 km² and a population of a bit below 3.1 billion people² representing 29.53 per cent and 42.19 per cent of the world, respectively. Both are respectable amounts of share. If we consider the GDPs (counted on purchasing power parity) they accumulate an amount of more than 33.1 trillion USD together, which is more than 30 per cent of the world's GDP (PPP).³ In terms of Africa, the numbers go as 30,370,000 km² for the area with a population of around 1.2 billion people in countries generating a GDP (PPP) of 6.757 trillion USD.⁴ Respectful numbers too, but only fractions of the corresponding BRICS data.

After this short introduction, my intention with the study is to show how these facts – the new circumstances of the BRICS and the African states, as well as the strengths of the BRICS countries – have a great impact on the African continent. BRICS countries have been gradually setting foot in Africa, multiplying their influence in most of the countries, in many cases even surpassing Western states or the former colonial powers in the field of trade. However, so far it seems they are competing more with each other than they are behaving as a coalition or working for the original goals of the BRICS. Even though this course of action might change when the newly set up financial institutions – the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement – are functioning on a full scale. The original aim of the study is to show, how BRICS countries can find their ways in Africa but due to the limitations of the volume, the focus will be on the Latin American giant, Brazil and the unique path it pursues, since it lacks the vast resources (both financially and in human resources) that China has, so it needs to have a special approach in order to be successful.

¹ “The World Factbook Field listing: Area”. CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2147.html#br>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

² “The World Factbook Field listing: Population”. CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html#br>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

³ “The World Factbook Field listing: GDP (purchasing power parity)”. CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2001.html#br>, Accessed on 14 June 2017. China is the leading player in all factors mentioned above.

⁴ “The World Factbook Field listing: Area”. CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2147.html#br>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

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A Brief Overview about BRICS: Africa in BRICS – BRICS in Africa

When in 2001, Jim O’Neill coined the term *BRIC* in his article *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*⁵ in the Goldman Sachs Global Economics Papers, very likely none of the strategic thinkers would have thought that the original four countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China made a long-term coalition in eight years. This prognosis became even more exciting when in the 2003 Annual Report of Goldman Sachs,⁶ O’Neill wrote about BRIC states surpassing the economies of the G6, namely the six greatest economies – USA, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy – by 2050.

What brought these quite different and in many ways distant countries together – that are often even hostile with each other, just think of the border disputes of China and India – is that they are all leading developing countries in their regions and besides this: their economic growth and its rate, the need for mostly raw materials to fuel their economies and productions. Besides these – especially since the accession of South Africa at the end of 2010 – BRICS has a special focus on the South–South Cooperation,⁷ which in a way means an additional dimension for the group. This special approach was especially supported by Brazil thus the fellow IBSA-member South Africa was invited by the then-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil to participate at the second BRIC Summit in Brasília, Brazil in April 2010. This meeting was shortly followed by the official invitation of South Africa in August to join the BRIC which became effective at the end of the same year, 2010.⁸

If mentioning the Brasília Summit of 2010, we should talk about the other meetings of heads of states, as well. The first two summits – the first official summit that was actually meant to be a BRIC meeting and not just a side event of a United Nations General Assembly or a G20 summit being held in Yekaterinburg, Russia⁹ – only ended with a short, few-page-long joint statement. The main difference that is interesting in our approach is that the 2010 joint statement was the first one to particularly mention Africa, in this case, in the context of the fight against poverty. It called upon “the international community to make all the necessary efforts to fight poverty, social exclusion and inequality bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries, especially LDCs, small islands and African Countries.”¹⁰

The first closing document that went by the name declaration was the one after the Sanya Summit in China, 2011. This was the first occasion, when member states

⁵ O’Neill, J. “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”. *Global Economics Paper No. 66*, November 2001.

<http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/building-better.html>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

⁶ *Goldman Sachs 2003 Annual Report – Every catalyst elicits a reaction*. New York: Goldman Sachs, 2003. 18. <http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/annual-reports/attachments/2003-annual-report.pdf>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

⁷ South–South cooperation has always been a framework of reference for developing countries, later on emerging economies since the first African–Asian Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. On the Spirit of Bandung see Tarrósy, I. “Need for non-alignment in our global world? The Non-Aligned Movement Today and Tomorrow”. *Croatian International Relations Review* XI/40–41. 2005. 157–163.

⁸ Smith, J. A. “BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard”. *Foreign Policy Journal*, 21 January 2011. <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/01/21/bric-becomes-brics-changes-on-the-geopolitical-chessboard/2>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

⁹ “Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders”. Government of South Africa. 16 June 2009. <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/first-summit>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹⁰ “II BRIC Summit – Joint Statement”. Government of South Africa. 16 April 2010. <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/second-summit>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

mentioned particular security issues in connection with Africa, as well (in this case North and West Africa, and in particular, Libya) which later on became a permanent part in the following declarations. They also touched upon development and expressed their support to “infrastructure development in Africa and its industrialization within framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)”.¹¹

The Delhi Declaration of the next year did not bring too many new topics or initiatives. Even though it clarified a bit more on cooperation in the field of development, declaring that BRICS sees the highest importance in “economic growth that supports development and stability in Africa, as many of these countries have not yet realised their full economic potential. We will take our cooperation forward to support their efforts to accelerate the diversification and modernisation of their economies. This will be through infrastructure development, knowledge exchange and support for increased access to technology, enhanced capacity building, and investment in human capital [...]”.¹²

In connection with Africa, the real breakthrough was when the summit was also held on the continent, in Durban, South Africa, 2013.¹³ Only the title by itself *BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation* showed that the only African member of the coalition meant serious business and really wanted to take advantage of the opportunity of a locally organised meeting. This document is by far the most Africa-centred, dealing with African issues in 12 paragraphs (as opposed to the previous two years’ 4–4, and the upcoming years’ 9 or fewer cases).

From our point of view, one of the most relevant ones was to “acknowledge that infrastructure development in Africa is important and recognise the strides made by the African Union to identify and address the continent’s infrastructure challenges through the development of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU NEPAD Africa Action Plan (2010–2015), the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), as well as the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plans that have identified priority infrastructure development projects that are critical to promoting regional integration and industrialisation.”¹⁴

The document also highlighted that two fundamental agreements were negotiated successfully between the Export–Import Banks (EXIM) and Development Banks of BRICS so the *Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing for Sustainable Development* and the *Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure Co-Financing for Africa* were signed as well, meaning a significantly broader spectrum of possibilities and greater financial opportunities for development initiatives in Africa.

Regarding Africa, the Fortaleza Summit of 2014 strengthened the previously mentioned fields of cooperation and needs of development, however – probably because it

¹¹ “Sanya Declaration”. Government of South Africa. 14 April 2011. <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/third-summit>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹² “Delhi Declaration”. Government of China. 29 March 2012. https://brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201701/t20170125_1406.html, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹³ “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation – Durban Declaration”. Government of South Africa. 27 March 2013. <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/fifth-summit>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹⁴ “Delhi Declaration”. Government of China. 29 March 2012. https://brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201701/t20170125_1406.html, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

was held in Latin America, *the land of regional integrations* – the document highlighted the importance of regional actors such as first of all of course the African Union (AU), and more particularly the AU Peace and Security Council, but also the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) which is especially important for Brazil, the host of the summit.

Touching upon defence issues, the declaration also named some of the ongoing UN missions of the continent – MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), MINUSMA (Mali) – but more importantly and for the first time, mentioned the importance of local capabilities in the sector. It welcomed “the AU Malabo Summit decision to establish an interim African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) by October 2014 to respond quickly to crisis situations as they arise”.¹⁵

Besides the *standard* issues in connection with Africa, the Ufa Declaration highlighted the problems of terrorism, especially the acts against the most vulnerable groups such as women and children. It also mentioned the challenges in the field of health, on the occasion of “the impact of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, including its grave humanitarian, social and economic consequences” and as well as other major diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and the highly pathogenic influenza.¹⁶

The *African highlights* of the Goa Declaration in October 2016 are the support and will for cooperation in connection with Africa’s long-term strategies. First of all, *Agenda 2063*, the document that collects the visions and goals of the African Union in connection with the development of the continent, as a broader frame to the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Also fitting in this picture is BRICS’s welcoming and support for a lasting and sustainable peace and security architecture for the African Union in cooperation with the United Nations and regional organisations. In particular, the decision of the Assembly of the African Union about the operationalization of its Peace Fund in order to create the financial means for its peace and security operations that can – in the end – relevantly contribute to enduring stability and growth on the continent.¹⁷

The declaration of the ninth BRICS Summit was a little bit different in context than the previous ones but one point is very relevant in connection with Africa: the establishment of the Africa Regional Center of the New Development Bank in South Africa, as the first regional office of the Bank.

Having mentioned all the relevant details in connection with Africa that are included in the nine BRICS Summit outcome documents, we can have a quite clear picture about the highest level of decisions and strategic thinking, although, in order to get a full picture, all the ministerial and lower level professional meetings should be analysed, which of course would not fit the limits of this study. Concluding the first part of the chapter, we need to

¹⁵ “Fortaleza Declaration”. Government of Brazil. 15 July 2014. <http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/214-sixth-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration>, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹⁶ “Ufa Declaration”. Government of China. 9 July 2015. https://www.brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201701/t20170125_1409.html, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹⁷ “Goa Declaration”. Government of China. 16 October 2016. https://www.brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201701/t20170125_1410.html, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

mention that even though BRICS is a coalition of countries with common goals and similar circumstances in many ways, every single summit, and naturally every single declaration is tailor-made by the host country. As we could track this regarding at least the last five summits, we can assume that African issues are going to be a bit more stressed during the tenth BRICS Summit since it will be hosted in Johannesburg by South Africa in 2018.¹⁸

Means of United Presence: The Financial Instruments of BRICS

In addition to the economic aspects, in the political sphere BRICS members are linked by the fact that they are not satisfied with certain areas of the current world system: some countries feel excluded from world affairs (think about Brazil's and India's aim to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, for instance), others see their role in world economics unfair with regard to their burden sharing or their presumed or real position (e.g. China's goal to reform the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in order to gain more voting rights to better reflect its place or Russia's quest for making the Rubel become the sixth currency in the SDR basket besides the US dollar, the Euro, the Japanese yen, the British pound and the newly introduced Chinese Renminbi).

In order to have stronger means to execute their goals and to start their own way of dealing with areas they found problematic, during the fifth summit of the BRICS in March 2013, in Durban, South Africa, member states decided to set up financial institutions as alternatives to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.¹⁹ The *Agreement of the New Development Bank* (NDB) was signed at the sixth summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, on 15 July 2014. The document that defines all the details of operation of the bank clearly states that the purpose of the Bank is to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.

To fulfil its purpose, the Bank shall support public or private projects through loans, guarantees, equity participation and other financial instruments. It shall also cooperate with international organizations and other financial entities, and provide technical assistance for projects to be supported by the Bank.”²⁰ So as to reach these goals, the five members allocated 10–10 billion USD each, giving all five of them equal voting rights in the decision-making.

¹⁸ “BRICS Leader Xiamen Declaration”. Government of China. 4 September 2017. https://www.brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201709/t20170908_2021.html, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

¹⁹ Powell, A. “BRICS Leaders Optimistic About New Development Bank”. *Voice of America*, 27 March 2013. <https://www.voanews.com/a/brics-summit-leaders-optimistic-about-new-development-bank/1629583.html>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

²⁰ “Agreement on the New Development Bank – Fortaleza, July 15 Article 1 – Purpose and Functions”. 15 July 2014. New Development Bank. <http://www.ndb.int/wp-content/themes/ndb/pdf/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

To highlight the importance of the African continent, summit participants agreed to have the first regional centre after the Shanghai Headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa.²¹

Besides many other economic actors from all over the world and especially from Africa, representatives of the African financial sector gathering in Abidjan, Ivory Coast at the 50th Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank in May 2015 welcomed the decision very positively, expressing their hope that the bank would play a leading role in infrastructure development and in enhancing trade and economic relations among states of the African continent and beyond.²²

The other leg of the BRICS financial institutions is the *Contingent Reserve Agreement* (CRA). The framework that is meant to support BRICS members with short-term liquidity problems was established in 2014 in Fortaleza, Brazil²³ and became operational in October 2016.²⁴ CRA has a double amount of resources compared to the NDB, but capital intakes, access to funds and voting rights are shared unequally among the member states.

Table 1.
*CRA financial and voting rights*²⁵

	Capital contribution (billion USD)	Access to funds (billion USD)	Voting rights (per cent)
Brazil	18	18	18.1
Russia	18	18	18.1
India	18	18	18.1
China	41	21	39.95
South Africa	5	10	5.75
TOTAL	<i>100</i>	<i>85</i>	<i>100</i>

As shown by the data, these institutions are brand new, so we cannot have a clear picture of how big of an impact they will have in the development of African states, but what we can say now is that both the NDB and the CRA are fully operational and functional. According to the NDB's website – as of 1 July 2017 – it has seven ongoing projects with a total loan

²¹ "Agreement on the New Development Bank – Fortaleza, July 15 Chapter 1, Article 4 – Headquarters". 15 July 2014. New Development Bank. <http://www.ndb.int/wp-content/themes/ndb/pdf/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

²² Africa welcomes NDB Regional Centre. BRICS Business Council. 22 September 2016. <http://bricsbusiness-council.co.za/trade-investment-opportunities/africa-welcomes-ndb-regional-centre>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

²³ "Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement – Fortaleza, July 15". Itamaraty. 15 July 2014. <http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/220-treaty-for-the-establishment-of-a-brics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-fortaleza-july-15>, Accessed on 14 July 2017.

²⁴ "BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement operational: Finance Minister Arun Jaitley". *Indian Express*, 7 October 2016. <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/brics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-operational-finance-minister-arun-jaitley-3070448>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

²⁵ "Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement – Fortaleza, July 15 Article 2 – Size and Individual Commitments". Itamaraty. 15 July 2014. <http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/220-treaty-for-the-establishment-of-a-brics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-fortaleza-july-15>, Accessed on 14 July 2017.

amount of 1.559 billion USD. Although, of which only one with 180 million USD is carried out in Africa, namely in South Africa.²⁶

The *ESKOM*²⁷ project is an investment in the renewable energy sector with an intended impact of 670 megawatts renewable energy evacuated and a yearly 1,300,000 tons of CO₂ avoided.²⁸ It is clearly visible that there is a lot more to go if BRICS and NDB want to have a significant impact on the continent. This can be said in connection with the partnerships of NDB regarding Africa. Today, the Bank has 11 memoranda of understanding with financial institutions (multilateral development banks, national development banks and commercial banks) representing Europe, Asia and Latin America, but none from Africa²⁹ which on the long run needs to be fixed in order to be more effective and more available.




Figure 1.
*Ongoing NDB projects (as of 1 July 2017)*³⁰

Having a clearer picture now of BRICS' financial instruments and their institutional relations with Africa, one might wonder: what will make the intensity of relations stronger amongst the actors? With the earlier formation of IBSA,³¹ an alliance focusing on the South–South Cooperation with member states such as India, Brazil and South Africa, two of the original four BRICS countries were already in coalition with each other. With the accession of South Africa to BRICS, today, all IBSA members share a double partnership.

²⁶ "Projects". New Development Bank. 2017. <http://www.ndb.int/projects/list-of-all-projects>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

²⁷ Eskom is a South African electricity public utility, successor of the Electricity Supply Commission established in 1923 by the Government of the Union of South Africa. Steele, M., Schulz, N. and Musana, F. "The Eskom factor: Power politics and the electricity sector in South Africa". *Greenpeace*, June 2012. 3. www.greenpeace.org/africa/global/africa/publications/coal/theeskomfactor.pdf, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

²⁸ "Project: ESKOM (South Africa)". New Development Bank. 2017. <http://www.ndb.int/project/eskomsouth-africa>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

²⁹ "Partnerships". New Development Bank. 2017. <http://www.ndb.int/partnerships/list-of-partnerships>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

³⁰ "Projects". New Development Bank. 2017. <http://www.ndb.int/projects/list-of-all-projects>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

³¹ IBSA was established by the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003. "The India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum". IBSA. <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/background>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

Although there is more in common in BRICS members, they tend to have and build relationships with countries that are *out of the league*, states like Muammar Gaddafi's Libya, Iran or Venezuela. Besides this, they also share common patterns in their history: during the colonial period they were the colonised ones rather than being colonisers themselves,³² therefore they are seen in a totally different perspective than Western (European) states in general.

In order to get a better picture about the involvement of BRICS states in Africa, we should take the five members individually. Given the fact that there are 54 bigger or smaller countries in Africa³³ this would take a lot more space than the dimensions of this study allows, so my aim is to highlight some factors, tendencies or intensions of BRICS member states in Africa, with a special focus on how each BRICS member has a unique approach to their countries of interest.

BRICS or Rather briCs? – In Other Words: Is Africa only China's Playground?

When people talk about China nowadays, it is not the Sleeping Dragon³⁴ any more. It is a common cliché that the Dragon woke up and is stretching now, not only in economic terms, but also politically and militarily. One of the means of doing so – especially if we talk about trade and (financial) influence – is through international/regional organisations, such as BRICS.

In order to demonstrate this often stated fact, find below two maps – containing the data gathered from reliable sources – showing the trade (export and import) of BRICS countries to African states, each BRICS-member with its own colour. Darker colours represent the strongest BRICS-member in the given state, even surpassing the former colonial power, lighter colours show supremacy only towards the other four members.

Without getting into too many details, some tendencies can be spotted at the first look. The first map – showing the African exports to BRICS countries – is a lot more colourful, while the second one, picturing the imports to Africa is more in a reddish shade. Namely, while regarding BRICS' imports, India can almost match China's results – 20 versus 24 countries out of the 54 African states – BRICS' export map shows 42 countries as leading Chinese partners, 31 of which have stronger trade relations with Beijing than with the former colonial power.

³² Even though that of course, we cannot forget about Russian, American or Chinese activities in Tibet, that is also considered by some scholars colonisation.

³³ Since Western Sahara, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is only partially recognised and not a member of the United Nation, it is not considered a sovereign state in the study.

³⁴ The original saying was from Napoleon upon returning from China, saying: "That is a sleeping dragon. Let him sleep! If he wakes, he will shake the world."




Figure 2.
The trade of BRICS countries to African states

With these maps in mind, especially with the second one, we can easily have the impression that China is *colonizing* Africa and with *China-level volumes* other countries can only be secondary players, despite the fact that China – as a BRICS-member – is only one of the five partners, sharing supposedly the same goals and acting as a team-member and not as an individualistic player. So in the forthcoming parts below, we will see what the Latin American giant, Brazil can do in order to find its ways to African countries and establish mutually prosperous cooperation.

Looking for a Special Link

If a country with a responsible government knows that their possibilities are limited but they still want a piece of the cake so they need to compete with bigger players around the table, then, in this case, other methods need to be identified and taken advantage of to ease their job. In case of Brazil's relations with Africa two ideas can come up. The first one is history. Out of the estimated approximately 11 million Africans who were taken as slaves to the American continent, every third person, around 4 million people were transported to

Brazil.³⁵ Later on, when the Portuguese Empire started to have larger and larger portions of Africa, the movement reversed: large groups of African–Brazilians were moved back to Africa. These groups are referred to as Agudás in Benin, Amaros in Togo and Nigeria, and Tabom in Ghana.³⁶

If one might think that these are just people who share the same customs and religion, but their importance is not that high, the case is quite the opposite. In fact, the Kingdom of Portugal was so concerned about a possible union between Brazil and Portuguese territories in Africa that upon Brazil gaining independence from Portugal, in the Friendship and Alliance Treaty of 1825, there was a particular clause requiring Brazil to refuse any proposals of territorial integrity with Portuguese colonies.³⁷ However, this period eventually ended with the abolishment of slavery in 1888, meaning not only the end of the arriving of masses of African people, but also marking the beginning of a period where the distance between Brazil and Africa started to grow and later on, even some kind of *Europeanization* was introduced in 1945, stating that “in the admission of immigrants, the need to preserve and develop, in the ethnic composition of the population, the more convenient features of their European ancestry shall be considered”.³⁸

During most of the twentieth century, Brazil carried out a very limited foreign policy. One of the few exceptions to this was the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961–64). The African Division was created within Itamaraty in this period. However, this process and the increase in bilateral relationships were interrupted by the military coup of 1964, since, according to the Cold War logic, African liberation movements were considered Communist. In this era, Brazil was on the opposite side regarding independence movements, since The Friendship Treaty of 1953 gave very limited autonomy to Brazil especially in regards to the Portuguese African colonies which were considered domestic policy issues.

The other exception was during the so-called *Economic miracle* during the Medici and the Geisel Governments. The economic boom was a catalyst for Brazil and Brazilian companies to reach out increase in their export and in some cases even set foot in Africa. In 1972, Mario Gibson Barbosa, Medici’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited nine African states to secure oil supplies for Brazil. Following the Carnation Revolution of 1974 and the political changes in Portugal, Brazil regained total control over its foreign affairs.

This was the time, when Angola and Nigeria became important trading partners of Brazil exporting industrialized products and also importing oil. The export with the latter

³⁵ Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). *Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil: Séries Econômicas, Demográficas e Sociais de 1500 a 1988*. [Historical Statistics of Brazil: Economic, Demographic, and Social Series from 1500 to 1988.] 2ª Edição Revisada e Atualizada do v.3 de Séries Estatísticas Retrospectivas, IBGE, 1990. https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/monografias/GEBIS%20-%20RJ/serieestatisticasrestrospectivas/Volume%203_Estatisticas%20historicas%20do%20Brasil_series%20economicas_demograficas%20e%20sociais%20de%201550%20a%201988.pdf, Accessed on 17 September 2017.

³⁶ Figueiredo, E. “Os Brasileiros Retornados à África”. [The Brazilians that Returned to Africa.] *Cadernos de Letras da UFF, Dossiê Diálogos Interamericanos*, No. 38. 2009. 51–70.

³⁷ de Freitas, M. V. “Brazil and Africa: Historic Relations and Future Opportunities”. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 8 February 2016. <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/brazil-and-africa-historic-relations-and-future-opportunities>, Accessed on 30 August 2017.

³⁸ “Decreto-lei Nº 7.967 de 18 de Setembro de 1945”. 18 September 1945. Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/1937-1946/De17967.htm, Accessed on 16 August 2017.

one grew almost 40 times in four years: from 3 million USD in 1973 the volume went up to 115 million USD in 1977, representing half of Brazil's overall trade in this period. Northern Africa started to become more important in the 1970s as well: Brazilian exports grew from 50 million USD in 1972 to 300 million USD in 1980.³⁹ Meanwhile, the number of Brazilian embassies in Africa almost doubled in 10 years, and reached 21 in 1984, from the level of 12.⁴⁰ This boom period was followed by the so-called *lost decade* when Brazil needed to deal with domestic political and economic problems, so African relations were more or less neglected.

From the very beginning of Brazilian history – a history that is linked in so many ways to Africa – we reached the millennium, the time of great changes in the history of Brazil, but before we continue, we need to mention the other link with the African continent, that started to *develop* in this period.

When people think about Brazil in connection with Africa, it is more than likely that what comes in mind first is the historical links explained earlier. However, there is a closer and probably stronger tie: language. Thanks to Portuguese sailors and the zealous colonising strategies of Portugal, several countries share the Portuguese language in the world. These states joined together in 1983 and established the *Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries* (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP). As of today, CPLP has nine member states covering 10,742,000 km², around 7.2 per cent of the world, out of which a great majority, six countries – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea – are situated in Africa, as well as three associate observers, Mauritius, Namibia and Senegal.⁴¹

Main objectives of the CPLP include:

- Political and diplomatic cooperation among member states to have a stronger presence in the international arena;
- Cooperation in multiple areas, such as education, health, science and technology, defence, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public safety, culture, sports and media;
- Promotion of the Portuguese language.⁴²

No question these are policies and common goals that are really helping Brazil to have a welcoming environment when negotiating in Africa.

If we look back a bit more than a decade in Brazilian history, we can see a big shift in the Latin American country's politics and especially in the field of foreign affairs. Presidents of the democratic transition after the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, focused more on strong relationships with the hegemon of the greater region, the United States. When *Lula da Silva* became president, he made a huge turn in the intensity of Brazil's foreign affairs and its directions, as well: he turned more to Africa, referring to Brazil's *historic debt* to the African continent, and also stressing on cultural ties, the importance of the South–South relations. Additionally, he also realised that the markets of

³⁹ Ligiero, L. F. *A Autonomia da Política Externa Brasileira*. [The Autonomy of the Brazilian Foreign Policy.] Brasília: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão. 2001.

⁴⁰ Ligiero. *A Autonomia da Política Externa Brasileira*.

⁴¹ “Estados-membros”. CPLP. 2017. <https://www.cplp.org/id-2597.aspx>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁴² “Objetivos”. CPLP. 2017. <https://www.cplp.org/id-2763.aspx>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

Africa mean a great opportunity for Brazilian companies and investments. Also, the reason behind the change was the then President Lula's goal to push for a reform of the United Nations and especially for the Security Council: his ultimate foreign policy goal was to gain permanent membership for Brazil in the exclusive group. In order to reach this, he started a very active foreign policy by contacting previously *untouched* regions and countries to gain support for his quest. This also meant an increased number of visits abroad. During his two terms, Lula made 56⁴³ foreign trips, out of which 12 were to Africa,⁴⁴ covering 23 countries on the continent.⁴⁵ This figure is even more remarkable if we consider the fact that he visited a total number of 35 states. His successor, *Dilma Rousseff* continued Lula's very dynamic foreign policy. On the occasion of her international trips, she visited 84 countries, including eight in Africa.⁴⁶ Since 31 August 2016 – when after her impeachment, *Michel Temer* took over the presidential office – he has made seven trips, but has not visited any African states so far.⁴⁷

There is also a sharp rise in the number of diplomatic representations,⁴⁸ namely, under Lula's and Rousseff's terms the number of embassies more than doubled in Africa reaching

⁴³ Vigevani, T. and Cepaluni, G. "A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação". *SciELO*, March 2007. *Contexto Internacional* 29/2. 2007. http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&id=S0102-85292007000200002#n4, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁴⁴ One very visible sign of appreciation of the Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa happened in July 2009, when President Lula was invited as a guest of honour to the 13th African Union Summit held in Sirte, Libya. Mahmoud, S. M.: "The Brazilian Foreign Policy Towards Africa". *African Perspectives* 12/41. 2015. 7–13.

⁴⁵ Amorim, C. "Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003–2010): an overview". *SciELO*, 11 November 2010. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53/Special issue on Brasil Dec. 2010. http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292010000300013, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁴⁶ "Viagens Internacionais da Presidenta da República/2011". Planalto. 20 December 2011. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de...da.../viagens-internacionais-2011>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

"Viagens Internacionais da Presidenta da República/2012". Planalto. 14 December 2012. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de...da.../viagens-internacionais-2012>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

"Viagens Internacionais da Presidenta da República em 2013". Planalto. 10 December 2013. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de...da.../viagens-internacionais-2013>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

"Viagens Internacionais da Presidenta da República em 2014". Planalto. 17 December 2014. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de...da.../viagens-internacionais-2014>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

"Viagens Internacionais da Presidenta da República em 2015". Planalto. 15 December 2015. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de-imprensa/relatorios-da-secretaria-de-imprensa/viagens-internacionais-2015.pdf>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

"Viagens Internacionais da Presidenta da República em 2016". Planalto. 24 April 2016. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de-imprensa/relatorios-da-secretaria-de-imprensa/viagens-internacionais-2016.pdf>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

⁴⁷ "Viagens Internacionais do Presidente da República". Planalto. 19 October 2016. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de-imprensa/relatorios-da-secretaria-de-imprensa/viagens-internacionais-michel-temer-2016.pdf>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

"Viagens Internacionais do Presidente da República". Planalto. 10 January 2017. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/area-de-imprensa/relatorios-da-secretaria-de-imprensa/viagens-internacionais-michel-temer-2017.pdf>, Accessed on 16 June 2017.

⁴⁸ There are some unique cases in connection with diplomatic relations. The Brazilian embassy is the only Latin American embassy in Gabon, and both Gabon and Ghana have their only Latin American embassies in Brazil. "Gabonese Republic". Itamaraty. 2017. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7385&Itemid=478&cod_pais=GAB&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en, Accessed on 1 July 2017; "Republic of Ghana". Itamaraty. 2017. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7407&Itemid=478&cod_pais=GHA&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en, Accessed on 1 July 2017.

37 from 18,⁴⁹ leaving out mostly the very small (island) states only, and some with major domestic security problems.⁵⁰ In order to value this information, one should note that a traditional world power like the United Kingdom, has only 34 embassies or high commissions (UK diplomatic missions accredited to the capitals of members of the Commonwealth of Nations thus on the same level as embassies) in Africa.⁵¹

Even though in its rhetoric, Brazil's aim is to work on changing the *unfair balance of power in the world* and pushing for development in the Third World, the Latin American country has strong geopolitical and commercial motivations resulting in a more and more visible role in Africa, in form of companies (the most visible sector is construction, with companies like Odebrecht), mining concessions (the largest share belonging to Vale, and regarding hydrocarbons, to Petrobras) and in financing/banking industry (BNDES with financing Brazilian companies abroad and Itau-Unibanco being the leading one in banking) as well. Today, Brazilian companies – often referred to as *multilatinas* – have robust business interests in most of Africa's fastest growing economies. In less than a decade and a half, Brazilian trade to Africa rose from \$4.3 billion in 2000 to \$28.5 billion in 2013.

This energetic and conscious strategy was well supported by the decision of the Rousseff Government in 2013, to cancel (or in some cases restructure) the debts of 12 African countries, worth of almost 900 million USD.⁵²

The investments were made possible by the several bilateral agreements that were signed or renewed mostly during the Lula–Rousseff period. In case of Angola and South Africa, Brazil signed a *Strategic Partnership*. In the latter one, it includes a wide spectrum of areas, like agriculture, communications, defence, energy, environment, food security, health, public administration, science and technology. Trade between the two countries, consisting of primary and secondary products, started to grow with an impressive speed especially during the Lula period: it increased approximately 300%, from USD 659 million in 2002 to USD 2.6 billion in 2012. The more balanced relationship is reflected in the fact that it is not only Brazilian companies investing in South Africa, but South African companies – especially in communications, mining, aviation – are also operating in Brazil, while Brazil is present in South Africa with motor vehicles and spare parts manufacturing,

⁴⁹ Brazil has two consulate-generals in Africa, one in Lagos (Nigeria) and one in Cape Town (South Africa), but both of these countries have Brazilian embassies in their capital cities. "Bilateral relations". Itamaraty. 2017. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/brazilian-missions-abroad>, Accessed on 19 June 2017.

⁵⁰ 17 countries do not have their own Brazilian representations but are accredited to neighbouring countries. In case of South Sudan, Brazil is one of the 21 states that has already expressed its will to open an embassy in the country. Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda. "Bilateral relations". Itamaraty. 2017. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/brazilian-missions-abroad>, Accessed on 19 June 2017; "Republic of South Sudan". Itamaraty. 2017. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6626&Itemid=478&cod_pais=SSD&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en, Accessed on 19 June 2017.

⁵¹ "Find a British embassy, high commission or consulate". Government of the United Kingdom. 2017. <https://www.gov.uk/government/world/embassies>, Accessed on 22 June 2017.

⁵² The three biggest debts belonged to Congo–Brazzaville (352 million USD), to Tanzania (237 million USD) and to Zambia (113.4 million USD); they were followed by Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Sudan. "Brazil 'to write off' almost \$900m of African debt". BBC, 25 May 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22669331>, Accessed on 10 July 2017.

mining, food, and reinsurance companies.⁵³ With Angola, the partnership covers the fields of political and technical cooperation, as well, besides economic integration. The relationship of the two countries is very special. At the time of the rightist military dictatorship in Brazil, the Latin American country was the first to recognise the independence of Angola, in November 1975, which was gained by the Marxist-inspired *Movement for the Liberation of Angola* (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA). This historically strong relationship started to be even more visible in terms of trade after the turn of the millennium. In its peak years, between 2002–2008, the volume of the trade reached USD 4.21 billion which is a twentyfold growth. The main areas of business are of course in the construction and the financial sector, many companies and other state actors like the *Brazilian Development Bank* (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES), the *Brazilian Cooperation Agency* (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC) and the *Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation* (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, EMBRAPA) have offices in Luanda.⁵⁴ This latter one is especially interesting since it opened a new field of cooperation and investment: agriculture (programs like the *Cotton 4+Togo* program, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad Mali and Togo involving sharing of expertise, know-how and best practices⁵⁵) and in recent years a special field, bio-fuels which in case of Brazil means bio-ethanol.

When talking about special partners, we need to highlight the unique position of Egypt, which became the second African entity – after Southern Africa Customs Union (2009) – to sign a Free Trade Agreement with MERCOSUR as an extra-regional partner. When President Lula broke the *silence* in December in his first year as President, he became the first Brazilian head of state to visit Egypt, after Dom Pedro II did so 127 years earlier. Since then, several ministerial and presidential meetings took place and Egypt became the main destination of Brazilian exports to Africa and in a way a special link not just to Africa, but also more precisely to Maghreb, the Arab World, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, as well.⁵⁶ However, it should be underlined that Egypt always had a special status regarding its relations with Brazil: in 1983 Embraer, Brazil's civilian and military aerospace conglomerate signed a contract for 120⁵⁷ *EMB 312 Tucano* aircrafts to be delivered to Egypt and Iraq as a part of the industrial cooperation program of the Arab Organization for Industrialization. This initiative was unique as it was the first time an aircraft designed in Brazil was assembled abroad under license.⁵⁸

⁵³ “Republic of South Africa”. Itamaraty. 2017. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7422&Itemid=478&cod_pais=ZAF&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en, Accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁵⁴ “Republic of Angola”. Itamaraty. 2017. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6018&Itemid=478&cod_pais=AGO&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en, Accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁵⁵ “Cotton 4+Togo”. <http://www.embrapa.br/en/cotton-4-togo>, Accessed on 25 June 2017.

⁵⁶ “Arab Republic of Egypt”. Itamaraty. 2017. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7475&Itemid=478&cod_pais=EGY&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en, Accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁵⁷ The first 10 aircrafts were transported to Egypt, while the rest of the order was assembled there. *The Market for Military Fixed-Wing Trainer Aircraft*. Forecast International. April 2011. 3.

⁵⁸ “Embraer 40 anos: Parcerias e inovação”. Portal CR/Portal de Aviação. 2009. <http://www.contatoradar.com.br/paginas-da-historia/702-embraer-40-anos-parcerias-e-inovacao>, Accessed on 10 July 2017.

Last but not least, we need to talk about Nigeria who is in fact the biggest trading partner of Brazil with a volume of 9.1 billion USD, way before Egypt's 3 billion USD, followed by South Africa and Angola with 2.6 billion USD and 1.2 billion USD respectively (only these four, totalling a more than 60% share of Brazil's trade). However, unfortunately, this trade involves no added value, it mostly consists of natural resources such as gas and oil since Nigeria is Brazil's major petroleum provider.⁵⁹

On the whole, the trade relationship between Brazil and Africa seems to be a bit more favourable for the Latin American giant. Brazil's exports are more or less balanced with 42% manufactured, 27% semi-manufactured products, while regarding imports, the picture looks a bit different, natural resources taking the lead with two thirds fuels (oil, natural gas and liquefied natural gas) and the rest is raw materials.

On the other hand, we must not forget about other forms of cooperation that Brazil is offering, namely development programmes such as humanitarian assistance, scholarships, technical cooperation and contributions to locally involved international organisations. The idea of technical cooperation – meaning knowledge transfer and capacity building – came up during Lula's presidency and is in many ways a very different approach in comparison with other BRICS or Western countries, since it has a special focus on promoting the use of local labour, initiating projects tailored for local specificities and needs with no or limited conditionality.⁶⁰

Additionally, bearing all these in mind, we also have to add that while securing economic positions in several countries, Brazil is also working on securing and even extending its maritime influence over the South Atlantic.⁶¹ From this point of view, the goals of the *White Book* and more particularly of the *Defence Articulation and Equipment Plan* (Plano de Articulação e Equipamentos de Defesa) – especially the nuclear submarines developed in cooperation with France⁶² – are more understandable.

Having mentioned Lula's quest for the UN reform and the growing interest of the Brazilian Government in Africa, the issue of UN peacekeeping missions cannot be left out. According to the official website of Itamaraty, Brazil has contributed to more than 50 peacekeeping missions so far, with more than 33,000 military, police and civilian personnel. Since the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has fulfilled its mandate in October 2017, Brazil's *flagship mission* has come to an end decreasing the country's contribution to UN peacekeeping to 250 persons,⁶³ as opposed to the 1,288 PAX at the

⁵⁹ "Africa and the BRICS: a Win-Win Partnership?" African Development Bank. 10 July 2013.

<https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/africa-and-the-brics-a-win-win-partnership-12098>, Accessed on 29 May 2017.

⁶⁰ These projects are carried out and fostered by the ABC. Alves, A. C. "Brazil in Africa: Achievements and Challenges". In Kitchen, N. (ed), *Emerging Powers in Africa*. London: London School of Economics, 2012. 40.

⁶¹ Muggah, R. "What Is Brazil Really Doing in Africa?" *Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-muggah/what-is-brazil-really-doing_b_6413568.html, Accessed on 22 June 2017

⁶² Vogel, D. "A Rend és Haladás szolgálatában: a Brazil Fegyveres Erők". In Ferenc, P. (ed), *O Brasil em contexto europeu e húngaro – Brazília európai és magyar kontextusban*. Budapest: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, 2015. 208–216.

⁶³ More particularly, with 10 Individual Police Officers (IPO), 19 Military Experts on Mission (MEM), 206 troops and 15 Military Staff Officers (MSO). "Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations". United Nations. 31 October 2017. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/msr_31_october_2017.pdf, Accessed on 5 December 2017.

beginning of the year.⁶⁴ Although, 2017 did not only bring changes for Brazil in the number of personnel contributed, but also in its involvement in Africa. In June 2017, another UN peacekeeping mission – with Brazilian participation – the United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) has finished its operations, meaning that Brazil is contributing to nine UN missions – including political missions – as of December 2017, six of which are in Africa:⁶⁵

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO): 10 MEM;
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA): 1 MEM, 2 MSO;
- United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID): 3 MSO;
- United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS): 1 MEM, 3 IPO;
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA): 2 MEM;
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS): 5 MEM, 5 IPO, 6 MSO.

Even though the number of Brazilian participation in African peacekeeping missions might seem impressive – six out of nine – the overall contribution is only a not so impressive 38 persons. Although, as the authorised size of the military component deployed in MINUSCA was lifted by 900 military personnel by the new MINUSCA mandate,⁶⁶ Brazil had a chance to show not only its dedication to peacekeeping, but its interest in the African continent, as well. Based on the statement found on Itamaraty's website stating that "Brazil is proud of its historic and consistent participation in UN peacekeeping operations, which is always in accordance with its foreign policy interests, along with national and international rules and principles",⁶⁷ one can say that deciding not to contribute troops to MINUSCA is a sign of change in Brazil's foreign affairs and relations with Africa. So far, the decision has still not been made by the Brazilian Government, but there are indications that the supporting arguments of the Brazilian military will not be strong enough to convince the political elite to send a contingent to the Central African Republic.

⁶⁴ 3 Police; 26 Military Experts on Mission; 1,259 troops. "Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations". United Nations. 31 January 2017. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/jan17_1.pdf, Accessed on 5 December 2017.

⁶⁵ MINUJUSTH (2 IPO), MINURSO (10 MEM), MINUSCA (1 MEM, 2 MSO), UNAMID (3 MSO), UNFICYP (1 Troop, 1 MSO), UNIFIL (205 Troops, 3 MSO), UNIOGBIS (1 MEM, 3 IPO), UNISFA (2 MEM), UNMISS (5 MEM, 5 IPO, 6 MSO). "Brazil's participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping operations". Government of Brazil. www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/6283-brazil-s-participacao-in-the-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations, Accessed on 5 December 2017.

⁶⁶ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017)". United Nations. 15 November 2017. 8. https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/resolution2387_2017en_0.pdf, Accessed on 5 December 2017.

⁶⁷ "Brazil's participation in the United Nations' Peacekeeping operations". Government of Brazil. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/6283-brazil-s-participacao-in-the-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations>, Accessed on 5 December.

Food for Thought

Quickly having gone through the history of Brazil, at least on those aspects that are relevant in connection with Africa, we can say without hesitation that the two regions have a lot in common. Historical roots, common language, similarities in culture and society, the challenges and possibilities they face and even the lifecycles of the countries, even though they are probably at different stages, but they can definitely learn from each other. With all these areas of similarities, mutual understandings, the size, or the volume that is behind some fellow BRICS members' possibilities, the overall situation can be balanced. If Brazil is able to overcome its current domestic problems – especially those of related to politics, corruption and economy – then it can again pay attention to other regions as well, and at the same time, serve as a good example for the African countries, many of which are facing the same problems as Brazil.

With regards to BRICS, the goals and visions that are articulated in the declarations and other documents show grandiose plans, lots of energy and effort put into numerous ideas covering almost all areas of life by now, not only the original fields of interest. The outcomes of these are still quite unpredictable, since the economic cycles of the five countries – just like many of their other aspects – are different, and their intent tends to be different, as well. However, the first steps are taken, investments are being made and all five BRICS members seem to be determined to pursue their aims. Now, all we need to do is watch carefully, if they pursue their aims as Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa or they do it as BRICS. From Brazil's example, we know that even states with limited possibilities can be successful, but on the other hand, are the five individual successes more or less than the success of BRICS as a group? Also, which scenario is closer to a win–win situation for BRICS countries and African states?

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Quest for Egypt's Renewed Geopolitical Status

Péter Miletics – Róbert Stohl

Abstract

In the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa, the destabilising nature of the Arab Spring included the potential of rearranging geopolitical structures, and has generated dilemmas not negligible in terms of economy.¹ The region of the Greater Levant – in need of control of local geostrategic hot spots² – is traditionally the scene of the superpowers' rivalry. Taking advantage of the territorial, political, and civilizational disorder following the 2011 events, emerging regional powers also joined the clashes. The cultural and civilizational borderlines make this geo-economically important territory fragmented, with a kind of proto-Westphalian characteristics. For this reason, any event concerning regional geopolitical structures may have regional and global effects in terms of security policy. Global actors should not react with neutrality to the potential transformation of the geostrategic/geopolitical order of the Eastern Mediterranean.³

In this complex and evolving region, Cairo needs to seize the opportunities that enable the maintenance of strategic values as well as the restoration of its former leading status in the Arab and Muslim world in order to become an active geopolitical player on a regional level.⁴

Keywords: *Egypt, Ethiopia, geopolitics, Islamism, Mashreq, Mediterranean, Nile, Saudi Arabia, water distribution*

¹ “The Next Phase of the Arab Spring”. Stratfor. 3 July 2013. <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-phase-arab-spring>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; “Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christian Nuns, Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis”. Human Rights Watch. 19 July 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expelling-minorities>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

² These include the Bosphorus–Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, which provide instant connection to the Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

³ Nazemroaya, M. D. “The “Great Game” Enters the Mediterranean: Gas, Oil, War, and Geo-Politics”. *Global Research*, 14 October 2007. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-great-game-enters-the-mediterranean-gas-oil-war-and-geo-politics/6862?print=1>, Accessed on 6 March 2017.

⁴ Bassou, A. “The geopolitics of Egypt: Strengths, Opportunities, Constraints and Vulnerabilities”. OCP Policy Center. 28 June 2016. <http://www.ocppc.ma/publications/geopolitics-egypt-strengths-opportunities-constraints-and-vulnerabilities#.WL0idfnhCUI>, Accessed on 6 March 2017.

Introduction

According to Fernand Braudel, there are three cultural-civilizational systems in the Mediterranean, and their solid cultural-ethnic traits determine the quality of geopolitical contact, as actually existing geographical dividing lines have not hindered the pursuit of power expansion. The Eastern Mediterranean is (also) the region of the Mackinderean World Island that is the traditional buffer zone of maritime and continental imperial spaces. In this geostrategic perception, the importance of the Mediterranean Sea cannot be questioned. Historically, the Mediterranean could only be integrated into the political unity by the Roman Empire – the dominant super power of the era mainly on land – annihilating not only the rival naval power, Carthage, but – if we accept the thesis that the opposition of East and West has been a decisive factor in the development of the European region – keeping its Asian continental rival, Parthia – later the Persian Empire – at bay.⁵

The political-economic and civilizational structures of the Mediterranean – including Egypt as well – were integrated through military force into the conglomerate by Rome between the first century BCE and fifth century CE, which, in a rather ambiguous way, was realised politically in the term *mare nostrum* – *our sea*. The term itself refers (inter alia) to the fact that the Roman power was based (at least partially) on supremacy over the sea (thalassocracy) which, however, rather refers to the lack of rivals.

This interpretation may perhaps be confirmed by the assumption that the imperial territory was in fact the unification of the Hellenistic and Latin civilizations, which dissolved in 395 after the reign of (Saint) Theodosius I.⁶ The attempt to restore the Mediterranean geopolitical unity and the universal ideology of the state proved unsuccessful, although the ideological unity of Saint Peter's Europe was temporarily maintained by Christianity in the region, preserving the civilization and cultural heritage of antiquity in the East. As a result of the schism in 1054, the unity of the Christian world became permanently

⁵ Pap N. A *Balkán „kis” politikai földrajza*. Pécs: PTE TTK FI Kelet-Mediterrán és Balkán Tanulmányok Központ, 2007. 9–10. <http://pea.lib.pte.hu/bitstream/handle/pea/11045/pte-periodikak-balkanfuzetek-ttk-2007-5.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Nazemroaya. “The “Great Game” Enters the Mediterranean...”. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-great-game-enters-the-mediterranean-gas-oil-war-and-geo-politics/6862?print=1>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Parker, G. *Geopolitics. Past, Present and Future*. London: Pinter, 1998. 93.

⁶ Flavius Theodosius (347–395) is the last emperor of the unified Roman Empire who at the synod of Constantinople (381) made the Nicaean–Constantinople creed the most determining course of Christianity. In his political will, he distributed the territories of the Roman Empire among his two children. (Byzantine Empire and the Western Roman Empire); Woods, D. “Theodosius I (379–395 AD)”. An Online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors. 1998. <http://www.roman-emperors.org/theo1.htm>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Roman Empire.net. ““Theodosius the Great’: Flavius Theodosius (AD 347 – AD 395)”. <http://www.roman-empire.net/collapse/theodosius-I.html>, Accessed on 6 March 2017.

fragmented, while in the Eastern Basin the cultural heritage of Hellenism survived until the arrival of Islam.⁷

The civilizational heritage of the statehood in the Nile Valley and the political, economic and cultural consequences of the Arab conquest in 642, the political ambitions of the shifting dynasties, the Ottoman conquest and the informal Western empire-building laid the foundation of the geostrategic imperatives of the modern sovereign political entity, the fulfilment of which can justify Cairo's active – and successful – regional geopolitical role.⁸

A Brief Outline of Egypt's Regional Geopolitical Position

The purpose of our study is to outline the geo-strategic dilemmas of Egypt in a macro region that is nowadays dynamically evolving (the eastern Mediterranean, the larger Levante region). For these reasons and for the interpretation of security interests and challenges affecting the country as well, it is necessary to outline the narrower and wider geopolitical environment of the state. In general, it can be stated that the political territory is located between several civilizational areas with varying degrees of divergent characteristics' influence at historical intervals. The specific geopolitical and cultural environment of the Egyptian state has an impact on its geostrategic position: it is located in the eastern part of political North Africa under the authority of Cairo, and – as the westernmost area of the geopolitical Middle Eastern region – it connects the African and Asian continents, while lying in the intersection of the Arabic, the Islamic, the African and the Mediterranean civilizations.⁹

Despite the challenges that threaten the geopolitical balance and the traditional pattern of the region, or even so, there is no agreement between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey – which are the heartland of the Islamic world – on the question of mutually beneficial and effective regional cooperation. Rather, in order to fulfil the need to acquire

⁷ Lendvai L. F. *Közép-Európa koncepciók*. Budapest: Áron Kiadó, 1997; Lendvai L. F. "A földrajz filozófiája mint történelemfilozófiai probléma". *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 40/1–3. 1996. 98. http://minerva.elte.hu/mfsz/MFSZ_9613/LENDVAI.pdf, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Tarján, M. T. "1054. július 16.: Egyházzakadás a katolikusok és ortodoxok között". Rubicon online. http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/1054_julius_16_egyhazszakadas_a_katolikusok_es_ortodoxok_kozott/, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Szantner V. "A hajdúdorogi egyházmegye története a kezdetektől 1920-ig". PhD dissertation. Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Bölcsészettudományi Kar, 2008. <http://doktori.btk.elte.hu/hist/szantnerviktor/diss.pdf>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Halecki, O. *Európa milleniuma*. Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 1993. 27, 43, 50–58; Speliopoulos, E. "The Great Schism Between East and West in 1054". Liberty University, 2009. https://www.academia.edu/506089/The_Great_Schism_Between_East_and_West_in_1054, Accessed on 6 March 2017.

⁸ Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...". "The Geopolitics of Egypt: From Eternal Stability to Turmoil". Wikileaks. 19 December 2011. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/18/1854332_the-geopolitics-of-egypt-from-eternal-stability-to-turmoil-.html, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Besenyő J. and Miletics P. *Egyiptom: országismertető*. 2nd extended edition. Budapest: MH GEOSZ, 2014. 142–172; Goldschmidt, A. Jr. *A Brief History of Egypt*. New York: Facts on File, 2008. 37–144.

⁹ "Arab Civilization". Arab Information Center, Washington, D.C. <http://www.alhewar.org/ArabCivilization.htm>, Accessed on 6 Mar 2017; Platan, P. and Teal, J. "Comparative Geopolitics: A Geopolitical Analysis of Egypt". Groupe ESC, Marseille. 2001. <http://www.peterplatan.com/other/files/egypt.pdf>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...". "The Geopolitics of Egypt: From Eternal Stability to Turmoil".

regional supremacy, power rivalry is enhanced by the ideological, religious, and civilization-cultural fractures among individual states. In this shared civilization-power space, there is little likelihood for the emergence of an ideologically unified federal system, defined by a hegemonic power.¹⁰

In order for the Egyptian state to regain its former strategic importance and become an active regional geopolitical actor, it is necessary to determine where Cairo focuses its power potential. The narrower and wider neighbourhood situation of the state is not necessarily beneficial in this respect, with the risk that Egypt as an active actor would exercise its power potential without gaining sustainable, globally and regionally valuable strategic positions.

The geopolitical dilemma is in fact that Cairo needs to define its strategic priorities, decide whether to focus on the Mediterranean, the Middle East, or the (African) Nile Basin region. Egypt should not get into the *strategic overstretch* raised by Paul Kennedy, it must outline its strategic priorities. However, this can be done in parallel with the maintenance of the geopolitical imperatives – formulated partly by the global and regional powers – as ignoring them poses security policy risks. Thus, it is understandable that the location of the Egyptian state in the focus of the three greater regions does not only have geostrategic advantages.¹¹

For the political entity of North-eastern Africa – typically a territorial unity – the Nile Axis, as a natural geographic path connecting the Mediterranean with the central and southern territories of the African continent, a geopolitical axis, which traditionally strengthens the state's space-retention (centripetal) forces was traditionally extremely important. The sharing of the river water based on mutual benefits would be important for all African political entities concerned, and could form an axis integrating the economic and innovation corridors. The potential spatial-economic system of the Nile Axis could provide geopolitical benefits to Egypt, partly because of its power, economic potential and its demographic weight. On the other hand, in the focus of the Middle Eastern and North African impacts, the Delta region can be advantageous for Cairo, as it provides relations between Africa and the Mediterranean.¹²

The other geopolitical dilemma of Egypt, is the Suez Canal, which indirectly links the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Potential geostrategic and geo-economic benefits from interactions with the great powers in the Mediterranean region, in the given historical period, will force the Egyptian state to re-evaluate the relationship with the most significant strategic maritime player. A friendship with a dominant maritime power in the Mediterranean, can

¹⁰ Besenyő and Miletics. *Egyiptom...* 13; Ahmadian, H. "Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Changing Political Groupings in Mideast". *Iran Review*, 9 March 2015. <http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Saudi-Arabia-Turkey-Egypt-and-Changing-Political-Groupings-in-Mideast.htm>, Accessed on 22 July 2015.

¹¹ Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...". "The Geopolitics of Egypt: From Eternal Stability to Turmoil". Janaro, J. "The Danger of Imperial Overstretch". *Foreign Policy Journal*, 15 July 2014. <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger-of-imperial-overstretch/>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Kausch, K. (ed), *Geopolitics and Democracy in the Middle East*. Madrid: FRIDE, 2015. 21–22. http://fride.org/download/geopolitics_and_democracy_in_the_middle_east.pdf, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Kennedy, P. *Nagyhatalmak tündöklése és bukása*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1992. 292–301; Korany, B. "Egypt: Between overstretch and pivotalness in its foreign policy". In Robertson, J., Maurice, A. and East, M. A. (eds), *Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign Policy-Making Structures and Processes*. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, 2012. 154–180.

¹² Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...". "The Geopolitics of Egypt: From Eternal Stability to Turmoil".

be a benefit to a country with essentially continental power capabilities. The predominant maritime imperium in the region also allows control over the canal for the self-interest of Cairo, which makes it impossible to isolate the Egyptian state, while maintaining the safety of significant water transport and communication lines. That is why Russia's Middle Eastern activity can offer diplomatic and, to a lesser extent, economic alternatives – expand Cairo's geopolitical latitude. Cairo may increase the geostrategic value of the Egyptian state in the East Mediterranean oikoumene, but it would only be able to effectively compensate the regional maritime power's lobby through long-term presence.¹³

In pursuing geopolitical interests in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula can play a key role, which provides a geographic relationship between Egypt and the fragmented Middle East. Cairo's geopolitical interest is regional projection of its sovereignty and hegemony. At the same time, the question of re-thinking relations is raised, regarding the fight against terrorism and the dilemmas associated with relations with the State of Israel, and may therefore have an impact on the geopolitical environment of the state. In addition, one of the directions of the Silk Road linking China and the ancient Mediterranean has led to Alexandria through the peninsula, and today it connects the two centres of the world economy, which still provides revenue for Egypt. The area is traditionally the focal point of the geographical, economic, civilizational and cultural contact between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, Africa and Eurasia, but it is a relatively large distance from the strategic hinterland, the large urban demographic and economic centres in the Nile Valley. The channel connecting the river to the Red Sea could further increase the strategic value of the triangular territory.¹⁴

Of course, the question is whether the differences between the Egyptian and Middle Eastern linguistic and cultural identities help Cairo's political leadership to mark its geostrategic priorities in such a way that it does not result in overstretch, but maintains the geopolitical freedom of Egypt in other relevant strategic areas. At the same time, the issue of relations between the state and the North African area is also raised. Is the Egyptian political territory part of the African region that can be defined as the Maghreb? The structure of the North African region seems to be interpreted in a context in which Egypt is not directly involved. In a natural geographical sense, an East–West maritime Mediterranean geopolitical axis links the Muslim and Arab states of the northern part of Africa. Nevertheless, the rapidly becoming sovereign Maghreb's narrower spatial structure to the eastern direction formed primarily an economic and social territory with the northern

¹³ Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...". "The Geopolitics of Egypt: From Eternal Stability to Turmoil". Lamon, W. A. "Interests, Identity, and the Geopolitical Causes of Military Rule in Egypt". Thesis. The American University in Cairo, 2015. 89. http://dar.aucegypt.edu/bitstream/handle/10526/4342/William%20AustinLamon_Thesis_Final%20Draft.pdf?sequence=1, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

¹⁴ Nizar, A. "The Geopolitics of Egypt's Change". SAGE. February 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/127904/The%20Geopolitics%20of%20Egypt%E2%80%99s%20Change.pdf>, Accessed on 6 March 2017. Nerguizian, A. "The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability". CSIS. 18 September 2014. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-levant-geopolitical-battles-and-quest-stability>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Lamon. "Interests, Identity...". 63–72. Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...". Besenyó J. "Migrációs Útvonalak a fekete kontinensen". *Afrika Tanulmányok* X/4. 2016. 33–50. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313302591_Migracios_utvonalak_a_fekete_kontinensen Accessed on 6 March 2017.

regions of Western Sudan (Sahel region), where the integration was ensured by the organized political power and Islam.

The active cultural, economic and power interactions between the two geographically more or less parallel zones were made possible by trans-Saharan transport routes between the northern and southern regions. The region – obviously involved in global and regional geostrategic games – has a much closed spatial structure that has little impact on Cairo's direct geopolitical interests. The essential elements of the geopolitical spatial structure of Egypt are the northern Mediterranean coastline and the Delta-region, the Sinai Peninsula and the Nile Valley.¹⁵




Figure 1.

Sketch of the Northern-African geopolitical structure¹⁶

In the Axis of Geopolitics: The Others and Egypt

The geopolitical analysis of the Arab Spring and the Egyptian events is necessary because the strategic environment of the state has changed significantly. In the context of the regional chaos, Russian and Turkish strategic activities have strengthened, and Europe is faced with the phenomenon of mass migration. It is therefore necessary to develop a comprehensive geostrategic concept in Brussels in order to prevent the destabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean basin.¹⁷

¹⁵ "Three Geopolitical characteristics of the Maghreb-Sahel sub-region". <https://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2010/12/13/three-geopolitical-characteristics-of-the-maghreb-sahel-sub-region-2/>, Accessed on 6 March 2017; Bassou. "The geopolitics of Egypt...".

¹⁶ Source: <https://themoornextdoor.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/screen-shot-2010-12-07-at-8-26-27-pm.png?w=680>

¹⁷ "Geopolitical Ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean". Stratfor. 4 April 2013. <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/geopolitical-ambitions-eastern-mediterranean>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Nopens, P. "Geopolitical Shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean". Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations. *Security Policy Brief*. 2013. 43. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/SPB43.pdf>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Park, J. "Europe's Migration Crisis. 2015". CFR. <http://www.cfr.org/refugees-and-the-displaced/europes-migration-crisis/p32874>, Accessed on 10 March 2017.

The bet of the rivalry in the region is the change of regional power relations for the benefit of some so-called *emerging powers* – including Iran, Russia – to weaken the geopolitical key role of the United States and Israel in an area of high geostrategic value (Mediterranean) that provides the extension of the supremacy of Washington to the inner parts of the World Island. The necessary and sufficient condition for maintaining its domination is the Ankara–Tel-Aviv regional partnership, and the geopolitical support of Egypt for inter-oceanic transport and communication routes. US maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean can provide the European Union with the opportunity to diversify its energy supply through the recently discovered sites.¹⁸

In recent years, events in the Middle East have not reduced decisively the strategic interest of the United States, and its primary geopolitical interests are sustainable, a substantial component of which is the military presence of the US and its regional allies. Occasionally, it seems that its rivals – and some of their partners – tend to forget about the US economy's performance, Washington's real power potential.¹⁹

As a result of the global economic climate following the Millennium, the Russian economy stabilized, expanded its diplomatic potential and increased Moscow's confidence. The regional crisis resulting from the eroding of the former stable balance of power is a geopolitical opportunity, which holds out with at least partial restoration of its former influence in the highly important Mediterranean region. This is backed with a deliberately built economic and geopolitical strategy: a move towards Egypt and Iraq, support for the Persian and Syrian state, and improving relations with Israel. Moscow is aiming to change the geopolitical status quo, which may counterbalance its deteriorating geo-economic situation.²⁰

¹⁸ Besenyő J. "Arab tavasz: politikai rendszerváltás az észak-afrikai arab államokban". *Kül-Világ, a Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Folyóirata* VIII/4. 2011. 51–75. <http://www.kul-vilag.hu/2011/04/besenyoy.pdf>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Madsen, W. "NATO turns into IOTO as it spread to the East". *Strategic Culture Foundation Online Journal*, 5 November 2012. <http://www.strategic-culture.org/pview/2012/11/05/nato-turns-into-ioto-as-it-spread-to-the-east.html>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Graziani, T. "The Mediterranean and Central Asia: The Hinges of Eurasia". *Eurasia*, 10 June 2011. <https://www.eurasia-rivista.com/the-mediterranean-and-central-asia-the-hinges-of-eurasia/>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Lamon. "Interests, Identity...". 72–80.

¹⁹ Perlez, J. "Panetta Outlines New Weaponry for Pacific". *New York Times*, 1 June 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/world/asia/leon-panetta-outlines-new-weaponry-for-pacific.html?_r=0, Accessed on 10 March 2017; "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense". U.S. Department of Defense. January 2012. http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, Accessed on 27 July 2015; "National Security Strategy". White House, Washington. February 2015. 24–26. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Moore, B. "U.S. Economic Indicators Improve in 2013". Gallup. 2013. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/166784/economic-indicators-improve-2013.aspx>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Nerguizian, A. "The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability". CSIS. 18 September 2014. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-levant-geopolitical-battles-and-quest-stability>, Accessed on 6 March 2017.

²⁰ "Black Sea Fleet (BSF)". *Globalsecurity.org*. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mf-black.htm>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Stergiou, A. "Russian Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Implications for EU External Action". EU Institute of Security Studies. 25 July 2012. <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/russian-policy-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-and-the-implicationsfor-eu-external-action/>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Magen, Z. "The Empire Strikes Back?" INSS. 1 November 2012. <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/381.pdf>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; "The recent geopolitical shifts in the triangle Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Iran". *Eyes on Europe & Middle East blog*. 2016. <https://middleeastnewsservice.com/2016/11/09/the-recent-geopolitical-shifts-in-the-triangle-egypt-saudi-arabia-iran/>, Accessed on 10 March 2017.

Ankara is aiming for the regional great power position and a dominant role in the Islamic world, the geopolitical basis of which is the special spatial location of the state: it controls the most important transport routes and offers an alternative political model to the Arab states. Therefore, a diplomatic – not too successful – offensive has been launched since 2002, so that the settlement of its regional relations would secure its regional dominance.²¹

The Turkish state defines its foreign policy ambitions independently, so the US can no longer count on its unconditional support, but it has not isolated itself from NATO either. The foreign policy strategy based on the soft power policy has not resulted in the expected strategic benefits, the regional instability increased, and other geopolitical actors openly strived to enforce their national ambitions, so Ankara could more actively use other means of conventional power tools. That is why the *Arab Spring* was treated as a geopolitical opportunity to increase regional influence. This could have been served by a successful *smile offensive*, which, however, could force Egypt to at least partially limit its traditional geopolitical ambitions, the supreme power of the Levante region and dominance in the Islamic world.²²

An Ankara–Cairo axis is not unlikely either, which could shape the power structure of the Middle East into a tripolar structure, as a peculiar alternative to the rival pole (USA–Iran), which cooperates only at tactical level. The realization of the perception would transform the system of regional geopolitical counterbalances, and dynamical movements. The traditional competition between the two states would re-evaluate Camp David's status quo and the incoherent regional ambitions of the United States and the West. The complexity of the situation is enhanced by the common and contradictory interests of the two

²¹ The Kurdish issue is the biggest internal dilemma. In external relations, the most significant problems are the tensions between Turkey and Israel since 2008, and the Syrian crisis as well as the Islamic State (Da'esh). Besenyő, J. and Oláh, P. "One of the new competitors in Africa: Turkey". *AARMS* 11/1. 2012. 135–148. <http://www.zmka.hu/docs/Volume11/Issue1/pdf/12.pdf>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Agarwal, R. "Is Turkey's Foreign Policy of 'Zero Problems with Neighbours' Coming Apart? A Critical Appraisal". Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. 31 October 2012. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IsTurkeysForeignPolicyof%20ZeroProblemswithNeighbours_RajeevAgarwal_311012, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Fradkin, H. and Libby, L. "Erdogan's Grand Vision: Rise and Decline". Center for Geopolitical Analysis. 27 March 2013. <http://icmu.nyc.gr/Erdogan%E2%80%99s-Grand-Vision%3A-Rise-and-Decline>, Accessed on 10 March 2017.

²² Joshi, S. and Stein, A. "Not Quite 'Zero Problems': Ankara's Troubles in Syria". *The Rusi Journal* 158/1. 2013. 28–38. <http://shashankjoshi.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/turkeysyrianato.pdf>, Accessed on 24 July 2015. Besenyő and Oláh. "One of the new competitors..."; Kouskouvelis, I. "The Problem with Turkey's 'Zero Problems'. Turkey, Past and Future". *Middle East Quarterly* 20/1. 2013. 47–56. <http://www.meforum.org/3455/turkey-zero-problems>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Iskenderov, P. "Erdogan's Neo-Ottomanism Shift: What Makes It So Dangerous? (I)". Strategic Culture Foundation. 21 May 2016. <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/21/erdogans-neo-ottomanism-shift-what-makes-so-dangerous-i.html>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Iskenderov, P. "Erdogan's Neo-Ottomanism Shift: What Makes It So Dangerous? (II)". Strategic Culture Foundation. 22 May 2016. <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/22/erdogans-neo-ottomanism-shift-what-makes-so-dangerous-ii.html>, Accessed on 10 March 2017; Langendijk, J. "Does Morsi's Rise Mean Erdoğan's Fall?" *Today's Zaman*, 25 November 2012. http://www.todayzaman.com/columnist/joost-lagendijk_299180_does-morsis-rise-mean-erdogans-fall.html, Accessed on 28 July 2015.

states regarding the Shia expansion efforts, the Palestinian question and their capital and technology dependence.²³

Mashreq (Middle East) – the eastern neighbourhood of the Egyptian state – carries the legacy of political and territorial disorganization after World War I. The sovereign political entity's modern history can be described through the (pre-) Westphalian conflicts, influenced by external powers. The geopolitical status quo was completely destabilized by the *Arab Spring*, and the image of the region was shaped by the radical Islamism and its countering warfare, which also maps the power, civilizational and cultural conflict.²⁴

The quality of foreign policy interactions between Cairo and Tel Aviv are also of a great importance, the geopolitical focus of which is the Sinai Peninsula. The territory is at a high strategic value, it does not only have a geographic connection with the divided Middle East, but it also symbolizes Egypt's specific mediating role between the Arab world and the Israeli state where both powers are interested in the prevention of being a transit state for radical Islamist organizations. The region is a buffer zone, whose immediate neighbourhood contains the Turkish–Egyptian rivalry, besides it enhances the mediator Cairo's partly compulsory – economic and financial – and coexisting geostrategic interests driven cooperation with the oil monarchies of the Gulf against Shia expansion. It is also important, that the status quo between Israel and Egypt could be disrupted by a pan-Arab, radical or anti-Semitic takeover in Syria and the Nile Valley, which is not in the interests of regional (Cairo, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Tehran) or global players. An eventual Turkish–Egyptian approach could lead to a more flexible geopolitical lobbying for Washington, which could help strengthening the influence of Egypt, as well.²⁵

The Egyptian crisis has raised a geopolitical dilemma if the Egyptian army is able to ensure the stability of the Gaza Strip and the Suez Canal. The problem coincided with the Middle Eastern events – the Syrian conflict, the emergence of the Islamic State, the internal problems of Iraq and Iran's ambitions for expansion – that took both global and regional priority. However, despite the fact that Cairo has not yet been able to restore its regional supremacy, we cannot speak about the geostrategic devaluation of the Egyptian state. The true value of Egyptian political territory is demonstrated by the fact that the quality of the diplomatic interaction with the USA is never determined by the quality of the political regime. Therefore, the role of the army is crucial in maintaining the state and the stability of the region – its operations are invaluable within the framework of counter-terrorism – as well as in the foundation of sustainable economic and social development. Several analysts

²³ Besenyő and Oláh. "One of the new competitors..."; Özhan, T. "Egypt Turkey' Axis and the New Middle East Geopolitics". SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, Ankara. 17 Nov 2012. <http://www.setav.org/en/egypt-turkey-axis-and-the-new-middle-east-geopolitics/>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

²⁴ Reifer, Th. E. "Militarization, Globalization, and Islamist Social Movements: How Today's Ideology of Islamophobia Fuels Militant Islam". *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 5/1. 2006. 51–72. <http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&context=humanarchitecture>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Fromkin, D. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. 351–464.

²⁵ "Egyptian army counters major attack by IS militants in North Sinai; dozens killed". *Ahram Online*, 1 July 2015. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/134218/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-army-counters-major-attack-by-IS-militant.aspx>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Eldar, D. "Egypt and Israel: A Reversible Peace". *Middle East Quarterly* 10/4. 2003. 57–65. <http://www.meforum.org/565/egypt-and-israel-a-reversible-peace>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

are of the opinion that without the cooperation of Cairo, the West would not be able to effectively enforce its regional geopolitical interests and restore its strategic credibility. Perhaps this may partly motivate Moscow to improve its regional positions substantially by arms exports, while today's strategic challenges may strengthen the Cairo–Washington–Tel-Aviv strategic partnership on the long term.²⁶

The Ankara leadership – defining the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as an enemy – has defined Morsi's fall as a geopolitical failure, but the Gulf States support the new Cairo leadership in the spirit of Arab solidarity. The largely Saudi subsidy is backed by the fact, that the Egyptian radical Islam – similarly to the Islamic State – doubted the political legitimacy of the Wahhabi ideology. The shadowiness of the situation in the regional geopolitical chessboard is indicated by the thesis, that a stable and predictable Egyptian Sunni entity can strengthen the Syrian *stances* of Riyadh against Iran. Curbing Persian expansion efforts (the creation of the so-called *lunar-crescent*) is also in the interest of the regional rival, Ankara, thereby we may not exclude the emergence of an anti-Shia, Egyptian–Turkish–Saudi geopolitical triangle. Nevertheless, it is not entirely possible to rule out the possibility that the geopolitical conception of Turkish neo-Ottomanism will bring Iran and the Egyptian state closer, which in this strategic situation would balance Ankara's

²⁶ Brown, N. J. "After the Egyptian Coup". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 4 July 2013. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/04/after-egyptian-coup/gd97>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "Egypt's waning influence". Stratfor. 4 July 2013. <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/egypts-waning-influence>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "Egyptian army counters major attack by IS militants in North Sinai; dozens killed". *Ahram Online*, 1 July 2015. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/134218/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-army-counters-major-attack-by-IS-militant.aspx>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Baron, K. "Hagel Admits U.S. Influence in Egypt Is 'Limited'". *Defense One*, 19 August 2013. <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/08/hagel-admits-us-influence-egypt-limited/68924/>, Accessed on 25 Mar 2017; Copley, G. R. "Egypt Better Prepared for Future after Power Change". Oilprice.com 9 July 2013. <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Egypt-Better-Prepared-for-Future-after-Power-Change.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Weiss, Ph. "US aid to Egypt is not for Egypt but Israel, JJ Goldberg explains". *Mondoweiss.com* 16 August 2013. <http://mondoweiss.net/2013/08/us-aid-to-egypt-is-not-for-egypt-but-israel-jj-goldberg-explains>, Accessed on 25 July 2015; Arrott, E. "Common Threats Keep Egypt, US Relations Going". *Voice of America*, 11 October 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/a/common-threats-keep-egypt-us-relations-going/1767997.html>, Accessed on 25 Mar 2017; El Zayat, M. "The Reality and the Future of Cairo-Washington Military Relations". In Shahin, M. (ed), *Egypt–U.S. Relations in a new era: challenges and possibilities*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 2013. 80–89. <http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/casar/outreach/Documents/US%20Egypt%20Relations%20-%20Full%20English%20book.pdf>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "Egypt: Russian Foreign, Defense Ministers to Have Talks in Cairo Today". *All Africa*, 14 November 2013. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201311141357.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

importance in the Levante region, while Cairo and Tehran regard each other as geopolitical rivals in the Horn of Africa and in the south of Sahara, in the Eastern Sudan region.²⁷

The power vacuum in Cairo's wider geopolitical environment favoured the spread of radical Islam, which created the foundations of political violence, ethnic cleansing and anarchy. The regional implications of religious fanaticism, reinforced in Iraq and Syria, have been assessed inappropriately by the West. As a major security policy challenger, the Islamic State (Da'esh) declared the creation and maintenance of regional hegemony, territorial integrity and the practice of traditional Islamic law (Saria). This has resulted in the extreme use of political and civilization intolerance and violence, which generated a significant wave of migration.²⁸

The pre-state organization based on the Jihadi ideology was able to maintain its fiscal stability for a long time, but as a consequence of the ethnic and religious genocide, which was legitimized by a specific cultural concept, a rather controversial quasi-alliance system was established in which the United States of America and Iran also played an important role. The strategic geopolitical priority of the states surrounding the Da'esh is the destruction

²⁷ Zeynalov, M. "Erdogan, Israel and Egypt". Center for Geopolitical Analyses. 21 August 2013. <http://icmu.nyc.gr/%20Erdogan%2C-Israel-and-Egypt>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Kostner, J. "State, Islam, and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post Desert Storm Phase". Rubin Center. 8 July 1997. <http://www.rubincenter.org/1997/07/kostner-1997-07-08/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Worth, R. F. "Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals". *The New York Times*, 9 July 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/world/middleeast/aid-to-egypt-from-saudis-and-emiratis-is-part-of-struggle-with-qatar-for-influence.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "Syria is a battle ground for Saudi Arabia's confrontation with Iran over regional dominance". *Russia Today*, 4 September 2013. <https://www.rt.com/op-edge/syria-saudi-conflict-region-iran-407/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Trifkovic, S. "Neo-Ottomanism in Action: Turkey as a Regional Power". The Lord Byron Foundations for Balkan Studies. 7 February 2012. <http://www.balkanstudies.org/articles/neo-ottomanism-action-turkey-regional-power>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Agarwal, R. "Iran-Egypt Rapprochement: Compulsions and Realities". Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. 8 March 2013. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IranEgyptRapprochement_ragarwal_080313, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Rózsa E. N. and Szalai M. "Az iráni-szaúdi hidegháborús konfliktus értelmezése". Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, Budapest. 2016. http://kki.hu/assets/upload/1_KKI-tanulmany_IRI_SYR_N_Rozsa-Szalai_20160121.pdf, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Lamon. "Interests, Identity, and the Geopolitical Causes...". 56–69. http://dar.aucegypt.edu/bitstream/handle/10526/4342/William%20AustinLamon_Thesis_Final%20Draft.pdf?sequence=1, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "The recent geopolitical shifts in the triangle Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Iran". Eyes on Europe & Middle East blog. 2016. <https://middleeastnewsservice.com/2016/11/09/the-recent-geopolitical-shifts-in-the-triangle-egypt-saudi-arabia-iran/>, Accessed on 10 March 2017.

²⁸ "The World Factbook". CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christian Nuns, Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis". Human Rights Watch. 19 July 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expelling-minorities>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Khanna, P. *The Second World*. New York: Random House, 2008. 220; Besenyó, J. "The Islamic State and its human trafficking practice". *Strategic Impact* 60/3. 2016. 15–21. http://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si60.swf Accessed on 25 March 2017.

of the extremist Islamic territorial entity, from which all regional and global power actors are hoping to increase their own influence and realize their own strategic ambitions.²⁹

Along with the transforming Mediterranean region, Cairo had to face the geopolitical and economic challenge, the emerging northeast African power Ethiopia's initiative for the Nile's water resources. The conflict between the two states was basically focused on the question of sharing the amount of water delivered by the Blue Nile. The reason for this is the Ethiopian economic policy decision, concerning one of Egypt's most important natural resources, the water, which was a necessary and sufficient condition for economic and social prosperity in Egypt since the beginning of state building.³⁰

In addition to the many foreign and security policy challenges, the geopolitical relations maintained with the Southern African region cannot be indifferent to Egyptian leadership, but the Islamic government has failed to focus the political opinion on the inter-state conflict of water distribution, besides, the Ethiopian state also has an interest in regional cooperation – regarding the Nile Valley – with Sudan and Egypt.³¹

The focus of the geopolitical problem was that the Egyptian leadership feared that the dam, planned by Ethiopia – referring to an international convention – in the north-western part of the country would reduce the water resources by 20, as well as the energy and working capacity of the river by 40%.

Cairo then threatened with the possibility of using violence, though neither the international political climate or the technical capacities, nor the neighbourhood system provided

²⁹ This is well expressed in the patterns of the geopolitical behavior of Riyadh, who is maintaining a proxy war against Iran. Simultaneously, Riyadh intends to suppress Shiite influence in Syria, Iraq, and the Levante region, while the Wahhabi state parallelly pursues the destruction of the Caliphate based on the ideology of the Sunni Puritanism, since its existence poses an acute challenge to the legitimacy of the Saudis. "The Islamic State: The Caliphate". Jewish Virtual Library. 2017. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/ISIScali.html>, Accessed on 10 April 2017; Rózsa E. N. "Az Iszlám Állam előretörése Irakban és az amerikai válaszcsepások". NKE Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont. 2014. http://nit.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/svkk-elemzesek-2014-14-az-iszlam-allam-eloretorese-irakban-es-az-amerikai-valaszcsepások-n-rozsa-e-1-original.pdf, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "The Islamic State: The Caliphate". Jewish Virtual Library. 2017. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/ISIScali.html>, Accessed on 10 April 2017; Brown, J. "The Islamic State: A Geopolitical Analysis". Australian Institute of International Affairs. 13 September 2014. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/the-islamic-state-a-geopolitical-analysis/, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Mansur, Ch. "Saudi Arabia & Islamic State: Between Iraq and a Hard Place". *Geopolitical Monitor*, 8 September 2014. <http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/saudi-arabia-islamic-state-iraq-hard-place/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Salhani, C. "Islamic State's Ultimate Goal: Saudi Arabia's Oil Wells". 9 September 2014. <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Islamic-States-Ultimate-Goal-Saudi-Arabias-Oil-Wells.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

³⁰ "How Egypt Might Try To Stop Ethiopia's Dam Project". *Forbes*, 13 June 2013. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/06/13/how-egypt-might-try-to-stop-ethiopia-dam-project/#139f3742ea99>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

³¹ *Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework*. <http://www.nilebasin.org/images/docs/CFA%20-%20English%20%20FrenchVersion.pdf>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Ferar, K. "Nile Water: Development, Environment, and Conflict". BA Thesis. Claremont: Pitzer College, 2011. 22–31. <http://ea.pomona.edu/wp-content/uploads/FERAR-Thesis-final.pdf>, Accessed on 25 July 2015; Mahkaleng, M. K. "Environmental Conflicts: The case of the Nile River Basin". MA Thesis. Bloemfontein: University of the Free State, 2015. 47–62. <http://scholar.ufs.ac.za:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11660/2303/MahlakengMK.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

a chance for this.³² The dispute between the two states triggered tension between Egypt and Sudan, and naturally it also had an impact on other states in the Nile Basin, while global actors, particularly the United States, emphasized the importance of regional cooperation.³³

In the background of the strategy of Egypt, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) had more complex motives: they saw an opportunity in the challenge, namely, that it may divert attention from internal problems and should become the basis for a new national consensus. After the failure of this concept, in Cairo, co-operative solutions came to the fore simultaneously with the attempts to destabilize the Ethiopian state. The strategic position of Ethiopia has been improved by the ratification of the Treaty signed by the states of the upper Nile section – they repealed the previous document of 1929 – and the resolution of the invited panel of experts (the installation does not significantly reduce the amount of water to Sudan and Egypt). Subsequently, the two Sudanese states have opposed the project, although Sudan has provided shelter to radical Ethiopian refugees.³⁴

For the Egyptian Islamist Government, therefore, only Somalia could represent the geopolitical partner that could be able to isolate Ethiopia (with a possible military subsidy to

³² “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia”. Water-technology.net. <http://www.water-technology.net/projects/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-africa/>, Accessed on 28 March 2017; Beyene, A. “Reflections on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”. *Somaliland Sun*, 19 June 2013. <http://www.somalilandsun.com/news-feeds/regional/3154-reflections-on-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam>, Accessed on 28 March 2017; Hammond, M. “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Blue Nile: Implications for transboundary water governance”. Global Water Forum. 18 February 2013. <http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2013/02/18/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-and-the-blue-nile-implications-for-transboundary-water-governance/>, Accessed on 28 March 2017; Al-Labbad, M. “Egypt, Ethiopia Headed for War Over Water”. *Al Monitor*, 24 March 2013. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/03/egypt-ethiopia-water-war.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2017; Deressa, T. T. and Mbaku, J. M. “While Egypt Struggles, Ethiopia Builds over the Blue Nile: Controversies and the Way Forward”. The Brookings Institution. 25 July 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/07/25/while-egypt-struggles-ethiopia-builds-over-the-blue-nile-controversies-and-the-way-forward/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; “Food Security Strategy”. Benishangul-Gumuz Region, Ethiopia. October 2004. 5–6. <http://www.cangoethiopia.org/assets/docs/Benishangul-Gumuz%20FS%20Strategy%20-%202005.pdf>, Accessed on 28 Mar 2017; “Ethiopia Diverts Water From the Nile River”. Stratfor. 28 May 2013. <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ethiopia-diverts-water-nile-river>, Accessed on 28 July 2015; “How Egypt Might Try To Stop Ethiopia’s Dam Project”. *Forbes*, 13 June 2013. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/06/13/how-egypt-might-try-to-stop-ethiopia-dam-project/#139f3742ea99>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

³³ Yihdego, Z. “The Blue Nile dam controversy in the eyes of international law”. Global Water Forum. 18 June – 2 July 2013. <http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2013/06/18/the-blue-nile-dam-controversy-in-the-eyes-of-international-law/>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Mohammed, A. “Egypt, Sudan clash over use of Nile waters”. *The East African*, 8 June 2013. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Egypt-Sudan-clash-over-use-of-Nile-waters/-/2558/1876196/-/5lenwiz/-/index.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Besenyő J. and Miletics P. *Egyptom: országmertető*. 2nd extended edition. Budapest: MH GEOSZ, 2014. 206.

³⁴ “Ethiopia ratifies Nile accord opposed by Egypt”. *Ahram Online*, 13 June 2013. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/73911/Egypt/Ethiopia-ratifies-Nile-accord-opposed-by-Egypt.aspx>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Copley, G. R. “Ethiopia-Egypt Maneuvering Takes on “Black and White” Operational Guises”. 19 June 2013. <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Ethiopia-Egypt-Maneuvering-Takes-on-Black-and-White-Operational-Guises.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Deressa, T. T. and Mbaku, J. M. “While Egypt Struggles, Ethiopia Builds over the Blue Nile: Controversies and the Way Forward”. The Brookings Institution. 25 July 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/07/25/while-egypt-struggles-ethiopia-builds-over-the-blue-nile-controversies-and-the-way-forward/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

Somalia, it could close the port of Berbera in the Red Sea, a major contributor of Ethiopian export-import).³⁵

Egypt assessed correctly that in a possible Egyptian–Ethiopian conflict, the geopolitical location of Somalia could provide strategic benefits, but the power and willingness of the country were questionable. Cairo’s strategic capabilities have been narrowed by the support of the former (Siad Barré) regime and the fact that after 1991, Egypt sought to use its political influence in the Arab world and on the African continent to deny the international legitimacy of the new system. For a comprehensive understanding of the strategic situation it is necessary to mention that Ethiopian–Somali relations are traditionally burdened by the Great-Somalia space perception, which played a significant role in the explosion of the 1977 War in Ogaden. Due to the complexity of the problems, the diplomatic solution for the crisis seemed to be the most effective, even though Cairo attempted to involve Eritrea in an anti-Ethiopian coalition.³⁶

The lack of military, logistical capabilities and geographic difficulties excluded – even alongside Sudan – direct military operations against Ethiopia, thereby Cairo only used the tools of traditional diplomacy to maintain supremacy over the Nile Basin. Cairo’s strategic goal was to encircle the Ethiopian state through a geopolitical array – Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan – parallel with the concept of the weakening of Ethiopian space retention units

³⁵ Azam, J. P. “A State is Born: Transport Infrastructure and Democracy in Somaliland”. University of Toulouse. 2010. http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2011/state_born.pdf, Accessed on 25 Mar 2017; Abdi, M. F. “UAE Military Base Boosts Berbera International Trade Hub and Somaliland: Ethiopia’s Relations and Economic Growth”. *Jowhar*, 13 February 2017. <http://www.jowhar.com/2017/02/13/uae-military-base-boosts-berbera-international-trade-hub-and-somaliland-ethiopia-relations-and-economic-growth/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Berger, L. “Pre-Feasibility Study of the Regional Transport Sector in the Berbera Corridor”. 2003. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/somalia/documents/more_info/berbera_corridor_pre_feasibilitystudy_executivesummary_en.pdf, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Copley, G. R. “Egypt’s Instability Triggers a New Proxy War Against Ethiopia and its Allies”. 8 June 2013. <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Egypt-Instability-Triggers-a-New-Proxy-War-Against-Ethiopia-and-its-Allies.html>, Accessed on 25 July 2015; Khalif, A. “Egypt set to boost Somali National Army”. *Africa Review*, 5 June 2013. <http://www.africareview.com/News/Egypt-set-to-boost-Somali-National-Army/-/979180/1873138/-/w63w3v/-/index.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

³⁶ Samatar, S. S. “Historical settings”. In Metz, H. Ch. (ed), *Somalia: a Country Study*. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992. 26–45. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a264997.pdf>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Kiss Álmós P., Besenyő J. and Resperger I. *Szomália: országismertető*. 2nd extended edition. Budapest: HVK Tudományos Kutatóhely, MH Geoinformációs Szolgálat, 2014. 39–43; “Ethiopia, Somaliland and Egypt: Somaliland’s Roll in a Potential Military Conflict Between Ethiopia and Egypt”. Geopolitical Analysis and Monitoring blog. 21 June 2013. <http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.hu/2013/06/ethiopia-somaliland-and-egypt.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Tekle, T. A. “Eritrea supports Egypt’s position over Nile water dispute”. *Sudan Tribune*, 18 April 2013. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46276>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; “Egypt to support Eritrea via its Partnership Agency for Development”. 16 March 2015. <http://www.caperi.com/egypt-to-support-eritrea-via-its-partnership-agency-for-development/>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; “Is Egypt Seeking a Military Defense Pact With Eritrea?” <http://www.madote.com/2014/02/is-egypt-seeking-military-defense-pact.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Nasef, O. “Egyptian National Security as Told by the Nile”. The Century Foundation. 4 August 2016. <https://tcf.org/content/report/egyptian-national-security-told-nile/>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Oluwole, A. “The River Nile: Trans-Boundary Water Conflict and Cooperation Among The Basin Countries”. MA Thesis. University of Glasgow, 2014. <http://www.peakdissertation.co.uk/2.pdf>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

by Ethiopian Islamists and other groups (for example, OLF).³⁷ As a response, the Ethiopian Prime Minister formally acknowledged the sovereignty of Somalia, and in May 2013 promised its protection even through military means.³⁸

The geopolitical commutations of Khartoum referred to the characteristics of the regional power system, since it supported the construction of the dam, but attempted to influence Ethiopia by his relations with Eritrea. The latter, however, strengthened Egypt's geopolitical potential position, which in turn was compensated by Addis Ababa through the improving relations between Ethiopia and South Sudan.³⁹

Somaliland,⁴⁰ as an actor of the geopolitical chessboard of North-eastern Africa, also has an impact on Egypt, since its territory is in a specific relationship with Somalia and with the radical Islamist al-Shabaab organization.⁴¹ Its relations focus on Ethiopia, though it seeks to diversify its strategic potential: Hargesa⁴² has received the Egyptian Government Delegate, although Cairo opposed the international recognition of the sovereignty of

³⁷ "Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)". <http://www.romoliberationfront.org/PrOLFMission.htm>, Accessed on 25 March 2017.

³⁸ Mbaria, J. "How regional power shift has worked against Egypt's bid to control Nile". *Africa Review*, 22 July 2013. <http://www.africareview.com/Analysis/How-power-shift-worked-against-Cairo-/979190/1922900/-/45s-2dp/-/index.html>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Copley, G. R. "Ethiopia-Egypt Maneuvering...". <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Ethiopia-Egypt-Maneuvering-Takes-on-Black-and-White-Operational-Guises.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; "Egypt politicians call to sabotage Ethiopia's Nile dam project". 4 June 2013. <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/egypt-politicians-call-to-sabotage-ethiopias-nile-dam-project>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; Copley, G. R. „Ethiopia-Egypt Maneuvering...". <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Ethiopia-Egypt-Maneuvering-Takes-on-Black-and-White-Operational-Guises.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Di Nunzio, J. "Conflict on the Nile: The future of transboundary water disputes over the world's longest river". 25 November 2013. <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/conflict-on-the-nile-the-future-of-transboundary-water-disputes-over-the-world-s-longest-river/>, Accessed on 25 March 2017; "Ethiopia: 'We will defend Somaliland' Said PM Hailemariam Desalegn". Midnimo. 20 May 2013. <http://www.midnimo.com/2013/05/20/ethiopia-we-will-defend-somaliland-said-pm-hailemariam-desalegn/>, Accessed on 25 July 2015.

³⁹ "Ethiopia says ties with South Sudan continuing to improve". *Sudan Tribune*, 11 July 2013. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47254>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Mesfin, B. "The crisis in South Sudan: a game of regional chess. The full-blown political and military crisis in South Sudan has increasingly important implications for Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea". Institute for Security Studies. 26 May 2014. <https://www.issafrika.org/iss-today/the-crisis-in-south-sudan-a-game-of-regional-chess>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Doop, V. M. "How to Handle Your Neighbors' Conflict: Ethiopia's Relationships with Sudan and South Sudan". UNISCI. 2013. <http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/viewFile/44819/42229>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

⁴⁰ *Szomaliföld*. Afrika tanulmányok. <http://www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu/htmls/szomalifold.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; "Our Country". <http://somalilandgov.com/country-profile/>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

⁴¹ The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin operates in the southern regions of Somalia since 2006. In general, it does not support global jihad, although some leaders are in close contact with al-Qaeda, but the links with the Islamic State (Da'esh) cannot be completely excluded. "Al-Shabab". National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html, Accessed on 24 July 2015; Masters, J. and Sergie, M. A. "Al-Shabab". Council on Foreign Relations. 13 March 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; Hayward, J. "ISIS Reaches Out to Somali Terror Group Al-Shabaab". *Breitbart*. 24 March 2015. <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/03/24/isis-reaches-out-to-somali-terror-group-al-shabaab/>, Accessed on 24 March 2017; "Islamic State or Al Qaeda? Somalia's Al Shabaab Mulls Future". *Arutz Sheva: Israel National News*, 26 April 2015. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/194548>, Accessed on 24 Mar 2017.

⁴² The capital city of Somaliland.

Somaliland, as it perceived Somalia's restored territorial integrity as a geostrategic counterweight to the Ethiopian state. Despite the Islamic bonds of the political entity, Ethiopia basically exists in economic and security policy dependency, so its geopolitical significance in the question of supremacy over the Nile Basin seems rather small. The incompetence of the Islamic Egyptian Government increased the likelihood of a conflict that would have generated geostrategic instability in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Nile Basin. The intergovernmental conflict has been distorted by the Egyptian crisis, and as a result of the revolution in July, the concepts of utilization of water resources are less burdensome for regional geopolitical relations. In the longer run, however, they may have an impact on Egypt's geopolitical position as well as events in the Levante region.⁴³

Conclusions

It can be stated that the geopolitical environment of the Egyptian state – influenced by the *Arab Spring* – has undergone significant changes. Occasionally, the political leadership has reacted with inappropriate geopolitical-geostrategic perceptions for these changes, which spurred Cairo's regional relationships. The processes generated by events in the Eastern Mediterranean and Northeast Africa can also lead to the emergence of a new status quo in the region, in which the Egyptian state must be integrated as successfully as possible. The often insecure steps of the great powers defining the regional system do not ease the situation of the states that seek their individual positions in the emerging structure. For Egypt, the difficulties towards successful adaptation are partly caused by an increasingly sharp power protection and focus of the active geostrategic players with powerful capacities. In addition, the previous, Morsi-led Islamist state leadership has itself contributed to increasing regional instability with its strategic perceptions. The turning point, therefore, was not only to solve the individual crisis of the state, but for the purpose of the new leadership to make Egypt predictable and a significant geopolitical player over again.⁴⁴

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Egypt: From the Rule of the Army Back to the Rule of the Army again – Is this all that the Arab Spring Should Have Brought about?

György Iván Neszmélyi

Abstract

After nearly seven years, the political metamorphosis called Arab Spring swept away President Mubarak's three-decade rule, but by now, it looks the recent years brought more disappointment than success for the Egyptian people. This six-year period can be divided into several stages: military governance, then moderately radical Islamist rule, then military government again. Finally – since May 2014 – head of the recent military government, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became President as a result of a dubious election and he is the incumbent head of state now. President Sisi came with ambitious plans, the essence and goal of which was the economic restoration, and the political and social reconciliation of Egypt. No doubt, certain results have already been shown, but without foreign loans and capital investments the Egyptian economy is still closer to bankruptcy than to prosperity. The dissatisfaction of society seems to be growing. Prospects for the Egyptian society of nearly 90 million people, especially for the poorest groups (which ranges toward the half of the population) have not yet improved and many people of the young generation feels no future. In parallel with restrictions in the economy, people may feel the effects of shrinking political rights and the increasing role and power of the armed forces.

Egyptians expected better living conditions and possibilities, also more political rights from the Arab Spring, but instead, they experience increasing economic restrictions, corruption cases of politicians being closely tied to the army, and certain signs of a police state which was well known from the Mubarak-era. After all, it is a delicate question whether President Sisi will be able to achieve the macro-economic restoration of Egypt or not, but if so, what is the price the society has to pay for it?

Keywords: *Egypt, social problems, economic and political transformation*

Introduction

The paper is mainly based on secondary research founded on the descriptive-analytical exploration of concrete economic, social and political factors, which can be found in

the background of the so-called Arab Spring, a kind of political crisis followed by economic stagnation and increasing social tensions. The author's examinations are based on the available international bibliography and databases in this field. The author used to live and work in Egypt for a two-year period which coincided with the Arab Spring and the fall of the Mubarak regime; he has been visiting Egypt frequently since then. Therefore, his on-site experiences, his existing personal contacts and some of his formerly published papers related to this field were also beneficial to the outcome of this work.⁴⁵

In recent months, independent media sources and economic and political analysts have watched Egypt with growing concern in the two and a half years since General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became President of the state. There have been no signs of progress and prosperity in the economy and none of the major social problems have been solved. The formal and informal role of the Armed Forces are getting stronger while the state and the respect of human rights resembles the former Mubarak regime.⁴⁶

After all these a significant part of the Egyptian population – mainly those who live in deep poverty and from among them especially the members of the young generation – feels growing disappointment and hopelessness for their future. They may feel that comparing to the present prospects, life was better under Mubarak's regime or even during the short, one-year period of Mohammed Morsi, the President backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, the so-called moderately radical Islamist movement. Many people may raise the question: is that really all what the Arab Spring (in Egypt it is called 25 January Revolution) brought about?

It is also important to emphasize: in all probabilities, the future of Egypt – should it be success or failure, and should it develop along by any kind of scenarios – would have a direct and thorough impact on Europe, as well. Egypt is not just one country furnished with significant economic potentials with which the member states of the European Union developed broad scale economic, trade and investment relations. Egypt is a country which has a distinguished and peculiar geo-strategic position. It is located among continents, it is directly on the geographic borderline of Africa and Asia, but from many aspects it can be stated that it has close ties with Europe, as well. Egypt has a very important role in international trade – one of the most important navigation routes crosses her territory (Suez Canal). Egypt, as the most populous state in the Southern Mediterranean region and in the entire Arab world has an opinion-leading role in its region and also in the Arab and in the Islamic world. Egypt is a key actor in the Palestinian–Israeli peace process, as well.

The Arab Spring in Egypt was not followed by such tragic implications like in Libya and Syria. Egypt as a nation and country still exists and works in terms of the classic notion of state sovereignty that contains four aspects consisting of territory, population, authority and recognition. But seven years after the 25 January Revolution, Egypt still faces serious difficulties.

⁴⁵ Neszmélyi, Gy. "The Impacts of the Arab Spring on the Egyptian Economy". Selye E-Studies. http://www.ujs.sk/gtk/e-studies/hu/cimlap/doc_download/63-the-impacts-of-the-arab-spring-on-the-egyptian-economy.html, Accessed on 28 December 2014; Neszmélyi Gy. "Az arab tavasz politikai és gazdasági hatásai Egyiptomban". [The Political and Economic Implications of the Arab Spring in Egypt.] *Kül-Világ* 10/3–4. 2013. 71–85. <http://www.kul-vilag.hu/2013/0304/20130304.pdf>, Accessed on 15 May 2014.

⁴⁶ Besenyő J. and Miletics P. *Egyiptom: országszemlétető*. 2nd edition. Budapest: MH ÖHP, MH KDK, MH GEOSZ, 2014.

The objective of the present study is to examine and analyse how and why Egypt could fall into its present complicated situation from which – still at the moment – there is a chance to break out, but a much worse scenario – a new revolution – may also be envisaged.

The migration crisis that hit Turkey and Europe in the recent years may just be a prelude.⁴⁷ Syria had around 23 million people. Egypt has almost 90. If Egypt fails to provide acceptable life conditions to its citizens and if a new revolution brakes out, millions of Egyptians might flee to seek and find their better future abroad. Until now illegal migration from Egypt to Europe is not very intensive, but one day it may change.⁴⁸ Therefore, in the European point of view it is very important that the Egyptian society and economy successfully progresses and develops in the future. Egypt is still one of the biggest beneficiaries of the European Union through its partnership programmes, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In 2014, EU funding through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) amounted to 115 million EUR for the following three programmes: Egypt's Natural Gas Connection Programme (68 million EUR), Kafr El-Sheikh Waste Water Management Programme (17 million EUR), and Expanding Access to Education and Protection for Children at Risk (30 million EUR). The indicative bilateral financial allocation under the ENI for the period 2014–2015 was in the range of 210–257 million EUR to support local socio-economic development and social protection; governance, transparency and the environment. In addition to ENI, Egypt also benefitted in 2014 from other EU support such as European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (1.5 million EUR).⁴⁹

Egypt before the 25 January (2011) Revolution

By the frequently used term, *Arab Spring* we mean the movements aiming to subvert the dictatorial, clan-based regimes of various strongmen. These functioned for decades mainly in the form of republics in North Africa and in the Middle East which have made a radical alteration in the political and partly in the economic situation in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria, starting from the beginning of 2011. The characteristics of the process (perhaps not accidentally) is that the events – except the demonstrations being lesser and lasting for a short time – passed off in Bahrain spread over several other Arabic monarchies, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. These countries had a series of demonstrations as well, and even Morocco faced events organised by the 20 February Movement. However, their implications were by far less serious and long-lasting than those in states with a republican form of government. In the latter ones, presumably, partly the large-scale and unconditional respect felt towards the rulers' person, partly the high living standards in the majority of these countries could be the main factors which prevented the appearance and spread of these processes. However, in Egypt, the transformation swept away practically during a couple of days. Nevertheless, under the pressure of turn-about a stable regime being viable from

⁴⁷ Besenyő, J. "The Islamic State and its human trafficking practice". *Strategic Impact* 12/3. 2016. 15–21. http://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si60.swf, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁴⁸ Besenyő, J. "Security preconditions: Understanding migratory routes". *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues* 6/1. 2016. 5–26.

⁴⁹ "ENP Country Progress Report 2014: Egypt". European Commission. 25 March 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4687_en.htm, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

the aspect of politics and economics could not come into existence. The crisis of the year 2011 (which has been named in Egypt as the *Revolution of 25 January*) in certain countries of the Arab world seemed to be a progressive trend for a short time, which might have led these countries towards democracy.

In power since 1981, after the violent death of former President Anwar Sadat, Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, the former vice-president based his regime on the *veteran* military leaders' circle of the 1973 war, respectively building on the National Democratic Party (NDP) functioning as a quasi state-party, and ran a strong presidential regime in the country. The quasi dictatorial regime was operating under the conditions of the so-called emergency state from the beginning to the end. In the maintenance of the regime, the police authorities and the secret services had a key role. However, human rights were strongly limited, the regime, from the beginning to the end, strictly arose against political and religious extremities. Before 2011, the presence and activity of the above could be experienced rarely in Egypt.

The secular political system rendered possible the relatively peaceful coexistence of the moderate Muslim majority and the practically 10% of Christian minority. Although the constitution determined the Sharia as a fundamental source of law, it was practically applied in cases of family law, only concerning the Muslim inhabitants. As part of the social provisions of the Mubarak regime, among others, the foodstuffs and energy price level were kept low. This was a matter of life and death – as it is today – for the more than 10 million of the local population with very low income. Otherwise the state of emergency and the general, almost police-state type control was not particularly disturbing for the foreign tourists and businessmen. Due to the prices kept low, respectively the increased control, the measures of public security both for the foreign tourists and businessmen arriving to the country, these could enjoy it as peculiar, positive externalities.

The national economy of Egypt, till the beginning of the changes, stood on specifically firm bases. The structure of national economy on the basis of the contribution to the annual GDP in 2010, in the last full year of the Mubarak regime, was the following, according to the major branches: agriculture: 14%, industry: 38%, services: 48%. From the aspect of employment, the proportion of the agrarian, respectively the industrial sector was essentially different from the latter, almost inverse: agriculture: 32%, industry: 17%, services: 51%. The hydrocarbon reserves of the country, the amounts rolled in, from the usage of the Suez Canal and the annual 10–12 billion USD income deriving from the potential of tourism created stable bases for the development of the economy. All these increased the growing performance of other branches e.g. of the textile industry and the agricultural export, further on the foreign direct investments still increased more.

Just for that and due to the economic reform process, which had started from 2004, hallmarked by the name of Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Nazif, the country survived the years of 2008–2009 of the world crisis without considerable losses. In 2010, the GDP nominal value was 218.5 billion USD, the PPP (purchasing power parity) was approximately 500 billion USD. Projecting to the 83 million of inhabitants the volume of per capita mounted up to cc. 6,000 USD. The growth of the gross domestic product in the preceding 10 years reached 7–8% in average, and it was reduced only by 2–3% on the effect of the international economic crisis that broke out in the autumn of 2008. The most important export articles of Egypt in 2010 approximately with a 51% proportion were the hydrocarbon derivatives,

industrial finished products representing 38% (textile, clothes, footwear), further on cotton and other agricultural products. Its major imported products were: machines and mechanical equipment, foodstuffs, chemical substances, wooden products and fuels. In the Egyptian economy – besides the export of goods – the incomes of tourism, the tolls paid by using the Suez Canal and the foreign remittances (mainly the transfers of the Egyptian guest workers) meant the main sources of incomes. The latter ones created cc. 20% of the GDP in the earlier years. Before the revolution – besides the poverty affecting the predominant part of the population negative phenomena could be observed mostly in two fields: in the relatively high (more than 10%) unemployment and in the significant recession of the active foreign capital investments. During the fiscal year of 2009/2010, the gross FDI inflow was 11.0 billion USD. This was already from the outset 40% lower than two years earlier. However, at the same time, from a European aspect, it was positive that it reached (2009/2010) FDI participation from the EU member-states to Egypt, while this proportion was, all in all, 35%. The European Union became the most important trading partner for Egypt (among the EU-members Italy was the biggest partner).

The Revolution and the Military Government

In case of Egypt, in the big cities of the country (Suez, Alexandria) – for the first time during the rule of Mubarak such demonstrations of great importance arose which, contradicting the earlier ones, the police forces could not keep under control anymore. The direct calling forth was the rise of the prices of foodstuffs, the planned suspension of consumer price subsidies for bread and other basic commodities. However, in the background several motives could be retractable: unemployment, low minimum wages, holding out of poor prospects, especially among the members of the young generation. However, the claims of the masses demonstrating in the streets almost immediately overgrew the merely economic issues. The first place was given to the president and his clan for leaving. Furthermore, on the basis of the above, they extorted the setting aside of the profound political reforms.

The subsidy system of consumer prices is one of the biggest item in the Egyptian budget as it took (and even does till now) around 13% of the GDP. Even during the fiscal year of 1 July 2011 – 30 June 2012, the subsidy for foodstuffs and energy was 18 billion USD.⁵⁰ In addition, there were a number of factors of social tensions like unemployment, low minimum wages, lack of perspectives especially among the members of the young generation. In their study,⁵¹ Abdou and Zaazou pointed out that the public opinion considers around 40% of the Egyptian population living under the threshold of poverty (under 2 USD per day income). However, the World Development Indicator – based on data of the year 2011 and other sources – considered this level *only* 17.5–23% between 2005–2010 but shows an

⁵⁰ Rohác, D. “Solving Egypt’s Subsidy Problem: Policy Analysis No. 741.” Cato Institute Washington D.C., 6 November 2013. http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa741_web_2.pdf, Accessed on 03 January 2014.

⁵¹ Abdou, D. S. and Zaazou, Z. “The Egyptian Revolution and Post Socio-Economic Impact”. *Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies* 15/1. 2013. 92–115. <http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume15/pdfs/The-Egyptian-Revolution-and-Post-Socioeconomic-Impact.pdf>, Accessed on 03 January 2014.

increasing trend and extends to around 20 million people.⁵² In his study Tarrósy recalled the world rank list of Human Development Report in 2005 which – in a comparison of 177 countries – listed Egypt to place No. 119 within the medium-developed group of countries.⁵³

The claims of the masses of people who went to demonstrate to the streets were first economic-oriented, but soon extended towards radical political demands, like the prompt resignation and leave of President Mubarak which should be followed by thorough political reforms. The police endeavoured with excessive forces to subdue and to extinguish the demonstrations to such an extent that due to the rough infringements done during their presence, President Mubarak disbanded the police forces, then the defence of the public buildings and main infrastructural establishments (like bridges) was taken over by the army. Still, at the end of January a partial reshuffle of the government was implemented. However, this was not considered sufficient change neither for the society nor for the sober international opinions. By the effect of the further continuing demonstrations Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 and the power was temporarily taken over by the army. In the provisional period – started after the takeover of Cairo – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) got to the centre of the power. Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, Minister of Defence and Military Industry came to the fore of the nineteen persons' corporate body which had a key position in Mubarak's deprival and earlier it stood under the guidance of the head of state. The General provisionally took over the capacity of the head of state, as well.⁵⁴

Tantawi dissolved both houses of Parliament and respectively appointed a managing (acting) government under the leadership of Ahmed Shafik, in which several ministers of the previous government held positions, as well.

Presidency of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood

The presidential election – which had been postponed several times by the military government – finally took place on 16–17 June 2012. By that time the economy showed some signs of a slow stabilization. The election, which was relatively fair, resulted in the victory of Mohamed Morsi with 51.7% of the votes as the candidate of the Moslem Muslim Brotherhood which represented the Islamist line. (Morsi, formerly worked as a professor at Zagazig University and was the head of the Engineering Department, and he even used to live and work in the United States between 1982 and 1985. Morsi joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1977. He served as an independent Member of Parliament between 2000 and 2005, as the Muslim Brotherhood was forbidden to nominate candidates during Mubarak's tenure. Morsi later served as a member of the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau. In 2011 he was

⁵² Abdou and Zaazou. "The Egyptian Revolution...".

⁵³ Tarrósy I. "A globális világrrend és az Észak-Dél kontextus". [Global World Order and the North-South Conflict.] *Politikatudományi Szemle* 15/2–3. 2006. 169–188. http://epa.oszk.hu/02500/02565/00047/pdf/EPA02565_poltud_szemle_2006_2-3_179-188.pdf, Accessed on 09 November 2014.

⁵⁴ Gazdik Gy. "Egyiptomi belpolitikai átalakulás a poszt-mubaráki korszakban". [Political Transformation in the Post-Mubarak Egypt.] *Külügyi Szemle* 11/1. 2012. 144–165.

the founder and President of the Freedom and Justice Party. Morsi, however, formally quitted the Muslim Brotherhood before he was elected President.)⁵⁵

During the presidency of Morsi which lasted nearly one full year, he was not able, or perhaps he did not even strive to preserve the unity of the Egyptian nation. The inhabitants of Egypt, above all, revolted against the regime of President Mubarak with the aim of obtaining human rights and better living conditions. The revolt was neither organized for reaching the moderate Islamic majority, nor for about the 10 million Coptic Christians who used to live peacefully together with the Moslim majority. The peaceful co-existence of the Moslim and Christian communities served as a solid basis for the secularized social arrangement. Morsi's international acceptance was generally negative, too in spite of the fact that he reached power by democratic elections. To the gaining ground of the radical Islam to inner division even to the possibility of an eventual revision of the Camp David treaty, even the moderate Muslim inhabitants of the country looked at it as a risk factor of a grave destabilization. A great many people considered that a similar scenario could happen in Egypt, just like in Iran and Pakistan.⁵⁶ For instance, Pakistan is a religious forefront, in that sense too, that since the scene and foundation (1947) of the moderate Islam and fundamentalist fighter lines, the country is serving unbalanced and uncertain bases. However, the first president, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his followers from the intelligentsia dreamed of such a secular state where the country is laying on democratic piers and Islam is not a political but a cultural factor. But gradually we could witness the Islamization of the country. Comparing the fundamentalist wings to the number of inhabitants, the former got a much bigger political role and weight to such an extent that quite a number of persons question the secular statehood of Pakistan.⁵⁷

It soon became clear that Morsi himself, together with the Muslim Brotherhood movement divided and polarized the society. They enjoyed the support of a significant part of the society, but, at the same time, many people opposed his presidency and they started protesting which became more and more frequent and far-reaching. On 30 June 2013 – on the first anniversary of Morsi taking office – 14 million people in total proceeded on the streets all over Egypt, demanding the immediate demission of the President. The demonstrations were peaceful at the beginning, later they became hard-boiled, claiming numerous fatal causalities. Parallel to the above, in certain parts of Cairo, demonstrations for Morsi's party took place which also led to violence. After Morsi declared that he was not willing to resign from his office, the demonstrations were continuing and the tension escalated.

⁵⁵ "Mohamed Morsi". *Biography.com*. <http://www.biography.com/people/mohamed-morsi-20862695>, Accessed on 16 May 2017.

⁵⁶ Besenyő, J. and Gömöri, R. "Arab Spring, Christian Fall? The situation of Christian minorities in the Middle East after the Arab Spring". International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2013. <https://www.ict.org.il/User-Files/Arab%20Spring%20Christian%20Fall.pdf>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁵⁷ Nadicsán J. "Pakisztán dilemmái". [Pakistan's Dilemmas.] In Hamar F. (ed), *Multidiszciplináris kihívások, sokszínű válaszok: Vol 2. Workshop for Economics and Social Sciences Academic Forum of the Department of Economics College of Commerce, Catering and Tourism Budapest Business School*. Budapest: BGF KVIK, 2013. 96–102.

The Second Military Government

On 1 July 2013, the number one leader of the army, General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi demanded Morsi's resignation in an ultimatum. After the deadline passed, Morsi was replaced and arrested, and later he was even jailed. Him and his responsibility will be investigated by court (the first trial of his case was supposed to be held in November 2013, however it was postponed until the beginning of 2014). Furthermore, several other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested, too. The army suspended the constitution of the country. Additionally, it had Adly Mansur, the Head of the Supreme Court to temporarily take over the presidency until the Egyptian people decided about the new president in the forthcoming new elections (which are to be announced soon).

A significant percentage of the Egyptian population, especially the business circles gave a warm response to the step of the army. The legitimacy of the new situation was helped by the fact that the measures of the army were supported in a declaration by Ahmed el-Tayyeb, the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar (the highest Muslim leader of Egypt and of the Sunni-branch of Islam), Tavrados II Coptic Orthodox Pope and Mohamed El-Baradei, the internationally known politician of the opposition, as well. Due to the seizure of power by the military, the domestic situation of Egypt became stabilized regarding public law; however, massive demonstrations followed, first of all by Morsi's devotees. The attacks on the Christian communities living in Egypt became the turning point. By his own account the Muslim Brotherhood, having approximately one million members, was banned in September 2013. It had the motivation to instigate Mohamed Morsi's devotees to violence as he had been elected President as their candidate and then he suddenly turned to be an ousted head of state who was turned down by the army. Following this – up until now – the circumstances seem to get stabilized again. In the last week of September 2013, the previously suspended international charter flights were launched again and today it can be witnessed that foreign tourism into Egypt has been rising although to a moderate extent.

It is worth mentioning that the way Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood had been removed from power was judged negatively by a part of the international community. For instance, in November 2013 a tension emerged between Cairo and Ankara which resulted in the mutual expelling of ambassadors. The direct reason of this was the series of declarations of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, (who has been the incumbent president of Turkey since 28 August 2014), who sharply criticized the dismissal of President Mohamed Morsi and the oppressive measures against Islamists. He added that he could not respect those who grabbed power by a coup and claimed that Morsi should be released. He underlined that he did not speak against the Egyptian people but in favour of democracy; however, the spokesman of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry declared that the words of the Turkish Prime Minister are considered to be an interference into the domestic affairs of Egypt which in addition *"provokes the people and supports such forces which would undermine the institutions of democratic Egypt"*.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ "No respect for coup-installed rulers, says Turkey in Egypt row". Ahram Online, 23 November 2013. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/87301.aspx>, Accessed on 03 January 2014.

From General to President

The recent chapter of the post-Mubarak era in the Egyptian political and social life started with the presidential election (26–28 May 2014) when the majority of the voters elected – with a ratio of 96.91% – General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former head of the Armed Forces as the new and legal Head of State of Egypt. However, the official turnout was only 47.45%, far less than 74% that Sisi expected before.⁵⁹ Therefore, the legitimacy of the new President has been considered dubious from the first moment by the Egyptian society.

The election and its outcome was sharply criticized by the Muslim Brotherhood that denounced the election calling it *the election of blood* and liberal and secular activists, including the April 6 Movement, dismissed the polling.

Even though the United States and Great Britain claimed they looked forward to cooperating with Sisi, the United States expressed concern over the *restrictive political environment* in which polling was held and urged the new President to carry out human rights reforms. However, Sisi, right after his election claimed that “*it was now time to work...*”⁶⁰ but the programme was still not clear by which the new President wanted to lead out the Egyptian society and economy from the preceding years’ stalemate.

After suffering its worst economic crisis since the 1930s, Egypt under President Sisi managed to draw international attention to its reforms and recovery. At the beginning of 2014, the indexes of the Cairo Stock Exchange increased and reached their top value in the recent 3 years. In the first half year of Sisi’s presidency it seemed that Egypt was on the right track, most of the macro-economic figures, such as unemployment improved, the previously halted foreign tourism inflow re-started. It also seemed that Egypt – with newer huge foreign capital injections (mostly from the Gulf-states) would be able to progress.

At that time analysts said the economic improvements were due to reforms introduced since the election of Sisi. Aboulkheir, quoting Salwa al-Antary economic analyst and former head of the research department at the National Bank of Egypt claimed: “*By restoring political stability and security in Egypt, Sisi has performed economic miracles in no time...*” Sisi “*introduced many reforms that helped the economy reach spectacular numbers that haven’t been seen since the beginning of the political crisis in 2011.*”⁶¹

The main question of the present study has to be raised now: What has gone wrong after a relatively good start? The fact that Sisi as a former general became president is nothing new in Egypt where the Army has always enjoyed a distinguished power and role, ever since the Pharaonic ages. Furthermore, Sisi is not the first high ranking officer who became the head of state in Egypt – he just followed the way of Mubarak, Anwar el-Sadat and Gamal Abd el-Nasser. In addition, the Army used to enjoy high popularity among people. (This was the reason why President Mubarak – in the first days of the Revolution in January 2011, after the first harsh police attack against demonstrators in Cairo – dismissed

⁵⁹ Casey, M. “Sisi Declared Winner of Egypt’s Presidential Election”. *The Middle East Daily*, 04 June 2014. <http://link.foreignpolicy.com/view/52543e79c16bcfa46f6cfd3c1m3wk.rxa/12bb5675>, Accessed on 06 June 2014.

⁶⁰ Casey. “Sisi Declared Winner...”.

⁶¹ The National Bank is the oldest commercial bank in Egypt, and it is not the same as the Central Bank of Egypt which is the bank of issue. Aboulkheir, R. “Analysts: Sisi reforms key to Egypt’s economic upswing”. *Al-Arabiya News online*, 24 October 2014. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2014/10/24/Analysts-Sisi-reforms-key-to-Egypt-s-economic-upswing.html>, Accessed on 27 December 2014.

the police forces and asked the Army to restore public order and a few days later, he vested his power to the head of the Armed Forces.) But nowadays, as a new phenomenon, it seems the Army visibly lost its prestige and popularity among the people.

The Main Factors of Destabilization

The author attempted to summarize those main factors and reasons which led to general disappointment and dissatisfaction of the people in Egypt as follows.

a) Shrinking political and human rights

While the government shows strong commitment to combatting against the extreme political and religious movements including the agents and activists of the Islamic State which appeared in Egypt as well, this attitude is used against all those who openly show support and sympathize with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and the former President, Morsi, who – in the meantime – has been sentenced to life imprisonment. The Armed Forces have been crushing down demonstrations with increasing violence. It has reached such peaks that it cannot just be considered a kind of *over-reaction* of the authorities but a conscious and oppressive stance.

The Telegraph quoted Philip Luther, Amnesty’s Middle East and North Africa Director who said “enforced disappearance has become a key instrument of state policy in Egypt. Anyone who dares to speak out is at risk”.⁶²

Al-Sokkary⁶³ claimed in a Turkish news site that just a few weeks after Morsi was ousted, in mid-August 2013, Egyptian security forces violently cleared two major sit-ins staged by Morsi supporters in eastern Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square and Giza’s Nahda Square. According to the state-run National Human Rights Council, the dispersal of both protest camps that day left 632 people, including eight policemen, dead. But the National Alliance for the Defense of Legitimacy, Morsi’s main support bloc and the sit-ins’ main organizer, puts the death toll in the thousands. In a report based on a year-long investigation, Human Rights Watch said at least 817 demonstrators were killed that day in Rabaa Square and another 87 in Nahda Square. The London-based Human Rights Monitor, meanwhile, has documented more than 400 cases of people who disappeared from both squares.⁶⁴

In July 2016, BBC News – quoting Amnesty International – reported that Egypt’s security services have forcibly made hundreds of people disappear and tortured them in

⁶² “‘Unprecedented rise’ in Egypt forced disappearances amid fears of torture”. *The Telegraph*, 13 July 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/13/unprecedented-rise-in-egypt-forced-disappearances-amid-fears-of/>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁶³ Al-Sokkary, R. “1,000 days since Cairo massacre, families look for missing loved ones”. *Anadolu Agency*, 11 May 2016. <http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/1-000-days-since-cairo-massacre-families-look-for-missing-loved-ones/570738>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁶⁴ Al-Sokkary. “1,000 days since Cairo massacre...”.

the past year to try to tackle dissent.⁶⁵ Students, political activists and protesters – some as young as 14 – have vanished without a trace, according to a new report by Amnesty International. Many are alleged to have been held for months and often kept blindfolded and handcuffed for the entire period. The case of an Italian student, Giulio Regeni focused the attention of the international community to the current situation of Egypt. The 28-year-old Cambridge University PhD student was found dead on a roadside on the outskirts of Cairo in February 2016, his body bearing signs of torture. While the Egyptian Government has denied the fact that it uses enforced disappearances and torture, still since the military's overthrow of Morsi in 2013 more than 1,000 people have been killed and 40,000 are believed to have been jailed.⁶⁶

The Middle East Eye news agency published a report on the 5th anniversary of the 25 January Revolution. It claims that the Egyptian political opposition is fragmented, deeply divided and characterized by fearmongering tactics. After all it has a symbolic role and the chances are low to radically change the present system. It underlines that within a year of the 2011 uprising that brought Egyptians of all religions, social classes, political and ideological affiliations together in Tahrir Square and brought about the end of Hosni Mubarak's decades-long rule, more than 90 new political parties had been established and elected to Parliament. But five years on, with those same groups that remained on the political sidelines and deeply divided among themselves, that era has proved to be short-lived. The report quoted Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution who pointed out "in today's Egypt there is no real opposition". "None of the groups that are part of the current political process such as those in parliament can be called opposition", he added. It also quoted Nagwan al-Ashwal, an Egyptian political analyst at the Florence-based European University Institute who said: "Today, the different groups, especially those with differing ideologies, refuse to speak to each other. There is a lot of bitterness and an inability to move forward from what each group perceives as the unforgivable mistakes of the other."⁶⁷

After all it is contradictory, that Sisi who became a *civilian* president of Egypt, left nearly absolute power in the hands of the Armed Forces. In fact, the Sisi administration applies strict retaliation against all who criticize or even question the role and actions of the Armed Forces, especially towards supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

b) The economic recovery is dubious and hits the poor the most

By the summer of 2014, it became clear that Sisi's administration, while launching its road-map of economic recovery found the easiest way how to restore the balance of the national budget and the current account deficit: the government started to implement a series of cuts on the subsidy system and in parallel started to raise taxes. As a first step, on 5 July

⁶⁵ "Hundreds forcibly disappeared in Egypt crackdown, says Amnesty". *BBC News*, 13 July 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36775035>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁶⁶ "Egypt court quashes Red Sea islands' transfer to Saudis". *BBC News*, 21 June 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36584812>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁶⁷ Ibrahim, A. "'There is no opposition': How Egypt's 'real politics' fizzled and faded". *Middle East Eye*, 24 January 2016. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/5th-anniversary-revolution-egypts-opposition-remains-divided-980722446>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

2014, a 40–70% rise in fuel prices was announced, which was shortly followed by the risen prices of natural gas and electricity.⁶⁸ It seems that the Sisi administration is strongly devoted to the decomposition of the subsidy system of consumer prices. They announced also that the subsidies inflowing to the energy sector would be decreased by 67% in the course of 5 years. On 29 August 2016, the Egyptian Parliament approved the introduction of the value-added taxation at a rate of 13% which will be raised to 14% from the following fiscal year.⁶⁹

In spite of the relatively optimistic views in 2014, there had already been sounds of concern raised as well, as the austerity measures could aggravate the economy, with some opponents of Sisi predicting a possible *revolution of the hungry*. Unfortunately, those who expressed concern and criticism were right, as it looks the impressive roadmap has exhausted.

While the Sisi administration focused on the macro-economic recovery as Egypt's No. 1 goal, they disregarded the fact that nearly half of the Egyptian population lives in deep poverty (less than 2 USD/day income) whose vital interests were hurt the most heavily by those restrictive steps which were found inevitable to restore the balance of the budget and the current account.

It looks that the poorest segment of society feels and has to pay the price of the economic recovery in the biggest extent and there are no visible signs for the solution or at least the mitigation of the social problems. However, *some* of the macro-economic figures of the Egyptian economy are still not bad. For example, the ratio of public debt to GDP decreased slightly, from 93.7% to 91.7% (2014/2015)⁷⁰ but according to Al-Weli it is still close to bankruptcy. He pointed out that Egyptians have been busy recently with concerns that their country may be heading for bankruptcy, especially in the light of a report by the US Council on Foreign Relations. Some citizens fear that the economic conditions may lead the government to seize their deposits in local banks to save itself.⁷¹ It means the public trust in the Egyptian banking system has diminished. As Zéman et al. (2013) pointed out banks and financial institutions should be customer and profit-oriented organizations in such a way that clear task and responsibility allocation of the bank fields' contribution to the outcome should be constantly followed.⁷² It does not look so in Egypt. Since the revolt in January 2011, the rate of Egyptian pound (EGP) had not changed considerably for nearly six years, even though the state of economy, the lagging tourism would have long ago justified a pegged devaluation. Yet almost nothing happened; then nearly one year ago in early

⁶⁸ "Pharaonic frailties: A new regime attempts to foster growth". *The Economist*, 19 July 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21607850-new-regime-attempts-foster-growth-pharaonic-frailties>, Accessed on 24 September 2014.

⁶⁹ Aboulenein, A. and Noueihed, L. "Egyptian parliament approves Value Added Tax at 13 percent". *Reuters*, 29 August 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-economy-tax-idUSC6N1AW01D>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁷⁰ "CIA World Factbook: Egypt". Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_eg.pdf, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁷¹ Al-Weli, M. "Is Egypt heading for bankruptcy?" *Middle East Monitor*, 7 Feb 2017. <https://www.middleeast-monitor.com/20170207-is-egypt-heading-for-bankruptcy/>, Accessed on 15 May 2017.

⁷² Zéman, Z., Gacsi, R., Lukács, J. and Hajós, L. "Management control system in banks". *BIATEC* 21/6. 2013. 14–17. http://www.nbs.sk/_img/Documents/_PUBLIK_NBS_FSR/Biatec/Rok2013/biatec0613.pdf, Accessed on 25 April 2016.

November 2016 Egypt devaluated its currency in a sudden move by 48% and also announced that from then on it would float. This measure was almost a shock, still it was taken with the intention of meeting the demand of the International Monetary Fund in order to secure a loan of 12 billion USD over three years to overhaul its ailing economy.⁷³ The devaluation of the Egyptian currency however continued throughout the recent year as well and by early October 2017 one US dollar was equal to around 18 Egyptian pounds.

Table 1.
Several main macro-economic indicators of Egypt 2011–2016⁷⁴

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
GDP (billion USD) (current prices)	247.7	275.8	285.4	301.4	330.8	na
Per capita GDP (USD)	3,081.2	3,346.5	3,370.0	3,476.3	3,740.2	na
GDP PPP (billion USD)	887.3	923.7	958.5	995.8	1,047.9	1,105.0
Per capita GDP PPP (USD)	11,035.8	11,210.4	11,316.7	11,485.0	11,849.6	12,137.0
GDP growth, annual (%)	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.2	4.2	3.8
Current account balance (billion USD)	-6.1	-10.1	-6.4	-2.4	-12.2	na
Current account balance (GDP %)	-2.5	-3.7	-2.2	-0.8	-3.7	-5.8
Inflation (annual, %)	11.1	8.7	6.9	10.1	11.0	10.2
Unemployment (%)	10.4	12.4	13.0	13.4	12.9	12.7

Table 1 shows that the economy still grows at 3–4%, but at a negative and growing current account balance.



Figure 1.
Foreign reserves of Egypt 2006–2016⁷⁵

⁷³ “Egypt devalues currency by 48% to meet IMF demands for \$12bn loan”. *The Guardian*, 3 November 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/03/egypt-devalues-currency-meet-imf-demands-loan>, Accessed on 16 November 2017.

⁷⁴ Source: <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/egypt.pdf>

⁷⁵ Source: “Egypt Foreign Exchange Reserves”. Trading Economics database. 2016. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/foreign-exchange-reserves>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

The level of foreign reserves in October 2016 reached almost 20 billion USD. It is somewhat higher than the figures of the preceding 5 years; however, it is only half of the sum that Egypt possessed during the last days of the Mubarak regime (around 38 billion USD).




Figure 2.
*Tourism in Egypt 2006–2016*⁷⁶

The arrival of foreign tourists has been unsteady and followed closely the political events and regime changes during the recent 5 years. At present, it is in a low phase again, and it is also visible that since 2011, it never reached the level which used to be experienced during the last few years of the Mubarak regime. According to a report of Smith and Knecht (2016) which was published by Reuters, an economic adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism claimed that in the first quarter of 2016 only 1.2 million tourists travelled to Egypt, which was a sharp fall comparing to the figure of 2.2 million of the preceding year.⁷⁷




Figure 3.
*FDI inflow to Egypt 2006–2016*⁷⁸

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Egypt increased by 3,500.60 million USD in the first quarter of 2016. FDI in Egypt averaged 2,330.70 million USD from 2002 until 2016, reaching the all-time highest 5,572.50 million USD in the fourth quarter of 2007 and a record low

⁷⁶ Source: “Egypt Tourist Arrivals”. Trading Economics database. 2016. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/tourist-arrivals>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.
⁷⁷ Smith, M. and Knecht, E. “Egypt tourism revenue down 66 pct in Q1 2016”. *Reuters*, 25 April 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-tourism-idUSL3N17S3DT>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.
⁷⁸ Source: “Egypt Foreign Direct Investment”. Trading Economics database. 2016. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/foreign-direct-investment>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

of 40.70 million USD in the second quarter of 2002. Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt is reported by the Central Bank of Egypt.⁷⁹




Figure 4.

The unemployment rate in Egypt 2006–2016 (The vertical column shows the percentage.)⁸⁰

On Table 1, it can be seen that the unemployment is 2.4% higher in 2016 than it was in 2011. However, since 2014 it seems slightly decreasing in a country with almost 90 million people. The abovementioned 2.4% can mean a million people!

According to analysts the Egyptian economy would need higher annual growth to absorb all the c. 600 thousand new job seekers.⁸¹ The situation is even more difficult for the young generation. Recalling a study of Ghafar, Berman pointed out that roughly 40% of Egypt's population of nearly ninety million is aged between ten and twenty years and the overall youth unemployment in Egypt stood at 30%. This more than doubled the national unemployment rate. He added that it is even more difficult to find jobs for the highly educated people.⁸²

c) Prestige-projects

The government has been pushing forward several large and costly projects while Egypt is still in a difficult economic and social situation. The Sisi administration considers these ambitious investments which establish a better future for Egypt. Many people think that although they might be useful, these projects are not needed right now as they mean an additional burden to the taxpayers and some of them are not only beneficial but may also

⁷⁹ "Egypt Foreign Direct Investment".

⁸⁰ Source: "Egypt unemployment rate: forecast". Trading Economics database. 2016. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/unemployment-rate/forecast>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁸¹ Barsoum, G., Ramadan, M. and Mostafa, M. "Labour market transitions of young women and men in Egypt". International Labour Office, International Labour Organization, Geneva, June 2014. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/--dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_247596.pdf, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁸² Ghafar, A. A. "Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge Facing Egypt's Youth". Brookings Doha Center (BDC), July 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/en_youth_in_egypt-2.pdf, Accessed on 15 May 2017; Berman, I. "Egypt's Economy Is in Big Trouble". *The National Interest*, 28 September 2016. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/egypts-economy-big-trouble-17863>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

have negative implications. Additionally, in Egypt these projects are attributed with corruption issues leading to the highest-ranking politicians.

Two of the most prominent examples for such *pet projects* are as follows:

The Second or New Suez Canal Project

Goals:

- Significant shortening of the waiting time and passing time for the ships;
- Duplication of the number of vessels crossing the Canal (from 48 to 97 per day);
- To increase the incomes deriving from the use of the Suez Canal by 2023 (from the present 5.3 billion USD to 13.5 billion USD);
- To facilitate the economic development and job creation in the surrounding region.⁸³



Figure 5.

*The New Suez Canal Project*⁸⁴

Questions:

Should it look like a large-scale, prestigious investment, there are several arguments and considerations which put the reasonableness of this projects to question. First, it was financed from mainly domestic sources (8.2 billion USD) and to cover such an expenditure harsh additional restrictions might be put on the people. Next, the new canal is not a full alternative following a parallel route to the old canal; it is merely a 72 km long section. Finally, there is no guarantee that the global trade would grow at 3.4% annually as it was predicted in the project plan, so it may take a significantly longer time until the costs of the investment returns. Diab also warned that many international and local experts were

⁸³ Suez Canal Authority. <http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=69>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁸⁴ Source: "A bigger, better Suez Canal – But is it necessary?" *The Economist*, 8 August 2015. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21660555-it-necessary-bigger-better-suez-canal>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

sceptical about the project, the canal is currently running at below capacity, and the rate of annual growth in global shipping would have to be considerably higher than it is now.⁸⁵

Bridge over the Gulf of Aqaba – The King Salman bin Abdel Aziz Bridge

The idea of building a joint bridge over the Red Sea at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba is not a brand new idea, it goes back several years. The previous proposals even suggested a railway line parallel with the road lanes, integrating both country's proposed high-speed railway systems. In the plan, the causeway would pass through Tiran Island, which would serve as a connection between the two countries.⁸⁶

Goals:

- To establish direct public road connection between the two countries or even between two continents at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. This project was planned long ago, during Mubarak's period, although Mubarak suspended the project in 2005;
- In April 2016, the two heads of state agreed in the continuation of the project. According to Alter, there have been several other proposals for a bridge linking the Arab states, but none have come to fruition. The most recent proposal made in 2011 for a 20-mile-long bridge, was expected to cost roughly 5 billion USD. Planners claimed this amount would easily return from the tolls paid by pilgrims travelling to the holy sites of Saudi Arabia.⁸⁷



Figure 6.
*The King Salman Bridge Project*⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Diab, K. "Suez Canal II: The sequel that impresses no one". *Al Jazeera*, 6 August 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/08/suez-canal-ii-sequel-impresses-egypt-sisi-150806072157374.html>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁸⁶ "Saudi Arabia, Egypt agree to build bridge over Red Sea". *Al Jazeera*, 9 April 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/saudi-arabia-egypt-announce-bridge-red-sea-160409032158790.html>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁸⁷ Alter, C. "Saudi Arabia and Egypt Want to Build a Bridge Over the Red Sea". *Time*, 8 April 2016. <http://time.com/4286571/saudi-arabia-egypt-bridge-red-sea/>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁸⁸ Source: "Egypt, Saudi Arabia agreed on \$16 bln investment fund, settle maritime spat". *Gulf News*, 10 April 2016. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/egypt-saudi-arabia-agree-on-16b-investment-fund-settle-maritime-spat-1.1707587>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

Open questions:

- hampering navigation;
- environmental, marine-biological implications;
- the project will be coupled with handing over *Tiran Island* to Saudi Arabia.

It is worthwhile to get a deeper insight into the case of *Tiran Island* as this issue generated a really wide scale public anger and disappointment in Egypt.

The Tiran and Sanafir islands in the Gulf of Aqaba are two small spots without native population and noticeable natural resources. (There is only an Egyptian military station and some international observers located on the island.) The importance of the islands derives from their location: they are right at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, therefore, they are of strategic importance from the point of view of navigation control also for Israel and Jordan. During the recent decades, the increasing tourism also discovered the islands, especially the surrounding sea – nowadays it has a significant value and potentials added, as well.

These two islands used to belong to Saudi Arabia, but upon Saudi request, they were taken over by Egypt in 1950 (at that time Saudi Arabia did not have appropriate naval forces to control the area.) Israel occupied them twice, but both times returned them to Egypt and not to Saudi Arabia. However, even under President Anwar Sadat, Egypt considered that the islands were part of the Hijaz, a region in northwest Saudi Arabia on the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, and thus did not subject them to the 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty after the 1978 Camp David Accords.⁸⁹

In April 2016, on a bilateral summit the King of Saudi Arabia promised to give Egypt several billion USD as a bailout package. More than a dozen other accords, including a memorandum of understanding to set up an industrial zone in Egypt, were also announced. But the dispute over the islands of Tiran and Sanafir provoked an immediate backlash in Egypt.⁹⁰ Many Egyptians connected this directly to the fact that a few months later, in June, President Sisi agreed to hand over the islands to Saudi Arabia within the framework of the King Salman Bridge Project, and the President was also accused that he sold the islands (and was even bribed with billions of dollars). Even though the agreement was signed, nothing will change anytime soon. The agreement to transfer control over the two islands will not come into effect for 65 years, according to the Egyptian media.⁹¹

The issue is still pending as it heavily raised the ire of the Egyptian street, provoking protests in opposition to the move. Despite all that, an Egyptian administrative court ruled

⁸⁹ Al-Hatlani, I. “Why Egyptians’ anger at island handover is misplaced”. *Al-Monitor*, 21 April 2016. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/egypt-saud-arabia-islands-deal-saudi-debt-investment.html>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

⁹⁰ Al-Atrush, S. “Egypt, Saudi Arabia agree on \$16b fund, settle maritime spat”. *The Times of Israel*, 10 April 2016. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-saudi-arabia-agree-on-16b-fund-settle-maritime-spat/>, Accessed on 15 May 2017.

⁹¹ Ahren, R. “With island deal, Saudis signal they’re warming up to Israel”. *The Times of Israel*, 14 April 2016. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/island-deal-shows-saudis-warming-up-to-israel/>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

that the islands are still legally Egyptian, providing a victory to the Egyptian public opinion that was opposed to the official position of the Government.⁹²

On the 21st of June 2016, in an unexpected move, the first circuit of the Egyptian State Council's administrative court, headed by State Council Vice-President Yahya al-Dakrouri, annulled the Saudi–Egyptian maritime agreement, ceding sovereignty of the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir to the Gulf kingdom.⁹³

Conclusions – Challenges of the future

Almost seven years after the revolutionary movement for political and social metamorphosis called the *Arab Spring*, Egypt is still in a difficult situation and it seems it arrived at crossroads. Egypt, luckily, did not follow the Libyan and Syrian patterns, the country is still in unity in terms of governmental administration. However, it is more or less the only *achievement* as the economy is far from full recovery, furthermore, the economic and social problems deepened and trust on the part of foreign tourists and investors is still missing.

President Sisi tries to lead Egypt with a strong hand and his leading methods seem to be more and more autocratic. There are no traces of any development in the field of democratic values and human rights, furthermore, the behaviour of the authorities is intolerant and violent, just as it used to be in the Mubarak regime. So the standard of democracy and human rights is already similar to which used to be typical during the Mubarak regime, but without its social-policy that gave a protective net for the poor.

One may raise the question: *Was the Revolution of 25 January (2011) good for anything at all? What did the Egyptian people benefit from ousting President Mubarak?* A general fear to freely express one's opinion (if it is different from the official standpoint), and at the same time deepening social problems and growing economic burden on people do not look really promising. So far all this led to a general mistrust towards President Sisi who needs to be very careful. He is still in a position to lead Egypt out of this critical situation in a relatively peaceful way, but he also has to be aware that Egypt is proceeding on a wrong track. The main question is raised by many Egyptians: is there still room for reconciliation or the eve of a new revolution has come?

⁹² Elabd, R. R. "Will Egypt hold popular referendum on islands transfer?" *Al-Monitor*, 31 July 2016. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/egypt-khalid-ali-saudi-arabia-transfer-islands-sisi-tiran.html#ixz-z4Og0xvjAb>, Accessed on 31 October 2016.

⁹³ Elgohari, M. "What Was in the Egyptian Court's Reasoning in the Tiran and Sanafir Case?" *Atlantic Council*, 24 June 2016. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-was-in-the-egyptian-court-s-reasoning-in-the-tiran-and-sanafir-case>, Accessed on 16 September 2016.

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Algeria's Strategic Position – The 21st Century's Security Challenges and Efforts towards Regional Stabilization in Algeria

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Abstract

In 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa launched a wave of internationally significant political, economic and social changes. Besides the strategic geographical location, political and social conditions also increased the significance of Algeria, which after gaining its independence reflected the core of the region's major questions (the disharmony of secular leadership and the Islamic-oriented management and social system), thereby the country had and still has a central role in the security of the region. Algeria is also a top priority in tackling the Arab Spring's destructive cross-border effects. The purpose of the analysis is the presentation of the foreign and geo-policy of Algeria, particularly with regard to the recent years' changes in the strategic goals.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Algeria, Morocco, Maghreb, MENA

Developments of Algeria's Foreign Policy Network from Independence to the Arab Spring

Algeria gained its independence in 1962, after an eight-year long revolution, that left the country with hundreds of thousands of casualties. The foreign policy outlined for the independent country was mostly based on the Muslim Arab nationalism, which gave an opportunity to a relatively stable regional foreign relations system. The return to tradition also meant separation from colonial memories and the expression of consolidated relations with regional partners. This ambition is also confirmed by the fact that the country soon joined the Arab League (August 1962) and the African Union (May 1963).

Algeria was a loud preacher of *non-interference* and decolonization ideals, it joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961¹ and became a strong voice of African and Arab

¹ Anouar, B. "Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/14/algerian-foreign-policy-in-context-of-arab-spring-pub-50613>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

revolutionaries and the rights of the developing world, rejecting the Cold War bipolar structure, and emphasizing the inviolability of borders, non-interference in domestic affairs and sovereign equality.²

During the unique socialist presidency of Chadli Bendjedid from 1979–1992, Algeria's economic instability led to a shift in the country's foreign policy orientation.

Global economic and political aspirations were refocused with strengthened regional diplomacy, which is why Algeria became a founding member of the Arab Maghreb Union (including Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and Morocco) in 1989,³ that now operates as a latent organization. Neighbouring states also fought for stabilization, Morocco endured conflict primarily with Mauritania – but since 1975 also with Algeria – over Western Sahara's affiliation.⁴ As a result of the clashes, the Western Saharan independence movement, the *Polisario Front* found haven and a secure base in some Algerian territories, in addition a stream of displaced people also affected the border regions.⁵ At the end of 1976, more than 100,000 people stayed in the refugee camps along the Algerian border (mainly women and children).⁶

The administrative system still felt the French influence, operating according to secular governance models, the state leadership has remained at the separation of economic interests and religious background, indeed, industry and agriculture has been gradually nationalized.⁷ We must add, however, that due to the 1984 oil crisis the secular government was not able to perfectly accomplish its tasks and serve the relevant needs of society, and owing to this the economy began to weaken, the financial situation in the country worsened in parallel with the internal stress level's increase.⁸

The civil war conditions of the 1990s had a negative impact on the emerging regional contacts, a number of international conflicts hardened the way towards flourishing foreign policy discussions. The trouble had started in February 1989, when the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) embarked on a series of reforms, changing the Constitution to allow multipartism and alternation in power by means of elections. But the legalization of multipartism benefited the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, a catch-all-party of Islamists), which carried both the June 1990 local elections and the first round of the December 1991 national

² Anouar. "Algerian Foreign Policy...".

³ "No. 26844, Morocco, Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania and Tunisia, Treaty instituting the Arab Maghreb Union (with declaration). Concluded at Marrakesh on 17 February 1989. World Intellectual Property Organization" Vol. 1546, 1-26844. WIPO. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/amu/trt_amu.pdf, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

⁴ Between 23–24 July, 1973 in Agadir, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania they held a tripartite summit, as a result of which they declared: "the three leader is going to pay special attention to the then Spanish colony, Western Sahara. They further confirmed their ideological standpoint on the sovereignty of states." Besenyő J. *A nyugat-szaharai válság – egy magyar békefenntartó szemével*. Pécs: Molnár Nyomda, 2012. 61.

⁵ Besenyő, J. *Western Sahara*. Pécs: Publikon Kiadó, 2009. 100.

⁶ Besenyő J. *A nyugat-szaharai válság – egy magyar békefenntartó szemével*. 118.

⁷ J. Nagy L. "Új állam születik: Algéria, 1962." *Külgügyi Szemle*, 2014 ősz. <http://kki.gov.hu/download/f/2e/d0000/Nagy.pdf>, Accessed on 5 December 2016.

⁸ Takeyh, R. "Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony". Council on Foreign Relations. 2003. <http://www.cfr.org/world/islamism-algeria-struggle-between-hope-and-agony/p7335>, Accessed on 5 December 2016.

legislative races.⁹ The parliamentary elections that would have brought the FIS to power were cancelled by the Algerian army. Next, it forced President Chadli Benjedid to resign. Supporters of the FIS and different extremist organizations took up arms against the *coup*.¹⁰

The military declared a state of emergency and established a *transitional* regime that permitted little popular participation. When the government called a new multi-party election for November 1995, the violent clashes between Islamist and security forces worsened.¹¹ The presidential election was boycotted by the FIS supporters and the even more radical insurgent groups (for example GIA), who considered the election *blasphemous* and threatened voters to be legitimate targets for their activity.¹²

In the following years (1992–99), Islamic fundamentalists have been reported as serious humanitarian threats, who carried out attacks in Algeria in rural regions. Reacting to the flames of brutality and the hardly solvable political and social tensions, the Algerian leadership declared a state of emergency. The core of the rebels were provided by the GIA (approximately 2–3,000 members), while the FIS counted 4,000 people.¹³ In 2007 as a result of Algeria's counter-terrorism strategy at that time – offering extremists amnesty which led to the creation of GSPC – and the call of Ayman al-Zawahiri (second leader of the al-Qaeda), the *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) had been created from former members of the GSPC.¹⁴ The operation of the newly formed terrorist organization is still one of the most urgent issues of the country and the region. The rise of militancy across Algeria is also fuelled by the considerable ideological shift from the traditional Maliki Islam – a school of Islamic law historically concentrated in the Maghreb region – to the Saudi-exported Salafi and Wahhabi ideology.¹⁵

⁹ Nafeez, M. "Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its Consequences and the Contemporary Crisis". Algeria International Watch. http://www.globalresearch.org/view_article.php?aid=791006378#208276110, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

¹⁰ Nafeez. "Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy...".

¹¹ Widner, J. "Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution: Data & Summaries, Algeria 1996". Princeton University. <https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/algeria1996.html>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

¹² Peter, H. "Algerians prepare for first free presidential election". CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/algeria_election/, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

¹³ Ladányi É. and Kobilka I. "Algériai terrorszervezetek". In Kiss Á. (szerk), *Afrikai terrorista és szakadár szervezetek*. HM Zrínyi Nonprofit Kft, 2015. 132.

¹⁴ Walker, A. "Security concerns push Algerian defence budget beyond \$10 billion". *Middle East Eye*. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/security-concerns-push-algerian-defence-budget-beyond-10-billion-1337659799>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

¹⁵ Boubekeur, A. "Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria". *Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Middle East Center. http://www.lignes-de-reperes.com/news/salafism_radical_politics_algeria.pdf, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

The internal political battles¹⁶ drew attention to the social demand that the secular leadership style needs to be consistent with Islamic cultural influences and should not try to dominate the country that earned self-identity after the colonial years.

Considering the regional context, it is worth mentioning that among members of the Muslim-majority society a significant proportion of integrist movement followers – mostly from the GIA,¹⁷ the GSPC¹⁸ and AQIM¹⁹ – supported either indirectly or directly the fights against the Soviets in Afghanistan.²⁰ According to Maj. Gen. Rachid Zouine, approximately 2,800 Algerians fought on the side of Afghans, who, returning home could easily act as a basis to spread radical Islam, thereby contributing to the destabilization of the security structure in the already ailing country.²¹ These social tensions thus underlined the importance of a geopolitical parallel, namely the proximity of the seething radical Islamist movements of the region, which could serve as collecting points for radicals across the continent.

Presidential elections were held on 16 November 1995, but they have been largely irrelevant for solving the internal clashes. Incumbent president Liamine Zeroual (a retired general and the army's designated candidate) won a 61% majority.²² Zeroual has not been able to assert control over the army, the national dialogue that he promised has broken down, and violence continued. In May 1996, the president promised legislative elections for early 1997, but the opposition parties dismissed his announcement as a manoeuvre to buy time. Similarly, the April 1999 election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika – although he introduced a national reconciliation policy – has proven insignificant in terms of providing a genuine resolution to the crisis in a peaceful political framework.²³ In Algeria's *black decade* about 200,000 people lost their lives.²⁴ Stabilizing his power, Bouteflika won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. In 2005, the Charter for Peace and National

¹⁶ After the independence serious breaking points appeared between the National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale – FLN), the Islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du salut – FIS) party and their supporters. While the FLN propagated secular leadership over the integrated Islamic state administration, the majority of the population supported the FIS, who offered the revival of traditional, Islam leadership. In order to counter the many times radical operation of the FIS, the party was banned in 1992, but the social unrest and violent terror incidents continued to determine the Algerian domestic political atmosphere. FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, was disbanded in January, but the stabilization of the political environment was still to be achieved. Inter alia this conflict pushed the Algerian society close to the level of the nearby Arab Spring affected countries, perceived as destructive.

¹⁷ Armed Islamic Group – GIA. (GIA is the French equivalent's shortened version.)

¹⁸ Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Group salafiste pour la prédication et le combat – GSPC).

¹⁹ Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – AQIM.

²⁰ Turshen, M. "Militarism and Islamism in Algeria". *Journal of Asian and African Studies special issue on Africa and Globalization: Critical perspectives* 25/3–4. 2004. 458–459. 1. <http://www.meredethturshen.com/www/pdf/Militarism%20Islamism%20Algeria%20JAAS%202004.pdf>, Accessed on 13 December 2016.

²¹ Col. Rachid, Z. "Islamism and terrorism in Algeria". Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2002. 2–3. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a404562.pdf>, Accessed on 5 December 2017.

²² Lahouari, A. "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions". *Journal of Democracy* 7/3. 1996. 94–107. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32221804_Algeria's_Tragic_Contradictions, Accessed on 5 December 2016.

²³ Mosaddeq, N. A. "Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its Consequences and the Contemporary Crisis". Algeria International Watch. http://www.globalresearch.org/view_article.php?aid=791006378#208276110, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

²⁴ Ladányi and Kobilka. "Algériai terrrorszervezetek". 132.

Reconciliation was approved in a referendum, offering immunity to Islamist rebels. In exchange, rebels, including FIS leaders, were banned from participating in politics.²⁵

The government in 2011 introduced political reforms in response to the Arab Spring, including lifting the 19-year-long state of emergency restrictions and increasing women's quotas (minimum 30%) for elected assemblies²⁶ and aiming to ensure a minimum number of female candidates at provincial level,²⁷ while also increasing subsidies to the populace.²⁸ In terms of women's representation, the regional leader is Algeria, where their proportion in the lower house increased from 6.7% in 1995 to 31.6% in 2015 (+24.9 points).²⁹

As regards Algeria's economic potential, the deep geo-political connection can again be seen, since because of its natural conditions and trade relations the oil crisis determined the country's erosion of power in domestic and foreign policy. Algeria's oil and gas reserves are significant,³⁰ the export revenues are mainly based on foreign oil selling.³¹ However, the economy is slightly differentiated.³²

Economically, it was essential to modernize technologies by supporting the development of industry and agriculture opportunities, as well as the diversification of imports. The volume of export started to increase since 2014, the main foreign trade partners were Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the USA,³³ but according to international data on the openness of the export market (see below the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index [HHI]),³⁴ Algerian export is still not diversified enough. However, the labour market and

²⁵ Khettab, D. "The 'Black Decade' still weighs heavily on Algeria". Al-Jazeera, 03 November 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/black-decade-weighs-heavily-algeria-151102100541203.html>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

²⁶ Apart from this decision, the gender gap in Algeria remained high, even if we look at MENA or the Middle-Eastern countries' relevance. According to the World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2010 (rankings of in total 134 countries), Algeria received the 119th place among 134 countries when taking into account gender gap. Source: "Algeria – MENA Gender Equality Profile, Status of Girls and Women in the Middle East and North Africa". UNICEF. 1. <https://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Algeria-Gender-Equality-Profile-2011.pdf>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

²⁷ "Algeria – MENA Gender Equality Profile, Status of Girls and Women in the Middle East and North Africa". UNICEF. 3.

²⁸ "Algeria". CIA Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

²⁹ "Women in Parliament: 20 years in review". IPU. 7. <http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/WIP20Y-en.pdf>, Accessed on 27 February 2017. It is an interesting fact, however, that in relation with Hungary, we have to add that while in Algeria, 31.6% representation was achieved, at the same exact time, in Hungary this representation stood at 10.1 percent, even lower than in 1995 (then it was 11.4%). Source: "Women in Parliament: 20 years in review". IPU. 19.

³⁰ "Algeria – Statistical Appendix". Table 3. Algeria: Sectoral Distribution of GDP at Current Prices, 2005–09. IMF. 5. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1140.pdf>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

³¹ "African Economic Outlook – Algeria". OECD. 56. <http://www.oecd.org/countries/algeria/32411852.pdf>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

³² "Algeria". OEC. <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/dza/#Destinations>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

³³ "World's Richest Countries". Top Algeria Trade Partners 2014. http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_algeria_exporters_trade_partners.html, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

³⁴ The Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of concentration used by biologists, ecologists, linguists, economists, sociologists and demographers. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market and then summing the resulting numbers; it can range from close to zero to 1 (in some sources 10,000). Higher scores indicate higher diversity.

other economic opportunities are waiting to be reformed. In addition to diversification, the proper utilization of domestic resources is needed, as well.³⁵




Figure 1.

*Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Algeria, 1992-2015*³⁶

High unemployment and corruption, among other internal failures also hampered the MENA region's balance; Libya and Tunisia also struggled with internal political disturbances. Civil war and a coup d'état was taking place in Mali, Nigeria was struggling against radicalization and civil war conditions. After the September 11 attacks in 2001, the American initiative attempted to cut back radicalization on the spot; in 2005, the US leadership launched the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in cooperation with Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.³⁷

However, the international geopolitical relations have undergone a dramatic change. Following the terrorist attacks in the US, the perception towards MENA region fell to lows. As a country with a long *tradition* of terrorist organizations, as well as tribal and ethnic-religious conflicts (e.g. Tuaregs), Algeria's conditions were key element to regional stability. Abdelaziz Bouteflika began policy consultations with NATO and the United States and in 2000, became a part of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.³⁸

Taking into account the challenges of regional cooperation, the country is back on its feet in terms of the economy, being open to the advantageous multi-threaded Western

³⁵ "IMF Survey: Algeria Seeks to Diversify, Reshape Economy as Oil Revenues Decline". IMF. 2016. <http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew052016a>, Accessed on 27 February 2017.

³⁶ Source: "Economic Diversification in Oil-Exporting Arab Countries". IMF. 10; "Trade Competitiveness of the Middle East and North Africa Policies for Export Diversification". The World Bank. 49; "Algeria Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values". World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS); "UN COMTRADE data". In Dogruel, A. and Tekce, M. "Trade Liberalization and Export Diversification in Selected MENA Countries". Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies Vol. 13, 2011.

³⁷ Walther, O. and Retaillé, D. "Sahara or Sahel? The Fuzzy Geography of Terrorism in West Africa". *CEPS Working Papers*, No. 2010-35. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1803996, Accessed on 28 February 2017.

³⁸ "Mediterranean Dialogue". NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

integration. The significantly increasing oil and gas prices of the 2000s contributed to the development of the national economy, and both parties gave impetus to a favourable infrastructure development.

Such was the implementation of the Algeria–Tunisia–Italy gas pipeline in order to diversify Southern Europe's energy dependency, the Algeria–Sardinia–Corsica–Italy gas pipeline with a branch in France and the Medgas gas pipeline (Algeria–Spain–France–continental Europe).³⁹

A record amount of hydrocarbon revenues contributed to the development of the economy⁴⁰ and allowed the country's military elite to consolidate power. On the international scene, Bouteflika's second term (2004–2009) has seen diplomatic connections strengthening Russia by large imports of Russian military hardware.

After the Arab Spring

From 2001 onwards, the government stressed the role of the armed forces in national development,⁴¹ as a result of this, Algeria almost completely modernized its army, mostly by Russian-made equipment⁴² and thus became the leader of the regional military expenditure databases,⁴³ leaving Morocco and Libya behind.⁴⁴ Between 2005–2009 and 2010–14, Algeria was the largest arms importer in Africa, followed by Morocco.⁴⁵ Despite this, at the beginning of the 2011 chain of events, it was likely that Algeria – facing domestic political problems, such as corruption, incorrect or questionable legitimate government – will also end up in a civil war.

³⁹ “Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006, laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC”. EUR-Lex. 1. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02006D1364-20130701>, Accessed on 10 December 2016.

⁴⁰ Lemtaouch, L., Kai, J. Y. and Rui, R. X. “Economic growth and CO2 emissions nexus in Algeria: A co-integration analysis of the environmental Kuznets curve”. *International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Research (IJEER)* 4/4. 2014. 1.

⁴¹ “Global Security”. Algeria – Military Spending 2016. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/algeria/budget.htm>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁴² “Global Security”. Algeria – Military Spending 2016.

⁴³ “Asia and the Middle East lead rise in arms imports; the United States and Russia remain largest arms exporters, says SIPRI”. SIPRI. <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/asia-and-middle-east-lead-rise-arms-imports-united-states-and-russia-remain-largest-arms-exporters>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁴⁴ “Military expenditure by country, in constant (2014) US\$ m., 2006–2015”. SIPRI. 15. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-USD.pdf>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁴⁵ “The United States leads upward trend in arms exports, Asian and Gulf states arms imports up, says SIPRI”. SIPRI. <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2015/united-states-leads-upward-trend-arms-exports-asian-and-gulf-states-arms-imports-says-sipri>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.




Figure 2. *Military expenditures by year in US\$ m. 2001–2015*⁴⁶

Although the country really suffered from a wave of uprisings, the well-equipped and well-managed law enforcement units were able to maintain the level of social movements at moderate levels. Nonetheless, in the coming months, protests were mostly local, sporadic demonstrations.⁴⁷

In the context of the Arab Spring, Algeria was forced to change its geostrategic and foreign policy. The country became more receptive to the joint management of humanitarian crises in international cooperation,⁴⁸ although it continued to stick to the ideology to protect the sovereignty of states.⁴⁹ However, in a practical point of view, it can be a much more serious aspect that the international military intervention could directly affect the ongoing outflow of refugees to neighbouring countries, reaching Algeria within a short period of time, where it is still difficult to defend and maintain the current security level.

As one of the most important states in Africa’s economic and geostrategic potential (sea coastline, strategic crossing points towards the EU, commercial hot spots in the north-

⁴⁶ Source: SIPRI Military expenditure by country, Trading Economics – Morocco military expenditure; Trading Economics – Libya military expenditure, Trading Economics – Algeria military expenditure; The World Bank – Military expenditure (% of GDP).

⁴⁷ Zoubir, Y. H. “Algeria After the Arab Spring”. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-spring>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁴⁸ As it has already occurred, Algeria assumed the role of mediator in 2000 between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Source: *Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea*. <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/786>, Accessed on 11 June 2018.

⁴⁹ Boukhars, A. “Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring”. *Combating Terrorism Center* 6/1. 2013. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/14/algerian-foreign-policy-in-context-of-arab-spring-pub-50613>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

western and northern parts of the country), in the course of a fading Arab Spring, Algeria became a major influential state in the North African region.

Given the quantity of influx of refugees in the region, it was crucial to preserve the stability of Algeria for the European region, as well as the sustaining of refugee camps (e.g. Tindouf). The country and the region still have throwbacks derived from the Arab Spring, which significantly set back the long-term planning. The domestic political difficulties, and ethnic conflicts still require a lot of care and dynamic response from the leadership of both the country and the international community.

While President Abdelaziz Bouteflika devoted special attention to the limitation of the work of terrorist organizations at national and international level, the country is still facing major problems: the operation of the GIA, extremist organizations and radical individuals from Libya and other unstable places. In the light of the high level of radicalization, the threat of terrorist organizations remained high, owing to this it is not surprising that the country estranged its relationship with Morocco and Libya.

Algerian leadership supports the international diplomatic dialogue.⁵⁰ Considering the military deployment, Algeria feared that an external intervention in Libya would reawaken ethno-tribal demands for sovereign identity, mostly concerning the return of the Tuareg fighters. The Algerian Government was convinced that the overthrow of the Libyan autocrat would trigger a chain of events and in addition to the migrant flow, it would eventually help Tuareg fighters and terrorist organizations infiltrate and return to the country or – in a worst case scenario – create a parallel, socially more homogenous territory nearby or within the border, which could be a great inspiration for the country's Tuaregs in the south.⁵¹ According to Anouar Boukhars,⁵² “it might also spark a revival in Berber activism, even if Berber nationalism remains less threatening to the territorial integrity of the state”.⁵³

Of course, several factors stand in the background of the estrangement,⁵⁴ but it is essential to take into consideration potential cross-border challenges and effects of the instability in Libya. A practical example for the limited border control was linked to al-Qaeda extremists in 2013, where weapons from Libya were deployed⁵⁵ to attack a factory complex in In-Amena.⁵⁶

In order to protect the western border with Libya, Algeria deployed a 75-strong preventive policing force against radical individuals' infiltration. The Algerian preparedness and equipment has been repeatedly proven to be successful during this administration, for

⁵⁰ Qsiyer, K. “Dynamics of the Maghreb's Geopolitics in 2014”. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/01/201512713642692743.html>, Accessed on 6 December 2016.

⁵¹ Boukhars. “Algerian Foreign Policy...”.

⁵² Boukhars is a non resident scholar in Carnegie's Middle East Program. He is an Associated Professor of international relations at McDaniel College in Westminster, Maryland.

⁵³ Boukhars. “Algerian Foreign Policy...”.

⁵⁴ For example, the Algeria–Mauritania–Tunisia foreign policy axis and the Morocco–Libya approach.

⁵⁵ “Letter dated 15 February 2013 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council”. UN Security Council. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_2013_99.pdf, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁵⁶ Gauthier-Villars, D. “Algeria Attack Shows Reach of Militants”. *The Wall Street Journal*. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732462440457825503958509588>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

example in December 2014, they were able to liquidate the Jundt al-Khilafat terrorist organization's central cell in northern Algeria, who previously pledged loyalty to the Islamic State and maintained a connection with operating units in Libya.⁵⁷ This is all the more central to the Algerian security point of view, because in October 2011, in Libya after the events of Gaddafi's regime change, the leader of the AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) terror organization, Ayman al-Zawahiri called on the supporters of the organization to topple the Algerian regime and create a corresponding radical Islamic regime in the country. In 2011, AQIM also threatened to murder prisoners (senior officials, for example the Illizi province leader) since the country concluded a bilateral agreement with Mali to act together against the local units of the terrorist organizations.⁵⁸

In February 2011, the regime lifted the state of emergency that it had imposed in 1992. In April, the Government promised more political openness, and in September 2011, it opened the broadcasting sector to private media. Libya's collapse and previously expressed growing support for radicalism and militants has sustained the regime's narrative that "an uneasy peace is still better than chaos".⁵⁹

Although, increased efforts are unquestionably taken against terrorism on every level, Bouteflika made some irregular institutional steps in 2016, with which, many questioned that he may attempt to reassert his primacy over the country's military elite. In January 2016, Bouteflika dissolved the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) – the powerful state security service long seen as the nexus of political power in the country – and replaced with the Department of Surveillance and Security (DSS) which, unlike its predecessor, reported directly to the presidency.⁶⁰

Along the Berm,⁶¹ as the result of the conflict on sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco, there are still noticeably high tensions between the Algerian and Moroccan administration units, as well as a wide range of radical groups built bases as *safe havens* in the hardly controllable area.⁶²

⁵⁷ Zoubir, Y. H. "Algeria After the Arab Spring". <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-spring>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁵⁸ "North Africa after the Arab Spring Political Outlook for Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt". EGF MENA Briefing. 2012. 5. http://gpf-europe.com/upload/iblock/47f/egf_maghreb_security_f_stability_briefing_may_2012.pdf, Accessed on 6 December 2016.

⁵⁹ Serrano, F. "Algeria on the Brink?" *Foreign Policy*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-05-27/algeria-brink>, Accessed on 2 March 2017.

⁶⁰ "Why Bouteflika dissolved Algeria's powerful spy agency?" *Al Jazeera*, 26 February 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/algeria-dissolved-powerful-spy-agency-160225171417842.html>, Accessed on 28 February 2017.

⁶¹ Western Sahara until 1976 was under Spanish rule. After that, the deserted area was divided among Morocco and Mauritania. In 1975, after the attack of the Moroccans on Western Sahara, thousands of refugees arrived in western Algeria, where they live in refugee camps to this day, especially in the city of Tindouf. In 1979, Mauritania renounced its territorial claims. Morocco sensed the vulnerability of the area, which previously lacked central control and occupied the territory, including the largest city in Western Sahara, Layoune, as well. The Berm, built by Moroccan engineers, was set up to separate Western Sahara into areas with Moroccan administration and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Construction began in August 1980 and lasted until April 1987. Source: Besenyő J. "Magyar logisztikusként az ENSZ nyugat-szaharai missziójában". *Katonai Logisztika* 13/1. 2004. 208–223.

⁶² Besenyő J. "A nyugat-szaharai menekült kérdés és az algériai menekülttáborok". *Afrika Tanulmányok* IV/3. 2010. 74–85. http://www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu/application/essay/906_1.pdf, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

The primary crossing point of the Berm is the Algerian town of Tindouf along the boundary wall, the command centre of the UN mission, MINURSO is located nearby.⁶³ Tindouf also serves as a base for the Western Saharan independence *party*, the fighters of the Polisario Front, who repeatedly carried out attacks against forces of Morocco with presumable Algerian support. Tindouf represents a source of tension between Morocco and Algeria, since it had been separated from Morocco's (Western-Saharan) territory by Algerian (French) Colonel Trinquet in 1934.⁶⁴ Armed clashes have been taking place since 1979, though their number and intensity fluctuates.⁶⁵ Restrictions have already been introduced on a number of occasions along the 1,600-km-long border between Algeria and Morocco. In 1994, the Algerian leadership decided to close the borders again after Morocco withdrew the Algerians' visa after the terrorist attacks in Moroccan Atlas Asni Hotel.⁶⁶ Conflicts have had an impact on the frozen operation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) since 1994, partly because of the Algerian and Moroccan conflict. Supporting Polisario is not only a way to balance the Moroccan regional power, but also a sign of commitment towards the ideology in support of the liberation movements similar to East Timor's independence.⁶⁷

As a result of the border closure, a significant number of Moroccan–Algerian families were separated from each other and remained that way until 2004. Considering economic interests, the closure has many disadvantages, mostly for Morocco.⁶⁸ Quoting the Economist, “Had Algeria and Morocco honoured their agreement back in 1989 to form an economic union, along with Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, they would be among the Middle East's largest economies. Their poor border regions would be booming crossroads. Over the decade to 2015, reckons the World Bank, their two economies would each have almost doubled in size. Instead, Algeria grew only by 33% and Morocco by 37%, as both governments instead reinforced their barricades.”⁶⁹

That is part of the reason, which led King Mohammed VI of Morocco to allow the Algerians travel to the country in 2004. When Morocco, the United States and the European Union asked President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika to open the border, he denied their request. Although some level of rapprochement can be observed between the two countries, the expulsion of Algerians left a mark on the public in Morocco and Algeria.⁷⁰

⁶³ Mitch, S. “The world's longest minefield isn't where you think it is.” *The Week*. <http://theweek.com/articles/534866/worlds-longest-minefield-isnt-where-think>, Accessed on 12 December 2016.

⁶⁴ Besenyő J. *A nyugat-szaharai válság – egy Magyar békefenntartó szemével*. Pécs: Molnár Nyomda, 2012. 61.

⁶⁵ Besenyő J. “Gerillaháború Nyugat-Szaharában: Polisario vs. Marokkó és Mauritánia”. *Hadtudomány* (online), 25 (E-publication). 48–58. real.mtak.hu/24617/7/6_BESENYO_JANOS.pdf, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

⁶⁶ “Patterns of global terrorism”. U.S. Department of State. Department of State Publication 1994. http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_94/middleeast.html#Morocco, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

⁶⁷ Boukhars. “Algerian Foreign Policy...”.

⁶⁸ Khettab, D. “Algeria turns ‘deaf ear’ to border dispute”. *Al Jazeera*, 31 October 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/algeria-turns-deaf-ear-border-dispute-2014925121752206960.html>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

⁶⁹ Mhidi, M. “Morocco and Algeria keep building more barriers”. *The Economist*. <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725576-fences-make-neighbours-poorer-morocco-and-algeria-keep-building-more-barriers>, Accessed on 17 November 2017.

⁷⁰ “Open that border.” *The Economist*. <http://www.economist.com/node/16219845>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

As a transit country of arms and human trafficking towards Europe, Algeria had to face the problem of increasingly frequent transit on these routes by organized crime groups. These tendencies were highly linked with the aggravation of the processes of the Arab Spring.⁷¹ Its location thereby requires increased action, stricter border controls and operations against organized crime groups. Morocco has repeatedly accused Algeria of gasoline and drug trafficking, and on July 14, 2014, Interior Minister Mohammed Hassen has taken steps to eradicate these threats, called on policy makers to set up a barbed-wire fence between Morocco and Algeria.⁷² On May 26, 2015, the Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane announced the construction of a 140 km long border wall, which was planned to partly cover the 550 km long joint Moroccan–Algerian border. It is important to realize that the situation is neither advantageous economically for the domestic markets, nor for the volume of export because of the decline in export opportunities and direct transit cuts.⁷³

In addition to the aforementioned economic factors, the tense relations of the two countries have other factors, as well. Morocco is not in favour of the planned North African pipeline, through which Algerian oil would be transported through Western Sahara to Europe and the United States.⁷⁴ Considering that it would diversify the already established phosphate and iron trade relations between the US, the European Union and Morocco with a rival state, the dependency on Moroccan shipments would decrease. However, if Morocco does not allow economic relations between Western Sahara and Algeria,⁷⁵ it could even result in legal conflicts on international level.⁷⁶ All the same, for Algeria, further differentiating its exports is almost inevitable.

According to foreign estimates, at least 60 per cent of the country's GDP is based on revenues from hydrocarbons,⁷⁷ thus in case of a loss in a route or reduction of current oil prices, purchasing power parity (PPP) is significantly exposed to the economic recession. During the oil price boom in Algeria, the country has been able to accumulate financial reserves (about 200 billion USD) that have contributed to raise the level of infrastructure and social services.⁷⁸ However, estimations of recent years show, that only half of this

⁷¹ Bob-Milliar, G. M. and Bob-Milliar, G. K. "The Politics of Trans-Saharan Transit Migration in the Maghreb: Ghanaian Migrants in Libya, c.1980–2012". *African Review of Economics and Finance* 5/1. 2013. 62.

⁷² "Morocco building a fence on the border with Algeria." *The Moroccan Times*. <http://moroccantimes.com/2014/07/6297/morocco-building-fence-border-algeria>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

⁷³ Tebas, M. and Alberto, J. "África fronteras: muros frente amenazas". Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estratégicos, 2016. 6–7. <http://www.ieee.es/contenido/noticias/2016/01/DIEEEA01-2016.html>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁷⁴ "Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects". Joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) 2003. 92. https://www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/03503.Cross_Border%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Pipelines_Problems%20and%20Prospects.pdf, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁷⁵ Hayes, M. "Algerian gas to Europe: The transmitted pipeline and early Spanish gas import projects". *Geopolitics of Gas Working Paper Series*, James A. Baker III. Institute for Public Policy Energy Forum, Working Paper #27, May 2004. 14. <https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91495/algerian-gas-to-europe-the-transmed-pipeline-and-early-spanish-gas-import-projects.pdf?sequence=1> Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁷⁶ "Changing Geopolitics of Western Sahara after the Arab Spring and Morocco". ORSAM. Center for Middle-Eastern Strategic Studies, 2016. <http://www.orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4555?s=orsam%7Cenglish>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁷⁷ "Algeria GDP Annual Growth Rate". Trading Economics, 2001–2016. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/algeria/gdp-growth-annual>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁷⁸ Zoubir. "Algeria After the Arab Spring".

amount is available for the Government, so in December 2015, the financial management foresaw restrictions, which already took effect from the beginning of 2016.⁷⁹ The economic upswing is a security interest, as it was highlighted by Barry Buzan – a respected ideologist and professor of the so-called Copenhagen School of International Relations – among five sectors of security: social discontent may lead to questionable safety of the country in the short term.⁸⁰

Flare-ups of the Arab Spring and the ongoing instability in the region has confronted the Algerian leadership with a never-experienced amount of migration. The long-used caravan trade routes are especially affected by the flood of people towards Europe. The first collection point for Western African migrants is the city of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso,⁸¹ to where migrants from Niger and Mali arrive and from where they continue their way towards the Libyan ports.⁸² Along a different route, through Mali and Algeria, Gao (in Mali) also receive migrants heading to Libya.⁸³ Throughout larger collecting locations, a whole industry was launched by migrants, some of whom also undertake work in these places in order to collect the amount of money needed to reach the target countries.⁸⁴ This means that some of the migrants settle down for months or even several years before moving to Europe. In 1966 the Algerian city of Tamanrasset was populated by barely 3,000 people, whose 10% came from sub-Saharan countries, while in 1990 a total of 65,000 people lived in this town, whose 50% also came from sub-Saharan countries.⁸⁵

The deterioration of the security situation in the Maghreb region resulted in a change of foreign policy configurations (*coalitions*), as well. In 2014, a new unit started to be built, which excluded Algeria and Morocco from the political dialogue. Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad initiated the co-called *Sahel Quintet* with joint action against an increasing problem in countries: radicalization and jihadism. Besides, they also pay attention to the fight against organized crime, as well. At the same time, in purely geographic terms, Algeria–Tunisia relations are weakening. It is an important addition, that the uncertain security situation – considering the Tunisian terrorist attacks and activity – and cross-border security challenges make it harder to protect Algeria's North-western borders.⁸⁶ Moreover,

⁷⁹ Sahbani, L. and Chastel, A. "Contribution of the Finance Law for 2016: the main legal and tax developments, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Algeria". 2016. <http://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/invitation-assets/article-main-developments.pdf>, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁸⁰ Buzan, B. "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century". *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 67/3. 1991. 432. http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/10/New%20Patterns%20of%20Global%20Security%20in%20the%20TwentyFirst%20Century_Buzan.pdf, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁸¹ "Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report". Frontex. 2015. 6, 14. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/AFIC/AFIC_report_2015.pdf, Accessed on 24 February 2017.

⁸² Besenyő, J. "Security Preconditions: Understanding Migratory Routes". *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues* 6/1. 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2016.6.1>, Accessed on 28 February 2017.

⁸³ Besenyő. "Security Preconditions...".

⁸⁴ Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar. "The Politics of Trans-Saharan Transit Migration...". 63.

⁸⁵ Besenyő. "Security Preconditions...".

⁸⁶ Ladányi and Kobilka. "Algériai terrorservezetek...". 138.

we may not ignore the fact that Morocco in recent times has been a more promising partner to Tunisia than the neighbouring Algeria, both in economic terms and in noticeable political cooperation.⁸⁷

Conclusion

Due to its geopolitical position, Algeria became a cornerstone of European and African regional stability since it gained independence. The duality of leadership aspiring to moderate Islamic secularization and traditional social norms still leads to internal political difficulties; after the Arab Spring, restoring the security level is still difficult.

Algeria's strategic position can only be understood in relation with the crossing trade routes, previously operating as a network of caravan routes, connecting sub-Saharan Africa with the southern areas of Europe. Today, the quality and quantity of trade goes through significant changes (globalization, emergence of online transactions etc.); however, these routes are still in use. As a result of internal tensions in the MENA countries and the Central African instability, organized crime groups often launch shipments through the difficultly controllable corridors and migration routes also frequently use the passage for escaping the military conflicts of the surrounding states (Nigeria, Chad, Western Sahara, Libya). Thus, the geographical location constitutes associated security risks for Algeria, which counters the significant challenges with the region's highest military expenditure.

Algeria's foreign policy orientation supports decolonization and the sovereignty of states, but the high risk of cross-border security threats of the Libyan and Malian conflict gradually re-shaped the doctrine of non-interference. The country supported international political dialogue in Libya. Algeria's power is primarily understood as the leader of the Maghreb region, its second *office* is the representation of the Arab states' motivations at international level.⁸⁸ In view of the events taking place in Mali, the infiltration of radical units is still regarded as a challenge. In the southern regions of Algeria, the work of the Islamic State, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda and other groups, who pledged allegiance to them could involve a protracted security risk. To increase social security on the southern territories, Algerian leadership contributes to the social and economic assistance of Malian Tuaregs, as well.

The rugged path of Morocco and Algeria towards cooperation seems to be still on hold, and the main problem is not only the unresolved Western Sahara conflict or the support of the Polisario Front, but the Mediterranean oil pipeline (between Algeria and Europe) – which deeply affects Algeria and Morocco's economy – is also a point of collision.

⁸⁷ Qsiyer, K. "Dynamics of the Maghreb's Geopolitics in 2014". *Al Jazeera*, 27 January 2015. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/01/201512713642692743.html>, Accessed on 28 February 2017.

⁸⁸ Ladányi and Koblak. "Algériai terrrorszervezetek...". 138.

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The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb after the Arab Spring

Zoltán Prantner

Abstract

The Arab Spring, having evolved at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, offered new opportunities for millions of disappointed people. Due to the unfortunate turn of events, the hope for democratization was not realized after the overthrow of tyrannical systems in several countries. Instead, with the introduction of power-vacuum and anarchy, the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and aligned terrorist organizations began to operate freely. They succeeded in exploiting the nationalist revolt in Mali and gained control of substantial parts of the country in cooperation with other Jihadist groups that forced France to intervene with its army. However, the defeat in Mali and the split in the terror-organization did not reduce the danger represented by the AQIM. Nowadays, it still means a potential risk and if succeeds to recover from its losses it will continue its grim private war.

Despite the ethnical and personal conflicts, the organization is still active and fights its battle in many countries neighbouring the Sahel-region with modern weapons smuggled from Libya.

Keywords: *Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (MPLA), Arab Spring, Jihadism, Algeria, Mali, Sahel, Azawad, Tuareg, Abdelmalek Droukdel, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Iyad ad Ghali, Aménas, MINUSMA*

The Arab Spring in Algeria

The Arab Spring started in Algeria on 28 December 2010. Like other Middle Eastern and North African countries, the demonstrators marched in the streets against unemployment, lack of accommodation, corruption, restriction of free speech and low standards of living. In the beginning, the government considered the unrests local demonstrations like the ones usual in previous years. The government tried to restore order with the use of police force. However, the unemployed angry youth did not flinch and threw Molotov cocktails and stones at the security forces in Algiers on 29 December 2010, as their Tunisian counterparts

had done before. Finally, 53 people were wounded and the police arrested 29 others during the unrest.¹

The anger was fuelled further by the rising prices of basic commodities with more than 30% and the demonstrations in the neighbouring Tunisia in the beginning of January 2011.² These circumstances led to the conversion from local riots and protests to a nationwide unrest between 3 and 9 January, 2011. The security forces managed to limit the demonstrations to some towns on 10 January where the protests continued. However, the situation consolidated throughout the country on the following day.³

It was soon realized that this quiet is fragile. As the Tunisian Mohamed Bouzazi, who committed suicide, many protesters marched in front of governmental buildings where they set themselves on fire. The first incident occurred on 12 January, 2011 when the 26-year-old Mohamed Auichia committed an unsuccessful suicide attempt in Borj Menaiel.⁴ This act was followed by many similar incidents and more self-immolations were carried out. The most famous incident on the very next day following Auichia's suicide attempt, happened in front of the town hall of Boukhadara where Mohsen Bouterfif, a father of two, set himself on fire after the mayor could not provide him either occupation or accommodation.⁵ Bouterfif died of his injuries in the hospital 11 days later. His death resulted in such a great public outcry that the provincial governor dismissed the mayor of the city under pressure of about a hundred young protesters in the streets. Across the country dozens of self-immolation cases happened, mostly after Tunisian president Ben Ali resigned from his presidential post and hastily flew to Djidda, Saudi Arabia with his family. However, unlike in previous cases or elsewhere in the Arab world, these individual actions did not transform into mass demonstrations, which thoroughly thwarted the prior expectations of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Arab Spring

The terrorist organization saw a perfect opportunity for enlarging its influence in the territory of the two states when the bomb of dissatisfaction exploded in Algeria and Tunisia. That

¹ "Scores hurt in Algeria protests. At least 53 injured and 29 others arrested as police clash with youth during housing rallies in Algeria". *Al Jazeera*, 30 December 2010. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010123012345588575.html>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

² Essentially, the Algerian cabinet was not responsible for lifting the price of elemental foodstuff. Fundamentally, the aim of the government was to eliminate the private sector that emerged and pullulated in the economy. That is why it introduced new decrees for controlling the commerce of the private-merchants. The merchants' respond was the rise of such basic and common goods like sugar, flour or olives. (Roberts, H. "Algeria's national 'protesta'". *Foreign Policy*, 10 January 2011. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/10/algerias-national-protesta/>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

³ Khadige, B. "Unrest eases in Algeria as prices drop". Middle East Online. 11 January 2011. <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=43557>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

⁴ Starting in 2003 Auichia lived with seven people in a room. Therefore, he asked to be placed on the waiting list of social flats. He committed his act after his request was denied. (Haddadi, A. "Algeria to Jail Self Immolators of the Arab Spring". *International Business Times*, 8 December 2011. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/algeria-jail-self-immolators-arab-spring-263710>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

⁵ "Algerian dies from self-immolation". *Al Jazeera*, 17 January 2011. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111162363063915.html>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

is why Abdelmalek Droukdel sent out two video messages in the beginning of January 2011. In a 13-minute record, the leader of the terrorists guaranteed his support for the Tunisian people against the *corrupt, criminal and tyrannical* regime, and for the introducing of the Sharia. About the Algerian events, he said it was “predictable, honourable and positive” and offered military support to overthrow President Bouteflika, as well as training volunteers for armed struggle.⁶ However, it was unequivocal that the jihadists’ actions were motivated not only by the fight against the hated regimes but against the *beau geste* declarations, as well. The extremists suffered considerable losses during the large-scale military offensive in the mountainous uplands of Sidi Ali Bounad in Kabylie in December 2010. This is why it was assumable that the AQIM tried to supply its losses from the demonstrators, exploiting the social disaffection. Above this, it tried to recruit young people who shared its ideology and some of them previously fought against the coalition forces in Iraq or with the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip. To their biggest disappointment, the AQIM’s messages had no influence among the demonstrators who grew up mostly on foreign TV channels and the Internet.⁷

As in the two Arab states, the terrorist organization was ready to align with the rebels in Libya, too, when the insurrection broke out against the Gaddafi-regime. However, in this case we can consider its declaration rather a verbal commitment than a concrete intention. The group, mainly operating in the Sahel region, Mali and Niger, was forced out from the country by the Libyan security forces and had little presence in the neighbouring Algeria either. The new, more extreme jihadist ethics also rendered recruitment more difficult and it made the youth who grew up in a secular mind to rethink their intention of accession. Finally, the importance of the Islamists’ message was also reduced because the mass-movements’ aim was essentially to overthrow the totalitarian regimes and establish democracy in these months rather than the creation of an Islamic state, propagated by the terrorists. Furthermore, it was questionable how many terrorists joined the fight against the government forces. After all, the declaration for support was ideal for Gaddafi’s propagandists to make connections between the AQIM and the insurgents, as well as to blame them for stirring up the rebellion.⁸

Although the AQIM did not succeed in obtaining the demonstrators’ sympathy in either of the countries, it had huge benefits due to the events of the Arab Spring. The border-security of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya collapsed and the effectiveness of the security services diminished considerably due to the disturbances. By that, the relations became more intensive with different drug and weapon cartels, as well as with terrorist groups, like the Nigerian Boko Haram, the Somali al-Shabab or the Yemeni Al-Qaida in

⁶ “Al-Qaeda supports the events in Tunisia and Algeria”. Ennahar Online. 14 January 2011. <http://www.ennaharonline.com/en/news/5541.html>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

⁷ Amine, A. and Arfaoui, J. “AQIM leader exploits Tunisia, Algeria unrest”. *Magharebia*, 13 January 2011. <http://archive.is/TfIK#selection-1227.0-1227.44>, Accessed on 06 June 2017.

⁸ Cruickshank, P. “Libya: An opportunity for al-Qaeda?” *CNN*, 25 February 2011. <https://web.archive.org/web/20110225053322/http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/25/libya.jihad/>, Accessed on 06 June 2017.

the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). Beyond this, it boosted the illegal drug⁹ and cigarette traffic, facilitated considerably the supply of the terrorist-organization with equipment, weapons and volunteers and it became more difficult to follow the financial support of the Saudi or Gulf founders. For instance, this was indicated by the fact that previously clashes had been regular between the Salafist rebels and the government forces in Algeria, especially in the northern mountainous Kabyl region. However, the Islamists suspended their attacks against the Algerian regime in the summer of 2011. Of course, it did not mean that the AQIM did not commit terror acts against western targets on the territory of Algeria's neighbouring countries. It regularly exercised kidnapping, one of their most significant source of income.¹⁰ They abducted three Western tourists from Timbuktu on 25 November, 2011 and published two photos on 9 December. On the pictures, there were two other French hostages who were also kidnapped in November.¹¹ On the other hand, several imprisoned religious extremists were freed from their custody due to the collapse of order. Many of them got in touch with the terrorists within a short time and joined them.¹²

Split in the AQIM

However, the ideological and ethnical differences deepened within the terrorist organization, which caused splits and the establishment of independent terror-groups. In this vein, the first event occurred in the middle of 2011 when the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) emerged. Officially, they justified this step by the claim that they

⁹ The South American drug cartels have begun transporting their goods through North Africa towards the European markets after the Arab Spring. The AQIM came in for the profit in return for the safe crossing of the Sahel region which they used to buy weapons and recruit volunteers. The United Nations Office for Drug Control estimated the quantity of cocaine at 35 tonnes that passed through the region in 2013. (Freeman, C. "Revealed: how Saharan caravans of cocaine help to fund al-Qaeda in terrorists' North African domain". *Daily Telegraph (London)*, 26 January 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9829099/Revealed-how-Saharan-caravans-of-cocaine-help-to-fund-al-Qaeda-in-terrorists-North-African-domain.html>, Accessed on 06 June 2017.

¹⁰ The European governments paid 44 million dollars to AQIM for ransom alone in the 2014 calendar year. (Callimachi, R. "Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror". *The New York Times*, 29 July 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html?_r=0, Accessed on 06 June 2017.

¹¹ AQIM abducted the Dutch Sjaak Rijke, the Swedish Jorge Gutafsson and the South African Malcolm McGrown on November 25, 2011. The fourth hostage, a German tourist was killed in the field after he denied cooperation. Rijke was rescued from captivity by French soldiers in the beginning of April 2015. One of the French prisoners, Philippe Verdon was killed by the terrorists in March 2013 as a revenge for French military intervention in Northern Mali. The other French prisoner, Serge Lazarevic was released by his guard on December 09, 2013 in exchange for four Islamist activists who were released by the Mali authorities. ("Al Qaeda Hostage Sjaak Rijke Freed by French Forces in Mali". *NBC News*, 6 April 2015. <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-hostage-sjaak-rijke-freed-french-forces-mali-n336406>, Accessed on 05 June 2017; Lazarevic, S. "Mali confirms militants freed for French hostage". *BBC News*, 12 December 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30450092>, Accessed on 06 June 2017; Leakey, B. "Al-Qaeda Media Arm to Answer Questions on Twitter". *Asharq al-Awsat*, 1 April 2013. <http://english.aawsat.com/2013/04/article55297531>, Accessed on 07 June 2017.

¹² Scheuer, M. F. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Using Crime to Advance Salafist Goals, Secure Safe Havens, and Acquire International Reach". Tribal Analysis Center, Williamsburg, January 2015. 9.

wanted to spread jihad into further regions of West Africa, that were not within the operational area of AQIM. However, the real cause of their separation was ethnical. Namely, most of the members of the AQIM's leadership were Algerian Arabs who did not have any kind of information about the tribal and traditional conditions in the southern Sahel region. That is why they kept back effaced the black-skinned members of the terror-organization who came from Mali and Mauritania in the lower ranks of the organization. They used them particularly to commit kidnappings and other crimes, in addition, they were also the connection between the AQIM and the Islamist militant groups operating in the territories of the Sahara.¹³ This opinion seemed to have been proven by a video in which the AQIM emphasized their ideological unity with Osama bin Laden or the Taliban leader Omar Mullah. At the same time, they put a greater emphasis on historical characters of West African origin.¹⁴ It should also be noted that while the group seemed to become independent from the AQIM due to the previously mentioned factors, there were many figures in its leadership who had previously occupied key positions within the AQIM, like Oumar Ould Hamaha, who planned the AQIM's kidnappings, or Khalid al-Barnawi, who fought under Mokhtar Belmokhtar's leadership in Mauritania and Algeria in the mid-2000s, and participated in many kidnappings in Nigeria. Another group, the Ansar Dine announced its establishment and its split from Boko Haram on January 26, 2012.¹⁵

The splits and the emergence of new groups augmented further the personal conflicts within the AQIM's leadership. The conflict deepened particularly between Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel and one of his senior leaders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar due to the geographical distance, their different opinion about the jihadist doctrine and personal ambitions.¹⁶ Finally, their rivalry resulted in Belmokhtar's extrusion from AQIM's leadership by Droukdel. In reply, Belmokhtar and all of the fighters under his command broke with the AQIM and formed a new group in December. The group, known variously as the Signed-in-Blood Battalion, the Masked Men Brigade and the Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade, identified itself as the trans-Saharan franchise of al-Qaeda and it promised attacks against Western interests if their governments encroached against jihadists in Northern Mali.¹⁷

¹³ George, W. L. "Mali's irrevocable crisis". *Al Jazeera*, 16 April 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241572956363410.html>, Accessed on 07 June 2017.

¹⁴ "New Qaeda spin-off threatens West Africa". *Ahram Online*, 22 December 2011. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/29968/World/International/New-Qaeda-spinoff-threatens-West-Africa.aspx>, Accessed on 07 June 2017.

¹⁵ Finally, the hostage-drama ended unluckily in Sokoto on March 08, 2012. In pursuance of the issued command, the guards killed both of the hostages when the soldiers of the British Special Forces invested their accommodation. The German engineer also lost his life during the rescue in May 2012 who was kidnapped from Kano two months earlier. Al-Andalus, AQIM's official media channel, took responsibility for the action. (Zenn, J. "Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru after the Mali Intervention". *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, March 27, 2013. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/cooperation-or-competition-boko-haram-and-ansaru-after-the-mali-intervention>, Accessed on 08 June 2017.

¹⁶ Droukdel found Belmokhtar's growing popularity and prestige too dangerous from the point of view of his power. According to a former jihadist, at one point he tried to assassinate him.

¹⁷ Cruickshank, P. "Algeria gas facility attack fuels jihadist rivalry". *CNN*, 30 January 2013. <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/30/algeria-gas-facility-attack-fuels-jihadist-rivalry/>, Accessed on 08 June 2017; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar". *BBC News*, 15 June 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21061480>, Accessed on 09 June 2017.

In a short time, Belmokhtar gave proof of keeping his influence/effectiveness despite his secession from AQIM and it would be a huge mistake to consider his promise an empty threat. His fighters occupied the Tigantourine gas facility near the Eastern Algerian In Amenas under the command of one of his senior lieutenants, Abdul al-Nigeri on January 16, 2013 where they took more than 800 workers hostage. Finally, the four-day hostage-drama claimed at least 39 foreign workers' and an Algerian security guard's lives. Only three jihadists were captured and the other 29 militants died in the armed clash with the Algerian security forces.¹⁸ Belmokhtar was also considered to be the mastermind of two suicide assassinations in Niger four months later. In cooperation with MUJAO, the jihadists left their Libyan bases and carried out aligned attacks against a military base in Agadez, as well as a French-property and -run uranium mine in Arlit. The attacks were carried out by the same method and equipment to those in the Algerian gas facility case. However, there was an exception because here the terrorists also used explosives, deployed on a vehicle and put into operation by a person who blew himself up. The attacks, which demanded at least 21 casualties in addition to the terrorists themselves, wanted to take revenge for the French–Nigerien cooperation and the military involvement in Northern Mali.¹⁹ Although the attacks of the two terrorist groups were important, these still could not challenge the AQIM's primacy in the area. That is why the jihadists decided to unite their power and officially announced their fusion in August after several months of close cooperation. The new jihadist movement, named al-Murabitoun (*The Sentinels*), wanted to step up as the AQIM's rival at its emergence, and wanted to claim the right to unify the Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic in the jihad against the West.²⁰ Without doubt, the experiences gained in Mali, had a considerable influence on the emergence of the union and the declared aims.

The Tuareg Revolt in Northern Mali

Mali became independent in 1960. However, the ethnical differences – besides economic and social problems – have caused serious troubles since the beginning. It was mainly the Tuaregs living in the Northern part of the country and dealing with stock-raising, as well as commerce, who meant a revolving neuralgic point for the central government. The desire for independence was always strong in the Tuaregs, who are a nomadic Berber ethnic group, especially since the government neglected the area called Azawad, inhabited by them, both politically and economically. There were also other aggravating circumstances, e.g. the drought, returning regularly, or the Southern soldiers' brutal military presence. These reasons led to several outbreaks of armed rebellions suppressed every time until the 1990s.

As a consequence of the serious droughts, many young Tuaregs emigrated from Mali and Niger to Libya and Algeria in the late 1970s. Gaddafi took them under his wings in

¹⁸ "Algeria details the deaths at In Amenas siege". *Euronews*, 21 January 2013. <http://www.euronews.com/2013/01/21/algeria-details-the-deaths-at-in-amenas-siege/>, Accessed on 10 June 2017.

¹⁹ "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger suicide bombs". *BBC News*, 24 May 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22654584>, Accessed on 10 June 2017.

²⁰ "Belmokhtar's militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao". *BBC News*, 22 August 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23796920>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

Libya. They received military training and were enlisted in his regular army or in the Islamic Legion, sponsored by him. The members of the latter fought on the Lebanese, Palestinian or Afghan fronts where they gained valuable military experiences. However, they were also active politically and formed the Liberation Movement of the Northern Region of Mali and Niger in addition to the armed struggle. The cooperation did not prove to be long lived and the Mali members of the movement seceded as the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (MPLA) under the leadership of Iyad ag Ghali with Gaddafi's support. The serious economic crisis evolving in Algeria and Libya at the same time, however, made the Tuaregs leave their host countries. Since these frustrated veterans had no alternative, they returned to their homes in the summer of 1990 where they unleashed an anti-governmental armed rebellion.²¹

The Bamako cabinet signed a peace agreement with the MPLA in 1991, which resulted in a split within the movement. The hardliners seceded and continued their fight as the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad until 1994. Next year they joined the peace-process that led to the suspension of hostilities. However, the conflict was not managed successfully, and the Bamako government often disregarded the contract with the Tuaregs and the northern regions remained neglected. Discontent among the Tuareg fighters enlisted in the army was growing from the end of the 1990s, leading to the outbreak of another rebellion in 2007 that lasted two years.²²

The Bamako government did not learn from its mistakes and it was lagging behind with its promises. Therefore, the collapse of Gadhafi's regime was consequential for Mali when the Tuareg mercenaries from the Libyan army returned to their state. They formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) organization on October 16, 2011, which, in spite of their previous experiences and secular nature, tended to align with Islamist groups. Due to their military and political power, the Tuaregs provided an attractive perspective for such terrorist groups in Mali like the Ansar Dine or the AQIM. They did not hesitate utilizing this when the rebellion broke out in January 2012.

The fighters of the MNLA launched attacks to secede Mali's three northern regions on January 16–17, 2012. The fights were going on mainly for the towns of Ménaka, Aguelhok and Tessalit in the second half of the month and they changed hands several times.²³ However, the Mali army became gradually exhausted in the clashes with MNLA forces due to its poor training, equipment, desertions as well as the growing number of casualties. Aguelhok fell on January 24 when its garrison ran out of ammunition. 82 prisoners of war and civilians were executed on the next day, which drew the international attention to the AQIM's participation in the conflict for the first time.²⁴ The MNLA continued its advance and attacked Kidal, the centre of the governorate on 6 February.²⁵ It seized Tessali,

²¹ "Backgrounder: Situation in Mali". Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 05 June 2012. <https://uppsalaconflictdataprogram.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/backgrounder-situation-in-mali/>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

²² "Mali". Uppsala Conflict Data Program. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=103®ion-Select=1-Northern_Africa#, Accessed on 01 June 2017.

²³ Stewart, S. "Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya". STRATFOR Global Intelligence. 02 February 2012. <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya>, Accessed on 10 June 2017.

²⁴ According to local residents, the mass-execution was carried out by the AQIM's activists when MNLA's fighters left the town ad interim. (Keenan, J. "Mali's Tuareg rebellion: What next?" *Al Jazeera*, 20 March 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123208133276463.html>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

²⁵ "Tuareg rebels attack Mali town of Kidal". *Al Jazeera*, 06 February 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/02/20122416445129368.html>, Accessed on 10 June 2017.

Dire and Goundam practically without resistance in the middle of March and its vanguard approached Timbuktu to a distance of 135 kilometres.²⁶

The coup d'état by the Mali soldiers, frustrated by the continuous defeats, led by Captain Amadou Sanago on 22 March, had a profound impact on the later process. The military junta suspended the constitution and wanted to act as an interim government under the title of the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State stepping into the place of the overthrown President Touré.²⁷ Nevertheless, the international community unanimously denied the recognition of the new leadership and in their critical situation the governmental forces became divided anyway. The soldiers left their positions and the MNLA occupied the vacated northern garrisons and towns one after the other. Kidal and Gao also fell in the end of March and Timbuktu capitulated in the face of the Tuareg forces on 1 April.²⁸ The MNLA declared the secession of the occupied territories from Mali on 6 April. However, neither the African Union nor the European Union recognized the independence of Azawad.²⁹

The AQIM and the Azawad Conflict

The government in Bamako associated the MNLA with the AQIM when the Tuareg rebellion broke out, but it could not prove that in the beginning.³⁰ However, it was clear from the outset that Ansar Dine (*Defenders of the Faith*), following the MNLA's example, was in close communication with the AQIM. This was confirmed by the fact that Iyad ag Ghali, leader of Ansar Dine, was the cousin of the AQIM commander Hamada Ag Hama who was killed in May 2015. According to different reports, the former supplied the rebels with weapons, as well as actively accompanied his men into action in the beginning of 2012.³¹

Ansar Dine extended its authority over many villages next to Kidal and Timbuktu where it began to introduce the Sharia (Islamic law) after the collapse of the government forces. According to the local inhabitants, the AQIM's fighters appeared daily in these occupied settlements and three high-ranking AQIM leaders (Abou Zeid, Belmokhtar and Yahya Abou al-Hammam) came to negotiate with Iyad ag Ghali in Timbuktu on 2 April, the day following the occupation of the city. Abou Zeid and al-Hammam put up their headquarters in the city and the latter was appointed commander of the Islamist troops in the city after

²⁶ "Mauritania denies collusion as Mali rebels advance". *Reuters Africa*, 14 March 2012. <http://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFL5E8EE7LD20120314?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>, Accessed on 09 June 2017.

²⁷ "Renegade Mali soldiers declare immediate curfew". *Reuters Africa*, 22 March 2014. <http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL6E8EM04O20120322>, Accessed on 9 June 2017.

²⁸ "Mali Tuareg rebels control Timbuktu as troops flee". *BBC News*, 02 April 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17576725>, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

²⁹ "Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north". *BBC News*, 06 April 2012. <http://www.webcitation.org/6AGfVdHeO>, Accessed on 7 June 2017.

³⁰ Stewart, S. "Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya". STRATFOR Global Intelligence. 02 February 2012. <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya>, Accessed on 2 June 2017.

³¹ "Islamist fighters call for Sharia law in Mali". *Vanguard*, 13 March 2012. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/03/islamist-fighters-call-for-sharia-law-in-mali/>, Accessed on 10 June 2017.

the talks.³² The joining of the two terror-organizations was also reflected by the fact that Sanda Ould Boumama, the spokesman of Ansar Dine, had been the member of the AQIM as well as, presumably, its predecessor organization, the GSPC.³³

At the same time, the extreme interpretation of the Sharia and its daily implementation estranged many civilians from the Islamists. Many inhabitants were shocked by the prohibition of video games, Mali and Western music or playing football without any kind of a transition period.³⁴ Bars were closed and several alcohol-serving establishments ransacked in Gao and Kidal.³⁵ Women were obliged to wear headscarves, although the Islamists disregarded their own regulations when they kidnapped and raped many of them.³⁶ The tensions grew so fast between the population and the Islamists that Droukdel himself condemned jihadist fighters for the quick implementation of the Sharia in his letter on 20 July.³⁷ In the meantime, the extreme actions continued. For example, a couple was stoned to death in Aguelhok on 29 July, because their children were born outside marriage.³⁸ At another occasion, the Islamists chopped off an alleged thief's hand in Ansogo, despite the crowd asking mercy for him.³⁹

The application of the Sharia also resulted in conflicts within the winning coalition. Namely, the MNLA stood on a nationalist basis from the beginning and its aim was to establish a democratic regime. It distanced itself from Islamist groups when the extremists began enforcing the Sharia. The conflict deepened more due to the Islamists' actions that risked foreign intervention and the breakdown of the newly declared Azawad State.⁴⁰

³² LWJ Staff. "Al Qaeda affiliate and Turaeg rebels merge, create breakaway state in Mali". *The Long War Journal*, 28 May 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/05/turaeg_rebels_and_al.php, Accessed on 9 June 2017.

³³ Lebovich, A. "Primer on Jihadi Players in Algeria & Mali". *Al-Wasat*, 23 January 2013. <https://thewasat.wordpress.com/tag/aqim/>, Accessed on 1 June 2017.

³⁴ "Islamists block first Mali aid convoy to Timbuktu". *Reuters*, 15 May 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/mali-idUSL5E8GFF1220120515>, Accessed on 3 June 2017.

³⁵ "Mali: Timbuktu heritage may be threatened, Unesco says". *BBC News*, 3 April 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17596831>, Accessed on 4 June 2017.

³⁶ Daniel, S. "Mali junta denounces 'rights violations' by rebels". *AFP*, 05 April 2012. <https://sg.news.yahoo.com/mali-islamist-advance-alarms-world-leaders-094810821.html>, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

³⁷ Droukdel also argued against the destruction of shrines in his letter because it could provoke Western governments to intervene in Mali according to his opinion. However, his expostulation proved to be useless, just like his other advices. He could not refrain religious extremists from devastating, as well as destroying more Sunni cemeteries and mausoleums. ("Mali al-Qaeda's Sahara Playbook". *Associates Press*, 20 July 2012. http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-Qaeda-manifesto.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁸ According to reports, several inhabitants from the city fled to Algeria after the execution. (Nossiter, A. "Islamists in North Mali Stone Couple to Death". *The New York Times*, 30 July 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/world/africa/couple-stoned-to-death-by-islamists-in-mali.html?_r=0, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

³⁹ "Mali 'thief's' hand amputated by Islamists in Ansongo". *BBC News*, 09 August 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-1919598>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁴⁰ In foreign policy, the queasiest precedent occurred when armed Islamists stormed the building of Algerian consulate in Gao and kidnapped the consul with his six associates on April 5, 2015. Finally, the hostage-crisis ended without violence and the prisoners were freed. ("Mali coup: Islamists kidnap Algerian diplomats". *The Telegraph*, 05 April 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9189810/Mali-coup-Islamists-kidnap-Algerian-diplomats.html>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

The Jihadists successfully gained the support of the anti-Tuareg forces as the tension increased. They seized control of Gao in the end of June with the support of the MNLA-opposition which led to the outbreak of an all-out combat between the warring sides.⁴¹ The MNLA has done everything to regain its lost position, unsuccessfully. The Islamists and their allies occupied practically all important MNLA fortresses in the North within months. Fighters of the MOJWA and the AQIM also captured Ménaka in a fierce battle on 19 November, therefore, the remaining men of the MNLA had to withdraw to the mountains.⁴² The MNLA had no choice but to begin peace negotiations with the Mali Government in December, when it gave up the demand of independence for Azawad and asked for the establishment of an autonomous Tuareg regional government instead.⁴³ Hostilities were ended by a cease-fire and the negotiating sides became virtually allies after the French intervention, which had taken place a month before.

Following the capture of the strategically important town of Konna by the Islamists, Paris launched Operation Serval upon a UN authorization to expel the extremists and to stabilize the region.⁴⁴ The Jihadists' advance stopped under the strikes of the French Air Force and their spectacular roll back started due to the advance of the Mali Government Forces and the French special corps. Due to their serials of defeats, the population rebelled against them in several towns and the angry mob lynched many Jihadists.⁴⁵ Therefore, the extremists began to evacuate the settlements and withdrew to the mountainous and well-defendable Kidal region near the Algerian border.⁴⁶ Their situation further worsened when certain groups broke ties with them and deserted to join the MNLA. The soldiers, who had left previously in the hope of gaining wealth, also returned to the MNLA. Finally, with the loss of Tessali near the Algerian border on 8 February their military defeat became complete.⁴⁷

⁴¹ "Mali: Islamists seize Gao from Tuareg rebels". *BBC News*, 28 June 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18610618>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁴² Daniel, S. "North Mali clashes kill dozens, some unarmed: source". *AFP*, 20 November 2012. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=50ac78ab5>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

⁴³ "Tuareg rebels ready to help French forces in Mali". *Al Arabiya News*, 14 January 2013. <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/14/260337.html>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁴⁴ Felix, B. and Labbé, Ch. "France bombs Islamist strongholds in north Mali". *Reuters*, 13 January 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/14/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90912Q20130114#gCKjWewkctTzXUV.97>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁴⁵ "Residents in northern Malian town lynch Islamist: sources". *Reuters*, 19 January 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/19/us-mali-crisis-lynching-idUSBRE90I0IM20130119#vIgi5PVWQig5zBGv.97>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁴⁶ Daniel, S. "Malian, French troops patrol as powers offer aid". *Modern Ghana*, 20 January 2013. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/440478/1/malian-french-troops-patrol-as-powers-offer-aid.html>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁴⁷ "Mali conflict: 'First suicide bombing' in Gao". *BBC News*, 08 February 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21381379>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The Re-emergence of the AQIM and its Allies

A considerable part of the AQIM's fighters sought refuge in the neighbouring and mountainous Southwest Libya after the intervention of the French and Western African armed forces where they succeeded in replacing their lost equipment as well as refilling their ranks with local discontented Tuaregs. According to Western opinion every condition was given in their training-camps to take back the positions after the French departure that they had lost in Mali just a year before.⁴⁸

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the presence of the AQIM and the allied Islamist groups had never been completely eliminated in Mali. The survivors withdrew to difficult-to-access and well-defended hideouts where they reorganized their ranks. Despite the undoubtedly credible results achieved under French leadership, they executed several attempts against UN forces stationed there to force them to leave the region. The AQIM's activity often resembled guerrilla-warfare: suicide attempts against military, government and civilian targets, assassinations, surprise raids, explosive devices as well as launching rockets and mortar fires. Foreign forces suffered considerable losses in addition to the permanent uncertainty and threat due to the Jihadists' unexpected actions that used the *hit-and-run* tactic perfectly. The situation worsened when the separatist forces terminated the June ceasefire unilaterally in the end of November 2013. The AQIM militants became more active when they saw the failure of peace-making attempts between the rebels and government forces. The Sahel region proved to be a perfect field for this with its huge and open areas. The terrorist-convoys could pass through the desert without any trouble due to the weak governance and easily permeable borders. They could renew their stock of weapons with thousands of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, RPG's, anti-tank mines, small arms, truck-mounted heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft artilleries as well as the necessary ammunition with the help of some 300 fighters operating in the southern part of Libya.⁴⁹ The terrorists claimed responsibility for the attacks against United Nation MINUSMA vehicles at Goundam and near Timbuktu in June, they launched Grad rockets at Timbuktu Airport on 12 July, as well as they committed a suicide attack in Berb on 16 August that demanded the lives of two soldiers from Burkina Faso. The detonation also burst one of the trucks in a military convoy, carrying Chadian soldiers, on 2 September. Four peacekeepers died and 15 others got wounded in this attack.⁵⁰ Another Senegalese peacekeeper lost his life on 7 October when a rocket hit the joint French–UN military garrison near Kidal.

Finally, the Libyan events as well as the internal developments made France renew its anti-terrorist operations in West Africa in July 2014. Paris set up a military base in Northern Niger to control smuggling and commerce routes in the Sahel–Sahara areas. France placed about three thousand soldiers in this garrison who then carried out missions against

⁴⁸ Schemm, P. "Al-Qaeda gather strength in the desert after Mali defeat". *Mail & Guardian*, 19 January 2014. <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-01-19-al-qaeda-gather-strength-in-the-desert-after-mali-defeat>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁴⁹ Wood, D. "Libyan Weapons Arming Al-Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say". *The Huffington Post*, 20 February 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁵⁰ Gueye, B. "Mali: Al-Qaeda Claims Mali Peacekeeper Attacks". *All Africa*, 3 September 2014. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201409040336.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

Islamist militants on the soil of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. However, the achieved results could only disable at best the functioning of the terrorist groups ad interim.⁵¹ Three peacekeepers got injured when their vehicle was hit by a mine on 28 May 2015.⁵² Ansar Dine carried out two different attacks in the Central and Southern part of Mali on 28 June, 2015. The militants attacked government buildings as well as the local Malian military camp in Nara and occupied the little village Fakola for a short time. The AQIM raided on a MINUSMA convoy with small arms and RPG's at Goundam four days later. The militants managed to destroy two vehicles in the videotaped and later publicized ambush that killed six *blue helmets* and wounded at least five others.⁵³

Altogether, the terror-attacks demanded the lives of more than 50 peacekeepers between 2013 and 2015, so the service in Mali became practically one of the most dangerous UN missions.

Conclusion

No doubt, the AQIM and its affiliates suffered a considerable defeat in Mali. However, this had an ad interim impact on its activities. According to U.S. State Department estimates, about a hundred AQIM activists were operating again in Algeria in 2014 alone. Besides, hundreds of soldiers were active in the Sahel region, including areas in Chad, Mali and Mauritania. It also has cells in Libya, Nigeria and Tunisia.⁵⁴ In the latter, it clearly demonstrated its presence on 27 May, 2014 when it killed four policemen defending the home of Tunisia's Minister of the Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou.⁵⁵

Algeria also increased its security measures and strengthened its border guard by ten thousand soldiers in the areas neighbouring the Sahel-region, Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. This was partly to prevent smugglers, but mostly to stop any eventual spill-

⁵¹ For instance, French forces captured and later annihilated one of AQIM's convoys in Niger on October 10, 2014. The aim of the convoy was to transport weapons from Libya to Mali. (Irish, J. "French forces launch raid in Niger against al Qaeda units". *Reuters*, 10 October 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/us-sahel-france-idUSKCN0HZ1IW20141010#Lug0osvLXMz63Kwc.97>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁵² "UPDATE 1-Blast wounds 3 peacekeepers in UN Mali commander's convoy". *Reuters Africa*, 28 May 2015. <http://af.reuters.com/article/djiboutiNews/idAFL5N0YJ4QK20150528>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁵³ Weiss, C. "AQIM attack on UN convoy near Timbuktu kills 6 peacekeepers". *The Long War Journal*, 2 July 2015. <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/attack-on-un-convoy-near-timbuktu-kills-6-peacekeepers.php>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁵⁴ Laub, Z. and Masters, J. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)". CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations. 27 March 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghrb-aqim/p12717>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁵⁵ "Al-Qaeda claims recent attack on Tunisian minister's home". *Al-Arabiya News*, 13 June 2014. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/06/13/Al-Qaeda-claims-recent-attack-on-Tunisian-minister-s-home-.html>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

over of the anarchical situation evolving in Libya, especially after the Islamic State occupied the Libyan Sirte city on May 29, 2014, and the recurrence of armed clashes in Mali.⁵⁶

Algeria also increased its cooperation with Tunisia in the war against terrorism around the highland of Mount Chambee.⁵⁷ Despite the successful operations of the Algerian security forces, the AQIM proved several times that it is far from declining, as it was stated by the Algerian military and government circles. The AQIM could make up for the loss of more than two hundred men in 2014 and the first half of 2015 and it was also capable to carry out successful raids against the armed corps. The terror organization is held responsible for the assassination of two in the beginning of June 2015. A roadside bomb killed an Algerian army colonel and wounded two other persons.⁵⁸ The terrorists attacked again six weeks later. The ambush took place in the wooded region of Ain Defla against a military convoy during the night of 17 July. The Algerian soldiers were travelling to celebrate the end of Ramadan when the attack happened and at least eleven of them were killed.⁵⁹

It is assumed that the prestige of the AQIM leadership hiding in the mountainous area called *Death Triangle* grew among the local population following the Jihadist military victories, and this is the reason why the rival Islamic State could not gain a footing in the country.⁶⁰ During the military operations against the Soldiers of the Caliphate,⁶¹ which had split from the AQIM and pledged alliance to the Islamic State, the Algerian security forces hit severe blows to the group several times from October 2014 onwards and killed its leader, Abdelmalek Gouri.⁶² Nevertheless, the AQIM can continue its determined private war with its considerable sources of income against the Algerian armed forces in the future.

⁵⁶ The resolution of Algeria was shown perfectly when nearly 100,000 men, about a third of the whole army forces, patrolled on the concerned border sectors after the announcement of the decision. The introduction of these measures was also motivated by the fact that this time 500–600 AQIM activists operated in four different regions in Algeria according to Algerian security services. (Matarese, M. “Belmokhtar’s killing would be major blow for AQIM”. *Middle East Eye*, 19 June 2015. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/belmokhtars-killing-would-be-major-blow-aqim-307574809>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁵⁷ The success of the campaign against smugglers was perfectly shown by the fact the security forces arrested 650 suspected persons between April and the middle of May, 2015. According to the report of the Ministry of Defence, the seized prize were two mortars, two rocket launchers, 45 rockets, as well as 225 kilograms of explosives and landmines during the same period. (Chikhi, L. “Wary of disorder in Libya and Mali, Algerian army targets southern smuggling”. *Reuters*, 11 May 2015. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/11/uk-algeria-security-idUKKBN0NWICP20150511>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

⁵⁸ “Al Qaeda’s North African wing claims two Algerian attacks”. *Reuters*, 07 June 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/07/us-algeria-security-idUSKBN0ON0QL20150607>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

⁵⁹ “Algerian soldiers killed in suspected Islamist attack”. *France 24*, 18 July 2015. <http://www.france24.com/en/20150718-algerian-soldiers-killed-ambush-suspected-islamists>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁶⁰ Sheikh Abu Abdullah Osman al-Assimi, a leader judge of the AQIM’s consultative council, pledged alliance to the Islamic State in the beginning of July, 2014. His act abashed the terror-organization’s leadership in an extreme imbroglio.

⁶¹ The Soldiers of the Caliphate (Jund al-Khilafah) announced its establishment under the leadership of former AQIM-leader, Khaled Abu Suleiman on September 14, 2014.

⁶² Recently, the Algerian security forces swooped down upon the terrorists in the Boukram Forest, about 20 kilometres far from Alger on May 20, 2015. Actually, the terrorists prepared an attack against the capital in the moment of the raid. 21 jihadists were killed and two others were captured during the action. The new leader of the terrorist-group also lost his life in the clash of arms. (“Algerian forces kill ‘21 ISIL-linked fighters’”. *Al Jazeera*, 20 May 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/algerian-forces-kill-21-isil-linked-fighters-150520031043192.html>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

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The Border Dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, c. 1998–2016

Luca Puddu

Abstract

The unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea displays its effects well beyond their bilateral relationship, affecting the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Since 2000, the two countries have repeatedly hosted opposition movements struggling to topple the government of the counterpart and engaged in proxy wars in Somalia through financial and military support of Islamic movements and warlord militias. Moreover, the deterioration of the Eritrean economy and the Eritrean government's decision to introduce mandatory military service without time limit for all citizens between 18 and 40 in reaction to the persistent occupation of the Eritrean motherland by Ethiopia ignited an unprecedented migratory flow of Eritrean youth towards the Italian shores of Europe, as proof of the globalized nature of an apparently local conflict between two African states.

Keywords: *Eritrea, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Badme, war*

On 6 May 1998 an Eritrean mechanized division entered Badme, a village along the poorly-demarcated international boundary with Ethiopia, in reaction to the occupation of the settlement by an Ethiopian police detachment. The two parties started discussions on where the exact location of the border was and then engaged in what apparently seemed to be a minor border skirmish. One week later, the armies of the two countries were launching one of the major conventional wars on the African continent in the 20th century, a trench warfare that would leave behind tens of thousands of casualties. On 12 December 2000, following Ethiopia's successful invasion of Eritrean territory after two years of substantial stalemate, the Algiers Peace Agreement formally sanctioned the end of the conflict, the establishment of a demilitarized zone patrolled by a United Nations peacekeeping force and the submission of the territorial dispute to an international court of arbitration. The ruling of the court assigned the contested village of Badme to Eritrea, which immediately called for evacuation of the area by the Ethiopian army and the beginning of boundary demarcation operations. The Ethiopian Government, however, argued that it would accept the ruling in principle, but only with the condition that border demarcation operations were preceded by negotiations over broader political and economic issues aimed at normalizing the relations between the two countries. Diplomatic stalemate favoured the consolidation of what has

been termed as a *no-war–no-peace* situation: still nowadays, thousands of soldiers are deployed on both sides of the border and periodically engage in deadly battles with hundreds of casualties, such as the skirmishes that took place in 2012, 2015 and 2016.

The unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea displays its effects well beyond their bilateral relationship, affecting the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Since 2000, the two countries have repeatedly hosted opposition movements struggling to topple the government of the counterpart and engaged in proxy wars in Somalia through financial and military support of Islamic movements and warlord militias. Moreover, the deterioration of the Eritrean economy and the Eritrean government's decision to introduce mandatory military service without time limit for all citizens between 18 and 40 in reaction to the persistent occupation of the Eritrean *motherland* by Ethiopia ignited an unprecedented migratory flow of Eritrean youth towards the Italian shores of Europe, as proof of the globalized nature of an apparently local conflict between two African states.

The Root Causes of the Conflict

At first sight, the controversy between Ethiopia and Eritrea might be framed as one of the many border disputes that affect the African continent, where poor colonial boundary demarcations have often favoured the emergence of diplomatic rows between neighbouring countries eager to assert control over resource-rich contested borderlands.¹ The history of Badme and its surrounding is nonetheless paradigmatic of the complexity of a stalemate in that it is not only about the boundary *per se*, but has its roots in the liberation struggle undertaken against the DERG between 1975 and 1991 by the two armed movements – the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) – that would later become the undisputed rulers of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Badme was an isolated frontier outpost along the boundary between the northern Ethiopian province of Tigray and the former Italian colony of Eritrea, which was federated to the Ethiopian Empire in 1953 and then annexed as a province in 1962. Starting in the early 1950s, the area was gradually repopulated by Tigrayans who occupied the fertile plains so far inhabited by another ethnic group – the Cunama – and turned them into a major agricultural district.² During the liberation struggle against the DERG, the TPLF periodically clashed with the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) over the control of Badme, whose remoteness made it an ideal place for recruitment of *liberation fighters* and relief from counter-insurgency operations.³ After the successful joint offensive conducted against the ELF by the TPLF and the other major Eritrean armed movement, the EPLF, the TPLF raised again the issue of boundary demarcation, claiming sovereignty over the village and its surrounding on the grounds of the ethnic origin of its inhabitants. The EPLF on its part decided to leave the administration of the area to the TPLF and postpone negotiations until

¹ Okumu, W. "Resources and Border Disputes in East Africa". *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4/2. 2010. 279–97.

² Gilkes, P. and Plaut, M. "Violence and Identity along the Eritrean–Ethiopian Border". In Jacquín-Berdal, D. and Plaut, M. (eds), *Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War*. Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2004.

³ Triulzi, A. "Badme: conflitto di confine, conflitto di memorie". In Carcangiu, B. M. and Negash, T. (eds), *L'Africa Orientale Italiana nel Dibattito Storico Contemporaneo*. Roma: Carocci, 2007.

the war against the Ethiopian government was over, in order not to open another front of conflict.⁴ At independence, once the EPLF had become the ruling party under the name People Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) the border issue resurfaced again. The official position of the PFDJ was that Eritrea's boundary corresponded to the international borders of the former Italian colony of Eritrea as sanctioned by the international agreements signed in 1900, 1902 and 1908 between Italy, Ethiopia, Great Britain and France, and reiterated the same argument during negotiations with the TPLF-led Ethiopian People's Republic Democratic Front (EPRDF), the multi-ethnic coalition that took power in Ethiopia after the fall of the DERG. Bilateral discussions within the framework of the joint boundary commission were nonetheless rapidly overcome by events on the ground, since the second meeting of the commission took place in correspondence with the first exchange of fire between Eritrean and Ethiopian troops around Badme.⁵

In very general terms, the official position advanced by Eritrea and Ethiopia before and after the 1998–2000 war reflects two different strategies of border diplomacy: 1. Asmara embraced the legalistic view enshrined in the Cairo Declaration of the Organization for the African Union, which reaffirmed the binding validity of colonial borders as the only internationally recognized boundaries of new post-colonial African polities; 2. Ethiopia, on its part, implicitly supported the principle of self-determination, that privileges the interests of the people inhabiting a specific territory and, consequently, the supremacy of effective occupation over the sanctity of international agreements. The Ethiopian position has been coherent with the diplomatic strategy pursued by previous Ethiopian governments in the last sixty years in relation to other border disputes that had involved Djibouti, Somalia or Sudan. Addis Ababa did not deny in principle the validity of international treaties, but claimed the superior value of the principle of self-determination whenever the area was inhabited by highland settlers or friendly ethnic groups that acted as the vanguard of the Ethiopian state.⁶ The Eritrean government, on its part, had been encouraged to claim for respect of international treaties because of its weaker position on the ground, whereas the majority of the inhabitants of Badme privileged their Tigrayan identity in place of the Eritrean one.

The underlying reasons of the divergence between Ethiopia's and Eritrea's border diplomacy are also embedded in the different ideological background of the nation-building strategies pursued by the two armed movements that took power in Ethiopia and Eritrea after 1990. The legalistic position adopted by Asmara is somewhat linked to the national project advocated by the EPLF since the beginning of the armed struggle: "a rejection of everything that had come before, the carving of new regional identities (...) [that] disconnected Christian highlanders from the Christian Ethiopian Empire and Muslims from the Arab Islamic world and its culture".⁷ In spite of the official anti-colonial rhetoric of

⁴ Reid, R. "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observation on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-state War". *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 73, 2003. 369–401, 387.

⁵ Negash, T. and Tronvoll, K. *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war*. Oxford: James Currey, 2000.

⁶ Morone, A. "The unsettled Southern Ethiopia–Somali boundary on the eve of decolonization: political confrontation and human interactions in the Ogadeen Somali borderlands". *Northeast African Studies* 15/2. 2015. 93–116; Puddu, L. "Border diplomacy and state-building in north-western Ethiopia". *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 11/2. 2017. 230–248.

⁷ Reid. "Old Problems...". 390.

the contemporary Eritrean government, Italian colonialism might be considered the driving force behind the emergence of the Eritrean nation, since the country's territorial configuration and its right to exist are explicitly rooted in the establishment of the *colonia primogenita* and the international treaties signed in its name by Italian authorities.⁸ The TPLF's political agenda in this regard was more fluid because, at least in the beginning, the movement supported the independence of the Tigray nation, an imagined political entity that would include every people who speak Tigrinya. It was only in the later years of the armed struggle that the group turned to the principle of ethnic self-determination within the framework of a federal Ethiopian state composed of multiple nationalities.⁹ In this regard, scholars have argued how the TPLF's request for boundary demarcation during the armed struggle might have been at that time considered the first step towards the establishment of the envisaged Tigray nation-state.¹⁰ Not incidentally, perhaps, the Eritrean government and many sections of the Eritrean society largely perceived the 1998 war as a later attempt by Tigrayan nationalists to realize the dream of Greater Tigray through the annexation of Tigrinya speakers who lived in the central highlands of what Asmara deemed to be Eritrean territory.

The second reason behind the different diplomatic posture adopted by Ethiopia and Eritrea in relation to the border dispute is of an economic nature. The rise to power of the EPLF in Eritrea and the EPRDF coalition led by the TPLF in Ethiopia paved the way for a radical restructuring of the economic relationship between the Eritrean territory and its former Ethiopian metropolis. Eritrea's independence sanctioned the loss of direct access to the sea for Ethiopia, whose import–export trade was now dependent on the goodwill of two countries, namely Eritrea and Djibouti. Asmara was in an ideal position to benefit from this situation, since it could exploit its oligopolistic position to capture a large part of Ethiopia's import–export sector and embark on a *Singapore* development strategy. Not incidentally, the Eritrean president favoured the maintenance of free cross-border trade between the two countries, to the extent that he did not consider necessary to undertake any boundary demarcation and immediately agreed to grant duty free access through the ports of Assab and Massawa for Ethiopian import–export goods. In this regard, the Asmara Pact of September 1993 regulating bilateral economic relations was very favourable for Eritrea, since it envisaged a gradual integration of the two economies through harmonisation of exchange rate policies, import–export tariffs and investment regulations. Nevertheless, the agreement was implemented only in part, as the Ethiopian government opposed Eritrea's attempts to become the focal point for Ethiopia's import–export trade and placed restrictions on investments in the Ethiopian economy by Eritrean nationals.¹¹

The hostile attitude of Addis Ababa towards Eritrean business interests might be explained in light of the divergent economic policy envisaged by the EPRDF ruling coalition after 1991. Historically, the Ethiopian state developed along centripetal patterns that

⁸ Calchi Novati, G. P. "Colonialism as State-Maker in the History of the Horn of Africa: a Reassessment". In Ege, S., Aspen, H., Teferra, B. and Bekele, Sh. (eds), *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*. Trondheim: Department of Social Anthropology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2009.

⁹ Young, J. "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36/3. 1996. 105–120.

¹⁰ Reid. "Old Problems...". 383–4.

¹¹ Negash and Tronvoll. *Brothers at War...* 33.

promoted the concentration of political and economic power in the region surrounding the capital Addis Ababa, but the EPRDF was determined to change this trajectory of state building and encourage the development of the country's periphery. The TPLF – the dominant force within the EPRDF – was particularly eager to address financial resources towards the impoverished northern part of the country inhabited by ethnic Tigrayans. To this end, starting in 1995, it established a series of parastatal organizations under the umbrella of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), with the last objective of promoting an import-substitution strategy and the development of a local agro-industrial sector.¹² This economic strategy had the side effect of straining the relationship with Eritrea, because the protective measures in favour of Tigray's nascent industrial sector clashed with the market-oriented strategy envisioned by the Eritrean ruling class.¹³ Economic relations deteriorated further following the introduction of the Eritrean currency – the Nakfa – in 1997. The Ethiopian government reacted introducing a Letter of Credit system, which meant that cross-border trade would have been managed through hard currency, while Eritrea struggled to maintain an open trade policy and resisted attempts to enforce cross-border regulations. The basic issue at stake was that Ethiopia feared that Eritrea would exploit its own currency to gain control of Ethiopia's import–export, while Eritrea saw in Ethiopia's trade restriction the confirmation that the TPLF wanted to pursue a protectionist policy at the detriment of Eritrean business groups.¹⁴ To make matters worse, once Eritrea launched the Nakfa, the Ethiopian government reacted with a sudden and short-notice change of its banknotes that left Asmara with a disproportionate amount of worthless Ethiopian Birr in its treasury: a move that was perceived by Eritrean rulers as an act of economic warfare. When the conflict in Badme erupted for the first time, the two governments were already on the brink of war for reasons that had nothing to do with the territorial configuration of the international border.

The Domestic Dimensions of Stalemate

Often, inter-state border disputes are perceived as mere controversies between two monolithic actors, each one with its own voice and agenda, which struggles to assert control over a contested territory in the name of national sovereignty. When we look at reality on the ground, however, the picture usually turns out to be more complex. In case of the Ethiopia–Eritrea dispute, for instance, the controversy has not simply been shaped by the agenda of two distant central governments in charge of the defence of the country's territory, but has been affected by the behaviour of different levels of administration and the entrenched ideas within the two respective civil societies, as well. In a certain sense, the border dispute and the ensuing no-war–no-peace situation turned out to be an arena of

¹² Vaughan, S. and Gebremichael, M. *Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia: The Role of EFFORT, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray*. Research Report 02, Africa Power and Politics, 2011. <http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20110822-appp-rr02-rethinking-business-politics-in-ethiopia-by-sarah-vaughan-mesfin-gebremichael-august-2011>, Accessed on 10 September 2017.

¹³ "Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, Canonical ID: 09ADDISABABA1201-a". Wikileaks. 21 May 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ADDISABABA1201_a.html, Accessed on 15 April 2017.

¹⁴ Negash and Tronvoll. *Brothers at war...* 37–45.

negotiation between the various components of the Ethiopian and Eritrean society on an idea of the state that would better serve their own particularistic interests.¹⁵

Ethiopia

In case of Ethiopia, the political debate concerning the elaboration of the foreign policy towards Eritrea after 2000 is a litmus test of the coexistence of different concepts of statehood within the Ethiopian society. One striking example of this multiplicity of perspectives is provided by the early debate concerning the decision of Addis Ababa not to invade Asmara after having overrun the Eritrean defence line in 2000. Indeed, such decision was not unanimous, but stemmed out of a fierce dispute within the EPRDF itself: the hawks within the Ethiopian military and the TPLF suggested to advance towards Asmara and promote regime change, or at least take control of the port city of Assab in order to regain direct access to the sea, while the then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his comrades argued that Ethiopia should concentrate every effort on internal development without wasting the country's human and economic resources in an expensive war of attrition with the PFDJ. The Eritrean war thus became a site of confrontation between those who advocated return to the military tradition and territorial grandeur of imperial Ethiopia and those who were pushing for the creation of a revolutionary developmental state, focused on the fight against poverty within its national borders.¹⁶

Another harsh debate within the Ethiopian establishment rapidly surfaced after the end of the war, when Addis Ababa had to decide how to deal with the unfavourable ruling of the international court of arbitration that assigned Badme to Eritrean sovereignty. Indeed, the Ethiopian government initially reacted in a positive way to the verdict of the court, but later changed its mind when it became clear that Badme had been awarded to Eritrea. The decision of the central government to resist the verdict was the result of strong pressure on the part of those communities and lower levels of administration residing in the proximity of the international border, which were able to impose their own particular interests and make it coherent with the national interest of the country as a whole. The then President of the Tigray Regional State in 2003, Tsegaye Berhe, explicitly admitted that people at the frontier would never accept the court's decision, arguing that Ethiopia's compliance with the ruling would have weakened the legitimacy of the TPLF before its own electorate. A district official in the area around Badme went even further, arguing that "the people will never accept this, and they will fight for it".¹⁷ The position of the regional administration in Mekelle and in the frontier districts was somewhat natural, since the Tigray Regional State was necessarily more prone to meet the *desiderata* of its own constituencies not to cede *Tigrayan territory* to the enemy.

¹⁵ Haggmann, T. and Peclard, D. "Negotiating statehood: dynamics of power and domination in Africa". *Development and Change* 41/4. 2010. 539–562.

¹⁶ De Waal, A. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War, and the Business of Power*. Malden: Polity Press, 2015. 165–167.

¹⁷ "Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?" International Crisis Group. Africa Report 68. 24 September 2003. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-and-eritrea-war-or-peace>, Accessed on 18 November 2017.

The controversy over Badme also had the side effect of raising a public debate concerning the very legitimacy of Eritrea to stand as a sovereign entity of the international community: a debate that involved scholars, practitioners and policy makers from Ethiopia and the Western countries, as well.¹⁸ In an interview to an Amharic newspaper concerning Ethiopia's claims on Eritrean territory, a prominent Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewde, author of *A History of Modern Ethiopia* argued that "if history was to determine the fate of Ethiopia and Eritrea, they should never be separated".¹⁹ Bahru Zewde's statement reflected a widespread opinion among several Ethiopian intellectual circles: the argument that before the advent of Italian colonialism, the Eritrean highland territory was part of a tributary kingdom, the Mereb-Mellash, that historically fell under the influence of Ethiopian overlords and was ruled by the brother-in-law of Emperor Yohannes until the Italian invasion in 1889.²⁰ In the Ethiopian nationalistic discourse, this historical antecedent meant that Addis Ababa was right in claiming large parts of the Eritrean territory, since these claims were aimed at redressing a historical mistake, such as European colonialism. This argument was particularly strong among the nostalgics of the great imperial tradition, which framed Ethiopia as a political entity entrusted by God to rule the surrounding territories. In contrast to the principle of contemporary international law that recognizes the sanctity of colonial borders, the great imperial tradition incorporates the idea that any territory that was once ruled by Ethiopian Emperors is Ethiopian ad libitum, while any territorial change is unlawful and temporary in character.²¹

The federal government in Addis Ababa on its part exploited the ensuing no-war–no-peace situation to legitimize the closure of the political space and consolidate an authoritarian structure of control. Since 2002, Asmara has been blamed for being the grey eminence behind any political disturbance and armed insurgency, even when Eritrea's involvement was far from being ascertained. A case in point is provided by the large-scale manifestations that took place in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara in 2015 and 2016 against the results of the 2015 elections and the redrawing of administrative boundaries between the regional states. The shadow of a hostile foreign involvement in the organization of street protests justified restriction on political freedom, imprisonment of prominent opposition leaders and, since October 2016, the declaration of a state of emergency that remained in place for several years.

¹⁸ Reid, R. "The Challenge of the Past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea". *History in Africa* 28. 2001. 239–272.

¹⁹ Smidt, W. "History, Historical Arguments and the Ethio-Eritrean conflict: between xenophobic approaches and an ideology of unity". *Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 22. 2012. 103–120, 105.

²⁰ Nevertheless, it should be noted that this vassal entity was only a small part of the contemporary Eritrean territory, while large parts of the western and eastern lowlands inhabited by Muslim peoples were under the influence of local sultanates and, since the 16th century, of the Ottoman Empire. See Smidt. "History, Historical Arguments...". 110.

²¹ Smidt. "History, Historical Arguments...". 115.

Eritrea

In case of Eritrea, the decision to engage in a trench-style conventional war for a small piece of land with no particular economic value reflected the militaristic style of Eritrea's diplomacy since independence, which was marked by frequent recourse to military means to solve political disputes with neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Yemen and Djibouti. This approach was encouraged by the aura of invincibility that surrounded Eritrean soldiers after the liberation struggle against the much better funded and equipped Ethiopian army, and was subsequently reinforced by the successful performance of Eritrean commandos during the 1996 Congo war. The military setback inflicted by the Ethiopian army in 2000, when the Eritrean line of defence was overrun and Ethiopian soldiers entered deep into Eritrean territory, was a sort of cultural shock for the Eritrean ruling elite, with far reaching consequences for the ensuing relationship between state, economy and society.²² The end of bilateral trade with Addis Ababa and the vertical rise of military expenditure in relation to the GDP to keep pace with the neighbour's military spending also provoked a major setback for the Eritrean formal economy, which was gradually overshadowed by a shadow financial system controlled by the ruling elite and aimed at centralizing hard currency revenues. Public-owned companies became an instrument of the state to extend control over import–export trade and financial transfers from the Eritrean diaspora, which was the main provider of hard currency until the beginning of mining operations in 2012.²³

The no-war–no-peace situation authorized the Eritrean ruling elite to resist internal pressure for political reform through reproduction of an undefined state of exception that was justified by the existence of an immediate threat to the independence of the country. The repression of political dissent began in 2001 with the arrest and disappearance of several high-level PFDJ members who had called for implementation of the 1997 Constitution and restructuring of the single party system and the state. Prominent veterans of the liberation war such as Solomon Woldemariam and leaders of the university movement were imprisoned with the accusation of advancing the interest of bourgeois democracy before the supreme interest of the nation in time of peril, thereby marking a parallel between the continuation of a frozen war with Ethiopia and the suspension of the rule of law at home. Since then, political debate has been banned from the public sphere, individuals suspected of criticism to the ruling party being prosecuted with long periods of detention.²⁴ In this perspective, the conflict with Ethiopia has been instrumental in the consolidation of a siege mentality and creation of pervasive structures of control. Political opponents of different political and ethnic background were usually labelled as being the fifth column for Ethiopia and hostile

²² "Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Asmara, Canonical ID: 09ASMARA80-a." Wikileaks. 5 March 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ASMARA80_a.html, Accessed on 13 April 2017.

²³ United Nations Monitoring Group, Letter dated 11 July 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2012/545. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF-CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%20545.pdf>, Accessed on 25 June 2017.

²⁴ "Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea". Human Rights Watch, New York. 16 April 2009; Kibreab, G. *Eritrea: A Dream Deferred*. London: James Currey, 2009; "UN Inquiry Finds Crimes against Humanity in Eritrea". United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner. Geneva, 8 June 2016. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20067&LangID=E>, Accessed on 23 March 2017.

Western countries, while special courts under direct authority of the presidency have been set up in the name of defence of the nation.²⁵ Mistrust towards the international community has been reproduced through secondary school textbooks that describe how Eritrea suffered various forms of foreign imperialism – from Egypt to the Ottoman Empire, from Italy to Great Britain and Ethiopia – and was regularly betrayed by *the international community* in its multiple forms, be it the United Nations that blessed the incorporation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian Empire after the Second World War or contemporary Western powers which turned a blind eye on the misconduct of their Ethiopian ally following the ruling of the international court of arbitration.²⁶

Another consequence of the no-war–no-peace situation was the large-scale securitization of the Eritrean society through introduction of a compulsory military service that involved all strata of the society. The launch of the Warsay–Yekealo Development Campaign in 2002 eliminated the 18-month time limit for military service that was in place before 1998 and sanctioned that conscripts would stay under arms indefinitely or at least until the stand-off with Ethiopia was resolved.²⁷ National Service is perceived by Eritrean authorities as an instrument to promote economic development, social change and a common sense of belonging to the nation that would transcend ethnic and religious differences within Eritrean society. Conscripts are indoctrinated to the core values of *Eritrean-ness* as envisaged by the EPLDF during the liberation struggle, which consists of hard work, perseverance, self-reliance and discipline. Nevertheless, large scale recruitment and the pervasive presence of the military in everyday life had the side effect of giving an unprecedented power to high-level military officers over the Eritrean citizenry, which has been often exploited as a large and poorly paid workforce in activities that were not always connected to proper military service such as construction, agriculture and mining.²⁸ Arguably, this state of affairs has produced an entrenched interest in maintaining the border dispute with Ethiopia, since the no-war–no-peace situation legitimizes the continuation of undefined military service and the consequent concentration of political power within the military.

The Regional and International Dimensions of the Border Dispute

The formal end of conventional warfare in 2000 and the virtual delimitation of the border by the international court of arbitration simply changed the patterns of violence, provoking

²⁵ Connell, D. “From Resistance to Governance: Eritrea’s Trouble with Transition”. *Review of African Political Economy* 39/129. 2011. 419–433.

²⁶ Reid, R. “Caught in the headlights of history: Eritrea, the EPLF, and the post-war Nation-State”. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43/3. 2005. 467–488.

²⁷ Muller, T. “From Rebel Governance to State Consolidation, Dynamics of Loyalty and the Securitisation of the State in Eritrea”. *Geoforum* 43. 2012. 793–803.

²⁸ Kibreab, G. “Forced Labour in Eritrea”. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47/1. 2009. 41–72. These arguments have been advanced also by many human rights organizations and UN agencies that have conducted interviews among Eritrean refugees abroad. On the ambivalent reliability of remote methodologies adopted by the UN Monitoring Group and other human rights agencies to support their claims against Eritrea, see Duffield, M. “From Immersion to Simulation: Remote Methodologies and the Decline of Area Studies.” *Review of African Political Economy* 41. 2014. 75–94; Muller, T. “Representing Eritrea: Geopolitics and Narratives of Oppression”. *Review of African Political Economy* 43. 2016. 1–10.

a shift from direct confrontation to proxy war through co-optation of armed movements operating in the neighbour's territory or third countries such as Somalia.²⁹ Since 2000, the Eritrean government has turned to the *tried and trusted methods* of the politics of the Horn, engaging in proxy wars with both Addis Ababa and Djibouti.³⁰ In Ethiopia alone, Asmara has been providing training or logistical support to different ethnic insurgencies such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), just to cite the most prominent ones among them. The rationale of this strategy was to divert Ethiopian military forces from the northern flank and weaken the EPRDF grip on power by showing its inability to maintain internal security, especially in the most remote peripheries where state presence has been historically poor or non-existent. The basic rule that drove the Eritrean policy was that *my enemy's enemy is a friend*, without particular attention to the ideological posture of the proxy. In Somalia, for instance, the Eritrean government reportedly provided financial support and military training to Islamic movements linked to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) – the coalition of armed groups that briefly took power in Mogadishu in 2006 – and subsequently to the terrorist movement Al Shabaab, in spite of the radically alternative civilization project advanced by Marxist–Leninist rulers in Asmara and Islamic groups in Mogadishu.³¹ Another proof of the pragmatic stance of the Eritrean government towards proxies is provided by the alleged collaboration between Asmara and Ginbot 7, an Ethiopian rebel movement with a strong nationalistic ethos. Indeed, Ginbot 7 might be considered a custodian of the great imperial tradition and has an ambivalent position with respect to the legitimacy of Eritrea's stance as an independent and sovereign state.³²

Eritrea's involvement in the Somali civil war and Ethiopia's insurgency politics has been often framed by Western powers and media as a proof that Asmara is a rogue actor that defies international law and supports terrorist groups. Cross-border politics was not an exclusive prerogative of Eritrea, however, since Ethiopia also supported insurgent groups or other opposition movements to foster its *national interest*. Since 1999, Addis Ababa has been hosting a coalition of Eritrean opposition movements reunited under the umbrella of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), previously known as Eritrean National Alliance, and has provided logistical and financial support to ethnic insurgencies such as the Democratic Movement for the Defence of Eritrean Kunama or the National Liberation Front for Liberation of Eritrean Saho. The Ethiopian government made no mystery of its intention to topple the Eritrean leadership: a goal that was openly declared by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi during a public speech in 2011.³³

²⁹ Abbink, J. "Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 21/3. 2003. 407–425.

³⁰ Mosley, J. "Eritrea and Ethiopia: Beyond the Impasse." The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. 2014. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140410EritreaEthiopiaMosley.pdf, Accessed on 18 November 2017.

³¹ Bereketeb, R. "Eritrea's Refugee Crisis and the Role of the International Community". *Nordic Africa Institute, Policy Note 2*. 2016. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196430/FULLTEXT01.pdf>, Accessed on 18 November 2017.

³² "Berhanu Nega's Struggle for Relevance and Legitimacy (Part 2)". Strathink Editorial Team. Strathink.net. 10 February 2016. <http://www.strathink.net/uncategorized/we-have-to-pay-with-blood-berhanu-negas-struggle-for-relevance-and-legitimacy-part-2/>, Accessed on 4 April 2017.

³³ Connell. "From Resistance to Governance...". 427.

The great difference between Asmara and Addis Ababa involved the capacity of the latter to put itself on the *right* side of the wall by playing the card of international geopolitics. Although Eritrea's early involvement in Somali politics in 2006 was mostly a tactical response to Ethiopia's support to the opposite camp organized around the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, Western powers framed the alleged collaboration with Al Shabaab as a proof that the Eritrean government was a trouble-maker. The ensuing economic sanctions against Asmara were adopted with full agreement on the part of the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti and the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government in Somalia: a fact that led the Eritrean Ministry for Foreign Affairs to dismiss the Monitoring Group as a pawn of other regional powers.³⁴

Ethiopia, on the contrary, was much more effective in engaging in an *image management strategy* aimed at providing a representation of local realities that was coherent with the security concern of its Western allies.³⁵ Ethiopia's invasion and subsequent occupation of Somalia from 2006 to 2009 was framed as part of the global effort against terrorism, although the motivation that drove the Ethiopian army in Mogadishu was primarily based on the Ethiopian government's fear that the Union of Islamic Courts' aggressive anti-Ethiopian rhetoric might turn into effective support of the Somali insurgency in the Ogaden.³⁶ In the following years Ethiopia continued to intervene in the internal affairs of Somalia and stationed its troops in different parts of the country under invitation of Somali transitional governments that existed only on paper and controlled a few pockets of the capital Mogadishu. Anyhow, the Ethiopian policy was praised again as part of the global anti-terrorist effort, while Eritrea's support to the Somali opposition group Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia – led by the same Sheikh Sharif Ahmed who would become President of Somalia under the auspices of Western donors in 2009 – was framed by the United Nations and Western powers as an attempt to undermine regional stability.

The relationship between Addis Ababa, Asmara, and their regional proxies has not been a top-down process, however: armed groups operating in the most remote borderlands have been able to maintain a certain agency and negotiate the price for their collaboration, in a necessity shifting allegiance between the two neighbours when the deal was not worthwhile anymore. A case in this point is provided by the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), an armed movement struggling for self-determination of the Afar ethnic group in the eastern regions of Eritrea and Ethiopia. ARDUF came into existence in 1991 with the objective of toppling the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments and reunite all Afar citizens in the Horn of Africa region under one single flag, but was fought back by the collaborating Eritrean and Ethiopian security services until 1998. Once the war broke out, however, ARDUF signed a tactical peace with Addis Ababa and received training and military hardware to conduct operations within Eritrean territory, while engaging in renewed dialogue with the Afar Regional State in Ethiopia “to seek means and ways to

³⁴ Menkhaus, K. “The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts”. *African Affairs* 106/424. 2007. 357–390.

³⁵ Fisher, J. “Managing Donors’ Perception: Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 intervention in Somalia”. *African Affairs* 111/444. 2012. 404–423.

³⁶ Interview with Patrizia Sentinelli, former Italian Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Florence, April 2011.

protect the Afar people”.³⁷ Nevertheless, once it became clear that the alliance of opportunity with the Ethiopian government was not bearing the expected fruits, ARDUF changed sides again. In 2007, the front kidnapped five employees of the British Foreign Office and their personal guides, while visiting the Afar region of Ethiopia in protest against what they labelled as the illegal encroachment of the salt mine in the Afar region by the regional government of Tigray, and released them to Eritrean authorities several weeks later.³⁸ Then, in 2012, the movement killed five European tourists within the Ethiopian side of Afar territory and conducted several operations against Ethiopian troops, while Addis Ababa accused Asmara of being the grey eminence behind the activity of ARDUF.

Concluding Thoughts

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the ensuing no-war–no-peace situation are a paramount example of the complex web of factors that affect local and regional politics in the Horn of Africa. Conflict is the outcome of competition for geopolitical supremacy between two regional powers, but it is also the by-product of international interventions and domestic political discourses embedded in the two countries’ recent history.

In an interview to the Voice of America in 1998 concerning the border dispute, the Eritrean President Afewerki claimed that “we might be more concerned about pride, integrity, respect, trust, confidence. When you lose that, it might become a great problem for us in this region. It is not always money and resources”.³⁹ This statement highlights that, to a large extent, reproduction of the no-war–no-peace situation has been encouraged by the fact that both Ethiopia and Eritrea are still ruled by the same armed movements-turned-political parties that fought together against the Ethiopian military junta of the DERG and then became bitter enemies, developing a reciprocal distrust which is difficult to overcome.

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³⁷ Tronvoll, K. “Borders of Violence, Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation State”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22/6. 1999. 1037–1060, 1051.

³⁸ “Kidnapped Europeans Released in Asmara”. Wikileaks, Telegram 000300 from British Embassy in Asmara, Secret, 14 March 2007.

³⁹ Tronvoll. “Borders of Violence...”. 1049

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Boko Haram: From an Isolated Sect to Regional Security Challenge

Virginia Comolli

“Boko Haram is a typical example of small fires causing large fires.”
President Muhammadu Buhari, 29 May 2015¹

Abstract

Boko Haram has been terrorising Northern Nigeria since 2009–2010. The group has evolved from an isolated, broadly non-violent sect in the early 2000s to a violent Islamist insurgency employing terrorist tactics, carrying out criminal activities and establishing relations with the likes of AQIM and ISIS. The combination of these factors has made Boko Haram a threat not only to the north-eastern part of Nigeria but to the broader region where repercussions have gone beyond the security sphere, undermining the economy, education, food supply, the social contract between the state and its people, foreign relations at the regional level and Nigeria’s international reputation. Owing to this extensive list of implications – and given the group’s successful attempts at territorial control – Boko Haram warrants a sustained and multinational effort that includes security but also developmental initiatives aimed at targeting pre-existing socio-economic grievances that have been exploited by the group to increase its followers.

Keywords: *Boko Haram, Nigeria, insurgency, COIN, Jihadism*

Introduction

Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awatiw’al Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) – commonly known as Boko Haram (Hausa language for Western civilisation is forbidden) – is unarguably the deadliest radical Islamist group currently operating in Sub-Saharan Africa. Boko Haram has in fact been responsible for thousands of deaths, the displacement of millions of civilians, hundreds of abductions and large scale destruction since it launched an insurgency campaign in 2009–2010.

¹ Muhammadu, B. “Read President Buhari’s inaugural speech”. *Vanguard News*, 29 May 2015. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/read-president-buhari-inaugural-speech/>, Accessed on 24 September 2015.

The group, headed by the elusive Abubakar Shekau, relies on a cell-based structure capable of operating beyond its stronghold in the northeast and indeed launching attacks across Northern and Central Nigeria, including the federal capital, Abuja. Crucially, Boko Haram is not a monolithic group. It includes ideological, as well as opportunistic elements. Evidence indicates that different factions are existing within the group. Divisions and tensions should be exploited and alternative responses for less radical elements should be considered.

The ensuing pages aim at providing an overview of the socio-economic and historical context in which Boko Haram has emerged, and at shedding some light on the tactical evolution of the group, the increased sophistication and brutality of attacks and its regional expansion. Boko Haram's tactical trajectory has been strongly influenced by government responses, especially the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign. The latter has produced mixed results and, unarguably, exacerbated levels of violence.

Although the author acknowledges that some steps have been made towards the implementation of a more comprehensive strategy that includes, for instance, counter and de-radicalisation programmes, economic rejuvenation initiatives and attempts at negotiations (including a possible offer of amnesty), owing to the limited success registered by these initiatives to date and given the likely audience of this paper, priority will be given to assessing military responses.

Socio-economic Context

Very often discussions about Nigeria make reference to the north-south division to indicate a country with a poorer, predominantly Muslim north and a wealthier, mainly Christian, south. Without overdoing this characterisation – there are also Christians in the north and Muslims in the south – it is undeniable that from a socio-economic point of view, Northern Nigeria suffers from higher levels of poverty and underdevelopment than the south.

Notably, 75% of the northern population lives in poverty (27% in the south, 60% is the national average); 49% of northern youth are unemployed (the national average is 34%), and 70% of northerners are illiterate.² Shockingly, 10.5 million Nigerian children are out of school – the highest number for any country in the world. This trend is predominantly evident in the north.³

Historically, the North and the South have followed different trajectories. Islam first arrived in Northern Nigeria in the 15th century but it was with the Usman Dan Fodio Jihad of 1804 and throughout the 19th century that Islam spread across the whole of Northern Nigeria and people from different ethnic groups and faiths were incorporated in the caliphate.⁴

² “Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%”. *BBC*, 13 February 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873>, Accessed on 25 September 2015.

³ Idoko, C. “Mid-Term Review: One out of three Nigerian children still out of school”. *Nigerian Tribune*, 13 June 2013. <http://tribune.com.ng/news2013/en/component/k2/item/14177-mid-term-review-one-out-of-three-nigerian-children-still-out-of-school.htm>, Accessed on 25 September 2015.

⁴ El-Masri, F. “The life of Shehu Usumandan Fodio before the jihad”. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 2/4. 1963. 442.

When the British arrived in Northern Nigeria in 1902–1903, they found a marked separation with the South. Very few signs of influence from the so-called modern world could be observed and the relatively few Christians present there were not integrated into society and faced many limitations in taking part in social and public life.⁵

Aware of the vast religious power in the hands of local rulers, Britain established a system of indirect rule and allowed the administrative system of the Fulani Empire to continue and Sharia remained the recognised law until the end of the colonial era.⁶

When Nigeria became independent in 1960, the isolation that had characterised the North for so long and the extremely low number of northern graduates, meant that most official positions were given to southerners, predominantly Igbos. This power shift in favour of the Christian south left the northern aristocracy worried that the traditional and highly conservative way of life of the North would come under threat – a sentiment that is at the basis of the inter-religious conflicts that followed.⁷

Since the late 1970s, religious conflicts intensified and took many forms, including the Izala Movement, Maitastine Movement (leading to infamous and violent riots in Kano), the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and Muhajirun. It is important to note the almost cyclical emergence of these groups – which can be seen as precursors to Boko Haram – and the fact that in addition to their religious message, broader socio-economic grievances, the feeling of political marginalisation and stark criticism of the government (perceived as corrupted) and of local Islamic leaders (accused of having abandoned the true tenets of Islam) were used to mobilise the masses and attract followers.⁸

Boko Haram's Evolution

Boko Haram is not Northern Nigeria's first extremist Islamic movement. These first appeared in the early 19th century when Islam in the area was dominated by the Sokoto Caliphate and Northern Nigerian groups that described themselves as enforcers of the strict Islamic law and opposed foreign influence; these groups, in reality, are also motivated by social and economic problems. Between 1999 and 2001, 12 northern states adopted Sharia law. But a number of people in the north started calling for the adoption of Sharia law across the country. This sentiment, together with the growing socio-economic inequality gave rise to what became known as the Nigerian Taliban in 2002, led by the charismatic preacher, Mohammad Yusuf.⁹

The group had the ultimate goal of establishing Sharia law in Nigeria but also of destroying the country's Western-imported institutions, including education and democracy. In its first years, however, this was an isolated religious community based on Salafist principles and the societal model of the Taliban, and thus it was nicknamed the *Nigerian Taliban*. Its base in Kanamma village in Nigeria's Yobe State was referred to as *Afghanistan*

⁵ Harnischfeger, J. *Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2008. 55.

⁶ Harnischfeger. *Democratization and Islamic Law...* 55.

⁷ Meredith, M. *The State of Africa*. London: Free Press, 2005. 77.

⁸ Comolli, V. *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*. London: Hurst, 2015. 25–43.

⁹ Comolli. *Boko Haram...* 19–21.

and it attracted followers from neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon who would travel to Nigeria to listen to Yusuf's preaching. His wealth and willingness to offer micro-loans so that followers could set up small businesses also contributed to his appeal.¹⁰

Small attacks in Yobe led to the destruction of their base, Afghanistan in 2003 by Nigerian security forces which forced the group to retreat to Maiduguri, Borno's state capital city, and more or less go underground. During this *dormant* phase, group leaders focused on recruitment and travelled to Pakistan to receive funding from al-Qaeda to carry out attacks against Americans in Nigeria. This phase lasted until 2009 when they started a small uprising in some northern states.¹¹

The importance of the 2009 events cannot be stressed enough as they set the bases for a radically different phase in the group's history turning the low-level activity Nigerian Taliban into fully-fledged insurgents known as Boko Haram. A four-day battle with Nigerian Security Forces in Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno states (this is often referred to as the Battle of Maiduguri) led to the death of 800 of its members and the extrajudicial execution of leader Mohammed Yusuf while in police custody.¹² Seeking revenge for Yusuf's killing had since become a key rallying point for Boko Haram. Although these events forced the group underground, they did not mark its extension. In the summer of 2010 the once second-in-command Abubakar Shekau – a very radical and violent individual – took over the leadership of the group.¹³

Shekau tied Boko Haram to the international Jihadi movement in his statements by adopting anti-American rhetorics and showing support for Jihadists in Algeria, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq. Under Shekau, Boko Haram also stepped up its attacks within Nigeria, targeting police stations, churches, schools, media houses, state institutions, markets, clinics, banks, mobile phone masts – infamous became the attacks on churches on Christmas. Weapons and tactics also evolved from the initial machetes and clubs and drive-by shootings with locally made pistols to truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and remotely propelled grenades (RPGs). Later, they even managed to acquire some tanks following battles with Nigerian forces. By 2011, they staged the first ever suicide attack in the history of Nigeria targeting the police Headquarters in Abuja in June; two months later the group used a car bomb against the United Nations building in Abuja, killing 25 people. Many similar attacks have followed since, including some involving women and children wearing suicide vests, starting in 2014.¹⁴

This increased sophistication – especially the adoption of suicide operations – has been attributed to exposure to foreign and more advanced Jihadist groups. General Carter Ham, then Commander of US AFRICOM has been one of the first senior foreign officials to indicate a possible foreign link. In August 2011, he claimed it was likely that Boko

¹⁰ Walker, A. "What is Boko Haram?" USIP. Washington, May 2012. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR308.pdf>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

¹¹ Walker. "What is Boko Haram?"

¹² Mohammed, A. and Haruna, M. *The Paradox of Boko Haram*. Nigeria: Moving Image Ltd., 2010. 81–83.

¹³ Rice, X. "Changing face of Nigeria's Boko Haram". *Financial Times*, 22 May 2012. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d2ab750-9ac1-11e1-9c98-00144feabdc0.html>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

¹⁴ Onapajo, H., Uzodike, U. O. and Whetho, A. "Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: The international dimension". *South African Journal of International Affairs* 19/3. 2012. 347.

Haram had established contacts with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and with al-Shabaab. He described this as, if confirmed, “the most dangerous thing to happen not only to the Africans, but to us as well”.¹⁵

Intelligence also suggests that Boko Haram had been trained in AQIM’s camps in the Sahel, as well as in Somalia with al-Shabaab. Yet, Boko Haram has not been recognised by the al-Qaeda core, and any cooperation with al-Qaeda-related groups seems to have been tactical and there is no evidence of them being strategic partners. This foreign connection became more evident during the 2012–2013 Malian crisis when Nigerian, Algerian and Malian officials pointed at cooperation between Boko Haram and AQIM in Northern Mali. However, additional reports have suggested that members of Boko Haram’s offshoot Ansaru were more likely than Boko Haram proper to be the ones fighting alongside AQIM and its sympathisers, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Ansar Dine in Mali.¹⁶

This points to a broader and important issue: Boko Haram is not a homogenous entity, consequently a number of factions exists. Ansaru, the best known group whose fate is unknown as of September 2015 (a possible merge back into Boko Haram is possible), first emerged in the spring of 2011, under the name of *al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel*, when it kidnapped a British and an Italian worker in Kebbi State. They were both killed ten months later during a failed rescue operation and the group was listed as a terrorist organisation by the British Government. Ansaru had officially announced its existence in January 2012 under the name of *Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa*, or simply Ansaru, and justified its split as driven by its opposition to Boko Haram’s killing of Muslims and very extreme ideology.¹⁷ Disagreement over the redistribution of funds and ethnic tensions between the predominantly Kanuri leadership and the Hausa-Fulani (the other prominent ethnic group that makes up Boko Haram) have also been cited as possible explanations for the split which – it has to be noted – did not translate into a complete end of cooperation among militants from the two groups. Indeed, fluidity characterises the existence of these violent groups and it is very common for groups in the region to emerge, split, merge at different stages and for fighters to switch allegiance.

Ansaru became known for the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom – most infamously (but not exclusively) – in Cameroon in 2013, a practice that had hitherto never been adopted by Boko Haram and that suggests a transfer of knowledge between AQIM – which had long relied on this tactic to raise funds – and Ansaru.¹⁸

¹⁵ Leigh, K. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Al-Qaeda’s New Friend in Africa?”. *Time*, 31 August 2011. <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2091137,00.html>, Accessed on 28 September 2015.

¹⁶ Da Silva, I. “Mali Islamists seize town of Konna, advancing towards Sévaré, Mopti”. *Moon of the South*, 11 January 2013. <http://moonofthesouth.com/mali-islamists-seize-town-konna/>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

¹⁷ “Rift in Boko Haram, ‘Ansaru’ Splinter Group Emerges, Calls BH ‘Inhuman’ To Muslims”. *Sahara Reporters*, 31 January 2012. <http://saharareporters.com/news-page/rift-boko-haram%E2%80%98ansaru%E2%80%99-splinter-groupemerges-calls-bh-%E2%80%98inhuman%E2%80%99-muslims?page=4>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

¹⁸ “Priest freed in Cameroon arrives back in France”. *BBC News*, 1 January 2014. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25566473>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

Territorial Control

By spring 2013 reports indicated that Boko Haram was controlling the territory around its camps in Borno State. This threat to national sovereignty and widespread violence prompted the government to declare a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa which remains in force at the time of writing. This move was accompanied by the largest military deployment in the country since the Civil War (Biafra War) of 1967–1970.¹⁹ Despite some progress, violence did not diminish and 2014 saw a 40% rise in the level of violence compared to 2013.²⁰ This surge was accompanied by a relentless advance and the capturing of many towns and villages. Indeed, in a move that appeared to be amounting to the encirclement of Maiduguri, the group proved determined (albeit unsuccessful) to gain control over Borno's capital city which had been Boko Haram's key stronghold before the military effort pushed the fighters to rural areas. Besides, Maiduguri has a double symbolic value: first as the set of the infamous 2009 Battle of Maiduguri which resulted in the killing of Mohammed Yusuf. Second, Maiduguri seats on the remnants of the Kanem-Bornu Empire which, unarguably, Shakau aims to recreate, as suggested by his choice of targets in neighbouring countries which fall within what was once the Empire.²¹

A swathe of territory that according to some estimates might have been as large as Belgium, is believed to have fallen under Shekau's control. In August 2014, Shekau announced the establishment of a *state* with the Borno city of Gwoza as its capital.²² He appointed Emirs to control towns. Violence also escalated beyond the Nigerian borders. Attacks in Cameroon, repeated abductions, including the wife of Deputy Prime Minister Amadou Ali (released in October 2014)²³ and the mass kidnapping of children in January sparked a wave of international outrage. In February 2015, Niger and Chad also came under attack.²⁴

The group's regional expansion merits further explanation. Boko Haram has long exploited the cultural, ethnic and religious ties that Chad, Niger and Cameroon share with northern Nigeria for its own purposes. These have included the smuggling of weapons,

¹⁹ "Nigeria: Goodluck Jonathan declares emergency in states". *BBC News*, 15 May 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22533974>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

²⁰ Based on the author's own tracking of attacks and estimates.

²¹ Smith, A. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Violence Puts Maiduguri City on Edge". *NBC News*, 4 February 2015. <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/nigerias-boko-haram-violence-puts-maiduguri-city-edge-n299056>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

²² Gartenstein-Ross, D. "Boko Haram Did Not Declare a Caliphate". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 4 September 2014. <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/gartenstein-ross-daveed-boko-haram-did-not-declare-a-caliphate/>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

²³ "Boko Haram' abducts Cameroon politician's wife". *BBC News*, 27 July 2014. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28509530>, Accessed on 26 September 2015; "Cameroon flies freed Boko Haram hostages to capital". *BBC News*, 11 October 2014. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-29581495>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

²⁴ "Boko Haram launches first attack in Niger". *BBC News*, 7 February 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31162979>, Accessed on 26 September 2015; "Nigeria's Boko Haram militants attack Chad for first time". *Biodun. BBC*. 13 February 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31453951>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

the recruiting of fighters, and allowing personnel flows between Boko Haram in Nigeria and their Hausa, Kanuri, and Muslim kin in Niger, Chad and Cameroon.²⁵

In the main, however, those borderlands had been considered safe havens and, strategically, had not been targeted by attacks possibly for fear of retaliation by local authorities. This clearly changed in late 2014 – early 2015 when it became clear that Niger, Chad and Cameroon had become part of Boko Haram’s fighting ground. Significantly, national borders are unlikely to hold much meaning for Shekau and therefore the move beyond Nigeria does not translate into a genuine effort towards regionalisation. Boko Haram retains a rather domestic agenda and its goal remains one that involves Islamising Nigeria rather than the whole of West Africa.

The ISIS Connection

In March 2015, Boko Haram’s newly opened Twitter account released an audio message from the group’s leader Shekau, pledging allegiance (*bay’ah*) to the Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Five days later al-Baghdadi’s acceptance of the pledge formalised the alliance and Boko Haram became the latest and deadliest organisation to have joined a growing cohort of over 35 armed groups in the Middle East, Pakistan, North Africa and Afghanistan that had sworn allegiance to ISIS since July 2014.²⁶

Public statements predating the *bay’ah* have signalled Boko Haram’s intent to strengthen its links with ISIS. On 9 February 2015, the Nigerian group posted a message urging the “*mujahideen of the Islamic State to deliver our message to all Muslims that your brothers in Nigeria are calling you to immigrate to us, to assist us in managing the areas in which we have control and fight the alliance of the disbelievers*”.²⁷ Already in 2014, Shekau had praised al-Baghdadi’s actions.

The initial months of 2015 also saw increased communication between the two groups, with US officials reporting in February that ISIS had dispatched a team to Nigeria to negotiate a more formal alliance. Since ISIS’ acceptance of the *bay’ah*, Nigerian militants have further highlighted the new alliance by rebranding Boko Haram as the *Islamic State in West Africa* or the *Islamic State West Africa Province* (ISWAP) in its media propaganda.²⁸ Yet, the latter represents the most concrete aspect of cooperation between the two groups. Boko Haram has since issued more professional-looking videos and used the ISIS flag in the background, just to cite two examples.

In addition, given Boko Haram’s fragmented structure, it is unclear how many Nigerian militants would honour Shekau’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS.²⁹ Moreover, it is not yet

²⁵ Comolli. *Boko Haram*... 86–92.

²⁶ Ewi, M. “What does the Boko Haram-ISIS Alliance Mean for Terrorism in Africa?” Institute for Security Studies. Dakar, 17 March 2015; “Islamic State’s 35 Global Affiliates Interactive World Map”. IntelCenter. 19 May 2015. <http://intelcenter.com/maps/is-affiliates-map.html>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

²⁷ Lister, T. “Boko Haram + ISIS = Marriage from Hell”. *CNN*, 25 February 2015.

²⁸ Joscelyn, T. “Boko Haram Leader Pledges Allegiance to the Islamic State”. *The Long War Journal*, 8 March 2015. <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/boko-haram-leader-pledges-allegiance-to-the-islamic-state.php>, Accessed on 31 May 2015.

²⁹ Campbell, J. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Moving Towards ISIS?” Council on Foreign Relations. New York, 11 March 2015.

evident whether the move to rebrand Boko Haram as the *Islamic State in West Africa* or *Islamic State West Africa Province* has been endorsed by Shekau – and indeed it is likely to have caused some internal tensions. It is too early to tell whether the Nigerian group will fall directly under ISIS command and the extent to which it will act as an ISIS proxy.³⁰

Government Responses

The early months of 2015 saw some genuine progress against Boko Haram. Renewed military effort, most likely propelled as a last attempt by President Goodluck Jonathan to secure votes ahead of the presidential elections (scheduled for 14 February and controversially postponed by six weeks on security grounds), the arrival of foreign military contractors (*mercenaries*) and an influx of weaponry ensured that most, if not all, towns and villages were recaptured and many militants were either killed or apprehended.³¹

However, Nigerian and foreign observers alike put the question why it had taken so long – the insurgency had been ongoing since 2009–2010 – for the military to achieve such results notwithstanding Boko Haram’s resilience and adaptability in tactical and operational terms. Historically, the many violent Islamist groups that had operated in Northern Nigeria had been met with an exclusively militarised and heavy-handed approach never addressing any genuine socio or economic grievances fuelling discontent. In case of Boko Haram, the same short-sighted approach was adopted.

Starting in 2004, the government deployed troops to areas in which Boko Haram was present. This approach continued under the Goodluck Jonathan administration (2010–2015) which coincided with the escalation of violence into a full-blown insurgency. President Jonathan’s image was badly damaged. In spite of ambitious promises, he proved unable to contain the violence and failed to address the socio-economic grievances that appeared to be the real drivers behind discontent in the north.³²

The growing insecurity in Borno State and elsewhere in the Northeast led to the establishment of a Joint Task Force codenamed JTF Operation Restore Order 1 in June 2011.³³ The mandate of the Task Force was to restore law and order to the north-eastern part of Nigeria and Borno State, in particular. The JTF – led by the Army – was composed of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Nigerian Police Force, the Department of State Security, the Nigerian Customs Service, the Nigeria Immigration Service and the Defence Intelligence Agency.³⁴

In late 2011, the federal government approved the establishment of permanent operational bases for JTFs in the states of Bauchi, Yobe, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Adamawa. Shortly afterwards in January 2012, Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 15 local areas across 4 states: Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau, and granted the military Emergency

³⁰ Comolli, V. and Robertson, K. “Boko Haram (ISWAP) and ISIS: two of a kind?” *Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC)*, July 2015. <http://bit.ly/1HKTGzN>, Accessed on 25 September 2015.

³¹ Siollun, M. “How Nigeria turned a corner against Boko Haram”. *The Guardian*, 21 May 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/21/nigeria-boko-haram-buhari>, Accessed on 25 September 2015.

³² Comolli. *Boko Haram...* 109–112.

³³ “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s growing new headache”. *IJSS, Strategic Comments*, 17 November 2011.

³⁴ The author’s interview with anonymous source, Abuja, 2013.

Powers. The state of emergency had a six-months' time limit under the Constitution, which elapsed at the end of June 2012 and was not renewed by the National Assembly. Sadly, this did not coincide with an improved security situation.³⁵

On 14 May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa – a territory of some 60,000 square miles (155,000 square kilometres) of the Sahel bordering Cameroon, Chad and Niger. During the TV address, he indicated that the challenge faced by the country was “not just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity” and that “[a]lready, some northern parts of Borno State have been taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies”.³⁶ This declaration coincided with the deployment of 2,000 additional security personnel, accompanied by fighter jets and other military equipment, in Borno, and later an extra 1,000 were sent to Adamawa, bringing the total to approximately 8,000. In addition, the President introduced a curfew in Adamawa, and granted the military full search, arrest and detention powers in a move prompting contrasting reactions as many, including locals, feared that expanded powers would be abused.³⁷

On 16 May, a military offensive was launched in Borno with raids on Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Game Reserve and increased patrols along national borders, before moving on to aerial targeting with jets and attack helicopters. Within a week, the army announced the destruction of several Boko Haram camps and captured up to 200 militants, and rescued women and children held hostage by the sect. Boko Haram was *in disarray*, the military claimed, and fleeing across the border into Niger and Cameroon. However, Boko Haram leader Shekau painted a rather different picture in a video released at the end of May.³⁸

In August 2013, the newly formed, 8,000-strong army 7th Division replaced JTF ORO leading the COIN campaign.³⁹ This change did not happen without criticism, as the new division largely lacked the interoperability element that characterised, albeit not always successfully, the very nature of the JTF. In truth, however, the Army recorded some success. The early months of 2014 saw the violence largely contained to the areas under state of emergency with little spill over beyond the three states in question. Yet, this did not prevent

³⁵ Comolli. *Boko Haram...* 114–115.

³⁶ Jonathan, G. “Nigeria: President Jonathan State of Emergency Declaration in Adamawa, Borno, Yobe – Full Speech”. *Premium Times*, 14 May 2013. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201305150548.html>, Accessed on 25 September 2015.

³⁷ Owete, F. “Mixed reactions trail declaration of State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa”. *Premium Times*, 14 May 2013. <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/134285-mixed-reactions-trail-declaration-of-state-of-emergency-in-borno-yobe-adamawa.html>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

³⁸ “Nigeria’s Boko Haram claims victories over military”. *AFP News, YouTube*, 29 May 2013. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTMwqGtUyJQ>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

³⁹ Omonobi, K. “Jonathan creates new army division, sends 8,000 troops after Boko Haram”. *Vanguard*, 18 August 2013. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/jonathan-creates-new-army-division-sends-8000-troops-after-boko-haram/>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

the abduction of nearly 300 girls in Chibok in April (many of whom are still missing as of late 2017), dozens of other kidnappings and many violent attacks.⁴⁰

Nigerian citizens have learnt, by paying a very high price, that the use of the military among the civilian population can be highly problematic. Human rights abuses have indeed marred the entire COIN effort and it is believed that some Boko Haram attacks have been carried out in response to the actions of government forces. Several organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have extensively documented various cases of summary executions, extra judicial killings, rapes, torture and house burnings committed by security forces.⁴¹

In 2013, for instance the town of Baga, Borno, became the stage of a fierce exchange lasting several hours between Boko Haram and the military forces producing at least 187 deaths, dozens of injuries and destroying over 2,000 houses between 16 and 17 April. The Baga incident came under close scrutiny following allegations of excessive use of force on the part of the military. Satellite images corroborated this account and identified 2,275 destroyed buildings with another 125 severely damaged, during a military raid to hunt down Boko Haram.⁴²

The Jonathan administration always denied or downplayed the gravity of the situation in spite of its damaging effect not only domestically but also on Nigeria's foreign relations, e.g. with long-standing partners such as Britain and the United States. President Muhammadu Buhari made clear in his May 2015 inaugural speech that this culture of impunity would no longer be tolerated: "We shall overhaul the rules of engagement to avoid human rights violations in operations. We shall improve operational and legal mechanisms so that disciplinary steps are taken against proven human right violations by the Armed Forces."⁴³

Regional Military Cooperation

As mentioned earlier, Nigeria's neighbours have not been left untouched by Boko Haram. But although in those countries the group managed to exert significant ideological influence, operationally, current leader Abubakar Shekau had assumed a stance towards the governments of Niger, Chad and Cameroon that was until 2014 non-confrontational, with the exception perhaps of abductions of foreign nationals in Cameroon in 2013. For their part, neighbouring governments have been reluctant to launch a major crackdown

⁴⁰ Hayden, S. "The Chibok Girls Abducted One Year Ago Are Just a Small Percentage of Boko Haram's Victims". *Vice News*, 14 April 2015. <https://news.vice.com/article/the-chibok-girls-abducted-one-year-ago-are-just-a-small-percentage-of-boko-harams-victims>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

⁴¹ "Nigeria: Senior members of military must be investigated for war crimes". Amnesty International. London, 3 June 2015. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/nigeria-senior-members-of-military-must-be-investigated-for-war-crimes/>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

⁴² "The Baga incident and the situation in north-east Nigeria: An interim assessment". National Human Rights Commission. Abuja, June 2013. <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/wp-content/files/2013/07/NHRC-Baga-Report.pdf>, Accessed on 24 September 2015.

⁴³ Buhari, M. "Read President Buhari's inaugural speech". *Vanguard*, 29 May 2015. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/read-president-buhari-inaugural-speech/>, Accessed on 24 September 2015.

against Boko Haram possibly for fear of retaliation and, more concretely, owing to their limited capabilities.

In spite of their contribution to the Multinational JTF dating back to 1998 (as set up to fight Chadian rebels), and bilateral agreements on border control, it was only in 2014 that a more concerted effort was embraced through the established regional force by the Lake Chad Basin Commission: Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon pledged to jointly deploy 2,800 troops at a summit in London. Additionally, in March 2014, the Directors-General of External Intelligence Services of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, alongside France, signed a deal to increase border policing coordination and intelligence sharing.⁴⁴

2014–2015 have seen growing cooperation among regional countries prompted by Boko Haram's growing incursions beyond Nigeria. Nigeria's neighbours have become more involved in the fight against Boko Haram in both military and non-military terms. Notably, President Deby of Chad had brokered failed negotiations between Nigeria and Boko Haram.⁴⁵ The African Union (AU) has endorsed a plan for a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of up to 10,000 troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and possibly Benin expected on the ground in autumn 2015 (whose deployment has experienced some delays). Nevertheless, while greater multinational cooperation to tackle what has now become a regional threat is welcome, challenges remain. Namely: mistrust, resource availability, zones of deployment, varying military skills and capabilities, Boko Haram's resilience and the role of public opinion.⁴⁶

Broader Implications

Boko Haram is a *threat* in the most comprehensive way. Security wise, the implications speak for themselves. As of September 2015 the insurgency has produced over 18,000 deaths, over 2 million displaced individuals, the systematic victimization of women, hundreds of abductions and the destruction of millions of homes.⁴⁷ The groups have also violently targeted foreign nationals and interests in the region and have established links to dangerous outfits such as AQIM and ISIS.

Worryingly, the implications go well beyond the security sphere. In July 2015, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, reported on the situation: "*Moreover in most of the towns and villages that have recently been recaptured by the regional forces, Boko Haram fighters reportedly looted and burned down houses shops and schools; destroyed hospitals and health centres and smashed water*

⁴⁴ Owete, F. "EXCLUSIVE: Nigeria, France, Cameroon, three other countries sign deal on massive, joint offensive against Boko Haram". *Premium Times*, 18 March 2014. <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/156947-exclusive-nigeria-france-cameroon-three-other-countries-sign-deal-on-massive-joint-offensive-against-boko-haram.html>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

⁴⁵ Soyombo, F. "Nigeria's 'fake' ceasefire with Boko Haram". *Al Jazeera*, 11 November 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/nigeria-fake-ceasefire-with-b-2014111103442243308.html>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

⁴⁶ Comolli. "The regional problem of Boko Haram". *Survival* 57/4. 2015. 109–117.

⁴⁷ Nnbugwu, F. "Insurgency: Over 2.1m people displaced by Boko Haram in six years". *Vanguard*, 5 September 2015. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/09/insurgency-over-2-1m-people-displaced-by-boko-haram-in-six-years/>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

*points and water systems. In several cases they methodically destroyed bridges and other infrastructure vital to people's lives and livelihoods. Coupled with the massive displacement generated by this movement this destruction has had a major impact on the economy of the region; there are now severe food shortages in a region that has traditionally produced crops for trade across the Sahel.*⁴⁸

Indeed, the violence has brought economic activities to a halt. People are too scared to go to markets and often national borders have been closed to prevent the movement of militants resulting in the suspension of cross-border trade in a region already affected by widespread poverty and limited economic options. In an unfortunate domino effect this also meant that the availability of goods has declined and food has become scarce.

Then there is the impact on education. Boko Haram's targeting of schools, teachers and pupils has meant that secondary schools in Borno State have been closed since March 2014. Only in September 2015 some schools have considered re-opening. This is unlikely to be a swift process as many schools have been converted into shelters for internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁴⁹ For instance, two thirds of IDP camps in Maiduguri are in schools, 15 out of 21. Children make up a large proportion of IDP population: UNICEF estimates that 1.4 million children have been displaced by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.⁵⁰

Politically, the insurgency and the response to it have been highly damaging. Domestically, the COIN campaign had become a poisonous political issue, often used by rival parties to undermine one another. This was particularly clear during the most recent election campaign. Regionally, over the years Nigeria and its immediate neighbours have criticized one another for their inability to stem the Boko Haram problem. Internationally, Nigeria's foreign relations and, particularly military exchanges (in terms of weapon transfers, training and funding) with Washington and London had oftentimes been put on hold as a result of human rights abuses perpetrated by Nigerian forces.⁵¹

Finally, some brutal aspects of the COIN campaign have jeopardized the social contract between the state and its people. The latter have found themselves trapped between Boko Haram's violence on the one hand and government forces' brutality on the other. This will take time to rebuild.

Owing to this extensive – and possibly non-exhaustive – list of implications, and given the group's past successful attempts at territorial control, there is no doubt, the Boko Haram issue asks for a sustained and multinational effort that includes security but also developmental initiatives aimed at targeting pre-existing socio-economic grievances that have been exploited by the group to increase its followers.

⁴⁸ Al-Hussein, Z. "Oral Update on Boko Haram at the Human Rights Council 29th Session by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights". United Nations. New York, 1 July 2015. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16177&LangID=E>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

⁴⁹ "Borno parents beg govt to re-open schools". *Nigerianews*, 15 June 2015. <https://www.nigerianewsgrio.com/news/153185-borno-parents-beg-govt-to-re-open-schools.html>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

⁵⁰ "Boko Haram violence displaces 1.4 million children in Nigeria and beyond – UNICEF". United Nations. New York, 18 September 2015. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51909#.Vggrkc4kO2w>, Accessed on 26 September 2015.

⁵¹ Comolli. *Boko Haram...* 142–152.

Conclusion and a Future Outlook

Following historic presidential elections in March 2015, former General Muhammadu Buhari was elected President of the Nigerian Republic ending Goodluck Jonathan's presidential career but, more significantly, marking the end of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)'s 16 years in power. High expectations surrounded the change of leadership but the country continued to face challenges on all fronts, from the political environment through the economy to several security preoccupations. Yet, upon taking office on 29 May, it was clear what topped President Buhari's agenda. Buhari has vowed to show Boko Haram "the strength of our collective will" and to "spare no effort until we defeat terrorism".⁵² Addressing the security crisis in the north had indeed been a cornerstone of his election campaign and proved to be a top priority the newly installed president was determined to lead on.

Indeed, among his first initiatives were the replacement of the heads of the Armed Forces, the relocation of the 7th Division Headquarter from Abuja to Maiduguri, and the entering in close discussions with neighbouring countries to promote stronger cooperation under a Nigeria-led MNJTF.⁵³

Developing a better understanding of history and patterns of violent religious extremism in Northern Nigeria will be vital to go forward if long lasting stability is to be achieved. Many similar movements have emerged in the region over the past two centuries and they all have been addressed through repression providing the temporary illusion that the problem had been eradicated when, in fact, the group in question had gone underground only to re-emerge a few years later under a different name but with a similar drive.

There is nothing new about Boko Haram, the only novelty is that in the 21st century groups of this sort benefit from the advances in communication and information technology their predecessors could not access and therefore are able to establish links with foreign and often more advanced Jihadists, as well as more lethal weaponry. The solution does not simply rest on enlarged military deployments, although the exacerbation of violence does require a military approach to restore peace in an immediate term. Issues of social, economic and political marginalisation should be addressed. Unless a more comprehensive approach is adopted and, when the security situation allows it, carried out in parallel with military operations, there is little hope peace will be restored and maintained in Nigeria and the affected regions of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Areas such as economic rejuvenation, education and counter-radicalization (including strategic communication) should be prioritised in all affected countries.

A Muslim northerner himself, Buhari is unlikely to neglect the north – one of the criticisms often levelled against Jonathan – and many are hopeful that the combination of a military background and his own position as a northerner will herald a different and more effective approach. Yet expectations should also be managed, for the restoration of peace will not be an easy undertaking. First, the mishandling of Boko Haram by previous

⁵² "Boko Haram 'will soon know the strength of our collective will' – Buhari". *Vanguard*, 1 April 2015. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/04/boko-haram-will-soon-know-the-strength-of-our-collective-will-buhari/>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

⁵³ Senator I. "DHQ: Military Working on Relocation of Command Centre to Maiduguri". *This Day Live*, 2 June 2015. <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/dhq-military-working-on-relocation-of-command-centre-to-maiduguri/210924/>, Accessed on 27 September 2015.

administrations has allowed the insurgency to effectively spiral out of control and establish deep roots. Second, Buhari will be under lots of pressure to deliver results. A military surge is the most likely approach to be chosen in order to produce quick and tangible results that can be paraded before the electorate. Human rights abuses at the hands of the security forces may increase and evidence shows this can be extremely counterproductive in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign, not to mention its unlawfulness. Third, reconciling the military approach with long-term re-engagement and economic initiatives in the north will be a challenge. These are essential and very much linked to the emergence and endurance of Boko Haram and earlier violent extremist movements that have plagued Northern Nigeria for the past few decades.

In this context, Western partners such as the UK and the US (owing to their long-standing ties with Nigeria), and increasingly France, can play a positive role. Indeed, they already have a presence in the region and have supported local governments with military training and funding, counter-terrorism initiatives and development programmes, just to mention a few.

All of the above should be aimed at helping local governments immunise themselves from the spread of Boko Haram and the emergence of future similar movements. Importantly, local governments – rather than Western allies – ought to be driving initiatives particularly in the context of security and military operations. Indeed, a highly visible Western military presence would likely fuel Boko Haram's anti-Western rhetoric and even facilitate recruitment. As a result, it can be argued that the international community should emphasise its role in helping alleviate the humanitarian crisis brought about by the conflict rather than becoming more involved militarily in the region.

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Ethiopian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1991

Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu

Abstract

This paper aims to describe and analyse the Ethiopian participation in UN peacekeeping missions after 1991. Though Ethiopia is one of the largest troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping, there is no big academic literature on it to describe how and why Ethiopia is able to send a large number of troops mostly to the conflict ridden Horn of Africa. The paper provides a comprehensive picture of how Ethiopia shaped its foreign and defence policies by engaging in peacekeeping operations.

First, it explains what UN peacekeeping is, then describes all UN peacekeeping operations in which Ethiopian troops participated. Following this, it examines the rationale behind the motive of Ethiopia's focus on peacekeeping and the future of Ethiopian peace support operations – the establishment of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Coordination Centre.

The study concentrates on the Ethiopian participation only in UN peacekeeping operations. It does not cover other missions through AU or other organisations or coalitions. The paper is a desk study, mainly based on secondary data analysis of the available information of news materials, existing academic literature, books, as well as research findings.

Keywords: *Ethiopia, United Nation, peacekeeping operations*

What is a UN Peacekeeping Operation?

According to UN, peacekeeping¹ is one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigating the difficult path from conflict to peace and create conditions

¹ United Nations use the term Peacekeeping Operation, while United States popularized the term *Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW) and UK crafted the term *Peace Support Operations* (PSO) which later was also used by NATO. All three are military interventions almost with the same meaning. (Fitz-Gerald, A. M. "Military and Post-conflict Security: Implications for American, British and Other Allied Force Planning and for Post-conflict Iraq". In Segal, H. [ed], *Geopolitical Integrity*. Montreal: Institute for Research on public Policy, 2005. 275.)

for lasting peace.² Moreover, UN peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional missions.³

Peacekeeping operations use diplomatic, civil and military means normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and support to humanitarian assistance where no sole civilian alternative exists. Peacekeeping did not emerge by design but out of necessity that UN can take “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”.⁴

UN has been establishing peacekeeping missions since 1948; however, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was formally established as a separate department of the UN Secretariat only in 1992.⁵ DPKO is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, supporting and, on behalf of the Secretary-General, providing executive direction to all UN peacekeeping operations.⁶

UN peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for international peace and security. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help laying down the foundations for sustainable peace. (See Appendix 1 for full UN peacekeeping mission leadership and authority structure.)

In larger multidimensional peacekeeping operations, components may include the military, civilian police, political affairs, human rights, civil affairs, public information, mine action and administration. Depending on the size and mandate of the mission, additional components may include judicial and penal, legislative support, civil administration, institution building, electoral assistance and socio-economic development.⁷

The fact that the UN has no army or police force implicates that the organization generates troops and civilian police from member states as part of their country’s contribution and recruit international and national civilian staff as individuals when it is required by the mission’s mandate.⁸

² “What is peacekeeping?” United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>, Accessed on 28 December 2016.

³ “What is peacekeeping?” United Nations.

⁴ Cockayne, J. and Malone, D. “United Nations Peace Operations Then and Now”. In Langholtz, H. et al. (eds), *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. 2.

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⁶ *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. United Nations. New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. 3.

⁷ “Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations”. United Nations. UN.org. 2003. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/.../peacekeeping-handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

⁸ *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. 3.

Currently, United Nations made three personnel type classifications of member state contributions.⁹ These are contingent troop, police and military experts on mission.

Formed units or contingents often referred as blue helmets can include armour, infantry, maritime, riverine, aviation, logistic, engineers and various unit capabilities depending on the mission and mandate. Contingent troops are mostly the biggest number of military personnel in a mission, they may operate in the form of companies, battalions or brigades.¹⁰

The main functions are provision of a secure environment, through – conducting patrols, establishing and operating checkpoints, securing major routes to facilitate mobility; assisting in-country military personnel with training and support; securing key facilities (hospitals, power plants, police recruiting stations, etc.); working with other components on – Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Defense Sector Reform (DSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and protection of civilians.

Other tasks of UN troops specific to a particular operation can be: establishment of buffer zones, joint operations, reinforce/relief operation and evacuation. In the performance of the above mentioned missions, the troops may be required to detect and neutralize mines/Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) and Improvised explosive devices (IEDs).¹¹

Police is one of the non-military components of UN peacekeeping operations. The use of police in UN peacekeeping operations dates back to the 1960s, with the first deployment of police officers to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the organization of the first CivPol component in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964.¹²

United Nations Police aims to reinforce or re-establish domestic police services to create the conditions for sustainable peace and development of the host-State by assisting to develop community-oriented policing, and train host-State police officers or provide specialization in different types of investigations and address serious and organized crime.¹³ Civilian police officers are usually law enforcement personnel on active duty in their home countries and are seconded by Member States to UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁴

In environments characterized by weak or dysfunctional rule of law institutions and in contexts of criminal and low-intensity violence, UN police can play a vital role in maintaining security and protecting the civilian population from human rights abuses and physical violence.

UN police generally includes two types of deployment modalities, Individual Police Officer (IPOs) and Formed Police Units (FPUs). IPOs are normally unarmed (with some

⁹ Staff officers can be the 4th categorization of contributions; technically they are part of contingents, individual military officers serve in staff posts, both within the force headquarters and in various specialized positions where they are integrated into civilian staff.

¹⁰ “e-Guide to the United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support: A Resource for New Staff at Headquarters”. United Nations, January, 2015. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/DPKO-DFSe-Guide15-01-08.pdf, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

¹¹ *United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual. Volume I*. New York: United Nations, 2012. 82.

¹² Sebastián, S. *The Role of Police in UN Peace Operations: Filling the Gap in the Protection of Civilians from Physical Violence*. Civilians in Conflict Policy Brief No. 3, September 2015. 9.

¹³ “What the United Nations Police do in the Field”. United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/work.shtml>, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

¹⁴ *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. 84.

exceptions), and have historically been utilized for community-oriented policing, information-gathering, capacity-building, training and monitoring. FPU are cohesive mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. FPU are armed and, generally speaking, deliver a more robust form of policing than IPOs based on mandate authority and tasks. The first police unit of this kind was deployed in Kosovo in 1999.¹⁵

United Nations Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)¹⁶ are also categorized as UN Military Observers (UNMOs), UN Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) or UN Military Advisers (MILADs). The UN normally asks the member states to nominate their officers in the rank of Captain and/or Major to serve as an UNMEM. However, depending on the nature of the task, at times, senior officers such as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels may also be assigned as UNMEM.

Military experts are military officers who are not permitted to carry weapons. Though their roles are determined by the mandate of the mission, there are four main roles that can be mentioned. First monitoring and observation, for example foot or aerial or sea patrols and inspection. Second negotiation and mediation – which can be identification of dispute, prevention of escalation and dispute resolution. Third liaising with different external partners of the mission like other UN Agencies, NGOs and neighbouring countries; or liaising with opposing armed groups and military forces. The fourth is reporting to the appropriate chain of command.¹⁷

The Role of Ethiopia in UN Peacekeeping Operations

According to a UN report, as of February 2017, Ethiopia ranks first on the troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations around the world by sending 8,169 troops, 91 military experts and 61 police officers.¹⁸ A total of 8,321 people of which 7,731 are men and 590 are women, deployed in conflict zones mainly in the Horn of Africa.¹⁹

Since January 2016, Ethiopia has been the top contributor and since 2012 it has been one of the top four contributors in the world by exchanging places with Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. Bangladesh was the highest single contributor in UN history, contributing 9,380 troops, police and military experts in 2015.

Furthermore, Ethiopia has been sending troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2014 and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) are stationed bilaterally in Somalia which is outside Ethiopia's contribution to AMISOM to provide support for the Somali National Armed Forces.

¹⁵ Sebastián. *The Role of Police...* 11.

¹⁶ Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) can be categorized as UN Military Observers (UNMOs), UN Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) or UN Military Advisers (MILADs).

¹⁷ *United Nations Military Observes Handbook*. New York: United Nations, 2001. 23–24.

¹⁸ "Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations". United Nations. UN.org. 31 January 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/jan17_1.pdf, Accessed on 28 February 2017.

¹⁹ "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations". United Nations. UN.org. 31 January 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/jan17_2.pdf, Accessed on 28 February 2017.

Ethiopia's first international contribution to a UN-authorized peacekeeping force happened in Korea (1951–1954). In 1951, some 3,518 soldiers²⁰ of the Imperial Guard of Ethiopia, the *Kagnew* Battalion, were sent to Korea to fight alongside the UN forces as part of the United States led 7th Division.²¹ Hence, Ethiopia was one of the sixteen nations to intervene in the Korean crisis and was one of the few non-NATO states to contribute a contingent of UN forces in South Korea and the only independent African state which participated in the mission.²²

Ethiopia's second contribution was in a UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The mission lasted from July 1960 to June 1964 and Ethiopia sent one battalion with 1,200 troops.²³ Though it was Ethiopia's first UN blue helmets operations,²⁴ Ethiopian Lieutenant-General Kebede Gebre was Force Commander from April 1962 to July 1963. Ethiopia didn't participate in any UN peacekeeping mission after the establishment of the military government called *Derg* in 1974 until the end of the cold war. Ethiopia resumed its participation in peacekeeping after the fall of the military government, *Derg* in 1991. Its first mission was in Rwanda in 1994.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR): October 1993 – March 1996

UNAMIR was originally established to help the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement²⁵ signed by the Hutu-dominated Government of Rwanda and the armed forces of Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front in August 1993. But the mandate modified through time due to the change of the tragic security circumstances.²⁶

Initially, the UNAMIR's mandate was to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali, monitor the ceasefire agreement, including the establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures. Then after the installation of the new

²⁰ Gesit, T. *Yekedimow Tor 1927–1983*. Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing, 2006. 167.

²¹ Kinfe, A. "Ethiopia and the World: Roles in Peacekeeping, Conflict Mediation and International Affairs". In Smidt, W. G. C. and Kinfe, A. (eds), *Discussing Conflict in Ethiopia: Conflict Management and Resolution. Proceedings of the Conference 'Ethiopian and German Contributions to Conflict Management and Resolution' Addis Ababa 11–12 November 2005*. Berlin: Lit, 2007. 181.

²² Djinnit, D. "Ethiopia's Contribution to Global and African Peacekeeping Operations". *IPPJournal*, 7 April 2016. <https://ippjournal.wordpress.com/2016/04/07/ethiopias-contribution-to-global-and-african-peacekeeping-operations-2/>, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

²³ Shibeshi, L. *Kofitanaw Wetader: Letena General Kebede Gebre*. Addis Ababa: Far East Trading P.L.C., 2015. 133.

²⁴ Solomon, A. D. "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Ethiopia". Providing for Peacekeeping. November 2013. <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-ethiopia/>, Accessed on 25 December 2016.

²⁵ Following a skirmish that broke out in October 1990 across the border between the two parties, a ceasefire agreement was negotiated at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. It called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until the elections, in addition to repatriation of refugees and integration of the armed forces of the two sides. Both sides asked the United Nations to assist in the implementation of the agreement.

²⁶ "Rwanda – UNAMIR Mandate". United Nations. UN.org. 2001. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm>, Accessed on 10 January 2017.

Government, in June 1995, the mandate adjusted further to support the Government of Rwanda by assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care, demining, the training of a national police force, and to ensure the security of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

It was the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, which was established in 1991 after a long civil war, which sent the troops to UNAMIR in 1995. It was ambitious for a new government that just came out of civil war to respond to the UN call for the peacekeeping and humanitarian operation in Rwanda following the genocide.²⁷ After the French Army completed its mission, as its third mission for peace, Ethiopia deployed two battalions called *Wegagen* and *Guna*²⁸ with two shifts. A total of 1,694 Ethiopian military personnel served in UNAMIR.

Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR reported that “despite their lack of equipment, the Ethiopian contingent were incredibly resourceful on being able to do their job effectively with minimum equipment and had no reluctance to help local farmers harvest their fields”.²⁹

Moreover, on the 4th of July 2009, on the Rwandan Liberation Day, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda presented the *Uruti* National Liberation Medal and the *Umurinzi* Campaign Against Genocide Medal to the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. The first medal was given in recognition to Meles’s contribution in toppling down the former regime and bringing peace, and socio-economic development in Ethiopia. The second recognized Ethiopia’s contribution in deploying peacekeepers to help Rwanda.³⁰

United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB): May 2004 – December 2006

The mission was to support and help the implementation of the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring national reconciliation as provided under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi³¹ signed at Arusha in August 2000.³²

As of September 2005, in total ONUB consisted of 5,665 uniformed personnel, including 5,400 troops, 168 military observers and 97 police officers, supported by 316 inter-

²⁷ Hailemariam, Z. “Africa: Ethiopia’s Contribution Toward Peacekeeping Mission”. *The Ethiopian Herald*, 8 January 2016. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201601081051.html>, Accessed on 10 January 2017.

²⁸ Hayder, A. “Ethiopian Military Marks National Day”. *African Defense*, 9 February 2015. <http://www.african-defense.com/defense-news/ethiopian-military-marks-national-day/>, Accessed on 10 January 2017.

²⁹ Djinnit. “Ethiopia’s Contribution...”.

³⁰ “After Ethiopia, Eritrea will also be honored for Rwanda Liberation”. *Rwanda News Agency*, 04 July 2010. <http://rnanews.com/politics/3724-after-ethiopia-eritrea-will-also-be-honored-for-rwanda-liberation>, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

³¹ The agreement was facilitated by former Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa and it ended 12 years of civil war dating back to Burundi’s independence in 1960. The conflict was between Hutu rebels and the successive Tutsi-dominated regimes. The agreement was signed between the warring parties for power sharing formula to establish a more representative government and military.

³² “Burundi – ONUB – Background”. United Nations. UN.org. 2006. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

national civilian personnel, 383 local civilian staff and 156 United Nations Volunteers.³³ In January 2005, Ethiopia sent 858 troops and 5 military observers.

ONUB could use all necessary measures to ensure respect for ceasefire agreements, carry out the disarmament and demobilization, and monitor the illegal flow of arms across the national borders, as well as contributing to the successful completion of the electoral process by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections.³⁴ ONUB successfully completed its mandate on 31 December 2006 and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): September 2003 to the Present

UNMIL was established in September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, the humanitarian and human rights activities, as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military force.³⁵

A civil war broke out in Liberia in late 1989 between governmental forces and fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government official, Charles Taylor. In 1993 the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In August 1997, Charles Taylor formed a new Government and announced a policy of reconciliation and national unity. UNOMIL's principal objective was achieved and its mission ceased. However, the Government and opposition party leaders failed to resolve their differences and abuses of human rights continued, which contributed to the intensification of the civil war again.

In September 2003, UN established UNMIL with 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers, 160 staff officers and 1,115 UN police officers, aimed to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia.³⁶ Ethiopia has contributed with 2,569 troops and 17 military observers (Ethiopia started sending military observers/experts from this mission onward see Appendix 4) since August 2004, which meant eight brigades in nine shifts and one battalion.³⁷

³³ "Burundi – ONUB – facts and figures". United Nations. UN.org. 2006. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/facts.html>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

³⁴ "Burundi – ONUB – Background". United Nations. UN.org. 2006. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

³⁵ "Support for the implementation of the Peace Process". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/index.shtml>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

³⁶ "UNAMIL – Background". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁷ *FDRE Peace Support Training Center Graduation booklet*. Addis Ababa: Brana Publishing Co., 2015. 14.

Ethiopia's Current Engagements in UN Peacekeeping

At the time of this study, there are sixteen UN Peacekeeping operations deployed on four continents. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in the Caribbean, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in Europe, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Asia, United Nations Interim in Lebanon (UNFIL), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.

The remaining nine missions are in Africa: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

At the beginning of 2017 Ethiopia participated in six UN missions. In the Caribbean, Ethiopia sent eight police officers to MINUSTAH. The other five missions are in Africa; one infantry man was deployed to MINUSMA in Mali and as of January 2017 one infantryman and one military expert were in UNMIL, Liberia. The other three missions in Africa are in the wider Horn of Africa region (UNMISS, UNISFA and UNAMID) in which Ethiopia makes a significant contribution.

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

Ethiopia also has participated in missions in Côte d'Ivoire since 2006. The Security Council established UNOCI in April 2004 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement signed by the Ivorian parties in January 2003.³⁸ However, following the 2010 Presidential election and political crisis UNOCI has remained on the ground to protect civilians, provide good offices or mediation, support the Ivorian Government in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as well as in the security sector reform, to monitor and promote human rights.³⁹ Ethiopia's two military observers served in Côte d'Ivoire until December 2016.

³⁸ "Protecting civilians and supporting the Government in DDR and security sector reform". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁹ "Protecting civilians...". United Nations.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

MINUSMA was established by the Security Council in April 2013 to support political processes and assist the reestablishment of state authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in Mali.⁴⁰ Ethiopia has only one infantryman to MINUSMA in Mali since April 2016.

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

MINUSTAH was established in June 2004 after an armed conflict that forced President Aristide to exile. Its original mandate was to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment, to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police and demobilization and reintegration programs. But the devastating earth quake of January 2010 forced MINUSTAH to increase its commitment.⁴¹ Ethiopia has been deploying police officers since 2015 and currently there are eight of them serving in MINUSTAH.

African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

A civil war erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of Sudan, its allied militias and other armed rebel groups. In 2006, the African Union deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan, which was replaced in 2008 by the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, the second largest UN Peacekeeping operation in the world.

Though, the protection of civilians is its core mandate it also makes humanitarian assistance and monitors and reports on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.⁴²

Ethiopia began its mission in UNAMID in February 2008 by sending 11 troops and one military observer and as of February 2017 it had 2,575 personnel altogether which made the country the largest contributor to the mission.

⁴⁰ "Supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴¹ "MINUSTAH – Background". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴² "Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid and helping political process in Darfur". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

South Sudan became the newest country in the world on 9 July 2011 after a six-year peace process which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which ended more than 20 years of war. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) supported the implementation of the CPA.⁴³

The Security Council established UNMISS to consolidate peace and security and to help to establish conditions for development in the new country. However, in December 2013, violence broke out in South Sudan's capital, Juba and quickly spread to other locations in the country resulting in a deep nation-wide political and security crisis.

Following the crisis which broke out, in May 2014 the Security Council decided to reinforce UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.⁴⁴

Ethiopia has contributed fifteen police officers since December 2008 which was the first police deployment for Ethiopia (see Appendix 3) for UNMIS and when UNMIS was deployed in South Sudan it also began sending its police officers and by February 2017, it sent 23 police officers, 11 military experts and 1,277 contingent troops, becoming the second largest contributor, only behind India.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

UNISFA's establishment came in June 2011, after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei, which was claimed by both sides and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area also called *Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area*.⁴⁵ Under that deal, brokered by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, the two sides agreed on the need for a third party to monitor the flashpoint border between the North and South.

The mandate of the operation is monitoring the border between the two countries and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. It is authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei.⁴⁶

UNISFA is exceptional for the reason that unlike most peacekeeping missions in the world it is almost entirely composed of Ethiopian peace troops. As of February 2017, 28 countries sent 78 people in total to the mission, while out of the total 4,504 troops, Ethiopia contributed 4,426 personnel. In addition, the fact that both parties requested the Ethiopian

⁴³ In March 2005, UN established UNMIS to support the implementation of the CPA and it provided mediation and political support to the parties, monitored and verified their security arrangements and development. The mandate of UNMIS ended on July 9, 2011 following the completion of the interim period.

⁴⁴ "Protecting civilians, monitoring human rights and supporting implementation of cessation of hostilities agreement". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴⁵ "UNISFA – Background". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/background.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴⁶ "Demilitarizing and monitoring peace in the disputed Abyei Area". United Nations. UN.org. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

force, the Addis Ababa Agreement on Abyei expressed the trust which Ethiopia enjoys in both Khartoum and Juba.⁴⁷

Starting from February 2017, Major General Tesfay Gidey Hailemichael of Ethiopia became the Force Commander and Acting Head of the Mission of UNISFA. Preceding him, all acting heads of mission and force commanders were from the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF): Major General Hassen Ebrahim Mussa, Lieutenant General Birhanu Jula Gelalcha, Lieutenant General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam, (who was also serving as Force Commander at UNMISS in 2014) and Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede Tesfay. The highest ranking female officer in the UN Peacekeeping was Brigadier General Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan, an Ethiopian who was appointed as Deputy Force Commander of UNISFA in the mid of 2016.

Why Countries Contribute for Peacekeeping Operations?

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams pointed out five reasons why states contribute to UN peacekeeping, these are: political, economic, security, institutional and normative reasons. Politically, peacekeeping contribution enhances the national status of the nation on the security issues or it can strengthen a country's bid for an elected seat in the UN Security Council.⁴⁸ Economically, national governments may use UN compensation payments to support their national budget and individuals who participated in the mission can benefit from UN payment of \$1,028 per soldier per month.⁴⁹ The security benefit would be due to the fact that usually "peace operations being more likely to receive contributions from states in the immediate neighbourhood or region than those further afield". Neighbouring states are likely to contribute to contain armed conflicts that might affect them.⁵⁰ The institutional reason lies in the fact that for a country's armed forces the mission provides "invaluable overseas experience".⁵¹ Lastly, a normative reason is the fact that UN peacekeeping promotes a greater good for all and serves as a proof of "good international citizenship".⁵² Generally it can be said that UN peacekeeping support became automatic and unquestioned because it involved few costs in blood and treasure and produced power, prestige, peace and pride on the cheap.⁵³

Historically, one of the main reasons Ethiopia contributed to UN peacekeeping troops was that the League of Nations failed to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936. The Ethiopian government was motivated to participate in the collective security efforts of the UN because Ethiopia had been the victim of the League of Nations' ineffectiveness

⁴⁷ Mehari, T. M. "Keeping Peace in Abyei: The Role and Contributions of Ethiopia". *JSS Africa*, 28 October 2011. <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/jss-today/keeping-peace-in-abyei-the-role-and-contributions-of-ethiopia>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴⁸ Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P. D. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping No. 1*. New York: International Peace Institute, 2012. 3–4.

⁴⁹ Bellamy and Williams. *Broadening the Base...* 4.

⁵⁰ Bellamy and Williams. *Broadening the Base...* 5.

⁵¹ Findlay, T. cited In Bellamy and Williams. *Broadening the Base...* 5.

⁵² Bellamy and Williams. *Broadening the Base...* 5.

⁵³ Jakobsen, P. V. "Denmark and UN Peacekeeping: Glorious past, dim future." *International Peacekeeping* 23/5. 2016. 741–761, 747–748.

of its principles of collective security and it did not want the same thing to happen to other states of the world under UN.⁵⁴ Underlining this fact one can use the words of Skordiles, who said: “This nation [Ethiopia] lost her independence for five years, because of the lack of collective security.”⁵⁵

The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I in his speech at the League of Nations in 1936 clearly shows this.

“On behalf of the Ethiopian people, a member of the League of Nations, I request the Assembly to take all measures proper to ensure respect for the Covenant. I renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the Ethiopian people has been the victim. I declare in the face of the whole world that the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not bow before force; that they maintain their claims that they will use all means in their power to ensure the triumph of right and the respect of the Covenant. ...The great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take?”⁵⁶

Despite this call, the League of Nations failed. This was one of the reasons why the Emperor sent Ethiopian troops to Korea in 1951 and to Congo in 1962.

In 1997, Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) said:

“OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.”⁵⁷

African Heads of States decided to establish a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa at the 1993 Summit in Cairo but just one year later the Rwandan tragedy showed the weakness of OAU’s conflict prevention and management.⁵⁸ UN also acknowledged its failure on its 1999 report.⁵⁹ After OAU changed to AU in 2002, it established

⁵⁴ Haile, A. A. “East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations”. Thesis presented for Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 35.

⁵⁵ Skordiles cited in Haile. “East African Crisis Response...”. 35.

⁵⁶ Haile Selassie. “Appeal to the League of Nations”. Astro. June 1936. http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/appeal_to_the_league_of_nations_.htm, Accessed on 22 January 2016.

⁵⁷ Address by Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the OAU, at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, October 25, 1997. Cited in Malan, M. “Africa: Building Institutions on the Run”. In Daniel, D. C. et al. (eds), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008. 90.

⁵⁸ Murithi, T. “The African Union’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia”. *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 69–82, 72.

⁵⁹ “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda”. United Nations. New York, UN. 1999. www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCE9B.../POC%20S19991257.pdf, Accessed on 30 January 2017.

the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing body of the AU with core functions to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace-support operations and, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in Member States to promote peace, security and stability.⁶⁰

After the establishments of PSC, AU started peacekeeping missions in Africa. In 2003, the first mission wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was deployed to Burundi.⁶¹ In 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish UN Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB) and AMIB troops were incorporated into the ONUB.⁶² Likewise, after the Darfur crisis in Sudan, AU set up a peacekeeping operation in 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan. By 2007 the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur was established by the Security Council and incorporated AMIS personnel.⁶³ And also AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with the approval of the United Nations. These trends of assuming responsibility of securing peace and ensuring stability on the African continent by African states is the idea of African solutions for African problems which is taken earnestly by Ethiopia, especially in the East African region.

The National Security and Economic Interests of Ethiopia

Peacekeeping operations can also be considered a vehicle for national security strategy. Ethiopia is to be found in a region which is distinguished for its civil wars and state failures and most of the problems are transnational due to social and economic problems that in one country have intended, as well as unintended spill over effects on neighbouring countries.⁶⁴ The fact that, out of six states which Ethiopia shares borders with, with the exception of Kenya and Djibouti either Ethiopia is in conflict with (Eritrea) or there are interstate armed conflicts, such as in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. This makes Ethiopia without any other option than sending its troops to UN peacekeeping operations to the troubled neighbouring states.

Post-1991 collapse of the government in Somalia, which resulted in a civil war and the rise of radical Islamists in the country, has been a major security threat in the region. The Sudanese civil war which resulted in the breakaway of South Sudan still has not brought peace because SPLA North launched an armed conflict allied with the Darfur rebels and the division between the leadership of South Sudan led to a new civil war in the country. In addition to this, Sudan and South Sudan still have not finished the demarcation of their borders because of the oil rich Abyei region claimed by both states.

⁶⁰ "Peace and Security Council (PSC)". The African Union Commission. AU. 2017. <https://au.int/web/en/organs/psc>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁶¹ Murithi. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations...". 75.

⁶² Murithi. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations...". 76

⁶³ "Security Council Authorizes deployment of United Nations African Union 'Hybrid' peace operation in Bid to resolve Darfur Conflict". Security Council. Press Release, SC/9089, 31 July 2007. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁶⁴ Mulugeta, G. B. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors". *Journal of African-centered Solutions in Peace and Security* 1/1. 2016. 63–90, 63.

Thus, Ethiopia responded to all four aforementioned calamities through AU and UN peacekeeping missions. (See Appendix 5.) Security threats due to spill over effects come from communities living on both sides of the borders, namely pastoral communities, human traffickers and they are also present in the form of illegal movement of migrants, illicit trade and organized crime such as drug trafficking. They represent major security threats along the whole Ethiopian border region.⁶⁵

In addition, scholars found evidence that rebellions are contagious, in other words, a rebellion significantly increases the risk of internal upheaval in a neighbouring country.⁶⁶ An ongoing conflict in neighbouring states may decrease the price of arms and increase their availability, making it relatively accessible to rebel groups to mobilize insurgencies.⁶⁷ This is most likely along the “poorly defined borders of Ethiopia”.⁶⁸ Recently, armed groups attempted to attack the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – set to become the biggest hydropower dam in Africa – located only 15 km from the Sudanese border. The Sudanese government handed over some of the rebels who fled from the Ethiopian security forces and killed 13 of them.⁶⁹

Unlike the Sudanese government’s effort when more than 1,000 gunmen from South Sudan killed 28 people and kidnapped 43 children in the Gambella region of Ethiopia, bordering South Sudan at the beginning of March 2017, the South Sudanese government which had been in a civil war since 2013, was not in a position to do anything. The occurrence of such incidents for the second time⁷⁰ demonstrated that violence in South Sudan could spill over into its neighbours.⁷¹ These made sending peacekeeping troops to neighbouring states to help to create strong and functioning governments not a matter of altruism but a matter of national security.

Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing countries in the world. One of the incentives which the government provides beside low-tariffs and cheap labour, is security. Li Yifan, China’s ambassador to Ethiopia said, “Ethiopia’s government and its military have managed to keep peace and stability in this country ... that is the basis of any meaningful economic activity. Without that I don’t think the investors will come over here.”⁷² Security in the region is also essential. In order to sustain this growth, one might remember Colonel Haile’s words:

⁶⁵ Mulugeta. “Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy...”. 75.

⁶⁶ Collier and Hoeffler cited In Sesay, F. L. “Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth”. *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004. www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPNo68.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

⁶⁷ Sesay. “Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries...”.

⁶⁸ Mulugeta. “Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy...”. 75.

⁶⁹ Gaffey, C. “Ethiopia and Eritrea trade accusations over grand dam ‘attack’”. *Newsweek*, 3 February 2017. <http://europe.newsweek.com/ethiopia-dam-nile-eritrea-562895?rm=eu>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁷⁰ “Ethiopia attack: 200 people dead, 100 children missing”. *Al Jazeera*, 18 April 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/ethiopia-attack-200-people-dead-100-children-missing-160418045025770.html>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁷¹ “Ethiopia reports deadly raid by gunmen from South Sudan”. *Al Jazeera*, 15 March 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/ethiopia-reports-deadly-raid-gunmen-south-sudan-170315130515870.html>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁷² Davison, W. “In the Fastest-Growing African Economy, Government is the Fuel”. *Bloomberg*, 5 February 2016. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-05/in-the-fastest-growing-african-economy-government-is-the-fuel>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

“Peace in Ethiopia alone was not considered to be enough for the development of the country. Over time it has become increasingly obvious that it’s not only the stability of the neighbouring states, but also regional security disturbances, directly, that affect the process of development in Ethiopia.”⁷³

Yet Ethiopia’s trade with its neighbours is small. Negative spill over to neighbouring nations is likely to occur from disruptions to trade, heightened risk perceptions by would-be investors in the region, severance of input supply lines, collateral damage from nearby battles, and resources spent to assist refugees.⁷⁴ Ethiopia sheltered 742,700 refugees in mid-2016, which made it the biggest host country after Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon.⁷⁵

The effects of civil wars are not only felt in the countries where they are fought but also in neighbouring countries and beyond.⁷⁶ Conflict in one country does not only reduce economic growth of its neighbours but also significantly affects other growth enhancing variables.⁷⁷ Unless Ethiopia tries to help neighbouring countries to achieve peace, the spill-over effects of the conflict will hinder its ongoing economic growth. It seems at this point and time, unless there is peace in all countries in the region, there will be a way for economic integration and prosperous future. This makes Ethiopia’s focus on peacekeeping the right thing to do.

Peacekeeping missions provide economic gains for the soldiers who participate in the peace operations. UN operations offer to troops experience in crisis situations, and reward them with a UN-level salary that goes with such assignments. In Ethiopia’s armed forces, being deployed for peacekeeping duties is increasingly becoming the goal of soldiers.⁷⁸

Peacekeeping has also become an indispensable part of Ethiopia’s foreign and military policy for the last ten years. As Ethiopia hosts the headquarters of the African Union, it wants to keep its regional great power status. As we have mentioned, Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, though its per capita income remains one of the lowest ones.⁷⁹ Its growing involvement in peacekeeping operations in the region makes the government look for its hegemonic position in the African and global politics and enhance its national image.

Ethiopia became the temporary member of the UN Security Council for the third time – after twenty-six years of absence – without opposition, in June 2016. In its campaign, the then Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tedros Adhanom stated during the African Union’s 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government that Ethiopia’s desire to be a member of the Security Council emanates from “a strong and real

⁷³ Haile. “East African Crisis Response...”. 45–46.

⁷⁴ Murdoch and Sandler cited In Sesay. “Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries...”.

⁷⁵ “Poorer countries host most of the forcibly displaced, report shows”. UNHCR. 27 February 2017. <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report.html>, Accessed on 22 March 2017.

⁷⁶ Sesay. “Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries...”.

⁷⁷ Sesay. “Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries...”.

⁷⁸ Haile. “East African Crisis Response...”. 53.

⁷⁹ Holodny, E. “The 13 fastest-growing economies in the world”. *World Economic Forum*, 12 January 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/world-bank-fast-growing-global-economies-2015-6/#turkmenistan-12>, Accessed on 22 March 2017.

belief that our solid record of continued contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security puts us in a well-placed position to shoulder the responsibility”.⁸⁰ He also mentioned that historically, “Ethiopia has always responded to UN calls for collective action on international peace and security. Since the inception of the UN, Ethiopia has deployed over 80,000 military and police personnel to more than 10 peacekeeping missions worldwide.”⁸¹

The Future of Ethiopian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions

The demand for UN peacekeepers has grown in recent years. More than 100,000 uniformed peacekeepers are deployed around the world, of which the highest numbers of troops are deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and South Sudan. In the mid-1990s when the Balkan states of Europe were riddled with violence and UN peacekeepers were active in the area, European nations particularly the UK and France made up the largest shares of total contributions.⁸² In the 2000s most of the UN peacekeeping missions are in Africa, where European nations supply just 6% of the total personnel contribution.⁸³ Today the top ten contributors are five African and five Asian nations. (See Appendix 6 and 7.)

This is due to the geographical proximity to the conflict-ridden countries. Another reason of the less contribution of Western countries to UN peacekeeping operations after 1995, might be the fact that they start to conduct peace support operations through EU and NATO.⁸⁴

Though Ethiopia has one of the region’s most effective armed forces and capability, (see Appendix 1) which has become battle-hardened and experienced following a history of combat operations,⁸⁵ it still has hard work ahead to become the much needed high quality force that can work in urban terrain and in diverse environments.

Ethiopia established the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Coordination Center in Addis Ababa in 2015 under the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence. Formerly, the Peace Support Training Centre initially started its operation at the beginning of 2005, at the Hurso Training Centre in the eastern part of Ethiopia, 525 kilometres from Addis Ababa. Later the Centre was relocated to Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), 45 km east of Addis.⁸⁶ It was responsible for the training of individuals designated for PSOs and was responsible for providing assistance to peacekeeping units in the designing and conducting of PSO training.

⁸⁰ Mesle, A. “Africa: Ethiopia’s UNSC Seat – Reinvigorating UN’s Role in Addressing Global Challenges”. *The Ethiopian Herald*, 8 July 2016. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201607111176.html>, Accessed on 22 March 2017.

⁸¹ Mesle. “Africa: Ethiopia’s UNSC Seat...”.

⁸² Gao, G. “UN peacekeeping at new highs after post-Cold War surge and decline”. Pew Research Center. 2 March 2016. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/02/un-peacekeeping-at-new-highs-after-post-cold-war-surge-and-decline/>, Accessed on 19 March 2017.

⁸³ Gao. “UN peacekeeping at new highs after post-Cold War surge and decline.”

⁸⁴ Jakobsen. “Denmark and UN Peacekeeping...”. 741–761, 748.

⁸⁵ “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa”. *The Military Balance* 117/1. 2017. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 14 February 2017. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271216>, Accessed on 30 January 2017.

⁸⁶ Haile. “East African Crisis Response...”. 67.

The establishment of the centre in a new form is not only positive in the aspect to make more troop and police contributions from Ethiopia and other African countries but also to meet the challenges of the contemporary peacekeeping missions.

Ethiopia's main peacekeeping challenges stem from inadequate language skills and its low presence in senior and middle level leadership positions in UN missions and in DPKO despite being one of the top contributing countries.⁸⁷

The centre was also established as part of Ethiopia's commendable contribution to regional security and stability and aimed to build and share more broadly Ethiopia's long years of experience and good practices in peace support operations with other states in East Africa. It will help to enhance regional standby capacities of military, police and civilian experts for peacekeeping missions and peace building elements of the East African Standby Force (EASF) and the African Standby Force (ASF).

The centre gives a comprehensive curriculum on conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict recovery which was developed by seasoned experts representing national, regional and international institutions. The training targets middle and senior level military members, police and civilians from Ethiopia and abroad who will potentially be deployed to peace support operations and other multinational efforts to promote the agenda of peace and security.

It is apparent that Ethiopia will continue its peacekeeping role mainly in the Horn of Africa as long as the region lacks internal political stability and military capability. Moreover, since the Ethiopian government remains somehow, with the exception of Somalia, neutral in the internal conflict of its neighbouring states and is able to combine diplomatic and military instruments to insure peace and stability in the region, its peacekeeping operations can be successful. In general, Ethiopian peacekeeping operations are one of the most important achievements and success stories for a country transformed from being a source of regional instability to a force of peace.

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⁸⁷ Dersso, S. A. "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Ethiopia." *Providing for Peacekeeping*. November 2013. <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-ethiopia/>, Accessed on 25 December 2016.

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
Appendix 1.

Summary of Ethiopian military strength⁸⁸

Total Population – 99,465,819 (2015)			
Geography – 1,104,300 (sq. km)			
GDP \$ 69.2 bn. (2016)			
Active Armed Forces	Military Expenditure	Air Power	Ground Force
Army 135,000 Air Force 3,000 Reservists – None Paramilitary –None World Ranking (size): 35	2015: US \$ 399 m (0.6 % of GDP) 2016: US \$ 451 m (0.6 % of GDP)	Aircraft: 26 combat capable Fighter: 11 fighter/ground attack – 15 Transport – 12 Training – 16 Helicopters Attack: 18 Multirole: 7 Multirole / Transport: 12	1 (<i>Agazi</i> Commando) Special Force Command 1 (Northern) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 4 Infantry division) 1 (Western) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 3 Infantry division) 1 (Central) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 5 Infantry division) 1 (Eastern) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 5 Infantry division)

UN peacekeeping mission leadership and authority structure⁸⁹

Levels of Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping.




⁸⁸ "Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa". *The Military Balance* 117/1. 2017. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 14 February 2017. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271216>, Accessed on 30 January 2017.

⁸⁹ Source: *United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual. Volume I*. United Nations. 55.


Appendix 2.

Ethiopian troop contribution to UN peacekeeping operations since 1994⁹⁰



Appendix 3.

Ethiopian police contribution to UN peacekeeping operations since 1994⁹¹




⁹⁰ Every year the number of troops varies from month to month, for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

⁹¹ Every year the number of police varies from month to month, for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

Appendix 4.

Ethiopian military expert contribution to UN peacekeeping operations since 1994⁹²



Appendix 5.


Detail description of Ethiopian UN peacekeeping operations in the world, as of February 2017

	Region	Country	Name of Mission	Type of the Mission	Number		
					Male	Female	Total
1	The Caribbean	Haiti	MINUSTAH	Individual Police	8	0	8
			Total				8
2	West Africa	Mali	MINUSMA	Contingent Troop	1	0	1
			Total				1
3	Horn of Africa	Sudan	UNAMID	Individual Police	26	4	30
				Experts on Mission	10	1	11
				Contingent Troop	2,365	168	2,534
			Total			2,575	
4	Horn of Africa	Abiye	UNISFA	Experts on Mission	67	2	69
				Contingent Troop	4,055	302	4,357
			Total			4,426	
5	Horn of Africa	South Sudan	UNMISS	Individual Police	23	0	23
				Expert on Mission	11	0	11
				Contingent Troops	1,164	113	1,277
			Total			1,311	
			Total				8,321

⁹² Every year the number of military expert varies from month to month, for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.


Appendix 6.

As of February 2017, the World's top ten UN peacekeeping troop, police and military expert contributors



Appendix 7.

As of February 2017, the World's top ten UN peacekeeping troop, police and military expert contributors



Hungarian Participation in the European Union's Congo Mission – Balance Sheet of 10 Years of the EUSEC RD Congo Mission

Sándor Nagy

Abstract

The European Union's mission named EUSEC RD Congo started its operation more than ten years ago in 2005, in the security sector of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, within the areas of rebuilding the Congolese national army. In the past years, the continuous expansion of the initial mandate made the creation of the opportunity of earlier aims possible, so that the cornerstone of state authority, the army, can set off on the path that provides for environment and capacity, which prepares it for the field of completing tasks in the areas of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this job, experts of the Hungarian Defence Forces actively participated during the period of 2005 and 2015.

Keywords: *security sector reform (SSR), EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo*

Introduction

EUSEC RD Congo is the mission of the European Union in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the most significant activities on the African continent with more than ten years of history. The 2001 assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila, the current president's father created a significant power gap in a country where law was maintained only by guns for years; where the population has not known peace since the 1960s, when the process of emancipation from colonization began. Similarly to other African countries, here too, a sort of inheritable bid of power occurred, as Joseph Kabila, son of the assassinated president became the next head of state. He did not have the experience of political leadership, but saw that without peace or relative peace, he cannot lead the country out of its extremely precarious situation.

Prior to the 2006 presidential election, it was absolutely essential to recover the national apparatus, the rather self-governing, but in no way efficient army and the police from its ruins. In order to do so, it was indispensable to have international assistance. The leaders of the DRC turned to the European Union with the request to send an expert mission to rebuild

the army, which formed a highlighted part of the security sector. Responding to the request, the European Council initiated the organization of the mission.

The decision was made on 8 June 2005, and the EUSEC RD Congo mission started its operation officially at the end of June 2005 under the command of General Michel Joana.¹ As a result of the contribution of the EU member states, the mission continuously expanded in its number and tasks. The extraordinary efforts of the first period, as well as the work of the experts in the following mandates gave proof of the fact that the experts did an effective job.

More than once during the years, arguments broke out about the effectiveness of the mission among the EU member states, but it needs to be known that the evaluation of the work should not be measured according to European standards. Having spent four years as a member of the EUSEC RDC mission in army-building tasks, I can state that the results of our job justify the tremendous effort which perhaps was not always visible and measureable in numbers for outsider spectators. Visualizations about the future of the mission, and the dilemma to *abolish, continue or transform* was finally settled. The 2015 mandate defined the fate of the mission's future.

Therefore, despite all difficulties, the ten-year mission brought such results that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo – FARDC) now is able to accomplish the fundamental tasks on its own. However, professionally supporting the tasks started in 2005, and following developments of processes is still necessary.

Origins of the Formation of Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Today the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire until 1997), is in the center of armed conflicts in the area of the Great Lakes, which has more than one reasons. Among these we can enumerate the practice of the state to misuse power and conduct bad procedures formed around the exploitation and treatment of natural resources; the sharpening of sometimes artificially generated ethnic conflicts; the questions of post-colonial borders; the flow of refugees due to the conflicts, and the external armed interventions.

The First Congo War in 1996–97 led to the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko,² president for more than 30 years. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, leading the armed militia of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo–Zaire (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo, AFDL), taking advantage of Marshall Mobutu's decreasing Western and American support as the Cold War was coming to an end, and the waning political and military support of Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew Mobutu's rule, and became leader of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The armed conflict then led to the development of the Second Congo War (1998–2003), for which the reason should be looked for in the fundamental political instability and

¹ "Pierre-Michel Joana". <http://www.operationspaix.net/341-biographie-de-joana-pierre-michel.html>, Accessed on 21 August 2015.

² "Mobutu Sese Seko". Encyclopædia Britannica. <https://global.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko>, Accessed on 10 August 2015.

the extreme vulnerability of the state of Congo, which stood on weak legs. In the latter, militaries of more than 10 African countries, and many groups of Congo and foreign illegal armed forces were affected.

Starting from 1998, Laurent-Désiré Kabila made efforts to consolidate his power, during which he attempted to suppress the political influence of Uganda and Rwanda. He did so while the power and legitimacy of the Congolese state was extremely weak in significant parts of the country, especially in the eastern regions. Again significant parts of the Eastern Congolese territories were under the control of illegal armed groups of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Angola. These areas were treated in such a way as if they were the heartland of their illegal activities in the inland and Congo, and the field of battle for the monitoring of the DRC's natural resources. Continuous rivalry and serial clashes resulted in the engulfing and universal wave of violence, which was going on among the groups concerned to control these territories.

The Congolese government, recognizing its own interests in establishing stability and standing helplessly against the waves of events, enjoyed the military support of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Chad. It resulted in the splitting along the borders of their interests of the countries in the region.

Comprehensive Agreement about the Elimination of the Hostile Confrontation and the Transitional State of Congo

The agreement taking shape could be nothing but the elimination/suspension of the hostile confrontation and the agreement of a transitional period, as the ultimate condition of making peace.

Since 1999 the international community has played an increasingly active role in the solution of the conflict, one of the most prominent areas of which was the security sector, more precisely the reform of the army. Several ceasefire agreements were born during this period, however, despite the positive processes, the fights and massacres did not decrease significantly.

On 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe signed a ceasefire agreement with the aim of abolishing the hostility between all opposing parties operating in Congolese territories. The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement de Liberation du Congo, MLC), the Congolese insurrectionist fraction signed the Lusaka ceasefire agreement a bit later, on 1 August 1999.

The agreement included the conditions necessary for the solution of the situation getting more and more beyond control in the area along the Congolese border, such as the following:

- Monitoring the infiltration of illegal weapons trade and armed groups into Congolese territories;
- Starting national dialogues (dialogues between the government, civil and social organizations and the armed groups);
- The alignment of the issues regarding the security area, as well as the disarmament and integration of the armed militia and groups.

Among the plans there was the establishment of a Joint Military Committee, with a representation of the opposing parties in equal proportion. It was defined that the Joint Military Committee could only operate under the surveillance of a neutral authority designated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). They also defined the establishing of armed forces with the coordination of the OUA (later on AU), which – at the same time – operated under the aegis of the UN.

On 22 February 2001 in its Regulation No. 134, the UN Security Council called the opposing parties for the elimination of their illegal armed forces. At the same time, they invited those involved in the conflict to work out a plan with the aim of the disarmament of these armed groups and militia and their integration into civil life.

In a report of 8 July 2001 the UN General Secretary suggested the surveillance of the structure and location of the UN Congolese mission (MONUC).³ The suggestion included the establishment of special forces and their stationing in the most endangered, eastern territories of the country. In its Regulation No. 1445, on 4 December 2002 the Security Council accepted the suggestions of the General Secretary, and at the same time raised the number of MONUC forces to 8,700.

On 17 December 2002 the government of the DRC and other participants of the conflict signed the agreement known as *Accord Global et Inclusif* in Sun City, South Africa, making a proposal concerning the transition period with an aim of putting an end to the current troubled history of the DRC.

The basis of this was the Lusaka Agreement (Accord de Lusaka), which had already anticipated the indispensable ceasefire. This new agreement highlighted the abolition of the opposition between the Congolese armed groups and the governmental forces and also determined the tasks of the political transition period. The first step of the process was the establishment of the transitional government where different political parties, as well as civilian organisations should have their own representation. The agreement considered it fundamental to establish a transitional government, determining the limitations of executive, legislative and judicial powers, and beyond these, military regulations, as well. The agreement defined the restoration of the Congolese state power on democratic bases, as well as the reform of the security sector (RSS) a priority.

The Transitional Period and the Participation of the EU in the Congolese Stabilization Process

Prior to the EUSEC RDC and EUPOL RDC missions, the EU had already been present in the DRC with its EUPOL Kinshasa mission established on 9 December 2004 on the basis of a mutual decision (Actin commune 2004/847/CFSP). The EU together with the UN and other international players took part in the support of the process.

The primary responsibility for the EUPOL Kinshasa mission was the professional support of the integrated police forces under Congolese command. The steadiness and adaptability of these forces were a precondition of the rebirth of a nation through the assurance

³ “MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. UN. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc, Accessed on 10 January 2016.

of the inner security of the country. The implementation did not meet the expectations. The police (as well as the army) was a totally polarized organisation at that time, being unable to meet standard expectations and requirements. However, the EUPOL Kinshasa mission was not able to respond suitably to the needs emerging at an exceptional urgency either. Its limitations lay within its mandate, which did not ensure enough space for the consultants. However, the main thing is to understand that several internal security and border control tasks were provided by the army in the first place, and its influence was even much more significant compared to that of the police, but there was no assistance of specialists similar to the police in their case.

In the security sector reform (SSR), the army meant a special part and the possible solution concentrated on three factors:

- *Global and Inclusive Agreement* 2002, including the foundation of the Supreme Defense Council whose significant tasks were to form an integrated and restructured national army, define its directives and create defense policy;
- *Interim Constitution*, adopted on 3 April 2003, defining the task and structure of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and emphasising its political neutrality;
- *Dar es Salaam Agreement*,⁴ which strengthened the legitimacy of the RSS by insisting on continuing the process in agreement with the leaders of armed groups not signing the agreement in 2002.

The army structural reform plan (later recast), determining needs, objectives, possible participating parties in the establishment of FARDC and the timeframe of the reform was accepted by the Congolese authorities in May 2005.

Foundation of EUSEC RDC and Its Directives

On 26 April 2005 the Congolese Government asked the European Union to take part in the stabilization of the security sector with experts paying special attention to the reform of the army. The EU accepted the request and in its decision 2005/355/PESC acted on the launching of Mission EUSEC RD Congo on 8 June 2005.

The request of the Congolese Government was in connection with the run-up to the presidential election of 2006. Joseph Kabila, prior to the death of his father in 2001, served in the army in the rank of Major General thus he was equipped with an insight into the state of affairs of the army. The reform of the army was essential since an effective army was needed to consolidate the power of Kabila. It must be noted that several military and political leaders benefitted from the army by the embezzlement of the money resulting from the difference between the budgetary and the actual strength of the army. The official strength of the army at that time was over 350,000. However, as a result of the census headed by EUSEC RDC mission, it was later reduced to 110,000–120,000.

⁴ Accord global de cessez-le-feu entre le Gouvernement de Transition du Burundi et le Mouvement Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD). According to the African Union, its statements could also refer to the situation in the Congo. <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5923/3177.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed on 01 July 2015.

The EUSEC RDC operated in close cooperation with the already operating EUPOL Kinshasa mission, later transformed to EUPOL RDC, and continued operating on the basis of the reform of the police forces.

The priority of the EUSEC RDC was to support the Congolese authority in forming its national army. Furthermore, it participated in the integration process of various armed groups and militants. The headquarters of the mission was based in the capital city of Kinshasa, concurrently experts groups operated in Kisangani⁵ (October 2007 – September 2010) Bukavu,⁶ Goma⁷ (from January 2006), Lubumbashi⁸ (March 2007 – March 2008 and from March 2010) and Bunia⁹ (January 2006 – September 2009).

The personnel of the EUSEC mission consisted mainly of experts from 13 EU member countries, but local people also participated in providing administrative and logistical support. The EUSEC RDC was an unarmed advisory mission though most of the experts were experienced soldiers, active or retired.

The objective of the EUSEC RDC mission was continuously being developed and was adjusted to the army reform process and to the current situation taking into account the emerging needs. Compared to its initial period, it had widened till its transition in 2015. The three major areas of activities were the following:

- EU experts (active and retired experienced soldiers)/technical support of the army;
- creating conditions for the relaunch of military training;
- coordination of the international and local organizations in order to ensure the security sector reform.

Expert/technical Support of the Congolese Army in the Fields of Management and Organisation

The support aimed at the rebuilding of the administration and managing human resources. In particular, EUSEC experts focused on establishing an effective administrative system of personnel in parallel with a transparent, manageable and auditable financial system. The first success of the mission was the establishment of the financial/payment system (*Chaîne de paiement*). The financial structure operating under the control and with the support of the mission aimed at separating the command and the financial structures. However, it was merely one of the fields in relation with finance with a particular view of the correct payment of salaries to the soldiers and catering supplies. The program set as its main priority the elimination of the current practice of financial dependence of soldiers on their commanders, since previously commanders paid (most of the cases did not pay) their soldiers thus enhancing their personal vulnerability. Therefore, in numerous cases subordinates respected only their immediate commanders ignoring command hierarchy and in most of the cases commanders stole their soldiers' money. To carry out the project, it was necessary

⁵ "Kisangani". Encyclopædia Britannica. www.britannica.com/place/Kisangani, Accessed on 01 May 2016.

⁶ "Bukavu". Encyclopædia Britannica. www.britannica.com/place/Bukavu, Accessed on 01 May 2016.

⁷ "Goma". Encyclopædia Britannica. www.britannica.com/place/Goma, Accessed on 01 May 2016.

⁸ "Lubumbashi". Encyclopædia Britannica. www.britannica.com/place/Lubumbashi, Accessed on 01 May 2016.

⁹ "Bunia". Encyclopædia Britannica. www.worldatlas.com/af/cd/5/where-is-bunia.html, Accessed on 01 May 2016.

to know the actual strength of the army. To determine the strength of the army, the Army of Congo was involved in two great campaigns. The basis of the central personnel database was composed of the data found here which more or less showed real numbers.

The condition of the communication infrastructure in Congo did not enable the coordinated operation and continuous coordination of the administration system of the military sections. It was essential to install the information system. As a first measure, the information system was installed at the Defence Staff in Kinshasa, later on at 11 military zone commands, and after that they connected them. This information development was conducted with the financial and technical support of EUSEC, but during the operation a great deal of problems had occurred as it was the task of the Defence Staff of Congo in accordance with the contract.

On many occasions, the compulsory maintenance and service tasks were conducted, and a great deal of difficulties were caused by the irregular electricity service. The operational information personnel were trained, and their further training was continuous. After the registration of the personnel, military cards equipped with memory cards were handed out. During that, we met several servicemen who had not taken part in the previous registrations or had joined the army during the integration which continued unofficially. This military service card was suitable for authorization by fingerprints and contained all personal data which were necessary for the right transfers of salaries.

Restarting Military Training in Order to Consolidate Military Reforms

As a result of long lasting wars, the officer and NCO training stopped over 20 years ago, or apart from few exceptions, the training of troops was not conducted, which were the result of some commanders' personal ambitions. Previously, over 30 military schools had been operating in the country. The consultations with the Defence Staff of Congo resulted in the designation of the schools whose renovations were financed by EUSEC RDC and controlled by their experts. Apart from these, there had been previous courses in which various topics were involved, such as civil-military relations, military and logistic skills, human rights.

In addition to the programmes initiated for soldiers, certain measures were taken in favour of the soldiers' families, but the number of the projects realized for this purpose was relatively low for the demand. The mission aimed at helping the soldiers' wives and widows with various short useful courses, so that they could adapt to the civilian communities more easily and assist the families' daily lives, too.

2005–2010, the first five-year mandate

Going back a little in time, a brief overview of the scope of activities and tasks defined in the mandates is required, since in the course of the years the priorities defined in the mandates changed. In the years following the establishment of the mission, the priority was the establishment of a financial hierarchy and of a unified pay structure. As I have referred

to it earlier, within the army there was no single system where the command and financial hierarchy was not separated. The technical side of the program implementation included the appointment of payment officers at the units and in military districts, their preparation and supply with vehicle because of the fragmented location of the units. When the soldiers had *more or less* regularly and at the designated locations (usually at their headquarters) received their salaries, the census of the army could begin in order to know the real size and strength. However, it must be recorded that even in spite of the tight control, a lot of money got embezzled due to incorrect strength data.

The census campaign in 2007 and 2008, carried out jointly by FARDC and EUSEC following a very profound preparation, provided a realistic data for the Central Database which became the basis for the budget. It was followed by the construction and operation of structures for continuous monitoring of the financial system.

Like the previous issue, NCO and officer training restarts after several decades meant another big challenge for the mission. During the long and mutual preparations, it started to renew the chosen schools within the given budget. Setting up priorities was not an easy task, but finally an order was accepted, according to which the Command Academy and the School of Logistics in Kinshasa, the NCO Academy and the Infantry and Artillery School in Kitona,¹⁰ while in Kananga the School of Administration were placed in the project of the coming years.

The first year at the NCO Academy started in 2010, prior to it the EUSEC consultants working in the eastern region took part in the process of testing and selection. With the School's pedagogical programme, in the framework of a bilateral agreement, the French Army helped us. Outside the school, a training lasting several weeks was organized and financed by the EUSEC. Up to 2010 about 1,800 Congolese officers and non-commissioned officers working in administration were trained at 19 locations.

Modernizing logistics constituted the third big area of the tasks. The technical conditions at the Congolese Army were so outdated that its renovation exceeded the capabilities of EUSEC mission. Logistics doctrine and the associated controls development, formation and determination of the logistical procedures in the logistics organizational structures has begun.

In the field of social policy and the issue of human rights the focus had to be placed on the situation of the military families, because stabilizing the soldiers' family background was of extraordinary significance. The action took part in collaboration with international partners in order to ensure that both the soldiers and their families had and an improvement in living standards. In cooperation with partners EUSEC experts provided assistance in assessing the needs of the developed infrastructure planning.

¹⁰ Kitona: a settlement 300 km south-west of Kinsahasa in the Bas-Congo province, with a population of 4,000. A military base was established here by the Belgian Army after WWII. A part of the base went through modernization. 'Bas-Congo: la base de Kitona a frôlé une insurrection armée'. <http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/bas-congo-la-base-de-kitona-frole-une-insurrection-armee-29246>, Accessed on 23 August 2015.

2010–2015, the changes

The expansion of areas of activity started in 2009 by the fifth mandate, but a real enlargement took place by 2010. Previously experts also had worked in the Cabinet of Ministers and the Chief of Staff in addition to office staff, but the scope of activities from the fifth mandate on aimed at the strategic level, as well. By 2009, the Congolese army reform plan was finished. However, due to several amendments it was only in 2010 that it was presented to the representatives of the international community. EUSEC RDC developed a program of action for effective cooperation which was signed by the Congolese Defense Minister and the head of the mission, General Jean-Paul Michel.

The reform plan defined 10 points of the tasks in order to meet the military standards expected of them:

1. Rejuvenating the Army by recruitment;
2. Continuous education and training;
3. Supplying the army with modern equipment;
4. Improving working and living conditions;
5. Reorganization of the country's defence on new territorial principles (protection zones and military districts);
6. Implementation organized on new principles;
7. The re-interpretation of the use of the forces (Joint Force Doctrines);
8. The renovation of existing military infrastructure and construction of a new one;
9. Defining the pace of the army reforms;
10. The creation of financial resources.

In order to ensure that the main objectives of the reform are sufficiently corroborated, EUSEC strategy consultants took part in the drafting work.

Elaborated:

- 2009–2010 the Congolese army reform plan;
- 2011 Army Act governing the organization and functioning;
- 2013 Army Act regulating the status of its soldiers;
- 2014 Presidential Decree on the appointment of senior staff;
- 2015 creating a body supervising the implementation of reforms (under development);
- From 2012 on, tasks centred around three scopes of activities, as opposed to the previous five ones, they are: Strategic consulting, Administration Reform and Restart of Military Training.

Hungarian Participation in the EUSEC RD Congo Mission

The Hungarian Defense Forces from the very beginning, i.e. from 2005 up to the present day, was present with experts in the EU missions in Africa. With the creation of the EUSEC RD Congo mission in Brussels, as a first step, a tender was announced for the positions of the newly formed mission. The conditions included: excellent physical and health condition,

knowledge of one of the official languages spoken in Congo (French, Swahili, Lingala) and African mission experience. Among the candidates, there were French, Portuguese and Belgians applicants for the posts.

The first Hungarian expert was *retired LTC István Papp*,¹¹ who had had considerable experience because he had taken part in several peacekeeping missions, but worked for the UN in New York as the senior officer of the missions in Africa. Lieutenant Colonel Papp was one of the advisors of the Military Integration Group which played a main role in the integration of the Congolese army. In this position he worked for a year and after the 2006 EU elections, he set up the 3–4 advisory groups in the eastern provinces of the country. Then Lt. Col. Papp continued his service in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, where he led the delegated expert group.

The time spent here was not without risk, as Congr s National pour la D fense de Peuple – CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People – NCDP) led by General Laurent Nkunda was constantly fighting the government forces of the province. Meanwhile, the EUSEC deployed a further advisory group in Lubumbasi, the headquarters of Katanga province. It is known that the province is rich in mineral resources and countless Congolese armed groups wanted to get the power over this region, but it was in the neighbouring countries' interest to dominate the area, as well. Lieutenant Colonel Papp with his French colleagues created the basis for the cooperation of the provincial military and civilian leadership, and on 1 June, 2007 he has completed his two-year mission.

MAJ Zsigmond Csajgi,¹² who provided effective support to finance professional development of the payment system, also joined the mission EUSEC RDC from the outset. The first major project of the mission was to develop the payment system. In the successful operation of the financial advisory group, Major Csajgi played an important role. His duties included preparing reports to the financial contributors of the Congolese reforms, organizing the logistical support for the project and providing continuous monitoring. He served for two years in the mission. In the second year of the mission (December 2007) the army completed the first emphasized phase of census that had taken place outside the province of Kinshasa.

Following them, *LTC Zoltn Gerle*¹³ began his two-year long service to the EUSEC mission on 1 September 2007. He spent two months in the mission headquarters in Kinshasa, where he participated in the reform of the army tasks. After the army's leadership has contributed to set up mission advisory groups in the eastern part of the country, Col. Gerle was relocated in the France sized Orientale province, in Kisangani in a newly formed Advisory Group. In connection with the reform of the army he participated in numerous activities, since fulfilling the objectives of the census required a lot of travelling in the provinces concerned. Later he was transferred to the South-Kivu province, in the town of Bukavu and worked in a settled group. He finished his service on 20 January 2008.

¹¹ Beseny, J. "Report on the EUSEC mission in Congo". *Seregszemle* 7/1. 2009. 91. http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/28301/s_sz_2009_1.pdf, Accessed on 09 November 2016.

¹² Beseny, J. and Kobilka, I. *Magyar b kefenntartk Afrikban*. Katonai Nemzetbiztonsgi Szolglat, 2013. 346–359.

¹³ Beseny and Kobilka, I. *Magyar b kefenntartk...* 360–373.

During Col. Gerle's service, another Hungarian soldier served in the mission, *LTC Gábor Kiss*,¹⁴ who did an outstanding job as an IT specialist. He operated the information system of the mission. Almost traditionally, he also completed two years of service. He was responsible for the IT system of the headquarters in Kinshasa, moreover, he was tasked with providing contacts among the advisory groups of the Eastern provinces. In the given Congolese conditions, this work claimed lots of sacrifices. It was a 24-hour standby position, which was carried out by Lt. Kiss and his two Congolese colleagues.

In December 2008, *COL Sándor Nagy*¹⁵ replaced Lt. Col. Gerle at the head of the group in Bukavu. In the Hungarian leadership group, French and Swedish soldiers served, as well. The group had a double task system, as the two French officers and a Swedish one were in communication with the brigades that had already undergone the integration and only the leader of the group was in direct contact with the Military District Command. Col. Nagy had to contend with many difficulties to create a workable relationship, as well as he had to win the trust of the Congolese soldiers for their effective work. It was quite a difficult work, as the communication was not easy at first because the commander, General Masunzu did not really speak French. However, over time, through winning their trust, they carried on with their tasks in a good working relationship.

At the beginning of December, in 2009, Col. Nagy was replaced by *LTC László Török*¹⁶ in the Bukavu team leader position. The number of the Advisory Group was reduced to three people: Lt. Col. Török and two French colleagues worked together. They were in communication with the brigades, as well as with the Military District Command.

At the request of the Head of the Mission, Brigadier General Jean-Paul Michel and in line with the decision of the Chief of Defence, the Hungarian participation was expanded at the beginning of May 2010. Col. Sándor Nagy returned to Bukavu as the head of the advisory group and he served in this group until May 2013. Following the replacement in Bukavu, Col. Török worked as a military district expert in Kisangani (Oriental Province). Then he worked for the mission headquarters in Kinshasa in the field of infrastructure, especially in school projects. Col. Török spent two years in the mission.

During the two missions Colonel Nagy served for four years in the EUSEC RDC. He acquired great experience and he was respected by the local people of the Congo, as well as by his superiors, the management of the mission. The Mission Chief was General Antonio Martins from Portugal. In line with his decision the advisory groups have been restructured. Instead of the earlier Hungarian–French composition, there has been created a Hungarian–Romanian one, then a purely Hungarian group. In the Bukavu group he has worked with *LTC Mihály Nyitrai* and *MAJ Béla Lökösházi*.

At the beginning of May 2013, Colonel Nagy was replaced by *COL Attila Kral*. Due to the changes in the task of the mission, EUSEC RDC, Colonel Kral was responsible for the liquidation of the Bukavu group. As a result of changes in the organization of the mission, only the Goma group remained in the Eastern region. After the winding-up, Colonel Kral worked in Kinshasa, where a mobile advisory group was formed. In 2014 he was replaced by *COL János Tomolya*, who had great international experience. When he left,

¹⁴ Kiss, G. "Morale and discipline in a chaotic country". <http://www.honvedelem.hu/article/16481>, Accessed on 08 August 2017.

¹⁵ Kiss. "Morale and discipline...".

¹⁶ Besenyő and Kobilka. *Magyar békefenntartók...* 374–393.

the Hungarian participation (in the mission) came to an end. During the years, as a result of a significant number of dilemmas and reduction, the EUSEC RDC mission has changed and has been transformed.

Dilemmas Around the Mission EUSEC RDC

Over the years the leading nations of the European Union had extensive debates on the relevance of some of the performance criteria on which the Mission's performance was evaluated. Questions still remain whether to continue, to transform, or to terminate the mission.

Another issue would rise if the EU decides to terminate this Mission: in that case who or what organization would continue the already started EU projects?

It is understood that the African political and security approach may not be the same as the European one. The work of the EU experts was largely influenced by this difference, as well as by the current political and security climate both in Africa and Europe. For example, Swedish experts were withdrawn by their government because the fight against sexual violence did not get enough attention in the programme of the EUSEC. The reason why the EU did not put an emphasis on this area was that many relief organizations, including the United Nations mission, the MONUSCO,¹⁷ the CICR, just to mention the biggest ones, dealt with it in their mandate. In addition, several sessions were organised by EUSEC, in cooperation with organisations within the army on this matter. My colleagues and I also participated in such events in South-Kivu province with the inhabitants of the affected area.

If the mission remains, in what form will it be present in the future? In 2013, these issues needed more and more urgent answers. The last Commander of the mission, (according to Colonel Jean-Louis Nurenberg) said that we needed a reduced number of expert teams (approximately 10 people), with a budget of EUR 1.5 million.

Along this line there were several possible options:

- A *mini EUSEC* in the EU delegation to Kinshasa;
- A newer, but also small EU mission;
- A common mission, EUPOL RD Congo (with a staff of about 20 people).

The decision was finally made: much remains to be done to stabilize the country's security. The EUSEC mission, as such, ceases to exist, but the EU decided on a 6-year programme with a budget of 25 million Euros, which aims to reform the Congolese army FARDC and provides continuous support.

The *PROGRESS* name refers to: *the security sector, promoting the reform of the army*. The programme is similar to the Congo EUSEC RDC programme, i.e. it aims to strengthen the bodies of the personnel and financial administration system, as well as the support of the army personnel. In addition, the defence sector in order to run the external and internal accountability mechanisms can support the main tasks.

¹⁷ "MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo". UN. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en>, Accessed on 01 August 2015.

The Mission officially changed on 1 July 2015 to a one-year mandate, similar to its predecessor. Compared to the past changes, the budget of the European Development Fund (FED, Fonds Européen de Développement) provides grants, which previously had no conservation targets.

Conclusion

The results and experience of the European Union's EUSEC RD Congo mission prove that, in spite of all the difficulties, the well-executed job has born its fruit. Parallel to the establishment of a transparent billing system, the army personnel have been registered. Based on the strength of the personnel, a central database has been established with the support of EU experts. An efficient information technology network, indispensable for the continuous and accurate flow of data between the headquarters and the military regions, has been developed. By now due to the reorganisation of the army, the information network also covers the headquarters, which is controlling the defense zones of the military regions.

The reconstruction of educational facilities, indispensable for the relaunchment of officers' and non-commissioned officers' training, disrupted twenty years ago, has been completed. Thanks to the efficient support of the EUSEC mission, the most important schools were renewed and the training restarted. By this, the rejuvenation of the army's personnel became feasible, moreover, well-qualified leaders could get to the head of the units, thus remedying the insufficiencies caused by the personnel joining from illegal armed groups, during the earlier integration process. The consultants of EUSEC actively participated in the selection of potential candidates, as well. The new programme ensures the further operation of the schools.

In the field of logistics, with the EU consultants' close support, the basic rules were established, along which the renewal of the equipment of the army, naturally in accordance with the country's financial resources allocated for this purpose, may be started. In order to establish a secure environment, it is indispensable to guard the army's weapons at safe installations, avoiding that the soldiers commit violent acts against the population. Although the renewed and newly built weapon and ammunition depots have not solved all the problems of the army related to this area, they can set good examples for future tasks.

Projects aiming the support of families, by assisting the approach of the military and civilian population helped to promote better understanding and mutual acceptance among military families, living quite isolated in the past, and the civilian population. The refurbishing of the medical centres of the military bases created the basic conditions of essential health care. Due to the trainings carried out within the army, a high number of well-prepared personnel was educated. These leaders are able to forward the already initiated projects.

It is important to emphasize that the Hungarian soldiers took an active part in this project. Our contribution, (in which I took part for four years), was highly appreciated by the Congolese and international partners, as well as by the commanders of the mission.

The Hungarian officers taking part in the mission proved their preparedness, they became experts not only of Congo but the whole region. Their expertise should be taken in consideration in the future. The African continent is getting more and more in the focus of attention, moreover its strategic role is increasing in the future. For this reason, the gained

expertise, knowledge, not to mention the personal contacts should be preserved. Soldiers having taken part in EUSEC RDC missions should be relied on, in case of further, potential African tasks.

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After decades of civil wars, state collapses, famines and genocides Africa experienced significant developments in the new millennium. Booming economies, the spread of good governance and democracy and the end of armed conflicts were the benchmarks of the new era.

Nevertheless, there is still another side of Africa. On this side we find the prolonged conflicts of Sudan and Somalia, the challenges of peacekeeping in the Central African Republic and Mali, and the increasing tensions of Northern Nigeria and the Maghreb. Therefore, contrary to many optimistic works, this book will concentrate on the dynamics of conflicts and challenges in Africa – not only armed struggles, but other aspect of crises, too. To achieve their goals, the editors asked Hungarian and foreign experts to contribute to the book by the examination of different challenges of the continent. Some of the thirteen articles will explore wider regional or continental issues (*Concerted Development Strategy for Africa, BRICS in Africa and the Brazilian approach*) while others will focus on more local issues (*Black Holes of Insecurity – the North of Mali, The Border Dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea*). It is important that the papers describe not only the problems but also the best practices which could contribute to the lasting solution to the crises.

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