

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE

Doctoral School of Military Science

SHORT THESIS OF

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**The creation of military strategy and doctrine development in
Hungary**

Doctor of Philosophy (PHD) dissertation

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1. Overview of the research project

The aim of the project was to explore strategies for strategy development and doctrine development. The reason for actuating of the research was the anomalies that were increasingly evident in the persistent crisis of Hungarian doctrinal thinking. Although the roots of the Hungarian doctrinal thinking date back to the early 1990s, from the very beginning they have been burdened by serious misunderstandings and confusion. The Hungarian military thinkers were basically under the influence of Soviet military science and they were not able to separate the concepts of "military strategy" and "military doctrine", they did not know the relationship and hierarchy between them. The lack of clear and precise terminology was exacerbated by the fact that the Hungarian National Military Strategy was not available for a long time and the political-strategic leadership left military doctrine development without any guidance.

The research was based on the assumption that **there are peculiarities of the strategic and doctrinal thinking and thus there are general principles of strategy and doctrine development**. The exploration of these peculiarities promotes coherence between strategy and doctrine and prevents contradictions and wasting of resources for the development. This is the central concept of this paper and the dissertation is trying to find the methods, procedures and principles that provide solid foundation, low risk, and high efficiency and timely strategy and doctrines. The research has shown how rational methodologies can be applied in developing national strategies and points out that, in the absence of basic security strategies, despite of the enormous effort, doctrinal development efforts were doomed to failure. On the other hand, as an unexpected result of the research project, it became clear that military doctrine is depending not only on strategy development, but that it has independent methods of development and the **doctrines can be a valuable sources of strategic thinking**.

1.1. Formulating a scientific problem

The term "military doctrine" has been used in Hungary since the beginning of the rapprochement to NATO, both in scientific and military circles, but its specific meaning has not been clearly defined until recently, and with its interpretation or more precisely, misinterpretation, still negative stereotypes are emerging and the development of doctrine is also marked by sarcastic indicators by regressive military thinkers. Unfortunately, these opinions seem to be supported by the fact that the Hungarian doctrine system is indeed contradictating and conflicting to NATO standards. The authors of the Hungarian doctrines have long been unaware of the purpose and functions of the doctrines; and they did not receive clear guidance from the political-strategic level and **lacked a clear, unified methodology**, hence odd and obsolete documents are written, even nowadays.

1.2. Research goals

In this respect, the main goal of the dissertation was to identify the guidelines, alignment points and methods that allow the preparation of viable and timely strategies, doctrines through the best use of time and resources available. By identifying the guidelines, the dissertation set up a methodological framework that clearly defined the required system of the interrelated documents at all three analytical levels.

- **At the strategic level**, the nation's "Grand Strategy" is the concept and vision of the nation, the moral principles, values and views of the citizens, which is formulated and materialized by the current government in the National Security Strategy (NSS). In order to implement the NSS, must be used and can be used all the means of national power available. The military component is considered to be the most traditional and most powerful component among the elements of the national power. But in today's conflicts it is not the most effective and it has a lasting effect just in combination with other factors of the national power. The concepts of developing and applying military force are formulated in the National Military Strategy, which sets out the **objectives** to be achieved by the military component and the **sources** for military forces and provides some guidance for the **methods** to achieve the objectives.
- At the operational the doctrines summarize the methods to achieve the objectives prescribed in the military strategy. They make this in a manner that can be interpreted for the military domain. These are authoritative documents that require judgment in application. At this level, however, it is not only the simple phrasing of the strategic guidelines, it is not only the detailed version of the strategical methods, but as part of more complex processes independent military methods are developed. These military methods (doctrines) have a backreverse impact on the preparation of the strategy. Since the doctrines include the results of lessons learnt from the latest operations and the result of the future researches, namely the methods of dealing with foreseeable skill deficiencies identified in future.
- **At the tactical level**, unlike the operational doctrines, we find detailed specifications, normative, binding documents here. However, the rule books (field manuals, pamphlets, SOPs, TTPs) are not entirely independent from the doctrines, moreover they are subordinated to them, but they contain much more details of the practical implementation of the principles derived from doctrines. Thus, while doctrines lay the foundations for common thinking, the rule books prescribe details of specific activities.

2. Methodology and hypotheses

2.1. Research methods

The dissertation basically relied on qualitative research methods. Although the use of quantitative methods in the analysis of the Hungarian experience of doctrine development has emerged (how many STANAGs were ratified or implemented?, how much did the Hungarian doctrine system had been transformed? etc.) but it would not be the a proper focus for the research, because very impossible to demonstrate the actual effect on the Hungarian system. In contrast, qualitative methods provided a good perspective for the study.

The dissertation tried to remain positivist, namely an objective description of the existing reality, in order to reveal the peculiarities of Hungarian strategic and doctrinal thinking. But the Hungarian reality had to be compared with other international systems and the research of the international theories and practices led me to conclusions that developed a kind of subjective value judgment of mine. Therefore I was not able anymore just describe the Hungarian doctrinal system, but measure the system against these international standards.

So the most important chapter became normative, therefore the overall research had a normative approach as well.

The start point of the research was the development of Hungarian doctrine. On this field I made primary researches: observation, collecting and analyzing primary data. Henceforward in the frame of focused research, based on primary sources and secondary sources, it was possible to develop a precise picture of strategic and doctrinal thinking. Guides, manuals and doctrines were used as sources for the study of lessons learnt, doctrine, terminology and concept development. Personal visits to international (NATO) and national (British, German and Czech) doctrine development centers were done on several occasions, and original (Czech, English) publications and lectures were used to prepare my dissertation.

In terms of strategy development, István Resperger's studies (*A stratégia tervezés alapjai, A „diadal” és egyéb módszerek alkalmazása a válságkezelésben, A nemzeti biztonsági stratégia tervezésének kérdései, és megint A stratégiai tervezés alapjai*) have drawn my attention to some pioneering studies that I have used thereafter, such as: Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. of several writings (*A methodology for developing a military strategy, Toward an understanding of military strategy*) and Harry R. Yarger (*Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation*), Henry C Bartlett (*Art of Strategy and Force Planning*) P.H. Liotta and Richmond M. Lloyd (*From here to there, The Strategy and Force Planning Framework*). I have to mention the work of Károly Barakonyi (*Stratégiai döntések*), which I took into account at the terminology part, but his conclusions are more related to business management strategies.

The analysis of strategy and doctrine development was based on two qualitative methodologies: document analysis and a systematic observation process. During the document analysis I tried to clarify the most common, widely accepted concepts of strategy creation. I presented the classification of strategies according to various aspects and the theoretical framework of their development.

The NATO documents, which were also subject to qualitative document analysis clarified the theoretical fundamentals of doctrine development, and they highlighted that the **development of doctrines is the result of a far larger system** (namely the transformation). Thus, it is **only possible to talk about independent doctrinal development if all elements of the transformation system exist and interrelated**: future research, lessons learnt, concept development and experimentations. After the clarification of these principles, became clear the criterion for measuring the various doctrinal development practices and this resulted a definite normative approach in the dissertation. The NATO doctrine development system is defined by a separate standard (doctrine). The most important feature is that the doctrines are described as dynamic cycle rather than a relatively static linear model. The development of the doctrine is supervised by the NATO Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) with the assistance of the NATO Command for Operations. The ACT and its subordinate organizations and many other organizations (International Military Staff, Centers of Excellence, NATO Standardization Office, etc.) carry out the NATO's transformation activities (ie preparing the Alliance for future challenges and dissolution and eliminating identified skill shortages. The result of the transformation process is that NATO's new capabilities are built on a complex solution. One out of the many components is the doctrinal component, which is relevant to my dissertation.

The other qualitative methodology used in the dissertation was official visits, from which I gathered international experiences in doctrine development. The visit to the British at

Doctrine and Concept Development Center (DCDC) demonstrated **an effective and national doctrine development works system**. The British process of doctrine development is regulated and centralized. The relatively large organization of the center, the directly available and occasionally involved external intellectual capacity¹, the interrelated and mutually supportive task system of the branches made United Kingdom perfectly capable of developing its own independent doctrine system. However **they do not sacrifice a substantial part of its resources and capacities the development of national doctrines**, but they focus on alliance doctrines and actively, decisively contribute to the creation of NATO doctrines. The organizational structure follows precisely the needs for the implementation of transformation tasks, so there are branches for future research, concept development and experimentation, doctrine writing, strategic studies, legal aspects raised by modern battle, technical research. Thus the DCDC is able to work out viable solutions for the armed forces which put not only one single factor (doctrines) to the focus of transformation, but presents **complex and comprehensive solutions**.

The official visit to Vyskov in the Czech Republic was disappointing because I expected another situation based on previous studies (by Zoltán Krajncz and János Forrai). Compared to earlier situations, the development of Czech doctrine has been completely decentralized, various doctrines are developed in several isolated workshops, they are not properly resourced, and the doctrine development has no any legal normative or regulated order. The development of doctrine is not embedded in the transformation tasks, ie there is no concept development, future research, etc. supporting it. The Czech Army recognized the risks of developing a separate national doctrine and how costly and resourceful it would be to create such a center, so they try to take over the doctrines of countries with significantly more doctrinal and concept development potential. Adapting the doctrines of NATO and other countries has led to a rather mixed result, with a lot of uncertainty and coincidence. This underlines the need for regulated, normative doctrine development.

As an officer responsible for doctrine development of the Hungarian Defense Forces, I recorded the processing of the Hungarian doctrine development. Like the Czech system, the Hungarian doctrine development operates in isolation from the rest of the transformation. Despite of the common organizational unit, **there are no valid operational or strategic lessons learnt neither future research inputs nor concept development**. By studying the Hungarian doctrines and tactics, I learned that the system produces doctrines in the right amount according to the needs, but in its quality are completely unreliable, **opinion-based writings**, which are **not harmonized** either separately with other the elements of the Hungarian doctrine hierarchy or with the subordinate rule books (eg field manuals). The most serious problem, however, is that all elements of the doctrines and the whole hierarchy are generally severely contradictory to NATO's valid doctrines.

All together, these qualitative methods resulted the discovery of a comprehensive methodology that has proved to be ideal to support the main assumption and hypotheses of the dissertation.

¹ The Bristol University, Cranfield University, Oxford Research Group, London Imperial College, Oxford Analytica, University of Cambridge, University of Oxford, etc. are regularly involved in producing the Center's publications. In addition, other foreign research institutes also send their contributions, suggestions from the French Directorate of Strategic Affairs, the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil, RAND Europe and foreign state institutes: Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Saudi Arabia Armed Forces War College, Slovak Republic Institute Security and Defense Studies Ministry of Defense (!), Swedish National Defense College, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, etc.

2.2. Frame of analysis

In the course of research on strategy creation and doctrine development, the first setback was the inaccuracy of the terminology, namely all the authors attributed different content to the same words. They practically "compared apples to pears", and that was true for both strategical and doctrinal terminology. Thus, the terminology framework has become the most important analytical framework for the dissertation. Instead of setting up a new terminology system in the dissertation, which would have been freely used by me in a "virtual world" but not recognised by anyone else, I chose the generally recognized and agreed NATO terminology.

Further researches have shown that the doctrines that reflect the common wisdom and thinking of the NATO would be incomprehensible without common vocabulary, that is, uniform terminology. The only one way of converting knowledge and thoughts can be achieved through the NATO agreed military terminologies. Thus, clarification of terminology frameworks has become an important factor in the dissertation.

An additional framework was the historical background, the appearance of strategy and doctrine in military thinking. The term "strategy" has been going back more than two millennia, so the overview of the history of the strategy would have gone too far and the dissertation would have lost focus. That's why I only looked at the relevant thoughts of the greatest military thinker of the 19th century. Before Clausewitz, the strategy meant only the combination of military movements outside the range of the enemy's cannons. Clausewitz, defined the strategy as the art of using the battle as a means of achieving war objectives. It also states that strategic theories are not able to establish eternal rules, laws, but able to provide a framework for thinking about reality, and their real task is to discover which are the permanent factors of the strategy, and which are temporary phenomena. Clausewitz's thinking is centered on recognizing the political nature of war. According to his theory, war is not an isolated autonomous phenomenon, but a means of achieving political goals. As a result, political leadership must define and direct military strategic goals, and military strategic goals determine tactical goals. Continuing Clausewitz's thoughts, Professor Jablonsky pointed out the expansion of the vertical interpretation of the strategy and the emergence of a new, horizontal dimension. The **national strategy** includes not only application of military forces and military strategy, but also **contains other elements of nation power: such as economic, psychological, and political power**. Of course, the military strategy cannot be separated from any element of the national strategy.

The history of military doctrine does not look so far, and so the meaning has not gone through such major changes as the concept of strategy. The doctrine in the most widespread interpretation is a guide, a set of principles that are tight regulations, binding norms, but rather a way of thinking, explaining, narrating the phenomena of modern armed battle, providing explanations, educating and providing common ground, a philosophy and unified language. The Prussian and Russian military attributed a radically different function to the doctrine. They believed at the end of the 19th century that doctrine has a definite normative, prescriptive character to military. The Soviet-Russian military thought retained this characteristic and even changed the relationship between military strategy and doctrine (eg. according the Soviet-Russian theory the military strategy is subordinated to the state's doctrine). In this sense, the Russian doctrine is not a military document but rather a political document.

2.3. Hypotheses

The research was based on the following hypotheses:

1. The creation of strategy and doctrine development is interrelated, but their impact on each other is not one-way, but mutual, meaning, the doctrines also affect (back) to the strategic thinking.
2. There are specific and generally accepted principles, contexts and uniform methodology for strategy creation and doctrine development.
3. Applying the universal principles of strategy creation and doctrine development leads to the coherence of the doctrines of NATO member states, which is an essential part of interoperability.
4. The Hungarian doctrine system supposed to be coherent with NATO doctrines.

The proof of the first hypothesis is related to the basic idea of the research, and I tried to find the general principles and laws that apply to strategy development and doctrine development. In the course of the research, this hypothesis was divided into two parts, first I studied the principles of strategy development, and then I studied the hypothetical system of doctrine development. It is a premise in strategic studies that strategies define doctrines. However, the idea that this relationship is in the opposite direction, that is, the military methods and procedures discovered by the doctrines influence strategic thinking, the novel and deductive conclusion puts the development of doctrines on a completely new basis. Even when I set up the hypothesis, I only knew the doctrine's determination by strategy. It is true that the framework of military thinking is determined by the political strategic level by setting goals and assigning means for achieving the goals. At the same time, the policy strategic level is no longer able to respond to the concrete methods of achieving the goals, so there is an undiscovered source of doctrine that places military thinking on a professional basis independent of the strategy. In my dissertation I presented the effects of the doctrine-related systems on the doctrine and through it on the strategy², thus confirming my first hypothesis.

The basic idea of the second hypothesis is that a modern state and modern army cannot rely entirely on intuitive strategies, on individual impressions, on charismatic genius instincts, but must have a well elaborated methodology that minimizes errors and seeks engineering thoroughness and prudence in creation strategy. The aim of the research was to find the principles and procedures that can be used to develop sound, deliberate and rational strategies. My initial assumption was that, by exploring the methods of strategy development, I also find methods for developing doctrine, because they are similar or identical. However, my research has uncovered two independent methodology for each but these theories are consistent with each other in the field of strategy creation and doctrine development. The doctrine development process described in my dissertation is generally recognized in the development of NATO's doctrines, and is used by the advanced member states to develop their national doctrine. My dissertation presents the theoretical methods of strategy creation³ and discusses in detail the theory⁴ and practice⁵ of doctrine development. So this hypothesis has been proven.

² See Annex 2 and Chapter 3.2.4.

³ See Chapter 2.

⁴ See Chapter 4.

⁵ See Chapter 6-7.

The third hypothesis was based on the scientific criterion of reproducibility. The theoretical premise of the hypothesis is that the general and special principles of strategy creation and doctrine development are known, understood and followed by all NATO countries. I assumed that taking into account the above mentioned principles, member states in similar security situation would have a similar conceptual outcome, so their doctrines would show a high degree of coherence. The hypothesis has particular importance for doctrines, since doctrines are systematic tenets and precept that form the basis of common thinking. If NATO member states use unified doctrinal development methods, then its outcome must be a unified doctrine system. The slightly different national doctrines refer only to the specificities, variance and different emphasis in national policy, but major differences already point to serious discrepancy. The second half of the hypothesis is undoubtedly true, as the purpose of NATO doctrines is to develop common thinking and cooperation. At the same time, I have discovered a number of anomalies in the uniformity of doctrines of NATO member states: the Hungarian and Czech systems only randomly (understand: not necessarily) produce the same doctrinal ideas (documents). The differences are not always significant, but in the case of the Hungarian doctrine hierarchy I had to report of its dysfunction. My study found that these deviation are not derived from conscious and systematic activity, but are random and irregular, that is to say, due to the unregulated nature of the area under investigation. The conceptual design of doctrines stems from the fact that there is no unified intellectual process that would exclude the subjective opinion of stake holders. It is necessary to build guarantees in the process that the doctrinal principles are based on objective experiences, scientific research and experimentations. Although the hypothesis has not been fully substantiated, it has provided valuable conclusions, which would be useful to conduct further research in the practice of international doctrine development for full examination.

In relation to the fourth hypothesis, the dissertation examined the recent past and present of the Hungarian doctrine development. The organizational and planning frameworks of the Hungarian doctrine development are reminiscent of the experiences of international practice, but the development of Hungarian doctrine is not sufficiently regulated. The Hungarian system gives the developers a huge space for displaying their individual opinions and therefore the doctrines are published with different content from one edition to the other. The valid Hungarian doctrines contain severe self-contradictions, and contradict the Hungarian field manuals and the NATO doctrines. However, the refutation of the hypothesis led to the results and conclusions that help to create a coherent system that brings together the doctrine development system with its input (lessons learned, futures research) and its output (military capability development).

3. Results of the research

The first chapter of the dissertation had three main functions. First, it clarifies the conceptual system of the strategy, while reviewing the contradicting definitions of strategies in prominent foreign and Hungarian writings and the history of the concept of strategy and its extension. The clarification of the concepts is an important prerequisite for the introduction of the hypotheses of the dissertation, since the hypotheses are based on the central idea that strategic and doctrinal thinking and development have specific characteristics and principles. The dissertation combines the basic concepts in order to confirm the hypothesis with the strategy and doctrine development theories.

Secondly, this chapter presents the introduction of the concept of doctrine and its recent past, highlights its role and fundamental differences from rigid, binding rule books. This chapter delimits the notion of military doctrine from doctrines of other meaning (eg, scientific, religious, and political).

Thirdly, this chapter presents the relationship between policy and doctrines and their mutual interactions. This relationship seems to be trivial, since Clausewitz has been an axiom of the political nature of war, which is a direct result of the political determination of doctrines, but few have been aware of the influence of military thinking on the political-strategic level, and we do not have even an example in Hungary.

The second chapter of the dissertation presents the "Grand strategy", which is the highest level strategy in the life of a nation. "Grand Strategy" is inherited for generations, comes from the ethos and values of the citizens, and its fundamental goal is to preserve it for the next generation. The most important idea of the chapter is that the real strategy does not with application of the resources of the nation in short-term, but coordinates all the elements of the national power at the same time and goes beyond the time horizon of one government. This chapter reviews the literature of strategy creation, presents the relevant works of the most prominent thinkers of strategic studies and points out that the different models do not distinct significantly and in fact fit perfectly into each other. While Cunningham presents his strategy observations with a kind of positivist methodology, Lykke, Bartlett, Yarger and Lloyd take a firmly normative point of view and are not satisfied with the objective expression of reality, but seek to influence the surrounding environment and adjust their reality to their research findings. The direct result of this is that the focus of the dissertation at this point instead of describing the creation of the Hungarian strategy is to articulate recommendations on how to formulate a correct strategy. The chapter again underlines the previous conclusion that the military strategy, as one of the sectoral strategies of the national security strategy, must be consistent with the strategies for the other components of national power, and must be mutually integrated to support each other.

The third chapter confirms the essential hypothesis of the dissertation by revealing general principles of strategy creation that can be well coordinated with each other and appear to form a coherent whole.

While the previous chapters were based on the work of prominent representatives of strategic studies, the fourth chapter is based specifically on the observation of the NATO Allied Command for Transformation and its subordinate organizations, and the study of other primary documents. Another key chapter of the dissertation is that it presents not only the administrative acts of the doctrine development, but also places the development of the doctrine in a new dimension. In this dimension, doctrine development is not only dependent on political strategies, but also on military transformation processes, including lesson learned, futures researches, concept development and experimentations. This thinking and practical testing provides doctrines fresh knowledge and current operational experiences. Transformation works as a complex system, where the result is the creation of new capability and in this context the doctrine, the doctrinal literature is only a component of a given ability.

The fifth chapter, regarding the human aspects of doctrinal development, states the expectations against doctrine writers. The Hungarian source of this chapter is a work nearly a decade ago, still fits into the underlying principles, but definitely puts the full responsibility onto the doctrine writers.

The sixth chapter examines international doctrinal development trends and practices. By examining the doctrine development of an advanced NATO member (United Kingdom, UK), I learned that with the proper organizational culture, traditions, infrastructure and intellectual resources, it is possible to maintain the extremely complex transformation process, of which results the doctrines. Another important statement in the chapter is that in UK the doctrine is well defined in terms of organizational order and process. It has also become evident that, despite the British eccentric political thinking, the British Army seeks the closest possible cooperation with the Alliance. The results of conceptual and doctrinal development are not retained for themselves, but they are trying to spread it as widely as possible and therefore the resources available to them are offered to the Alliance and thus UK is active contributors to NATO's doctrine development process. Similarly to the Hungarian practice, the Czech doctrine development does not have a clearly defined doctrinal development regulation in contrast to the British procedure. The organization of Czech doctrine development is decentralized, the doctrines are of uneven quality. An important lesson, however, is that Czech doctrine developers have recognized that the development of a fully independent national doctrine carries serious risks, so they have chosen as spontaneous alignment point the doctrines of more advanced NATO member states (such as Dutch, British and Norwegian).

The seventh chapter is one of the most important chapters of the dissertation, which summarizes the experiences and results of the Hungarian doctrine development. This chapter is based on primary researches: direct observation, data collection and its processing, but also the research of the relevant Hungarian literature. The publication of the sub-results related to the chapter led to polemic, which resulted that the original study not appeared fully in the central journal of Hungarian Defence Forces. The development of Hungarian doctrine is facing serious contradictions and, while enormous resources are misused, its results are questionable. The chapter points out that doctrinal development works in isolation, both from the Hungarian lesson learned system and from transformation processes (futures research, capability and concept development), and training, education. The system can be said formally fulfil its direct function (ie it prepares a certain amount of doctrine for it), but unreasonably binds huge resources. The chapter basically describes the existing reality with a positivist approach, but at the same time confronts with the practice already existing elsewhere and describes the round of duties almost in a normative way. The approximation of the two perspectives (ie descriptive vs. normative) also leads to the improvement of the Hungarian doctrine development, how to approach the development principles to the practice.

4. Summary of conclusions

The dissertation has placed great emphasis on the elaboration of the terminology framework of the strategy and the doctrine, because I assumed that there is a strong correlation and interaction between the two concepts. At the beginning of the research it seemed obvious that the **creation of strategies and doctrine development is not only done intuitively**, but in a **properly structured, thorough methodological way**. This has undoubtedly been proven.

The theory of strategy creation is a system of highly logically built and mutually supportive theories, with which it is possible to integrate not only strategic documents rationally and coherently, but also provides the basis for the initiation of transformation processes for military planning. **Transformation, as a system over doctrine development**,

brings not only from the strategic documents the necessary capacity needs, but also the science based **futures researches and the lessons learned** from the current operations. Scientific **concepts** are developed to solve the explored lack of ability, and the usefulness of these concepts are proven by **experiments**. Finally, based on the concepts, they develop new capability, the **doctrinal component** of the capability is worked out by intellectual workshops.

The entire strategy and doctrine development process takes relatively long time, although for obvious reasons there is always an urgent need to address capability shortages. In addition to the time required for the process, the demand of the elements for human resources (staff officers, experts and other intellectual capacities) is also high, and can not be estimated in total. Obviously, small member states that are constantly struggling with time scarcity and human power, are not in favour of establishing such a time-consuming and human resource-heavy organization. It is a reasonable alternative if the scarce resources are combined, together, in a **common organization, and they take over the results of the complex transformation process**, which would be adapted, utilized, validated and feedback provided.

5. New scientific results

1. **I have expanded** our knowledge about the theory of strategy creation. It is a great step forward that it has been proved that these theories about national strategy creation are not competing theories, but complement each other and thus further expand our knowledge.
2. **I have proved** that doctrines are not only influenced by strategy, but also by the results of concept development.
3. **I discovered** that doctrines have an impact on strategic thinking. The policy define aims, means, and describe the desirable military capabilities that will enable the forces to carry out the tasks defined by the strategy. However, the doctrines, by clarifying military methods and competencies, also provide guidance to the policy in creation of the strategy.
4. **I have proved** that the development of doctrine is a complex, high resource demanding task, therefore, the adaptation of the NATO doctrine system should be reasonably sought.

The dissertation **rives off the doctrine development from purely strategic relationship**, and from the point of view that it is determined only by the strategic-political level. The new nexus **places doctrines in the transformation system**, and thus opens up new perspectives for researches.

5. Recommendations for practical usage

The application of my dissertation is primarily possible is during the ongoing preparation of Hungary's National Military Strategy. Practical models include the complementary strategy making theories presented in the dissertation. It would be important to have real strategic thinking instead of the synopsis-type strategy writing.

Secondly, I make recommendations for further scientific research. I suggest to repeat the researches of Zoltán Krajnc (OTKA 67890) about a comparative study of doctrine

development strategies. This research can also be valuable in terms of having a new picture of the changes that have taken place over the past 10 years. I also consider as important to review the utilization and validation of Hungarian doctrines. In this field, Hungarian practice should be documented and the experiences of countries and armies of similar size should be brought to the attention of us. Especially it is important in view of the fact that the development of Hungarian doctrine will be reorganized in the near future, but without the previous lessons being recorded and learned, the new organizational order will not result effective solution.

The third, much more practical application of the dissertation is to put the Hungarian doctrine development into a new context (ie: the development of the doctrine is part of the transformation). It would be advisable to unite the transformation functions of the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Defense Forces within an organization. If it would not be possible to group transformation functions into an organization, then there should be an organized and legally controlled relationship and synergy between each element. The practical usage of the dissertation may include the creation of the necessary legal regulation of the developing transformation domain as well as the transformation's organizational institutional system.

My research has proved that the Hungarian doctrine development can produce results only if it is informed by the lessons learned system and futures researches, and the right human power is available to draw up concepts and based on the agreed concepts make doctrines. In the absence of this, it would be wise to connect our small resources to other major systems and adapt their results practically.

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