

**NEMZETI KÖZSZOLGÁLATI EGYETEM**

**Hadtudományi Doktori Iskola**

Wolfgang Peischel

**Relations Between Functional Principles of Democracies and  
Their Armed Forces**

*An Analysis of Relevant Influencing Factors and Their Systemic Interde-  
pendence*

Doktori (PhD) értekezés

**Témavezető:**

Dr. habil. András Ujj, CSc

.....

**Wien, 2014**

Herewith, I declare that the presented thesis with the topic “Relations between Functional Principles of Democracies and Their Armed Forces” was not presented to an other institution, and was not rejected by any other one.

Vienna, July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2014

(Bgdr MMag. Wolfgang Peischel)

## PREFACE

Europe steers currently a security-political course that is characterized by shrinking defense budgets and declining armed forces, whereas sub-conventional risks, as e.g. listed under the „New Threats“ in NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999, simultaneously are increasing. Regardless if this paradox is accepted as an unavoidable necessity or if it is considered as the result of short-sighted strategic thinking, it will coercively result in a twofold challenge for military leaders: on the one hand, the leaders will be confronted with increasingly complex requirements in the field of joint command and control, because limited resources will have to be compensated by command and control-/leadership-superiority. On the other hand, they will – in the sense of a chosen comprehensive approach - have to contribute to strategic developments, at the interface with the political leadership.

Both objectives require a - compared to the current level - significantly higher proportion of military-scientific, politically educated military leaders. Therefore it seems reasonable that military science, particularly in its original core subjects, has to be performed, both in terms of research and teaching, by military leaders<sup>1</sup>, who acquire their teaching-qualification through an institution in which direct and permanent reference to the armed forces is guaranteed, and which is - within itself - capable of generating “new blood” for its cadre of teachers, at least in the core subjects.

When advancing this goal, it seems a matter of urgency for general staff officers, to complete a PhD-degree in the field of military science. This was the motivation for me, to take up academic studies at the Doctoral School of the *Zrínyi Miklós Defence University* in Budapest, which, in this area of science, can be seen as a pioneer of modern military science, which commits its purpose to a “whole of government/comprehensive security” and thus to an understanding that will become crucial for the perpetuated actionability of democratic states to follow peaceful national as well as global developments to guarantee the survival of the principles of democratic freedom.

The epistemological foundations, security political - strategic correlations, and armed forces-specific analyses had been picked out as central topics in the course of the PhD-program and were a reliable basis for the development of a model for the representation and target-oriented control of interdependencies, arising from a network of closely interconnected effects, concern-

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<sup>1</sup> This must not be seen as limited to military officers alone but also includes scientifically trained civilian members of the armed forces.

ing functional principles of democracies as well as other factors, specifically related to military leadership.

At this point, I want to express my gratitude to the Doctoral School of the *Zrínyi Miklós Defense University*, Budapest, its teachers and its far-sightedness regarding the creation of a broadly diversified topics-canon that does not only *meet* future challenges for military scientific researchers and teachers, but also clearly *exceeds* expectations.

I also explicitly would like to express my thanks to my supervisor, Dr. habil. András Ujj, CSc for his assistance in the subject, his expertise in the field of scientific methodology, his tireless willingness to be available to me as an sharp-witted expert and dialectical counterpart in the corroborating of my theses.

Wolfgang Peischel



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## PART ONE

### 1. Introduction

*„Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure ... and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.<sup>2</sup>”*

Abraham Lincoln, 16<sup>th</sup> President of the United States

The above quotation can be seen as the starting point, and at the same time also as the core-logic for the following research that Lincoln had captured significantly in a few words.

In his Gettysburg Address, Lincoln defined democracy through freedom and the innate equality of all people. The war, and thus the armed forces that fought it, were necessary to keep the nation alive. Without the engagement of armed forces, a perpetuation of freedom and equality wouldn't have been possible. Citizens had to fight for the survival of the nation with weapon in their hand, had to make their contribution to the war and even to sacrifice their lives in order to ensure that the *“government of the people, by the people, for the people”*, in other words that *“democracy”* survives. Only if the citizens contribute to the defense of democracy, the state, which guarantees their citizens their fundamental freedoms, may survive - otherwise it would lose its ability to act, and the participation of citizens would have had no higher purpose and might even lead to absurdity.

The very similar basic idea that already had been formulated by ancient Greek philosophers, e.g. Plato or Aristotle, could - at least in a figurative sense - be understood as envisaging a state-model that makes democratic participation depend on the single citizens' willingness to contribute to the common defense of the Polis - thus defining the right to vote as a reward, granted by the community based on their readiness to vindicate the Polis' security. This interpretation of the *„who is not willing to defend, shall not be granted the right to vote“*-principle, might be considered slightly hyperbolic, but in its core this deliberately exaggerated pattern defines the primordial relation of democracies and their armed forces via the synallagmatic interdepend-

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<sup>2</sup> BORITT, Gabor: The Gettysburg Gospel: The Lincoln Speech That Nobody Knows.



ence between the participation in democratic decision-making, and the personal willingness to undergo military service, respectively to contribute to the Polis' defense.

The Age of Enlightenment has resulted in well-educated middle classes in Europe and subsequently had led to the decline and finally to the collapse of the monarchies. Via the intermediate step of "constitutional monarchies" they had transformed to real democracies in the end, respectively in the aftermath of World War I. Forms of governments that were able to comply with the requirements of modern pluralistic democracies (apart from early constitutions such as the one of the United States of 1787, or the one of France of 1791, by which the absolutist systems were transformed into constitutional monarchies<sup>3</sup>) could not be achieved until the end of World War II. This can in some way be seen as the discharge of internal and external tensions, World War I had left unsolved.

Although there had been attempts to establish constitutions based upon democratic principles already before 1918 (e.g. Basic Democratic Rights Catalogue – "Grundrechtskatalog" of the Austrian Constitution of 1867), particularly in Germany and Austria they had been suspended in the era of National Socialism, and did not live up until 1945. Such events were seen in many European states like in Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria etc.).

Despite the fact that nationalism has to be identified as one of the driving factors that have led to World War II, the nation state had survived the latter as the primary pattern for political order – but from then on, under a quality of constitutional principles that allowed for the codetermination by those, who were most directly affected by the sufferings of war. Thus education – rather in the role of a catalyst, respectively precondition for modern democratic structures than as a resulting factor – has to be dealt with, as one of the major "democratic functional principles", which is responsible for the stabilizing, peace-ensuring effect of pluralistic democracies.

Although the decision, to which degree the offensive use of armed forces will be integral part of the state's foreign policy, from then on - at least theoretically - lay in the hand of the voter. The nation state-principle, which had been identified as one of the main causes of the world wars, was not yet overcome. However the emergence of the Warsaw Pact had resulted in a new common threat for Western Europe that united the defense efforts of its nations – including the American ones, and led to a concise, solidary and commonly accepted threat perception. By the delimitation against the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, there was given birth to the term of a Western State Community that defined itself, foremost by its opposition to the

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<sup>3</sup> The Polish Constitution of 1791 is by 4 months older than the French one. The oldest constitution is likely to be the one of San Marino, which entered into force in 1600.

communist sphere of influence. Of course are the reasons for the emergence of a Western state-community far more complex and can neither exclusively nor one-dimensionally be explained by the opposition to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The focussing on the development of this opposition in the late '40s and early '50s, was only used *as an example*, by which the principle of a "unifying" threat should be depicted.

The fact that NATO in its first years was to prevent Germany from regaining power and influence<sup>4</sup>, but subsequently had to integrate it as a member in order to balance Soviet preponderance on the continent, might serve as a proof for the thesis that the above mentioned "unifying" threat that challenged Western Europe and America "collectively", was the necessary compulsion to suppress nationalistic egoism, to "tame" excessive nationalism and thereby to enable the value-based development of a Western civil society that gradually transformed towards the model of a peace-ensuring democracy, however with large military forces.

The disciplining effect of the Soviet-threat faded after the decline of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The immediately succeeding new threats and challenges, which defined the basis of NATO's Strategic Concept 1991, did not prevent the fast decline of Western unity and military potentials.

While the Western State Community prepared itself to cope with the demands deriving from the new challenges, the new networking of NATO, EU's ESDP/CSDP, OSCE and the UN, had consequently intensified and its communication institutionalized respectively to a degree interlocked that actually had restricted, partly overcome, in some respect even eroded national autonomy.

Today, the state community looks back to more than four decades in which the democratic type of government provided for a peaceful and stable, political development in Western Europe. But this is no guarantee that the next decades will remain the same.

Any possible answer to the question if Western democracies had been able to provide a peace-ensuring policy reliably, only building on values and the education of their societies - will remain hypothetic. It cannot be answered if Europe would have been capable of any joint procedure, without being exposed to a major threat from the outside or without having available a reliable and sufficient internal mechanism that had been constructed according to plan, and that could have been activated to suppress or to deal with nationalistic approaches – i.e. approaches

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<sup>4</sup> On the day before the official ceremony of signing the NATO-Treaty in Washington, Dean Acheson, U.S.-Foreign Minister, mentioned that the United States would bring Western Germany into NATO what caused some irritation to the French delegation.

that could have created new rivalry among the members of the Western state community. Due to the reasoning of Kant, the assumption is likely to be correct – but far from being generally valid.

What can be proved is that Western-pluralistic democracies are currently able to produce a peace- and stability-ensuring effect as soon as nationalistic ambitions are tamed by an unifying external threat, by collective considerations or by internally associating mechanisms. If nation state-based democracies - without ruling out any competitive nationalistic ambitions among them – would be peace and stability-ensuring by trend, doesn't need to be verified, as the Western state community builds on value-based associating institutions, represented by NATO respectively the EU. But what about an additional military threat? It would be very seducing, simply to neglect the question of the influence of nationalistic ambitions on the peace- and stability-ensuring effect of democracies – just for the reason that they, as shown above, had been tamed continuously since the end of World War II. But what proves true for the analysis of Western pluralistic democracies themselves and their behavior among each other, must not prove true for the strategic goal of projecting peace and stability onto other states and regions all over the world. Particularly, because the Western state community's current political security paradigm, which strongly aims at projection of democratic principles – thus sowing the seeds for peace – was not really accepted by other countries, would this question be worth analyzing in a separate research.

Anyway, the thesis at hand builds upon the axiom that the European “Western-pluralistic” type of democracy has to be considered as that kind of a usable fundament for a democratic constitution, which offers the most favorable framework for a peaceful development of a society. For the foreseeable future, and under currently prevailing framework conditions, Western-pluralistic democracies shall be dealt with as the best choice and as peace-ensuring “by trend” – regarding internal and social peace within the state as well as peaceful interstate relations within the Western state community and the best potential system to project democratic principles to crises-areas outside of Europe. The assumption is that calmed-down conflicts or crises-areas would not spill-over their negative effects to the home-bases of intervening states anymore. Thus represents this principle the rationale of the Western governments' current security political paradigm.

It has been a long and stony way from the post-block-confrontation-order to this current security political paradigm, which - due to rapidly changing framework conditions and a new isolationism - is about to be thrown overboard, unless Europe's political elites are not aware of the impact, such a change might have especially on the idea of a peaceful, global order, based upon

a steadily growing community of democratic states, who reliably refrain from using military force against each other.

Europe had experienced the “transformation”<sup>5</sup> of armed forces - that were exclusively designed for the defense against Warsaw Pact armies - into forces, partly trained and equipped to support EU- or UN-led approaches in the framework of first-generation-peace-keeping. It witnessed the alteration of merely humanitarian missions towards the concept of “Humanitarian Military Operations (HMI)”, which allows for interventions without prior consent of conflicting parties, legitimated by claiming violations of humanitarian principles. Via the intermediate step of peace-enforcement (according to Chapter VII of the UN-Charter and beyond) EU and NATO pushed peace-keeping farther into the currently prevailing paradigm of calming crises, even outside of Europe before their negative effects might spill-over to the home-bases of those states that are troop contributors to enforcement-missions. Criticism on the International Law-related legitimation of HMI was elegantly bypassed by claiming the “generation of new Cus-

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<sup>5</sup> As it has a number of different connotations, the term "*transformation*" must be regarded and used very cautiously: (1) *Transformation* as the shift of technology within military forces, organizations, leadership and training as implemented in the US armed forces after 1990. (2) Transformation as the description of NATO force reductions which were compensated by new technologies and procedures. (3) *Transformation* in the understanding of the new members of NATO/ EU, who – from their perspective - have taken considerable risks to themselves, to come under the protective shield of the Western collective defense and to cover their need for security against their former "protector". But as soon as they had reached membership, NATO's collective defense capability began to erode, and was softened in favor of a transfer of stability to crisis-prone regions – thus shifting the main focus from reliable defense to crises response activities. Because this development in Western diction was referred to as "transformation", it is only natural that the new members met this term with legitimate suspicion. (4) This above connotation could also not be altered by the fact that the EU meanwhile (starting in 1999/2000) explicitly uses the short term *transformation* particularly for strengthening European defense capabilities and thus to support the tendency of getting increasingly independent from United States' efforts. However as it was seen, EU neither was able to increase its capabilities, nor were EU states willing to shift from NATO-oriented defense to a self dependent and credible crisis response quality. Experiences from the Libyan campaign and the inactivity regarding Syria and the Ukraine additionally substantiate the above evaluation.

See LARRABEE, F. Stephen: Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Entwicklung der GSVP, in De VASCONCELOS, Álvaro [Hrsg.]: „Perspektiven für die europäische Verteidigung 2020“ mit einem Vorwort von Catherine Ashton, EU Institut für Sicherheitsstudien, 2011, ISBN 978-92-9198-186-1, QN-80-10-181-DE-C, page 64. However, to avoid misinterpretation, the term will in the sequence not be used throughout the research anymore.

tomary International Law”. This development, regarding the extended application of International Law, will be explained in chapter 3.2.3.2.2.).

Despite all understandable criticism of the overconfident conviction that the specific type of democracy, Western community projects, exactly *is* what people in crisis areas need most, and regardless of whether gaining political influence in the area and decreasing the risk to be cut off from vital resources - in return for the peace enforcing engagement - will be considered sufficiently legitimated, this paradigm seemed to be a reasonable, commonly accepted instrument to foster a peaceful mid-term development that would have been judged *fair* by people in the crisis area as well as by the nations that support the missions – *fair*, particularly because this kind of democracy-projection represented a just balance between the achievement of desired political goals and the efforts undertaken in order to prevent/terminate the violation of human rights in the crisis area.

The criticism on the projection of the specific type of democracy, Western community offers, can be summarized by the following three very different issues that represent the major obstacles for the acceptance of Western crisis management:

- Social traditions, sectionalism, corruption and the classical “failed state” conditions in many regions hinder improvements (Congo, Somalia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq etc.).
- The basic question if intervening states have the right to implement also their *national* political interests in a crisis region.
- The question if intervening governments have the right to link humanitarian interventions to economic interests.

Since the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century, the idea of the development of an enforced democracy projection became disrupted. Currently, most of the European states reduce their defense budgets dramatically, have withdrawn from abroad missions that originally had aimed at founding self-sustainable democratic structures in conflict areas. They even withdraw from overseas deployments that were maintained since centuries, neglecting the availability of actionable European forces and thus the strategic power projection capability. If certain European security experts would blame them for letting themselves fall back to a “Fortress-Europe” – it would not be easy to contradict. Moreover, this development did not only affect the active component of security policy but also were defense capabilities continuously reduced. Prognoses of a 10 – 20 years timespan of a “prewarning”, meaning that any conventional threat could be ruled out with a degree of probability that allegedly would allow for force- and capability-reductions were more than questionable. This treacherous calculation seduced many (“core”)-European states to

gain extensive economies. The problem only is that states which are more directly exposed to a hypothetical conventional threat did never agree to those prognoses, and just on the contrary refrained from cutting down budgets, respectively even raise defense expenditures. Thus it is not only Europe's foreign policy related actionability that is eroding, it is also the belief in a common effective and reliable European defense that is at stake to get lost.

Both, the development of an active peace-support-component and a limited concern for the defense-component, are very likely to affect the weight of defense/armament industry, and in the long run also the technological capacity of EU-member states. Pooling and Sharing, unless driven by a collective will to minimize shortfalls, particularly if this would request substantial investments by member states, cannot be considered an appropriate remedy to the decline of Europe's willingness to defend itself and the democratic values it stands for. Because NATO falls victim to the "Smart Defense"-approach<sup>6</sup> of European governments, it neither will be able to compensate deficiencies resulting from the development as explained above. EU-member states' armed forces firstly might lose capabilities, which could lead to an "exodus" of national high-tech armaments enterprises. Subsequently Europe might lose its technological winning margin as whole<sup>7</sup>.

Paradoxically however, the intended withdrawal from abroad missions (e.g. the one from ISAF) and the return on homeland security-tasks concerning EU-core territory does not mean that vital resources outside Europe would remain totally out of consideration. As an example, the EUISS-

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<sup>6</sup> The initiative of "SMART DEFENSE", originally an American idea coined by RAND, was introduced in February 2011 at the Munich Security Conference, partly as an answer to shrinking defense expenditures. NATO defines Smart Defense on its official homepage as a "... new way of thinking about generating the modern defense capabilities, which the Alliance needs for the coming decade and beyond. It is a renewed culture of cooperation that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the Alliance's essential core tasks agreed in the new NATO strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better"

(see: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_84268.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm?), as of 16.02.2013).

In a number of documents „Smart Defense“ includes also diplomacy, multi-track diplomacy, information warfare, deployment of forces, force transformation, use of allies, containing hostile forces etc.

<sup>7</sup> Compare MÖLLING, Christian: Europe without Defense, The States of Europe Have to Re-evaluate the Interrelationship between Political Sovereignty, Military Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 38, November 2011, ISSN 1861-1761, page 4.

paper “What ambitions for European defense in 2020?”<sup>8</sup> may be cited, which defines "Universal Treasures" as vital global environmental resources, which will have to be secured by military interventions conducted by the Western state community. A similar approach can also be seen in the alignment of the Russian strategy towards “privileged interests in certain regions of the world”. After the end of the Georgia conflict, late August 2008, President Medvedev had defined five principles<sup>9</sup> that are supposed to determine the future of foreign- and security-policy orientation of the Russian Federation - among them the right to maintain so-called "privileged interests in certain regions of the world". This correlates to some extent with the “rebirth” of Russian geopolitics about the year 2005 that implicitly is insinuated by the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020" (NSS 2020) and that expresses itself in a thinking in categories of “vital areas of influence” and in the constant competition for resources, particularly in the South Caucasus, in Central Asia and at the Caspian Sea.

Both approaches will probably need to be defended against the accusation that they only might be a pretext for power-politically-motivated interventions and thus could lead to a new perception of global injustice.

The overall picture that could be composed out of all these factors does not really seem to be too promising.

Decreasing defense expenditures as a consequence of a lack of identification of Western pluralistic states with their own armed forces are likely to lead to shrinking and subsequently dwindling force capabilities (regarding stability-projections as well as conventional defense), and to a loss of trust in an effective collective security that has negative consequences (like a diversified threat perception), particularly for the security of peripheral-states, which would be more directly exposed to any kind of emerging threat. Additionally will shrunk defense budgets result in the problem that the demand for enforcing access to vital resources abroad, can - due to Europe’s armed forces’ shortened “effective range” - not be met sufficiently anymore. Approaches like Pooling and Sharing – already mentioned above – won’t provide an effective

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<sup>8</sup> Compare RIES, Thomas: The globalizing security environment and the EU, in De VASCONCELOS, Álvaro [Editor]: “What ambitions for European defense in 2020?” with a Preface by Javier Solana, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Second edition (the original edition of this book was published in July 2009. This is a revised edition, updated in the light of the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum result on 2 October 2009), ISBN: 978-92-9198-158-8, QN-80-09-917-EN-C, page 70.

<sup>9</sup> Compare WOLF, Christian: Quo vadis Russland? Die aktuelle russische Sicherheitsstrategie, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 6/2011, pages 683 and 689.

remedy, and on the opposite as they rather might lead to a widening of capability gaps instead of bridging them<sup>10</sup>. The general tendency to relieve the conscript youth from compulsory military service confirms this trend, showing that the defense of democratic freedoms and values might be taken less seriously.

It seems that the contribution of the citizen for the military defense of the state is seen as an obligation and no longer considered as an inalienable right, or at least as an undelegable duty. Instead, to a certain degree, even a defenseless democracy would be accepted by a majority of Western societies. This scenario probably would lead to a dramatically altered security political paradigm, which allows Western democracies to reduce, respectively refrain from peace enforcement and democracy-building commitments, which, so far, had made the strive for sustaining political influence in crisis areas somehow acceptable. The scenario of withdrawing from an active democracy-projection had, at least to a certain extent, made it understandable that intervening states – beyond the humanitarian goal of the mission - countered aggressors who had tried to deny other states access to vital resources in the mission area. However, claiming political influence and access to vital resources on one hand, while simultaneously reducing democracy-projecting commitments on the other hand, might generate a new perception of injustice between rich democracies and poor peoples in crises shaken areas; such peoples would be left alone in their struggle for freedom and democratic structures.

Above all, and regardless of the actual capability and will of the Western state community to intervene for humanitarian purposes, the United Nations have signalled by their R2P-approach<sup>11</sup> that in the future they won't agree to interventions anymore as they have done in the past, and that from then on time consuming examinations of the legitimation of such operations would be requested. The basic intention behind R2P undoubtedly was the demand that a state must protect its population from human rights violations *by himself*, in order to be considered "sovereign". On the other hand there is an additional rationale that can be assumed, i.e. the possible attempt by the UN to curb an unwarranted growth of too independent, humanitarian-motivated

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<sup>10</sup> Compare MÖLLING, Christian: Europe without Defense, The States of Europe Have to Re-evaluate the Interrelationship between Political Sovereignty, Military Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 38, November 2011, ISSN 1861-1761, page 4.

<sup>11</sup> Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international legal concept that was originally developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), approved at the 2005-Summit of the United Nations in New York by almost every state and for the first time anchored in international law by the resolution 1674 of the Security Council.



interventions of Western alliances, which are based upon the claiming that there had *new* Customary International Law been created<sup>12</sup>. The “commandment” that obligated the state to protect its own citizens by himself, could also be understood to that effect that the UN wants to limit “enforcement”-activities of a state to “within its borders”, reserving the responsibility for (international) humanitarian or any militarily carried out missions, solely to the UN-Security Council.

It would be too simple to explain the entire scenario, as described above, as a consequence of unwillingness and/or an acute economical weakness of Western democracies caused by inescapable budgetary limitations - the actual reason might lie much deeper. The theory that financial needs are the main trigger for the current erosion of military capabilities, can be questioned by two reasons: Firstly the analysis shows that the average percentage of defense budgets compared to overall GDPs is very low<sup>13</sup>; savings in that sector won't provide a substantial contribution to the consolidation of budgets as a whole. Secondly, would the loss of access to vital resources abroad, the possible exodus of defense/armaments industries and finally the forfeit of the technological winning margin, strain the EU-member states' economies much harder than the defense expenditures, which were necessary to prevent the hypothetical scenario from becoming a real one. Particularly when national economies suffer from recession, they need to develop the capability to be active players abroad and to protect their interests and vital resources.

This capability is therefore that important because political adversaries could try to hold European states ransom by denying access to those vital resources. Therefore, one conclusion is that the assumed reason for the current development is caused by the phenomenon that armed forces

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<sup>12</sup> Due to inactivity of the UN-Security Council, or when veto-powers were blocking its decisions, the US, NATO, EU and coalitions of states decided to intervene by bypassing the Security Council.

<sup>13</sup> It should be mentioned that the Western democracies after 1945 and until 1990, could rebuild their cities and economies, could spend a rather high percentage of the GNP on defense, had a healthy annual economic growth (usually between 2% to 5% per year), had nearly no unemployment and provided essential social benefits without rising the national debt. It was the political mismatch of over-spending welfare, an increasing growth in life expectancy while maintaining a low retirement age, inflation, high costs of energy and the legitimate demand of equal opportunities for women - that all together caused a dramatic reduction of the birth-rate. The political issue “wealth accumulation” versus “children” was usually answered in favor of the former. The societal task of bringing up children was more and more left to low-income families and immigrants, with all consequences of declining family-values and education.

and their missions have become uncomfortable, unappealing and incompatible<sup>14</sup> with “peace-time-spoiled” democracies. This state will last until governments will get aware of the need to communicate to the people, why armed forces are the constitutive and conditional tool for maintaining democratic structures and their peaceful development, for common welfare and the basic freedoms, which people enjoy without understanding that they easily could be affected by a destabilized internal situation or by terrorist attacks, or by being cut off from resources. These resources are needed to keep up their standard of living – a condition the masses are meanwhile used to. Particularly, when the capability to project democracy to crises areas, to execute reliable collective defense operations or to harden internal stability against terrorist acts of violence - i.e. the entire survivability as a democratic state - is at stake, it would be a sacrilege to disqualify permanently exactly those forces, which provide the only cure for the multiple problems, society might face in the future because of the superficial and hypocritical argument that armed forces were “incompatible” with modern democratic societies and their way of living. If this incompatibility turned out to be a hinder for armed forces to effectively defend the indispensable preconditions for the continuance of democratic value-based governments, then it seems more promising to restore compatibility from both (the civil-societal as well as the military) sides than to sacrifice the survival-principle of democracy per se, on the altar of incompatibility-theories.

Simply to accept a lack of political respectively societal will for bridging any asserted “divergence” between armed forces and the democratic state to which they serve, doesn’t seem a proper way to make democracies survive in a long term perspective.

This assumption was the „movens“ for choosing and suggesting the topic of my thesis – and was at the same time the underlying “cognition-guiding” interest that accompanied its compilation.

The core-questions, which led to the definition of the research design, in particular to the hypothesis and the research-targets were the following:

- How can the political decision-making-level, as well as public opinion, be made more sensitive for the crucial meaning of the mutual interrelation between functional principles of Western pluralistic democracies and military functional principles?

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<sup>14</sup> “Incompatible” should here be understood in the sense of the four central theses of the new assumption of incompatibility between military and industrialized society (according to Kernic). Compare KERNIC, Franz: Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, pages 95 and following.

- How can the political decision-making-level be advised on the engagement of armed forces that are supposed to serve the long-term sustainment of a democratic political order?
- How to construct and offer a structured model, by which these interrelations can be systematically comprehended and analyzed that allows to influence political and military factors target-orientedly (that means according to the logic of the analyzed interrelation-network), to enable armed forces – under sufficient compatibility with the modern democratic social order – to support the state’s external actionability?
- How will the state react to external and internal threats and how will it facilitate its peaceful long-term survival as a social entity, based upon democratic principles?
- How can armed forces be made compatible with modern democratic societies and how can these societies be made willing to accept military peculiarities, especially when such are inevitable to enable the military to defend democratic freedom?
- How, along which “axes” and under which circumstances do these four questions systematically influence each other?

The thesis deliberately refrains from pleading for higher budgetary provisions of armed forces, as decreasing defense expenditures are to be seen only as a symptom, a consequence resulting from the underlying core-problem, namely the underestimating of the importance of the democratic functional principles-based interrelation between the state and its armed forces, respectively the deficiency of understanding this interrelation. A higher democracy-relevant effectiveness of armed forces will therefore rather be achieved by an approach starting from just this interrelation, than from the request for higher budgetary means, which, like every symptomatic treatment, would neglect the actual “disease”. The research is designed to show that the problem rather derives from a lack of understanding of the importance of armed forces as a tool of “last resort” to make democratic principles prevail, than from adverse budgetary conditions.

Once the approach to convince citizens of the democracy-fostering effect of armed forces, is successfully understood, the requested budgetary boost would probably follow automatically, and where this effect is momentarily impossible due to inescapable economic constraints, the shortage would lead to a stronger emphasis on the creation and conservation of skills including “soft skills” (in this context understood as teaching theory, military decision making processes, joint command and control-principles, postgraduate education for higher military functions) which will allow to preserve knowledge and to support a build-up of forces in numbers as well as in capabilities later on in case of re-emerging threat.

The thesis is based upon the conviction that armed forces for the foreseeable future will remain indispensable for achieving a peaceful global order, and that any further reduction of their capabilities, only for the purpose to comply with societal compatibility requests, is a dangerous and false syllogism.

Primacy of politics is referred to as the most irrevocable of the democratic principles that defines the relation between the state and its armed forces. However, it will be tried to construct a role profile for higher military leaders that makes them part of the basis for political decision-making and that provides an unbiased, highly competent, political advice, regarding (military-) strategic planning tasks.

For the development of the structured model, and the analysis of interdependencies between democratic functional principles and militarily relevant factors are to be analyzed, the focus was primarily laid on the German-speaking part of Europe and here specifically on the interrelations applying to the Austrian situation and to Austrian framework conditions. The leadership-philosophy associated with the latter, was analyzed via its “delta” to those, prevailing outside Austria respectively the German language area. The analysis of concrete military factors in front of the background of defined categorization-perspectives will mainly be done for the example of the above mentioned leadership philosophy, again mostly applied with the German language area. The depicted categorization-perspectives, together with the explanation of the model’s functionality, are supposed to enable any user – regardless of the respective underlying leadership philosophy – to insert its own constellation of democracy-relevant, military factors into the model - in analogy to the given example.

Although the defense industries represented by big multinational enterprises and bi- or multinational procurement cooperation initiatives and defense jobs, have become an important factor, influencing states as well as the supranational state community, the interrelation between the defense/armaments industry and the real-political implementation of the democratic state, had to be omitted, because it would have gone beyond the scope of the thesis.

The research will initially elaborate on the current security political environment of Western pluralistic states with a clear focus on the German language area, and in particular on Austria. This step is designed to make sensitive for the danger that might result when pursuing the practice of giving in to efforts, which were mainly driven by incompatibility-perceptions.

Such efforts concerning the relation between the modern democratic state and its armed forces are hence that dangerous, because they ignore the fact that security political framework conditions have been dramatically changing since long.

Deduced from that, it will be tried here to develop a “structured model”, by the help of which the systemic interrelation between functional principles of democratic states and the armed forces can be systematically comprehended, analyzed, influenced and finally controlled.

As an initial step, it will be described, how the democracy’s underlying functional mechanisms have developed, how they were changed in the historic context, under which mutual interdependence they have to be understood and how they can affect the relation between the democratic state and its armed forces.

The model, which represents a major part of the thesis, is at the same time its “added value”. It builds upon a system of interlocking principles that have been abstracted to a degree that allows for individual use, regardless of specific national conditions like recruiting-system, leadership philosophy, intellectual history-related backgrounds, budgetary issues, geo-strategically driven threat perception et cetera. Conclusions, drawn from this model might, and must differ from nation to nation, but the functional logic that leads to specific national conclusions will have to prove universally valid.

The core of the model lies with defining three categorization-perspectives that represent the research matrix for the one to one - comparison of identified democratic functional principles and democracy relevant military factors in a way that allows for the deduction of systemic interrelations most directly, and comprehensively.

In the following step of the research, selected military functional principles, phenomena and factors that substantially influence, respectively are influenced by democratic principles of the state, will be analyzed by the use of the developed model. It has to be emphasized again that this will be done exemplarily for the German language area, in particular for Austria.

By the description of deduced comprehensive systemic interrelations between democratic and military functional principles, the hypothesis’ assertions will have to be confirmed.

Finally it will be tried to compress the findings of the research into recommendations for the political decision level regarding the questions: By which means and “regulating screws”, can a drifting apart of armed forces and the state be most effectively prevented or at least counter-steered? According to which principal, democracy-related algorithm must military forces be planned, educated, equipped and engaged to make the Western type of government prevail? What peace-projecting effects are needed to enhance or maintain peace in a long-term perspective?

*New scientific results*, i.e. the *value added* of the research become manifest in the analyzed systemic interdependency network and the therefrom derived assessment-model, both of which are answering, how in the future armed forces will have to be set up in principle, structured and

strategically oriented in order to cope with the new task of securing the survival of values-defined, western democracies effectively.

The innovative value of the identified scientific results will together with the useability for present force-planning processes, give guidelines for future demands.

Furthermore the outcome of the research is delineating the applicability under a changed situation that can be expected for new security-political developments. Above that, there are general pragmatic recommendations to be given that could facilitate the initiation of a profound systemic reorganization-process of military forces, based on the suggested assessment-model.

Additionally the analysis will guide decision-makers in regard of organizing forces, the purchasing of equipment and coming requirements of education and training.

## 2. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design of this thesis includes:

- the research framework,
- the identified problems,
- a hypothesis that offers a problem-relevant solution,
- the research questions,
- the methods of research-processing (including the association of methods with the individual processing steps),
- the methods that are to be applied in the proposed structured analysis-model,
- the research structure (i.e. the logical, critical path through the chapters of this work),
- the derived research-targets (i.e. principle nature, extent and a scope of possible solutions), and finally
- the added value, i.e. the proof of novelty-value and of the “unique selling proposition” of the research, compared to previously authored studies.

The research design required the following basic, substantive processing logic that stood in the background of the formal categories:

- 1) First, the question had been pursued, where major **problems** can be identified within the thematic area of "democracy and armed forces (see also section “Academic Problems, Hypothesis“).

- 2) After the derivation of the key-problems, a **hypothesis** will be created that claims to provide explanations
  - of how the specific impacts systemically affect each other,
  - by which control measures can the recognized problems effectively be assessed respectively tackled and
  - what kind of a structured model can be offered to political and military decision-makers, to support an independent assessment of the two aforementioned objectives including the finding of corresponding solutions.
- 3) Subsequently it will be investigated how and with the help of which **research questions** (see section “Research Questions”) and methods (see section “Methods”), the corroboration of the hypothesis can be operationalized.
- 4) The **analysis** will show whether, and in what areas, the assumptions of the hypothesis could be confirmed, and whether the intended targets (see section “Research Targets“) had been met.
- 5) Confirmed assumptions about the systemic network of interdepending impact-factors (between democratic and military functional principles) and the elaborated structured assessment model, will eventually be converted into a suitable form, for providing **advice to the political / military political decision-level.**

## 2.1. Research Framework

Here it will be described the security-political and social framework in which the analysis is embedded, including the current aggregate state and current trends.

Europe has since 1990 reduced defense budgets – continuously and dramatically<sup>15</sup>. The extent of the reductions and the effects the latter might cause significantly constrains the European, foreign policy.

Most of the European states that have retained the general conscription-system, abandoned respectively suspended it (Sweden, Germany) recently. Even where the draft was maintained, only a small portion of the eligible population was drafted.

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<sup>15</sup> Many sources, e.g.: FRYER-BIGGS, Zachary: US pushes NATO-Allies to Boost Defense Spending in Defense News, May 5, pages 1 and 5.

However, can budgetary “needs” not be accepted as imperative necessity, nor as the only driving logic for such a development because

- the effects of budget restrictions on foreign stabilizing missions will lead to declining chances to encourage any possible European enterprises to stay in crises-areas, and thus to a decrease of the achievable added value in such or any new markets;
- the possible loss of vital resources<sup>16</sup> in such regions by attempts of political actors who try to deny access to them, might lead to a dramatic increase of raw material-prices (these higher prices that must be paid in order to maintain the European industry/economy functioning properly, might be instrumentalized to hold Europe ransom);
- budgetary shortfalls, which will lead to a decline of military capabilities, including a decrease in demand in the defense industry, which in turn is very likely to cause a loss of the winning margin in technological know how and consequently – regardless of security-political implications – will have negative effects on employment, competitiveness and fiscal performance of that industry;
- discharging personnel, due to reorganizations will not reduce costs as they must be paid in any case (e.g. in new positions, new organizational areas, unemployment costs or via specific programs for the unemployed – thus burdening the labor market) although a reduction in the context of armed forces personnel would - at least theoretically - allow substantial savings, as personnel costs can amount to 50% of the total defense-budget (the argumentation as a whole, to achieve savings out of personnel-reductions can be considered as wishful thinking, at least as far as short-/mid-term savings are envisaged because any reduction of personnel will usually have to be compensated by additional investments in modern and expensive technology - unless a dramatic loss of capabilities is put up with);
- the percentage of social spending within the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is disproportionately and dramatically higher than that of defense spending – which is why any plan to cure domestic social needs by cutting defense-budgets, is of limited value already for mathematical reasons;
- and because of the fact that wherever conscription was “tandem-measured” with a

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<sup>16</sup> This shall not be understood as a legitimation to “occupy” resources abroad by the engagement of armed forces. Just on the contrary, this only aims at the prevention of attempts to illegitimately blackmail Europe by denying access to such vital resources.



mandatory community service, the change to professional armed forces had usually led to higher social expenditures.

So, there is no actual imperative budgetary logic that would provide an argument for the programmatic reduction of armed forces in Europe. But then it must be asked what other reasons there are that determine the framework under which the analysis will have to be elaborated, and that are responsible for the current development. There are a few answers;

First - which will be supported by the analysis – there is a **deficit of strategic target identification and -assessment** expertise; that may have an adverse effect on the national security and thus can result in a loss of democratic freedoms. In this context, the top echelons of the armed forces could be called upon, to support - via the instrument of policy advice - strategy development, strategic goal setting and -evaluation and to contribute to a professionally underpinned threat analysis (thus creating a helpful corrective regarding excessively optimistic threat perceptions).

Second, the **change in values towards a “post-modern” society** will here have to be addressed<sup>17</sup>. According to this change, particularly the youth of Europe in recent decades, had aimed at self-related, egocentric and at the same time rational and secular values. The trend towards “personal fulfillment” and development is substantiated by the userplanet online survey of 2012<sup>18</sup> that had collected the views of 20-30-year-olds in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland: 58,3% considered “personal fulfillment and development” as very important and 38,5% as important (the average of the three researched states). This ego-centered factor is thereby seen as more crucial than “physical fitness”, “material prosperity” or “tradition and homecountry”, and is only exceeded by the topics “family”, “mental well-being”, “peace and freedom” and “friends”. The fact that “peace and freedom” and “personal fulfillment and development” are ranked close to each other, shows that the logic interrelation between both values is obviously

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<sup>17</sup> Compare: The World Value Survey Cultural Map 2005-2008, Source: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy." Perspectives on Politics June 2010 (vol 8, No. 2) page 554, [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org), as of 20.11.2013.

<sup>18</sup> Compare JUGENDSTUDIE 2012 – ONLINE UMFRAGE bei 20-30-Jährigen in DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH UND DER SCHWEIZ, Mai 2012 USERPLANET RESEARCH, Zukunftsfähige Gesellschaft. Userplanet Research – E [office@userplanet.com](mailto:office@userplanet.com) URL [www.userplanet.com](http://www.userplanet.com), cited in WOHLMEYER, Heinrich: Empörung in Europa - Wege aus der Krise, IBERA/european university press, 1. Auflage 2012, ISBN 978-3-85052-320-2, page 19.

*not* understood. If “peace and freedom” is granted such high importance, then it is self-evident that citizens would have to contribute to the goal of peace and freedom, and therefore to subordinate their own individual goals, i. e. to accept a certain restriction of unlimited personal development. Accordingly to Ernst Gehmacher (in the above cited userplanet online survey - study, see page 36), the basic- mood in this generation might result in new political trends up to a possible disengagement from the ruling system. Thus would unlimited personal development cause fatal effects for the defense of a state and for its democratic basis.

The general tendency to relieve the youth of military age from compulsory military service seems to confirm the trend of the governments to accept the disengagement of youth and state, which would proceed at the expense of defense-capabilities. By this development would the defense be shifted to a professional caste of soldiers with a limited loyalty to the state.

Both questions will have to be thoroughly explored by the users of the structured model, as far as it is determinative for the force planning-related “response”.

Moreover, the research framework is determined by the phenomenon, which results as a logical consequence of the above two factors, namely that European governments often underestimate the importance of armed forces especially with regard to the survival of a democratic social order. They deny the role of the military as a stabilizing *instrument* and do not realize that they thus put at risk the *instrument* and at the same time, the entire *democratic principle* that is secured by this instrument – a military:

- which besides defense tasks, guarantees (in future disaster relief operations, assistance operations for the internal security forces regarding border control, internal unrest and counter-terrorism) the state’s internal security and thus supports the core-element of a functioning of democracy,
- whose absence would create a power-vacuum, which may invite and encourage potential aggressors who might simply take advantage of this imbalance (i.e. aggressors that would not have emerged unless there had been such a vacuum), whereat there would be a lack of adequate national defense forces<sup>19</sup> that would undermine the nation's sovereignty and thus democratic stability,

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<sup>19</sup> The paradox here is that European forces were reduced because a direct, conventional military threat can be ruled out for the next decade (with a high degree of probability); but on the other hand, it is just the existence of the current defense potential that is justifying the forecast upon which military capabilities are further reduced. This highlights the need for a longer term strategic assessment of global trends as European security requirements are currently ignored.

- which supports aims of a nation's foreign-policy, provides the power that enables the state to enforce unimpeded access to resources, guarantees prosperity<sup>20</sup> as well as internal social peace, and thus is representing the precondition for democracy-acceptance,
- which implements the *current* European security policy paradigm (i.e. calming down of crises in the periphery followed by democracy-projection, in order to prevent the spill-over of instability to the heart of Europe),
- which however would also have to implement a possible and generally accepted *new* European security political- paradigm<sup>21</sup> (i.e. reduction of peacemaking operations in the periphery, defense against migration flows, organized crime, nuclear proliferation at the external borders of the EU – ideas about an EU-led "Fortress Europe" - while simultaneously securing of "Universal Treasures<sup>22</sup>" and the creation of access to vital overseas resources; thus Europe could be accused of taking "neo-imperialist" action, whereby the creation of a global peace order, based on universal justice, a democratic values-understanding and an equality of all and for all would be hampered; as inequality cannot be eliminated and global growth of population will continue, a higher migration rate, crime-, proliferation- and terrorist-threat to the home bases of the European democracies would arise; at the same time a broad range of requirements for armed forces would be mapped out).

The above defined security-political and social framework, in which the analysis is embedded, contains basic topic-related problems that will be included in the research questions. In short, this framework can also be characterized as a composition of the following "*European realities*":

- Academia and politicians speak about "strategy" but rather mean subordinate strategies like sales-, economic-, employment-strategies than "comprehensive strategy", "geostrat-

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<sup>20</sup> The idea of the Helsinki Headline Goal was also based on interventions to protect European investments in the periphery of Europe (e.g. Africa) and defense of European property against armed gangs, insurgents or aggressors.

<sup>21</sup> Currently there exists no valid European Security Strategy but there are some ideas regarding a generally accepted security-political paradigm.

<sup>22</sup> Compare RIES, Thomas: Die EU und das globalisierte Sicherheitsumfeld, in De VASCONCELOS, Álvaro [Hrsg.]: „Perspektiven für die europäische Verteidigung 2020“ mit einem Vorwort von Catherine Ashton, EU Institut für Sicherheitsstudien, 2011, ISBN 978-92-9198-186-1, QN-80-10-181-DE-C, page 79.

egy” or “military strategy”.

- When politicians speak about “security”, they debate job-, health-, workplace-, traffic-, income- or internal security (organized/transnational crime).
- The primacy of welfare-financing denies adequate defense budgets.
- The European public underestimates the threat and challenges emerging from global wars.
- Increasing multipolarity raises the probability of armed conflicts as a consequence of power imbalances (according to John J. Mearsheimer, power asymmetries in a multipolar environment make it hard to deter strong states and are more likely to lead to conflicts than such in bipolar systems<sup>23</sup>).
- Military leadership fails to explain the need for military capabilities credibly.
- Mass media deny to debate threats both on a global and national scale.
- The experience that European armed forces were never massively engaged after 945 (the Balkan war episodes were rather to be judged civil wars respectively limited NATO-operations), might lead to further demilitarization.
- Military know-how is on a decline, when specific military forces are disbanded, doctrine and terminology is fading.
- European politicians insist on crisis management procedures (like conferences, OSCE, African Union, non-use of Battle Groups) despite the experiences of the past had shown that they do not achieve sustainable success.
- Military interventions to maintain peace or create a situation to separate forces, fight aggressors (Petersberg Missions, *Alliances of the Willing* and *Alliances of the Able*) became a task for US-forces. European governments, because of public opinion, budget restraints and capability limitations are restricting their participation.
- Military service (in particular compulsory service) will soon be outdated, even the terms combat or war are omitted in official documents and instead circumscribed by “crisis”, “turbulences”, “challenges”, “unlawful activities by some forces”, “fighting insurgencies”.
- Although there should be taken all efforts in order to avoid a drifting towards a “Fortress

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<sup>23</sup> Compare MEARSHEIMER, John J.: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York - London, 2001, ISBN 0-393-32396-X pbk, page 341.

Europe” by fostering a closer cooperation among European states with regard to a perpetuated democracy-projection, not much political will to do so, is to be recognized.

## **2.2. The Academic Problem and the Key-Hypothesis**

### **2.2.1. The Academic Problem**

The key-problem lies with the fact that Western-pluralistic democracies, which currently are based on a post-modern values constitution, in order to maintain their ultimate goal, namely social welfare and prosperity as the paramount desires of their citizens, and the subjective feeling of security at the highest possible level, regularly take measures by which they unknowingly and unintentionally jeopardize the indispensable preconditions for the desired internal democratic stability. For as long as no direct threat to the state will be seen,

- governments on the one hand will try to reduce the role and importance of the armed forces and will gradually withdraw them from the public view of the state,
- because they want to avoid any subjective perception of a threat to the citizens, and aim at documenting their peacefulness visibly,
- and they will attempt on the other hand, especially in difficult economic times, to gain financial means, through the above mentioned down-grading of the military, to redirect them into the total budget.

However, threats exist also in peace, which is always relative. Therefore any down-grading of armed forces, without in-depth comprehension and without any consideration of the systemic interrelation of their democracy-related functional principles, would destroy the fundament of the internal democratic stability of the state and can destabilize the international political system. However, a scientific analysis of these relationships is still missing, so neither a relevant advice to the political decision-level can be given so far.

The relationship between democracy and peace, and the effectiveness of the armed forces within the democratic principle (related to both, the internal democracy-supporting effectiveness, and the democracy-transfer to the outside) is undervalued. If peace is the ultimate goal and if it can only be secured by the presence of military forces, then efforts to base these forces on democratic functional principles should be pushed with more vigor.

The above deductions can be abstracted as follows: The fundamentally different categorization-contexts under which democratic forces-related operating principles can be classified, are not

recognized. So can neither the mutual interdependence of their factors be examined systematically, nor their interrelation to military functional principles. Even less can a model for a system-compatible change be given. The different integration-frameworks in which democratic individuals (i.e. norm-addressees) are embedded and their mutual dependence are not sufficiently analyzed.

Even when the role of the armed forces is recognized as a prerequisite for the maintenance of peace and for internal democratic stability (via the peace-creating function of democracy-projecting missions that help to prevent destabilizing effects in other regions from spilling-over), and where the political decision-level, despite budget-limitations though intends to keep the armed forces mission-effective,

- might governments - in ignorance<sup>24</sup> of the system interdependencies – with high probability, tackle a few factors first, whose change only can provide a symptomatic, selective success but elsewhere even will create more damage than the change has brought benefits,
- and they will be enticed to this approach, also because the meaning of democracy-relevant military principles for mission-effectiveness had not been scientifically analyzed and therefore had remained undervalued.

The compelling, mutual, dependence between measures to maintain internal democratic stability, and external security, which are acting under the strict requirement of simultaneity (Western pluralistic democracies in order to maintain sovereignty, need stability-projection and protection including critical infrastructure at the same time) is not sufficiently recognized, and even if, an adequate protection is missing. The developments that had led to the current, underlying security-political paradigm are scientifically not sufficiently analyzed. The consequences of a possible, new paradigm-shift that among other reasons could be caused by armed forces reforms can therefore not be reasonably estimated and would probably include a further downgrade. Paradoxically, budgetary constraints or ideological shifts seem to dictate the capability spectrum of the armed forces, this capability spectrum on its part the achievable level of ambition and thus the European security political paradigm. The more compelling logic however, would lie along the line of argument that the threat analysis defines the level of ambition to be achieved, respectively the security political paradigm to be chosen and that a sufficient capability profile of the armed forces including the necessary budgetary means can only be determined

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<sup>24</sup> “Ignorance” is understood here not in the meaning of a lack of will to respect those interdependencies, but as a consequence of the fact that a systemic research of influencing factors had not yet been accomplished so far.

by the latter two. Only this logic would guarantee that the military response meets the demands of the actually existing threat.

The interplay between the recognized deficit of strategic target identification and -assessment expertise and the ongoing values-change towards a post-modern society creates a problem for the states to align their armed forces to a structure that complies with the analyzed long term threat.

The proceeding value-changes into the direction of a post-modern society, leads to the loss of the sense that the fundamental undisputed pillars of the democratic order bases on the syn-allagmatic relation of the contribution of the citizen to the state including the citizen's willingness to defend the nation against aggression from any side.

### **Concise definition of the academic problem:**

1. Western, post-modern democracies, in peace-time unknowingly jeopardize internal democratic stability by reducing and withdrawing armed forces from the public view. Additional research should create the requested awareness.
2. A down-grading of armed forces without consideration of the systemic interrelation between democratic principles of the state and military functional principles, endangers the internal democratic stability of the state. Therefore a scientific analysis of the above mentioned relationship is indispensably needed. It will have to be distinguished between wars of democracies among each other and wars of democracies against less democratic systems<sup>25</sup>.
3. The relationship between democracy and peace is undervalued. The research is to sensitize for the importance of this relation.
4. Categorization-contexts for democratic principles of the state and for the military functional principles, as well as the different integration-frameworks are not recognized. The structured analysis-model will have to define such frameworks, as precondition for system-compatible changes.
5. Even where the importance of armed forces for internal democratic stability is recognized, political leadership - due to missing knowledge of the above deduced systemic interrelations – will only access symptomatic changes. The main purpose of the analysis-model is advice to political leadership and force planners how to achieve systemic changes towards democracy-

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<sup>25</sup> The finding that democracies are more peace-loving by trend, results from a one-sided interpretation. In fact democracies are engaged in wars *against less democratic systems*, as often as other political regimes. It is only the probability of wars *between democratic systems* that is significantly lower.

compatible, and at the same time, mission-effective armed forces.

6. The mutual dependency of internal democratic stability and external security is not sufficiently recognized, whereby primarily Western national strategies might be doomed to fail. The analysis will have to prove the democracy-relevance of this interrelation and to include it into the systemic interdependency-network.
7. The antagonism between the need for the identification of a state's strategic targets and the ongoing decline of values, results in the problem to explain the need for armed forces in peacetime or to keep them long-term mission-effective and at the same time democracy-compatible. The research will have to suggest a synthesis, combining both requests and an argumentation, which supports the acceptance of the logic that particularly contributions to the state's defense are a major precondition for a participation in the political decision-making.

### **2.2.2. Hypothesis**

#### ***Development of the Hypothesis***

For the purpose of protecting the current form of Western pluralistic, democratic political systems and constitutions and for safeguarding further developments, political actors will have to take into account that armed forces indispensably contribute to those goals in a triple manner:

- Armed forces of any democratic system need internalized democratic values-understanding in order to meet the expectations of stability projection (and not to be perceived as occupational forces, thereby achieving the very opposite of what they are expected to achieve);
- Armed forces, once having internalized this democratic principle, will serve as an identity-creating catalyst for the state and its values ("state" defined here through the identity-creating principle of a "values-based community") and the cohesion among Western democracies;
- Armed forces are *means* to project stability to other regions of uncertainty, and hence prevent crises from spilling over destabilizing effects to Western democracies.

If peace is the ultimate goal for the functioning of Western-pluralistic democracies under the given security policy-paradigm, military forces are essential for the long term survival of the state. This goal can only be achieved by armed forces, which must



- in order to function within themselves,
- in order, to avoid to become a “foreign body” within the society, and even more to provide democracy-supporting effects, and
- in order to reach operational effectiveness in defense- and stability-projecting missions,

be trained, equipped and supported in this role, but also must be imbued with a full and internalized understanding of democratic values.

The question of a democratic values-foundation of armed forces is nothing less than the question of the long-term peaceful survival of the state per se - at least as long as the current European security-policy paradigm will be pursued. This will presumably be the case as long as the current value-understanding will not be fundamentally changed. Such a change however, might in turn occur, when a long-term deterioration of the economic situation would take effect and the decline of military capabilities would continue. The effects of a crisis that deteriorates the political system cannot be predicted and might lead to internal unrest, dissolution of the state and of its institutions.

The logical correlation between the above requirements results from the fact that the mission-effectiveness of armed forces depends on their internal functioning, their democracy-political compatibility (the military must not become a foreign body to the state) and the consistent enforcement of the primacy of politics. All the aforementioned claims, in turn require the full democratic values-inspiration of the armed forces themselves. In particular will the acceptance of the restriction of some fundamental rights, which are derived from the primacy of politics and the resulting command- and obedience-principle, require an internalized democratic value-understanding (but exactly this rule can lead to a conflict between a military which is based on democratic values and a new government that follows a non-democratic path).

It will be shown that the crucial principle, by which the above democratic value-awareness can be generated, preserved and developed, lies also within a broad humanistic general education of soldiers.

Logically, the hypothesis is based on the assumption that a broad humanistic general education for soldiers of all ranks, and the therefrom resulting values-awareness, represent the critical key factors for aligning armed forces to the principle of democracy-supportive effectiveness.

### ***Deduction and structuring of the Core-Hypothesis and Sub-Theses***

*The nucleus of the hypothesis* lies in the lines of arguments that a peaceful long term survival of the democratic state requests armed forces, functioning “democratically” within themselves,

compatible to the democratic respectively social order of the state. These forces, in order to unfold a democracy supporting functionality, and to provide mission effectiveness, must have fully internalized and understood the democratic values-set, which in turn also depends on a broad humanistic general education.

The question of how the further, derived factors interact in a complex systemic network of mutual interdependencies, how they must be steered and controlled militarily as well as politically, in order to achieve the above mentioned quality of armed forces, can be derived from a structured analysis model that allows the state to conduct an analysis self-dependently, and to adjust its forces' structure due to its specific national requirements. This structured analysis model will come into effect if the research at hand will succeed to provide appropriate assessment-factors, including mutual interdependencies, to define processing steps and recommendations how to interpret results, respectively to systemically influence the current state towards a new, more democracy-supporting and at the same time mission-effective alignment of its armed forces.

“Systemically” in this context means that the change is not only about a symptomatic alteration of driving-factors, which would lead to a modification of dependent but unconsidered and unrecognized factors in a way that would inflict damages that are greater than the benefits, the reorganization was planned to achieve. A change in a single parameter, due to the ignorance of the interdependencies *between* the areas, where armed forces play a democracy-relevant role, only seemingly has no effect on the viability of the democratic principle. In fact, such a change might have unforeseen, harmful consequences for the democratic stability of the state.

Therefore, a structured analysis-model will be developed, which explains the systemic interrelations between democratic functional principles of the state and operational principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership and thus creates the basics for their further evaluation. With the help of this model, shall the appropriate “set-screws” be identified, through which the the long-term survival of the state can be increased, also taking into account specific national circumstances and conditions and particularly under the precondition of limited defense budgets. The analysis-model also will help to recognize and evaluate risks that result from wrong steering inputs or inputs that have *not* been set. Thus a system-compatible prioritization can be suggested.

The nucleus of the hypothesis is concretized by two sub-theses, which themselves represent mutually interdependent lines of argument (see figure “2-3”).

- ***The first sub-thesis*** starts from the assumption that Western pluralistic, democratic states need mission-effective armed forces in order to maintain sovereignty to the outside and inwards. Maintaining sovereignty is an indispensable precondition for

guaranteeing basic democratic freedoms domestically and for surviving as a democratic-value based member of the community of Western states (instrumental aspect of the armed forces). In this sense, armed forces contribute to democracy-constitutive sovereignty in particular:

- by ensuring its survival against open attacks or by deterring an aggressor and by preventing a possibly emerging power vacuum (direct national defense),
- by maintaining and defending democratic self-determination also against major subversive subconventional threats to the homebase that might arise from a response to military interventions in the course of "Enhanced National Defense"<sup>26</sup>,
- by "preventively" securing national peace and the survival of the state through maintaining free access to vital strategic resources outside Europe,
- by the creation of democratic self-determination, through democracy-transfer to crises-areas (abroad missions with a rather preventive/preemptive character) and
- by constantly aligning to the imperative mutual dependence between the demands of internal democratic stability and external security, while taking into account the strict requirement of simultaneity of both.
- ***The second sub-thesis*** bases on the finding that democratic value-understanding - in order to achieve mission effectiveness accordingly to first sub-thesis at all - has to be consistently projected into the armed forces and from top down to the common soldier. Military culture can thereby be seen as the transposed reflection of the entire society's set of values. The above democratic values-canon can be measured by the following categories that at the same time provide indicators for the achieved level of democratic maturity within the armed forces:
  - Combat success derived from the demand for superiority over potential aggressors has to be achieved at the lowest possible own losses and with ultimate respect for the lives of soldiers as well as of citizens to be protected. This respect is of particular importance because it affects the most personal, individual-democratic and inalienable rights and because the support of the voters (which represents the necessary democratic "de facto"-legitimation of a mission) would be quickly withdrawn as soon as casualties (of soldiers as well as of civilians) would become too high or when the claimed democracy-supportive, character of the strategic objectives respectively the international law-related legitimacy of the mission, were in question.

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<sup>26</sup> „Enhanced National Defence“, is to be understood as the precursor of the current European security political paradigm and bases on the same idea.

- The obedience-principle means to keep armed forces subjected to the primacy of politics and to implement the will of the sovereign consistently down through all levels of command. Necessary restrictions of fundamental rights of the soldiers serve the purpose of preserving freedom and democracy. A compensation, respectively a mitigation of these restrictions can be found in the principle of the right of resistance regarding unlawful orders<sup>27</sup>.
- Forces must be integrated into the state's organization so thoroughly that they do not become a totally separated subsystem of the society, nor even are perceived as one. Otherwise they would be rejected by society like a foreign body and thus they might turn into democracy-hazardous, largely independent sub-system within state.
- With appropriate alignment, common values and excellent leadership, armed forces can have a democracy-invigorating effect on society. As the society is exposed to the post-modern values-change even more dramatically and defenseless than the armed forces, this is an important social and value-enhancing task if one observes the current trends in Western societies).
- The democracy-invigorating effect on society is seen as necessary, especially in order to counter the loss of the insight that social cohesion that is so important to support a functioning democratic order depends on the synallagmatic relation between the contribution of the citizen to the state (that includes in particular the contribution to the state's defense) and the participation in political decision-making.

### **Concise definition of the hypothesis:**

1. Democracies depend for their peaceful, long term survival on armed forces, functioning within themselves and compatible with the democratic, social order of the state. These forces must - in order to unfold their democracy-supporting functionality and mission effectiveness - at the same time, be fully imbued with an internalized democratic values-understanding. This means that they must be integrated and understand the democratic values of the society.
2. In turn, the key factor for the generation of the above values-understanding (i.e. the insight how democracies depend on armed forces), thus for the alignment of armed forces towards

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<sup>27</sup> This right of resistance is – as the analysis will show – also expressed by the principles of „mission-type-leadership“ („Auftragstaktik“), „leadership by empathy and example“ and in “internal leadership”.

the highest possible degree of democracy-compatibility and at the same time for the attainment of mission effectiveness, lies with a broad humanistic education of soldiers of all ranks.

3. It is possible to construct and offer a structured analysis-model, which explains the systemic interrelations between democratic functional principles of the state, and at the same time operational principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership – an analysis-model that provides logically deduced recommendations on how any derived factors interact in a complex systemic network of mutual interdependencies, how they must be steered and controlled militarily as well as politically, in order to achieve the above mentioned, democracy-relevant quality of armed forces.
4. The inward, democracy-constitutive effect of armed forces, which supports the state in maintaining its sovereignty, imperatively has to be dealt with as the *organic unity* of the components:
  - defense against conventional and subconventional threats from the outside,
  - democracy-/peace-projection respectively securing/enforcing access to vital resources abroad and
  - continuous alignment to the mutual dependence between the demand of internal democratic stability and of external security.
5. The democratic values-understanding of civil society, has to be consistently projected into the armed forces, from the top down to the common soldier. The perception of those values serves as an indicator for the achieved democratic maturity within the armed forces and can be additionally influenced/controlled by its constitutive components:
  - the request for missions of lowest possible losses,
  - the interdependence between (a) the obedience-principle/primacy of politics and (b) the right to resist against unlawful orders,
  - the avoidance of becoming a foreign body to society and
  - the armed forces' democracy-invigorating effect on society.

### **2.3. Research Questions**

The research questions had been deduced from the *overarching, guiding question of the research* “How can democracy-relevant *military functional principles* be made consistent with

military-specific *democratic functional principles of the state* in a way that enables the armed forces to achieve maximized mission-effectiveness without becoming a totally separated body in society even under limited budgetary resources, and that at the same time supports the military in securing the peaceful survival of the democratic state?”

These identified research questions are to be understood as tools, to help operationalizing the analysis of the problems, as defined in chapter “Academic Problem, Hypothesis”.

1. How can the governments of democratic states countersteer the fatal combination of a deficit of strategic thinking, like the missing political target identification/-assessment expertise, and the values-change caused by the drifting towards a post-modern society, which might lead to keeping armed forces out of the social life and at the same time to undervaluing their importance for maintaining democratic stability?<sup>28</sup>
2. How can the progressive values change towards a post-modern society that has lost the sense for the need of the citizen’s contribution to the state’s defense-efforts (but at the same time fears internal disturbances), be influenced respectively excluded from the armed forces’ development in a way that sustains the military capability to safeguard the democratic survival of the state (this in particular refers to the question how governments involve citizens in defense-issues and how they link the society to the military)?
3. Is there any prove that potential threats to democratic societies already exist and that the underestimated importance of armed forces deprives the state of its capability to maintain security and wealth?
4. How can the mutual interdependence between democracy and peace be explained<sup>29</sup>?
5. How can the mutual interdependence of (a) external security and (b) internal democratic stability and its combined influence on a democracy-compatible alignment of armed forces be explained?
6. Does democracy-transfer request acceptance on the part of ethnic groups in the mission area and is therefore only credible democracy-understanding transferable?

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<sup>28</sup> Research-questions 1 and 2 build upon the section “Introduction / driving core-questions for the creation of the research design / third question”.

<sup>29</sup> Research-question 5 refers to the section “Introduction / driving core-questions for the creation of the research design / first question”, in an abstracted form.

7. What implications would a paradigm shift from "calming of crises in the periphery before their negative effects might spill over to Europe" to a "Europe, security-politically fencing itself in but reserving its right to selective interventions to ensure access to strategic vital resources" on the development of the armed forces?
8. How must a structured analysis model be designed, to make system interdependencies transparent to the political leadership in a way that allows for positive systemic changes but at the same moment will avoid to achieve only a symptomatic, selective success, which on the whole, causes more damage than the reorganization has brought benefits, and thus neutralizes its intended results<sup>30</sup>.

## 2.4. Methods

The thesis had to rely on a number of established authors in the fields of political analysis, political theory, strategy and especially of military strategy.

Discussions about politics and strategy are a frequent topic in seminars of the Landesverteidigungsakademie in Wien (Austrian National Defence Academy).

In the course of this paragraph the theory-/method-set will be depicted, upon which the compilation of the research is based. In doing so, *theories* will be understood as the general perspective from which the specific parts of the analysis are to be seen – whereas *methods* stand for the scientific techniques and approaches that were applied within the research at hand. Underlying theories were outlined because of their inherent predisposition for certain, appropriate methods that had to be chosen for the analysis. Theoretical approaches predetermined the choice of methods, and threw a light ahead on the quality of the results.

The text offers a structured and *methodical* model for the systemic analysis of the interrelation of functional principles of states, and military functional principles/factors/phenomena.

This *model is part of the research's added value*, and is thus rather a *result of the research*, than a method for its creation.

Because the fundamental theory-approaches are suitable for the respective user of the model,

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<sup>30</sup> Research-question 8 mirrors the second and fourth question of the section "Introduction / driving core-questions for the creation of the research design.

their selection and application represent a major component of the analysis as a whole. As they however are too voluminous to be tackled here without interfering with the flow of the research, they will be discussed in detail, in annex 2. Neither will this model's underlying, methodical basic principles be given attention here - they will rather be dealt with, in the context of the development of the model itself.

Although the mass of relevant theories and their immediate implications on related methods will be treated in detail in Annex 2, "Extended Theoretical Framework", some theoretical approaches, which have a specific importance for the choice of the guiding methods, will be extracted and explained already within this section.

The description of the chosen methods-mix, and the explanation of its function, was given wider space, as a kind of "manual" should be provided to help the user tailoring the structured model to each state's national conditions, and to make it applicable for the democracy-beneficial, "strategic realignment" of the state's armed forces.

Just like the structured model itself has to be seen as the *result* of the research, and less as a *tool* for arriving at certain findings, also the analysis and explanation of the chosen methods, and of the function of the specific combination of methodical approaches for certain research questions, will have to be considered as an *outcome* rather than an *instrument* for the compilation of the research. The model is designed to provide a methodical support to the respective user while applying the theory-approaches suggested in Annex 2.

The acquisition of interpretative theoretical foundations, which were considered by the author, and the stringent derivation of methods or combinations of methods therefrom, were oriented towards the main purpose of the work, namely, to find a synergetic combination of philosophical-rational and nomothetic ways, universal laws and functional principles, which - by deductive derivation - were subsequently to be transferred into recommendations for political and military decision-making.

#### **2.4.1. Composition of the Chosen Theory-/Method-set**

The selection of appropriate theoretical and methodological approaches influenced substantially the outcome of the analysis, and is, vice versa, influenced by the large number of phenomena to be tackled. Therefore, and due to the variety of functional principles that shall be analyzed in the course of the research at hand, it became firstly necessary to deduce, how to embed the research questions into the framework of International Political Relations-theories, and secondly



(within Political Theory, and within other scientific perspectives, respectively branches), subsequently to reason why and how, specific methods for the analysis of primary and secondary literature, respectively of miscellaneous sources, correlate with the research topic's scientific questions most adequately. The envisaged goal, namely to arrive at a systemic interrelation within a wide and multidimensional range of democracy-relevant factors, functional principles and phenomena, compellingly led to a broad spectrum of theories and methods that should allow to deal with each of these facets, by handling them with the "tools" they require. Therefore, a particularly strong emphasis had to be given to the design and composition of the theory-/method-set to be applied here.

*Research-results* that deal with the mutual influence of democratic principles and armed forces from a comprehensive and systemic view are scarcely existing yet and there is only a limited amount of *literature* tackling this topic. *Experiments* respectively an *empiric reasoning* of findings inherently seems problematic, as soon as national security is at stake. Therefore the following guiding principles for the scientific-theoretical approach of the research had to be chosen:

- Functional principles that explain the systemic interrelations to be researched here, had to be constructed in a mainly **rational** approach.
- Subsequently, relevant, observed and observable phenomena had to be selected, abstracted and generalized on the basis of military scientific- respectively military leadership-related experience, in an **inductive** way.
- The findings, resulting from the above phenomena were supposed to lead to a **nomothetic** outcome – that additionally was expected to support the functional principles that had been rationally defined before.
- The subsequent breaking down of identified functional principles for an advice for the political leadership, like how to control the "network" of democracy-relevant factors systemically, represents the **deductive** part of the research.

#### **2.4.2. Theory of International Relations**

The Theory of International Relations is usually seen as the fourth pillar of Political Science, beside Political Theory, Political Systems and Comparative Political Science. It aims at the description and analysis of repeating behavioral- and event-patterns, actions and processes within

the structures and conditions of the International System<sup>31</sup>. In that way, they influence the perspective from which political as well as military phenomena are analyzed, the contents of the theory to be developed, and the policy recommendations derived from the latter. On the other hand, they also will be mirrored in the method set, chosen for the research.

The thesis focuses on the relationship of state (here always understood as the Western democratic state) and its forces. This is a correlation of force, strength, organization, purpose, mission and budget. International relations, possible missions, manpower and equipment are in this thesis only supporting issues.

International Relations' Theory is therefore not in the primary focus of this thesis. However, there is a linkage between external security and internal democratic stability, the use of international institutions, the humanitarian preservation of peace and mission-related topics that are well described.

According to the categorization into “descriptive–normative–predictive” methods, the descriptive approach will be given less weight. Because the focus of the research rather lies with envisaged military target-structures and policy recommendations than with a description of current developments, the main effort in that context will be laid on **normative and predictive** methods.

The research does not try to bridge the controversy between **Realists and Liberalists** (or, more lately, between Realists and Idealists). Just on the contrary, it will make use of a “dialectic” confrontation/comparison of both approaches. This leads to an equilibrium between positive (as they represent primarily the Realism-driven logic) and normative (better mirroring the character of Liberalism) methods.

Democratic functional principles<sup>32</sup> can be explained at best from the perspective of the individual, respectively the element subdued to the laws and rules of a higher social integration-level. The individual in particular, its unhindered, free development and its self-determination is the core on which **Liberalism**, in its normative dimension focuses – it builds on the assumption that the free play of the “forces of individuals” will, by itself and necessarily, lead to an

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<sup>31</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, ISS International Security Studies Band 2, Peter Lang GmbH, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main 2006, ISBN 3-631-55203-3, page 23.

<sup>32</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, 2006, pages 36 to 38.

optimal order.

Referring to the axiom “democracies are by trend peaceful”, Kant’s “Democratic Peace Theory”, combined with the “International Free Trade Approach”, will have to be considered as a corner stone of liberal thinking that must not be neglected. 20th century liberalism (idealism), which more or less invented the basics of the idea of “collective security systems” will have to be included as a theoretical construction that at least tried to break the “spiral of violence”, which resulted from the perpetuated interplay of mutual threats.

On the other hand, **Realism** undoubtedly presents a more coercive explanatory theory, for analysing the reasons why “Appeasement-Policy” had failed e.g. to avoid World War II and why the “Mutual Assured Nuclear Destruction”-pattern was an effective means to keep up a relatively stable balance between the superpowers for a remarkably long timespan – using the threat of retaliation without providing any appeasement-effect<sup>33</sup>. Above that, Realism explains convincingly, why alternatives to a military power projection towards the “axis of instability”, starting from the Middle East via Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India to the South China Sea, is so hard to be found. These findings obviously substantiate the assumption that the pendulum currently swings back to Realism-theory<sup>34</sup>. However, the research is carried by the conviction that a **dialectic approach between Liberalism- and Realism-Theory** will result in more reliable findings, than a preference for one of the two.

As far as the **Neo-Realism** approach of Kenneth Waltz<sup>35</sup> who developed Realism further towards security as the superior goal of states, instead of maximizing power within the international system, there as well neo-realistic “ingredients” had to be included.

Despite the envisaged dialectic equilibrium between Liberalism and Realism, Realism-driven thinking had to be stressed one-sidedly where the principles of the “National Interest”<sup>36</sup> had to be analyzed. Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Bismarck’s “Realpolitik” are examples of how moral

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<sup>33</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, 2006, pages 40 to 42.

<sup>34</sup> „Realism” must be understood here primarily in its antagonism to the newer term “Idealism”, which had replaced the Liberalism-idea.

<sup>35</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, 2006, pages 56 to 57.

<sup>36</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, 2006, pages 47 to 49.

and ethical values-based attitudes were subordinated to a superior reason of state. As soon as the western state community will be confronted with the challenge to secure or regain resources that are vital to its democratic survival, the “National Interest”-discussion will be very likely to live up again<sup>37</sup>. Where, due to the “primacy of politics”, democratic liberties of soldiers are to be restricted in order to foster the superior goal of democratic freedom and security for the entire state’s citizens, the “National Interest”-principle occurs again, albeit in a different connotation, making the emphasized intellectual dispute about this core-element of Realism-driven thinking even more necessary.

To some extent as a compensation for stressing Realism - with regard to the “National Interest”-principle - the International Institutionalists- and International Law-branches of Liberalism<sup>38</sup> had to be brought into the focus, where collective defence systems and International Law-based fundamentals of peace-building had to be scrutinized.

The research is designed to arrive at a theory that describes the systemic interrelation between democratic and military functional principles in a way that allows for policy-recommendations. In order to cope with that challenge, it will have to achieve a sufficient range that bases upon a superior explanatory context, which logically combines seemingly independent events and actions by a theoretical pattern<sup>39</sup>.

### **2.4.3. Singular-sciences/-disciplines-related Methods**

In this paragraph the singular-sciences/-disciplines-related methods shall be enumerated and explained that were not yet given attention in chapter “Theories of International Relations”. It will mainly be about methods that belong to qualitative research within the humanities. Already

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<sup>37</sup> The US-strategy papers stress the National Interest - and their foreign policy is based on such interests. After copying American political institutions like the National Security Council, publishing of National Security Strategies etc., “National Interest” has already become a terming in contemporary narrative of politicians, even of “small states”.

<sup>38</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, 2006, page 39.

<sup>39</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: *Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen und neue methodische Ansätze*, 2006, page 23.

the metaphor of seeing the qualitative researcher as a “bricoleur” (tinker)<sup>40</sup>, shows how tools, methods, and techniques, drawn from a broad spectrum, have been interwoven to a multiple instrument that is supposed to match the specific demands of research tasks “tailor-made”. It is just the variety and diversity of phenomena of military leadership that calls for the multifaceted method-set, offered by qualitative research.

The thesis explains the complex system of the mutual interdependencies between democratic and military functional principles, in order to recommend “control measures” by which armed forces can be made mission-effective and democracy-compatible at the same time. This requests a “working backwards”-analysis of phenomena and an in-depth understanding of the underlying functional principles to be able to predict possible coming challenges. Only when their function is well understood, mutual interdependencies can be achieved and deduced. To watch and describe a phenomenon only from one specific perspective falls short. It has to be understood where a functional principle’s virtual origin lies, how it gets effective, why it works as it works, and how it has developed, respectively is likely to develop in the future. This demand calls for a **hermeneutical approach** in combination with the **literature/context-analysis**. This combination was the guiding method of the research, regarding the specific development of hermeneutical methods into the direction of the **critical-hermeneutical**, respectively the **grammatical-psychological** interpretation, especially in the Clausewitzian understanding (see Annex 2, “Extended Theoretical Framework”).

**The hermeneutic approach** can be substantially facilitated by **comparative** elements that follow the idea of the inter-system-comparison, which is frequently used in case-studies. Comparative methods are particularly useful when it comes to the analysis of cultural-area-studies or of national specifics of military leadership (like comparing Anglo-American and continental European leadership-philosophies).

As the focus of the research lies with the system of interdependencies as a whole, there was not enough space for complete case-studies. However, where selected findings, drawn from military missions, were used in order to abstract functional principles from observed phenomena, the analyses of those missions were dealt with as “case-studies” in a figurative sense.

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<sup>40</sup> About the clarification of the terms bricoleur-bricolage with regard to qualitative research, see Nelson, Treichler, Grossberg, Lévi Strauss, Weinstein and Weinstein cited in DENZIN, Norman K./LINCOLN, Yvonna S.: Introduction, Entering the Field of Qualitative Research, page 2, in DENZIN, Norman K./LINCOLN, Yvonna S. [editors]: Handbook of Qualitative Research; Sage Publications, International, Educational and Professional Publisher, 1994; Thousand Oaks, London New Delhi; ISBN 0-8039-4679-1.

**The literature/context-analysis** that was used as the basis, upon which the hermeneutical approach of the research built, includes primary documentary (e.g. strategic concepts, strategy papers, doctrines, political strategies of global key players thereby emphasizing Europe and the US, military-strategic concepts, white books) as well as secondary literature and its analyses. Concepts mirror the will of political key-players, their estimates and decisions, their visions, strategic goals and projections more authentically. Logically was one main focus throughout the research laid on such concepts.

In this regard it must be noted that the more – particularly secondary literature - is closer to speech – it will request a more contextualized interpretation<sup>41</sup>.

By laying the main effort on contextualization, the research tries to avoid the weakness of content analysis, namely the inability to capture the context of a written text's meaning as well as the loosely, almost intuitive formulation of the narrative analysis<sup>42</sup>. Semiotic analysis however, as far as it is understood as based on the sign system “language”, had to be used to comprehend Clausewitz's “Theory On War”, because the change of the meaning of terms in the course of history, is often overlooked.

Publications dealing with the interrelation between democratic and military functional principles are hardly to find – even less any literature that is committed to the systemic network, which results from the mutual interdependence between recognized interrelations. Therefore the emphasis did not lie in citations of existing literature, nor was the topic suitable for an experimental probation of its theses. The intention<sup>43</sup> rather was to analyze strategic concepts, as far as they are the documented will to attain a certain goal, subsequently to *context-analytically* interpret and *hermeneutically* understand the underlying, interwoven conditions that have led to the formulation of the concepts, to independently derive systemic functional principles that can

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<sup>41</sup> Compare HODDER Ian, The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture, page 393, in DENZIN, Norman K./LINCOLN, Yvonna S. [editors]: Handbook of Qualitative Research; Sage Publications, International, Educational and Professional Publisher, 1994; Thousand Oaks, London New Delhi; ISBN 0-8039-4679-1.

<sup>42</sup> Compare MANNING, Peter, K./CULLUM-SWAN, Betsy, Narrative, Content, Semiotic Analysis, pages 463-467, in DENZIN, Norman K./LINCOLN, Yvonna S. [editors]: Handbook of Qualitative Research; Sage Publications, International, Educational and Professional Publisher, 1994; Thousand Oaks, London New Delhi; ISBN 0-8039-4679-1.

<sup>43</sup> This paragraph is to explain the specific linkage of methods/combination of methods to the individual process steps of the research.

then be related to each other and eventually to transpose those findings that are supposed to have a sufficient general validity, into advice to political decision makers, by using *deductive methods*. According to Denzin/Lincoln<sup>44</sup>, qualitative research aims at a process, comprising a set of analytic procedures that lead to interpretations and subsequently to a theory or a set of policy recommendations to be forwarded – this is why *qualitative research-methods* were used to support the engineering of the structured analysis model.

Where symbols, a specific military behavior, or values-orders, were used as indicators for certain leadership-philosophies that can be compared, a higher demand for contextual interpretation was preferred. For that purpose, the idea of a “Theory of Material Culture<sup>45</sup>”, as it is described by Ian Hodder for the sociological and anthropological analysis can, to a certain extent or in a figurative sense be used as a pattern. Just as documents, records, and artifacts can serve as mute witnesses that “cannot talk back” but though might help to understand cultures in their historic context, military behaviors, symbols and rites can provide information on the development of leadership-philosophies over the course of time.

**Heuristic methods** were insofar only *specifically* used because it was *not* the objective of the research to make many statements about the dependencies of the various factors of a political system with limited knowledge of this system itself (like it was in the past) and then to probe these statements empirically. The goal was rather to discover dependencies with rational-nomothetic methods, because the reliability of the deduced dependencies should be the core performance of the research. **Heuristics** were therefore only used where a principal dependence of factors could be logically and compellingly derived - however, in many cases could not be quantified sufficiently.

**Legal sciences** as well as the methods used by them play an outstanding role among the singular disciplines. Firstly because they are responsible for the definition and interpretation of basic democratic rights in the constitutions of the states, secondly because they delimit the “effective range” of military orders by a certain invisible line beyond which the commanders or common

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<sup>44</sup> Compare DENZIN, Norman K./LINCOLN, Yvonna S. [editors]: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*; Sage Publications, International, Educational and Professional Publisher, 1994; Thousand Oaks, London New Delhi; ISBN 0-8039-4679-1, page 479.

<sup>45</sup> Compare HODDER Ian, *The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture*, page 395, in DENZIN, Norman K./LINCOLN, Yvonna S. [editors]: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*; Sage Publications, International, Educational and Professional Publisher, 1994; Thousand Oaks, London New Delhi; ISBN 0-8039-4679-1.

soldiers have to act according to their conscience – sometimes even against the formally legitimized command-authority. Thirdly because these legal sciences, by formulating treaties, contracts, peace-/cease-fire-agreements etc. between states or conflicting parties, support the creation of International Law, which is supposed to give International Relations a reliable rule-set that facilitates the peaceful coexistence and fruitful cooperation between the subjects to International Law. Fourthly, because they entitle armed forces to exercise authority respectively because they restrict the “pouvoir” of the latter, to use weapons, through the setting of the Rules of Engagement (“ROE”, which are influenced by certain articles of International Law, other rules and political decisions).

The corresponding method-set comprises two fundamentally differing aspects - the natural law- and the positive law-approach, which can be seen as two sides of the same medal. In cases where legal science is challenged to define precise Rules of Engagement that don't leave commanders in the field alone with the requirement to “interpret” in time-critical situations, whether the use of force is legitimate or not, to design treaties and contracts between subjects to International Law or to formulate respectively alter democratic freedom-related articles of the states' constitutions – the **positive law-related approach** was predominantly used.

Where a weighing of circumstances was required about how much restriction to democratic freedoms may be put up with for the superior goal of national security/-interest, and where the responsibility of commanders demanded, to disobey orders like ones that are contradicting human rights or fundamental moral standards, the **natural law-related approach** was to be chosen. Where the “auxiliary construction” of Customary International Law and the assertion of “*opinio iuris*” must be used in order to save people that helplessly are exposed to life-threatening violence, because a politically agreed Security Council mandate is missing, there also had the natural-law-approach to be applied.

Regardless of the legal-oriented approach – the natural law- or the positive law-related – that was applied for the analysis of a particular phenomenon, the technical method to interpret legal matters, which was used throughout the research, was the **teleological** one. Particularly, when the basic functionality was to be explored, how legal regulations can influence the harmonization between military phenomena and general democratic principles, the analysis had to focus on the goal, the ends and the purposes at which legal norms aim – and less on a sophisticated, subtle, grammatical, systematic and historical interpretation of their text.



## 2.5. Research Structure

### Main-line of argument

The “Research Structure” follows the underlying **main-line of argument** of the thesis that starts with the axiom that democracies of a western-pluralistic style have proven to be “peaceful” within themselves and capable of projecting stability to neighbouring countries. Therefrom, the hypothesis is derived that, in order to project these peaceful conditions to distant crises-areas, armed forces are needed. These armed forces, which themselves have to be imbued with the message they are supposed to convey, credently. The message to be conveyed is about the peace-building effect of the spirit of democracy. While projecting this effect, armed forces will have to stay compliant with national social and political structures, reliably accepted and in agreement with civil society, internally functioning and effective in every mission. The argumentation continues that for this purpose, armed forces have to be embedded into a systemic network of interlocking functional principles<sup>46</sup>, typical for democracies. The main goal of the thesis is to capture constitutive factors to structure the above mentioned systemic network, to analyze their interdependencies, and to derive in which way, composition and relation they must be respected by governments in order to achieve a long-term, sustainable climate of security and national stability.

### The Research Structure in detail (see figure 3b)

By the representation of the Research Structure, the logical path through the work will be described. It is mainly planned to serve the orientation of potential users (to some extent as an “operating instruction”), who want to apply the structured model, after having adapted it to their national needs. These users shall be enabled to trace the analysis-process of this study, thereby to tailor the structured model to their specific national conditions, and eventually to arrive at the appropriate conclusions for their respective armed forces-development.

The “**Research Design**” begins with the section “**Research Framework**”, which roughly outlines the state of the European security policy development in its core parameters (like guiding political rationale, important predictable/expectable short- and medium-term trends). Subsequently, a basic overview will be given that is supposed to show in which security-political environment, in which current aggregate state of which trend, the research-questions will have to

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<sup>46</sup> This network does not necessarily concern all functional principles of democracies – mainly those were covered, which affect the armed forces’ mission-effectiveness and democracy-compatibility.

be processed.

At the beginning of the section "**Academic Problem, Hypothesis**" initially those issues are identified, to the solution of which, the research can provide a scientific contribution. The hypothesis, which is oriented towards answering the identified problems, is constructed around the core-assumption that a peaceful long term survival of the democratic state can only be achieved by armed forces of a capability-profile as already described in sub-chapter "*Deduction and structuring of the Core-Hypothesis and Sub-Theses*", which in turn depends on the key factor of a broad humanistic general education.

In order to eventually operationalize the results of the research, the hypothesis will include the assumption that, by the development of a structured analysis-model, the systemic interrelations between democratic functional principles of the state, and operational principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership, and thus the basics for their evaluation, will be explained.

The "**Research Questions**", derived from the hypothesis, are to be understood as the tools for its systematic analysis. They also reflect the problems that have led to the definition of the hypothesis.

In chapter "**Methods**", both the individual methods and selected combinations of methods, relevant for the analysis-part, and their specific application to the respective processing steps will be explained, as well as the methodological basis for the systemic, structured analysis model.

It must again be noted that the structured model is part of the added value, and thus rather a "product" of the research (see figure 3a) than just a method for its creation. Therefore, and because the recommendation regarding the choice of suitable methods for user-specific application, will also be part of the systemic structured model, it had to be explained, why one specific method had been selected in the present study whereas another had to be discarded. Thus, decision-makers are given alternative approaches and decision-process basics among which they can choose their individual method-sets that they need as soon as they start to adjust the structured model to their specific initial conditions.

The section "**Research Structure**" represents a "critical path" throughout the work, which is supposed to make the logical dependence of the steps among each other traceable.

The core of the "**Research Targets**" of the thesis lies with the approach to construct a systemic interdependency-network among democracy-relevant influencing factors – which requests to comprehend the entity of the latter, as an organic body. By creating a system-perspective over the effect correlations, will also be tried to make a contribution to curbing the lack of strategic thinking in the field of conceptual foundations of Force Development. By demonstrating the

central role of training, character-building and education, an antidote shall be defined to an uncontrolled postmodern values-development within the armed forces, by the help of which, the threat of military capability losses can be countered effectively.

The **“Envisaged Added Value”** of the thesis is represented by the offered analysis-model and centers on answering the question how the user himself can determine and adapt the system of effect-correlations between democracy principles of the state and democracy relevant military functional principles, according to his individual conditions and how he can apply the results as a basis for appropriate steering measures.

The main objective of the structured model is that the user (like the respective state), recognizes the system of effect-correlations and acquires the capability to apply this model in a way that it yields a holistical, reality shaping success, which means not only a symptomatic treatment of problems; it should bring guidance to many debated essential questions and must avoid to achieve only a seeming partial success that causes more significant adverse effects in other areas. That application of the structured model also would include contributions to the political level, which makes the final decision in budget allocation, capabilities- and force planning.

The **analysis-part (“Structured Analysis Model”)** of the work is introduced by an investigation on the question of the role of armed forces as an instrument, a symbol respectively as the ultimate manifestation of democratic states' sovereignty. Thus, the fundamental relationship between democratic states and their armed forces shall be derived from its historical roots and explained in its essence, in order to conclude therefrom on a contemporary valid set of expectations in the military.

Subsequently a method is offered (**“Assessment of the Respective User’s Initial Situation”**), which helps the user of the model to find and “calibrate” the respective initial situation from which the model-supported evaluation can start. This method includes a first overview of the criteria according to which a categorization of democratic principles can be deduced and an explanation, why democratic functional principles have such a significant constitutive value for the security-political paradigm of the Western community.

Sub-chapter **“Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State”** elaborates on the development of the Security Policy-paradigm of the Western State Community, deduces factors complexes that influence and determine the specific relation between the state and its armed forces and creates **“test-questions”** by which this relation can be measured.

The above step requires a broad theoretical basis in order to make the principles behind the test-questions (a) understandable and (b) applicable regardless of specific national conditions. Sub-

chapter “**Theoretical Framework to be Used as Toolset for the Respective National Analysis**” refers to **Annex 2**, which provides exactly this theoretical basis. It describes the embedding of the thesis into the general scientific disciplines and the main theoretical approaches, against the backdrop of which, the democratic principles to be analysed, and their development should be understood.

In the section that deals with the “**Structured Analysis-interface**” shall first the basic nature and effect of the analysis-tool be explained and a guide for the user-specific application be given. This *structured model* will, in the figurative sense, become a *portion of the hypothesis* – the systemic analysis of functional principles, conducted with the help of the model, *part of its corroboration* (see figure 3a).

Subsequently, it is shown, which basic, **security relevant functional principles of western democratic-pluralistic states** can be identified, and how they *project on* respectively how they *fit into* the defined system-categories.

As the counterpart to the democratic functional principles of the state, **democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership** are tackled with particular emphasis on the ethical dimension of military leadership respectively the overall soldierly ethos in the democratic political system.

As a third step, “**Categorization-dimensions**” are defined by which democratic functional principles and principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership are to be intersected for the purpose of the analysis of their mutual interdependencies.

The “**Analysis of Selected, Significant, Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership**” is conducted against the backdrop of the above defined categorization-dimensions. The resulting dependencies between the democracy-related military functional principles are additionally visualized by relational-arrows within the mind-map, in which these principles are depicted.

From the mutual connections found in the analysis, subsequently a “**Systemic Interdependency-network**” is to be derived. With the attempt to continuously extrapolate the recognized trends in the development of the interdependency-network shall a future prospect be outlined and a recommendation for the political decision-level be formulated that aims at an alignment of armed forces, which allows maintaining their effect for the democratic survival of the state even with limited budgetary means.

Chapter “**Results, Future Prospects, Recommendation, Verification**” includes the demonstration of the innovatory added value of the research, its useability for present force-planning pro-

cesses and the applicability under a changed/future security-political situation. Above that, pragmatic recommendations are given on how to initiate a profound reorganization of armed forces towards optimal democracy-compatibility at a sustained level of mission-effectiveness.

The **Conclusion**, summarizes the essential key findings and presents the “verification”/corroboration of the hypothesis.

## 2.6. Research Targets

The Research-Questions had been defined for the purpose of operationalizing the hypothesis. The elaboration on these questions represents the main components of the analysis and follows general guidelines as defined in chapter “Research Targets”. This chapter will delineate envisaged main targets, specific sub-targets and „non-targets“ of the research. New scientific results, the innovatory/explanatory value of the research as well as its useability for present force-planning processes, will be tackled only in chapter “New Scientific Results, Future Prospects, Recommendation”.

It will be reviewed in chapter “Conclusions / Check on the Achievement of Envisaged Research-Targets”, if and where the research-targets have been achieved from the side of the research. If the intention of sensitizing the political decision-making level and the military force-planners for the systemic interdependence between democracy-relevant functional principles of the armed forces and democratic principles of the state<sup>47</sup>, has actually been met, can only be judged as soon as the research has succeeded to get published.

### Main Target

The *main target* of the thesis lies with the attempt to *raise the sensitivity* of the political decision-making- and the military force-planning-level, for the importance of mission-effective, democracy-compatible armed forces. For this purpose a first understanding of the *entire system* of democracy relevant, interlocking functional principles of military leadership as an organic body, was to be created - instead of going into detail with single branches of factors. Functional

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<sup>47</sup> These democratic principles of the state are to be understood as including the conditionality of democratic values-imbued, mission-effective armed forces for the peaceful long-term survival of the state.

principles were chosen accordingly to their specific ability to “guide” the setup, strategic alignment, structuring, training, engagement, democratic embedding as well as national/international law related legitimation of armed forces and to allow for an *advice to political and military leaders*. This advice will include an answer to the question, which set of factors will have to be respected systemically, in order to arrive at forces that are qualified to project “positive peace” and thus to secure the long-term survival of the state. Moreover, it shall be concluded what might result from altering a single factor without sufficient knowledge about the systemic consequences of such a step.

Exactly the approach to realign armed forces only “symptomatically” (as opposed to “systemically”), which puts up with current shortfalls and increasing capability-gaps whereat it achieves only treacherous, temporary phases of hollow security of states, can be identified as one of the main factors that are responsible for missing the strategic target of long-term democratic stability.

The pressure to attain savings that currently is impacting on the defense budgets of European countries, in connection with an insufficient long-term strategic objective, has resulted in defense structures that neither can nor will cope with the current and emerging future challenges, neither in terms of democratic compatibility of armed forces nor with respect to their ability to secure the peaceful survival of Western democracies. Therefore, the present work has to be understood as a *tool to recognize deviations/deficiencies in time* and to counter possible, unavoidable negative developments prophylactically - without necessarily demanding higher budgets.

By creating a system-overview over the effect-correlations between democratic functional principles of the state and democracy relevant principles of military leadership, will a contribution be made to the containment of the identified strategy-deficit. Via the conceptual foundation of force-development, this system-overview shall result in an alignment of top levels of military leadership that enables them to provide *policy recommendations through offering strategic target identification and -assessment expertise*, substantial support on strategy development, strategic goal setting and -evaluation and to contribute to a professionally underpinned threat analysis. Thus shall the consciousness of political leadership and force-planners for the demand of a *new discipline of leadership-science* for complex, time-critical, unpredictable situations be raised. This branch of science that could be derived from *military-science* and that should be developed under responsibility of military tertiary educational institutions, would represent a unique and imperative contribution to the requested strategic target-identification and -assessment expertise.

Furthermore, shall the importance of *training, education and character-building* shall be substantiated, where it is about counteracting to an *uncontrolled post-modern values-development*, which affects the armed forces as well as the civil society, and thus the latter's values-related expectations of the armed forces. This step aims at the identification of appropriate counter-measures against an impending loss of military capabilities caused by a boundlessly escalating development of a post-modern social order.

The research is also designed to show the variety of constitutive contributions of armed forces to defense (in the narrower sense), stability-projection, values-creation and identity-enhancing (respectively identity-catalytic) ideas. Vice versa shall be explained how coercively functionality and effectiveness of the military depend on the *political perception* to understand the armed forces as appropriate and indispensable means for safeguarding the external security and for contributing to the internal security of the state and thus to be the imperative *precondition for the long-term democratic survival of the state*.

As already mentioned, the main approach will lie with the identification and analysis of inter-dependencies between democratic functional principles of the state and democracy-relevant military functional principles, the therefrom resulting complexities and possible consequences, both for the armed forces and the political decision-making.

An important goal is the *creation of consciousness* of the dependency that the *commitment of citizens* for military defense is constitutive and therefore indispensable for the survival of a democratic, value-based social order and thus a measure of the stability of a *fortified democracy*.

Further targets of the research lie in answering the question how forces - in terms of effectiveness and democracy compatibility - must be internally led, structured, procured, trained, and educated, to what capabilities they should be aligned, or how they shall be *embedded in the state and in the European context*<sup>48</sup>, and towards which kind of domestic or abroad-missions they will have to be oriented. All of these questions must be answered from a system-view, in order to make the result a helpful tool, to support the democratic principle, as *the* inner, identity-creating logic, of the European understanding of the state.

## Sub-Targets

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<sup>48</sup> To be seen in particular with regard to requirements deriving from e.g. the "Solidarity Clause" of the Lisbon-Treaty or the Integrated Defense Structure of NATO.

It is demonstrated that armed *forces already in the period of relative peace are safeguarding the security and thereby the democratic value order* of western-pluralistic states. It is substantiated that they unfold their safeguarding function by contributing to the transfer of stability, securing access to vital resources, avoiding a power vacuum, and by providing a means of last resort against terrorism<sup>49</sup> and that they represent an instrument of collective defense in case members in peripheral-location were attacked.

The *dependency between democracy and peace* is undervalued. The empirical finding that Western pluralistic democracies have been able to get along without military conflicts among each other –in fact for the longest time-span in European history - is not enough. The term *"democratic" is therefore understood here, in a figurative sense*, as the sum of the principles, which provide the individual, the state or any alliance within the relevant integration-framework, with enough legal certainty and social contentment, so that there is no reason to develop aggression nor any motivation or other circumstances that could endanger peace. It is therefore a sub-target, to include and analyze all the principles that actually create, support or preserve peace in the respective integration framework (such as political participation, rule of law, civil liberties). Peace has to be understood here as “Positive Peace”, i.e. beyond a status that is characterized by the absence of threats.

Furthermore it will be explained, why the *simultaneity-requirement* regarding measures to maintain *the internal democratic stability plus external security*, represents a critical factor of the current Western security paradigm, on which all interdependencies, analyzed in this research, are based.

### “Non-Targets”

The clearly defined “**non-targets**” of the research, would be to include any judgement of political decisions or to criticize or explain the reasons of shrinking budgets (which would require a macro-economic analysis of a number of European states). It much rather will be aimed at making the consequences of taken measures or of such that had not been taken, plausible, and to explain the respective risks that result from steering-inputs, whereby a reasonable prioritization will be suggested that allows to optimize military effectiveness even despite limited resources.

The analysis merely shows options including the respective risks, quantifies the risk-content of

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<sup>49</sup> Such missions could be conducted in form of assistance to civilian authorities/forces of the interior and could even include assistance in case of “internal unrest” arising within the state.



each option and *deduces an according prioritization*. This prioritization manifests itself in the distinction between driving- and dependent-factors, and in the suggested critical path for possible reorganizations. Which option governments choose, which risks they take and which priorities they actually set, may not be judged nor criticized – as political leadership has the sole and final responsibility for any chosen defense-policy (including having none at all), and because it is legitimated by the democratic will of the people and thus by the constitutional principle of the primacy of politics.

### **Concise definition of research-targets and sub-targets**

1. *The main target lies on the attempt to raise the sensibility* of political decision-makers and military force-planners, for the importance of mission-effective and at the same time democracy-compatible armed forces and their decisive impact on the long-term and peaceful democratic survival of the state. Above that, the main target includes the creation of understanding for the finding that the factors that are constitutive for the survival of the democratic social order, interact as elements of an organic system – and therefore only should be altered when all consequences of reorganisations of the *entire* system are reviewed and assessed.
2. One research-target was to transform the analyzed functional principles of the above system into policy-advice, to find core-elements to improve the current handling of security issues and to answer how such can support both, political leadership and military force planning.
3. As shrinking defense-budgets will not allow to cope reliably with foreseeable future challenges, the research is to provide a tool to recognize deviations/deficiencies from the current security situation just in time to countersteer negative developments prophylactically.
4. Personal insight for the demand is to be created that higher military leadership-levels are to be enabled to provide policy recommendations, based on strategic target-identification- and assessment-expertise. A profile of a new discipline of “leadership-science” for complex, time-critical, unpredictable situations is to be defined, as the intellectual basis for the attainment and enhancement of the above strategic assessment expertise.
5. In the same way, it will have to be sensitized for the importance of training, education and character-building as means to counteract an uncontrolled and negative development towards a post-modern values-order that results in a loss of military capabilities.
6. Sensitivity of political leadership will also have to be raised concerning the finding that the

broad scope of role-profiles of 21<sup>st</sup> century armed<sup>50</sup>, is to be perceived as the imperative precondition for the long-term democratic survival of the state.

7. Furthermore, consciousness must be enhanced concerning

- the commitment of citizens to national defense, as the precondition of the fortified democracy, and later on to an European defense establishment,
- the role of armed forces to safeguard the democratic values-order already during peacetime,
- the correct valuation of the interdependence of peace and democracy, and
- the requirement of a simultaneous linkage between internal democratic stability and external security.

## 2.7. Envisaged<sup>51</sup> Added Value

Just as Linnebach concludes in his analysis of the scientific method used by Clausewitz in his book „Vom Kriege“, the Prussian philosopher about war had not aimed at writing a “manual” that had to be “mechanically” applied, but rather at providing a suggestion for a reason-based, self-dependent judgment.

Taking this archetype of a military scientific estimate-method as a pattern, the structured analysis-model used here in this thesis, tries to provide an evaluation process that enables military strategists and politicians to recognize systemic interrelations between democracy-relevant military functional principles, to adjust the obtained findings (to their specific national conditions) and subsequently to convert them into requirements for their respective force planning processes.

The key-added value of the study will lie in the creation of a *structured and "organic" re-*

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<sup>50</sup> This role-profile includes defense to the outside as well as simultaneous contributions to internal democratic stability.

<sup>51</sup> This chapter is about the *envisaged* added value of the research. The review, on the actual achievement of this envisaged added value will only be conducted in the chapter “New scientific results, future prospects, recommendation”.

*search method*, by which the interdependence between (a) democracy-relevant military functional principles/phenomena/factors and (b) military-specific democratic functional principles of the state - including the capability-requirements of states towards their armed forces - can be represented and systemically analyzed. For this reason, the design of the analysis-method is given plenty of time and space (in relation to the analysis of *concrete* interdependencies) and thus has been granted priority over the achievement of a higher number of examined individual dependencies.

The *practical application* of the so developed and structured analysis model on concrete effect-correlations, resulting from the current European security situation, represents the second major strand of the research. The outcome of the practical application of the model is represented by the “interdependency network”, defined in chapter “Research Targets”. Thereby lies the focus not so much with the exhaustive processing of *all* possible dependencies, but rather with the definition and analysis of those that are constitutive for the identification of *basic systemic* effect-correlations.

The proposed structured analysis model is consciously designed that abstractly that it can be applied also to future developments, which are subject to new security-related challenges.

Furthermore, will the model allow to answer the following questions:

- How can the democracy-compatibility of the respective current aggregate state of the armed forces be diagnosed and is there a break between the demand for democracy compatibility and mission-effectiveness?
- Is it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of armed forces with regard to their capability to safeguard the peaceful survival of the state and its democratic order (particularly under the condition of shrinking defense-budgets)?
- Is there enough democracy-compatibility or “how can the military support the state”?

The method also intends to provide policy advice that comprises possible solutions, based on the recognized and analyzed interdependencies, by the help of which democracy compatibility of the armed forces and their mission effectiveness can be improved.

The structured analysis model goes beyond many previous approaches, as it aims to grasp all

- the relevant democratic functional principles of the state,
- the requirements of governments towards their armed forces,
- the military functional principles and

- the interdependencies *between* and the effects *of* the above principles on the survival of Western pluralistic democracies as a complex system within which, already the careless modification of one single specific military function or an inadequately assessed modification of the interpretation of a democratic functional principle, may lead to serious problems.

The above problems mainly regard the democracy-compatibility of armed forces (governments currently seem to accept shifts of democracy-compatibility) and their effectiveness as a guarantor of the peaceful survival of the state.

The categorization contexts defined in the proposed method and the democratic functional principles of the state, as well as the principles of military leadership assigned to it, are understood in this thesis as *organs of a human body*. Starting from the analysis of the function of the organs, this metaphor is to explain why, in which reach, and under which conditions, an impermissible change of a single parameter that is typical for the healthy organ, must inevitably and predictably affect the function of certain other organs and thus finally damage the whole organism permanently. The *organism* is compared here to the defense establishment and consequently to the state's government.

This "organic view" allows tracking, analyzing and presenting a functional logic that stands behind the mutual interdependencies, and that obeys to a barely visible but still present "circuit diagram". Therefore can the analysis-model - by "inserting different parameters", such as a changed national and EU-wide security-situation, security-deficiencies or specific national conditions - also be applied to variable time-horizons and to different European states, with their individual political respectively military systems or leadership-philosophies. The diversification of the analysis with regard to national peculiarities is necessary as the European states currently are far away from any will to combine defense efforts.

The analysis of these causal relationships, mainly with regard to Central European, particularly German-speaking countries, gives an example of the application of the method, and provides at the same time evidence of its functioning.

## **PART TWO**

### 3. The Structured Analysis-model

*A structured model for the analysis of the systemic interdependence between democratic functional principles of the state, and functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership*

The aim of this part of the research is to enable the user to **retrace** the course of the thesis' development, and thus to allow him to recognize, analyze, systemically link effect-correlations himself, and subsequently to deduce solutions for a democracy-compatible armed forces realignment therefrom.

As explained above, are the methods, tackled here - regardless of their methodological format - rather "*product*" of the research than an "instrument" for its creation. According to this objective, is the explanation of the application of equal importance as the exemplary analysis of selected factors by the help of the proposed model.

#### The "Idea of Western Democracy"

As the thesis aims at the examination of "relations between functional principles of democracies and their armed forces", there is to be given a definition, which factors and elements these democratic functional principles comprise, before it can be started to operationalize the research by engineering a structured analysis-model.

The sum, respectively network of functional principles of democracies, as addressed above, shall be understood as the broadest possible manifestation of the "*idea of western democracy*". This idea and the *functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership* represent the *two poles* between which the mutual interdependencies, to be analyzed, occur.

In order to comprehend the idea of Western democracy, it must first be understood, which functional principles that take effect in democratic countries, are democracy-relevant and why respectively how they affect the quality of the political system of democracies.

The above "idea of western democracy" will, for the present research, be defined as the network comprising the following democracy relevant factors, which influence the political system (see figure 7, mindmap "democracy-principle"):

- overarching, mostly intellectual history-related principles of democratically organized social systems,

- principles of democratic forms of government, which are that fundamental that they are anchored in the national constitutions, like
  - state structure principles, basic laws of the constitution (including the democracy principles in the narrower sense),
  - fundamental rights-/liberties, civil rights,
  - principles of “Recipient Freedom”,
  - civic obligations,
  - general orientation of state objectives (“Staatszielbestimmung”),
  - constitutional anchoring of the respective position towards International Law,
  - constitutional anchoring of the respective position towards relevant institutions like EU, NATO etc.,
  - principles of “co-regulation”,
  - the democratic state’s demands for/towards effective armed forces<sup>52</sup>, including the definition of their political purpose (see figure 2, “state’s perspective”; it is here about the *goals to be achieved by armed forces* for the purpose of making democratic sovereignty survive; therefore will these issues have to be referred to as democratic principles of the *state*, and not as principles of the *military*),
  - methods of ensuring sovereignty (to the outside as well as inwards), the peaceful survival of the state and the democratic form of government,
  - the capability of defending the state-territory (in order to maintain the democratic order within the state including its defense against aggression) and of projecting stability to crises-areas abroad,
  - obedience/loyalty to the primacy of politics, acceptance of the reason of state,
  - the demand for mission-effectiveness, which is to be achieved by socially fully integrated armed forces, although a higher mission effectiveness tends to lead to a values-understanding within the military that significantly differs from the one of civil society,
  - the functioning of armed forces according to internal operating principles, which re-

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<sup>52</sup> Political and military democratic principles are not to be mixed here. This enumeration, is not about military principles, it is rather about the requirements from the side of the *political system* towards the armed forces, which aim at preserving the democratic sovereignty and survival of the state.

flect democratic principles of the state in the figurative sense<sup>53</sup> and which aim at making the individual soldier feel to be embedded into a system of “democratic” rules<sup>54</sup>, furthermore

- the required willingness of governments to provide visible military contributions to international stability, and thus to prove the honest intent to be a fair, solidary, reputable member of the community of the next higher democratic integration framework.

It must be clearly stated that a generally valid “definition” of “democracy” cannot be given. Instead an “auxiliary construction” had to be created that bases on a “generic” working-definition. As described above, this democracy-understanding includes natural-law related democracy-relevant factors, principles that already are anchored in different national constitutions, such that would make sense to be anchored and principles that are not legally defined but though affect the armed forces and are democracy-relevant in a figurative sense. This generic working-definition does not claim to describe any existing democratic system, even less a foreseeable one – it rather tries to capture all factors that are necessary to be analyzed to explain the democracy-relevant interdependence between the state and its armed forces.

### **3.1. Basic Function, Practical Application of the Structured Analysis-model**

Clausewitz tried to close the gap between the attempt to provide the user of his theory with an instruction-manual and the approach to provide him with basic principles and analysis-methods instead that should enable him to evaluate independently. To that effect he clearly opted for self-dependent evaluation-capability. Following this principle (which also was a major reason

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<sup>53</sup> Thus can participation-rights (such as the right to vote) or elements of direct democracy, according to their inherent principle be transferred to the involvement of staff members in the decision-making-process of the commander. By this involvement can (apart from a substantive improvement of leadership-performance) job-satisfaction, motivation, loyalty and trust be created. Above that it will in the long run also end up in an improved implementation of the primacy of politics and in a deepened social compatibility of the armed forces.

<sup>54</sup> Thereby is not a direct democracy-political compatibility of armed forces with the state addressed. It is rather about the subjective perception of soldiers, to find in their unit a similar democratic rules-system as they know from their civilian life. Restrictions of democratic freedoms, arising from mission-necessities, can thus be made more manageable, respectively digestible. Soldiers who “live” a democratic understanding in everyday military life, help to make the armed forces as a whole democracy-politically compatible with the state.

for the success of mission-type leadership) the structured analysis model tries to provide a suggestion for an independent assessment by the user, while avoiding to patronize him by a rigid “tactical” instruction-manual or to prejudge the outcome.

### **The steps of the proposed assessment-method, explained in chronological progression:**

#### ***Basic Initiation***

The user of the analysis-model will be recommended to “retrace” the chapter “Introduction” and to look to the explanations given there. He thereby will be provided with an example, respectively with a pattern of the methodical foundation upon which the respective national assessment is to be based.

The offered systematics of a logical sequence sub-steps includes

- a definition of assumptions,
- the declaration of axioms,
- a rough outline of the security-political situation, in the context of which the following assessment will have to be conducted,
- necessary limitations (as e.g. the exclusion of the approach to seek solutions based on the demand for higher budgetary funds),
- self-definition or clarification of terms that - depending on the historical development of respective states – might have misleading or even contradictory connotations (as e.g. the terms “justified war”, “preemptive war” or “transformation”)

This systematic is to be understood as a suggestion on how the respective national analysis could be initiated. The specific national circumstances will thereby lead to different results, characterized by different perspective views and thus to different initial-situations.

The main purpose of the any initiation is to show which assumptions are to be defined, which axioms are valid, which security-political factors must be used, but also which factors that are not-thematically relevant, are to be hidden respectively excluded in order to isolate and capture only the subject “democracy relevance”, and to focus the presented analysis on the latter.

#### ***Step 1: Designing the respective user’s analysis-programme***

Structure and content of the research design were chosen with regard to the requirement, to



serve also as a pattern for constructing the respective user's analysis-programme. This step can therefore be processed by retracing the individual sections of chapter "Research Design".

Initially is the following basic, substantive processing logic to be proposed to the user (see chapter "Research Design"):

- Identify major **problems** that occur in the context of the relation between democracies and their armed forces,
- derive the key-problems,
- create a hypothesis for the specific user's analysis that claims
  - how the individual impact factors systemically affect each other,
  - by which control measures the recognized problems can effectively be countered,
- operationalize the analysis by transforming the hypothesis into research questions,
- choose appropriate methods (according to the chapter "Methods and annex 2, "Extended theoretical framework to be used as toolset for the respective national analysis") for the analysis of the deduced research questions;

## **Step 2: Underlying operating instructions<sup>55</sup> for the use of the analysis model**

The user is to be led to a possible definition of the essence of the ideal-type of Western democracy. The comparison between the respective specific, *real* democracy understanding and the *ideal* type of Western democracy can be understood as a pre-requisite for determining the initial position, described in step 3.

Section "Basic Function, Practical Application of the Structured Analysis.model" explains the basic function as well as the practical application of the entire structured analysis-***model*** (as opposed to section "Engineering the Structured Analysis-interface, Explanation of its Basic Function", which focuses on the explanation of the analysis-***interface***) via the course of the further steps.

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<sup>55</sup> The proposed analysis model deliberately refrains from giving operating instructions, like how to arrive at which results after a user's assessment. It rather aims at supporting the user in his self-dependent judgment. Step 2 is no contradiction to that principle, as it should be understood as an "operating instruction" only for the practical use of the *systematics* of the model. It is not to be seen as a constriction of the user in his – with regards to *content* - independent assessment.

### ***Step 3: Determining the ideal starting position by the user***

This step serves to make the user aware of his individual initial situation at the beginning of the analysis and thus of the relative distance that would have to be overcome in order to achieve desired objectives or to implement changes. It will be conducted by analogous retracing of chapter “Assessment of the Respective User’s Initial Situation“.

- The user is invited to get clear about the question, why just democratic principles have such a significant, constitutive influence on the security-political paradigm of the Western state community, and derived therefrom in particular on the security-policy of the respective state (according to the pattern of section “Influence of Democratic Functional Principles on the Security-Political Paradigm”).
- Subsequently, the user is asked to perform an assessment in front of the background of section “Basic Categorization of Democratic Functional Principles”, according to which criteria, a basic categorization of democratic principles can be defined, and which correlating preliminary classification of military functional principles can be foreshadowed respectively acknowledged that way – with regard to the respective national context.
- In the successive step, the user will be supported (see section “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State”) in examining the relation between the armed forces and the sovereignty of the state (from his individual point of view) and in determining the basic perception of the “character” of armed forces by the public.
  - For this purpose it is to be recommended, to analyze the specific influence of the currently prevailing European security-policy paradigm on the respective state. This process step is supposed to be conducted accordingly by working out a correlation of Western state community and individual states (this step is supported by the pattern proposed in section “The Current Security Policy Paradigm of the Western State Community”).
  - The actual starting point for the practical application of the structured analysis-model is given by a first rough overview assessment of particularly significant *factors-complexes*, which facilitates the recognition of contexts, the consideration of which is imperative for the subsequent analysis of the *individual factors* (this analysis-step is supposed to be performed following the pattern of the assessment in section “Starting Point for the Practical Application of the Structured Analysis Model”. It is split into the identification of factors-complexes and their initial assessment.

- Identification of basic factors-complexes that affect the relationship between government and the armed forces significantly (following the example of section 3.2.3.2.1.;
- an anticipated initial assessment/analysis of central principles (“test questions”) for the determination of the respective underlying relationship between the state and its armed forces (following the example of section 3.2.3.2.2.). Using selected "measurement-questions", the user is to be put in the position to evaluate his fundamental relationship towards his national armed forces and to base the subsequent analysis of individual factors on this initial assessment. Starting from this "calibration" he can also choose the appropriate *general scientific-research disciplines* or *classic philosophical and general theories* (see Annex 2, “Extended Theoretical Framework”) that correspond his national conditions reselectively initial parameters. The calibration is therefore of particular importance because the knowledge as well as the consideration of the above disciplines and theories is an indispensable precondition for entering into the application of the analysis-model.

#### **Step 4: Defining and examining the theoretical framework as the basis for the analysis**

This step is supposed to be conducted following the pattern of section “Theoretical Framework” and Annex 2, “Extended Theoretical Framework”. It is planned to result in a toolset of theoretical approaches for the respective national analysis.

It must be recognized which theoretical approaches are available, and which approach fits which initial-position best. It must be decided, for which principles to be analyzed, which of the approaches is more suitable. For this purpose, the time-dependent contents of the respective theories were hidden and only the timelessly valid were abstracted.

Furthermore, it must be determined, according to which theories about the relationship of armed forces and the state, respectively to which science paradigms the respective user-state is currently aligned. These theories can be derived *from*, respectively correlate *with* general - i.e. not only military-science related - science branches. It also must be decided which science-theoretical basis for the engagement in the subject is chosen, respectively admitted. The answer to this question might depend largely on whether the respective user-state has established an academic educational institution for the discipline of Military-/Leadership-Science.

Each state has its own intellectual-history background, its specific scientific paradigm, its lead-

ership philosophy and often its unique religious development. Based on these factors, the state defines its original and fundamental relationship to its armed forces and assigns the latter a specific role. Therefore, the analysis of the topic-relevant theoretical approaches also serves the purpose to make the user realize his initial-position with regard to the nation-specific influencing factors.

### **Step 5: Adjusting the structured analysis-interface to the respective user's specific national conditions**

Section "Engineering the Structured Analysis-Interface", explains the function of the interface, by the help of which democratic principles of the state and military leadership-principles are to be made intersectable. This step is designed to enable the user to adjust initial parameters to his national conditions and to *apply* the interface accordingly.

- "Democratic Functional Principles of the State" gives a general and deliberately abstract overview of basic, security relevant, democratic functional principles that might be of relevance for Western-pluralistic states. In this step, the user is given the chance to define his own national canon of democratic functional principles, following the structural pattern given here in this section, and to make it the basis for his individual analysis.
- Analogously, the user will have to define and structure his specific, national, democracy relevant functional principles of military leadership, following the pattern given in section "Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership".
- In the structured analysis-interface, are the deduced, possible principles of military leadership, classified into categorization-dimensions that are designed to make the most significant correlations visible already at an early stage. The user is again free to define and structure also his own democracy-relevant, military leadership principles. It is also up to him, to summarize the defined principles in sub-categories of a second or third level and to subordinate them to the respective categorization-dimensions at his own discretion. Only the categorization-dimensions and their immediate sub-categories as derived in section "Categorization-dimensions" should be maintained, in order to be able to transfer the deduced core-relations, beneficially to the respective user's assessment. In doing so it has to be kept in mind that
  - military leadership principles will have to be subsumed under the categorization-dimension *participation*, following the pattern of the deductions in section "Parti-

pation”

- military leadership principles or specific aspects of these principles will be assigned to the categorization dimension *Internal functional capability of Armed Forces*, when they meet the conditions, defined in section “Internal Functional Capability of Armed Forces” and that
- the categorization-dimension *mission-effectiveness* covers those military leadership principles or individual aspects of these principles that - in accordance with section “Mission Effectiveness” – serve to defend the state’s sovereignty and to maintain the democratic social order.

**Step 6: Analysis of the military leadership principles, defined by the respective user, through applying the adapted structured analysis-interface**

In this step, the user is advised, to analyze the military leadership principles, he had selected in step 5, accordingly to the pattern given in the analysis-chapter, where exemplarily selected, significant military leadership principles are analyzed by the help of the structured analysis-interface and with the background of the defined categorization-dimensions.

As explained in detail in chapter “Engineering the Structured Analysis-Interface” (paragraph “Figure 6b”), will the following operating-procedure (see figure 9c) be proposed to the user:

- Firstly, any identified democracy-relevant, military leadership principle will have to be examined for interdependencies with other identified military leadership principles.
- Subsequently, each military leadership principle will have to be factorized and broken down into the interface’s categorization-dimensions and sub-categories.
- Interdependencies between categorization dimensions, respectively sub-categories, will have to be identified and evaluated.
- Elements of the identified leadership principle (in the graphic shown as a column) will have to be intersected with the corresponding democratic functional principle of the state (shown as a row) – resulting interdependencies will have to be assessed.
- Finally a conjunction between the three described types of dependencies will have to be made.

### **Step 7: Determining the systemic interdependency – network between identified factors**

Step 6 arrived at a factor-specific cross-linking, with regard to the three above described kinds of interdependencies. In step 7 will the main dependencies that resulted from the analysis of the *individual* factors, be mutually, *cross-factor-wise* superimposed. It will have to be investigated which factor depends on which others and which of those are the driving ones. Thus, the user will be enabled to identify the appropriate “adjusting screws” for aligning his armed forces systematically, according to the desired degree of democracy-compatibility plus mission effectiveness that is required to keep the state capable of guaranteeing the democratic social order towards its citizens.

The individual systemic interdependency–network as described above, is to be constructed by the user according to the model of chapter “Engineerig the Systemic Interdependency–Network”.

### **Step 8: Converting the results of the analysis into a form, suitable for policy-advice**

Findings that resulted from the construction of the systemic interdependency–network in step 7, are finally converted into a form suitable for providing advice of the force planners to the political, respectively military-political decision-level. For this step it is recommended to follow also the pattern of chapter “New Scientific Results, Future Prospects, Recommendation”.

## **3.2. Assessment of the Respective User’s Initial Situation**

Regarding the sections of this chapter, see “*3 fundamental application areas where democratic functional principles might occur*” (figure 1-3).

### **3.2.1. Basic Categorization of Democratic Functional Principles**

*According to which criteria, can a basic categorization of democratic principles be defined, and which correlating preliminary classification of military functional principles can be foreshadowed that way?*

Corresponding to the time of origin, the level of abstraction, the legal non-appealability and the respective integration framework, various types of principles can be distinguished; they collec-

tively represent the “Idea of Western Democracy”, which will be deduced and explained in detail, in section “Democratic Functional Principles of the State”. Such principles will include

- the history of thought related, overarching principles,
- principles as developed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century following the American and French Revolution,
- principles to be determined constitutionally. like
  - principles of state structure and basic laws of the constitution
  - fundamental rights-/liberties, civil rights,
  - constitutional anchoring of the position towards International Law, EU/NATO
- states’ demands *on*, respectively goals to be achieved *by* armed forces,
- internal operating principles of the military, which reflect general democratic principles of the state, and
- other strategic and operational requirements.

The thus structured functional principles are to be categorized accordingly to the following criteria, with a special emphasis on the interdependence of rights and obligations:

- rights, in the sense of freedom „from“ the state,
- rights, in the sense of freedom to participate “in” the state,
- duties of citizens,
- duties/responsibilities of the state.

In particular, it will have to be worked out on the one hand that the guarantee of granted fundamental rights can only be provided by a state that sustains unrestricted sovereignty to the outside but also internally, and that the enforcement of such sovereignty mandatorily requires police forces plus effective, multi-tasked armed forces.

On the other hand, it will be deduced that democratic participation rights of the populace only make sense in a functioning state and that the latter *depends on*, in other words, *defines itself* by the fulfillment of the obligations of citizenship, by the norm-addressees. Participation rights in a values-based political system are thus conditioned by the fulfillment of those obligations of citizenship. In this understanding, any contribution to the defense of the state (and this goes

beyond serving with the armed forces) has an outstanding, dominant significance<sup>56</sup>.

The following step is trying to get the democracy-relevant functional principles of military leadership in an order that allows to weigh their elements individually against the categorized democratic principles, respectively to blend them with the latter, but at the same time also to identify systemic dependencies between the baskets of the above mentioned military factors themselves.

The synopsis of military factor complexes, which are widely affected by the democratic principle (see chapter “The Particular influence of the Democratic Principle on the Security of the State”), and of the classification of basic democratic functional principles, illustrated above, give a first idea of system categories, which shall be used as basis for the subsequent analysis, and which will allow the evaluation of the mutual interdependence of factors. This analysis has to cope with the demands, resulting from interdependencies among the national, democratic principles and with the logic of military leadership. The following categories (to be verified and analyzed in detail in section “Categorization-dimensions”) were assumed preliminarily:

- “Participation” of the military and of its service-members in the respective integration framework within the given democratic order,
- “Internal functionality“ of armed forces
- “Operational effectiveness” within the interior and in democracy-/stability projecting missions abroad.

### **3.2.2. The Particular Influence of the Democratic Principle on the Security of the State**

*Why has just the democratic functional principle such a significant, constitutive influence on the security-political paradigm and the peaceful, long-term survival of Western pluralistic states? Is its projection to crises-areas actually conducive to a global peace-order at all?*

Any argumentation, which is to corroborate the assumption that particularly the democratic

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<sup>56</sup> This e.g. would include the basic agreement to appropriate defense budgets, granting professional soldiers an adequate social role, the acceptance/support of foreign missions which indirectly might serve to national security, support for military contributions to collective defense agreements and various forms of assistance-missions.



principle has a substantial influence on the peaceful development of Western states, will have to start with the long tradition of philosophical thought and the importance of the Enlightenment in Europe, which has led to the development of humanity, determined by rationality. This reason-talent finally resulted in the finding that all human beings are equal, to social contracts and ultimately to the individual's rights to participate in policy-making.

Thus, the participatory democratic principle became the guiding idea of enlightened nations. The freedom of the enlightened, mature individual became the superior goal of early Western nations, and at the same time became the basis of their guiding-principle, "democracy". Thus it becomes clear that the survival of states, constituted according to the idea of Enlightenment, depends primarily on that democratic principle, and that the defense of this principle is nothing less than the defense of the survival of the state itself. The resulting democratic social order is based on the survival of democracy and its constitutional fundament. Is this fundament gone, the freedom and guaranteed liberties of the citizens are gone too – either in totalitarianism, or in anarchy.

Having deduced, why it is exactly the democratic principle that has such a substantial influence on the state's security, it will have to be analyzed, if this democratic principle, in particular the security-political paradigm of democracy-projection, actually is conducive to a global peace order.

Of course, it might be argued that peacemaking military missions in other states would generate a new perception of "collateral" injustice (the military could also be misused to suppress the rights of people) and - despite their stabilizing intent – could lead to new instability, and that the offer of importing democratic structures will only be accepted because of its consumable blessings, but not with regard to its principle and even less to the resulting civic duties (this factor will also be addressed in chapter "Strategy Related Principles").

It also could be objected that the Kantian thesis that democracies would tend to be more peaceful, was reduced to absurdity by the wars and interventions, which democratic states in fact have fought to the outside (i.e. against non-democratic states, as opposed to "among each other"). Such wars however, were rarely fought against other democracies.

In order to refute this legitimate criticism, the above line of arguments about the enlightened, democratic and mature individual as the superior goal and the same time as the guiding principle of Western democracies is to be continued. This ongoing debate affects politics, constitutions, the UN-Charter and International Law.

Once the norm addressee, who experiences the suffering of a war most directly, had been in-

volved in the decision on war and peace, the tendency of states to achieve their political objectives through violent conflicts, would decline necessarily<sup>57</sup>. The logic of Kant's argumentation (see Annex 2, section "Kant") lies much rather in the above correlation than in the mere assertion that democracies were less offensive by trend. However, in its outcome it can be reduced to the observation that democracies rarely fight each other.

If democracies were generally less offensive, then they wouldn't have fought wars against non-democratic states (such wars were often legitimated as "just wars" or as acts of "preventive self-defense". Obviously it is the fear of the voter that he/she in case of a decision in favor of war could him-/herself be exposed to a high-tech threat imposed by another, militarily well equipped democratic state, by which the emergence of actual war between democracies is prevented. This view apparently changes fundamentally, when it comes to wars against militarily poorer equipped non-democracies that can be overcome with a lower risk for the engaged troops, and with an arguable count of casualties. Wars are also fought today for self-interest, unilaterally or in the name of an UNSC-decision.

In fact Kant based his finding that the citizens, subject to a *republican* constitution, would refrain from a decision in favor of war<sup>58</sup> mainly on the argument that the tribulations of such an armed conflict, as the duty to fight, the obligation to bear the costs, the resulting devastations and the subsequent debt burden, would affect themselves personally. According to this reasoning, it would actually be understandable if citizens were rather inclined to support military interventions, when they aim at distant non-democracies, can be fought with a professional army (volunteers), entail lower risks as well as limited costs and don't result in the devastation of the own country<sup>59</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> However, it could be objected that sufferings alone would not end wars (see the sufferings of the British people from German bombardments in the Second World War; it became a principle then, to launch bombing campaigns against the enemy's population centers when the losses on the frontline had become too heavy; the sufferings of Germany or Japan in the Second World War are not representative here, as both states cannot be judged as democracies, even less as democracies in a modern, Western pluralistic understanding).

<sup>58</sup> Compare KANT Immanuel: *Zum Ewigen Frieden und andere Schriften*, Fischer Klassik PLUS, Fischer e-books, page 246f.

<sup>59</sup> However, can such costs hardly be calculated in advance. The Bush-administration calculated that the Iraq-campaign 2003 would cost 65 billion U.S. dollars and would last 6 months. The war finally did cost 1,6 trillion U.S. dollars and lasted nearly 5 years, not included secondary costs of damaged equipment, the war in Afghanistan, veterans' costs and pensions/benefits to families and injured soldiers.

Kant mentioned – which represents an important side-effect of the above logic – yet another factor, by which the actual or at least perceived, potential offensive capability of a state can be limited. In his third preliminary article<sup>60</sup>, he postulates that standing armies (“miles perpetuus”) should cease to exist, because they continuously threaten other states already by their presence and their permanent readiness to launch offensives. Therefrom results that states would be perceived as more peaceloving and thus would contribute to more mutual trust among each other, if they would base their armed forces on a compulsory recruiting system or if they would supplement their professional units by a strong reserve-component.

There is a persistent misinterpretation that Kant had disapproved the necessity of armed forces per se. He only opposed against “standing” forces because of their potentially escalating effect. Pacifists, who - with regard to Kant - voted for the disbanding of armed forces at all, were obviously taken in by a wrong interpretation.

Of course, this argumentation-pattern remains only an assumption – but it would make Kant’s logic, his “Democratic Peace Theory”, the according findings of modern political science and the observable reality about democracies’ peaceful behavior among each other, respectively their inclination to a higher aggression-potential against non-democratic opponents, consistent or at least free of obvious contradictions<sup>61</sup>.

Regardless whether the above assumption (i.e. as a possible rationale behind the Democratic Peace Theory) can be substantiated or not, the finding of Democratic Peace Theory allows only for one conclusion: if democratic states are actually inhibited to conduct wars against each other, then the democratic principle, as a constitutive basis of states, must be geographically extended as far as possible, until any potential war would be a war between democracies and therefore be hindered from breaking out.

After World War II, the democratic regimes of European countries had reached a quality that has excluded military conflicts among themselves effectively for a time-span, not considered possible until then. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had a security policy paradigm emerged, which even aimed at establishing a global order of peace through *democracy-transfer*. Today the European democracies are actually unable to wage war - they lack potentials, are geograph-

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<sup>60</sup> Compare KANT Immanuel: *Zum Ewigen Frieden und andere Schriften*, Fischer Klassik PLUS, Fischer e-books, page 238f.

<sup>61</sup> But in fact the tendency to go to war or to engage in wars can have very different causes beyond the simple question of “peace or war”: Geopolitical issues, energy, combatting terrorism, alliances, decisions by the UNSC or by NATO, removing tyrants etc.

ically not expandable and cannot afford to buy all, they cannot gain by force.

All in all, it can be concluded that democracy-projection has gained a reliable stability-promoting effect and in combination with the necessary, simultaneous home base-defense, represents a condition that is alternativeless for the foreseeable future.

Beyond the above theoretical deduction, there is also empirical evidence in topical security-political analyses, by which the assertion can be substantiated that the democratic principle, and in particular its projection to crises areas, actually works supportive for a global peace-order. Just a few examples:

- Nugent/Paterson<sup>62</sup> state that the EU was until recently, maladapted to pursue the ESS' two strategic objectives, namely *building security in the EU's periphery* and *creating an international, multilateralism-based order*, but that it had, since the begin of the new century, successfully caught up with the development of military and civilian crisis-management capabilities, as the instruments needed for the pursuit of a security and defense policy, oriented towards the defined strategic goals.
- They further conclude "The decision taken by the German cabinet in late October 2006 to accept that German armed forces can – and indeed must – participate in *crisis-management missions* to right humanitarian wrongs and correct gross imbalances in power relations not between states but between rulers and peoples...<sup>63</sup>" and judge this articulated goal as an indicator for an emerging new European strategic culture.
- They confirm<sup>64</sup> that the EU's stability-projecting missions, primarily in the Western Balkans and in Africa, were of a scale and range that must not be underestimated, had been put together with remarkable speed and efficiency and that EU's neighbours welcome and benefit from its engagement.

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<sup>62</sup> Compare NUGENT Neill, PATERSON William E. [General Editors]: Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, The European Union Series, Lolyon Howorth 2007, palgrave macmillan, ISBN: 13-978-0-333-63912-2, pages 133-134.

<sup>63</sup> Compare NUGENT Neill, PATERSON William E. [General Editors]: Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, The European Union Series, Lolyon Howorth 2007, palgrave macmillan, ISBN: 13-978-0-333-63912-2, pages 205-206.

<sup>64</sup> Compare NUGENT Neill, PATERSON William E. [General Editors]: Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, The European Union Series, Lolyon Howorth 2007, palgrave macmillan, ISBN: 13-978-0-333-63912-2, page 240.

- The European Security Strategy itself names the key-threats that have been actively tackled by the EU in chapter II, Strategic Objectives: “The European Union and Member States have intervened to deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organized crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organized crime within the EU<sup>65</sup>”.
  
- „The promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is both one of the major objectives of EU foreign policy and one of the constitutive elements of the EU as a values-driven international actor ... Promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law is important not only as an external objective but also as an identity objective ... Democracy is not enshrined as a principle in international law which makes it harder to legitimize intervening in third countries to promote the democracy cause ... <sup>66</sup>”. This quotation that stems from an earlier phase of EU-development, starts from the implicit assumption that the EU’s foreign policy orients towards sustainable peace in its periphery. In order to achieve this aim - as it already is commonly accepted – the EU chose the approach of promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Via its side-effect as an identity objective, this approach additionally was to contribute to deepened amicable relations between EU-member-states.

The hint at international law and its influence on possible interventions makes it clear that the democracy projecting principle was since ever planned to be supported by military forces. Thus does this quotation show that the EU defined its peace-oriented (crisis prevention/peace support) foreign and security policy paradigm via democracy-projection, supported by armed forces, to its periphery. Thereby expresses the EU its confidence in the peace-generating effect of a values-based democracy-projection,

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<sup>65</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier SOLANA.

<sup>66</sup> Compare KEUKELEIRE, Stephan and MacNAUGHTAN, Jennifer: The Foreign Policy of the European Union, in NUGENT, Neill und PATERSON, William E. [General Editors] - The European Union Series, palgrave macmillan 2008, ISBN: 13-978-1-4039-4722-2, page 223f.

backed up by military interventions where necessary<sup>67</sup>.

Despite the above empirical “evidence” that democracy projection raises the probability of a peaceful further development of crises-areas, and that Western democracies have succeeded to live together without armed conflicts among each other, there are dissenting opinions that doubt respectively generally contradict the principle that democracies are by trend more peaceloving (at least among each other). However, any thorough analysis will show that this argumentation has to be judged a semantic sophistry.

The present research bases on the model of an understanding of the state that describes the enlightened pluralistic democracy with universal, equal, secret suffrage including constitutionally anchored, effective legal protection-instruments and fundamental civil-rights catalogues. If states that are only formally denoted as “democracies”, although they are lacking the constitutive factual elements of the above definition, conducted wars against each other, their behavior would not contradict the hypothesis of the present research.

The lists<sup>68</sup> of historic “democracies” that allegedly would contradict the principle of peaceableness of democratic states, usually starts with the Greek Wars (in the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C.). But the ancient Greek democracy excluded classes of citizens and females, and was therefore not to be judged as a democracy in the understanding of the modern Western, pluralistic democracy.

It continues with the Punic Wars (2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C., Rome as well as Carthage didn't represent general democracies, as both of them excluded classes of citizens), the American Revolution (Britain had a restricted suffrage), the numerous American Indian Wars (the tribe structure of American Indians can hardly be compared to the challenge to reign democratic states of several millions of inhabitants), the French Revolutionary Wars (the victorious revolutionaries disregarded human rights, Britain had a restricted suffrage, many of the involved Eu-

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<sup>67</sup> These very optimistic descriptions of the EU's crisis management is also misleading because the EU could not influence the developments in Egypt, Tunisia and Lybia, could not put pressure on Turkey to limit its islamization, could not fight organized and transnational crime, could not counter high unemployment and could not prevent the destabilization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

<sup>68</sup> Compare WHITE, Matthew: Democracies Do Not Make War on One Another. ... or Do They?, <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/demowar.htm>, 201113. The list was only cited because of the chronologic sequence of armed conflicts mentioned, and as an example for the pattern of the attempt to rebut the hypothesis of the general peaceableness of democracies – neither the quality of the argumentation nor the arguments themselves had to be judged therefore.

European states were still constituted as absolute monarchies), and the American Civil War (the Confederate States endangered the survival of an all American democratic structure, see “Gettysburg Address”). This American Civil War was a very special case, because the Confederate States represented, from a pure legal point of view, a democracy although they had accepted slavery, and because the process of secession was generally agreed upon, by the ruling classes.

World war I (the factual power lay with absolute monarchic structures in the German federation as well as in the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy) and World war II<sup>69</sup> as the aftermath of problems that had been created by the First World War and left unsolved since, marked the final overcoming of absolute monarchical regimes and indirectly paved the way for the emergence of true democracies in the present understanding.

From this point of history on, there were no armed conflicts between European democracies to be observed anymore. The disbandment of Yugoslavia and the Croatian War of Independence cannot be judged as wars between independent democracies – it was seen from the one side as the secession from the Yugoslavian state, due to the perceived disregard of ethnic characteristics, and from the other side as a measure to prevent the disintegration of the state. The same is true with regard to the war over the Kosovo, which was mainly fought as an air-campaign of NATO.

Today, the conclusion seems generally accepted that if the participation of the individual in decision-making within the integration-framework of the Western pluralistic state, had by trend led to peaceableness, this also will apply to residents of crises-countries<sup>70</sup>. Logically would this principle also apply to approaches towards a global peace-order, in which each state represents the role of the individual, and the global community the role of the integration-framework.

This correlation shows that the analytical model will have to take the different possible levels of democratic integration-frameworks into consideration.

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<sup>69</sup> The National-Socialist ruled Germany was to be judged as the archetype of an absolute regime that seemingly legitimated itself via elections, but in fact ruled by demagogy, ideologization and suppression, and that violated the basic human rights, particularly of people of different ethnic background.

<sup>70</sup> This will require a cultural development, which lets the acceptance of democratic functional principles appear principally possible. The experiences of the Afghanistan mission, for example, have prompted the United States, to provide peace-support through Comprehensive Approach only for areas, where the acceptance of the latter was expected; see KORKISCH, Friedrich W.: Die „Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik“ in weiter Ferne, in *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ* 1/2013, page 32.

Regardless of the question, about the rate of success of peace-making missions that are based on the principle of democracy-transfer, it still can be assumed that a reduction of military peacemaking engagements and of democracy-projecting presence of the Western community in peripheral crises regions would - with a view to a peaceful world-order - rather have a destabilizing than a stabilizing effect. Such a reduction of stabilizing military engagements abroad would fuel the development towards a "Fortress Europe"<sup>71</sup>.

The attempt to conclude the importance of the democratic principle for the security paradigm of Western pluralistic states only from the finding that democratic *states* are – at least among themselves – demonstrably more peaceful, certainly falls short. It is the *individual* that, through education, its empowerment to participation in governmental decision-making and through its free will to defend the own participation-position in relation to other members of the community, comprehends the principle of democracy and thus at the same time contributes to a peaceful development.

If, as shown above, the democratic principle has an impact *on* respectively a crucial importance *for* the security paradigm of Western states, when the "rationale" of this approach represents the basis for social peace *within* and peace in general, *between* nations, then also the armed forces that, for the purpose of creating peace in troubled regions, project democratic values–understanding, must be imbued with this maxim, holistically.

Forces that are not permeated by democratic principles are prone to deficiencies in command loyalty, often lack social, intercultural and legal compatibility, and will have to accept limitations in both, their internal functioning and their mission effectiveness.

This democratic principle cross-sectionally, holistically and systemically affects all of the crucial factors complexes:

- contribution / participation of the norm addressee in the context of the respective democratic integration-framework,
- "command loyalty and allegiance out of conviction, trust in the leadership,
- internal functioning of armed forces,
- social, intercultural, legal compatibility,

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<sup>71</sup> The term of a „Fortress Europe“ emerged about 1985/86 and was originally an economic idea to build a „virtual wall“ around the European Community to prevent cheap imports and contradict UN-plans to open the European markets for products for low developed nations.



- effective engagement (mission effectiveness is thereby in principle to be understood with regard to stability-/democracy projection to crises areas abroad, to national defense including counter-terror as well as assistance to forces and institutions of the internal security of the state and to operational procedures that allow to cope with the demand for simultaneity between both of the mission qualities, stability-/democracy projection and national defense).

Therefore it represents the key factor for the structuring and alignment of armed forces that will ensure security, sovereignty and the democratic long-term survival of the state and that at the same time will provide the requested level of mission effectiveness at the highest possible degree of democratic compatibility.

### **3.2.3. Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State**

*Armed forces and their role as an instrument, symbol respectively as the ultimate manifestation of democratic states' sovereignty*

#### **3.2.3.1. The Current Security Policy-paradigm of the Community of Western States**

Until the end of the Cold War, mainly direct external threat had been the unifying moment, which had motivated the Western democracies to use armed forces as instruments to maintain their sovereignty, their way of life and their economic success.

After 1990/91 this threat disappeared and earlier motivations were abandoned. The “European Peace Project” shifted its focus to achieving enhanced wealth by reducing defense expenditures. However, the “End of History” was an illusion, totally disregarding the “process” of history and the trend of mankind to develop offensive intentions, where an emerging power vacuum “invites” potential aggressors. Other threat momenta hit Europe as well: Terrorism, unemployment, an aging population and growing welfare costs. Surprisingly, the EU had no valid plan how to counter those developments. The answers were multi-task diplomacy, soft power, smart power, strategic alliances and partnerships and investments in troubled regions.

Later on (which is a relatively new aspect, particularly for the European democracies) also common foreign- and security-policy objectives and opportunities (e.g. access to vital resources or the principle of calming crises in the periphery early enough in order to prevent destabilizing effects on Europe) started to become driving factors for military engagement.

In turn, might militarily conducted foreign and security policy action lead to criticism on the part of lower developed countries and to possible acts of terror against the civilian infrastructure of troop contributors to interventions that together with flows of refugees, or poverty-induced migration, generated by escalating crises, could make public opinion swing out from the support of military stability-projection to a greater emphasis on homeland defense.

This development provides a unifying moment for European defense efforts because - albeit in varying degrees of intensity - all EU-states would be exposed to sub-conventional threat against their home bases (see the "Solidarity Clause" in the Lisbon Treaty that provides the mutual assistance of European states among each other).

It had been assumed that popular education had been one of the most important roots of the development of modern democracy that this popular education had led to more prosperity and that wealthier citizens are more inclined to renounce power to enforce interests and to prefer a peaceful enforcement instead. Starting from this assumption, the conclusion would be justified that threats from the periphery can prophylactically or reactively be successfully countered, by projecting the democracy-principle to regions, from which these threats arise, before the crises created there, will reach the EU.

This principle represents the current security policy paradigm of the Western state community. In the context of the analysis it will have to be assessed critically, whether such peacemaking missions actually lead to an acceptance of democracy per se or only to an acceptance of its blessings (thus being just a "bottomless pit", a waist of efforts and money).

Are states, ethnic groups, religiously/ideologically motivated actors considered now as elements of a global "society," then will for each of these elements (especially for the less developed ones) again arise participatory claims that might lead to questioning, for example the legitimacy of a US-dominated "transatlantic order of power ", or the disproportionate prosperity of Europe. Democracy transfer supported by military forces, represents the approach of Western states that currently is without alternative, although it is time-consuming and costly and beyond that, also could still be interpreted as being imbued with neo-imperialist intentions.

Poverty-related migration – from the view of the incoming refugees to Europe - is the fast way to compensate the existng wealth gap. This means that any use of armed forces for the purpose

of democracy-projection, must be accompanied by a military protection of Europe's home base at the same time, which again points into the direction of the mutual interdependence between internal and external security. But Europe painfully avoids any measures to counter immigration.

Irrespective of the question, whether democracy projection alone is already sufficient to create peace in the region, the Western community must find a way how to structure possible democracy-projecting military interventions, under simultaneous military protection of the European home base in a way that they may be accepted as fair, just and helpful.

Armed forces, particularly in an escalating development of the security-situation, are the necessary prerequisite that humanitarian, economic and administrative support as well as law enforcement measures can be projected into a crisis-shaken region at all. In the pre-escalation phase forces are "facilitators" for political, economic and social measures, by which a subsequent, mostly not entirely preventable escalation can be at least limited in intensity or by which a preventable one can be avoided. Once escalation is on its way, armed forces must be capable of pacifying robustly in order to withdraw gradually when the subsequent decay-phase has started and thus to transfer responsibility to the civil authorities and support providers. Despite this deliberately reduced visibility, they must maintain the capability to provide the degree of protection that is necessary to give civilian agencies the chance to pursue democracy-building in a safe environment<sup>72</sup>.

Armed forces regularly and necessarily are the instrument that threatens or exercises distinct, noticeable power. The perception and acceptance of the overall operation will primarily depend on the perception of the power, the armed forces potentially could exert. This is therefore of such a great significance, because peace projection is in need of adoption, i.e. it does not work out without acceptance.

Peace for the Western-European community depends on the assumption that there is no *existential* threat from the outside, and that *sub-conventional* threats from the outside will be banned by a credible, from a "global democratic" perspective, fair and acceptable peace-projection.

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<sup>72</sup> The US-experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, using various methods of a „Comprehensive Approach“-policy failed; it was not possible to implement Western-type democratic „infusion“ with a lasting effect. The German Bundeswehr in Afghanistan was initially successful in the Kunduz-area, but finally had to admit that it could not achieve results that would have had lasting effects on the population. The tradition of masculine habits, female servant-type of family life, and of keeping girls illiterate, came back after a very successful beginning between 2002 and 2005.

Such a projection can be performed only by resorting to armed forces and these forces particularly are subject to the crucial question if they are a shining example, a “figurehead” for the propagated principles of democracy or if they eventually will be perceived as “neo-imperialist” occupiers who a fortiori cause new hate and an urge for retaliation. The problem is that in reality every operation is complex and does not allow for “black or white”-answers. Taking into account all of the above assumptions, it becomes understandable, why troop contributing countries need to be clear about the critical examination of how the instrument that is supposed to project peace, has to be made compatible with the fundamental, guiding principle of “democracy”, and how it can be reliably imbued with the latter.

This question primarily concerns the internal functional principles of armed forces, their combat effectiveness, in particular the distinction if and how they are perceived in their role as a peace-procurer by the population to be protected, in the area of operations. It also affects the armed forces’ democracy-political compatibility in case they are appointed to an assistance mission in their own country, and the acceptance of the mission per se.

In order to get closer to the goal of global security structures, it is - from the perspective of Western states - necessary, to detect the systemic relationship between the success of security-political respectively strategic approaches towards a global, democratic order of justice, the effectiveness of armed forces regarding the implementation of these approaches<sup>73</sup> and the internal, democratic principle-imbued functioning of the forces (the latter representing the precondition for the forces’ mission-effectiveness). Subsequently force planning, and any political message that should be delivered, will have to be aligned accordingly to this context.

The democracy-relevance of the inner functioning of forces arises here from the fact that only those military leaders who have experienced the mainly education-based, democratic functional principles as a de facto performance-enhancing instrument in the inner military leadership practice, will be able to contribute to top-performing, leadership-superior armed forces. Just as well, will only those soldier who experience “democracy” in their military every day life as a human dignity-preserving, participation-permissive principle (that additionally respects and fundamental rights), be able to project it credibly. In easier terms: Only officers and soldiers who experience democratic principles can deliver them credibly.

In the system-context defined above, also the armed forces’ contribution to the strategic goal

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<sup>73</sup> These approaches are to be understood as including the acceptance of the military in the area of operations (acceptance not only with regard to the troops themselves but also to the “democratic” message they should embody respectively deliver).

finding-/decision making-process and their “fair share” towards the national as well as international (i.e. based each on an European, a transatlantic and a global integration framework) capability-development will have to be included. This issue of “contributing a fair share” is not an integral part of the current security-political paradigm, but it substantially influences and conditions the latter. In the course of his individual assessment, the user will have to investigate, whether and by which substantive contribution, which niche-capability, which Pooling and Sharing- respectively which Smart Defense-initiative, the requirements of a “fair share” can be met best. What can be anticipated here, is that initiatives, which are primarily driven by the wish to keep domestic spending low, but though to make a visible contribution (regardless of whether they help to cover capability gaps), misses the point of a fair share<sup>74</sup>.

The failure to recognize this systemic dependencies in their full complexity, and subsequently any thoughtless turning of an adjusting screw of the above described effect-relationship, would inevitably, or at least with a high probability, result in a collapse of stability transfer ambitions. Thus it would give rise to new threats to Europe and the Western community that stem from unmastered crises, and which – due to shrinking military capabilities - cannot be effectively countered, if they finally would reach Europe. Ineffective defense-capabilities might lead to an appeasement-policy as well as to weak foreign-political responses, and thus to a power-vacuum on the territory of the Western state community, which would encourage respectively challenge the emergence of new medium- and long-term conventional threats, coming from a number of risk-accepting new powers. The finding that a single-sided power vacuum will generate offensive intentions where they else had not emerged is indirectly substantiated by the American strategic thinking, which emphasized the role and necessity of conventional military forces for a reliable deterrence against the Soviet empire, even under the dominating umbrella of mutual nuclear deterrence<sup>75</sup>. The Russian intervention on Crimea and in the Ukraine prove the principle valid again.

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<sup>74</sup> From the point of success or failure, the military would have to advise the politicians with regard to the decision whether to abstain from risky missions or to accept failure. Low financing in military capabilities can become an obstacle for an engagement in abroad missions. Current proposals of „pooling“ or „sharing“ are already an indicator of inadequate resources. Also „Smart Defence“ – a kind of division of labor within NATO – could be seen as a first step towards increased capability gaps.

<sup>75</sup> Compare HUNTINGTON, Samuel P.: The Renewal of Strategy in HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. [editor]: The Strategic Imperative - New Policies for American Security, Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge,

The research therefore is to explain the presented systemic overall context in terms of its effect relationships and to offer an assessment model that supports in deciding how armed forces will have to be aligned in order to serve as an effective instrument of state sovereignty and as means to arrive at stability in the light of the vision of a peaceful, “democratic” world society.

### **3.2.3.2. Starting Points for the Practical Application of the Structured Analysis-model**

This section is to be understood as the *actual* starting point for the *practical* application of the structured analysis model by the respective user. Through the use of selected "test questions" should the user be brought into the position to evaluate the *fundamental* relationship between the state and its armed forces and to make this relationship the underlying principle of the subsequent estimate-process.

Based on this "calibration", users can also select those “general scientific-research-disciplines” (Annex 2, chapter 1) respectively “classic philosophical and general theories about the relationship between the armed forces and the state” (Annex 2, chapter 2) that correspond their national conditions. This selection will support the definition of starting parameters by which users can interpret dependencies and functional principles resulting from the model, and make them applicable to their specific needs by tailoring them to their national conditions.

#### **3.2.3.2.1. Basic Factors-complexes that Affect the Relationship Between the State and Armed Forces**

The emergence of the above explained national framework conditions, respectively starting parameters, on the basis of which the state defines its fundamental relationship towards its armed forces, and according to which it assigns them a specific role, can be explained by the factors-complexes, described below.

In the analysis section (partly already in chapter 3.4.2.), each factors-complex will be analyzed in detail and proved why it is constitutive for the fundamental relationship between the state

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Massachusetts 1982, ISBN 0-88410-895-3, page 21 and BETTS, Richard K.: *Elusive Equivalence: The Political and Military Meaning of the Nuclear Balance*, *ibidem* page 109 f.

and its armed forces. The enumeration below serves the purpose of making the respective assessor aware of the underlying public understanding towards his armed forces and of the genesis of this perception. This step is of importance because the basic long term value-orientation of the state towards its armed forces substantially predetermines "spontaneous" short-term measures, taken in order to align the military to emerging requirements. Additionally it helps to make hitherto hidden gaps visible.

The creation of consciousness of factors that are constitutive for the relationship between the state and its armed forces should therefore primarily aim at the goal to critically question the (historically) evolved perception of the armed forces. The question must be answered in order to become aware, whether the perception still meets the requirements of the state's actual security and threat-situation or if it must be adjusted, before a profound realignment of military structures and procedures can be considered. Regarding the approached goal, the following factors had been identified:

- historical, particularly intellectual history-related, philosophical, religious, cultural (“national character”) and therefore necessarily values-based, cultural area-specific and demographic/ethnic developments,
- educational ideal, educational policy, innovative capabilities,
- geostrategic situation,
- strategic alliances,
- embedding into International Law, history of interference with International Law,
- embedding into National Law,
- competing power constellations,
- potential threats,
- resource-related factors of strategic importance (such as dependence on natural resources, energy, food as well as (drinking) water availability),
- demographic data (birth rates, population age median)
- the conviction of the political leadership and of general public that armed forces - both in the instantaneous as well as in the medium and long-term security situation of the state – are the indispensable guarantor of the preservation of sovereignty and thus the mandatory requirement that allows the state to assure the democratic freedoms, it has granted its citizens;

### **3.2.3.2.2. Significant Test-questions for the Determination of the Respective Underlying Relationship Between the State and its Armed Forces**

This section represents an attempt to single out representative factors that substantially determine the relationship between the state and its armed forces, to explain their effects and to convert them into measurement questions. The answers to these questions are to allow the user, to actually grasp the underlying attitude towards the armed forces, to objectify it further and eventually to understand it, in its national particularity as well as in its relation vis-à-vis other states.

#### **The interface between political theory and social science-related approaches**

Any research about relations between functional principles of democratic states and their armed forces will necessarily have to take into account political theory as well as social science-related approaches. Especially the interface between political theory and social science-related perspectives on the role of armed forces as a democracy-compatible instrument to maintain and project states' democratic structures, is an indispensable precondition for any analyses - in particular for analyses that are expected to provide suggestions for the political level, on how to perceive, orient, structure, educate, procure and engage armed forces effectively. Thereby has the compatibility of the latter with democratic principles to be guaranteed at any point of time.

Particularly the democratically constituted state should define its relation towards its armed forces. Such a definition should answer how the state perceives and utilizes its armed forces, and how this understanding feeds back on the state's actionability. The answer can be found via the amalgamation of political theory and social science. As already indicated by Kernic<sup>76</sup>, this amalgamation is useful simply for the reason that mission effectiveness should be weighed against democratic compatibility. This chapter is not about the question how democratic functional principles affect the mission-effectiveness of the military (and vice versa), neither is it about how they influence the internal cohesion, or the internal functioning of armed forces. It is

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<sup>76</sup> According to Kernic, is the relation between armed forces on the one hand and society on the other, substantially influenced by the social/socio-political system, in which the former are embedded as well as by the political system; compare KERNIC, Franz: Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, page 81.



rather about the specific way how the democratic state uses its armed forces as a means of expression of its sovereignty, as a guarantor for its peaceful survival and as a “design-tool” for its foreign-policy related actionability. By contrast might the use of military means to achieve boundless foreign policy objectives, already be at odds with a global peace order and the preservation of the democratic principle in a higher-level regulatory framework. However must this conclusion be relativated, because the most mission-capable nations are almost “perfect” democracies, like the United States, Great Britain or France.

Franz Kernic describes from which political theories, modern social science had started, in order to comprehend the mutual interrelation of states and their armed forces<sup>77</sup>. He points out that political theory regularly had linked the concept of “state” to armed forces by addressing the latter as an instrument, respectively symbol of the state – whereas modern social science takes on Platon’s idea of a guardian-/warriors-class that is to protect the “bonum commune”. In political theory, this principle is even more distinctly expressed by Hegel, who defines the state as the “reality of substantial will”, the “reasonable” per se, and the military as the external manifestation of the state’s sovereignty – to the unity and self-sufficiency of which it has to sacrifice itself<sup>78</sup>. Thereby, the dependence of the state on the military and the military’s reliability is addressed.

Contemporary military sociology, in the period of peace after the Second World War and in the beginning of the nuclear age, had rediscovered the incompatibility-theorem between the military on the one, and modern industrialized society on the other hand. It subsequently had defined four key problems<sup>79</sup>, on the overcoming of which it ultimately will depend, if armed forces can be prevented from becoming a foreign body within the democratic order of the state.

- Thesis/assumption of the loss of functionality of the military due to the political cost-benefit calculus.
- Thesis/assumption of the structural inability of modern (industrial) societies, to conduct

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<sup>77</sup> Compare KERNIC, Franz: *Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse*, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, page 85f.

<sup>78</sup> Compare HEGEL, G.W.F.: *Grundlagen der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, Reclam-Ausgabe, Stuttgart 1970; 258, §321-329 und §327 (Zusatz), cited in: KERNIC, Franz: *Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse*, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9; page 86.

<sup>79</sup> Compare KERNIC, Franz: *Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse*, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9; page 95f.

war.

- Thesis/assumption of the economic unprofitability of military and war.
- Thesis/assumption of the loss of legitimacy of the military.

However, the incompatibility theory among the social sciences is by no means undisputed. Samuel P. Huntington, and many other researchers, have re-defined the socio-military relations as a complex "system of interdependent elements respectively factors" and claimed a basic reciprocal integrability<sup>80</sup>.

Moritz Janowitz goes even further when he transposes the incompatibility theory into a compatibility-theorem, due to his assumption of a change into the direction of a harmonization of armed forces and society, which progressively reduced divergences<sup>81</sup>.

However, the change diagnosed by him, includes a shift from military authority to a common consensus-finding, which in higher intensive operations would result in a degraded mission-effectiveness, would in any case lead to increased military response-times and in addition would conflict with a seamless, distortion-free implementation of the primacy of politics.

Paradoxically, armed forces of a higher mission-effectiveness are more prone to democratic incompatibility, whereas structures that are democracy-compatible in the highest degree, must necessarily accept restrictions to their mission-effectiveness. This correlation becomes visible already by the example that the more the soldier is seen as a citizen "like any other", but only in uniform, the less would losses of human life be tolerated by civil society. This means that in operations, which require a higher death-toll, military contingents might be withdrawn or states would not even start to consider a contribution to such missions. However, are particularly those high-intensity Chapter VII missions indispensable for the preservation of global peace.

A closer examination of this principle will be carried out in the analysis section (see chapter "Values "Constitution" Within the Armed Forces"). Clear becomes already at this point that the above factors complex will bring to light the dependencies between the categorization-contexts

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<sup>80</sup> Compare HUNTINGTON, Samuel P.: *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Belknap Press), Publisher Harvard University Press, VIII, cited in KERNIC, Franz: *Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse*, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, page 99.

<sup>81</sup> Compare JANOWITZ, Morris / LITTLE, Roger W.: *Militär und Gesellschaft*, Boppard am Rhein 1965, cited in KERNIC, Franz: *Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse*, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, page 100.

"participation" and "mission effectiveness"

Hence derives the test question, whether the political system recognizes and inactively accepts the antagonistic-paradoxical relationship between democratic compatibility and mission effectiveness, whether it lays an one-sided emphasis on compatibility or mission effectiveness, or whether it goes for a consciously balanced synthesis of these two objectives.

### **Degree of postmodernity**

Essential parts of the analysis of the principle values-“constitution”, had to be moved forward to the present chapter, because they are of substantial importance for the assessment of the respective user’s initial situation, already in this state of the research.

According to Inglehart and Welzel (see figure 13<sup>82</sup>), the code of values of most Western pluralistic democracies (like e.g. Catholic Europe, Protestant Europe, Anglo-American world) is characterized by a balance of a relatively high degree of “self-expression” values and a relatively high degree of “secular-rational” values. How far away from the origin of the diagram a state is located on the angle-bisector, can - due to the underlying categorization of values - also be interpreted as an indicator for the state’s postmodern stage of development.

One emerging problem lies in the fact that just the values-attitudes of highly developed, postmodern democracies are extremely unsuitable for a well-functioning military<sup>83</sup>. They are particularly inappropriate for any application in the course of which, the self-unfolding of the soldier has to be limited with respect to the intended mission-targets and above all, for the sake of the full and seamless enforcement of the primacy of politics. In order to achieve the highest

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<sup>82</sup> The World Value Survey Cultural Map 2005-2008, Source: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy." *Perspectives on Politics*, June 2010 (vol 8, No. 2) page 554, ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)). This model provides a good basis for the explanation of the development towards a postmodern European society - however, it has some weaknesses like the definition of a “Catholic Europe”-array, in which Ireland is not included.

<sup>83</sup> Compare KERNIC, Franz: *Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse*, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9; page 105f.; Kernic deduces from the theories of Inglehart (INGLEHART, Ronald: *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton 1977) via a general shift from materialist to post-materialist values that in societies values gradually and increasingly start to hold sway, which diametrically counter to those, prevailing in military structures.

possible level of societal and democratic compatibility, armed forces would have to align with postmodern values-attitudes to the same extent as the society - what however would lead to restrictions to mission-effectiveness. Governments who force those postmodern values and social attitudes on their armed forces, undermine not only military effectiveness, but also eliminate discipline, social functioning, obedience, and end the idea that the military is the last "School of the Nation".

The core logic lies with the acceptance of the fact that the necessity of a stronger orientation of armed forces towards traditional-/survival- values (i.e. a "not-yet-post-modern" values-set) is not only a requirement - inherent to the system - that has *to be taken into account*. On the contrary it must be understood that precisely the therefrom resulting difference to the values-sets of civil society, represents the *consciously applied* functional principle by which the postmodern values-attitude of the state is to be protected effectively.

Compared to a ripe fruit, armed forces would have the task of the "not-yet-post-modern", uneatable but in turn hard and resistant peel, designed to protect the "post-modern" soft core (see figure 14). Is the peel of the same consistency as the protected fruit, it will not deter attackers - is it from dissimilar construction material, i.e. not grown from the same fruit, then it might suffocate the pulp. The challenge therefore is, to let the military protection coat grow out of the people while maintaining the society's respect for the armed forces, but to train and educate the latter - in terms of mission effectiveness - in the environment of a consciously less postmodern values-set.

Any uncritical acceptance of a further development towards postmodern values-attitudes may also entail long-term security-political consequences. Would the state still further disavow the ideal of a "fortified democracy", then it would become the target of anti-democratic developments, while it loses economic performance at the same time and while scenarios that require a mission-effective military instrument get more likely to occur. But just then must the armed forces be prevented from being subject to the same values-development (with reference to the military purpose rather to be seen as a "values erosion") as the one that has driven society into the above dilemma.

Via a possible worsening of the threat-situation, caused by progressive values changes that also would degrade the mission-effectiveness of the armed forces, there emerge additional risks and an increased dependence between internal democratic stability and external security.

An early example of the relationship between changes in values of the society and mission effectiveness of armed forces can, with reference to Stadler, be found in the defeat of the liberal Athens against the authoritative Sparta that in the Peloponnesian War was stronger emphasizing

military clout.

The primary test questions therefore should read:

- What degree of postmodernity has the society reached? Where would it be located in terms of the "World Value Survey Cultural Map" accordingly to Inglehart/Welzel?
- Is it recognized that there is a fundamental, values-related distinction between the protective shell and the core that needs to be protected? Will according to that finding, priority be given to mission effectiveness, or will the latter be sacrificed in favor of democratic compatibility? Is the relationship of this issue with the one, already mentioned in the above section "The interface between political theory and social science-related approaches", recognized?
- Can, in the case of prioritization of mission effectiveness, a different set of values between armed forces and civil society be explained as indispensable for the defense of democracy and can society be convinced to accept it?

### **The „Gettysburg Address“**

In 1862, in his legendary open letter to the New York Tribune, Lincoln explained that the goal of the Civil War was the preservation of the Union - largely independent of the number of slaves that could be freed thereby. This statement could now mislead to the assumption that Lincoln primarily saw the cohesion of the United States as the actual reason for going to war. The real underlying cause of the war was expressed in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address of 1863<sup>84</sup>, in which he represents the war as the necessary proof that any state, founded on democracy and individual freedom, is even long-term viable and does not break when a minority opposes a democratic majority decision. The Confederate States had opposed such a majority decision, and thereby endangered the overall democratic principle although it was a democracy as well, based on the same laws and rules.

In the United States, one of the first democracies that defined itself by „a government by the people for the people“, the armed forces therefore were - even before it was about the defense against an external aggressor or the pursuit of overseas interests – in first regard an indispensa-

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<sup>84</sup> BORITT, Gabor: *The Gettysburg Gospel: The Lincoln Speech That Nobody Knows.*, Appendix B p. 290: "This is the only copy that ... Lincoln dignified with a title: 'Address delivered at the dedication of the cemetery at Gettysburg.', a rare full signature, and the date: 'November 19, 1863.' ..This final draft, generally considered the standard text, remained in possession of the Bliss family until 1949."

ble means for preserving *democracy*.

The engagement of armed forces in the Civil War was a consequence of the message of the Gettysburg Address<sup>85</sup>. Via this engagement armed forces became - what was to be used as a guideline for the research – inextricably amalgamated with the task of direct<sup>86</sup> democracy preservation, which necessarily led to an internal dimension of the military mission-profile.

Already the guardian/warrior-class, which Plato had described, had - in addition to the defense of the polis to the outside - to exercise police functions in order to maintain internal order.

Both findings show that armed forces already in the early development stages of both forms of democracy (classic Greek democracy, modern democracy in the American/European understanding) were expected to provide an internal effect towards the preservation of the democratic order.

The view that armed forces historically have defined themselves primarily or exclusively by their exterior effect, has to be questioned for the reason that this external effect can be doubted according to Nietzsche („the vivid community did not need the war, whereas the hypocritical society were not able to conduct it“<sup>87</sup>), whereas a stabilizing internal effect has always been sought by the ruling class, regardless of the military readiness of the state and the society's will to defend.

The separation of powers for the maintenance of (a) external and (b) internal security is therefore man-made/artificial, ideologically based and has by no means grown over a long historical development. Only recent history criticized the abuse of armed forces for the preservation of

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<sup>85</sup> The Gettysburg Address was only mentioned in a number of newspapers. I was not distributed and remained unknown to military leadership that was not present at Gettysburg. The address became an „icon“ of American democracy decades after the war and was added to schoolbooks late in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Although it was not seen as a „doctrine“, it though mirrors the intellectual basis of Lincoln's decision to go to war, and the still valid rationale for the engagement of armed forces in the interior, when the survival of democracy is at stake.

<sup>86</sup> „Direct“ democracy preservation has to be understood here as “not just indirectly” via the defense against threats from the outside, which might endanger the state's sovereignty (i.e. the sovereignty that is needed to guarantee democratic freedoms and thus is the precondition for the democratic quality of the state).

<sup>87</sup> Compare STADLER, Christian: “Peaceless” War in spite of Military Victory, presentation in the course of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Military Academic Forum, 280911-300911, Reichenau an der Rax, Military Institute for Leadership, Education and Science (MILES).

absolutist or neo-absolutist dominions or for the power-enforcement by totalitarian regimes and the resulting necessity to limit the impact of armed forces by a separation of powers between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense<sup>88</sup>. Thereby it must be critically noted that it was usually the inability of the political system and of internal imbalances to prevent the authoritarian ruler from withdrawing the armed forces from democratic control. As the example of Nazi-Germany shows, also the separation of police- and military forces did not succeed to inhibit the abuse of the armed forces by the totalitarian regime. The approach, waged particularly by highly developed democracies, to exclude the task of maintaining internal security categorically from the military mission profile, shows of a kind of distrust, which modern European armed forces definitely do not deserve. To keep the military therefore on a tight rein means to doubt the democratic maturity of armed forces, their loyalty and their being imbued with democratic values – in other words to doubt the qualities, the presence of which is the mandatory requirement, the indispensable precondition for a credible democracy transfer.

But it is precisely this compelling mutual interdependence of internal democratic stability and external security, which results from the emerging threat situation, and that would – for mission purposes in the interior - require a support of internal security forces by military forces (in the way of assistance missions). This would particularly apply also to large-scale forms of internal unrest, for which the police are not sufficiently equipped nor structured. Already due to the numerical inadequacy, the lacking grow-up potential, the operational procedures, the mission profile and the logistical reach/endurance etc., can police forces not be expected to cope with this scenario. As this reasons are mainly *structural* ones, the frequently used argument that political leadership for the above purpose, simply would have to raise the *number* of police-forces, misses the point.

The above logic can be additionally substantiated by Daniel Bell's findings derived from the concept of "mass society". Bell states that the fear of the "mass" originated from the prevailing conservative tradition of Western political thought and expressed itself in authoritarian definitions of leadership and in the image of "mindless masses"<sup>89</sup>, with Aristotle's Politics, capable of violence and excess. So when there is an almost paradigmatic reluctance of today's governments to be found, to keep armed forces away from internal tasks, then this paradoxically might

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<sup>88</sup> In older history military forces were always also an instrument of fighting internal disturbances, rivalries etc.

<sup>89</sup> Compare BELL, Daniel: The End of Ideology, On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1988, ISBN 0-674-25230-6, page 28 f.

be an evidence that they still are guided by this image of masses and that they deliberately restrict themselves, respectively that they avoid to let themselves be seduced to engage armed forces against internal unrest.

As history shows, armed forces have not only contributed to the maintainance of democracy in the interior, they also have made the triumph of the French Revolution possible by enforcing the idea of modern democracy against the resistance of absolute, monarchical structures in Europe. Therein can another direct, democracy relevant influence be recognized.

The resulting test questions therefore read as follows:

- Does the political system of the respective state recognize the *direct* link between mission-effective forces and the maintenance of democratic social order?"
- What is the attitude of political leadership towards possible assistance missions of the armed forces within the interior?
- Will, in the event of escalating internal unrest, civilian security- respectively police-forces be supported by military forces, or will even the consideration of such a support be excluded due to a categorical separation of powers, which reflects a basic distrust in the democratic maturity of armed forces?
- Is it recognized that armed forces, being imbued with democratic values, represent the *conditio sine qua non* for any stabilizing democracy-projection to the outside, and that a categorical separation of civilian security/police-forces (internal security) and armed forces (external security) might draw this indispensable prerequisite into doubt?

### **Defense will of the people**

The defense will is *constituted* by the political will of the elites and of the masses, but *depends* also on the support by mass media. The will of the people to defend the state by military means, does not necessarily have to be expressed by the affirmation of a compulsory military service or a strong inflow of professional soldiers (although both factors would be an unerring evidence of this will). It will also be manifested by the readiness to endow the state's military with sufficient budgetary means, and by the appreciation that the society shows to the armed forces and their families. It is in a figurative sense, also reflected in the willingness of the people to stand up for the validity of their own constitution and for a values-based social respectively political order of their state – and thus to meet the requirements of a “fortified democracy”.

The question of the “will to defend” is therefore of central importance, because it is an indicator



of the democratic maturity of the population. Is this will, inter alia, defined by a commitment of the citizens to a values-based social and political order, this commitment means an adherence *to* and a life *in* accordance with jointly accepted values, usually also including the readiness to offer sacrifices for the community. Exactly this willingness turns out most clearly when it is about the general readiness of citizens, to serve as draftees, to commit themselves as professional soldiers or at least to make a solidary, honest support for the common defense.

Sacrifices for the community in the above sense also include restrictions of civic freedoms of soldiers. These restrictions however have to be legitimated by the superior goal of the sovereignty of the state, as the indispensable basis for the democratic freedom of its people. This principle of sovereign freedom in its organic form, embedded in the imperial concept of *auctoritas* that was first founded by Augustus, became the driving rationale for the European idea of freedom for fifteen hundred years<sup>90</sup>. In his *Res gestae divi Augusti* he reported about his approach to raise an army and to engage it in order to defend the liberty of the republic against tyrants. His idea was not about the civic freedom of the Roman noblemen – he envisaged the superior goal of the sovereignty of the state as a whole, for which purpose individual freedoms had to be sacrificed. Augustus' goal of freedom was to first control, then to free the Roman people.

Decisions regarding the recruiting system always have a factual aspect (which is not subject of the research), directly regarding the mission effectiveness of armed forces and one, concerning the democratic principle. From the perspective of the latter, it might be concluded that the general current European tendency to relieve the youth of military age from compulsory military service, neither indicates an increasing values-relatedness or defense-readiness nor represents a credo for a fortified democracy-perception of the citizens.

As shown in chapter “Research Framework”, does the present general trend towards unlimited personal fulfillment and development<sup>91</sup> supports the decrease of defense readiness and of the will to offer sacrifices for the community. This trend might entail another fatal result.

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<sup>90</sup> Compare PATTERSON, Orlando: *Freedom, Volume 1: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture*, Basic Books 1991, ISBN 0-465-02532-3, page 258.

<sup>91</sup> Compare JUGENDSTUDIE 2012 – ONLINE UMFRAGE bei 20-30-Jährigen in DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH UND DER SCHWEIZ, Mai 2012 USERPLANET RESEARCH, *Zukunftsfähige Gesellschaft*. Userplanet Research – E office@userplanet.com URL www. userplanet.com, cited in WOHLMEYER, Heinrich: *Empörung in Europa - Wege aus der Krise*, ibera/european university press, 1. Auflage 2012, ISBN 978-3-85052-320-2, page 19.

As quoted in chapter “Research Framework”, had Ernst Gehmacher concluded that the youth might support political trends up to a disengagement from the present ruling system. The 2011-report<sup>92</sup> of the Austrian Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth states that data would show that half of the young people were against a dictatorship, but wish a “strong hand” to bring “order to the state again” – whereat nearly half of those (mainly the male adolescents) would also accept a strong, unelected leader to take care of the land. It seems that the negligence of one's own obligations towards the community, might result in a transfer of these tasks to other actors. This could, *mutatis mutandis*, lead to a change regarding the perception of the necessity of individual contributions to the state's defense (e.g. an increased acceptance of a mercenary-mentality, respectively of a disproportionate ratio of soldiers with migration background within professional armed forces).

Developments of this kind, are in the highest degree dangerous for the democracy. It is therefore a primary task of the state to influence the underlying values-understanding of society into the direction of a stronger, at least mental, contribution towards national defense by all, although the according success cannot be expected in the short- or medium-term.

Already Augustine recognized the interrelation between the decreasing defense readiness of the original Roman citizens, the draft of mercenaries from foreign cultures, with different religious and values-related background and the military decline of Rome itself. It was exactly that military decline that made the “just war”-concept necessary, a concept by which Augustine in some way continued Cicero's “just war”-idea.

The principle of enlarging Rome by granting foreigners easy access, was already described by Machiavelli in his Discourses<sup>93</sup>. It actually might have contributed to a development that made the Roman Empire greater than Sparta or Athens but it also might have carried the seeds of decline within itself – to give the task to defend Rome over to foreigners, was an expression of the same principle, and it might have led to the defeat in Teutoburg-forest.

These deliberations result in the following test questions:

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<sup>92</sup> Compare KROMER, Ingrid: Die Wertewelt junger Menschen in Österreich, in „Sechster Bericht zur Lage der Jugend in Österreich – 2011“, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend, Sektion Familie und Jugend, Abteilung II/5 [Herausgeber], Kapitel 4: Interessen – Werte – Beziehungen, page 190.

<sup>93</sup> Compare MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò: The Discourses, Penguin Classics, 1983, ISBN 0-140-44428-9, Book Two [Discourses 1-5, Methods of Expansion], 3. Expansion and Citizenship, page 281 f.

- Does the political system recognize that the defense will of the people is constitutive also for the fortified form of democracy? To which level has the decline of the willingness to accept community service or military service proceeded?
- Does the above finding influence the decision of the state regarding its recruiting system?
- Is the direct relationship between the decline of the will to defend and the military defeat recognized (this sounds trivial, but behind a non-recognition might stand the mistaken belief that defense also can be ensured by superior technological means, disproportionate use of resources or the readiness of well-paid but isolated professional soldiers, to risk their lives for the benefit of society)?
- Is it attempted to influence the weak collective values-attitude of the people? Is it attempted to strengthen the defense will to a level, from which on a credible deterrence is possible?
- Is a higher proportion of soldiers with migration background (induced particularly by an all volunteer army and simultaneously decreasing defense budgets) accepted or are there attempts to avoid a disproportionately high representation of volunteers from socially poorer classes<sup>94</sup>, primarily by offering a more attractive guerdon?

### **Security-political paradigm-shifts**

In the course of the definition of research-questions, it turned out necessary, to investigate what implications a paradigm shift from *"calming of crises in the periphery before their negative effects might spill over to Europe"* to a *"Europe, security-politically fencing itself in, while at the same time reserving its right to selective interventions and to ensure access to strategic vital resources abroad"* might have on the democracy-compatible development of armed forces.

This section should describe and explain the sequence of paradigm shifts regarding the European security-policy, in order to visualize for the user of the structured analysis model, which stage of development the security-policy agenda of the respective state reflects. The user should also be enabled to deduce therefrom, which basic requirements-profile its armed forces currently would have to meet, and from which initial position one would have to start, if an adaptation of the state's security-policy orientation is to be considered.

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<sup>94</sup> The US Marine Corps already has a dominant percentage of Afro-Americans, whereas this percentage is significantly lower in the more demanding Navy or in the Air Force.

Since the final phase of Cold War, the security-policy orientation in Europe has changed so often that one could easily argue any number of "paradigm shifts". In the course of this research only those changes were analyzed and branded that have a significant influence on the relationship and the simultaneity-demand between abroad and domestic missions of armed forces.

As the **first paradigm shift** (see figure 4) that corresponds to this requirement, the transition from the classical static "layer cake defense" of NATO to a mobile defense deployment according to the principle of "operational counter-concentration" and to the FOFA-concept (Follow on Forces Attack), would have to be mentioned. Apart from a possible nuclear escalation, combat operations would have been fought as confrontations between conventional regular forces. Civilians and civilian infrastructure would - if they had no direct influence on the conduct of operations or the resource situation of the defender - not have become a primary target for the aggressor. If the armed forces would have managed to defeat the attacker (while avoiding the nuclear escalation), civilian casualties could thereby have been kept low.

The **second paradigm shift** (see figure 4) of the security-political realignment of the Western community manifests itself in the transition to the principle of "enhanced" national defense. "Enhanced national defense" describes a kind of "forward defense", but in a figurative sense, because forward stabilization is understood as a prophylactical means to prevent crises in the periphery from generating destabilizing effects on Europe that else might mutate into a substantial future-threat for the Union. In doing so, there initially was no simultaneous and even less a causally related threat to the homebases of troop contributing states to be detected. Classical internal/defense tasks of armed forces, like national main defense homeland security or civil protection were reduced<sup>95</sup> and the released resources relocated to stabilization tasks within the framework of abroad missions (like in the early stage of humanitarian military interventions - HMI, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). Thus, state sovereignty with regard to the internal security was unwittingly endangered, and the loss of the capability to guarantee democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, had been put up with. The force planning-related response in the initial phase of this paradigm, namely the shift of resources to foreign missions, without simultaneously providing a sufficient coverage of the home base-requirements was - judged from the hindsight - obviously based upon an incorrect interpretation of the changed security-political situation.

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<sup>95</sup> The reduction of national defense tasks and capabilities was accomplished due to the insufficiently substantiated "forecast" that Europe wouldn't have to face any conventional threat for at least 10 years to come - "NATO/Europe would have been deprived of any enemy".

It also remains to be questioned whether the argument by which the weakening of main defense forces was justified, namely that NATO has lost its main enemy, was well founded enough. If European countries from peripheral regions continue to refrain from following the trend towards a reduction of military budgets, so might that be taken as an indication of the local perception that this conventional threat still exists or at least could grow up further if there were no balancing power-potential to opposed a possible antagonist. Above that, force reductions create a waning confidence in the defense guarantee of NATO and in the principle of "democratic cohesion" of European states, respectively of the alliance.

Only since the devastating attack on the World Trade Center in 2011, it had been recognized even in Europe that Western pluralistic states – in order to survive in terms of lively democracies - indispensably need to protect their home bases. It turned out that stability projection does not work without hardening of these home bases (even less any other military force based, foreign-political acting), and that external mission-effectiveness indirectly even *depends* on the “hardening” of the national civil infrastructure. Force planning was therefore reoriented from a focus on international missions (that were accompanied by a simultaneous *degradation of home base requirements*) into the direction of an accentuated foreign missions-related effectiveness with a clearly defined security policy-main effort, *including the necessary homeland protection tasks* (“homeland defense”). The principle (see figure 5) lies in the function that antagonists who had attempted to thwart stabilization missions of Western coalitions, would not “grab the bull by the horns” (i.e. attack the deployed combat troops), but instead would try to launch sub-conventional and terrorist attacks against the home base of the troop sending state in order to extort the respective governments to withdraw their contingents from the international mission. The above principles and the examples of Spain (in 2004 Spain withdrew its soldiers from Iraq) and the United Kingdom (in 2005, but UK refused to withdraw its contingent) demonstrates how determinative homeland security can be for the sustainability of a military contingent in a foreign mission. The insistence of the voting public, to cancel operations before uncontrollable threats might hit the home base, will give the governments not much choice, besides terminating the mission, unless sufficient and credible police and military resources against large-scale terrorist attacks would be available (which rarely will be the case).

Although the internal security of the state will be strengthened by stability projecting interventions, paradoxically the latter might also increase the terrorist threat to the home base.

Asymmetric threats affect the home base and the military abroad-contingents alike and therefore must be fought simultaneously on the “interior front” as well as in the foreign mission area. However, the threat to the home base has a much stronger, immediate effect, because the civil-

ian infrastructure is not protected, and terrorist acts can neither be identified in advance nor can they be dodged or prevented every time. The civil population can not avoid to be hit by acts of terrorism (military forces on the contrary, could avoid losses by refraining from operating in areas of identified terrorist threat). This explains, why the pressure on governments to withdraw military contingents from foreign missions might primarily be exercised by threats to the home bases.

The **third paradigm shift** (see figure 4) in the security political alignment of the European community of states arose with the extension of the motive for a political decision to engage in foreign missions. Had it been a clear humanitarian and security policy focus in the beginning, started now additional motives to mingle with the original goals. These new goals additionally aimed at securing access to vital resources and at enforcing of foreign political objectives. Thus, the European security perception partially emancipated in opposition to the United States, but nevertheless exposed governments increasingly to the accusation to act rather out of economic interests than for humanitarian reasons. Of course, the securing of vital strategic resources (i.e. such resources that Europe needs indispensably to survive as a democratic values-defined community) must be understood as “defense in a broader sense” – also when the according argumentation is more difficult. Today it seems that the confidence in an exclusively peace-making driven intention of European governments would gradually dwindle away and that terrorist actors could be encouraged to "punish" the home base of troop contributing states for interventions of the latter.

A particular problem in this context, represent operations that indeed served humanitarian objectives but - at least initially – were conducted without a mandate of the UN-Security Council. The evidence that such humanitarian reasons, which required an intervention, were actually compelling, has to be adduced with much higher effort than in the case that the Security Council had originally mandated the mission. The practice to legitimize the necessity of such deployments via the fiction of the creation of Customary Humanitarian Law<sup>96</sup>, might be a useful "crutch" in order to help quickly and undelayed in particularly serious cases of human rights violations. But this approach is also dangerous, because it raised the suspicion that foreign policy- or economic objectives were the actual reason for the intervention – and that this motive was only camouflaged by a “humanitarian cause”.

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<sup>96</sup> The first evidence of this practice to legitimize a humanitarian intervention via the creation of Customary Humanitarian Law can be found in the case of the NATO intervention that led to battering the artillery ring around Sarajevo after the attack on the local marketplace on August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1995 - „Second Markale-Massacre“.

By contrast to the first three, the **fourth security paradigm shift** (see figure 4) has not yet occurred. However, developments are visible that - unless timely countermeasures are taken - could force such a change of direction. In the case of further declining defense budgets, European governments might decide to retract crises response operations (supply-bottlenecks in the Libya mission in 2011 that have turned out already after the first few weeks of the operation, should be seen as a serious signal) or to abstain from any foreign engagement and to withdraw to a "Fortress Europe"-policy. Crises that would not have been calmed in time, might lead to an increased flow of poverty-driven refugees, who will have to be repelled at the EU's external borders, by the help of military means<sup>97</sup>. As a reaction to selective operations that aim at securing access to strategic resources abroad, a renewed perception of injustice might build up in the periphery of Europe, which would be detrimental to European security interests and to a global peace order. The emergence of such a perception would move the goal of democratization of crises-threatened countries around Europe, into far distance.

A development like this, would represent a break with the previously applicable, humanity based, security-policy principles of the Western values-defined state community, would anew exacerbate the already existing poverty gap, nullify the achievements made so far on the way to a global peace order and would finally draw a much higher immediate asymmetric/terrorist threat on Europe.

This "fourth paradigm shift" is not to be understood as a probable development, even less shall it be offered as a desirable target-option. This hypothetical paradigm is just on the contrary to be comprehended as a worst case scenario that might turn out reality, if European states continue to misconceive respectively underestimate the rising threat-momentum, to neglect their long-term security political responsibility and to deny to search for appropriate strategic answers.

As the analysis shows, would this paradigm not even be consistent in itself. The decline of defense forces has meanwhile proceeded that far that the "draw bridges" could not be wound up and the castle walls could not be maintained anymore, due to shrinking budgets. Europe's stabilizing effect on crises areas would vanish and the chance to accomplish a global peace order would be gamed away.

In turn would instability be imported into EU-territory, where it cannot be distinguished sufficiently from externally triggered terrorist threat and where it hardly can be fought and even less

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<sup>97</sup> FRONTEX was created exactly for this task but is actually rather helping refugees, which could be interpreted as an indirect support of immigration – and that would be the opposite of the original purpose.

prevented.

A responsible European security policy would have to countersteer such a scenario decisively – but with the current, budget-related erosion of force-capabilities, Europe almost "forces" itself into such a development. With regard to the goal of a global peace order of democratically constituted states, and for the purpose of the immediate protection of the people of the latter, against mass migration and terrorist threats, defense budgets should at least be allocated in an amount that allows the armed forces to remain capable of democracy transfer and sustainable stability projection and at the same time to provide for a requested minimum of reliable home-base-protection.

Therefore, the following test questions may be derived:

- To which category of paradigm-development stages can the respective user-state be assigned?
- Do the users have aligned their armed forces with a corresponding valid, targeted paradigm-development level and the required set of capabilities (main effort with “defense/internal tasks” vs. main effort with “foreign missions **and** coping with simultaneity requirements between foreign mission- and homeland security-tasks, at different levels of ambition according to Chapter VI/VII/beyond Chapter VII missions, of the UN Charter”)?
- Which recruiting system is applied (all volunteer forces, professional armed forces with a reserve-/grow-up component or compulsory military service with professional cadres)? The choice of the recruiting system and the way in which it is implemented, correlates with the basic understanding of the state on the following issues: To which extent are armed forces also to be seen as a foreign-policy realization tool? Had the conditionality of a sufficient homeland security for the sustainability of international missions been recognized? Is the principle of a fortified democracy taken serious enough to contemplate military assistance missions for the maintenance of the internal order or are all efforts and means exclusively focused on conventional defense-tasks at home?
- Which Level of Ambition should be started from, if armed forces are to be realigned and adapted to a changed security-policy paradigm?
- Is the state aware of the dangers and the effects that may arise from a withdrawal to a „Fortress Europe“ and what is being done to counteract such a development?



## **“Projection” versus “Defense” – the purpose of armed forces in democracies**

The basic understanding of the state towards its armed forces is mainly defined by the question of whether the latter are primarily seen as a tool for the *defense of the state's territory* or as a tool for *the realization of foreign-policy goals* and additionally for *the projection of stability, democracy and of power*.

In the former case, i.e. when the primary focus lies with the territorial, defensive aspect, armed forces run the risk to be labeled as a "necessary evil" and useless investment, particularly in phases of a long lasting absence of acute threat.

However, when states have inherently and historically used their armed forces primarily as a tool to project power (like the classic colonial powers U.S., British Commonwealth, France), it seems that a public consent to use the military as a legitimate tool for the attainment of foreign policy goals, and for the preservation of power-superiority, is more likely to be achieved. Armed forces will also be recognized as a factor on which national pride and national identity may be based (contrary to the case that priority is given to the defense of the state's own territory, projection forces prove their utility for the foreign policy role of their state *permanently*). This theory can for example be corroborated by the high defense budget of the U.S., additionally by a substantial involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom in Chapter VII missions/coalitions, the British Falkland-intervention or the previous French military presence in its overseas territories in Africa. Above that, defense ministries in such states are mostly respected as "power ministries" in the respective governments. Obviously, the interrelation with the geostrategic position of the country is also evident: Maritime powers are, by definition, more dependent on a power projection capability over long sea-distances. Because they base their power, inter alia, on military strongholds on geographical counter-coasts, the access to overseas resources and their influence in distant economic-regions, they are strategically less exposed to attacks on their own territory. The principal alignment of armed forces to power projection and the necessity of certain offensive capabilities is a logical consequence of this principle.

*Although*, or maybe *just* because the United States, had been confronted with attempts of political actors to restrict the American power projection campaigns or to force the U.S. to withdraw its contingents from foreign missions by imposing a terrorist threat on its home base - finally (unlike e.g. Spain or Italy, both of which had decided to withdraw their contingents from the Iraq-mission due to terrorist attacks) the sustained strength of the armed forces, the political will to continue the mission and the public support for a visible foreign-policy enforcement prevailed. The cause of the fact that terrorist activities were not able to force the U.S. to change

its foreign policy lies largely in the congruence of political will and public opinion.

In the broadest sense, the foreign-policy driven projection-principle can also be seen as a kind of strategic "forward defense". However, lies its disadvantage in the fact that it is very likely to create a new perception of injustice and unrest in the target regions of the projection, and thus to be less beneficial to a democratic peace settlement in a global context.

From the perspective of the state that defines itself via the power to shape international political reality outside its borders, deployable armed forces are the indispensable prerequisite for such shaping efforts, for its survival and for the maintenance of its sovereignty (and thus for its capability to guarantee the democratic freedoms of its citizens).

But also the states that focus more strongly on the defense of their territory require powerful armed forces, be it in order to calm far away crises (in the sense of the second and third, above described, security political paradigm shift) at their source, or for the purpose to fend off migration flows, originating from uncalmed crises at the gates of a "Fortress Europe" or to defend the country against conventional military threats that have emerged because decades of undervaluation of armed forces have given rise to a power vacuum, by which the potential opponent only had been encouraged to rearm.

For both perspectives applies, what Kenneth N. Waltz<sup>98</sup> concludes from his contemplation about the nature of power: It doesn't make too much difference in political reality, whether power is seen as a necessary means to secure the ends of the state or as the natural struggle of men that are born as seekers of power. However will this research primarily start from Waltz's first assumption that power arises in competitive situations and in the absence of an authority that can limit competitors in their exercise of force.

John J. Mearsheimer's<sup>99</sup> distinction between offensive and defensive realism describes the same principle, only from a different perspective. Both share the finding that power is the key to survival in a world where no agency protects one state from the other. But whereas defensive realists would strive for maintaining the existing balance of power, offensive realists try to take advantage of opportunities, created by the international system, to gain power over rivals.

From both, Waltz's as well as Mearsheimer's theories can be concluded that a realism-driven

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<sup>98</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth N.: *Man, the State and War – a theoretical analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York and London 1954, 1959, ISBN 0-231-08564-8, page 35.

<sup>99</sup> Compare MEARSHEIMER, John J.: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York - London, 2001, ISBN 0-393-32396-X pbk, page 21.

power perception is the indispensable survival principle for states in a multipolar world order.

The problem here however is that “national defense-oriented” armed forces, which unlike projection-forces cannot prove their usefulness every day, are hardly borne from the electorate, in times without direct threat. Where a direct correlation between crisis response/democracy transfer and peace within the interior is not understood, where the survival of the state does not depend on its deployed forces or on its foreign policy, and where any application of state-, particularly military-power is - due to the prevailing, postmodern values-orientation - stigmatized as, already in principle, incompatible with democratic principles – there can the necessary preservation of credible and punchy armed forces one day only be realized by a far-sighted political leadership that raises the question of state sovereignty and of a “fortified democracy” above the current political party-sectionalism.

How absurd it would be to understand the democratic state, from a postmodern perspective, as an institution that lacks of exercised power, becomes apparent even in the Kantian approach, which sees the emergence of the state caused by a pre-legal power act, upon which the public law later on builds<sup>100</sup>. Thereby, in particular those strategies would be additionally legitimized that aim at foreign political shaping power.

According to Gustenau/Hofmeister, the negligence of the power monopoly of the state will inevitably develop into a factor that domestically as well as foreign-politically, will turn against the state itself. Power and credible independence however, were conditioned by the state’s will to survive and the strength of its army (for which reason the capabilities of its armed forces should be seen as the ultimate mirror-image of the state<sup>101</sup>). Insecurity and instability (internally as well as externally) are consequences from a neglected power monopoly of the state. Such conditions are typical for “failed states” and “failing states” especially in Africa or Iraq.

This context generates the following test-questions:

- To which type of armed forces will the state align its military - to forces mainly oriented towards the defense of the national territory with a partial aptitude to participate in multinational crises response missions, or to forces with the capability of a robust, foreign-

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<sup>100</sup> Compare KANT Immanuel: Werke (Akademieausgabe), Berlin und Leipzig 1923, 8, page 371 cited in GUSTENAU, Gustav E./HOFMEISTER Heimo: Die Krise des Heeres als Krise des Staates, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 1/1996, page 13.

<sup>101</sup> Compare GUSTENAU, Gustav E. / HOFMEISTER Heimo: Die Krise des Heeres als Krise des Staates, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 1/1996, page 14.

policy driven power-projection?

- Does the state rely on stronger or weaker armed forces? Can weaker forces be sufficiently justified due to the membership in a collective defense alliance? Is the logical request for stronger armed forces in case of not-membership to a collective defense alliance, realized and taken serious?
- Will, in the case of a stronger military, democracy-compatibility be achieved by the perception of its foreign-policy-related effectiveness, and thus through the identification of the people with "their" armed forces?
- Will, in the case of armed forces that are used as a guarantor for an effective security policy but not as a foreign policy-shaping tool, democracy compatibility be achieved through a further development of the societal values-canon? Will this approach be supported by the creation of the understanding that crisis intervention indirectly contributes to domestic peace or will the military be re-dimensioned to a small, inconspicuous size?
- Does the recruiting system correlate to the respective chosen political goal (focus on a security policy- vs. focus on a foreign policy-driven orientation)? Does this also cover the mandatory homeland security capabilities, required in both cases (which, in case of a contingency, would be expressed by a rapid grow-up capacity in numbers)?

### **Rational-philosophical vs. empirical-analytic, intellectual history background**

States - due to their specific development of intellectual history - usually have a stronger affinity either to empirical-analytic or to rational-philosophical thinking. This manifests itself inter alia in education, prevailing scientific paradigms, in the private business- as well as in the military-leadership-understanding.

Does a stronger affinity to empirical-analytic thinking prevail, there often is a tendency, to respond to future developments by contingency-plans (Martin van Creveld<sup>102</sup> found out that U.S. planning staffs in World War II were much stronger in numbers than the ones of the adversaries, and that this surprisingly was one of the reasons for the German leadership-superiority. He recognized the small size of German staffs as an indicator for the leaders' capability to decide according to individual evaluation in a given situation, without any necessity to resort to

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<sup>102</sup> Compare CREVELD, Martin van: *Kampfkraft, Militrische Organisation und Leistung der deutschen und amerikanischen Armee 1939-1945*, ARES-Verlag, ISBN 3-902475-17-X, pages 65 to 71.

contingency plans or complex staff procedures. Thus, a long and therefore expensive leadership-education, which aims at a rapid situational decision-capability, loses its justification. Simultaneously, with the abandonment of such a leadership-education, which focuses on an outstanding situational decision-capability, also the precondition for mission-oriented leadership (“Auftragstaktik”) would be eliminated, the basic principle of which lies with the chance that the able subordinate can use the given leeway by his own assessment more beneficially than the superior might have expected him to do.

Creveld’s observations must be seen as an outcome of the fact that the U.S. Army in 1941/42 had no valid combat experience and commanders learned strongly on the Army Planning Staff and the force-level staffs. To streamline leadership and staffwork in a fast growing army also required numerous field manuals, regulating details. Only these procedures permitted a smooth operating process that was run by a limited number of “amateurs” even to the level of regimental commanders.

An empirical-analytic leadership-understanding will therefore often entail a significant proportion of order-type leadership-related (“Befehlstaktik”) elements and will not allow for relying fully on mission-oriented-leadership derived procedures. Mission-oriented leadership is mainly based on the “above-average” level of education and talent of the sub-leaders’ cadre in its full width. With a lower degree of implementation of the mission-oriented leadership, naturally also the need for a broad general education, down to the lowest leadership levels is reduced.

Although a lower breadth of general education might help to save resources (this particularly goes for numerically strong armed forces), and to allow for laying a focus on an elite-type education, it also would mean a lower degree of animation of lower leadership-levels by enlightened thinking. This would lead to a restricted consciousness about a rational idea of man, about democratic rights and obligations. It also would entail a limitation of the sensorium for the recognition of the content of injustice in given orders. Only someone who is fully conscious of democratic rights, their function and importance, can determine at what point in an abroad mission, such rights of people in the area of operations would be violated.

Therefrom follows that in such systems a special emphasis must be laid on a democracy-building education, particularly for the lower leadership-levels of the armed forces.

However, when a stronger affinity to rational-philosophical thinking is given, there is an independent, situational judgment capability of leaders at all levels brought forward and thus, the alignment to the leadership-philosophy of mission-oriented leadership that from the beginning on, was a compensation for numeric and resource-related inferiority, and that therefore aimed to equalize such inferiority by enhancing leadership skills. These leadership skills that must per-

meate all hierarchical levels in their entire width, can only be achieved by a long-lasting and intensive leadership education (not only by “training”) itself. That is why this kind of education plays such a dominant role in mission-oriented leadership systems.

The significant advantage of this leadership-philosophy lies with the fact that all, but particularly the lower levels of the military hierarchy, are imbued with enlightened thinking in the sense of the Humboldtian educational ideal. Mission-oriented leadership together with its inherent requirement of general humanistic education, provides an enhanced knowledge of democratic rights and duties, supports their internalization and helps to developed a natural sense for detecting orders that contradicts the legal system or fundamental human rights.

The following test-questions can be derived:

- Is a stronger affinity given to rational-philosophical or to empirical-analytic thinking?
- Does the ratio of the shares of mission-oriented-leadership and order-type-leadership correlate with the associated, requested width of education respectively with the applied form of leadership education?
- Does, particularly on lower leadership levels, exist an acute sense for the recognition of contents of injustice in orders received?
- Is the understanding for democratic rights and duties sufficiently internalized, particularly on lower levels of leadership?
- Do states that are more aligned to an enlightened human image (like “advanced” post-modern states) and in which the civilian population shows an inherently critical attitude towards the use of military force, take effective precautions to prevent armed forces from being marginalized, excluded or even from becoming a social subsystem?

### **Lessons drawn from suffering a defeat**

Only where lessons are drawn from a defeat or a situation in which a military deficiency, simply due to a favorable development, has not led into a disaster, where arrangements are made to prevent such an event from occurring again in the future, where pertinent efforts stay upright, even when the threat does not immediately repeat itself, there will armed forces become more effective. Above that, they will become more adequately adapted there to the current challenges - and the democracy, the protection of which armed forces are to serve, will get more reliably consolidated.

The defeat of Prussia at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 was the birth of the Clausewitzian approach to build military leadership upon the foundation of a military-scientific method. The latter had inspired the triumph of enlightened thought in Prussia and had led to the establishment of a Military Reorganization Commission, an educational reform, aiming at a new scientific research quality in dealing with the subject of war and at introducing trend-setting social improvements. The Prussian failure against Napoleon can thus be seen as a shining example of how the state changed for the better simply by learning from the defeat: Both, the clout of its armed forces, and the social conditions of its citizens improved. In this context, it must be mentioned that Prussia was far from being a “democracy” in today's understanding but that issues such as education or social reforms, can though already be figuratively compared to "democratic" fundamental rights.

When lessons are not drawn, armed forces will remain “toothless” and unable to avert future defeats<sup>103</sup>. The state's leadership, in case of future threats, might fail again to ensure the social, respectively democratic rights of its citizens. Now would this finding however not be too spectacular, if exactly the same would not apply for developments of the threat-situation that might indeed be foreseeable but though were ignored by the political leadership.

Marc Bloch<sup>104</sup> describes the French rout of 1940 as a “defeat of mind”, respectively of intellectual thought. The French officers had – according to Bloch - considered themselves rather as descendants of the *ancienne régime*, than as members of the enlightened bourgeoisie, and thus

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<sup>103</sup> The defeat of the Austrian Army at Solferino led to the defeat in 1866. This defeat forced the ruling class to agree to the „Fundamental Rights Catalogue“ of 1867 and led to the splitting the monarchy into two parts, which should weaken the Habsburg-rule persistently. In France, the war-planning after 1918 remained static like in 1870/71, using a „protective force“ employed in a defense line of connected *fortresses* to prevent *trench-warfare* as between 1915-1918. The „Gamelin-plan“ that had aimed at protecting mobilization and at dynamizing the French defense employment by the use of mobile counter-offensive forces, supported by a long line of fortresses, did not become sufficiently effective. Any aggressor overcoming this line would have had a „free run“ all the way to Paris and to the Atlantic coast. General Weygand who participated in the planning predicted a German crossing of the line. All war-plans were based on a successful defense along the Maginot-Line, which required a large part of the defense budgets until 1935/36. After 1945, French historians blamed the inferiority of the French Army and Air Force exactly on the expenses of the Maginot-Line. The French infantry of 1939 was basically not much better equipped than in 1870/71.

<sup>104</sup> BLOCH, Marc: Die seltsame Niederlage: Frankreich 1940 – der Historiker als Zeuge, ISBN: 3-10-021603-2, zusammengefasste Darstellung der Argumentationskette in der Einleitung von Ulrich Raulff, page 13ff.

had not recognized the already distinguishable offensive intent against France that emanated from Germany.

Austria has underestimated the military development of Prussia. So it had underfunded its military for decades, did not keep pace with advances in technology, did not pursue science education in the armed forces vigorously enough - the defeat of Königgrätz was therefore predestined. But even 1866 did the military leadership remain passive vis-à-vis the progress and technical development in the adversaries' armed forces.

Although outstanding thinkers, like Johan Peter Lefrén and Johan August Hazelius, had received the Clausewitzian theory on war and suggested it as a possible guideline for the Swedish strategic thinking, already at an early stage, Sweden held on to the role model of France and the theses of Antoine Henri Jomini<sup>105</sup>. Not even the loss of Finland to Russia could dissuade the Swedish leadership from stubbornly sticking to this orientation. Only after the defeat of France in 1870-71, the Swedish leadership started to align its strategic thinking more according to the German school of thought and the teachings of Carl von Clausewitz.

The supply shortages that occurred with European NATO-members, who participated in the Libya Operation (2011), show that Europe meets with its limits already in not even high-intensity interventions<sup>106</sup>. The hypothetical question, what a NATO-assistance would have looked like if Georgia had been a NATO member already at the time of the Russian attack (Caucasian Five-Days-War in August 2008), the unresolved European shortfalls in strategic intelligence and in strategic deployability at simultaneously dwindling defense budgets as well as the incipient diversification of the endangerment-perception of Eastern border states of NATO might substantiate the assumption that Europe neither was in 2008 nor is today adequately responding to an already foreseeable increase in threats. Any European high-intensity intervention would have led to a fiasco, unless it had been substantially supported by a major U.S. involvement.

The following test-questions can be derived:

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<sup>105</sup> Compare POMMERIN, Reiner (Ed.): Clausewitz goes global – Carl von Clausewitz in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Commemorating the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Clausewitz Society, Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, ISBN 978-3-937885-41-4, page 320f.

<sup>106</sup> Compare KORKISCH, Friedrich W.: Luftkrieg „neu“: Mehr Evolution als Revolution, Teil 2, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ), Heft 3/2014, pages 294-308, regarding European insufficiencies see pages 304-307.



- Are individual states or the EU-bodies willing to respond to threats, and to make long-term investments in counter-strategies, even if this would require unpopular political decisions?
- Is the state leadership willing to raise issues of national/international strategic security above parties-particularism?

**“Igitur, qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum”<sup>107</sup>**

The postulation "be ready to fight in order to avoid to be forced to fight", was a successful argumentation-pattern to motivate citizens of postmodern democratic societies to undergo military service without any need to even mentally confront them with the abominations of actual war. However, would this logic - thought to end - lead to defenseless states that were mentally no longer ready, to actually engage their armed forces – in other words to states that are neither ready to fight nor to avoid war on them.

Any possible opponent will immediately recognize the fundamental and structural incapability to conduct intensive military missions, and therefore will not be deterred by such forces. The argument that armed forces, even in the absence of an immediate threat, are required to prevent the rise of any power vacuum that could animate a potential aggressor to offensive actions, is convincing but only works out if these forces will show a credible mission-readiness.

The full extent of the paradox about the principle of “be able to fight in order to avoid to be forced to fight” show itself in the fact that – as proved by historic examples - the decline of the will to defend had led to the ultimate vulnerability of the state and finally to its defeat. However, the same decline of the *state's* will to defend, has also resulted in the *forces'* loss of defense-will, and consequently in the loss of the operational capability to unfold mission effectiveness.

Precisely at a time when the state had become vulnerable and was in need of armed forces, the latter had lost their operational readiness. In times where the will to defend still prevailed, and armed forces therefore would have been mission-ready, their mere presence had been enough to deter opponents, and the fight could – in most cases - be avoided. Thus it could once again be referred to Nietzsche, who as shown above (see Annex 2, chapter 2. “Classic philosophical and

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<sup>107</sup> The more popular but shortened form, "Si vis pacem, para bellum", is not to be found in the original sources – however had Vegetius, according to Wagener, meant in a figurative sense: „Igitur, qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum“; compare VEGETIUS cited in WAGENER, Martin: Über das Wesen der Strategie, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 4/2010, page 445.

general theories about the relationship between the armed forces and the state”, subchapter “Nietzsche”) figuratively concluded that the healthy society does not need the war, whereas the weak one is not able to conduct it.

The paradox that had been defined by Nietzsche, could furthermore – in an abstracted form - be described as follows: The decline of defensive capabilities and of the defense will of the people evokes the susceptibility and vulnerability of the state to enemy attacks, and makes the actual engagement of a forceful army necessary.

As long as the mere presence of credible forces was enough to deter a potential aggressor (which only would have worked if they were strong enough and mentally capable of actually being employed) they usually had been spared the factual engagements. The “in fact”-use of armed forces became therefore only necessary when their deterrent effect was not sufficient anymore. This was the case when previously the valor and the will to defend had degenerated, and thereby the loss of mission-readiness of the military had been caused.

Weak armed forces are thus a *symptom* of progressive decline of the defense capability, and at the same time its *driving factor* - therein lies the absurdity of the self-pacification formula "be able to fight in order to avoid to be forced to fight". This formula, from a current perspective, would more likely have to be enhanced into "*at least be willing to defend in order to avoid to be defeated*". By this extension, and together with the finding that armed forces must exactly then be maintained operationally capable and mentally willing to fight when the defense-will of the people dwindles due to a shift towards a post-modern values-order, a first approach to the resolution of Nietzsche's paradox could be found. This approach also describes the dangers for a “demilitarized” Europe.

Russia provided a practical example for the necessity of the resolution of the paradox in the above described sense. It justified its recent series of military field exercises by the need to “evaluate the technical deployability of its armed forces and their command and control procedures” – any intention to use this series of exercises as a direct strategic signal to the West, was persistently denied from the Russian side.

By the *initial*<sup>108</sup> decision of NATO, to abstain from a "counter-exercise" (as it had been vehemently required on the occasion of the scenario “Baltic States”), the Alliance exposed itself to the suspicion that it would be incapable of such a reaction. Thus, already an unanswered exer-

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<sup>108</sup> Here is referred only to the *initial* decision of NATO – meanwhile had the Alliance already reacted by exercise-plans and, at the latest since the Russian intervention in the Ukraine, by concrete deployment decisions.

cise-activity was in some respect able to create strategic reality. Russia was ready, to prove its "be able to fight" through field-exercises. This shows that it did not succumb to the fallacy that the second part of the argumentation-pattern "to avoid to be forced to fight" would allow armed forces a mental conviction not to be actually deployed.

All the more problematic seems NATO's initial abdication of a counter-exercise, because it therefore could have be imputed just this kind of mental incapacitation to actually deploy forces, when it would be necessary and furthermore because thereby, the confidence of the new peripheral members, in the defense guarantees of the Alliance, could have been severely shaken.

The following test-question results:

- Is the political consciousness present that operational capability and mental willingness of armed forces, to be actually deployed, must be maintained particularly when the defense-will of the people decreases? Is it understood that the armed forces' readiness to fight is indispensable in order to guarantee the sovereignty of the state and thus the fundamental democratic rights of its citizens?

**Core-conclusions from the investigation of the factors, constitutive for the relationship between the state and its armed forces**

The resultant of the analyzed military factors and of the derived test-questions lies with the fundamental recognition

- that democracies, both for their emergence and for their sustained existence, depend on operationally capable armed forces plus their mental readiness to be actually deployed in case of need,
- that, with a decline of the values-order and a dwindling defense-will of the citizens, the sustained existence of the state and thus the democracy-political rights of its people are at risk, and
- that the long-term survival of the state is inextricably intertwined with the question on how fully the political leadership is aware of the above dependencies.

### 3.3. Theoretical Framework to be Used as Toolset for the Respective National Analysis

Each state has its own intellectual history-related background, and derived therefrom its specific science-paradigm, out of which it systematically deals with its relationship respectively attitude towards its armed forces. The theory-set presented in Annex 2, is supposed to give an overview:

- a) of the theoretical approaches, which had been applied in the course of the analysis of the *selected* military functional principles (and which therefore are to serve as a pattern for the analysis, performed by the respective users of the model),
- b) and of those, among which the respective users may choose when they analyze *further* democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership by using the structured analysis model/interface (in accordance with their specific, nationally prevailing science-paradigms).

In addition, it will be shown according to *which criteria*, and with respect to *which principles/factors* to be examined, users are advised to select their specific theory-approaches. Finally, a guide for the application of each theory-approach for the analysis of certain principles/factors, is given as well.

Annex 2, “Extended Theoretical Framework to be Used as Toolset for the Respective National Analysis” will cover the epistemological and scientific theory-related, general research disciplines in which the analysis of functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership is to be embedded, derived methods when they are immediately and closely related to certain theoretic approaches, and the classic philosophical theories about the relationship of the armed forces and the state whose survival they secure.

Concerning general scientific disciplines into which the research is embedded, the user will find analyses and explanations regarding (a) the rational/theoretical (b) the empirical approach and (c) a possible amalgamation of both poles of scientific methodology. A special emphasis is laid on the “postmodern approach” because the development towards a postmodern values-understanding represents a crucial factor for the definition of significant test-questions for the evaluation of the relationship of the state and its armed forces (see chapter 3.2.3.2.2.), for the analysis-part (see chapter “Values “Constitution” within the Armed Forces”) and subsequently also for the construction of the systemic interdependency-network (see chapter 5.).

Classic philosophical and general theories had to be analyzed and will be explained on the one hand according to the purpose of an application, which is tailored to individual test-questions, and on the other hand in order to provide a general starting-position (i.e. a starting position that

is irrespective of specific national developments) for the basic analysis of the users of the analysis model.

### **3.4. Engineering the Structured Analysis-interface, Explanation of its Basic Function**

*Definition of a structured analysis-interface, comprising categorization-dimensions by which democratic functional principles of the state and principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership are to be intersected.*

#### **Definition/specification of terms used in this chapter**

In order to describe the entire internal functional logic of armed forces in full scope, the term “*Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership*” had to be created, because this logic comprises

- *functional principles* that have developed out of experience respectively of lessons, as a consequence of changed framework-conditions or that represent the rationale of leadership-processes that have been constructed and designed due to military-scientific research results,
- *phenomena* that can be observed and comprehended with regard to the effects they work but cannot be consistently explained with respect to their inherent causality,
- and other *influence-factors* that can neither be subsumed under functional principles nor phenomena, but though are constitutive for the organic functioning of armed forces.

Where it turns out clear from the context, the short term (*military-*) *functional principles* was pars pro toto used instead of the bulky long one.

Where the functional logic of democratic principles was to be analyzed that guide legislation and government of states respectively the democratic rights, freedoms and duties of their citizens, the term “*Democratic Functional Principles of the State*” was used.


By the term “*Fundamental/Basic Democratic Principles*” are those overarching principles understood that mostly are history of thought related and that serve as a basis for both the democracy relevant military functional principles and the democratic functional principles of the state.

The key performance of the structured analysis-interface lies primarily with the fact that, for the

purpose of a meaningful explanation of the relationship of the poles "democratic functional principles of the state" and "functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership", the factors of both pillars must - in congruence with the above deductions - be categorized according to their respective "individual" regulatory logic. Subsequently the above factors will be limited to those that are relevant for the explanation of the mutual interdependence between the poles. Finally, the structured analysis-model will have to provide an interface that meets the requirements of both logics and thus allows for an appropriate intersection of principles from the direction of both poles. This intersection is – as soon as the analysis' findings have been taken to heart accordingly - supposed to result in suggestions for *systemic* improvements (i.e. not just *symptomatic* ones that might benefit one side while disadvantaging the other) for both poles at the same time.

**Development-process, macrostructure, basic functionality of the model** (figure 6a-6f)

Terms used in this step, defined and explained as an overview:

	Baskets of general factors		Baskets of extracted factors			
	Description	Short-term	Description	Short-term	Basket-innate categorization-logic	Interface-appropriate categorization-logic
<b>STATE-perspective</b> <i>(political view)</i>	„Security-Policy based, democracy-relevant general functional principles/goals of Western-pluralistic states“	“Basket 1” security relevant democratic principles of the state	Security-Policy based, democracy-relevant functional principles/goals of Western-pluralistic states  with respect to/supported by armed forces 	“Extracts-Basket 1”  „Military-specific, democratic functional principles of the state“	<b>Figure 7</b> <i>(political order-logic)</i>	<b>Figure 10,</b> <i>Analysis Interface,</i> <b>Rights and Duties</b> <b>columns F-J</b>
<b>MILITARY-perspective</b> <i>(force planning view)</i>	“General functional principles / phenomena / factors of military leadership - within the armed forces”	“Basket 2” military functional principles	Principles that are supporting / influencing/ conditioning / determining the accomplishment of security-/ democracy-political goals of the state	“Extracts-Basket 2”  “Democracy-relevant functional principles / phenomena / factors of military leadership“	<b>Figure 8</b> <i>(military order-logic)</i>	<b>Figure 10,</b> <i>Analysis Interface,</i> <b>Categorization lines 1-4</b>

 Principles referring to the military or such that only can be realized with support from the armed forces.

The structured analysis model provides a method for the intersection of military-specific democratic functional principles of the state (“extracts basket 1”) and democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership (“extracts basket 2”), and for a deduction of

the effect correlations between both baskets.

The development-process of the model that has been applied to both extracts-baskets, reaches from the detection of principles and factors (by using a mindmap-technique), via the abstraction of the respective underlying categorization logic, the screening of factors (with regard to the question which of them are relevant for a topic-related intersection) to the transfer of the extracted factors of both baskets into the constructed interface. This development-process will be explained in more detail in chapter 3. (sections 3.4.1., 3.4.2. and 3.4.3.) - the graphical schematic diagram (see figure 9a) is to give an early overview of its basic principle.

The interface is designed as a “thought- and assessment model”: Each state can insert its own intellectual-historical fundamentals, constitutional bases, expectations towards the armed forces, combat leadership-philosophy, forces-structure, range of tasks, military-internal functional principles, recruiting system, strategic goals, geopolitical situation etc., can categorize both extracts-baskets according to its respective initial conditions, and can finally deduce its own specific interpretation of the concrete mutual interdependencies between the factors of both extracts-baskets, as they are currently given in the local political system.

### ***Figure 6a***

Figure 6a shows that the model starts from the comparison of „security-policy based, democracy-relevant general functional principles/goals of Western-pluralistic states” (“Basket 1”) and “general functional principles / phenomena/ factors of military leadership - within the armed forces” (“Basket 2”).

Both baskets are continuously influenced by a „cloud“ of intellectual history-, natural law-, positive law-, constitutional development-related, religious and values-based, overarching principles. The military will be affected by these firstly directly, and additionally via the security relevant democratic principles of the state (“Basket 1”, from which military functional principles are derived).

The influences of this “cloud” of basic factors will be tackled in the course of the analysis, where they gain a specific relevance for the interrelation between elements of both extracts-baskets.

Subsequently will those principles be filtered out of “Basket 1” that refer to the military or can only be realized with support from the armed forces. The resulting “Extracts-Basket 1” will therefore comprise the „military-specific, democratic functional principles of the state“.

Out of “Basket 2” those factors will be screened that are supporting, influencing, conditioning, respectively determining the achievement of security-/democracy political goals of the state. The resulting “Extracts-Basket 2” will therefore comprise “democracy-relevant military functional principles”.

The next step is to combine respectively to compare factors of both extracts-baskets and to relate them to each other. Via the mutual interdependence between the extracts-baskets, this step aims at creating the precondition for an answer to the central research question of this paper (see chapter “Research Questions”): „How can democracy relevant military functional principles (“**Extracts-Basket 1**”) be made as consistent with military-specific democratic functional principles of the state (“**Extracts-Basket 2**”) that the armed forces, without becoming a foreign body, achieve maximized mission-effectivity despite a low level of budgetary resources and thus contribute to the peaceful survival of the democratic state?”

### **Figure 6b**

Figure 6b demonstrates how the individual principles of both extracts-baskets are identified, collected, analyzed, and categorized in a basket-specific order-logic. From the military perspective, this order-logic would be represented by the mindmap “Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership“ (see figure 8) and from the political view it would be explained by the mindmap “Idea of Democracy” (see figure 7).

These *basket-innate* order logic will subsequently be transferred to each one superior, *interface-appropriate* categorization scheme. From the military perspective, this scheme is represented by the Analysis Interface, lines 1-4 of column-heads/military principles, figure 10, and from the political view it is mirrored by the Analysis Interface, categorization into rights and duties, columns F-J/democratic principles of the state, figure 10). Both of these interface-appropriate categorization schemes will have to meet the following two conditions:

1. They must be deducible *from* and compatible *with* the basket-innate categorization logic, and they must allow a breakdown of the factors of the mindmap into their various dimensions (see figure 9c).
2. They must enable a meaningful intersection of the principles of both extracts-baskets, with regard to the identified research questions.

From this, a row/column-matrix can be developed that forms the interface for the intersection of the factors of both extracts-baskets. Arrays, marked with an „x“, indicate an overriding



row/column-correlation (for the procedure how to transfer “basket-innate” to “interface-appropriate” order-logics, see also illustration in figure 9b). For the analysis of an identified factor, out of extracts-basket 2, this would lead to the following operating-procedure (see figure 9c):

- First, the factor is to be examined for interdependencies with other elements of the extracts-basket 2;
- then, it will be checked by which of its components does the factor correspond to which columns of the interface-appropriate categorization logic (military perspective);
- subsequently, the columns into which the factor had been decomposed are marked; arrays indicated by an "x", are analyzed with regard to the corresponding row / column interdependence;
- finally, all deduced dependencies will have to be intersected:
  - dependencies within the extracts-basket 2
  - dependencies between columns into which the components of the factor to be tested, had been detailed
  - row/column-interdependencies of each component (at the respective “x”-positions) and
  - the conjunction of the three types of dependencies.

The ideal-typical analysis (i.e. one that is not focusing on a specific national perspective) will lead to three overarching categorization contexts for democracy-relevant military functional principles (Analysis Interface, topmost line 1 of column-heads/military principles, figure 10):

- Participation framework-level
- Internal functional capability of armed forces
- Mission effectiveness

These categories will be explained in detail in chapter “Categorization dimensions”. Important for the comprehension of the model is here in this phase only that this categorization is to be understood as slicing of “*one and the same*” cube in *three different directions of cutting planes*.

### **Figure 6c**

After having analyzed the interrelation of the military-specific democratic functional principles of the state, and democracy-relevant military functional principles according to each of the cat-

egorization-dimensions (“cutting planes directions”), all three of them will be merged in order to deduce a “three dimensional” interrelations-network.

### ***Figure 6d***

Military-specific democratic functional principles of the state and democracy relevant military functional principles, are - with regard to policy-areas involved - not entirely congruent (see figure 6d).

Although the “armed forces-related implementation of democratic functional principles of the state” defines requirements *towards*, respectively goals that should be achieved *by* armed forces that in the perception of the public are more or less seen with a focus on the accomplishment of the classical tasks that usually are attributed to the military, armed forces will - due to the current security-political paradigm (see chapter 3.2.3.1. and figures 4, 5) - increasingly be challenged to extend their capabilities, and to enhance their contribution also to the internal security of the state.

This already applies to the democracy-relevant military functional principles, which reach into the competence of forces in the area of internal security. Concerning the general military functional principles, the scope across which democratic principles of the state and military functional principles will have to be analyzed in their mutual dependence, is even wider – it includes large parts of foreign policy as soon as the armed forces are used as an active tool for projecting policy-making, and as soon as their military strategic level gets involved in policy recommendation (like providing contributions to the strategic decision-making-process of the state).

The “assessment-interface”, already mentioned in figure 6b, will therefore have to reach out beyond the military democracy-relevant functional principles (in the narrow sense) and will have to include those that reach into the area of competence of the forces of internal security (e.g. assistance missions in case of internal unrest, counter-terror-missions, consequence management in the event of catastrophies) and such, for which armed forces will become responsible when they are used as an instrument of active foreign-policy respectively as an asset for comprehensive policy-recommendation or as a contributor to national/ international strategy-development.

### ***Figure 6e***

Figure 6e summarizes the following principle, “basket-innate” categorization-logics that had been deduced:

(1) “Basket-innate” categorization-logics regarding military-specific democratic functional principles of the state that would include:

- History of thought related, overarching principles
- Principles to be determined constitutionally
  - State structure principles, basic laws of the constitution
  - Fundamental rights-/liberties, civil rights
  - Constitutional anchoring of the position towards International Law, security links to EU and NATO

(2) Categorization criteria that have – in this context - proved suitable for the transfer into an “interface-appropriate” order logic:

- Rights, in the sense of freedom „from“ the state
- Rights, in the sense of freedom to participate “in” the state
- Duties of citizens
- Duties/responsibilities of the state

(3) “Basket-innate” categorization-logics regarding democracy relevant military functional principles:

- Intellectual History
- Performance-principle
- Education
- Strategy
- Organic Leadership
- Constitution
- Demographic development
- Values-order
- Geopolitical and geostrategic situation
- Security-political system
- Resources
- Budget
- Technology
- Cyber-capability / vulnerability to cyber-threat

### ***Figure 6f***

Finally will the principle cutting-plane-perspectives be deduced that are necessary for the creation of the interrelation-framework.

### ***Functional logic of the analysis-interface***

After the process of the creation of the analysis model and its separation down into the cutting-plane-perspectives (“cube perspectives”) had been explained, shall now the functional logic of the analysis-interface between extracts-baskets 1 and 2, as well as the main steps of its application, be described in detail (see figure 9a):

1. Transfer of military specific democratic principles of the state, as defined in the mindmap „Idea of democracy” (figure 7, political order logic) into the “Analysis Interface” (figure 10).
2. Breakdown of the baskets of the mindmap "military functional principles“ (figure 8, military order logic) into categories (it is referred here to the lowermost classification-level) that could be used for a meaningful comparison with the democratic principles and sub-principles and for categorizing democratic principles of the state into specific rights and duties. By this step will military functional principles as democratic principles of the state as well, be transferred into each an interface-appropriate order logic.
3. Aggregation of the lower classification-level’s categories to overarching categorization contexts – creation of “Cube Perspectives”.
4. Screening out those categories (lines 2-4), for which a relevant match with democratic principles of the state (rights and duties, columns F-J) can be found. Subsequently will the factors of the governmental (lines) be intersected with those of the military order-logic (columns).

#### **3.4.1. Democratic Functional Principles of the State**

*Which security-policy based and democracy-relevant military specific functional principles/goals of pluralistic Western states can be observed/identified and how do they project on the system-categories to be defined?*

Starting point is the sum of general democratic functional principles with a “whole of govern-

ment-reference”, i.e. one that comprehends all relevant policy-fields, as they have been described in chapter “The Structured Analysis-Model/Idea of Western Democracy”.

In analogy to what Morgenthau defines as a basic belief of Political Realism, namely that in order to improve society it were first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives<sup>109</sup>, it will be tried here, to analyse the functional logic of the democratic principles of the state in order to deduce from that, how the democracy compatibility of armed forces can be raised without putting up with deficits in mission effectiveness.

For further study, those must be extracted from the above mentioned general principles that are of military-specific relevance. This relevance was assumed, as soon as the respective line of a principle within the Analysis-Interface (figure 10), had been marked with one or more “x”, indicating that a meaningful intersection with military functional principles is possible.

Subsequently this extract – extended by the requirements/objectives of the state towards its armed forces – will be transferred into an “interface-appropriate” order-logic (“political view”), which allows for an intersection/comparison with military functional principles, categorized according to an “interface-appropriate” order-logic (“military view”).

It has to be noted that some democratic functional principles of the state, even if they seem to have no immediate military relevance at first glance, are mirrored by military operating principles in a figurative sense. The right to “vote” for example - except for employee-representation-elections, soldiers' representatives-elections etc. – does not apply to military procedures. Nevertheless reflect many principles like the participation of staff officers in the decision making process of their military unit or the involvement of employees in creating a corporate mission statement, a similar functional logic.

Concerning the requirements/objectives of the state towards its military, the quality „effectiveness“ is linked here specifically to armed forces, which can successfully support democracy-transfer objectives while simultaneously being democracy-compatible, which are integrated within the state and are capable of conducting missions in a way that causes the least possible negative consequences for the home base (“mutual dependence internal-external security”).

By contrast to the usually restricted armed forces' view, from which combat-effectiveness as well as internal functioning are seen more mission-related respectively instrumentally, the state defines its request towards the armed forces from an overall, comprehensive strategic perspective.

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<sup>109</sup> Compare MORGENTHAU, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993, ISBN 0-07-043306-2, page 4.

Would armed forces be able to evaluate substance-related, in accordance with overall-strategic goals, and to forward the results as *propositions* to the strategically *deciding political* level (i.e. under absolute respect for the primacy of politics), it would conversely allow a more direct alignment of the military to the political objectives of national and foreign missions. Such an alignment would become possible simply because the “translation-interface”, which is painfully designed here in order to transpose “state-related” issues into “military effectiveness”-categories, would no longer be necessary. This “translation function” that is performed here in the analysis-interface through the intersection of the state’s request towards its armed forces with military functional principles - in the *current* political reality of Western democracies - is often expressed in excessive defense-ministries with a disproportionately high content of civil/administrative organisational elements. Such a disproportion tends to complicate the finding of a clear military opinion about security-related issues and often causes a blocking of military requirements by civilian authorities without sufficient insight into strategic and technological trends.

Thus, would the evaluation of the implications of military mission-leadership on other policy-areas (especially on the internal security) – with regard to substance-relatedness and to a decision-preparatory effect - be laid into the hands of the armed forces. Thereby, particularly the critical interface between the demands of internal and external security could be made much safer.

A more frictionless harmonization between military- and democratic functional principles of the state could be achieved by a higher degree of tertiary education for military top-echelon leaders. Such an education would allow for submitting strategic assessment-proposals to the political level, which were developed on the basis of a military scientific research and which, with respect to the military-strategic domain, would provide a quality that cannot be achieved by any, civil-scientific discipline. This winning-margin can be gained because military science falls within the exclusive *factual* competence of the defense ministries and of the tertiary education-institutions of their armed forces.

From the above finding results the requirement that higher military education-institutions (“Defense Universities”) should have to be open also for the civilian academia. Thereby, aspiring politicians could be introduced to the specifics of the military-strategic evaluation by accessing such courses and taking them as “supplementary subjects”, added to their civilian studies. That way, many interface-problems could be minimized prophylactically.

**The “Democracy Principle”** (see mindmap “Idea of Democracy”, figure 7)

The aim of this study is to contribute to stability and security of political systems (like the ones represented in the EU) that are based on a humanistic, enlightened, occidental and wider “democratic values”- understanding, by analyzing how forces should be aligned to support the long-term survival of the state most effectively. For the question of how the military is to be oriented in order to secure this long-term peaceful survival of the state, it must be examined first, what influence the state’s democratic principles basically have on the armed forces, which democracy-promoting effect can be expected from the armed forces (particularly from those who are deployed abroad) and how the latter influence the democratic principles of the state in general.

The basis for this analysis, as explained in chapter “The Structured Analysis-model”, was the sum (respectively the network) of typical functional principles of democracies that manifests itself in the “*idea of western democracy*”. In a next step were then those democratic functional principles identified and structured that are necessary for the explanation of the mutual influences of (a) democratic principles of the state and (b) functional principles of the armed forces.

One can start with those democratic functional principles that are already enshrined in the constitutions of European countries, in particular with those basic constitutional principles that define the “democracy principle in the narrower sense”, like Art.20 (I) GG<sup>110</sup> of the German “Grundgesetz”, Art. 1 B-VG of the Austrian Constitution<sup>111</sup>, or similar the Preamble to the Swiss Constitution<sup>112</sup>. The problem lies in the fact that by the selection of only a *few* national constitutions, too many deviating ones would be ignored, whereas a mere summation of the functional principles of *all* European constitutions must result in contradictions, when a specific application of derivations to a particular country is pursued.

It therefore is intended, to identify respectively generate an ***ideal-typical, hypothetical canon of democratic functional principles*** which consists (a) of essentially democratic functional principles that already are enshrined in most Western constitutions, (b) of those that only are defined

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<sup>110</sup> Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG), Ausfertigungsdatum: 23.05.1949, Vollzitat: "Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer 100-1, veröffentlichten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 11. Juli 2012 (BGBl. I S. 1478) geändert worden ist" Stand: Zuletzt geändert durch Art. 1 G v. 11.7.2012 I 1478. The „Grundgesetz“ is by definition not to be understood as a constitution in the narrower sense.

<sup>111</sup> Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG) StF: BGBl. Nr. 1/1930 (WV).

<sup>112</sup> Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999 (Stand am 8. August 2006).

by a few states but though seem purposeful, and (c) of those that are not explicitly formulated, but would have to be judged helpful in terms of an optimized democracy-supporting role of the armed forces. The latter would have to be understood as "demand factors" in the direction of a further development of the democracy principle in the broader sense that already would unfold an assessable interaction with armed forces, even when they exist only as "necessary requirements" and are not (yet) written down in the national constitutions.

Moreover, the research will go beyond the basic laws of a typical constitution, and will incorporate new elements into the framework of democratic functional principles of the state that correspond to the current state of International Law- and global strategic developments.

The key question for this hypothetical canon of democratic functional principles might be, whether its consideration/compliance would provide an improved opportunity for armed forces, to contribute to the long-term survivability of the Western democracy.

In this regard there is obviously no need to *demand*, even less to *predict* a change in the constitutions of European states. By this research only demand-factors are identified, which in the case that they actually were constitutionally incorporated, could be supportively influenced by armed forces respectively could facilitate an alignment of the military into the direction of a more democracy-promoting effect.

The investigation of the interdependence between democratic principles of the state and military functional principles will therefore build upon the canon following, as if the identified demand-factors were constituents of an ideal-typical, but though realistic future democratic constitution.

### **The Democracy Principle in the broader and in the narrower sense**

The Western pluralistic democracy is understood as a form of government that is supported by a "*principle of democracy in the broader sense*".

This "democratic principle in the broader sense" covers overarching intellectual history-related influences on democratic constitutions, fundamental laws of the national constitutions, including their implementing sub-principles, the legal anchoring of military defense as an expression of state sovereignty to the outside, general regulations concerning the guiding state objectives ("Staatszielbestimmungen"), fundamental rights, civil liberties, civil rights, civic duties, the expansion towards inter-/supranational democratic integration frameworks, and the involve-



ment of non-state actors who can have some informal influence on national decisions.

*The democracy principle in the narrower sense*, as a fundamental law and *the* key element of any democratic national constitution, indicates that the supreme sovereign of the state is the people. Therefore, only the people themselves, are allowed to determine their government (e.g. Art.20 (2) GG of the German “Grundgesetz”, Art. 1 B-VG of the Austrian Constitution)<sup>113</sup>. Had the research only aimed at the democratic principle in the narrower sense, i.e. had it started from an understanding as an element of the fundamental laws of the constitution, which themselves are only an element of the wider democratic value system of European states, then it would have fallen short, because the question of how armed forces influence democratic functional principles and vice versa, necessarily has to refer to the broadest possible scope of such principles – in order to grasp their systemic mutual interdependence most comprehensively.

### **Features that support the identification of genuine pluralistic democracies**

The definition of features that allow a distinction between genuine and nominal democracies is on the one hand necessary tool to classify systems that are presumptive targets of democracy transfer, like in the course of peace-enforcement operations. The new U.S. „philosophy“ for example, to engage in comprehensive approaches and nation-building, only when it can be expected that the democratic maturity of the population in the mission area will make the campaign a success<sup>114</sup>, logically should be based on such an assessment<sup>115</sup>.

On the other hand, a reliable assessment of the current aggregate state of democratic development in a crisis region will be essential for the determination of the earliest possible point of

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<sup>113</sup> What by the term of „Realverfassung“ („Real-Constitution“) currently is accepted as „party democracy“ etc., is often contradicting this principle. Only in Switzerland is this principle practiced by legislative and voting.

<sup>114</sup> See KORKISCH, Friedrich W.: Die USA-Politik – Das Scheitern des „Comprehensive Approach“, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 3/2012, pages 381-382, cited in KORKISCH, Friedrich W.: Die „Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik“ in weiter Ferne, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 1/2013, page 32.

<sup>115</sup> Historically, the US never engaged herself in nation-building, not even when in Vietnam „Civilian Support Operations“ were in full swing. Only FM 3-24 for the first time described with much emphasis the need of nation-building in all phases of an intervention. However, mixed results and abandonment oft he Comprehensive Approach by the Joint Chief of Staffs limited nation-building to specific areas and tasks.

time, in which the transfer of responsibility from the military force to civil authorities/governments can be carried out without thereby risking a renewed flare-up of violence<sup>116</sup>. Any responsibly conducted reduction of the duration of military responsibility in a mission area, saves resources of armed forces and makes engaged contingents available for new stabilizing tasks, earlier.

Of course, is the overview description of identifying features, given here, totally inadequate for a precise determination of this point in time. However, it shows which indicators could be used to start with.

The actual assessment of achieved democratic maturity depends on two conditions: First, it requires the permanent engagement in the crisis area in phases of the conflict that are characterized by the presence of violence, secondly it requests a high level of intercultural competence regarding the ethnic groups in the area of operations. Interculturally educated and trained members of the armed forces should meet both requirements perfectly.

**Identifying features** for a genuine pluralistic democracy (as opposed to a governmental system that only nominally describes itself as „democratic“) in the above understanding, can be categorized accordingly to the following structure:

- Minimum requirements for genuine democracies that, even when they are initially present only in a conceptual, formal-legal shape, though provide the actual basis for a later, practised living democracy:
  - Popular sovereignty
  - Elective principle, free, fair elections
  - Separation of powers
  - Constitutional determination of the above fundamental principles
  - Party pluralism
  - Democratic legitimation
  - Legality principle
  - Majority principle

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<sup>116</sup> In hybrid war conditions, regular war, counterterrorism, counter-insurgency and in a peace-like environment at the same time, nation-building will be run either in pacified regions or protected by military forces. In Afghanistan, US-Army, USMC and CIA protected nation-building efforts.

- Freedom of political expression / of political activity
- Characteristics of a vibrant democracy / features that go beyond minimum requirements and signal the transition to a vibrant form of democracy:
  - Respecting the political opposition
  - Practiced respect for Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties
  - Exercised State Sovereignty to the outside (at least rudimentary)
    - in the globalization context
    - vis-à-vis potential adversaries
    - in an inter-/supranational/NGO-context
  - Democratically controlled, state authority exercised in the interior (according to the constitutionally anchored principle of specified responsibilities for the maintenance of internal democratic stability and defense against threats from the outside).

### **The „Democracy Principle in the broader sense“ - scope and structure**

Starting from the distinction between “genuine” and “nominal” democracies, building upon the basic conditions of democracy in the narrower sense, and transferring constitutive elements of democratic orders to frameworks - that might go beyond the nation-context - the following ideal-typical canon of functional principles, serving the “democracy-principle in the broader sense”, could be derived, which is tailored to the later intersection with military functional principles.

- **Overarching principles influencing all levels of the democratic system**
  - **EQUALITY/JUSTICE:** The principle of equality, already defined by Cleisthenes, the father of Athenian democracy, is derived from the roots of natural law and manifests itself in equal political rights of free men. Aristotle separated in its state forms doctrine (Pol. III, 6-8) types of rule that (a) serve the good of all from (b) those that serve primarily the rulers. He admits that the former have a higher moral value. Thus he indirectly opposes benefits that rulers derive from the inequality between themselves and the people. Jean Jacques Rousseau created with his Social Contract (1762) the “identitary democracy” that was based on the equality between rulers and the ruled. The resulting “volonté générale” became the root of popular sovereignty. The

age of enlightenment eventually led to the awareness that people are generally equal because of their inborn reasoning power.

By this talent of reason-based equality of men, probably the most fundamental principle of democratic rule per se, is explained.

Military structures that, for the purpose of the alignment of all available forces towards one objective, and of the consistent and seamless enforcement of the primacy of politics, must necessarily be organized hierarchically; they will face particular challenges when mission accomplishment and respect for the natural law-related equality of men have to be reconciled at the same time.

Because the imperative of fundamentally equal treatment of norm-addressees results from their “equality”, given by natural law - this principle will at the same time, always have to be understood by the demand of equal “justice”.

The principle of equality of men and women has not been realized for a long time - despite enlightenment. Today, it has become a crucial factor for the internal functioning as well as for the mission effectiveness of armed forces with regard to the following major aspects:

- The equality of women in Western societies,
- the role of female soldiers in the units of Western democratic states’ armed forces,
- the important role of female soldiers and their acceptance by the local population, and
- the role of women in the mission area, as members of the society to be protected in the course of crisis response operations.

However, the gender-aspect will be excluded from the analysis in the present research, because gender-justice is a self-evident, inherent task of modern armed forces, regardless of their specific degree of democracy-political compatibility. To address this issue for the purpose of a democracy-supportive alignment of armed forces, would mean to build upon a potentially possible and still accepted unequal treatment. The assumption of achieved gender-justice has therefore been given axiomatic character in the present research.

The specific role of women within the society in the mission area is to be seen as an integral element of the respective operational procedures, but does not depend significantly on the democracy-compatibility of the engaged forces.

- **FREEDOM:** According to Aristotle (Politeia VI) „democrats“ are not eager to be governed, which is why in his time government offices were awarded only for a short period, respectively in rapidly changing rhythm, and officials have often been chosen by lot. Only Strategists held their command longer because it required a high level of skill as well as experience and because the safety of the polis depended substantially on the latter. In this light, it will have to be assessed today, whether the practice of fixed-term (time-wise restricted) appointments for higher military functions, as it was adopted according to the pattern of political and private management, is actually still purposeful, given the far-reaching consequences of insufficient continuity of higher military leadership-quality on national security.

The self-understanding of the Greek polis' citizens in Aristotle's time, was marked by a constant change between „governing” and „being governed”. The goal was to exercise only as much government activity as was immediately necessary for a peaceful coexistence. Beyond that, citizens should be granted most extensive freedom. Today's liberal principle of modern constitutions reflects this idea. The method of being chosen for public offices in the Greek polis, apart from the selection for „office“ by lot, has also been influenced by the quality of the services that officers had rendered to the community.

Naturally, those services that had been provided under the risk of life, such as the defense of the polis, had more weight. One - in a figurative sense - could speak of a kind of an early social contract, in which the contribution to the defense of the polis was compensated, by the right to participate in the political affairs of state. Thus, the solidary contribution of the citizen would be the precondition for their participation in national decision-making. The spirit of this principle is to be found even today, e.g. in Article 59 (3) of the New Swiss Federal Constitution, which demands a compensatory levy from citizens that neither undergo military nor civilian service. Any political system in which it is not recognized that democratic participation rights must be acquired by the citizen through providing efforts in return, reflects a values understanding that does not offer the best basis for the long-term survival of this social order.

- **PEACE:** According to Kant, democracies are therefore more peace-oriented because citizens are reluctant to send themselves to war. Although it cannot be proved that this principle would also apply to controversies between democracies and „non-democracies“, it though is generally accepted that there are fewer conflicts between democratic states that were fought out violently.

Within a democracy, peace must be guaranteed in any case, otherwise the basis for its legal and factual existence as a democratic state that is sovereign to the out- as well as the inside, would fall. Therefrom, two main conclusions can be derived:

First - the peace-creating effect of democracies would have to be “thought” not only with respect to the national state but also in a larger framework. Therefrom the problem can be deduced that measures aiming at peace in the larger frame of reference, might run counter such ones of a smaller integration framework. The European missile defense plan for instance, aimed at avoiding to provoke Russia (smaller integration framework) whereas the American approach would have put up with a provocation of Russia, if thereby a defense against missiles from the Asian region (larger integration framework) could have been ensured. The demand to think the peace-creating effect of democracies in differently wide integration frameworks is taken into account by tackling it in each a separate categorization context (see chapter “Categorization-dimensions”)

Second - the number of states that are to be judged as democracies (according to the Western pluralistic pattern) would have to be expanded continuously. This would also correspond to the current European security-political paradigm. However, this approach has encountered its limits, because it already turns out that strategists are at their wits' end with the „comprehensive approach“, when an acceptance of the Western understanding of democracy cannot be expected (or is outright opposed), and when the "collective" reduction of European defense budgets may lead to the decline of military capabilities and thus to a withdrawal towards a "Fortress Europe". Democracy-export would have turned out „unaffordable“ then.

Peace must also be seen as the “resultant” of equality, freedom, the defense of the state territory to the outside and the exercise of an undisputed sovereignty inward, including the need to keep the state’s democratic system strong.

The inborn reason-talent of the individual is the basis of its equality, freedom and of the will to defend the state against external threats as well as internal, adverse influences. That way reason-talent represents the indispensable precondition for the long-term peaceful survival of the state. As peace is the precondition and at the same time the ultimate goal of democratic values-orders and because the involvement of armed forces in all kinds of defensive measures to the out- as well as to the inside is alternativeless, the military will have to be granted role of the critical core-resource for this archetype of all overarching principles of democracy.

- **STATE-TERRITORY-reference:** The national constitution applies to the territory in which the “demos” lives, and consequently must be enforced there for the whole territory of the state. This calls for armed forces for the defense to the outside, and for internal tasks like (assistance-) missions to protect critical infrastructure, public administration, and energy-/water-resources, in case of emerging crises. The internal tasks-category applies however, also within the integration framework of EU (via the European states that at the same time are NATO-members, indirectly also with regard to the Atlantic Alliance) – due to the “Solidarity Clause” of the Lisbon Treaty. Military assistance missions, aiming at the protection of critical infrastructure and consequence management after disasters, need therefore to be thought “cross-nationally”. In the view of part of the legal experts, the solidarity clause would also include counterterrorism-operations under recourse to military means, within the EU domestic area (i.e. in any state of the EU). The principle of a “truly effective” military defense of the democratic state’s territory by protecting against external enemies *and* by assisting the fight against terrorism in the homebase, would have to be established in the national constitution as a state duty because it is not just arbitrary. It - on the contrary - is the indispensable precondition for the capability to guarantee those basic rights for the future that citizens had been granted in peacetime.
  
- **SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE to the outside:** All the fundamental rights, the citizens are granted by the constitution, are called into question and ultimately useless as soon as democratic decisions can be influenced, by an external power. Any, with regard to the absence of a credible military defense, “*non-fortified*” democracy, thus is to be judged as a contradiction in itself. The question, whether terrorist threats that are controlled from the *outside*, but become effective *inside*, are attributable to the defense against *outside* attacks, or to the exercise of public authority *inside*, will require new „Whole of Government“- procedures, in which both, the internal security- and military forces, will have to cooperate side by side.
  
- **EXERCISE OF STATE POWER inside:** This task, under normal conditions, lies with the sole responsibility of the internal security forces. However, when riots or acts of terrorism will have reached such an escalation level that state power cannot be exercised consistently throughout the country anymore, and when thus the question arises whether every of the three elements that are constitutive for the “State”-term (state people, state-territory, state power), still exists and if it therefore would be still legitimate at all, to speak of a functioning democracy, then the military contribu-

tion (assistance to civil authorities or independent military operational procedures) will again have to be considered the key-factor to the rescue or restoration of the democratic state-order.

- **RIGHT TO RESIST against troublemakers, defensive/fortified democracy:** The fundamental rights, citizens are granted, were however also useless, if actors in the interior, while taking advantage of guaranteed democratic freedoms, try to eliminate democracy and commit themselves to its abolition. Constitutions would therefore also have to take precautions for this case (Example: II Art. 20 (4) German Basic Law, gives every citizen the right to resist against anyone who tries to eliminate the constitutional order, if no other remedy is possible).

- **Principles to be determined constitutionally**

- **State structure principles, basic laws of the constitution**

- **Republican-/parliamentary-monarchical principle:** The Republican principle of state-rule in the European understanding expresses itself mainly in a politically-selected top mandate. In contrast to this, the Republic-term also might stand for an increased focus on the "res publica" according to Aristotle's understanding of the "common good" - which is closer to the American view of democratic rule.

The European type of „parliamentary-representative monarchy“, due to the lack of legitimation of the person of the monarch by the voter, would strictly speaking, not have to be subsumed under the concept of democracy. However, is there widespread consensus that the principle of popular sovereignty is nevertheless sufficiently respected, if the people can at least choose the form of government, the monarch depends on.

- **Democracy Principle (in the narrower sense):** The restriction to a "narrow sense" is to show that the principle of democracy is understood here as one of the basic laws of the constitution. The supreme sovereign of the state is the people - so they are the only ones who are allowed to give themselves "their" government (δῆμος + κρατια, popular rule).
- **Principle of Popular Sovereignty:** This principle states that all state authority emanates from the people. It is to be seen in connection with the sovereignty of



the state to the outside. Both principles are indispensable preconditions, for the capability of the state to guarantee the granted fundamental rights at all and thus for its competence to maintain democracy. Therefore the armed forces will be the imperative prerequisite for the survival of democracy, once sovereignty is threatened internally or externally.

Crucial for the implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty is the demand for an uninterrupted chain of legitimacy, i.e. the postulation that any political mandate, and thus all state action, can be traced back to the voter's decision. In this sense, the military chain of command and the obedience-principle are imperative in order to enforce the will of the sovereign, end-to-end, i.e. continuously by all levels of command, down to the individual soldier. Paradoxically, however, calls the very uncompromising demand, to put any military action down to the voter's will, for restrictions on the fundamental rights of conscripts and professional soldiers. By this logic it is also to be clearly understood that the "primacy of politics" must not be seen as a prerogative of the *governing*, but as a privilege of the *sovereign*, i.e. the people who, by elections legitimize the ones who exercise governance on their behalf.

- **Supplementation of the representative- by elements of direct (plebiscitary) democracy:** It seems that, in stages of escalating developments and under totalitarian regimes, elements of direct democracy have often been misused to distort and polarize (e.g. in the Weimar Republic), whereas they worked the better, the more stable political systems were (prime example Switzerland).
- **General, direct, free, equal and secret elections**
- **Parliamentary or semi-presidential democracy**
- **Fortified / defensive democracy / inward orientation**
- **Party-pluralism**
- **Rule of law:** This principle that, although not necessarily always, but in fact most often, follows from the democratic principle in the narrow sense, is embodied by the following elements:
  - Guaranteeing fundamental rights
  - Organization of the separation of powers

- Guaranteeing the freedom of expression/freedom of the press and of other media, freedom of broadcasting
  - Hierarchy of the legal system / legal protection system
  - Legality Principle, which demands that the entire administration as well as any governmental action must be carried out, exclusively due to the laws.
- **The Federal State Principle** manifests itself as a dual system of “enumeration” (federal level) and general competence (land/province/community levels). This means that in principle, the lands/provinces and communities are responsible for legislative and executive powers in the spheres which have not explicitly been reserved by the federal level. Transferred to the EU, this would correspond to the principle of subsidiarity. But just the frequent involvement of the European Commission in local and minor matters that could be more effectively decided by member states, causes a clearly noticeable disturbance of the current structure.
- **The Liberal Principle** means that limits must be set to state action whereas citizens should be granted the utmost freedom possible. So far, the political debate was polarized toward two opposite extremes - the granting of utmost liberality under acceptance of significant risks for citizens, on the one, and a nationwide "surveillance state", in which a maximum of security is paid for by substantial restrictions of civil liberties, on the other hand. With the present research, an alternative approach is to be analyzed that could succeed without a significant restriction of freedoms, and that ensures the necessary protection for the citizens by answering any threat to their safety, by an immediate, precise, general preventive deterrent. However, such a response capability will, particularly with regard to the demanded speed of reaction and the necessarily high mobility of counter-acting elements, require military capabilities.
- **The Separation of Powers Principle** goes back to the ideas of John Locke (17<sup>th</sup> century) and its further development by Montesquieu. It finds its first expression in the Declaration of Independence of the United States from 1776<sup>117</sup>. Thereby a separation of the state powers - executive, legislative and judicial, in all instances, is claimed. In this regard, critics consider the position of the EU Council of

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<sup>117</sup> See <http://www.rechtslexikon-online.de/Demokratie.html>, 12.01.2013.

Ministers a significant problem. Because the latter would be the *legislative* branch of the EU, and though would consist of representatives of the *executive* branch of the member states (which would lead to a lack of democratic legitimacy and to a breach of the principle of separation of powers), the EU would – with regard to its institutional structure – be suffering from a considerable democracy-deficit<sup>118</sup>. In this context it of course must be noted that in view of the number of members of the EU, and the diversity of conflicting interests, decisions within reasonable time frames could not be achieved, if they were to be taken while putting up with the interplay between each state's representatives with their own legislative (parliamentary) and executive (governmental) level at home.

- **Interior State Power:** Threats, which come and are controlled from the outside, but unfold effectiveness through terrorist acts within, and internal unrest that exceeds the capabilities of the forces of the interior, will demand new military capabilities / processes at the interface between police- and armed forces.
- **State-Sovereignty to the outside/Military Defense:** Because the maintenance of state-sovereignty to the outside is a basic prerequisite for a functioning democratic system of values in the interior, the constitutional anchoring of military defense has to be seen as *conditio sine qua non* for the granting of any democratic right and freedom (see e.g. the Austrian Constitution, Art. 9a B-VG, the German Constitution Article 87a GG, and the Swiss Constitution Art. 58). Need for regulation is given here, particularly in the areas of the determination of the recruiting system, the legitimation for assistance-missions in the interior (especially in the event of civil unrest of extraordinary scale), potential independent counter-terrorism operations within the state borders, the contribution *to* or abstention *from* collective defense alliances, respectively a declaration of neutrality. Via the possible missions in the interior, a special connection with measures to safeguard the inward-sovereignty is given.

Problems might arise, where the national constitution permits internal military assistance missions, only in a very restrictive pattern, whereas the armed forces of the state could basically be called upon to provide such a contribution (national reservations are also possible here) if another EU-state, with reference to “Solidarity Clause” as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, would request it (this also could

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<sup>118</sup> See <http://www.cep.eu/eu-glossar/?title=demokratieprinzip>, 12.01.2013.

include assistance for counterterrorism).

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 4 (3) b, legitimizes any services of military nature, and alternative service by exempting both from the prohibition of slavery and forced labor. Art 15 (1) of the ECHR allows the restriction of fundamental rights in the event of threats to the life of a nation through war, or of other public emergencies (which logically must include the preparation of military defense for such a case).

According to Article 4 (3) of the ECHR, neither military service nor alternative service is considered “forced- or compulsory labor”. Describing conscription as “forced service” would therefore (in the deeper meaning of Article 4 of the ECHR) not be in accordance with international law.

In this context, the New Swiss Federal Constitution provides for a compensatory levy for those, who neither undergo military nor civilian service (Article 59 (3)), and thus slightly reflects the idea of Athenian democracy that conceded the participation of citizens in the governance of the polis only in return for solidary services, but particularly for a commitment to military defense. Of particular importance is the accuracy by which the recruiting system is enshrined in the national constitutions. So does it make a serious difference, for example, whether a government has only the right to draft conscripts (which, once applied, leads to the obligation of the citizen to follow) or whether there is universal conscription that binds the state to draft. In the first case, conscription could be suspended without a prior constitutional change (example Germany), in the second case would a general non-drafting without constitutional amendment, not be allowed (example Austria).

- **Social Justice-/Welfare State Principle:** The perception of worsening social injustice following a dramatic decline in welfare, could be one of the main causes of the above-mentioned internal disturbances, which are therefore particularly dangerous for democratic coherence, because the lowest income strata may contain a high proportion of citizens with an immigrant background. Riots that, in addition to an *economic*, also have an *ethnic* background probably will escalate to an extremely high level of violence. For the armed forces, which in such cases, would have to provide assistance to the forces of the interior, this would result in a demand for a new delicate task quality.
- **Fundamental Rights-/Liberties, Civil Rights:** Article 15 of the ECHR provides

for a limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms only for the cases, when the life of the nation is threatened by war or any other public emergency (see above) - the preparation of the military defense for such a case is logically to be subsumed here. Apart from this mere „positive-legal“ legitimation by the ECHR, such a restriction initially can be morally justified by the overall goal of ensuring the survival of the state and thus of creating only the conditions for the sustained guarantee of all other democratic freedoms. The principle of command and obedience, as well as the need for the engagement of soldiers also in places where they have to put their own lives at risk (this implies individual conflicts with the right to physical integrity) can morally be justified only with the argument that they serve the consistent implementation of the defense intention of the sovereign (the people), and thus the primacy of politics.

- **Right to Life (Article 2 ECHR):** This right, in the broader sense (especially in conjunction with Article 5) of course includes the protection from any physical threat from outside including terrorist acts that become effective on the territory of the state, and thus demands an effective (not just nominal) military defense - independently or in close coordination with the forces of the interior. With the current neglect of the military instrument, the guarantee of fundamental rights and thus the basis of the democratic values-system is certainly endangered.
- **“Nulla poena sine lege”**, no punishment without underlying law, according to Article 7 of the ECHR.
- **Right of a fair trial**, according to Article 6 ECHR..
- **Privacy Policy/Data Protection**
- **Inviolability of human dignity** (already one of Kant's central core claims).
- **Human right to peace, justice, personal development, physical integrity, freedom of the person.**
- **Equality before the Law:** People are born equal in rights. Of particular importance in this context is the equality of men and women, firstly as a conditioning factor for the recruitment, training/education and engagement of armed forces of Western democracies, secondly with regard to the very sensitive task of stabilizing/peace-enforcing units to support females in the

mission area, in order to enforce their equal rights against an “archaic” male predominance.

- **Freedom of religion / conscience / worship:** No one shall be compelled against his/her conscience, to render military service, involving armed combat (i.e. to use firearms on command) - conscientious objectors in compulsory military- or mixed-systems, can be offered a substitute service, but then, this obligation to undergo substitute service, would not be a breach of the prohibition of forced labor (as already compulsory military service itself is no contradiction to the ban on forced labor, neither the kind of service that is to substitute it, can be one).
- **Freedom of expression**
- **Freedom of assembly / association**
- **Press / media freedom**
- **Freedom of movement** in the state-, and for EU-territory
- **Free choice of employment** in the state- and EU-territory (no compulsion to work).
- **Right of education** together with the public/state-responsibility for the education system represents the imperative condition, which only enables the individual at all, to - according to its reason talent - participate in political decision making.
- **“Recipient” Freedom:** This freedom is actually derived from a duty of citizens. The participants in the state’s decision making (i.e. voters) should know and understand on what they decide. As this however is difficult to test, at least free access to the information, which is necessary, in order to decide for the “public good” on a sufficient minimum-basis of knowledge, is to be provided.
- **Civic obligations**
  - Obligation to use recipient freedom in a way that allows to recognize solutions, which are beneficial to the “common good”, and to achieve reasonable decisions.
  - Compulsory military service (obligation for alternative service, alternative levy), in compulsory military- and mixed-systems. Where such systems

still exist, they contribute to maintain the public awareness of the synallagmatic conditionality between the fulfillment of solidary obligations and the democratic rights and freedoms that had been granted in return.

- **General orientation of state objectives:** These provisions have a lower non-appealability than basic laws of the constitution. A change in such a state goal doesn't mean an overall change in the constitution, the citizens cannot derive enforceable rights from, but the state commits itself to it, as a general guideline for governmental actions. As an example, environmental protection would have to be mentioned. Environmental protection can become important for the use of armed forces in two ways: *Firstly*, as forces in peace-making missions are under the critical eye of the local population in the area of operations and of political powers that act hostile against the peace process. Should objectors to the mission succeed in proving that the military uses polluting agents (e.g. depleted uranium), this might lead to a sustained damage of the media image of the employed forces, and thus to a decreasing international support for the mission. *Secondly*, because papers, such as EUISS "What ambitions for European defense in 2020?"<sup>119</sup> suggest approaches, according to which Western state-community should consider, to protect global environmental resources that are important for the survival of all humanity ("Universal Treasures", such as rain forests or fisheries) against damage, if necessary under resorting to military means. Military operations to protect such "universal treasures" will expose European states inevitably to the accusation of rather having access to strategic overseas resources in mind than environmental reasons – whereby a new perception of injustice and additional conflict potential would be created.
- **Constitutional anchoring of the position towards International Law**, which among other indicators expresses itself in the approval of certain international conventions (e.g. the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, "Ottawa Convention"), a specific interpretation of UN norms (e.g. "Responsibility to Protect", employment of EU battle groups/coalition forces against the consent of conflicting parties without previous UN-SC-mandate by claiming the creation of Customary In-

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<sup>119</sup> RIES, Thomas: The globalizing security environment and the EU, in De VASCONCELOS, Álvaro [Editor]: "What ambitions for European defense in 2020?" ISBN: 978-92-9198-158-8, QN-80-09-917-EN-C, page 70.

ternational Law, construction of the right to self-defense under Article 51/UN-Charta regarding the admissibility of preventive/preemptive action).

- **Constitutional anchoring of the position towards EU/NATO/international cooperations:** Such manifests itself, inter alia, in membership/non-membership/partnership/candidature to the above bodies, the nature and extent of contributions, national caveats - "opting in/out". Particularly the multi-/supranational framework, in which the state defines its collective or cooperative security policy, is a crucial factor for the alignment of its armed forces, with regard to their role profile, equipment, weaponry, structuring, deployability, preferred mission areas, level of ambition etc.).
  
- **Co-regulation:** Globalization, international/supranational organizations and NGOs are increasingly perceived as competitors to democratic systems. National governments rightfully fear, informal decision-makers (such as OPEC and the WTO) could become a threat to the democratic principle and contribute to the de facto erosion of the national will. Co-regulatory arrangements apply where non-state actors should be involved but the state has reached its limits, because expertise is lacking or because its government is legally bound to withhold. The benefits of synergy between society and the state (at which the principle of co-regulation primarily aims) are contrasted by a conflict between the network structure of co-regulation and the hierarchical organization of public administration, by which co-regulation will only have to be legitimized<sup>120</sup>. Private Military Companies (PMCs), the use of civil air transport initiatives (such as the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution - SALIS), civil security/guard services, and logistical support from civilian companies that contribute to the predefined, military objectives, represent a certain parallel to co-regulation, in the military operational command domain. Apart from the lower reliability of such solutions (according to European legal principles it is unlikely that civilian companies can be committed to an incalculable, unforeseeable risk) it might, in terms of democratic politics, become questionable, if tasks which should not be imputable to the State, are actually to be transferred to civilian providers.

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<sup>120</sup> Compare: Koregulierung und Demokratieprinzip, <http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de/de/forschung/koregulierung-demokratieprinzip>, 12.01.2013.



**Categorization of the elements of the "Democracy Principle in the broader sense" according to their nature as "rights" and "duties/responsibilities" (see figure 10, columns F-J)**

In the previous chapter the elements of the "Democracy Principle in the broader sense" were structured, according to their affiliation to democratic functional sub-principles and analyzed with regard to their military implications. Now, a categorization should be carried out, which focuses on the nature of these elements either as "rights" or as "obligations" and which is designed to support a more precise and multidimensional intersection with military functional principles/phenomena/factors. Thus, the above principles and the democracy-relevant demands/objectives of the state towards its armed forces will be converted from a categorization that corresponds to a comprehensively-political viewpoint, to an "analysis interface"-appropriate order logic.

Distinction will be made between

- rights, in the sense of freedom „from“ the state,
- rights to personal security and livelihoods<sup>121</sup> (vital basis) to be secured and reliably guaranteed “by” the State,
- rights, in the sense of freedom to participate “in” the state,
- duties of citizens *towards* the community/society, and
- duties/responsibilities of the state *towards* the citizens.

**Rights, in the sense of freedom „from“ the state** are to be understood here as an expression of the liberal principle that concedes the citizens the greatest possible extent of a "state-free" sphere (free from controlling interventions and agencies of the state), and that provides interventions of the state only when it is absolutely necessary for the common good.

**Rights to personal security and livelihoods (vital basis) to be secured and reliably guaran-**

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<sup>121</sup> „Livelihoods“ is to be understood here in a broader sense, as the citizens’ vital basis in general, as the resources on which their existence depends.

**ted by the state**, include all the fundamental rights of citizens to life/peace, physical integrity, security, health care, education, welfare, social embedding, justice/legal protection, support of personal development, and they require an *imperative* duty of the state to ensure these rights. In the medieval feudal law in the German-language area, a reciprocal, “synallagmatic” dependence between the performance of the duties of the feudal lords and those of the lessees was given.

This principle - in a metaphorical sense – is reflected also in the conditionality between the performance of the duties of citizens, and those of the modern democratic state. Above that it is mirrored in the mutual dependence between “leadership behavior of superiors”, and “trust as well as obedience out of conviction”, from the side of subordinates. What was exemplary with the historical pattern, was the fact that the principle originally had worked in both directions, which shines a light ahead on the understanding of “Organic Leadership” (see chapter 4.4.).

**Rights, in the sense of freedom to participate “in” the state**, include the possibilities that are given to the citizens in order to participate in the governmental decision-making. Because of their inherent synallagmatic relationship to the fulfillment of obligations, by which they are justified, elements of this category usually have a “rights”- but also an “obligation”-facet. Particularly in the light of a post-modern values-development, this relationship is less and less accepted, whereby the democratic cohesion of the state is significantly weakened. Contributions to national defense, but especially the military service, provide an - if not the sole, so though very meaningful - evidence for the mutual interdependence of rights and duties, which is an essential prerequisite to the functioning of a democratic state.

**Duties of citizens towards the community** are in some ways like the flip side of the coin, the face-value of which represents the participatory rights, because the prerequisite for a functioning democracy, and thus for a sustained guarantee of granted freedoms, can only be created by the participation and preceding fulfillment of obligations of each individual towards the community.

**Duties/responsibilities of the state towards the citizens** designate the obligations of the state’s political leadership, formed from representatives that had been elected by citizens, towards the latter. Because the choice of these representatives should be done, not least with respect to their foresight, experience, analytical and judgment ability, this political leadership may legitimately be expected, to provide for a strategic alignment, by which a long-term survival of the state can be secured.

By measures, focusing only on the success of a legislative period, or only on the announcement of being willing to take political responsibility, if an escalation of the threat situation should occur, for which no provisions have been made, would the state miss to fulfill its duties towards its citizens sufficiently.

A basic classification, particularly of the elements of the "Democracy Principle in the broader sense", has been worked out by the tabular display (see figure 10, columns F-J), which is designed to display the Janus face-character of individual principles in terms of their expression as "rights" as well as "duties", and the mutual interdependence of these two sides of the same coin.

The main purpose of this classification lies however with the transformation of the categorization of democratic functional principles of the state, from a comprehensively-political into an interface-appropriate order logic. The result of this step is represented by the entries in columns F-J in figure 10.

### **3.4.2. Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership**

*Functional principles with special emphasis on the ethical dimension of military leadership respectively the overall soldierly ethos in the democratic political system*

#### **3.4.2.1. Definition, Delimitation of „Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership“**

„Functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership“ is an unwieldy term, but necessary, because three basic qualities of content, to be examined, have to be covered:

- Firstly, it is about functional principles in terms of a systemic interaction of leadership-components. Functional principles can be used purposefully and according to plan, because of their inherent cause-effect correlation.
- Secondly, are also items to be covered that represent the nature of phenomena insofar, as they do not base upon their intended, planned creation. For example, the doctrine about

“Mission Type Leadership” is disunited regarding whether this leadership-philosophy has been created "constructively" or has evolved on the basis of an enlightened human image, almost automatically, and thus rather shows the character of a phenomenon, which is not always fully understood. History of thought-related developments and the respective values-canon underlying the soldierly profession, are further examples of phenomena that have to be analyzed.

- Thirdly, independent factors will have to be analyzed, which only indirectly serve a functional principle or influence it as a basic/boundary condition.

After the military-specific democratic functional principles have been settled and the demands/objectives of the state towards the armed forces have been converted from a categorization, corresponding to a comprehensively-political viewpoint, into an interface-appropriate order logic in chapter 3.4.1., will now the democracy-relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership, be detected and represented in a military-specific-systematics, respectively in a categorization that follows military-organisational/structural criteria.

At first the general functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership have been recognized and categorized according to organic military order logic. A sifting of the democracy-relevant principles before the above-mentioned categorization, was deliberately avoided, because it would have ended in inadmissible reductions (it would not have been verifiable anymore then, whether the sum of all principles would actually result in an organic general-coherence). Only after this categorization can the relevant democratic functional principles be sieved and put into a military-specific order logic (see figure 8)<sup>122</sup>. The transformation into the interface-appropriate order logic will be conducted in section “Categorization dimensions”.

Although democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership are comprehended here regardless of their specific national meaning within an European framework (e.g. leadership philosophy will be included with its mission-type accentuated as well as with its order-type accentuated understanding), will the following analysis be restricted to the German language area, particularly to the Austrian way of applying/understanding these military functional principles.

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<sup>122</sup> Initially, the sum of possible principles/phenomena/factors was recorded and checked for a total organic coherence, in a separate preliminary research. In the mindmap "Democracy relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership" (figure 8) however, were only those included that have been judged to be democracy-relevant.

### **3.4.2.2. Representation and Explanation of the „Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership” to be Analyzed (see figure 8)**

#### **Intellectual History (figure 11a)**

Intellectual history influences the development of the values-canon, without being influenced by the latter in turn (which means that there is no change possible from the hindsight, once the historical development of intellectual had worked its influence on leadership understanding). It affects further factors mainly via its influence on the intellectual history-related basics of military leadership (see according passage below and figure 11b).

Like the basics of military leadership resulting from it, also intellectual history itself is excluded from political control, as it is about a past, already completed development.

Democracy relevance is given here in analogy to the subsequent paragraph “Intellectual History-related basics of Military Leadership”.

#### **Intellectual History-related Basics of Military Leadership (figure 11a-1)**

The intellectual history-related development of a specific cultural region, continuously influences the military, firstly directly, secondly via the requirements of the state towards its armed forces – whereby the state itself bases upon this history of thought related development.

Out of the classic disciplines of intellectual history (history of philosophy, art history, literary history, history of science), primarily the history of philosophy and the history of science are determinative for the intellectual history related framework that influences military leadership. However, this framework is, in a wider sense, to be extended to basic positive law-, constitutional, religious and cultural developments. It also shows a close correlation to the development of the values-canon of a society, which will be tackled separately.

Democracy relevance results here:

- With regard to the philosophical development of the respective cultural region, from the influence of the former on the respective leadership-philosophy. The latter expresses itself in
  - the ability for responsible leadership, the recognition of the content of injustice in received orders (the Clausewitzian “third pillar”, explained in more detail later), the

- right/obligation to resistance against orders, which contradict and threaten the democratic social order;
  - mission effectiveness, which essentially depends on the prevailing leadership-philosophy, representing relevant test-criteria, of how effectively the armed forces are able to protect democratic order and its precondition - state sovereignty;
  - the manner and scope of the substantive involvement of the individual soldier in the decision-making of his/her unit (quasi-democratic participation).
- Derived from epoch-dependent world views, respectively from certain relevant ideologies in
    - the defense-readiness/-will of the people, and thus in their commitment to a Western-type fortified democracy;
    - the positioning of the state within a historical continuum, ranging from a lack of understanding for the necessity of the defense of the state, respectively of its democratic order, via preventive/pre-emptive self-defense, to the readiness for intervention-warfare and the use of the military as an instrument of active foreign policy-making;
  - With regard to the respective stage of development of the relevant science-paradigm, in
    - the capability of the military officer to make contributions to strategic goal-setting of the state and to its comprehensive security policy;
    - the way in which the military-/leadership-science is embedded into civilian scientific disciplines, which is to contribute to a reduction of those democracy-political compatibility-problems that are inherent to the military.

Intellectual history related basics of military leadership represent (from today's perspective) the provisional endpoint of a development that had begun in the past, and that at the same time are the starting point for any possible prospective changes. This is the reason why they indirectly influence future trends, but cannot be influenced in turn. "Values-understanding" is insofar an exception to the rule, as it is not only influenced by intellectual history with regard to its meaning as a "*static starting point*" for a further development of the values-order. It is - in a certain way - also influenced by the *effect* of intellectual history to continuously and dynamically accompany the values-development, to serve permanently as a pair of glasses through which the perception of the currently prevailing values-set is determined. Thus, could already existing history of thought-related findings and contents, theoretically be exploited to support values-

development. However, the time span subsequent to which such an influence could be noticed at the earliest, would be that long that this effect was not to be taken into account for the present research.

The resulting interrelation can be summarized as follows: History of thought could be utilized in order to influence the long-term development of values. However, can contents and findings of intellectual history - just like intellectual history-related basics of military leadership - not be controlled by political will, because they are essentially based on a past, already completed development.

The intellectual history-related basics of military leadership transform intellectual history into an applicable source of information on the reasons that have led to the present state of developments, explain why leadership principles work in a certain way and how they can be adapted/developed further (without contradicting the still effective, cultural region-specific basis, they have accrued from). For this reason, the knowledge of the basics of intellectual history is indispensable. Beyond that, it also is imperative because it enables the political decision-making level as well as the force planners, to assess (a) the chances for implementation and (b) expectable, internal frictional resistances of scheduled changes, more thoroughly already in progress or even better in advance.

Intellectual history-related basics of military leadership mainly include the philosophical foundations for the defense of states (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Kant, Clausewitz, Nietzsche, Morgenthau, Huntington etc.), the influence of the great European religions (Catholicism, Protestantism) on leadership-philosophy and the impact of intellectual history-developments, such as scholasticism, humanism, enlightenment, modernism, postmodernism, on training and leadership of the armed forces.

### **Thinking about War** (figure 11a-2)

Thoughts about war are substantially determined by intellectual history, whose influence becomes indirectly effective via history of thought-related basics of military leadership. Historically, thinking about war is conditioned by the respective geo-strategic position of the state. It directly affects the leadership-philosophy, the nature and content of tertiary, military science-education and the definition of security-strategic objectives. It shows a distinct cultural region-specificity, which is a conditional factor for interoperability of armed forces and their intercultural competence.

Thinking about war expressed itself via:

- The "war" theory that actually can be understood as the theoretical basis for the *prevention* of war and as a theoretical basis of security-policy concepts;
- the methodology of scientific studies in the field of "conflicts-" / "causes of war"-research (understood here as polemology) and crisis prevention;
- additionally the intellectual history approach, required by the military officer for the purpose of responsible leadership according to the idea of the "Clausewitzian 3rd pillar", and in order to recognize the illegitimacy of received orders, but particularly of those who are contradicting human dignity or other basic human rights.

Democracy relevance is given here because of the inherent chance to achieve the theory-based ability of military officers to detect orders that contradict democratic rights and because of the option to build conflict-research upon a theoretical fundament that aims at a stable and just democratic peace-order. Scientifically based thinking about war is supposed to lead to the prevention of war and thus to ensure the survival of democratic societies.

### **Leadership Philosophy** (theoretical aspect, figure 11a-3)

Leadership-philosophy is significantly influenced by intellectual history/ intellectual history-related basics of military leadership and by humanistic general education. It is conditioned by the cultural area in which it has emerged or in which it is to be applied, and also by the chosen recruiting system.

Leadership-philosophy, with regard to its theoretical basis in turn, directly affects the performance-principle, organic leadership ((a) in its function as a bridging principle between strategic goal-definition and operational planning and (b) in its implementation as an applied leadership-philosophy), tertiary education in the armed forces and in particular general staff-/higher leadership functions-education.

It expresses itself in:

- Mission-Oriented<sup>123</sup>-Leadership

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<sup>123</sup> The terms „Mission-Type“ and „Mission-Oriented“ as well as the terms „Command-Type“ and „Order-Type“ are used synonymously throughout the research.



- Command-Type-Leadership
- A Mission-/Command-Type-Leadership system that does not represent a mixed form but an effect-composite, which allows to switch between the two modes, in dependence on the situation and corresponding to the available reaction time, respectively to the requirements resulting from network centric warfare-processes;

In this context it is necessary to understand that leadership<sup>124</sup> is not an aim in itself, but seeks the ability of leaders to plan, assess and execute tactical situations and use forces in an advantageous way by combining movement and fire. The tactical level (armies, corps, divisions and brigades) uses surprise, speed, concealment, air support and logistics. The *AirLand Battle*, as described in the various editions of the FM 5-100 *Operations* (US Army) in the 1980s, is the utmost utilization of the idea to give commanders at all levels maximum freedom to act along the overall idea or in the framework of operational aims (e.g. a strategic, or tactical “Center of Gravity”, aims in Peace Enforcement-Missions, on land-, amphibious-, and air-operation, or in any combination).

Mission Type Leadership requires:

- well educated and trained commanders on all levels and staffs, with the ability to act accordingly to changes, enemy actions, challenges, and chances, and to master fog of war, attrition, unexpected obstacles, minor defeats,
- well trained troops,
- ideal terrain (air, sea),
- adequate logistics.

Mission Oriented Leadership is especially effective in offensive operations, and when it is necessary to regain superiority, to widen an advantage, and win the initiative (back). It is expressed by the responsible commander by **Mission Type Tactics**, which is the assessment of the overall situation and is culminating in specific orders for his employed forces (Table of Forces), deciding about targets, timing, concentration of forces, terrain, lines of communication, C3, fire, mobility, weather etc. The **Commanders Intent** is the starting point for any execution and to work out overall or specific orders. **Mission-type Orders** (resembles “Auftragstaktik”; given verbally, or written) also require detailed planning for movement, communication, fire support, supply etc., and require quick changes in the overall assessment to take advantage of sudden

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<sup>124</sup> Compare KORKISCH, Friedrich W.: Luftkrieg „neu“: Mehr Evolution als Revolution, Teil 1, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ), Heft 2/2014, page 162f.

achievement,s break-throughs, or to minimize crises or supply problems.

Usually in retrograde operations, defense, to undo unexpected high losses, or when losing the initiative, high command might switch to **Command-type Tactics** (“Befehlstaktik”), also when detailed planning is required that gives subaltern levels of command less freedom.

It must be understood that in coalition warfare that the freedom of commanders of all levels will be restricted,

- when **joint** or **combined** force structures must be managed,
- when various participants or different nations with command levels of unknown quality, and forces of less trained troops should act jointly,
- when complex requirements (fire support, air support, GBAD, effects of weapons and tactical movements) are less clear.

So there might be a frequent shifting from “Auftragstaktik” to “Befehlstaktik”, but in every case only the best trained commanders and staffs will be able to master such shifting (see the “Mission-/Order-Type-Leadership system” listed above).

Democracy relevance is to be found here in the *substantive participation* of soldiers of subordinate levels in the decision making/success of the unit (“quasi-democratic” participation) and the improved *factual mission effectiveness* that allows for a more reliable protection of the democratic social order of the state, despite lower troop-numbers and defense-budgets. These principles only will take effect if the military can resort to a wide and high *initial-standard* of education, which is already present in the civilian population, and that therefore has not to be provided by the military educational institutions.

Already this first rough assessment shows that leadership-philosophy is significantly and almost mono-dimensionally influenced by humanistic general education (it is also influenced by intellectual history - but the latter can – as shown above - not be controlled by political will), and that it substantially affects a multitude of military core leadership principles.

### **Cultural Area Specificity** (figure 11a-4)

Cultural area specificity is a conditioning factor for leadership philosophy, for thinking about war and military-/leadership science. It correlates directly and also via intellectual history, to the values canon of a society that is likewise cultural region-specific. Cultural area specificity points out that theories on war/conflict/security-policy, leadership philosophy, scientific re-

search in the fields of war-/conflict-prevention cannot be transferred to other cultural regions without prior reflection respectively massive adaptation. If the latter is necessary to bridge cultural region-specific gaps, then humanistic general education is to be judged as the required preceding instrument to facilitate such an adaptation.

The answer to the challenges resulting from cultural area specificity (in the context of intellectual history), lies with the generation of the theoretical preconditions for the interoperability between different national armed forces, respectively between their military-strategic leadership-processes.

Democracy relevance results here from the fact that the theoretical preconditions for the interoperability of armed forces, facilitate a more economic cooperation between alliance partners of different cultural regions, and thus a higher level as well as a wider scope of democracy transfer without requiring additional budgetary means.

### **Humanistic General Education in the Humboldtian Sense (figure 11b)**

Humanistic general education in the Humboldtian sense is to be understood here as education for all soldiers of the armed forces (i.e. not for the civil society but for the armed forces in their entire width).

It serves as a personal intellectual fundament (German: „Herzensbildung“, no English equivalent existing) already for aspiring leaders (i.e. not only in the course of their military-scientific education, but even before their selection for higher officers-training), who later will rise to higher functions and then will be supposed to research in the areas "thinking about war" and "theoretical foundations of leadership-philosophy". Higher military leaders should be well aware and knowledgeable on higher ideals and humanistic values.

Humanistic general education influences the understanding of values within the armed forces and to a certain, moderate extent even with civil society. It is vice versa strongly affected by the values-development of civil society, from which the armed forces recruit their personnel.

Insofar as humanistic general education improves the individual capability of soldiers, to cope with the demands resulting from intercultural diversity, it influences the intercultural competence of armed forces.

The broader the basis is, from which armed forces recruit their soldiers, the more comprehensively all social strata of the state (i.e. also members of the better educated ones) are included, the more likely it is that the basic education-level from which militarily provided education will

have to start, will be higher. This fact primarily applies with conscript systems and professional armies with a significant reserve-component.

The better military officers are educated, the higher is the probability that they will perform outstandingly when they leave active service and apply for functions in the domain of e.g. defense-technology. The combination of military experience and scientific education predestines them for such functions.

Humanistic general education, in connection with an understanding of different values, which is tailored to specific military needs, is the basis for a higher willingness of military leaders to perform and thus for the performance principle per se. This principle also requires that the political decision making level will have to be informed by military leadership, at the best and if necessary relentlessly, about imminent dangers and risks.

The competency of military leaders in the long-term, democracy-securing strategic goal setting and in organic leadership, is supported by a well based humanistic general education along two tracks:

- Firstly, via the direct influence of military-/leadership-science on strategic goal setting and organic leadership (intellectual basis for the development of strategic processes/concepts).
- Secondly, via the additional effect, military-/leadership-science exercises on general staff-/higher leadership- training, as the future general staff officers/higher leaders will later have to provide the military contribution to the political strategy-finding-process, respectively will have to perform their task as commanders/staff members in the framework of organic leadership. Although general staff-/higher leadership- training has a share that often deals with leadership by procedural instructions (insofar it correlates with order-type-like procedures), it mainly focuses on the dialectical linking of empirical and theoretical components of the leadership-process (insofar it correlates with the self-dependent evaluation-capability of leaders) and on responsible leadership following the pattern of the Clausewitzian third pillar. Training in the sense of the latter two principles is to prepare military leaders to take over functions that serve organic leadership, respectively strategic goal finding.

Military-/leadership-science expresses itself via its effect on general staff-/higher leadership-training, also in the comprehensiveness of its security-research and in the function of a national

“Think Tank” that is to be seen as an instrument of political consulting with regard to national security-related issues.

Humanistic general education manifests itself (beyond its effect on military-/leadership-science) also in the embedding of the latter into the overall academic education environment and in the non-tertiary education of military leaders.

Democracy-relevance of humanistic general education is granted

- because of the direct influence, the latter exercises on intercultural competence, one of the indispensable preconditions for democracy-projection and the multicultural composition of military combat units,
- because of its effect on strategic goal finding and therefore on the long-term provisions for the democratic social order and finally
- because of the intellectual foundation it provides, for responsible leadership in the sense of the Clausewitzian 3rd pillar (resistance to democracy-endangering orders), via “thinking about war” and “general staff-/higher leadership- training”.

### **Organic Leadership** (figure 11c)

Organic leadership (to be understood here as a systemic interrelation-network comprising strategic goal finding, operational planning, tactical implementation/C4I, leadership in the narrower sense, management/administration, controlling within the armed forces) depends on the theoretical foundation provided by “thinking about war” and “leadership-philosophy”. It will be developed further, respectively tailored to the respective current request by military-/leadership science. Via the general staff-/higher leadership-training, future leaders are prepared to meet the demands of the factual application of the organic leadership-principle.

As far as the mutual effect of the individual components of organic leadership on each other is concerned (this is about interrelations that neither result from the history of thought related basics nor from the need to tailor them to practical application) and where their interaction is oriented towards an additional strategic benefit, the contributing influence of theory/basics of strategy will have to be included into the research.

Because leadership in the narrower sense is to be defined as the bridging principle between strategic goal finding and operational planning/implementation, it will be strongly influenced by the underlying strategic orientation of the armed forces.

The idea of organic leadership expresses itself in

- the principle of leadership in a narrower sense,
- applied leadership philosophy (including the process starting from strategic planning, over operational/ tactical implementation/C4I to process-accompanying controlling),
- the way in which the leadership system deals with the phenomenon of fear (which includes the need to expose soldiers to dangerous situations in order to defend the survival of the democratic social order of their state, as well as the amount of fear that is used by the system instrumentally, in order to motivate the soldiers to risk their lives for the mission-fulfillment contradicting their natural instinct),
- troops psychology that allows for humane leadership, despite the necessity of discipline and hierarchical command-relations;

The fact that the requirements resulting from leadership in the narrower sense, troops psychology and from the need to cope with the phenomenon fear, are taken into account by organic leadership, underlines the attention that must be paid to human-oriented leadership. Therefore, the current values-understanding of the society is a decisive influence-factor/indicator for the degree to which organic leadership is conducted in a humane but though mission-effective way.

Democracy relevance results here due to the following reasons:

- The interrelation between the soldier and the unit represents some kind of a „micro-democratic order“. The soldier, like any other citizen has basic democratic rights and freedoms, whereas those of the soldier have to be limited due to the demands of military necessity and the security of the state. These limitations contribute to the allegation of democracy-political incompatibility that is anyway inherent to the system. Organic leadership that finds methods to make the necessary limitations easier to understand, to accept and to digest, helps to avoid or at least to decrease unwanted democracy-political incompatibility.
- The bridging function of leadership in a narrower sense allows for more forward-looking strategies and thus for a higher probability of survival of the democratic social order of the state.
- The optimized, substantive interaction of the components of organic leadership, increases mission effectiveness and thus the democracy-securing effect of armed forces.

## **Strategy** (figure 11d)

Strategy, in its meaning as a military functional principle to be analyzed, is primarily understood as the principle of trading in restrictions in the immediate present for a more reliable, long-term survival of the state's sovereignty and thus for its capability to maintain the democratic social order. This goal represents at the same time the democracy-political relevance of strategy per se.

Strategy is, due to the long-term time horizon of its objectives, the highest-ranking principle to increase the survival-probability of democracy. It is essentially influenced by humanistic general education, the geo-strategic location and the resource situation. However, a controlling influence is possible only on humanistic general education, primarily because geo-strategic location and resource situation can hardly be changed in the medium term without using offensive strategy-components.

Strategy bases upon four sub-components:

- The will of political leadership and norm-addressees to agree to restrictions in the immediate present in favour of future long term security. This willingness depends primarily on the values-order of society.
- The capability of military leaders to contribute to “strategic goal finding” of the state and the expertise of strategic staffs (whereat the task of military officers in strategic staffs, can always only lie in a strategic advisory role - the strategic decision remains due to the primacy of politics always subject to the state leadership). The capabilities required here, result from general staff-/higher leadership training (in particular from the synergetic use of theory- and empiricism-related methods) and from the direct influence of military-/leadership science on strategic evaluation procedures.
- The intellectual basis provided by intellectual history (i.e. by intellectual history related basics of military leadership, thinking about war and the theoretical basics of leadership-philosophy). As thinking about strategy and the definition of strategic goals has a military scientific character, it will in turn affect the institutionalized military science. Due to the comprehensiveness of strategic goal finding, strategy also contributes to the embedding of military-/leadership-science into overall science and to a possible advice to the political level.
- General conditions like geo-strategic location, the resource situation, and demographic development that significantly determine strategic options, but cannot be changed by po-

litical will in a mid term perspective, respectively not without using offensive strategy-components. Cyber threat has to be taken into account as condition of growing importance.

Strategy has insofar an influence on the organization of the armed forces and the recruiting system, as the latter has to match the decision on the question if defense is to be organized nationally or collectively. It also affects the technological base that is supposed to contribute to making strategic goals achievable.

Strategy expresses itself in:

- Theoretic basics of strategy that comprise the system of strategic functional principles (including the distinction into strategic, operational, tactical level, the interrelation between planning and implementation, “directions” of planning, synchronization of different goal-hierarchies, planning-cycles, specific decision making procedures, logistics etc.) and the requirements of strategy towards the principle of organic leadership (i.e. the embedding of strategic goal finding into other components of organic leadership and the bridging-function of leadership in the narrower sense, between strategic goal setting and operational planning).
- The influence of strategy on the general, applied strategic alignment of the state, which includes:
  - Ensuring of accordance with the respective prevailing, security-political, international system, whereby the fundamental decision of the state is concerned, whether to focus on an intensified multinational stability-/democracy projection, to let itself fall back on a “Fortress Europe”, or to draw the conclusions out of the imperative interdependence of internal democratic stability and external security. This is to be understood as setting a national strategic focus *within an already chosen* security-political system, not as the choice of being member to it.
  - The fundamental decision on the question if defense is to be organized primarily nationally, collectively (including the participation in stability/democracy-projecting missions), or if also intervention-warfare (out of its own national interests that wouldn't necessarily have to be only security-policy motivated) is to be considered a strategic option.

Force planning would per definitionem have to be subsumed under organic leadership/applied leadership philosophy. It however had to be broken out of this context



and shifted under the context of strategic alignment, as it is specific for the fundamental strategic decision described above.

### **Performance Principle** (figure 11e)

The performance principle bases on the attitude and willingness of the political and military leadership, to appoint and promote leadership functions exclusively in accordance with the performance, demonstrated by the candidates. This willingness depends on the prevailing values-order of the society. At the given willingness, military expertise becomes a reliable corrective for comprehensive, political decision-making. Possible biased influence by interest groups, could be pushed back, whereby a more responsible strategy, respectively force-planning could be achieved. Strategy and force planning could unerringly orient towards recognized risks and threats – regardless of their political opportunity. In this fact lies also the major part of the democracy-relevance of the performance principle. Apart from that, will a higher level of performance in military-/leadership science and strategic consulting also mean that military expertise will be recognized beyond resort-boundaries, whereby the allegation of inherent democracy-political incompatibility could be effectively counteracted.

The performance principle is nourished by humanistic general education and is significantly determined by the prevailing values-order that represents the indispensable precondition for the subjective willingness to perform. Via its influence on the personality and the education of leaders, it affects strategy, applied leadership philosophy and technological developments. Thus will a higher degree of mission effectiveness be reached, and that way a more reliable contribution to the defense of the democratic system.

The performance principle in connection with a high level of education, supports an easier transfer of leadership personnel to private business, whereby armed forces could be rejuvenated and money, else spent on retirement pensions, could be saved. The employment of highly qualified, retired military functions in the private business would also contribute to the reduction of democracy-political incompatibility.

### **Cyber Capability / Vulnerability to Cyber-Threats** (figure 11f)

The vulnerability to cyber threats results substantially from the prevailing post-modern values-order of society. The use of information technology and of social networks is in some way the expression of the way of life that correlates with a post-modern social order. Cyber capabilities

facilitate this extensive, sometimes excessive use of information technology and make people dependent on the latter– the so created dependence on this medium in turn, exposes society to all kinds of hazards resulting from it.

Military cyber capabilities are influenced by technological and military-/leadership-scientific progress. Cyber-related skills are imperative for leadership functions in the field of strategic thinking and applied leadership.

Cyber capability as well as vulnerability to cyber-threats are conditioning factors for the strategic overall assessment.

As cyber-attacks against the civil society directly threaten fundamental rights of citizens, democracy-relevance of cyber-defense is given.

### **Technology Standard / -Winning Margins (figure 11g)**

Technology-standard as well as the chance to gain technological winning margins, are driven by the quality-level of military-/leadership science. The achieved technological standard is a determinative conditioning factor for strategic assessment and might even influence defense budgets as well as the values-order of society. The interrelation with the defense budget results from the fact that advanced technological solutions help to spare cost-intensive personnel.

The influence on the values-order can be explained via the dwindling readiness of Western societies to make sacrifices and their decreasing willingness to accept military missions with high losses. High-technology could help to avoid losses, to meet the requirements of a post-modern society and though to arrive at a degree of mission effectiveness that is necessary to defend democracy.

In this principle, to compensate lacking values-based support for military missions that are necessary to ensure the survival of the democratic state, lies the democracy relevance of the factor “technology standard”.

### **Budget/Defense Budget (figure 11h)**

The defense budget is a conditioning parameter that influences a multitude of factors represented here. However, will those influences be deliberately neglected, as the research explicitly excludes the option of arriving at democracy-compatible and though mission-effective armed

forces, by demanding higher budgets.

What will be shown, are the factors that influence the defense budget - in particular those which might contribute to a relief by compensating necessary budgetary means by other functional principles.

Basically, the defense budget is determined by the respective security-political system, to which the state is a member and by its geo-strategic location (none of both factors can be controlled in a mid-term perspective). Additionally it depends on the values-pattern of a society, as the willingness to spend money on defense, expresses itself in the democratic decision of the voter, whereby the democracy-relevance of this factor is given.

A certain relief of the budget could be reached by exploiting the triangle "recruiting-system, defense budget, humanistic general education". If the state invests in a higher quality of humanistic education for all citizens, and the reached intellectual level could be made "accessible" for the armed forces via conscription or strong reserve components to professional armies, then a higher degree of mission-effectiveness could be gained without requiring additional materiel-procurement.

The chance to spare cost-intensive personnel by supporting advanced technological solutions, was already explained with the factor Technology Standard / -Winning Margin.

### **Constitution** (figure 11i)

"Constitution" is understood here as the combination of the two, for military leadership most determinative, constitutionally anchored principles "recruiting system (in a wider sense)" and "division of powers between institutions of the internal and external security.

In the background of both stands the intellectual-history-related derivation from early models of democracy development, for which the Athenian democracy was only mentioned as an example.

Thinking about war and military-/leadership science develop these derivations further and bring them in, as a basis for necessary adaptations (e.g. conscription-debate, considerations about a take-over of security tasks in the interior, by the military).

The values-order affects the domestic division of powers insofar, as the public's confidence in the democracy-compatibility of armed forces is decisive for the question, whether the latter can be used in case of need inside (assistance to institutions of the interior) or whether such a use must be constitutionally excluded.

The society's values order also affects the recruiting-system, because the values-understanding, in particular the degree of post-modernity of society, determines the will to defend and the public commitment towards a fortified democracy. With this interrelation lies the democracy-relevance of the functional principle "Constitution". However, the honest will to defend does not necessarily depend on the recruiting-system "conscription". This will can also express itself in the proportion of grow-up- respectively reserve components to professional armies, in the latter's size, salary, educational strata from which they recruit their personnel.

The commitment of a society to its own defense of democracy that expresses itself (among other reasons) in the above described recruiting-system (in a wider understanding), influences the strategic alignment of the state, as it favors the respective national orientation towards self-dependent defense, collective defense or even to intervention-warfare capabilities. It affects the strategic orientation also because of the fact that it – within the chosen security-political system - permits a national focusing whether on stability-/democracy-transfer, defense of a "Fortress Europe" or on a synergetic model, constructed from components of stability-/democracy-transfer and of functions of internal security.

The latter model is in close interaction with the division of powers between institutions of the internal and external security.

### **Values-„Constitution“ (figure 11j)**

Values-„constitution“ is understood here as the sum of values of a society, including the way in which they are understood/perceived, of acceptance, validity, mutability, and their reality-shaping power. It expresses itself in the actual values-canon (including the values-related basics of responsible leadership in the sense of the third Clausewitzian pillar), intercultural competence and the phenomenon of postmodernism. The latter will be factorized into the society's demands towards "postmodern" armed forces, the general values development according to the model of Inglehart/Welzel, the results of recent youth studies, and democracy-political incompatibility-theorems.

By giving a first definition of the term values-„constitution“ and by elaborating on basic implications of this principle, has a part of the analysis of the latter, been moved forward to the present chapter. The extended definition as well as the analysis of the principle as a whole, to be conducted only in chapter "Values-„Constitution“ Within the Armed Forces", will therefore build *upon*, respectively refer *to* this section.

The generation of intercultural competence/awareness, in the understanding as an expression of the cultural area specificity of the values-order, depends mainly on education efforts within the armed forces (contrary to the factor history of thought, in the context of which cultural area specificity results in theoretical basics of *interoperability*, leads cultural area specificity in the context of values-constitution to *intercultural competence/awareness*).

Democracy relevance results here from the fact that the achieved inter-cultural awareness/competence, is – with regard to stability-/democracy-projection - imperative, in order to create acceptance of Western values in the first place. Moreover is inter-cultural awareness/ competence also indispensable for the integration of soldiers of different ethnic and cultural background into the same unit.

The values-order *influences and drives* an overwhelming multitude of principles, as there is the recruiting system, the will to defense, strategy, organic leadership, applied leadership philosophy, defense budget, performance principle, cyber-vulnerability and the willingness to undergo humanistic general education. The according interdependencies (see figure 11j) were already explained in the course of the presentation/initial analysis of the above principles. The values-set also affects the demographic development, respectively the multicultural composition of the society and is vice versa impacted by both factors to a certain extent.

The values-order in turn, only *has been/is influenced* by intellectual history and education. The influence of intellectual history is already completed and can therefore not be used as a controlling input anymore. Humanistic general education and military-/leadership-science can - if at all - affect the values-order, only very moderately. Demographic development, respectively the multicultural composition of the population, represent a problem of such a high importance for the society as a whole that it must not be expected that its parameters could be changed for the purpose of the realignment of armed forces and thus would exert a deliberate, controlling influence on the values-order.

So if it were intended, to alter values-sets at all, then it would have to be conducted on a long-term basis and for the entire society.

Both conditions make this approach unusable for the orientation of armed forces towards democracy-compatibility and at the same time mission effectiveness. The military needs a values-set that meets the demands of mission-effectiveness and of reliable functioning according to the primacy of politics, i.e. a values-set that is significantly different from the one that prevails in postmodern societies, *now*. Thus, democracy-political incompatibility is preprogrammed. An increased level of humanistic general education and military-/leadership science for a circle, limited to members of the armed forces, turn out to be the only factors that were able to con-

tribute to a bridging of this incompatibility, already within a short-/mid-term perspective.

The **ethical dimension of military leadership**, respectively the overall soldierly ethos in the democratic political system is to be anchored under a principle of values-“constitution”, although this could - to some extent - also be understood as a cross-sectional matter that is fed by intellectual thinking (responsible leadership), “thinking about war” (Clausewitzian third pillar, right/obligation to resistance against unlawful orders), leadership philosophy (substantive as well as emotional staff satisfaction resulting from the participation of the soldiers in the decision making of the unit), humanistic general education (ethical basis for credible democracy-projection into crises areas, main instrument to lower democratic incompatibility with civil society and to make the necessary remnant-incompatibility understandable for the individual soldier), organic leadership (leadership in a narrower sense with its effect to create acceptance of hardships that are to be put up with, regarding the strategic long term security of the state, by honest empathy of superiors for the subordinates and by a bi-directional, mutual, synallagmatic perception of the leadership-relation per se) and strategy (ethical obligation of leaders, to contribute to strategic goal-setting and to stand up, respectively to argue responsibly for necessary capability requirements - particularly when the consequences, resulting from wrong strategic goals, will not turn out during strategic leaders’ active period of service and thus could not entail severe personal career- handicaps).

The emphasis on the ethical dimension of this thesis is expressed by the in-depth discussion of the respective part-elements in the course of the explanation of the individual functional principles, in the present chapter, respectively in their analysis in chapter “Analysis”. Values-“constitution” only has been chosen as connecting factor respectively as a bracket, in order to provide an overview of the multitude of principles that include elements of the ethical dimension of military leadership and of their principle interrelation. Deductions towards the result of the thesis will be done in the course of the individual detail-analyses.

### **Demographic Development** (figure 11k)

Demographic development in Europe is characterized by a general trend of low birth rates, resulting in the necessity of immigration. The functional principle to be comprehended here is therefore to be understood as the interaction of demographic development and the multicultural composition of the population.

The interdependence between demographic development and values-constitution has already been explained in the paragraph on constitutional values. What is to be supplemented here is the

effect of the values-order on the birth rate and the attitude of the population towards immigrants, which in particular, becomes an “influence factor” for the integration of such soldiers in multi-ethnic combat-units.

The problem of integration of soldiers in multi-ethnic units is mirrored in the interdependence of demographic development and intercultural awareness that has been analyzed in the paragraph values-constitution.

For soldiers of different ethnic background that have been brought up under a different values-set and –understanding, it will be difficult to cope with Western leadership philosophies that base upon a values-order, which is foreign to them. Above that, it will be a big challenge for military leaders, to conduct stabilizing mission that require impartiality when their units comprise soldiers, whose ethnic origin lies *with* or *totally against* one of the conflicting parties in the mission area. Both problems circumscribe the interrelation between demographic development and applied leadership-philosophy.

The interdependence of demographic development and recruiting-system results from the problem that low birth rates limit the number of conscripts as well as of volunteers in professional armies. A high immigration- at a simultaneously low birth-rate and a low defense-budget that entails low guerdon, leads to a higher proportion of immigrants from weaker social respectively educational strata. Armed forces will therefore not be able anymore, to represent a representative mirror-image of the ethnic composition of the entire population.

With the decline of the level of education, dwindles also the aptitude for leadership philosophies that aim at keeping the number of casualties low by building upon higher cohesion and cognitive abilities of the soldiers (principle: “brain saves blood”). At the same time mission effectiveness might decrease and thus the capability to protect the survival of the democratic social order.

Democracy-relevance lies here with the composition of armed forces that is not representative for the one of the total society anymore – which necessarily must add to a divergence between the values-sets of armed forces and of society and thus to the allegation of democracy-political incompatibility.

### **Resources** (figure 111)

The *location* of resources cannot – only the *access* to them can be altered. However, would this request offensive strategies, which would contradict to a global peace-order that is built upon democratic principles. As long such an offensive approach is not envisaged, the resources-

location is to be taken into account as a general condition but cannot serve as a factor via which influencing political will can be exercised.

The question if vital resources of a state are located predominantly domestically, within the EU, or abroad, determines the strategic alignment of the state with regard to the decision on whether to orient its force-planning towards national defense, collective defense (including stability-/democracy-projection) or towards intervention-warfare capabilities. It also influences the decision of a state whether to lay the focus of its security-political orientation within a chosen security-political system, on forward-stability-projection or on a fall back to the defense of EU-territory at its borders.

Beyond that, the resource question will affect the choice of the security political system, in the framework of which the state can cover also its resource-demand best.

Democracy-relevance is given here because the demand for vital resources that are not available within the state or its own security system, tends to a certain willingness to participate in interventions, even if they go beyond purely stability-/democracy-projecting objectives. Thus, a sense of injustice is generated respectively stoked and the security situation within the global state-community, which indeed represents the superior "democratic" integration-framework, is put at risk.

### **Geostrategic Situation (figure 11m)**

The geostrategic situation cannot be altered, not even in a mid-term perspective. Therefore it is to be taken into account as a stable general condition but cannot be used as a factor via which political will can exercise controlling influence.

The geostrategic location of a state influences its resources-situation insofar, as peripheral nations, particularly when they are capable of maritime power-projection, are easier tempted into gaining access to abroad resources. States within the core of security-political systems have lower chances to obtain access to external resources, but on the other hand can satisfy their resources-demand within the system with a relatively high probability.

The influence of the geostrategic situation on the strategic alignment of the state can be explained in analogy to the influence of resources on the strategic alignment. Peripheral states on NATO's Northern flank will probably rather focus on national defense, whereas peripheral states at the Mediterranean might sympathize with attempts to defend a "Fortress Europe" at its



borders, and maritime powers might favor forward-stability-projection and interventions that go beyond merely national security-political objectives.

Also analogously to the derivation in the paragraph “resources”, will the geostrategic situation support the decision, to which type of security political system, the strongest affinity is given.

Democracy relevance results here, just like in the previous paragraph, from the danger to democracy, which emerges from influences that encourage political actors to participate in interventions, which exceed the mere stability-/democracy-projecting dimension.

The geostrategic situation did and will continue to influence thinking about war and strategic conceptual thinking. The interrelation of the geostrategic location, and the defense-budget, had been explained in the paragraph “defense-budget”.

### **Security-Political System** (figure 11n)

European states in general have completed and executed their decision towards the respective security-political system. Therefore, will this decision have to be taken into account with respect to its conditioning effects – it however cannot serve as factor via which controlling political will could be exercised.

The interrelation between the security-political system at the one hand, and defense-budget, resources and the given geostrategic situation on the other, had already been explained in the respective paragraphs. Intellectual history, in particular thinking about war, has had a significant influence on the choice of the security-political attitude that now mirrors the current state of the history of thought related development of a nation.

Democracy-relevance lies here with the fact that the security-political systems isrepresenting the next higher democratic integration framework, to which member-states are the “norm-addressees”. Taxes, payable by the citizen to the state, are thereby to compare with a fair funding of the national defense-budgets by the member state.

### 3.4.3. Categorization-dimensions

*Definition of categorization-dimensions by which democratic functional principles of the state and principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership, are to be intersected into “diced” bundles of parameters*

After the democracy-relevant military leadership-principles have been extracted, recorded in a military-type order-logic, explained and analyzed in terms of their reciprocal basic dependencies (see section 3.4.2.), they are now transformed into an interface-appropriate order-logic, referred to here as “categorization-dimensions” that allow an intersection of democratic principles of the state with the democracy-relevant military principles.

For this purpose, the baskets of the mindmap “Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership” (figure 8) had first to be broken down to the lowermost three classification-levels that are represented in the analysis interface (figure 10), and that can be used for a meaningful comparison with the democratic principles and sub-principles of the state.

The key finding initially does not lie with the categorization-dimensions themselves (top line of analysis-interface), but in the sub-categories (line 2-4 of the analysis-interface), by the help of which, the intersection with each of the democratic functional principles of the state becomes only possible and via which the multidimensional interdependence/effect-correlation can be demonstrated best.

Subsequently, these lower classification-levels had been upwards aggregated to overarching categorization contexts - “Cube Perspectives” (topmost classification-level of the analysis interface, figure 10). The following representation (overarching categorization contexts as the headlines of chapters, the lower classification levels in subordination to them) must not conceal the fact that the generation of the overarching categorization dimensions had been conducted exactly the opposite way, namely bottom-up.

As it was already pointed out in the explanation of the structured analysis model as a whole, this categorization is to be understood as a slicing of “*one and the same*” cube in *three different directions of cutting planes*. The interdependency-network to be engineered, will project all three kinds of interrelations back into this “one and the same” cube.

The factorization of the functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership to be analyzed, will have to be carried out as a breakdown of the latter, and as an allocation of their elements to the lower-most categorization-level - the overarching categorization dimensions serve a more general representation of the overall contexts.

Apart from their aggregation from the factors of the lower-most classification level, have the overarching categorization dimensions also resulted from a logic interrelation among themselves.

The Western-type democracy maintains and defends its democratic existence via different policy-areas – one of them being security-policy with the subdomain of military-policy. In order to defend its democratic social order to the outside, it has to maintain armed forces that have to be integrated within the state and whose soldiers have to be granted reliable civic basic rights-standards. It has to equip those armed forces with an internal functioning mode that prevents them from becoming an alien body within democracy (“**Internal Functional Capability**”).

As the state itself is a part of a multinational order, it has to fulfill solidary democratic obligations (“**Participation**”). Both tasks aim at prophylactically securing/defending peace, by mission-ready and –effective armed forces (“**Mission Effectiveness**”). So, if the state has decided to maintain mission-effective armed forces in order to secure and project peace, then it has to keep them ready, internally functioning and integrated in a way that they don’t become an alien body, i.e. that they neither die off nor get tempted to raise against the primacy of politics.

#### **3.4.3.1. „Participation“ (Cube-perspective 1)**

This categorization dimension tackles the level-relevance of contributions, and the question of how the contributions on a certain level affect those on an other, respectively of whether they stand in possible competition to each other. Above that, it is about a solidary, fair contribution to the respective integration framework that may range from the interaction of the individual soldier within his/her primary group, via the contributions of armed forces to the strategic goal achievement of the state to the strategic acting of states as members of collective defense alliances towards a global peace order.

The meaning of this categorization dimension lies with the idea that there are “quasi-democratic”, mutual relations between a regulatory framework, and its norm addressees, regardless of the sizes and rankings of the frameworks. As these frameworks actually have different sizes and ranks, there emerges a hierarchy among them, which leads to the fact that an instance, which is “framework” vis a vis its subordinated norm-addressees, is at the same time “norm-addressee” towards the next higher, superior framework (figure 10a, b).

Because democratic quality usually expresses itself, first of all and primarily in the interplay between responsible leadership and fulfillment of community-obligations *within one and the*

*same* integration framework, it may happen that decisions perceived as democracy-compliant in a certain framework, conflict with the community-objectives of the next higher one.

Thus could for example a hypothetical intervention to secure access to vital resources abroad, be perceived as democracy-beneficial by the member-states within the EU-integration framework, whereas already in the framework of the transatlantic partnership it could encounter opposing American interests; in a global framework it even could lead to a perturbation of the democratic peace-order.

In this context it will have to be taken into account that undemocratic behavior towards the superior framework (e.g. abstention from contributing solidary shares) would give a bad example and thus negatively affect also the subordinate one.

Should the transatlantic Western states community plan, e.g. foreign-policy motivated interventions without taking into account a possible destabilizing effect on the framework of global peace order, then will this destabilization re-influence NATO/EU-member states through poverty-triggered migration, terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Politicians/planners of each country should therefore, in making their decisions, always reconsider, whether they are compatible with the demands of national democracy, whether they are recognized within the EU/NATO framework in the sense of a fair share, and additionally whether they are beneficial to a global peace order, as the superior democracy-political integration-framework.

The idea that democratic relationships and principles also project to overarching, transnational structures and act back from there, through the hierarchy of frameworks, to the national, democratic social-orders, is to be found in the following theories and examples that go beyond the pure security-political context:

- Fritz W. Scharpf (then director of the Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln) claims that the increasing transnational economic integration had again removed the ability of national policy to "domesticate democratic capitalism"<sup>125</sup>. He therefrom derives a democracy deficit of transnational politics that arises because the latter results from complex multilateral negotiations, which cannot be determined or dominated by

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<sup>125</sup> SCHARPF, Fritz W.: Demokratie in der transnationalen Politik, Max-Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIfG) Working Paper 96/3, November 1996, <http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp96-3/wp96-3.html>, präsentiert in der MPIfG Vortragsreihe Internationale Wirtschaft und nationale Demokratie, Vortrag am 22. August 1996, page 1.

any of the negotiators “unilaterally” and for the results of which, therefore no negotiation partner may be drawn to political responsibility<sup>126</sup>.

- Manfred G. Schmidt even locates a "globalization - democracy dilemma", which is to be blamed for the fact that in 21<sup>st</sup> century the scope for democracy-developments has gotten significantly narrower, although its conditions have never been more favorable than just now<sup>127</sup>. This future-vision seems diametrically opposed to a global peace-perspective.
- The American ballistic missile defense-system, with some of its components displaced in Europe, is supposed to lead to more security for the Western state community – but from the perspective of the EU-integration framework arises resistance, because there are concerns that this approach might jeopardize Europe’s relations to Russia.
- The vision of protecting overseas "Universal Treasures" (What ambitions for European defense in 2020) which are crucial for the survival of all mankind, also by military means, may be supported from the perspective of the Western state community – with regard to a more peaceful world order, this however could rather lead to a destabilization.

The categorization dimension “Participation” primarily aims at distinguishing the functional principles to be analyzed, with regard to their impact on different democracy-political integration frameworks. Above that, the user of the analysis-model should be made aware that any controlling influence on a specific factor must always be “thought” with regard to its impact on all further, possible integration-levels.

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<sup>126</sup> SCHARPF, Fritz W.: Demokratie in der transnationalen Politik, Max-Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIfG) Working Paper 96/3, November 1996, <http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp96-3/wp96-3.html>, präsentiert in der MPIfG Vortragsreihe Internationale Wirtschaft und nationale Demokratie, Vortrag am 22. August 1996, page 2.

<sup>127</sup> SCHMIDT, Manfred G.: Demokratietheorien - Eine Einführung, 4., überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, VS VERLAG FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN, GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-16054-2, page 503.

## Subordinate categorization levels 2-4 (Cube-perspective 1)

- Participation/contribution of the norm addressee in/to the respective democratically organized integration-framework, including:
  - Participation/contribution of soldiers in/to the success of the military unit,
  - Participation/contribution of the armed forces in/to the strategic goal achievement of the state,
  - National armed forces within EU/NATO<sup>128</sup> (including instruments like SSR (Security Sector Reform), Pooling and Sharing, Smart Defense),
  - EU-/NATO forces within the community of Western states,
  - Participation/contribution of multinational forces in approaches towards a global peace order.
- Commitment to global justice as a dimensioning factor for participation/contribution, on all integration framework levels as defined above.
- Willingness to solidary, fair and equitable contributions to all of the integration framework levels as defined above.
- Policy-advice and military involvement in the strategic decision-making at the interface between military and political leadership, on all integration framework levels as defined above.
- Democratic compatibility, within the respective framework (e.g. neutrality vs. collective defense within an alliance, different attitudes towards preventive/pre-emptive answers to imminent breaches of the peace, proactive/offensive securing of resources vs. humanitarian intervention) - democratic compatibility within the armed forces and between the latter and the state is excluded here and separately elaborated on, in chapter 3.4.3.2. “Internal Functional Capability of Armed Forces”.
- Communitization of armed forces in the respective integration framework, including the precursors “niche-orientation”, “Pooling&Sharing” and “Smart Defense”, while putting up with a gradual abandonment of sovereignty (the acceptance of the fact that capabilities which are necessary for a national self-dependent operational actionability are provided by other allies/EU-members, actually means a ceding/sacrificing of capabilities to

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<sup>128</sup> “NATO” is understood here primarily as the sum of *European* NATO-members.

other nations, and thus the creation of a higher degree of dependence – however can duplications be reduced/avoided that way).

#### **3.4.3.2. „Internal Functional Capability of Armed Forces“ (Cube-perspective 2)**

This categorization dimension describes the internal functioning-principles of armed forces, independently from the interrelation between different democracy-political integration frameworks. It is delimited from the categorization dimension “mission effectiveness” as the peacetime-functioning of armed forces, included here, is understood only as the precondition to unfold mission-effectiveness in case of need.

The internal functional capability of armed forces comprises topics like academic/humanistic general education (“Nobleness of Heart”), training, military-/leadership science, leadership-philosophies, strategic long-term thinking, mission-planning/-preparation, “theory+empiricism”-based decision making processes, staff-procedures, or the delegation-principle. This categorization context in particular includes the demand for political education, and the creation of understanding for the primacy of politics (i.e. the necessity of limitation of basic freedoms of soldiers for the sake of national security and for the seamless execution of the democratically legitimated will of the government).

“Internal functional capability” is to be comprehended here as mainly peacetime-oriented, i.e. independent from concrete mission-engagements. It also includes the issue of making contributions (e.g. of the individual soldier to the decision making process of the unit) – but contrary to the categorization dimension “Participation” rather with regard to the frictionless functioning of the military organization-element (e.g. company, brigade, battalion) than to aspects of fair-sharing.

Although it also would, to some extent (and in a figurative sense), apply to superior democratic integration frameworks, the categorization dimension “internal functional capability” focuses mainly on the interrelation between soldier and unit.

Therefore, the integration-framework-level “soldier-armed forces” is the relevant one for the research of this categorization dimension. It consequently differs from the step ladder-context of levels described under the title “Participation”.

## Subordinate categorization levels 2-4 (Cube-perspective 2)

- Democracy-supporting effects of armed forces towards the state:
  - "School of the nation", multi-ethnic integration, bridging the differences between different social strata. Internalization of values that help the soldiers in his/her social interaction after return to civilian life, and that serve to give an example for civilians, which is worthy of imitation;
  - Lived values consciousness, including a multiplier effect into the direction of society;
  - Recognizing/internalizing the mutual interdependence of democratic rights and civic duties.
  
- Democracy-political compatibility inside the armed forces and between the latter and the state:
  - Incompatibility theorems in general with regard to the compatibility with social standards, democratic values, the domestic legal system, intercultural requirements within the unit or in the operations area in peacetime. It was initially started from the theorems that were analyzed by Kernic, about the incompatibility between armed forces and modern industrialized societies, which modern military sociology had developed in the years of peace after Second World War<sup>129</sup>. Kernic states four central theses: Firstly the thesis/assumption of the loss of functionality of the military (due to the political cost-benefit calculus was the military no longer useful for the achievement of political goals); secondly, the thesis/assumption of the structural inability of modern industrialized societies, to conduct war (modern societies were incapable of conducting war against each other without putting their entire existence at risk); thirdly, the thesis/assumption of the economic unprofitability of military and war (there would be more cost-effective ways of preventing war); fourthly, the thesis/assumption of the loss of legitimacy of the military (modern industrialized socie-

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<sup>129</sup> Compare KERNIC, Franz: Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, page 95f., in Verbindung mit KERNIC, Franz et al.: Die isolierte Armee. Kritische Bemerkungen zur Landesverteidigung. Wien 1990, pages 9-14 und LIPPERT, Ekkehard: Funktionswandel und Entzauberung. Das Militär auf dem Marsch in eine ungewisse gesellschaftliche Zukunft?, in VOGT, W.R. [Hg.]: Militär als Gegenkultur, pages 121-132.



ties would fundamentally problematize organized systems of collective use of power). In the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century– according to Kernic - had developed a new explanation-approach for the incompatibility between the military and democratic-liberal society<sup>130</sup>: The military would align to an authoritarian state-bureaucracy and would thus be a hinder to liberal civic movements and democratization efforts.

The first three theses focus on conflicts between industrialized states. However, because the present research starts from the current security situation, and thus from threats arising from outside the Western states-community, these three theses have not been included.

The fourth thesis, and the one developed in the 80s, have been linked to the sub-category of democratic values-compatibility, by which the objective of the analysis can be achieved more pinpointly. However, had the research to be supplemented by the sub-categories social compatibility, intercultural compatibility and compatibility with the domestic legal system, which turn out to be indispensable, when it is about the analysis of factors resulting from current mission-reality.

- Social compatibility with regard to the question, if the soldier is granted a similar social position within his/her unit, like civilian citizens in their communities; evidence of the effectivity of factors to prevent armed forces from becoming a remote social subsystem.
- Democratic values-compatibility (“modern” military hierarchy vs. “post-modern” values-understanding of civil society) including the internalization of the democratic values order as an indispensable precondition for mission effectiveness (only those armed forces that are entirely imbued with democratic values, can credibly project them) and the evidence of effectivity of factors to prevent armed forces from becoming a democracy-political subsystem.
- Intercultural compatibility (intercultural requirements within the unit, including the question, if the military mirrors an intercultural “mixing ratio”, equal to the one prevailing in civil society).
- Compatibility with the domestic legal system, including the question, if the soldier has the same degree of legal protection, unionized representation or legal status while acting on behalf of authorities, as compared to civilian citizens.

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<sup>130</sup> Compare KERNIC, Franz: Sozialwissenschaften und Militär – Eine kritische Analyse, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2001, 1. Auflage, ISBN 3-8244-4473-9, page 98.

- The right to resist unlawful, unconstitutional orders.
  - Restriction of basic freedoms in favor of the implementation of primacy of politics, i.e. the political control that armed forces cannot be engaged for any other purposes than for constitutionally legitimated, respectively democracy-supportive missions.
  - Preventing the emergence of a “state within the state” (i.e. of a social subsystem), by applying the principles of leadership (in the narrow sense) and participation of the individual soldier to the decision making process of his/her unit (emotional staff satisfaction).
- Internal organic functioning of the armed forces, in terms of *readiness* to unfold mission-effectiveness if needed. Democracy-relevance results here because this factor on the one hand increases the operational effectiveness and thus the possibility of the state, to maintain its sovereignty - as a precondition for its peaceful survival and for guaranteeing granted basic freedoms - on the other hand, because an internal social functioning is necessary to prevent the military from becoming a "state within a state".
    - Education of enlisted men and military leaders regarding a *substantive aspect* (leadership-performance) and a *democracy-supportive* aspect (aiming at allegiance out of conviction, acceptance of the limitation of basic freedoms, democratic maturity, humanistic general education in its function as a sensorium for the detection of illegal orders).
    - "Command loyalty" – methods to enforce the primacy of politics consistently down to the lowest command level;
    - Leadership (in the narrow sense), generation of allegiance out of conviction, trust in the leadership in the sense of an increase of emotional staff satisfaction (e.g. through involvement of soldiers via the peacetime-application of mission-type leadership) and of the factual planning-/leadership-performance.
    - Empowerment of the individual soldier to participate in the decision-making processes (peacetime planning-/staff-procedures) - in the sense of increasing the factual/substantive planning-/leadership-performance (“**substantive aspect**”).
    - Empowerment of the individual soldier to participate in the decision-making processes - in the sense of an increase of emotional staff satisfaction, and the personal commitment, respectively identification of soldiers with given orders (“**emotional aspect**”).
    - Internal social structure within units, democracy-relevant, personal attitudes of the individual soldier (aiming at social coherence, motivation of soldiers, willingness to

undergo education/training, acceptance of the necessary restriction of democratic rights, immunity *from/avoidance of* a decline into a subsystem of society, trust in the leadership and at performance-adequate careers / merit principle);

### **3.4.3.3. „Mission-effectiveness“ (Cube-perspective 3)**

Also this categorization dimension is understood as being independent from democracy-political framework-levels.

#### **Subordinate categorization levels 2-4 (Cube-perspective 3)**

- Effective engagement, independent from integration-framework-levels - classic role profile of armed forces:
  - Operational effectiveness in national/collective defense (including homeland security, counter-terrorism, cyber-defense);
  - Operational effectiveness in (assistance-) missions in the interior (assistance in case of internal unrest as possible future task);
  - Operational effectiveness in missions in assistance to forces of the interior (within the state/within EU-territory according to Solidarity Clause);
  - Operational effectiveness in foreign missions (including, cyber-capabilities, counter-terror/counter insurgency, CIMIC etc.);
    - Humanitarian operations;
    - Missions according to Chapter VI/VII of the UN-Charta;
    - Missions based on the assumption of the creation of customary international law (achievement also of foreign-policy defined goals);
  - Compatibility with intercultural requirements arising in the mission area;
- Operational effectiveness in missions to protect global environmental resources (“Universal Treasures”).

### 3.5. Intermediate Chapter-summary

Chapter “The structured analysis-model” was about the engineering a structured model for the analysis of the systemic interdependence between democratic functional principles of the state, and of functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership.

Initially, it had been explained that the model follows a twofold approach – firstly, to provide an instrument by which the research will be enabled to deduce systemic interdependencies between functional principles of the military and those of the democratic state, secondly to offer a scheme by retracing of which, the user of the model can conduct the respective individual evaluation accordingly to his specific framework-conditions.

The model deliberately avoided to offer an “instruction manual” on how to reorganize armed forces. Its basic function lay much rather with suggesting fundamental principles and analysis-methods that would enable the respective user to come to an independent assessment.

The assessment of the respective user’s initial situation is aimed at the analysis of indicators that allow to define the starting point for the individual evaluation and to “calibrate” the latter in comparison to the approaches of other nations.

This assessment consists of the explanation of a possible basic categorization of democratic functional principles, an analysis of the crucial question of the influence of the democracy-principle regarding the security of the state, and finally the investigation of the fundamental interrelation between the state and its armed forces. The latter started with the analysis of the development of the security-political paradigm of Western state community, continued via the definition of basic factors-complexes that affect the relationship between the state and armed forces and eventually should arrive at the definition of significant test-questions that help to draw a concise picture of the underlying principles of the above interrelation.

The elaboration of the test-questions would include substantial parts of the analysis that were extracted and pre-drawn as their inherent fundamental logic had been judged as a generally valid basis and as a prerequisite for the following individual assessment by the respective users of the model. Subsequently, an explanation is given, why there exists the necessity of a thorough analysis of the theoretical framework, in which the research was to be embedded, and that was designed to serve as a toolset for the respective national analysis. Because the entire theory-part turned out to be relatively voluminous, as there had more approaches to be offered than would be needed for one specific assessment, it had been shifted to Annex 2 “Extended Theoretical Framework to be Used as Toolset for the Respective National Analysis”. Chapter 3.3., should only explain the function of the theory-apparatus and refer to the Annex.

Following to the representation of the analysis model as a whole, the structured analysis-interface (as the latter's operational/executive element) was explained in detail. This interface was developed as an instrument by which the state's democratic functional principles and principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership were intersected. Its creation was started with the analysis of the question, which security-policy based, democracy-relevant, military specific functional principles/goals of Western-pluralistic states could be identified and how they would project on the system-categories to be defined.

Subsequently, democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership were deduced, whereby special emphasis was laid on the ethical dimension of military leadership, respectively an overall soldierly ethos in the democratic political system.

Both strands, democratic principles of the state, and those with military implication, were transformed from their primordial order-logic into an "interface-appropriate" one, by the help of the deduced categorization dimensions "participation", "internal functional capability of armed forces" and "mission-effectiveness".

The above categorization dimensions were designed to serve as the structural basis for the subsequent analysis, represented in chapter "Analysis of selected, significant, democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership".

## **PART THREE**

### **4. Analysis of Selected, Significant, Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership**

*Analysis of selected democracy-relevant, functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership under exemplary application of the structured analysis-model, with the help of the structured analysis-interface and against the backdrop of the categorization-dimensions defined in chapter 3.4.3.*

Categories, sub-categories of military functional principles as well as the terms and names of democratic functional principles of the state, in their interface-appropriate order-logic refer to the analysis interface, figure 10. The subsequent deductions in chapters 3.1 to 3.6, base upon

the intersection of democratic principles of the state and military functional principles, according to the categories shown in figure 10.

The following analysis of selected individual principles builds, in substantial parts, upon the early, pre-drawn assessment, carried out in section „Amed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State“.

As explained in chapter 2.4.2., the democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/ factors of military leadership had been analysed regardless of their national origin. The analysis-section will however focus on the German language area, and within this area, particularly on the Austrian way of applying/understanding the selected principles.

The Austrian specificity lies with a long tradition of history of thought-related doctrine, enlightened, humanistic general education of military officers, a topics-canon, which includes military-scientific methodology, military-history, -ethics, -sociology, philosophy, polemology and a “human”-oriented understanding of leadership (as opposed to a more process-oriented connotation) and finally with the underlying and broadly applied principles of mission-type leadership.

It is to be shown exemplarily, how the selected principles can be analyzed by applying the proposed structured analysis-model. From the initial assessment of interdependencies between military leadership-principles, resulted factors-baskets, of a significantly higher relative topics-relevance. By the exemplary application of the model and by the explanation of the logic sequence of analysis-process-steps, are the users to be enabled, to retrace the assessment-procedure and to accomplish the analysis with the parameters, applicable to them and their security-political situation.

The overarching democratic functional principles correlate, primarily via the basis of intellectual history, especially with military leadership-principles in the proper sense. However, had their influence mainly taken effect, already in the past, wherefore they today are only relevant for academic doctrine but not applicable as a setting screw, through which political leadership can directly control the alignment of the national armed forces towards a democracy-compatible and at the same time mission-effective capability-profile. This is the reason, why they hadn't been preferentially tackled in the analysis-section.

*The following principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership, including preliminary foci were selected:*

- **Thinking about war** – Theory of War /Scientific Methodology (among others following the example of Clausewitz), „3<sup>rd</sup> pillar“ in an intellectual history-related context.

- **Leadership philosophy (theoretical basics)** – Mission-Type Leadership, Order-Type Leadership.
- **Humanistic general education in the Humboldtian sense** – Military-/ Leadership Science-related contents, focus on general staff- (higher officers'-) training, synergy of „theory + empiricism“, humanistic general education - „3<sup>rd</sup> pillar“ in the education-related context.
- **Organic Leadership**
  - „Leadership“ as a bridging principle between strategic goal-finding and operational planning/ implementation
  - Applied leadership-philosophy
  - Leadership and fear/angst
- **Strategy related principles**
  - Theory, basics of strategy
    - Separation between strategic / operational / tactical levels
    - System of Organic Leadership (theory)
  - Strategic alignment of armed forces towards a democracy-compatible and at the same time mission-effective capability-profile
    - „Internal democratic stability-external security“ paradigm
- **Values “constitution” within the armed forces** – post-modernism, intercultural competence.

#### **4.1. Thinking About War**

##### **Theory of War, following the example of Clausewitz**

Probably the most quoted theoretical finding of Clausewitz lies in the thesis that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. This thesis is relevant from a democracy-political point of view, as it indirectly constitutes the primacy of politics, at the same time defines the contribution of military leadership to the implementation of the political decision and because it legitimates the military strategic level to provide advice to political leadership during its decision making process.

The interplay between policy-advice and the primacy of politics, expresses itself on the one

hand in the sub-category policy-advice, on the other hand in the column internal organic functioning of the armed forces/command loyalty.

Regarding policy advice is thereby made clear that higher military leadership indeed has to contribute to the strategic goal finding of the state, in a substantive, military-specific and *decision-preparatory* quality – but that the *decision* itself, though remains reserved for the democratically elected political leadership. Primacy of politics is the foundation for the unconditional implementation of political will by the military and thus the basis for the preservation of peace, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the state to the outside as well as inside.

In this context, mainly democracy-related obligations of the state are concerned - in the case of peace-support and the protection of sovereignty to the outside (which also includes national defense) also civic obligations are addressed, as military missions finally are carried out by conscripts/volunteers.

Since the preservation of sovereignty to the inside usually falls within the competence of internal security forces, is a civic duty in this regard given only to a lesser extent. This relationship affects the external/internal sovereignty both as an intellectual overarching principle as well as a pragmatic state structure principle. “Primacy of Politics” is also an indispensable precondition for the reliable functioning of the fortified democracy, because it ensures that democracy-hostile approaches can be seamlessly controlled and fought, throughout the entire hierarchy of levels of state power.

Policy-advice includes also the contribution of military higher leadership to the general orientation of state objectives, to the positioning of the state with regard to International Law (e.g. concerning the legitimation of missions against the consent of conflicting parties via the generation of Customary International Law) and to the positioning of the state within the EU/NATO framework respectively vis a vis mission-relevant networks of non-state actors.

The interplay between policy-advice and primacy of politics affects all democracy-relevant demands of the state towards the armed forces, except the goal of preventing the military from becoming a foreign body to society, because without functioning armed forces, the whole principle wouldn't produce any democracy supportive effect.

Above that, projects the above interplay on the perception of equality among soldiers (every soldier, regardless of his/her rank is subject to the primacy of politics), on the right to resistance (also the primacy of politics doesn't eliminate the obligation of military leaders, to contradict illegal orders), and on the principle of participation (in reverse analogy to the primacy of politics that works its effect down over all intermediate levels, substantive military advice has to be



built bottom up, starting from the lowest level – which means that soldiers of every level are called upon to make their contributions).

Command Loyalty (internal organic functioning of the armed forces) depends on obedience to the primacy of politics, the right to resistance and on the principle of participation. Above that, is command loyalty significantly driven by the functional principle of leadership in a wider sense and thus by the lived values understanding of armed forces.

The second major theoretic finding of Clausewitz lies with the implicit advice to the state to *prepare for strategic defensive while maintaining the capability of convincing offensives on operational level*. Although there could be presented a long list of diverging interpretations (particularly driven by the deliberate misinterpretation of the “absolute war” in the direction of an imperative to attack first), the above one seems the most reasonable. Of course there are a lot of indicators from book 2 (out of the series of books “On War”) upwards that were able to proof a different understanding. What must be taken under consideration here is the fact that the ripest, most advanced and completed theses of Clausewitz are to be found in his first book, which was the only one that he was able to revise short before his death<sup>131</sup>.

If every state, or at least every collective defense alliance, or supranational security-political system, would maintain a reliable military instrument to deter any potential aggressor from challenging the former’s strategic defensive, a valuable contribution to a stable global peace order could be made. This principle will also have to manifest itself in the national defense capabilities, unless the superior security system provides sufficient forces for operational counter-offensives. As foreign missions might include the achievement of also foreign-policy defined goals, which could be understood as an answer to an attempt to challenge the defensive attitude of the state, these operational capabilities will also have to be thought regarding its embedding into the foreign mission context.

With regard to the category “participation/contribution of multinational forces in approaches towards a global peace order”, there is a strong interrelation to be found with the overarching

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<sup>131</sup> Compare HEUSER Beatrice: Clausewitz lesen! Eine Einführung, Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte - Militärgeschichte kompakt – herausgegeben vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt mit freundlicher Unterstützung der Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Band 1, zweite Auflage, R. Oldenbourg Verlag München 2010, ISBN: 978-3-486-59843-8, pages 38ff. According to Heuser, it can be concluded that the turning point in the thinking of Clausewitz manifested itself in the revision of the first book (due to his death, no further books had been revisited) - the absolute, ideal-typical war was no longer the gauge of things.

democratic principles equality (i.e. an equality of states resulting in a “just global peace order”) and territorial integrity as well as sovereignty to the outside (to be preemptively protected by armed forces, reliably capable of operational counter-offensives in case of any threat to the defensive deployment of the own state). With regard to the state structure principles, also state authority to the inside has to be included, as perturbances of the global peace order might affect internal security via terrorism, cyber threat or the denial of access to vital resources.

Therefore, a credible capability to operational counter-offensives also must provide measures to harden the internal civil infrastructure. Operational offensive capabilities affect the decision about the recruiting system, the international law-related legitimation of preemptive action and the demand of the state for effective armed forces in a very high level of ambition. The participation-aspect derives from the conviction that by maintaining strong armed forces that are capable of operational offensives, the state could afford to live in peaceful defensive and though would be “defended” by the mere presence, of this just-in-case to be engaged, offensive component – whereby the perception would be supported that the military contributes to peace in a global framework. This brings the sentence of Vegetius to mind again: “Igitur, qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum” (“Therefore, he who aims at peace, is to prepare for war”).

The portion of the “strategic defensive with operational offensive capability”-principle that falls upon the category “operational effectiveness in national/collective defense”, shows similar correlations. However, from the perspective of mission effectiveness, has the state’s demand for obedience to the primacy of politics to be added, as forces with a higher operational offensive capability request (theoretically) a higher degree of political control over the military instrument.

The portion that falls upon the category “missions, based on the assumption of the creation of customary international law, including the achievement also of foreign-policy defined goals” correlates with democratic principles of the state in two additional areas, the social justice-/welfare state principle and the human rights to peace, justice, personal development, physical integrity, freedom of the person.

When military interventions include aspects of a counter offensive (e.g. in return for major acts of violence against the state’s homebase), they are very likely to start from crisis response operations with a humanitarian background. Humanitarian operations base upon the idea to project the model of Western democracy to crises areas. Thus will the two major benefits of a pluralistic democracy, social justice-/welfare and the human right to peace, justice and freedom, have to be transferred to the people in the mission area – as a prerequisite for the success of the mission. This projection-idea in turn requests armed forces that themselves are imbued with demo-

cratic values – and thus indirectly influences the required democracy-political maturity of the own military.

### **Scientific methodology, following the example of Clausewitz**

Carl von Clausewitz was one of the founders of modern military science, as he started to research the phenomenon of war on the basis of a scientific methodology. Inspired by the age of enlightenment, he developed a kind of methodology that included elements of previous thinkers on war, philosophers and historians, but that in the end, mainly mirrored his own military-specific approach. Significant for his method was the **synthesis between the rational/philosophical and the empirical scientific paradigm**.

The starting point of his research lay with the defeat of Prussia at Jena and Auerstedt, from where he collected and analyzed the faults and errors that had been made by the Prussian military leadership. He further analyzed historical examples of campaigns and battles. This approach represented the empirical part of his research. But on the contrary to the rationale of the empirical science-paradigm, he didn't try to draw lessons out of the statistic results and to transform them directly into operating instructions for military forces. He rather tried to deduce logics of warfare, first by applying rational/philosophic methods, i.e. by finding solutions to leadership-problems out of his own conclusions (in doing so, he is close to Kant's a priori-thinking), and only subsequently to combine/intersect them with the empirical results of his research on historical battles.

His combination of empiricism and rational/philosophical approach defined a new quality of military leadership, as it allows to define cells within military staffs that are responsible whether for the creative, respectively rational finding of options or for the empirical task of their falsification, by which the probability that those which could not be excluded, are the more promising, is to be increased. Modern staff-organizations use operational decision making processes (e.g. Guidelines for Operational Planning/NATO) that build upon this iterative planning-cycle, which repeatedly oscillates between creative/rational options respectively ideas and the empirical evaluation of these options/ideas.

This principle also mirrors what Clausewitz had described by his "Hermeneutic Circle": As the task of the empirical/analytical evaluation of options lies mainly with the responsibility of staffs (whereas the finding of options is rather limited to the commander, chief of staff and J3-cell), this task-sharing method allows for substantive contributions of staff-members to the overall success of the unit (and of military strategic staffs to the strategic goal-finding of the state).

With regard to the categories “participation/contribution of soldiers in/to the success of the military unit” and “participation/contribution of the armed forces in/to the strategic goal achievement of the state”, this task-sharing method gets particularly effective with the state structure principles of “sovereignty to the outside”, and “state authority to the inside”, to which soldiers as elements of combat units have to make their contribution.

Via the participation within the staff-work of military units, a democratic principle of the state is projected on to the internal military functional principle. Command loyalty increases proportionally to the degree of participation of soldiers in the decision-making of their unit. It represents an important precondition for the obedience towards the primacy of politics, and it includes the right to resistance against the latter, as command loyalty, from the democracy-political perspective, has to end where orders have lost their legal/constitutional/ethical foundation.

Concerning the category “empowerment of the individual soldier to participate in the decision-making/substantive aspect”, there is the fundamental democratic right to education to be addressed. The capability of soldiers to participate in the decision making of their unit requests a broad and highly-productive educational system within the armed forces, and preferably already in the civil school-organization. The necessary efforts depend on a general commitment of the state to invest in such an educational system.

The improved operational effectiveness that is reached by using the mental capabilities of highly educated subordinates, expresses itself in all levels of missions. It gets more visible in missions that are conducted at a high level of intensity and under high time pressure (i.e. in particular national/ collective defense missions and missions comprising intervention warfare-elements). It mainly concerns the demand for armed forces, capable of ensuring/supporting sovereignty respectively the achievement of foreign-policy goals of the state.

Above this specific methodology for military leadership, Clausewitz demanded and defined a comprehensively-scientific basic requirement for military officers that results in the necessity of an academic education (with a military-scientific focus) for officers.

The principle of basing leadership performance of armed forces upon a broad and comprehensive academic education for officers shows a wide scope of implications on democratic principles of the state. It expresses itself in the policy-advice capability of higher military leadership levels (this concerns mainly the strategic orientation of the state within international frameworks/security-political systems and towards International Law). It regards the “school of the nation”-function, as it supports officers in achieving respectable jobs in the private business, after leaving active service – thus it improves the reputation of the military in the eyes of civil-

ian society and finally contributes to prevent the military from becoming an alien body in the democratic social order.

A broad academic education (based on a high level of humanistic general education) is to be judged the most powerful instrument to overcome social incompatibility (by enabling officers to apply for respectable private business jobs), democratic-values-related incompatibility (by offering the chance for scientific studies about the diversity of values-systems, their specific benefits, legitimations – and by the insight that the values-system of an instrument to protect a society, must necessarily differ from the one of the society to be protected) and intercultural incompatibility (as humanistic general education combined with the age of enlightenment-based equality-ideal provides the basis for intercultural understanding and acceptance).

Comprehensive academic education of military leaders also generates a more reliable, unmistakable sensorium for the detection of illegitimate contents of received orders and thus concerns the right to resistance. Above that the principle regards the democratic right to education and the empowerment of soldiers to contribute substantively to the decision-making process of their unit. In analogy to the previously analyzed principle, it also expresses itself in all levels of military missions.

According to his guiding idea of a military science, resting on the pillars of empiricism and theory, Clausewitz was oscillating between the wish to transform empirical research results into pragmatic operating instructions, and the approach to educate the officer comprehensively enough, to enable him to **judge independently on his own**. Finally, he decided clearly for the latter as one of the most important capabilities required for military leadership. This capability became at the same time the basis and precondition for the functioning of the leadership-philosophy “mission-type leadership”.

Beside its implications on operational effectiveness, regarding all levels of missions, this principle influences the substantive empowerment of soldiers to contribute to the decision-making of their units.

### **The „Third Clausewitzian Pillar“**

Clausewitz defined three categories within the role-profile of the enlightened, educated military officer of his era<sup>132</sup>. Firstly, he identified military-specific substantive core-capabilities for mili-

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<sup>132</sup> Compare HARTMANN, Uwe: Carl von Clausewitz, Erkenntnis – Bildung – Generalstabsausbildung, Olzog Verlag, München 1998 – ISBN 3-7892-9364-4, page 10.

tary leadership. Secondly he demanded character-related qualifications (whereat the term “character” does not correlate here to its modern connotation – it rather points into the direction of daringness, courage or endurance). The vague, only loosely defined “Third Clausewitzian Pillar” of requirements could most likely be understood as a values-related corrective for military leadership<sup>133</sup>, for which Clausewitz doesn’t claim a moral or ethical reference, nor a religious foundation.

The only attribute that Clausewitz assigned to this corrective was “responsible” leadership – responsible with regard to the capability of military leaders to recognize illegitimate or such orders that contradict the reason of state and to their steadiness to resist such orders. The core functional principle of this sensorium, for the recognition of the wrongfulness of received orders and for the avoidance of a deliberate ideologization of the second pillar, lies with a broad humanistic general education in the Humboldtian sense.

This interestingly goes for the statesmen’s decision on war as well as for the common soldiers’ behavior in battle and thus bridges the tensions between ends and means, i.e. between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, which Micheal Walzer<sup>134</sup> identifies.

Although this is not to be understood as a defection or betrayal in the modern sense, Clausewitz had with his change into Russian service though documented that he considered the king’s decision as a decision to the detriment of Prussia, which he therefore could by no means accept. Thereby, he made clear that the primacy of politics has to be understood as a *primacy of “raison d’etat”*, and must not be reinterpreted as a *primacy of the king*. Applied to today’s political reality, this would mean that the obedience towards the primacy of politics is solely owed to the constitution that bases upon the broadest democratic will of the sovereign (i.e. the people).

Another example of this understanding is to be found in the famous dictum of Field Marshal

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<sup>133</sup> It has to be mentioned that there is an analysis, written by the author, which serves as an explanation for the entire paragraph The „Third Clausewitzian Pillar“. Just for the case, this analysis will already have been published by the calendar date of the defensio, the prospective title had to be quoted: PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: Power and Authority – the Military Case, Strategic Change in Postmodern Armed Forces, in ERTL, Paul [Editor]: Armed Forces and Society in the 21st Century – Values, Needs and Ends, Springer Science International, Berlin/Wien/New York 2014.

<sup>134</sup> Compare WALZER, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Pelican Books 1980, ISBN 0-1402-2172-7, page 21 f.

Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia<sup>135</sup> towards a major that the king had promoted him a staff officer, so that he would have had to know, when *not* to obey.

Millotat describes in his essay on the Prussian-German General Staff system<sup>136</sup>, the differences between the War Academy in Berlin (which had been founded in 1872 and from which the majority of general staff officers, employed on the German side in World War II, had emerged) and the Bavarian War Academy.

Whereas the Berlin Military Academy mainly aimed at military-technical training (pragmatic, combat related leadership capabilities in a narrower sense, which could be compared to the first and second pillar of the requirements of the military officers' role profile), the Bavarian school focused more on humanistic general education and military-scientific methodology respectively research capabilities (this would rather correspond to a stronger emphasis on the third column). An interrelation to the values-canon of society arises from the fact that the more pragmatic, Northern-German doctrine originated from a Protestant environment – and the humanistic Bavarian from a Catholic one.

If it were assumed now that the deliberate suppression of the third pillar in the Berlin War Academy could have withheld the future general staff officers the sensorium for the wrongfulness of the commands of a criminal regime and thus could have supported an ideologization of the military leadership of the Third Reich, then it would be easy to recognize the potential democracy-supportive effect of this “Clausewitzian third pillar” (whereby the question of the personal guilt of individual German officers is not to be addressed at all – even less is the above deduction to be understood as an attempt to exculpate any kind of war-crime).

Humanistic, scientific education of officers, would - with a high probability - have counteracted to the well-known misinterpretation of Clausewitz's "absolute war" and of his "thinking on annihilation" - and to their fatal outcome.

According to this logic, represents the „third Clausewitzian pillar“, a core principle of democra-

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<sup>135</sup> Compare DUPUY, Trevor N.: A Genius for War, The German Army and the General Staff 1807-1945, Prentice-Hall 1977, cited in MILLOTAT, Christian E.O.: Auftragstaktik, das oberste Führungsprinzip im Heer der Bundeswehr. Ihre Entwicklung und Darstellung in deutschen militärischen Führungsgrundlagen, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift - ÖMZ 3/2001, page 300.

<sup>136</sup> Compare MILLOTAT, Christian E.O.: „Das preußisch-deutsche Generalstabssystem, Wurzeln – Entwicklung –Fortwirken“, in KÖNIG, Ernst F., SCHÖSSLER Dietmar, STAHEL, Albert A. (Hrsg.), “Strategie und Konfliktforschung“, 2000, vdf Hochschulverlag AG an der ETH Zürich, ISBN 3 7281 2749 3.

cy compatibility of modern armed forces that also affects the issue of resistibility of democracies (“fortified democracy”).

With regard to the category “commitment to global justice”, the “third Clausewitzian pillar” is insofar relevant, as any military participation that includes intervention-warfare-components, will request an assessment on whether the mission is in accordance with the global peace order and the democratic principle of justice. Abroad missions, when they are supposed to meet the demands of global justice, have to provide at least a minimum standard of democratic conditions to the people in the mission area, as there are guaranteeing of fundamental rights (as an element of the rule of law principle), social justice and welfare and the entire list of fundamental rights-/liberties that support either the freedom of the people from the new government or their personal security.

Democratic values–compatibility interacts with the “third pillar”, because humanistic general education, which represents the core element of the sensorium for the detection of illegitimate orders, bases on a values-set that arises from the same enlightened society that also has developed the subjects-canon and the contents of their model of humanistic general education. Although this third category of requirements has no direct relation to moral/ethical or values-based influence-factors, it though mirrors the value-understanding of the society. Democratic values-compatibility regards first of all the fundamental right to education, which is precondition for the citizens’ awareness and understanding of the values-set of society, and the instrument that helps them to orient and align accordingly, out of conviction.

Regarding military functional principles that mirror democratic principles of the state, the “third pillar” also serves as a sensorium for the detection of unjust leadership methods or such that contradict human dignity, within the units of all levels – thus a right to resistance in a metaphorical sense is addressed (“military moral courage”).

If an enlightened values-set is understood as a framework that allows the educated individual to contribute to the decision-making of the state, then will this principle also have to be transferred to military leadership-contexts (in a metaphorical sense) - the “third pillar” is supposed to “guard” this principle.

The categorization context “right to resistance against unlawful, unconstitutional orders” interacts, in analogy to the paragraph next to last, self-evidently with the right to resist in a metaphorical sense. The interrelation with the democratic principle “obedience to the primacy of politics” is only seemingly a contradiction. Of course lies the virtual character of the “third pillar” in its corrective effect towards illegitimate orders – however is the opposition against such orders not to be understood as an insubordination against the primacy of politics, it is an insub-



ordination against actors that misuse the power of politics. Clausewitz probably would have expressed it simpler: “It was *Prussia* whom he served, not the *king*”.

The military principle “education for enlisted men and military leaders” is to be understood as a means, by which the support of recipient freedom can be carried out at least for the military and with regard to the humanistic general education-requirements of the “third pillar”. In turn it depends on the obligation and the willingness of soldiers to use this offer. Above that, it represents the realization of the democratic principle “right to education” within the military and for the above purpose.

A high quality of military education is the basis for the obedience to the legitimate primacy of politics, the resistance against unlawful orders, the capability to distinguish between both cases, and the requested qualification to live up to the participation principle in a metaphoric sense.

Furthermore is a broad general education for enlisted men and military leadership functions of all levels to be considered the most reliable tool, to prevent forces from becoming a foreign body to society.

#### **4.2. Leadership Philosophy (Theoretical Basics)**

In his well-known article about the scientific method, underlying Clausewitz’ “On War”, Linnebach<sup>137</sup> arrives at the conclusion that the Prussian theorist had finally rather aimed at the military leaders’ capability of self-dependent evaluation in given situations than on a pragmatic, mechanistic operating instruction for different predefined, ideal-typical combat-situations (following exactly that understanding, the structured analysis model was designed as a tool for the independent assessment/ adaptation by the respective user and not as manual that offers rigid solutions, without taking specific conditioning factors into account).

This kind of self-dependent evaluation-capability is at the same time the basis from which mission-type leadership emerges. Subordinate leaders are educated towards an independent assessment capability, which they also are expected to contribute to the unit’s leadership process. For the delimitation between mission-type- and order-type-leadership, the imperative of Moltke the Elder “*planning* only up to the first encounter with the enemy - from then on *leadership*“ (to

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<sup>137</sup> Compare LINNEBACH, Karl: Die wissenschaftliche Methode in Clausewitz’ Werk „Vom Kriege“, in Wissen und Wehr, Monatshefte, Vierzehnter Jahrgang 1933, Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn in Berlin, page 484.

be perceived here as situational leadership, based upon self-dependent assessment in the specific situation) is well suited. That means that according to his understanding, leadership would have to be judged erroneous unless it had prepared a blow-by-blow planning, based on order-type procedures, for combat-phases, which can be pre-calculated with a high degree of reliability (i.e. in particular combat phases before first encounter with the enemy, for which the probability of unforeseeable developments/imponderabilities is low) – but that it would be just as wrong, if it tried to cope with phases from this point onwards (i.e. phases that cannot be predetermined sufficiently), by applying rigid contingency-plans. The latter would result in the loss of the chance to gain leadership-superiority by the use of the outstanding assessment-qualities of all subordinate levels (if these assessment-qualities are actually existing).

According to Martin van Creveld had US-command posts in World War II numerically strong planning staffs (rigid contingency-plans for the vast number of possible developments requested such an extensive planning-capacity) - whereas the German armed forces relied on self-dependent evaluation-capability of leaders at the front.

Millotat<sup>138</sup> builds on the importance of these situational assessment-capability and notes that today the principle of network centric warfare allows a close-to-realttime (as based on the omission of intermediate levels) transmission of reconnaissance-data from bottom to top and of combat-orders from top to bottom. The American military used these possibilities extensively and approximated order type leadership again, after the mission type-principle had only been introduced under the terms “mission orders/mission type tactics/directive control” in the mid 80s and after it already had been increasingly questioned with respect to the Revolution in Military Affairs, in the recent past<sup>139</sup>. Thus, initiative acting of subordinate levels would be hindered and finally become obsolete.

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<sup>138</sup> Compare FÜ S II 3: G2/A2 Information USA, VS – Nur für den Dienstgebrauch, vom 18.8.2000, cited in MILLOTAT, Christian E.O.: Auftragstaktik, das oberste Führungsprinzip im Heer der Bundeswehr. Ihre Entwicklung und Darstellung in deutschen militärischen Führungsgrundlagen, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift - ÖMZ 3/2001, page 300 (as the source is cited by the author in a not-classified publication, it had to be assumed that the permission for doing so had been granted).

<sup>139</sup> Compare BÜHLMANN, Christian / BRAUN, Peter: Auftragstaktik in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in MILITARY POWER REVUE der Schweizer Armee – Nr. 1/2010 with regard to (a.o.) JABLONSKY, David: US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs, in Parameters 24 (1994), pages 18-34.

The relationship between mission type- and order type-oriented leadership can also be explained with regard to the well-known combat-example of Otto von Moser<sup>140</sup>. Moser postulates already 1906 (“Ausbildung und Führung des Bataillons im Gefecht”) that the “directive” must supersede the “order”, when the operation has to be conducted under circumstances, not to be foreseen. He continues that the mission must in such cases emphasize the purpose, respectively the goal, but leaves the choice of ways and means to the on-site leader and that this principle that has turned out effective for bigger units, must also apply for smaller ones. In his example, an infantry battalion attacks with three companies over open terrain and with the fourth company enveloping on the right flank, through a wooded area. As opposed to the then valid tactical doctrine, Moser suggests to command the three companies, advancing in a terrain that can be overlooked, by precise orders, whereat the fourth company must be given leeway to decide on its own, as the battalion-commander cannot know about the specific terrain-conditions in the wooded and therefore invisible area.

Leadership philosophy is determined by the extent to which mental capabilities of subordinates are “according to plan”, in a bottom-up direction admitted, to influence the superior levels’ decision-making, and in turn, by which degree the superior levels deliberately use the mental capabilities of subordinates in order to increase the performance respectively the decision-/leadership-quality of the unit as a whole. The more this bidirectional, iterative interaction between hierarchy-levels is utilized, the more will the underlying philosophy tend towards the principle of mission type leadership - the less it is admitted, the more coercively it will approximate order type leadership. There is no principle qualitative appreciation/depreciation connected to one of these philosophies - each of them produces specific advantages in accordance to the history of thought related development, they have emanated from.

The inclusion of subordinates into the decision making-/leadership-processes of superior levels works due to the principle that a goal is given, but the decision on the way how to achieve it, is laid into the hands of subordinates. This principle combines the security that the given goal is achieved in the exactness in which it had been defined by the mission, and that is necessary for the enforcement of the primacy of politics, with the effectivity and efficiency by which the goal is achieved respectively exceeded and which in turn depends on the input of subordinate levels (whereat the added-value of this input results from using the given leeway for the benefit of the mission-accomplishment).

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<sup>140</sup> Compare OETTING, Dirk. W.: *Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Führungskonzeption*, Frankfurt am Main/Bonn: Reportverlag 1993, ISBN: 3-9802828-8-0, page 17f.

### The functioning of this principle requires:

- **A history of thought-related influence** on the entire population, which is strong enough, to allow also the soldiers that emanate from the latter, to obtain the educational basic qualification. This qualification represents the necessary precondition for the subsequent military education that is to enable leaders of all levels, to use the given mission-leeway reasonably. Thereby correlates a stronger affinity to the empirical-analytic science paradigm, with an alignment towards contingency-plans (as an answer to emerging critical situations) whereas a more rational-philosophical orientation rather supports situational decisions, based on superior assessment expertise, and thus points into the direction of mission-type leadership.

Superior assessment expertise („Takt des Urtheils“, divinatory component, genius of war, coup d’oeil - as Clausewitz named it) is not to be understood here as a “transcendental” giftedness. What is meant here is a basic qualification that actually builds upon a rare talent (according to that finding, future leaders would have to be chosen due to a thorough selection) but subsequently has to be developed further by systematic research/doctrine and the according academic education. Assessment expertise is therefore teachable and learnable - it has to be internalized by repeated exercising in order to finally appear to the eyes of outsiders, *as if* it had derived from a transcendental giftedness.

- **A tertiary military education for officers**, via which the utilization of the given mission-leeway can be taught in a way that enables the subordinate leader to arrive at better results than order-type leadership (as opposed to a “mission”, the “order” also determines the way of its accomplishment) would have allowed. This principle works out because the subordinate leader can use the given leeway by his own assessment more beneficially, than the superior might have expected him to do.

Both above mentioned factors express themselves in the sub-category “education for enlisted men and military leaders with regard to a *substantive aspect* and a *democracy-supportive aspect*”. From the perspective of the overarching democratic principles of the state, the idea of equal access to education is the primary motive for the equality of citizens among each other (and thereby also for the democratic equality between civil society and military – as far as soldiers are granted the same level of education), whereat the underlying reason-talent that is supported by a broad general education, is also the basis for the right to resistance within a chosen leadership-

philosophy. The military demand for a level of education that matches civilian standards and thus contributes to democracy-political compatibility between armed forces and the state, regards the right to education, which primarily is to be seen as a means to strengthen the position of the individual soldier within his/her unit as well as towards civil society and above that as an obligation of the state towards its military. With regard to the relation to the recipient freedom, education rather serves the (democracy-) political maturity of soldiers (“citizens in arms”). According to the state’s demands towards its armed forces, a high level of general education helps to prevent the military from becoming a foreign body within the society. Although this seems paradox at first sight, it also contributes to the obedience towards the primacy of politics. It is just the humanistic general education (to be compared to the Clausewitzian third pillar) that enables subordinate leaders to contradict orders, which deviate from the will of the sovereign (the people) and that thus generates a kind of assimilative capacity. Regarding internal military functioning, a high level of general and military-specific education, allows for a quasi-democratic participation of the individual soldier within his/her unit and thus mirrors the citizens’ democratic participation rights towards the state in a metaphoric sense.

- **Admittance of „faults“/capability of passive criticism:** Mission-type leadership increases the statistical probability of success at the availability of an above-average educated subordinate leaders-cadre. The admittance of attempts also when they are unsuccessful, indirectly increases the probability of success in the majority of cases - unsuccessful attempts are therefore no “faults” in the strict sense but an inherent part of the mission type principle<sup>141</sup>. Mission-type leadership is therefore mainly based

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<sup>141</sup> Compare OETTING, Dirk. W.: *Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Führungskonzeption*, Frankfurt am Main/Bonn: Reportverlag 1993, ISBN: 3-9802828-8-0 page 21f. Oetting quotes Manstein, who defined mission-type-leadership via his criticism against its opposite, i.e. order-type-leadership that might have reduced the risk of failure for on-average educated sub-leaders, but thus on the other hand would have meant to forgo the chance of taking advantage of favorable opportunities, by self-dependent acting of leaders of all levels. Oetting also cites Friedrich the Great, who gave leaders of self-dependently operating “detachments” (units that had to fulfill special tasks, separated from the main body of the army) sufficient leeway to decide whether to advance or to retire, due to their own evaluation – but who at the same time stated that relatively few officers were a priori [remark of the author: i.e. without the necessary education] qualified for this kind of leadership. The synopsis of both quotations (according to Oetting) leads to the finding that mission-type-leadership can be de-

on the above-average level of education of the sub-leaders cadre in its full width.

By the question on how to handle the phenomenon of “faults”, the role of the military as a “school of the nation” is addressed. Mission-type leadership bases on the bottom-up contribution of subordinate levels to the performance of the unit as a whole. Therefore are leadership-relations based upon mutual respect. Furthermore are they characterized by the acceptance of subordinates as “emancipated” (in its almost literal meaning “freed from the stranglehold” of rigid command) partners in a combat-companionship and by a general esteem for human dignity.

Therefrom results an error-culture that abstains from draconic penalties as long as faults arise from an honest effort. Above that, draws mission-type leadership – as shown above - its superior effectivity from the principle of gaining statistical *overall*-success by admitting sporadic “faults” in *some* places (which actually are no faults but rather represent those cases, in which attempts to use the given leeway, did not achieve the intended result but though did indirectly increase the probability of success in the remaining ones).

- **The necessary time**, requested for the accomplishment of the mission type leadership process (giving leeway only makes sense, when all hierarchy-levels are provided enough time for the according assessment)
- **The necessity to compensate** numerical / technological / resource-related inferiority by (time-consuming) leadership-quality
- **A people-oriented kind of values-understanding** that instead of depreciating subordinates, respects them as partners within a combat-companionship

This leadership-relation expresses itself insofar in the sub-category “lived values consciousness”, as its projection into civil society influences the potential willingness to undergo compulsory military service or to join the armed forces voluntarily.

Both functions, the respect for human dignity as well as the principle of significantly increasing the statistical probability of success by admitting sporadic faults, are specific in mission-type leadership and thus represent a “unique selling proposition” of the mission type-led military per se – both might therefore serve as a pattern for civilian leadership practice and thus as an instrument to bridge momenta of democratic incompatibility between armed forces and the civil society.

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defined as a principle that raises the (statistical) chance of success for armed forces that base on an above-average educated sub-leaders cadre.

There are two paths, along which mission-type leadership unfolds its **democracy-relevant** effect, and one junction in which those paths intersect:

- **Via focusing on substantive, pragmatic approaches** to achieve mission effectiveness that enable armed forces to act as a reliable tool for the preservation/projection of democracy. As far as the sub-category participation/contribution of soldiers in/to the success of the military unit is regarded, the task of ensuring state-authority to the interior would (from the side of personal security of citizens as well as from the duty of the state-perspective) be best facilitated by mission-type led armed forces, within which soldiers are included in the goal achievement of their unit and that thus provide a higher degree of national democratic compatibility.

With regard to the sub-category “empowerment of the individual soldier to participate in the decision-making processes - substantive aspect”, the state-principle “right to education” is affected that represents the indispensable precondition for a subsequent military education, on which the capability of soldiers depends, to use given mission-leeway beneficially for the substantive success of the unit.

Mission type leadership brings about its profoundest impact on mission-effectiveness in operations-planning that allows for a longer time-horizon for peace-time preparation, respectively that is conducted on higher leadership-levels. This interrelation applies regardless of specific combat-procedures, as all of these procedures/sub-categories are equally exposed to the demand of the state for effective armed forces, designed to support its sovereignty – a demand, which can be coped with, by the substantive effect of mission-type leadership. Particularly in abroad missions, will mission-type leadership interact with the human rights to peace, justice, personal development of the people in the mission area – especially in this sensitive field will the independent evaluation of leaders of all levels be a key factor for the credibility of democracy-projection.

- **Via a social dimension** that mirrors the democratic participation-principle towards the state, within the unit (in a metaphorical sense), and that is primarily to be understood as a principle of the internal peace-time functioning of military units.

With regard to the sub-category that is about the military goal of “preventing the emergence of a state within the state”, it is again the right to education, by which the state supports a mission-type leadership-based social order within the armed forces and that prevents them from becoming a foreign body to the social order of the state. As far as the sub-category “leadership (in a narrow sense), generation of allegiance out of conviction” is concerned, all demands of the state towards its armed forces as

well as all internal military operating principles that mirror democratic principles of the state, are universally affected by mission type leadership. Effectivity of forces that keep being obedient to the primacy of politics and don't tend towards becoming a foreign body to the social order of the state as well as soldiers who feel themselves embedded in their unit's social system, which allows for equality (with regard to the appreciation they are given), resistance against unlawful orders and a quasi-democratic participation in the armed forces, are collectively and significantly promoted by the allegiance out of conviction-facet of mission type leadership. This facet in turn, depends mainly on the quality of military education and the underlying level of humanistic education of the society, from which the military recruits its soldiers.

For the sub-category "empowerment of the individual soldier to participate in the decision-making- process - emotional aspect", apply roughly the same interrelations as stated above, with regard to the "demands of the state towards its forces" and "internal military functional principles reflecting democratic principles of the state" – except for the support of the right to resistance. Whereas the substantive leadership-relation is a bidirectional, synallagmatic, "do ut des"-interaction between the leader and the subordinate and therefore generates an individual responsibility to contradict to orders, by which the superior unilaterally breaches his duties towards the led ones, the emotional effect of participation in the units' decision making processes, arrives at a personal satisfaction of subordinate soldiers and staffs as soon as the appreciation for their contribution becomes perceivable. Withheld appreciation might lead to discontentedness, disappointment and frustration - however will subordinates not be able to derive any moral legitimation therefrom, to resist given orders.

The pragmatic, mission-effectiveness oriented aspect and the "leadership / generation of allegiance out of conviction" – related facet of mission type leadership intersect, as Millotat<sup>142</sup> describes, in the finding that depriving intermediate levels' leaders of assessment-responsibility

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<sup>142</sup> Compare Fü S II 3: G2/A2 Information USA, VS – Nur für den Dienstgebrauch, vom 18.8.2000, cited in MILLOTAT, Christian E.O.: Auftragstaktik, das oberste Führungsprinzip im Heer der Bundeswehr. Ihre Entwicklung und Darstellung in deutschen militärischen Führungsgrundlagen, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift - ÖMZ 3/2001, page 300 (as the source is cited by the author in a not-classified publication, it had to be assumed that the permission for doing so had been granted).



(*factual* decrease of decision quality) results in a loss of self-confidence and of trust in the leadership (*social* component).

If the conditioning factor “necessary time requested”, for the mission type leadership process is coupled with the possible shortness of reaction time that necessarily results if network centric warfare-technology is expected to pay off, then approaches which show a tendency back to order type leadership, will become partly understandable.

It could be argued that short reaction time is a key-factor of success in rapidly changing combat-environments – and that the costs of advanced network centric capabilities could be compensated by shifting the budgetary means that so far have been invested in the broad education of leaders of all levels, to an elitist education restricted only to higher level leaders, detailed for division/corps-staffs (as far as they are responsible for the operational level of the campaign).

If, additionally, the necessity to compensate numerical/technological/resource-related inferiority would be relativized through the argumentation that the armed forces of (particularly bigger) Western states wouldn't need to let themselves be restricted by any of these conditions, and if their governments would decide to cover the requirements in beforehand, then this also could lead to a renewed turning towards order type leadership.

However, do both lines of arguments - despite all their seeming plausibility - base on fatal fallacies because:

- there are also smaller countries that have very well and alternativelessly to deal with the above numerical/technological/resource-related restrictions,
- just stabilizing and democracy-projecting missions require combat command and control capabilities that cope with well over extended areas of responsibility and often have to be accomplished without backing by adjacent units,
- urban warfare forces into a high autonomy of subordinate leaders at all levels (“strategic corporal”) and
- because the democracy-compatibility of military and society, requires a quasi-democratic internal functioning of the armed forces that emulates the democratic functional principles of the state (whereat this kind of internal functioning can be most effectively created respectively significantly promoted by the integration of soldiers of all levels into the decision-making-/leadership-processes of their unit, via the application of the philosophy of mission type leadership.

A synthesis between democracy-political requirements and the necessity to compensate numerical/technological/resource-related inferiority on the one hand, and a reduction of combat reaction time by network enabled technologies/procedures on the other hand, could be found in the perpetuation of mission-type leadership, while simultaneously including order type leadership

and methods for situational switching between both philosophies, into the curricula of military education.

The creation of such capability, to be home in both worlds, to be able to switch between the two fundamentally different leadership-methods, and to understand the rationale behind changing over, means a higher demand on training time and makes a stronger emphasis on education per se, necessary.

### 4.3. Humanistic General Education of the Humboldtian Sense

Humanistic general education per se, is a comprehensive key-task for governments of enlightened, Western pluralistic states – and thus prima facie, not yet specific for military leadership, nor focussed on the democracy-compatibility of armed forces.

Trying now to examine concretely the significance of humanistic general education for the mission effectiveness of democracy-securing armed forces and for their democracy-compatibility, one can identify four reasons that make the former at the same time a *democracy relevant* as well as a *specific core functional* principle of military leadership, and that apply particularly as soon as this humanistic general education bases upon the Humboldtian educational ideal:

- The achieved level of humanistic general education of society as a whole, is the precondition for superimposing military-related general education<sup>143</sup>, and only based upon the latter, for specific military-professional training. Where the required level of civil, humanistic general education is not achieved sufficiently, the military has to make up for this deficiency, because this basis is imperative for the democracy-political reliability of armed forces and their unconditional obedience towards the primacy of politics.

As analyzed in chapter 4.1. „Thinking about War”, is humanistic general education the constitutive principle of the Clausewitzian “third pillar”, thus a corrective to any kind of ideologization of the specific military-professional training or the development of per-

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<sup>143</sup> In this context “military-related-“ and general-education should not to be seen as a contradiction in itself. The significance of humanistic general education, e.g. for the third Clausewitzian pillar, is specific for the military leadership correlation and though derives from a humanistic-philosophical basis. The definition of military strategic goals – to give another example - as well as the military contribution to the definition of strategic goals of the state, are assigned to the higher levels of military leadership and though require a comprehensive understanding of influence factors, the scope of which is too broad to be surveyed by the help of *specialized* military-professional knowledge alone.

sonality-related qualities of soldiers (first and second Clausewitzian pillar) – whereby the fundament for the right to resistance against unlawful orders is laid and the guarantee is given that the primacy of the actual will and the security of the sovereign (i.e. of the people/the democratically legitimized nomothetic institutions of the state) prevails and not the one of a misled government (e.g. an authoritarian regime that has illegally seized power).

The state gains from the “*school of nation function*” of the military via the side effect of supporting multi-ethnic integration that helps to maintain state authority to the interior. Also, the welfare-principle is positively affected via the surplus of education, retired/demobilized soldiers bring with them to their civil jobs. The educational function of the military bases upon the democratic right to education, which the state has to grant its citizens. It also meets the demands of the state on its armed forces, to prevent to become an unwanted social subsystem. Beyond that, it supports the perception of equality (in a metaphorical sense), as the individual soldier can raise his/her social “rank” within the armed forces by undergoing additional education.

The category “*right to resistance*” intersects with the state’s demand for obedience towards the primacy of politics and the right to resistance (in a metaphorical sense) within the military unit.

- Humanistic general education feeds back into the democratic system of the state, via the policy-advice function of higher military leadership.

With regard to the category “policy advice”, general education supports the state with its efforts towards a fortified democracy and with its task of maintaining state sovereignty to the outside and in the interior.

- Proportionally to a high level of humanistic general education, a better democracy-political compatibility of armed forces might be achieved and the probability of the emergence of a state within the state decreased.

Regarding the category “*democratic values-compatibility*”, humanistic general education primarily meets the state’s demand for the obedience towards the primacy of politics via its side-effect of preventing armed forces from becoming an isolated social subsystem. Concerning the category “*intercultural compatibility*” mirrors the democratic principle of equality, by providing equal chances for soldier of different ethnic origin, within their unit.

- The view that for the achievement of mission effectiveness, already military professional training would be sufficient, has to be judged a fallacy in two ways:

- Particularly where mission-type leadership is the prevailing leadership-philosophy, the independent evaluation capability of leaders of all levels, is the constitutive, underlying principle. This capability requests – particularly within higher levels of hierarchy - procedures of thought that are derived from philosophy (e.g. Hermeneutic Cycle, rational share of an operational leadership process that builds upon the interplay/synthesis between the dialectic counterparts empiricism and theory).

Regarding the category “education/substantive aspect”, the mission type leadership meets the state’s demand for effective armed forces by its beneficial influence on leadership performance. Education/democracy-supportive aspect, manifests itself in obedience towards the primacy of politics, because of the “allegiance out of conviction”-goal of mission type leadership.

- Empathy, understanding for ethnic groups in the area of democracy-projecting/ stabilizing operations, respectively the regarding intercultural skills, cannot simply be "trained" – they rather must arise from a lived cosmopolitanism

The category “lived values consciousness” is to meet the state’s demands for effective armed forces, particularly for the purpose of democracy-projection in the course of military missions.

Once having defined the above four reasons, it has to be asked, how the Humboldtian educational ideal can then concretely and positively affect the democracy-political quality of armed forces?

It has to be emphasized that education is not understood here in the sense of Political Liberalism, which – according to Morgenthau<sup>144</sup> - starts from the assumption that education (together with reform and sporadic use of force) almost automatically can avoid the failure of social order. Education is rather perceived in this research as a principle by the help of which democracy-compatibility of armed forces can be raised “according to plan” and that serves rather a Realist-approach.

Humboldt's ideal of education developed around two central concepts of civic enlightenment - the notion of the *reason-talented, autonomous individual* and the idea of *cross-cultural cosmopolitanism*. Universities are supposed to support the process in the course of which, autonomous individuals and cosmopolitans usually generate themselves by striving for (at first) hu-

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<sup>144</sup> MORGENTHAU, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993, ISBN 0-07-043306-2, page 3.

manistic education (later on also for natural sciences). The individual's self-determination and maturity is to be reached by the exploration of the given reason-talent.

Jürgen Hofmann<sup>145</sup> suggests that – regarding the idea of cosmopolitanism - the heritage of the brothers Wilhelm (self-unfolding of individuals), and Alexander (cosmopolitanism) von Humboldt were to be united. Cosmopolitanism was that very collective bond that unites people, regardless of their social and cultural socialization. According to Humboldt, would any “transforming as much as possible of the world into the own person, mean *life* in the higher sense of the word”. The approach aims, as fully as possible, at working oneself off vis a vis the world, and thereby at individual unfolding. Democracy relevance is given here, because the idea of cosmopolitanism, would - according to Hofmann - logically lead to dealing with the great questions of humanity, namely to strive towards peace, justice, the exchange between cultures, different gender relationships or different perceptions of nature.

With regard to the categories “*participation of armed forces within EU/NATO and towards a global peace order*”, *military education-related* cosmopolitanism points into the direction of maintaining sovereignty to the inside and outside, within the respective participation framework (national armed forces within EU/NATO-context, EU/NATO-forces within a global security context) – particularly with respect to democracy-projecting missions. It also supports the union/alliance in its duty of defining the position towards International Law (e.g. legitimation of crises response interventions also without a prior United Nations Security Council-resolution).

Education to cosmopolitanism-derived effectiveness of armed forces in democracy-projecting missions, supports EU/NATO in their duty to ensure basic democratic rights and freedoms for the people in a crisis area to be calmed – and thus proves the honesty of the commitment to global justice. Concerning the category “*intercultural compatibility*”, cosmopolitanism influences the empathy of deployed forces for the people in the area of operations of stabilizing missions.

Hofmann<sup>146</sup> derives from the Humboldtian ideal further that education must include both, knowledge and “nobleness of heart” (“*Herzensbildung*” – in the understanding of a blend of

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<sup>145</sup> Compare HOFMANN, Jürgen: Welche Bedeutung hat das Humboldt'sche Erbe für unsere Zeit? 225. Veranstaltung der Humboldt-Gesellschaft am 08.01.10, Abschnitt D), <http://www.humboldt-gesellschaft.de/inhalt.php?name=humboldt>, Abfragedatum 30.09.2013.

<sup>146</sup> Compare HOFMANN, Jürgen: Welche Bedeutung hat das Humboldt'sche Erbe für unsere Zeit? 225. Veranstaltung der Humboldt-Gesellschaft am 08.01.2010, Abschnitt B) <http://www.humboldt-gesellschaft.de/inhalt.php?name=humboldt>, Abfragedatum 30.09.2013.

character-related/moral/ethical personality traits and humanistic general education-based mental skills). Both skills would be necessary to achieve the desired "education of attitudes and of character". What makes Humboldt's concept of education unique beyond this context, was the fact that it also describes how to acquire "knowledge" and "nobleness of heart", i.e. that it incorporates a theory of socialization.

Regarding the category "substantive and democracy-supporting aspect of military education" applies for the amalgamation of "knowledge" and "nobleness of heart", what had been said under the paragraph "mission-type leadership", analogously. Improved mission effectiveness emerges from leadership performance that is derived from the substantive aspect of military education (which mainly concerns the higher intensive, operational leadership-/decision-making-procedures of national and collective defense, respectively interventions in the upper tasks of the Petersberg-spectrum).

The notion of education, as Humboldt defines it in his report to the King in December 1809, shows most clearly, how constitutive humanistic education is for the training of armed forces that are to be harmoniously as well as values-compatibly integrated into a democratic social order.

*„There exists by all means a certain knowledge that has to be general and above that a certain education of attitudes and character that no one may be lacking. Everyone is obviously only then a good craftsman, merchant, soldier, and businessman, if he is in himself, without regard to his particular profession, a good, decent, enlightened human and citizen, according to his class. Does school-teaching provide, what is necessary for that, so he will acquire the special ability of his profession very easily afterwards and he will always retain the freedom, as happens in life so often, to change over from one to the other<sup>147</sup>”.*

For the categories "substantive and democracy-supporting aspect of education" and "mission effectiveness out of leadership-performance" apply to the "interdependence between knowledge and a certain education of attitudes and of character", what had been said under paragraph "amalgamation of knowledge and nobleness of heart", analogously.

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<sup>147</sup> HUMBOLDT Wilhelm von: Rechenschaftsbericht an den König, Dezember 1809; zit. n. Ellwein, 1985, page 116 [translation by the author of the thesis] zitiert in HOFMANN, Jürgen: Welche Bedeutung hat das Humboldt'sche Erbe für unsere Zeit? 225. Veranstaltung der Humboldt-Gesellschaft am 08.01.2010, Abschnitt E), <http://www.humboldtgesellschaft.de/inhalt.php?name=humboldt>, Abfragedatum 30.09.2013.

Following the idea of Humboldt, would military-specific training have to be started only after a general humanistic fundament had been laid. Particularly with the application to armed forces, would a limitation to specific military training alone, be extremely dangerous, because the lack of humanistic general education would deprive the leadership process of its corrective to a possible ideologization of the first two Clausewitzian pillars of the role profile for military officers. The democracy-compatible officer will be brought up most effectively, when he/she firstly gets an education of attitudes and of character (nobleness of heart), is thus immunized against ideologization and only subsequently undergoes military specific training – the Berlin school of thought in the Third Reich did exactly the opposite.

For the categories “substantive and democracy-supporting aspect of education” and “mission effectiveness out of leadership-performance” applies for the dangers, resulting from military specific training without the necessary general humanistic fundament, what had been said under paragraph “amalgamation of knowledge and nobleness of heart”, analogously. In addition will the category “right to resistance” have to be paid attention, as it is a general military functional principle that at the same time mirrors a democratic principle of the state, by transforming the latter into an internal democratic principle in a metaphoric sense.

Analogously university education - in contrast to what is proclaimed today – is in first respect not to be job-oriented, but at least in the beginning it is independent of economic/related to practice or of specific career-related interests. Exactly the same goes for military-/leadership science (need for history of thought related basics of leadership as a propaedeutics of military science).

The affected categories „education/substantive aspect“ and “policy advice” have been explained in the context of above paragraphs.

According to Hofmann<sup>148</sup> in the mid-18th century a new social layer had emerged in Germany, whose members owed their professional position not to their birth, but to their academic education. Thus an, “aristocratic”-civic education-elite (educated citizens) arose that, together with the nobility and the propertied class, formed a new upper-social level in the 19th century. Therefrom, it can be deduced that also today, humanistic educated officers would contribute significantly to an improvement of the recognition and position of the military within the society and to the prevention of the emergence of an isolated subsystem within the democratic state.

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<sup>148</sup> Compare HOFMANN, Jürgen: Welche Bedeutung hat das Humboldt'sche Erbe für unsere Zeit? 225. Veranstaltung der Humboldt-Gesellschaft am 08.01.2010, Abschnitt B) <http://www.humboldt-gesellschaft.de/inhalt.php?name=humboldt>, Abfragedatum 30.09.2013.

With regard to the categories “social compatibility” and “internal social structure”, academic education-based “nobility” prevents armed forces from becoming a foreign body to civil society and allows to live the democratic principles of the state, equality and participation, in a metaphorical sense – thus strengthening the internal social coherence within military units, as the individual soldier may raise his/her social rank by undergoing additional education (which resembles Plato’s model of the educated soldier who can be promoted the ruler).

The most important impact of humanistic general education unfolded in the field of *Military-/ Leadership Science*. Where shrinking defense budgets, and the temporary absence of an immediate conventional, existential threat led to a reduction of military capabilities, particularly with regard to material and personnel, there offers the preservation of capabilities (soft skills) by tertiary educational institutions of the armed forces, one of the last opportunities, to maintain specific military leadership skills and to keep them available for a re-growth in case of need.

If the numbers of combat units have to be reduced, the armament as well as the defense material and finally the exercise-activities, have to be downgraded due to shrinking budgets, then armed forces – just like a tree before winter that drops its leaves and that retains its lifeblood within the trunk in order to be able to blossom again in spring – would be well advised to raise their leadership-philosophy, their general and applied leadership doctrine to a military-scientific level, to allocate them to their tertiary educational institutions, and to offer them as master/doctoral-studies to military and civil academia.

Strategy would have to be one of the core topics of such a *Military-/ Leadership Science*. Bernard Brodie<sup>149</sup> analyzes the question, where outstanding historic strategic leaders have “learned” their strategic thinking-capability. He states that strategic expertise often lay with leaders of lower noble rank, who self-dependently committed themselves to strategic studies, concedes that intuition plays a certain, whereas not dominant role, and explains the approaches of the new scientific “civilian strategists” – what remains unanswered is the question, by which contributions the military supports the strategy-education of its future leaders. Obviously has a misperception of the principle of Primacy of Politics led to a voluntary abstinence of the military from scientifically researched strategic thinking. However, with regard to a responsible policy advice, strategic research and doctrine would just be the task that the military would have to provide for the sake of the state.

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<sup>149</sup> Compare BRODIE, Bernard: *War & Politics, A major statement on the relations between military affairs and statecraft* by the dean of American civilian strategists, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1973, pages 433-453.



The above described tertiary studies affect the categories “participation of armed forces to the strategic goal achievement of the state” and “mission effectiveness” (particularly for operational procedures that require a significant re-growth potential) – the implications of both have been explained with preceding paragraphs.

Should the attempt succeed, to abstract from military leadership doctrine in a way that also civil leaders from private business, politics and public administration would judge this approach gainful, then a twofold benefit would be given. Firstly could officers, who had graduated in that studies, gain a foothold in private business after they had retired from active service (this would support the necessary rejuvenation of armed forces), secondly would the military be enabled to contribute to the academic education of the state, in the field of crises-related leadership and security provision.

Both approaches support the democratic compatibility between armed forces and society. Whereas the military officer of today is not paid too much attention from the side of political leadership, public life or private entrepreneurship, will the officer/higher leadership function that is scientifically educated according to the pattern given below, gain more social acceptance and be able to contribute more intensively to a reasonable security-consciousness of the population (military academies/ universities as strategic “think tanks” for a comprehensive security provision).

Military-/leadership-science affect the categories “*participation of armed forces to the strategic goal achievement of the state*” (via military representatives also towards EU/NATO/UN), “*mission effectiveness*” (via leadership performance), “*policy advice*” and “*social compatibility*” – the implications of these categories have been explained in preceding paragraphs.

Regarding the goal of the creation of a specific military-/leadership-science, would a general (i.e. not military-specific) leadership-doctrine studies have to be developed that is abstracted from military-science and that aims at “***deciding, structuring, organizing and leading in time-critical, hardly predictable/pre-calculable situations***<sup>150</sup>. By in depth-dealing with military-science, and creating the preconditions for an abstracted leadership-science, armed forces could lead the way to developing such a studies-program that reaches also civil academia and pro-

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<sup>150</sup> PEISCHEL Wolfgang: Zur Entwicklung eines Zweigespanns aus Militär- und Führungswissenschaft, in FRANK Johann, MATYAS Walter (Hrsg.): Strategie und Sicherheit 2013 - Chancen und Grenzen europäischer militärischer Integration, eine Publikation des österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung und Sport, Böhlau 2013, ISBN 978-3-205-79467-7, pages 475-488.

vides a military contribution to comprehensive efforts of the state, to raise security-related leadership-quality, regarding strategic goal setting, diplomacy, private business and public administration..

However, seems the current education of military officers, to be lacking the requested scientific quality in the military core subjects (primarily strategy, operations, tactics, military-specific leadership doctrine). Scientific quality of military leadership education is often represented only in civil branches of studies in civil universities that are made accessible for future-officers or in military-owned/run universities that offer these civil branches of study. Particularly the general staff-/higher officers' - training, would have to build upon the scientific quality of research and doctrine in the military core-subjects.

Scientific quality in the military core subjects affects the categories “*military education/substantive aspect*”, “*mission effectiveness*”, “*social compatibility*” (while preventing armed forces from becoming an isolated social subsystem) – the implications of these categories have been explained with preceding paragraphs.

Because the basic functions that could be abstracted from strategic/operational leadership, would be also appropriate to be used as the core principles of civil, crisis-related leadership doctrine, might the extension of military-science towards civil leadership-science, increase the democratic compatibility between the military and civil society and thus counteract to the emergence of a state within the state.

By this approach could security relevant, academic knowledge and skills, be merged in cross-faculty cooperations and embedded into a network of civil research disciplines, whereby a deeper mutual understanding between military and civil faculties would be achieved and a better societal acceptance of military science and of the military per se, could be reached.

Cross-faculty cooperations affect the category “*social compatibility*” (while preventing armed forces from becoming an isolated social subsystem), the implications of which have been explained with preceding paragraphs.

The benefit for the state would thereby lie with the chance, to unite the currently dispersed pieces of security relevant knowledge/skills, in tertiary, military educational institutions. The presently bemoaned, lacking strategic orientation of politics and private business, represents a massive risk to a long-term peaceful, democratic development of the state – any approach to overcome this deficit would therefore be supportive of a stable and long-term survivable, democratic social order.

The implementation of military tertiary educational-institutions that are responsible for military- and general leadership science, affects the categories “*participation of armed forces to the strategic goal achievement of the state*” and “*policy advice*” – the implications of both have been explained with preceding paragraphs.

There already is a trend on the horizon, according to which civil universities increasingly commit themselves to the subject „strategy“ and public administration- or security-universities start to incorporate defense universities. This trend seems to be caused by the fact that the temporary absence of a direct conventional threat has led to a downgrading of the capabilities of armed forces and thus to a decline of their tertiary education institutions. Above that cast the undervaluation of the necessity, to raise military core-subjects to a scientific quality-level, doubt on the assumption that the armed forces would have to maintain own defense universities.

This means that armed forces will have to be quick with claiming the competence for a military-/general leadership science that includes the responsibility for scientifically based, military core-subjects. Exactly this scientific quality level of military core-subjects is imperative for a role profile of officers that enables them to cope also with anew emerging asymmetric or direct threats.

According to the analysis of the principle „thinking about war“, represents education the basis for responsible leadership and the starting point for its moral and ethical quality – wherefrom the right to resistance against unlawful orders arises (third Clausewitzian pillar). Humanistic general education as the basis for the third Clausewitzian pillar, affects the category “*right to resistance against unlawful orders*”, the implication of which has been explained with preceding paragraphs.

As explained in chapter “Significant Test-questions for the Determination of the Respective Underlying Relationship Between the State and its Armed Forces”, requests the synergy of „theory and empiricism“ a broad fundament of humanistic general education. The scientific method that has been developed and applied by Carl von Clausewitz and that bases upon the dialectic intersection of the theory- and empiricism-paradigm, is still today the underlying principle of the operational leadership cycle, used with armed forces, mainly of the German language area.

The scientific method of merging the theoretic and the empiric paradigm, affects the categories “*military education/substantive aspect*” (from which leadership-performance derives) and “*mission effectiveness*” – the implications of both have been explained with preceding paragraphs.

Education is the main instrument to convey a value understanding to the soldiers that makes them accept the necessary deviation from the postmodern values-understanding of the society, they are meant to protect.

The approach to apply humanistic education as an instrument to convey value understanding to soldiers, affects the categories “*lived values consciousness*” and “*democratic values compatibility*” – the implications of both have been explained with preceding paragraphs. Above that, the category “*recognizing/internalizing the mutual interdependence between democratic rights and duties*” is addressed, because the values-canon, which armed forces have to align to in order to comply with the primacy of politics and in order to achieve mission effectiveness, is necessarily different from the one that applies with civil society. It is just the restriction of basic democratic freedoms of soldiers that constitutes the capability of the state, to maintain and secure democratic rights and freedoms for the entire civil society. This paradox only can be overcome by thorough humanistic education that aims at allegiance out of conviction. With respect to state sovereignty to the outside, this category requests a reciprocal duty of citizens, by which the duty of the state, namely to defend sovereignty, is to be supported.

With regard to *mission type leadership* it had been stated that education is the precondition, already for the choice, between the use of pragmatic operating instructions and the method of independent situational evaluation and that the current mission-scenarios request both capabilities. Education will therefore initially have to focus on the more demanding capability (mission-type leadership together with its imperative precondition - situational, self-dependent evaluation), as far as it is congruent with the history of thought-related background of the user and thus is applied at all.

- The initial analysis of the military functional principle “mission type leadership” has also showed that the method of situational assessment has to be researched, transformed into teachable/learnable contents. This contents will subsequently have to be internalized by repeated exercising, in order to finally appear to the eyes of outsiders, as if they had derived from a transcendental giftedness. Military higher education (military-/general leadership-science) has therefore first to achieve scientific quality in the core-subjects, preferably via the interplay between theoretical and empirical approaches, according to the pattern of the Clausewitzian method. The thus achieved contents have to be transformed into concepts of topical military leadership, taught and internalized repeatedly, until outsiders as well as the users of the method don't realize anymore that the estimate follows a scientifically developed decision making process.

- This context is of particular importance, because the attribution „transcendental“ and the misinterpretation of the term „operational art“ would insinuate that situational assessment capability cannot respectively need not be “taught”, because it is perceived as a God-given, artistic talent. The exact opposite is the case: Future military leaders of a quite rare basic-talent, are at first to be selected, and subsequently will have to undergo a highly-professional, scientifically based education.

The creation of situational assessment capability, affects the categories “*military education/substantive aspect*” and “*mission effectiveness*” – the implications of both have been explained with preceding paragraphs. Beyond that, the category “*empowerment of the individual soldier to participate in the decision making / substantive and emotional aspect*” is again to be addressed, whereat the substantive aspect focuses primarily on the state’s demand for mission effective armed forces. The emotional aspect on the contrary, covers mission effectiveness via the individual motivation of the soldier, the obedience out of conviction, towards primacy of politics, and the avoidance of a military that drifts into the direction of an isolated social sub-system.

#### **4.4. Organic Leadership**

As defined in chapter “Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership”, organic leadership is to be understood here as a systemic interrelation-network, comprising strategic goal finding, operational planning, tactical implementation/C4I, leadership in the narrower sense, management/administration and process-accompanying controlling within the armed forces.

This systemic network of skills could be best circumscribed by the German term “Organische Führung” or “Führung” in a broader sense, whereat already “Führung” would include all enumerated skills and the prefix “organisch” (organic) only would represent the necessary systemic-functional interrelations between the components. The English language does not provide a possibility to include all dimensions of this system under one term, even less the functional interrelations that are supposed to make them interact as an organic system. Therefore the term “Organic Leadership” was chosen, whereat “organic” represents the systemic interaction-context, and the substantive coverage of the term “leadership” (in a broader sense) had to be defined as the sum of the above mentioned, constitutive military skills.

Particularly the systemic interaction between the individual components of organic leadership, increases mission effectiveness and thus the capability of armed forces to support the state in securing state sovereignty to the outside and within. Systemic interaction provided by organic leadership, especially shows effect with operational procedures that request a higher level of ambition, like national/collective defense, missions according to Chapter VII of the Charta of the United Nations or interventions under the assumption of the creation of customary International Law.

A higher leadership performance would enable the state to make more visible contributions to international security, also with limited budgetary resources, and thus to bring in a fair share within a higher “democratic” integration-framework. The creation and preservation of an organic leadership capability must lie in the interest of the state, particularly with its duty of maintaining internal and external sovereignty. Especially “Chapter VII”-missions and interventions without prior Security Council mandate challenge the state, to anchor its position towards EU-/NATO-led missions and towards treaties as well as principles of International Law, constitutionally.

The systemic approach of organic leadership that combines all relevant process-steps from strategic goal-setting to tactical implementation, while guaranteeing democracy-compatibility of armed forces via human-oriented leadership, provides a solid, well balanced, self-consistent, comprehensive proposal concerning the security-political acting/reacting of the state. This kind of policy advice could be seen as interfering with the democratic principle of primacy of politics, as military representatives would have to be included in the political decision making. However, could any competence-conflict easily be avoided, if the proposal were judged “military-strategic” regarding its *contents*, but only a “suggestion” regarding its step-ladder *rank* in the political decision making process.

**Leadership in the narrower sense** is understood here as the human-oriented treatment of subordinates, which aims at esteem, respect for human dignity, as far as possible conflict-free interpersonal relations and that is based on mutual trust and empathy. Together, with the application of findings of modern troops-psychology and approaches to handle the phenomenon of fear, it represents the importance that is given to the psychological well-being, the mental satisfaction, the sense of social embedding, and the appreciation of the subordinate in a military command-relation.

The proof of the honesty of such a command relation lies with the attitude of leaders, whether the subordinate is accepted as an equally important partner in a combat-team, a “brother-in-

arms” or if he only is considered a part of the “machine” that has to accomplish the plans and orders of the superior levels<sup>151</sup>, – as this was the case e.g. before the defeat of Prussia at Jena and Auerstedt. The system-context of organic leadership becomes obvious already in the diremption of leadership in the narrower sense between honest, human-oriented commitment to subordinates and the indirect effect of “mechanistic”, sometimes only pretended, care for people, actually aiming at an expectedly increased *performance* of implementing hierarchy-levels.

Leadership in the narrower sense can appropriately be characterized by the new orientation in Augustus’ base of rule<sup>152</sup> in 27 B.C. As Michael Grant<sup>153</sup> shows, at that point of time, Augustus’ rule changed from “Naked force, control of the army and government by military force” (which resembled the relation between master and slave and correlated to the title imperator) to “auctoritas” (which resembles the relation between liberator and freedman), represented by “government by personality and advice”.

In order to comprehend the function of leadership in a narrower sense, as a bridging principle between strategic goal-setting and operational planning / implementation, the specific character of leadership in general, however with focus on the German language area, had to be analyzed.

Leadership in general (i.e. including leadership in a broader and a narrower sense), builds upon a specific understanding of leadership-relations in time-critical, hazardous situations. This understanding can be explained best by the metaphor of a covered wagon-trek that tries to find its way in the course of the grand migration of peoples<sup>154</sup>.

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<sup>151</sup> To be accepted as an equally important partner in a combat team, requested a high level of education that had to be invested in subordinate levels’ leaders in advance. So did the social embedding of the individual soldier and the appreciation he was given, not only depend on the respective “leadership”-perception but also on the educational level that was achieved to enable him to actually contribute to the units’ success, out of his own capabilities – whereby the interrelation between leadership and education is stressed anew.

<sup>152</sup> Compare PATTERSON, Orlando: Freedom, Volume 1: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, Basic Books 1991, ISBN 0-465-02532-3, pages 258 - 259.

<sup>153</sup> Cited in PATTERSON, Orlando: Freedom, Volume 1: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, Basic Books 1991, ISBN 0-465-02532-3, page 259.

<sup>154</sup> Compare HOLLERER Franz / PEISCHEL Wolfgang: „Leadership“ - ein Führungsprinzip zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, in Bundesministerium für Inneres (Hrsg.): .SIAK-Journal – Zeitschrift

The direction and path, the wagon treks have chosen, might have been determined by the fact that a clansman, who stood out due to self-confidence, farsightedness and reliable assessment-capability, had led the way by simply going ahead. Had the people of the trek trusted in his capabilities and had they followed voluntarily, then leadership had been constituted. Disappointed trust however, necessarily resulted in the denial of allegiance and terminated the leadership relation.

Following this metaphor, leadership would have to be defined as a mutual, synallagmatic bond of trust that is for the side of the leader, conditioned by his performance and empathy for the trek-members, for the side of the latter, depending on their acceptance and will to support the leader's decisions. Any sustainable leadership-relation requires, according to the above metaphor, the acceptance from the side of the led ones. In other words, leadership ends as soon as the led ones quit voluntary allegiance. In fact can the leadership-understanding that underlies mission type leadership-philosophy, be characterized by the above example.

The described leadership-relation however, runs into a dilemma, as soon as the farsightedness of the leader makes it necessary to impose immediate hardships on his trek-members that are inevitably necessary with respect to the long-term survivability of the entire trek. By farsighted and responsible leadership, the leader had run the risk to lose the allegiance of his trek-members and thus the leadership claim as a whole – he therefore has to use his ultimate convincibility, his social competence, his character-traits and his charisma, to maintain the allegiance of his people, although they don't have the mental capabilities to understand the necessity of immediate hardships for their long-term survival (and even if they had the required capabilities, there would – with respect to the dangerous travel-situation – not have been enough time to explain the rationale behind the leader's decisions.

Leadership could therefore be understood as a kind of „meta-language“, by the use of which the leader generates trust-based allegiance that is uncoupled from the deeper insight of subordinates in the concrete substantive logic of strategic decisions<sup>155</sup>.

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für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis – ISSN 1813-3495, „SIAK-Journal – Vierteljahresschrift: 8.Jahrgang, Ausgabe 2/2011, pages 18ff. (translation by the author of the thesis).

<sup>155</sup> Findings base on an analysis, written by the author, which has to be mentioned here because it - by the calendar date of the defensio - might already have been published under the prospective title: PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: Power and Authority – the Military Case, Strategic Change in Postmodern Armed Forces, in ERTL, Paul [Editor]: Armed Forces and Society in the 21st Century – Values, Needs and Ends, Springer Science International, Berlin/Wien/New York 2014.



The subordinate will – due to the *day-to-day* experienced social competence of the leader - finally arrive at the conviction that the thus perceived authenticity must underlie also the (immediately painful) *current* strategic decision, although he cannot understand the latter because of his limited insight-capability, which is oriented to a significantly shorter time-horizon than the one of the leader. Exactly this difference in scope and (time-related) planning horizon, represents the reason due to which the leader would have to stand out.

The logic of this analyzed principle, was to verify the above hypothesized bridging function of leadership, between strategic goal-finding and operational planning/implementatation.

As organic leadership, particularly by the principle of leadership in a narrower sense, makes the limitations that are necessary with respect to primacy of politics and mission-effectiveness, mentally easier to accept, it has a beneficial influence on the democracy-political compatibility of armed forces and the recognizing/internalizing of the mutual interdependence between democratic rights and civic duties of soldiers. Above that raises the bridging function of leadership in a narrower sense, the understanding for farther reaching strategies, also when they would request the acceptance of short-term restrictions and hardships in the present.

With regard to the category “democratic values-compatibility”, conveys the human oriented empathy of superior levels for the subordinate ones that is provided by the principle of leadership in the narrower sense, a subjectively experienced feeling of “democracy” within the military unit, in a metaphoric sense. Thus a kind of a *figurative*<sup>156</sup> “right to resist” is generated where superior levels are not able to create allegiance out of conviction. This is on the one side a challenge for the selection and education of leaders and at the same time a permanent source of criticism but supports on the other hand (given the required leadership-skills) a more reliable acceptance of the primacy of politics and thus helps to prevent armed forces from drifting away into an isolated social subsystem.

The synallagmatic character of the leadership relation makes it easier for the subordinate, to accept the mutual interdependence between democratic rights and duties and that way influences the public willingness to undergo compulsory military service, respectively to join the armed forces as professional soldiers or to support budgetary measures that are indispensably necessary in order to maintain a credible national defense-capability and to make a solidary

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<sup>156</sup> Of course can an actual right/obligation to resist, only be legitimized by legally anchored reasons (as e.g. orders that contradict the constitution, human dignity etc.).

contribution to the defense capability of the next higher democratic integration framework (e.g. EU/NATO).

Concerning the category “lived values consciousness“, leadership unfolds particular effects, because the value of the individual human being is kept up and recognized as the core principle of the military leader-follower relation. The bridging function of leadership provides methods to „translate“ the substantive logic (that normally cannot be understood by subordinate levels immediately) into an intersubjective, trust- and emotion-based language that is immediately understandable – but that does not allow to judge coercively, whether the underlying strategic “source-code” is driven by honest and legitimate goals.

The crucial prerequisite for the bridging function of leadership therefore lies with the honest intent of the defined strategic goal and the responsible use of the “translation-tool” for the long-term benefit of the society to be defended, and of the subordinates that are to accomplish the defense mission.

The permanent risk, inherent to the bridging-principle, lies in the hypothetic chance, to instrumentalize the leadership-tool and to make subordinates follow out of trust, although the underlying strategic goals are not legitimate, i.e. not congruent with targets that aim at long-term peaceful survival.

The fact that subordinates often have an ultimately “fine antenna” for the honesty of superior leadership and for only pretended empathy, is only a weak consolation. What in this context is rather to be demanded, is a clear emphasis on humanistic general education (as a basis for responsible leadership as well as a tool by which the “radio-reception-intensity” of the above antennas can be improved) and on a selection of military leaders that is based on their character-traits. Leadership influences via its inherent “lived values consciousness” again the public willingness to join the armed forces, and the subjective feeling of equality within the military unit, which mirrors a democratic principle of the state figuratively and in the metaphoric sense.

If acceptance of the long-term strategic goal can be reached by the human-orientation respectively bridging-function of leadership and despite immediate hardships, to be put up with, then also restrictions of basic freedoms can be made understood by this principle, as far as leaders are able to explain that these restrictions serve the higher goal of the defense of state-sovereignty.

Thus represents leadership an important factor via which the state can strengthen the willingness of soldiers, to accept restrictions of basic freedoms and thereby the reliability of their obedience towards the primacy of politics-principle.

The analysis has shown so far that due to its constitutive importance for the leadership-relation, particularly in mission-type-dominated armed forces, leadership in the narrower sense represents the *main principle* of the internal functioning of armed forces as a whole. With regard to the category “command loyalty”, leadership is the most effective guarantor for obedience towards the primacy of politics-principle. The “allegiance out of conviction”-aspect of the category leadership is a driving factor for the entire spectrum of democracy-relevant demands of the state towards armed forces and for the full range of internal military functional principles that mirror democratic principles of the state.

Therefrom results that any approach of the political level, which aims at the creation/ improvement/ maintenance of trust-based leadership and at allegiance out of conviction, would have the most expansive effect on the generation of democracy-compatible and at the same time mission-effective armed forces - leadership will therefore have to be judged as one of the most important “setting screws” for the achievement of that goal. The driving influence of humanistic education on the principle of leadership in the narrower sense, will thereby continuously have to be kept in mind.

The category “empowerment of the individual soldier in the decision-making of his/her unit/emotional aspect” can be understood as a precondition for allegiance out of conviction. If the soldier is given the feeling that he is more than only a part of the “machine” that implements plans that he is included in the unit’s decision-making, then he will build up the trust in leadership, which is necessary to obey out of conviction. Due to the similarity to the category “allegiance out of conviction”, are the interrelations between this category and the democratic principles of the state roughly the same.

With regard to the category “internal social structure within units”, affects leadership particularly the equality- and the participation-principle in a metaphoric sense, as the soldier experiences the unit as a kind of “quasi-democratic” framework and the trust-based leadership-organization as the regime that allows to internalize and live out “democratic rights” within this framework.

Concerning the category “right to resistance against unlawful orders”, intersects leadership with the democratic principle of the right to resistance. This right is mirrored in internal military functional principles, as the synallagmatic leadership-relation that underlies mission-type ori-

ented forces, in principle also includes a theoretic, figurative right of the subordinate to refuse the fulfillment of his duties, if superior levels do not meet their obligation to protect him or the reason of state (compare the relation between tenant and liege-/land-lord in the medieval feudal system).

**Applied leadership-philosophy** is here to be understood as the entire, *factual, applied* military leadership from strategic planning, over operational/tactical implementation/C4I to process-accompanying controlling. Because the preconditions of leadership in the narrower sense are founded already in the peacetime-education of armed forces, in order to make them function in combat, according to exactly those principles that have been prepared and exercised in peacetime, applied leadership-philosophy will not separately have to be factorized into categories. The applied leadership-philosophy that is “lived” in day-to-day peacetime education, has to be tailored exactly to concrete mission requirements – leadership, if it is expected to be authentic and credible, must not distinguish between peacetime and mission.

However will applied leadership have to focus more intensively on mission effectiveness and within this category, particularly on operational procedures of a higher intensity- and risk-level (as e.g. national/collective defense, Chapter VII missions, intervention warfare with regard to humanitarian operations).

Methods that help to maintain leadership also under the influence of fear and that are supported by findings of modern troops-psychology, have – from a democracy-related view – to meet the same imperative as leadership in general. They must not become instruments, which *replace* honest empathy with, respectively responsibility for subordinates. They must rather build upon fair-minded care for the latter. As these methods are only tools to implement the goals of leadership, they are to be subject to the same categorization-dimensions as the leadership-principle itself.

#### **4.5. Strategy Related Principles**

This section is to show that lacking strategic orientation is the factor by which democratic survival of the state can be endangered most directly and drastically that there currently exists such a lack and that higher military levels could effectively contribute to covering this strategy-deficit, as soon as strategic leadership is developed towards a core subject of military science and future military leaders are educated in that capability. By this line of argument, the democ-

racy-supporting effect of the military functional principle “strategic leadership” is to be proved. Strategylessness is currently complained about in the fields of private business, politics and military leadership<sup>157</sup>. Daniel Möckli<sup>158</sup> states that the EU would neglect the development of China, Gunther Hauser<sup>159</sup> addresses deficits of the European Security Strategy, Lothar Rühl doubts if the EU has a consistent strategy at all<sup>160</sup>, and Lennart Souchon postulates the return of European postmodern nations to strategic thinking and acting in the sense of a new enlightenment<sup>161</sup>. Klaus Naumann admonishes that military missions are to be given clear strategic, politically legitimated goals<sup>162</sup>. Andrea Riemer<sup>163</sup> points out that science had been unable to develop relevant strategic concepts for the past two decades. Martin Wagener<sup>164</sup> underlines that an

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<sup>157</sup> For the composition of the quotations within this paragraph, compare PEISCHEL Wolfgang: Zur Entwicklung eines Zweigespanns aus Militär- und Führungswissenschaft, in FRANK Johann, MATYAS Walter (Hrsg.): Strategie und Sicherheit 2013 - Chancen und Grenzen europäischer militärischer Integration, eine Publikation des österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung und Sport, Böhlau 2013, ISBN 978-3-205-79467-7, 2. Strategiebedürftigkeit der Führung, pages 475-488, and also PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: Zur Entwicklung eines Zweigespanns aus Militär- und Führungswissenschaft, in FRANK, Johann und MATYAS Walter (Hrsg.): Strategie und Sicherheit 2013 - Chancen und Grenzen europäischer militärischer Integration, eine Publikation des österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung und Sport, Böhlau 2013, ISBN 978-3-205-79467-7.

<sup>158</sup> Compare MÖCKLI, Daniel (Editor): Strategic Trends 2012 – Key Developments in Global Affairs, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich – 2012, ISBN 978-3-905696-36-3, pp. 8f.

<sup>159</sup> Compare HAUSER, Gunther: Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (ESS) in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 3/2010, pages 372ff.

<sup>160</sup> Compare RÜHL, Lothar: Die strategische Lage zum Jahreswechsel in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 1/2013, page 4.

<sup>161</sup> Compare SOUCHON, Lennart: Carl von Clausewitz - Strategie im 21. Jahrhundert, E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn – 2012, ISBN 978-3-8132-0939-6, page 10.

<sup>162</sup> Compare NAUMANN, Klaus: Einsatz ohne Ziel? Die Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen, Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg, 1. Aufl. 2008, ISBN 978-3-936096-98-9.

<sup>163</sup> Compare RIEMER, Andrea K.: Strategische Theorien und Politikgestaltung im 21. Jahrhundert in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 1/2010, page 24.

<sup>164</sup> Compare WAGENER, Martin: Über das Wesen der Strategie in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift – ÖMZ, 4/2010, page 443.

academic discipline „strategic studies“ had not yet emerged and that strategic research is often „under-theorized“.

Olivier de France and Nick Witney<sup>165</sup> build upon the research of the the Institut de recherché stratégique de l’Ecole militaire (IRSEM - a department of the French defense ministry), “*Etude comparative des livres blancs des 27 États membres de l’UE*”, published in 2012., and conclude that most member states’ national strategies were not fit for the purpose of ensuring proper national security decisions, according to a coherent strategic vision. They go even further and state that Europe as a whole, had failed to develop a shared strategic culture, and therefore were about to lose its ambition to be a credible and effective actor on the international scene and to maintain the hitherto reached level of defense capabilities<sup>166</sup>.

The demand for far-sighted strategic orientation gets particularly urgent in times of upheaval, discontinuity and of emerging, altered power constellations – as it has been the case in the decades since the fall of the iron curtain. The need for strategic thinking turns out a crucial factor exactly then, when leadership in the sense of “giving security-political direction” is requested.

This long-term security political direction is determining the degree of survivability of a democratic, peace-assuring social order (compare “Gettysburg-Address” and the virtual rationale of the American Civil War). Higher military leadership has to provide an according piece of policy-advice in a decision-preparatory quality that supports a kind of “comprehensive approach” and eventually is to result in plans for an appropriate military accomplishment. This requests a broad and sufficiently high level of humanistic general, and history of thought-based education upon which the tertiary, military-/leadership-scientific studies will have to build. Studies of that scope and quality are indispensably necessary in order to make future military leaders fit for substantive, decision-preparatory strategic assessment and planning. Particularly the visionary power of strategic thinking that is imperative for the setting of long-term goals, derives from intellectual-historic and philosophical basics.

Military scientific education of officers affects the category participation of armed forces within the state and participation of national armed forces within NATO/EU. In both categories it sup-

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<sup>165</sup> Compare de FRANCE, Olivier / WITNEY, Nick: EUROPE’S STRATEGIC CACOPHONY, European Council on Foreign Relations, ecf.eu, Policy Brief, ECFR/77, April 2013, [www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu), pages 1-2.

<sup>166</sup> Compare de FRANCE, Olivier / WITNEY, Nick: EUROPE’S STRATEGIC CACOPHONY, European Council on Foreign Relations, ecf.eu, Policy Brief, ECFR/77, April 2013, [www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu), page 2.

ports sovereignty to the outside and inside, as it aims at a professional basis from which high-end advice can be provided for the political decision making level – as far as the government is willing to make use of this capability. As military academic education represents the basis of strategic thinking in the armed forces per se, it is also the starting point for any kind of assessment-/planning-capabilities that are to be broken down therefrom. Thus, i.e. via founding evaluation capabilities for strategic and operational leadership levels, it meets the state's/alliance's/union's demand towards the armed forces regarding mission effectiveness. Above that it supports the participation-principle in a metaphoric sense, as it enables every officer to climb his/her career-ladder until he/she may contribute to the strategic goal setting of the state/alliance/union. With regard to participation of national armed forces within NATO/EU, academic military education plays an important role for the constitutional anchoring of the legal basis of foreign missions towards International Law.

With regard to the category policy-advice, provides military scientific education, in the context of strategic leadership, the fundament for any expertise concerning state sovereignty to the outside and inside, the anchoring of legal preconditions of foreign missions within national/international law, co-regulation within the framework of CIMIC-actors, the demand of the state for effective forces and their obedience towards the primacy of politics and the whole range of internal military operating principles that mirror democratic principles of the state.

With regard to strategic leadership, is the academic education of officers, linked to the category lived values consciousness, because strategy – as shown above – has to be values-based and because the officer will have to “admonish” political decision-making to comply with those values. The challenge for military leaders will thereby lie with the tightrope walk between arguing for armed forces that are able to ensure reliable strategic security of the state and the primacy of politics.

The basic idea of strategy that at the same time makes it the crucial principle for the democracy-supporting effect of armed forces, is to secure sovereignty on a long-term basis, thereby the peaceful democratic social order and the capability of the state to guarantee the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

Marc Bloch<sup>167</sup> analyzes the reasons of the strategic defeat of France in the year 1940 and starts from the findings that the officers were subject to a kind of caste-thinking, therefore considered

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<sup>167</sup> Compare BLOCH, Marc: „Die seltsame Niederlage: Frankreich 1940 – der Historiker als Zeuge“ ISBN: 3-10-021603-2, zusammengefasste Darstellung der Argumentationskette in der Einleitung von Ulrich Raulff, pages 13ff.; vgl hierzu auch PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: Geistesgeschichtliche

themselves rather as successors of pre-revolutionary aristocracy than of enlightened middle classes and thus showed little interest in (democracy-) political education. Bloch continues with the judgment that these officers, underestimated the threat, posed by fascist Germany, because of the one-sided perception that the threat had arisen only from the left spectrum in France. He finally states that they were socially isolated from the civil population that they lacked the ability to self-critique and enlightened thinking.

Bloch concludes that it was mainly a defeat of “strategic thinking” that had led to the rout and consequently to the loss of freedom and civil rights, i.e. the central democratic values of a society. The lack of strategic thinking-quality<sup>168</sup> had thus entailed a painful deficit in democracy and at the same time in military effectiveness. Had the officer corps been humanistically and military-scientifically educated and thus been enabled to provide advice to the government’s strategic assessment, it could have contributed decisively to the prevention of the defeat and to the defense of the democratic social order, to be guaranteed by a sovereign state.

Just as the undervaluation of the importance of the own strategic thinking can lead to the downfall of the democratic order (as the example of France in 1940 demonstrates impressingly) - so might also the underestimation of the strategic quality of the opponent's actions, lead to the loss of the own state’s sovereignty. The defeat of Rome in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest e.g., was significantly caused by the fact that the German princes were not considered capable of such a strategic quality. Also the Islamic fundamentalism, particularly the warfare of Al Qaeda has not been conceded a strategic direction, for a long time.

Besides the need for humanistic and scientific education, including the imperative knowledge about military-specific, intellectual history-related basics of leadership, the fundamental idea of strategy concerns the categories “democratic-values compatibility” and “intercultural compatibility”, which together mainly intersect with internal operating principles that mirror democratic principles of the state – and thus are responsible for preventing military leadership from becoming an isolated foreign body within society. The main problem lies here with the fact that socially isolated armed forces might easily lose track of what is the actual threat for civil society,

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Grundlagen operativer Führung im deutschsprachigen Raum, in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ), 5/2002, pages 557 ff.

<sup>168</sup> Findings base on an analysis, written by the author, which has to be mentioned here because it - by the calendar date of the defensio - might already have been published under the prospective title: PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: Power and Authority – the Military Case, Strategic Change in Postmodern Armed Forces, in ERTL, Paul [Editor]: Armed Forces and Society in the 21st Century – Values, Needs and Ends, Springer Science International, Berlin/Wien/New York 2014.



and from which ideological direction it emerges. Intercultural compatibility might also serve the purpose of judging correctly on strategic threat-momentua that arise from foreign cultural regions.

The basic idea of strategy manifests itself also in the category “mission-effectiveness”, as correct analysis/anticipation of strategic threat and the appropriate military contributions to the strategic goal-setting of the state are the prerequisite for framework-conditions that allow for mission effective forces. Mission effectiveness thereby mainly intersects with the state’s demands for effective armed forces that defend the sovereignty of the state while they at the same time have to stay obedient to the primacy of politics-imperative.

Regarding the “**theory and basics of strategy**”, it may be deduced from the above example that armed forces, if they are expected to secure the long-term sustainment of democratic values of a society, will have to comprehend strategic leadership rather as a capability of thinking than of acting, whereby the importance of broad humanistic and military-scientific education of leaders is emphasized one more time.

If one examines the essentials of contemporary strategic leadership for factors of particular democracy-relevance, the following two stick out<sup>169</sup>:

- The long-term reach of strategic objectives, which often allows achievements only beyond the term of the political leadership that had defined these targets.
- Focussing on vital long-term goals, imperative for the survival of a society, for the attainment of which, restrictions in the present must be imposed on the norm addressees that can neither be easily understood nor accepted.

Both factors together entail the effect that political representatives might be seduced to postpone strategic decisions, which were necessary for the long-term survival of democracy but would lead to a loss of voters, who are intimidated by imposed limitations - limitations they cannot understand and that will turn out to be beneficial for the security of society only when the respective government had been dropped by them. Military leadership will have to respond here in a twofold way: *Firstly* does it represent the instrument that is to explain amount and character of threats, the necessity of defense-measures (including recruiting system and defense

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<sup>169</sup> Compare PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: “Zum Nutzen der Definition des Strategiebegriffes – eine perspektivische Betrachtung“ in BIRK, Eberhard (Hrsg.) im Auftrag der Gneisenau-Gesellschaft der OSLw e.V., GNEISENAU BLÄTTER – Band 9 (2010), „Technik-Innovation-Strategie“, Fürstentfeldbruck, <http://www.gneisenau-gesellschaft.de>, pages 30ff.

budget) and the level of ambition the state has to reach, in order to maintain sovereignty, to civil society, in an expert, logic, understandable and unsuspecting because at least theoretically independent from the voters' decisions) manner. *Secondly* it has to analyze and deduce possible current as well as future threat-variants substantively and to convey the results of this evaluation to the political decision level – straight forward, unadorned, and regardless of political opportunity. Thereby is military top-level leadership to admonish political decision makers to meet the force-requirements that result from the respective threat-assessment, even when they demand unpopular decisions. Above that it has to keep up the military-internal values-understanding that is necessary to guarantee a reliable report on the threat assessment towards the government – which requests a strong emphasis on a lived values consciousness within the armed forces.

Theory and basics of strategy regard the categories “participation of the armed forces within the state”, “policy advice” and “lived values consciousness”. The intersection with democratic principles of the state results in findings that are analogous to those explained above (military scientific education of officers).

The sub-principle “**separation between strategic, operational and tactical level**” represents a series of essentials of strategic leadership that all together serve the overarching purpose to relieve the strategic level from concrete, *current/short- and mid-term* planning-/execution-tasks and in turn allow it to concentrate all its energy on the *long-term* survival of the democratic social order. Be it the dualism of leadership-theory between school of thought and pragmatic operating instruction, be it the differentiation between creative phantasy/operational reason and critical-analytic thinking capability<sup>170</sup> or be it the iterative sequence of goal-setting, planning, execution and target-performance comparison, within the strategic planning cycle – all these functions only aim at giving more leeway to strategic leadership, to focus on the long-term sustenance of state sovereignty.

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<sup>170</sup> Professor Bernd ROHRBACH assigns leadership-relevant functions to „operating modes“ of the human brain that hamper each other when they are called up at the same time. According to the level of operational creativity-capability, respectively critical-analytic thinking-capability of humans, he deduces a specific talent for “inventions” or for “management tasks” – a balanced ratio between both qualities predestined a person for a leader. Will decision processes have to be executed by one person alone, then Rohrbach suggests to blank out first the rational mode (in order to have all brain capacities available for the finding of possibilities) and subsequently to suppress the creative mode (in order to assess the collected possibilities rationally) – and calls this principle “Deferred Judgment”.

The sub-principle “separation between strategic, operational and tactical level” regards the categories “participation of the armed forces within the state” and “policy advice”. The intersection with democratic principles of the state results in findings that are analogous to those explained above (military scientific education of officers).

The sub-principle “**system of organic leadership-theory**” (organic leadership per se and its bridging-function between strategic goal-setting and operational planning/implementation, had been analyzed in chapter 4.4. “Organic Leadership”), which is tackled in this section, is about the systemic embedding of strategic goal-setting within the political framework of the state. If the demand for a comprehensive approach is taken seriously, it would be necessary to establish a staff-element at the government level<sup>171</sup>, i.e. an interdepartmental staff, equipped with coordination authority over other ministries, which would have to define an initial draft of an overall strategy and to break it down into tasks, guidelines and delimitations for the creation of partial-strategies, subsequently to be handed over to the respective departments for elaboration and specification.

This supreme strategic staff that would have to act on behalf *of* and according *to* the guidelines of the government, would have to harmonize the individual, worked out partial-strategies, to check them for consistency with the objectives of the initial draft of the overall strategy and finally to forward the revised initial draft and the harmonized partial-strategies as a suggestion regarding the final overall strategy of the state (that can be decreed only after the according parliamentary decision). Military leadership would have to support the Minister of Defense with the generation of the partial strategy “defense”. Above that it would have to offer its services as a *primus inter pares*-advisor and as a coordinator for the government in the thematic field of security-strategy - both on a trans-ministerial level (whereat it has always to be kept in mind that any contribution of military leadership to strategic matters is – according to the primacy of politics - to be understood in its *decision-preparatory* quality, not as an involvement in the factual *decision-making*). By this kind of input to the comprehensive strategy-approach of the state, military leadership would contribute decisively to the goal of the fortified democracy and its long-term peaceful survival.

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<sup>171</sup> Compare PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: “Zum Nutzen der Definition des Strategiebegriffes – eine perspektivische Betrachtung“ in BIRK, Eberhard (Hrsg.) im Auftrag der Gneisenau-Gesellschaft der OSLw e.V., GNEISENAU BLÄTTER – Band 9 (2010), „Technik-Innovation-Strategie“, Fürstentfeldbruck, <http://www.gneisenau-gesellschaft.de>, pages 30ff.

**The sub-principle “system of organic leadership-theory”** regards the category “participation of the armed forces within the state”. The intersection with democratic principles of the state results in findings that are analogous to those explained above (military scientific education of officers).

**„Strategic Alignment“** is to be understood here as a factual, security-relevant orientation of the state, respectively of its armed forces that results from the sub-principle “theory and basics of strategy”. It comprises the basic security-political, strategy-based orientation of the state (“*accordance to security-political system*”) and its principle decision to focus whether on merely defensive, security-policy driven operations, or also on interventions that support foreign policy-making approaches, including the force-planning (“*national-/alliance-/self-interest, force planning*”) that meets the specific demands of the respective chosen option.

The fundamental security-political, strategy-based orientation of the state respectively of its armed forces (in “accordance to security political system”) can be characterized by three ideal-typical alternatives:

- Forward-oriented stability/democracy projection,
- withdrawal from international missions/fall back on the defense of EU-core territory (“Fortress Europe”),
- balanced, comprehensive approach, meeting the demands of the mutual interdependence between internal democratic stability and external security.

This categorization in some way resembles the categorization in the paper of Olivier de France and Nick Witney<sup>172</sup>: A one-sided emphasis on forward stability/democracy projection could be compared to de France/Witney’s “globalists”, the fall back on the defense of EU-core territory to their category “localists”. The main finding in this section of the research at hand, lies with the assessment that only a well-balanced, comprehensive approach, based on the mutual dependence between internal democratic stability and external security, deserves to be conceded a strategic quality – which would fulfill the requirements of the ECFR Policy Brief’s classification/description of “strategists”.

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<sup>172</sup> Compare de FRANCE, Olivier and WITNEY, Nick: EUROPE’S STRATEGIC CACOPHONY, European Council on Foreign Relations, ecfre.eu, Policy Brief, ECFR/77, April 2013, [www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu), pages 3-9.

Forward stability/democracy projection represents the currently prevailing security-political paradigm of Western state-community (compare chapter „Significant Test-questions, for the Determination of the Respective Underlying Relationship Between the State and its Armed Forces” / paragraph “Security-political Paradigm-shifts“).

Of course, it is legitimate to doubt whether this approach is the best conceivable and if it - due to its intervention-character would not rather generate a new perception of injustice and that way new instability, in the long run. It finally remains to be assessed critically, whether such peace-making missions actually would lead to an acceptance of democracy itself or only to an acceptance of their blessings (the underlying broader correlation is also elaborated on, under chapter “The Particular Influence of the Democratic Principle on the Security of the State”). So far however, has this approach shown a successful stability-promoting effect - and with the exception of its necessary extension into the direction of an imperatively required, simultaneous home base-defense, no real alternatives have yet become visible on the horizon.

A possible deviation from the currently prevailing paradigm might result from the fact that shrinking European defense-budgets could force member-states to withdraw successively from foreign stability projecting missions, simply because they can't afford such engagements anymore. But when the access to vital resources should have to be enforced now, by military means, although there are no noteworthy crises response operations conducted into these areas anymore, then there must no stability-generating effects be expected from a fall-back to a “Fortress Europe”<sup>173</sup>.

If thus will be generated a new perception of injustice, then will the EU have to prepare for the defense against illegal immigrants on a very large scale – a defense to be carried out by military means and with the demand for a support for peripheral states by members from the geographic core of the union. Should the EU bethink itself of an enhanced stability-projection again, then would conventional military forces, capable of intervention against the will of conflicting parties, be requested – forces as they would be needed also for the exercise/enforcement of defense guarantees in favor of peripheral member-states. This would hypothetically have applied if

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<sup>173</sup> The definition of “universal treasures” in the EUISS-paper “What ambitions for a European defense in 2020” could be interpreted in this understanding. Compare RIES, Thomas: The globalizing security environment and the EU, in De VASCONCELOS, Álvaro [Editor]: “What ambitions for European defense in 2020?” with a Preface by Javier Solana, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Second edition (the original edition of this book was published in July 2009. This is a revised edition, updated in the light of the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum result on 2 October 2009), ISBN: 978-92-9198-158-8, QN-80-09-917-EN-C, page 70.

Georgia had been a NATO-member at that point of time (2008), when the Russian offensive was launched. Already the existence of credible military capabilities could deter potential aggressors from an offensive against peripheral member-states<sup>174</sup>.

In this sense, armed forces need conventional capabilities at any rate, in order to exercise defense guarantees in favor of member-states in the periphery. These capabilities will also be requested if the EU anew professes intensified stability-projection. A fall-back to the defense of EU-territory would require additional, strong military forces for the defense against illegal migration, might in return save costs for peace-support-missions, else to be perpetuated, but would ultimately not relieve Western state community from the necessity to maintain conventional combat units, eligible for intervention-warfare, in order to enforce access to vital resources and to exercise defense guarantees for peripheral members.

The latter is also therefore indispensable, because the loss of trust in the reliable exercise of defense guarantees must lead to a diversified threat perception and thus to a perishing coherence within the alliance/union. The decision between stability-/democracy-projection and a fall-back to the defense of EU-core-territory as well as the level of attention that is paid to mission-effective intervention-forces in both cases has therefore strategic quality. Force planners of European states will, at any rate, have to orient towards robust intervention-capability, particularly also for the reason that Europe will stay dependent on the Gulf-oil-resources, whereas the USA probably will achieve energy-autarky by 2020, due to their own and Canadian shale gas reservoirs.

The above analysis leads logically and imperatively to the paradigm of the mutual and balanced interdependence of internal democratic stability and external security, which is not to be understood as a contradiction to stability-projection but much more as its enhancement towards responsible security-political acting, which simultaneously provides the necessary home base-protection, as the indispensable precondition for democracy projecting missions abroad<sup>175</sup>. If such missions are compared to a bull, the head and horns of which are the armed forces in for-

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<sup>174</sup> There are assessments that say Russia would have refrained from an attack, if Georgia had been a NATO-member by then – but also if this judgments would have been correct, a Russian abstinence only could have been achieved due to credible defense capabilities that would have had to stand “visibly” in the background.

<sup>175</sup> Compare de FRANCE, Olivier / WITNEY, Nick: EUROPE’S STRATEGIC CACOPHONY, European Council on Foreign Relations, ecfre.eu, Policy Brief, ECFR/77, April 2013, [www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu), page 4.

eign areas of operations, and whose hind-legs are still standing in the troop-contributor's home-base, then it will be easily understood that opponents to the mission will not attack the bull by its horns. They much rather will try to hurt it by its unprotected hind-legs – that are to be compared to the vulnerable civil infrastructure and the civil population of troop-contributing states.

The constitutionally anchored separation of the responsibility for internal and external security that applies for democratic European states, can probably not be kept up any longer as strictly as hitherto. Also because external threats (that are unquestionably subject to military responsibility) do not exclusively manifest themselves in an effect that hits the state from outside the borders anymore, an amalgamation of the role-profiles of military and police is to be expected. Military might have to support the forces of interior with assistance-missions in case of terrorism, catastrophes and illegal migration within EU-territory, whereas the police will have to prepare for an intensified commitment in the democracy-building phase of democracy-projecting missions.

An extremely critical demand for armed forces might in this context arise with cases of internal unrest (the paragraph above was about terrorism that takes effect – this paragraph regards unrest arising from own citizens). Although constitutions theoretically allow for military assistance in such cases, when the civil authority and the forces of the interior are no longer capable, respectively are about to lose the capability to get the situation under control (compare civil unrest in Paris/November 2005, London/August 2011), democracy-political reality will however make such a military engagement very unlikely in the present situation. Nevertheless, will it be necessary, to define procedures and regulations, on how military forces would have to cooperate with/assist to the forces of interior in case of need, if the kind of emerging civil unrest, described above, should exceed the capacity of the police-forces.

Because security-relevant approaches will therefore have to be considered as inter-ministerial matters, comprehensiveness and strategic goal-setting will have to follow a completely new rationale.

Given the according military scientific basis of officers'-education, the military would thereby have to expand its opinion-leadership for cross-divisional, strategic assessment in complex and hardly predictable situations (like the one described in the above paragraph), to offer its service as security-relevant think tank and as an advisor for political decision making.

In order to maintain state sovereignty and thus to ensure democratic stability, the strategic alignment of armed forces will have to cope with the demands of three levels of the category “contribution/participation of the norm addressee in the respective integration-framework” – armed forces, within NATO/EU, EU/NATO-forces within Western state community and multi-

national forces in approaches towards global peace. In all three levels, force capabilities will have to be oriented mainly towards the duty of the respective integration-framework, to maintain sovereignty to the inside and outwards, the need to legitimize the chosen alignment with regard to International Law, and the framework's demand for military effectivity of its elements, required in the respective option. This means that the choice of a security-political option always has to respect the capability of the armed forces, to meet the resulting demands. The higher the participation-framework, the more important becomes the question, if European/Western state community's approaches are consistent with the goal of global peace. This leads over to the category "commitment to global justice". Abroad missions will therefore have to be measured by the degree in which they respect the democratic principle of social justice and welfare in the mission area, and the duty of the state-community to guarantee the entire list of basic democratic rights/freedoms for the people living there. As processes to achieve these goals, are long-lasting, armed forces will have to be enabled for long endurance. Finally, the chosen strategic alignment will have to be transformed into specific force-capabilities that are to result in sufficient mission-effectiveness for the respective option. The focus will thereby lie with national/collective defense including internal tasks of armed forces and with abroad missions, mainly according to Chapter VII of the UN-charta. Provided, the strategic approach is chosen, to cope with the demands of the mutual interdependence between internal democratic stability and external security, all three qualities of force capabilities - national/collective defense, internal tasks, and intervention-capability - will have to be achieved at the same time. Focusing on one, while disregarding the rest will lead to the kind of deficits and strategic shortfalls that de France/Witney<sup>176</sup> described for nations below the levels of national (grand) strategists.

Particularly the approximation between role profiles of military forces and forces of internal security, affect the category "democratic-values compatibility". The paradigm of mutual interdependence between internal democratic stability and external security will make assistance-missions of military forces to forces of the interior, sooner or later a critical topic on the political agenda. Meeting the demands of the state towards its armed forces, namely to prove unconditional obedience towards the primacy of politics and to avoid isolation from civil society, represent the indispensable precondition for any kind of military assistance-missions in the interior. The requirement to prevent armed forces from becoming a foreign body to society, which

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<sup>176</sup> Compare de FRANCE, Olivier / WITNEY, Nick: EUROPE'S STRATEGIC CACOPHONY, European Council on Foreign Relations, ecf.eu, Policy Brief, ECFR/77, April 2013, [www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu), pages 3-9.



arises particularly from the similarity of role profiles of the military and the police in assistance missions in the interior<sup>177</sup>, is closely linked to the duty of the state to guarantee the right to education, which in turn increases democratic-values compatibility and thus the personal democratic security of the citizens.

**The state's principle decision** to focus whether on merely defensive, security-policy driven operations or also on interventions that support foreign policy-making approaches, is to be understood as the decision regarding the political "interest" behind "security-political" actions. A main effort on national defense (except for neutral countries) indicates a lower commitment towards alliance/union-efforts. The intensity and level of ambition of contributions to intervention missions must be judged with regard to the question, if this commitment expresses the mere security-political interest of the respective state or if it also includes foreign policy-making-, economic or resource-related motives. The intensity of the commitment to stability-/democracy-projecting missions is in turn influenced by the respective understanding of the principle of mutually linked internal- and external security.

Force Planning is a function that actually would be an integral element of "applied leadership". As it is however specific for the individual national strategic decision (stability projection, fall back on the defense of EU-core-territory, mutually linked internal- and external security respectively national-/alliance-defense vs. foreign-policy-motivated interest) it has been assigned to the functional principle of strategic leadership.

The decision concerning the political "interest" regards the categories "participation of multinational forces in approaches towards global peace" and "commitment to global justice". The intersection with democratic principles of the state results in findings that are analogous to those explained above (strategic alignment).

#### **4.6. Values-"Constitution" Within the Armed Forces**

This section falls back on the analysis-parts that have been brought forward to chapters "Test-questions for the Determination of the Respective Underlying Relationship Between the State

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<sup>177</sup> The fear of the citizen that he/she could be exposed to military forces and their terrifying armament, and that this military forces could have to execute tasks against them, similar to those, the police is responsible for, under normal conditions, will probably lead to a vehement denial of such assistance missions from the side of civil society.

and its Armed Forces” and “Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership” / paragraph “Values-constitution” including the passage “ethical dimension of military leadership”. Substantial parts of the values-related analysis are to be found in the above mentioned chapters – in this chapter will primarily those values-related contents be tackled that have not, respectively not yet sufficiently investigated. This is why the analysis in chapter 4.6. turns out a little shorter.

### **Definition of the term Values-“Constitution“**

The term Values-“Constitution” had initially been explained in chapter 3.4.2. as the sum of values applying with a society, their understanding, acceptance, validity, mutability, and their reality-shaping power that expresses itself inter alia, in the actual values-canon. At this stage of the analysis, the definition has to be extended and deepened, beyond this preliminary delimitation. “Constitution” does not refer here, to a legal constitution in the sense of statutory law. It rather expresses, the fact that the values-order follows – to a certain extent - the inertia principle, as it remains relatively stable and serves as a reliable guideline for social action, over a longer period. The development towards the values-constitution originates from values-understanding, i.e. the collective perception of values and leads via their connotation as more or less binding, the choice on those, which are to be accepted as determinative (collectively agreed values-canon), the individual attitudes towards the society’s values-set, to an honest commitment, to support and to live up to the agreed values-canon by own performance, and to make sacrifices for it. Therein is a similarity to a legal constitution given insofar, as also the latter is only as effective as the factual will and readiness of the people, to align with it, allows.

### **Rationale of the values-based approach**

The moral-ethical aspect of military leadership, is today of growing substantive importance for the use of armed forces of Western, pluralistic states - particularly with regard to the latter’s development to post-modern social structures and the therefrom resulting, sometimes even overreaching, demand for (in a post-modern sens) “responsible” military leadership.

The **fundamental rationale** of the values-based approach can be deduced from the prevailing character of democracy-/stability-projecting missions that aim at “hearts and minds” of people in the operations area and the strategic goal of which lies with the creation of self-sustaining, survivable, peaceful democratic structures - and that alternativelessly have to be carried by the

democratic maturity respectively conviction of the engaged armed forces.

There is anyway the risk that democracy-transfer according to the pattern of the current Western security-paradigm, might be accepted in its perceived outcome (personal security, prosperity, living standard) but rejected regarding the way and necessary efforts (performance-society, statutory law, legality-principle, representative democracy) towards the achievement of these goals. This risk might lead to a development, due to which peace-projection as a whole could be judged as occupation, heteronomy, privation of one's own identity or as deliberate creation of subjection. Armed forces, not sufficiently imbued with democratic values, would further favor such a perception and thus lead the goal of democracy-projection ad absurdum. All the more must the alignment of armed forces with the values-set of Western democracies, be the adequate response.

The above basic rationale in connection with the enhanced definition and the hitherto analyses of all previous principles, have been anticipated and were already reflected in the categories and sub-categories of military functional principles (in their interface-appropriate order-logic, according to the Analysis Interface, figure 10) that had been made applicable for the detailed intersection with democratic principles of the state. The basic logic of the values-based approach manifests itself, according to the sub-principles "postmodernity" and "ethical dimension of military leadership" in the following categories of the analysis interface:

Regarding the phenomenon of „postmodernity“

- Values-based commitment to "global justice" – to be understood in the sense of the question, if society would be willing to contribute a fair share to the creation of global peace, even if this would result in losses in the people's living standard.
- Values-based "willingness to solidary contributions" - to be understood in the sense of the question, if the voter would agree to higher defense-expenditures, requested to enable the state to contribute its fair share to the defense alliance/union, even if that would mean a decrease of prosperity and would lead to participation in more intensive military missions that are likely to entail a higher number of casualties.
- "Democratic compatibility in the respective framework" – with regard to the seriousness of the state's commitment towards NATO/EU as a values-based community (does the state consider itself as a „democratic“ subject/individual within the framework of the alliance/union, does it also respect duties, resulting from a membership?).
- "Internal functioning/lived values consciousness" – regards soldiers, living in a not-yet-

postmodern values-environment and their capability to endure the values-related potential-difference towards a postmodern civil society.

- “Recognizing/internalizing the mutual interdependence between democratic rights and civic duties“ – This category concerns the insight of citizens into the principle that they in turn for granted rights, will have to make their contributions, in particular to serve as conscripts or volunteers, or to support an effective national defense, so that the state only will be enabled to provide these rights. This interdependence resembles the ancient Greek principle of „he, who contributes to the defense of the polis, shall be admitted also to participate in the political decision making“ (this principle had not explicitly been written down, but can in a figurative sense be concluded from the security structure of the polis, suggested by Plato). The more the values-constitution slips into the direction of self-expression- and at the same time secular values, the less will it be possible, to convince citizens to contribute to the state’s security, in turn for democratic rights and freedoms - the latter paradoxically being dependent on exactly these contributions.
- “Democratic values-, intercultural compatibility” – with regard to the compatibility of armed forces with the national civil society and above that, with the people in the operations area of a democracy-projecting mission and between soldiers of different ethnic origin within the own units.
- “Education for enlisted men and military leaders” – concerning the function of education as a tool to create acceptance of the necessary limitation of freedoms, to lower the degree of democratic incompatibility and to make unavoidable remnant-incompatibility endurable without letting the armed forces slip off to an isolated social subsystem.
- “Mission effectiveness” (particularly humanitarian operations and missions according to Chapter VI/VII of the UN-charta) – with regard to the sustainment of a values-set for armed forces that is “not-yet-postmodern” enough, to allow for mission-effectiveness, particularly concerning the need to act under adverse conditions and even under direct threats

Regarding the ethical dimension of military leadership:

- “Right/obligation to resistance against unlawful, unconstitutional orders” – in order to avoid military operations that would contradict the laws, in particular the constitution or international law, or that would violate humanity respectively human dignity.
- “Restriction of basic freedoms in favor of the implementation of the primacy of poli-

tics”.

- “Preventing the emergence of a state within the state, by applying the principles of leadership in the narrow sense and by participation of the individual soldier in the decision-making of his/her unit (emotional staff satisfaction)”.
- “Education for enlisted men and military leaders” – with regard to the sub-aspect of humanistic general education that represents the key-factor for the detection of unlawful orders, and thus the primary ethical corrective for military leadership-decisions.

### **The phenomenon of „post-modernity“ as influencing-factor for the values-order**

Values-development in the understanding of the above definition, respectively basic rationale, can, with regard to the world-values map of Inglehart/Welzel (see figure 11<sup>178</sup>, be determined by two main-factors. Beyond that, what had been briefly described in chapter 3.2.3.2.2., remains to be explained that the abscissa (x-coordinate) of the diagram ranges from “Survival Values” to “Self Expression Values”, whereas the ordinate (y-axis) reaches from „Traditional Values“ to „Secular-Rational Values“. Particularly<sup>179</sup> a high parameter-value of “Self Expression”, decreases the willingness to make contributions to the community and to subordinate oneself or to undergo compulsory military service respectively to join the armed forces voluntarily. Above that, it results in a higher sensitivity for the point, when the values-constitution within the armed forces that necessarily has to be different from the post-modern values-set of society, tends to become – at least allegedly - incompatible with the latter.

“Survival” is defined as the counter-pole to self expression, wherefrom can easily be concluded that the importance of survival-orientation dwindles with the development towards self-expression. Decreasing survival-orientation could logically result in the loss of defense-

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<sup>178</sup> The World Value Survey Cultural Map 2005-2008, Source: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy." Perspectives on Politics June 2010 (vol 8, No. 2) page 554, [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

<sup>179</sup> The entire argumentation that tackles the topic “postmodernity” as a main influence-factor for the development of the values-constitution, bases on an analysis, written by the author, which has to be mentioned here because it - by the calendar date of the defensio - might already have been published under the prospective title: PEISCHEL, Wolfgang: Power and Authority – the Military Case, Strategic Change in Postmodern Armed Forces, in ERTL, Paul [Editor]: Armed Forces and Society in the 21st Century – Values, Needs and Ends, Springer Science International, Berlin/Wien/New York 2014.

readiness and also in the abandonment of the will to self-assertion with regard to the survival of democracy per se. Exactly that fatal combination of lacking will to contribute to collective efforts and the decreasing readiness to defend the country and its political system, makes an unbraked development towards post-modernity, potentially democracy-imperiling.

This development is fatal particularly because its momentum is hardly to be influenced or controlled due to political will. According to Daniel Bell<sup>180</sup>, had the conception of “mass society” led to the demolition of the old primary group ties of family and local community and to the questioning of ancient parochial faiths. Above that, Bell concludes that only few unifying values had taken over and that collective opinion couldn’t be shaped by educated elites anymore, whereby as a result, mores and morals were in constant flux, inter-individual relations had become rather tangential or compartmentalized than organic.

The world-values map of Inglehart/Welzel also leads to another finding that is of crucial importance for a peaceful world-order. The location of states with regard to the defined axes does not only determine their willingness to defend their own political system. It can be assumed that the distance between states in the diagramme that stands for similarity in their values-orientation is also an indicator for the sympathy they develop for each other. Following David Hume<sup>181</sup>, one will have to conclude that sympathy is one of the strongest principles of human nature that influences the understanding of morals and ethics and that way might become the driving factor for values-related tensions and eventually for potential armed conflicts.

Also, where states had shifted towards all volunteer armed forces for reasons that were not primarily about saving financial means by sacrificing capabilities (rather in the understanding of making use of the defense guarantees that were legitimately seen as a “return of invest” from achieving NATO-membership), a lack of awareness of the population, to take defense of democracy serious, was to be observed. The general tendency to relieve the conscript youth from compulsory military service, confirms this trend, showing that the defense of democratic values might be taken less serious by society. The contributions of the citizens to the military defense of the state, are no longer seen as an inalienable right, or at least as a un-delegable duty – just on the contrary, even a de-facto, militarily defenseless democracy might be accepted, to a cer-

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<sup>180</sup> Compare BELL, Daniel: *The End of Ideology, On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1988, ISBN 0-674-25230-6, page 21 f.

<sup>181</sup> Compare HUME, David: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Penguin Books, Penguin Books Ltd. – London, First Published 1739 and 1740, ISBN 0-1404-3244-2, pages 626 and 667.

tain degree.

When the development has proceeded that far into the direction of self-expression- and simultaneously of secular-rational values (as this is the case in Europe), one will have to act on the assumption of degressive will to defense and to the employment of armed forces for the sustenance/enforcement of access to vital strategic resources. The logical consequence will be that a commitment to global justice, the willingness to solidary contributions and consequently the acceptance of necessary limitations to democratic freedoms, will not be achieved, if this would conflict with the maximization of the individual standard of living or the further liberalization of the individual life-style.

As opposed to the perception by postmodernism-spoiled, core-European societies, might the real security-political situation request a fundamentally different response. Actually could centrally located European states be threatened by migration, organized crime, proliferation, terrorism and cyber warfare, peripheral states in the medium term (which is reflected in the development of the defense-budgets of Eastern peripheral states that significantly differs from the one of centrally located EU-members) also by limited conventional attacks, launched by growing-up political actors and the whole of Europe by the privation *of*, respectively by denial of access *to* vital overseas-resources.

The above assumption can – with regard to the subsequent intersection of military leadership principles and democratic principles of the state by the help of the analysis-interface - be subsumed under the following core-factors:

- The systemic difference between “modern” (in the understanding of “not-yet-postmodern”) armed forces and the postmodern society, which is to be defended by the former, must not be seen as *unavoidable*.
- It much rather would have to be accepted as *indispensable*, because the requested “not-yet-postmodern”-quality of armed forces represents the actual reason for their capability, to obviate respectively to fend off “modern” (conventional attacks) and pre-modern (asymmetric acts of terror) threats.
- Thus, is the above defined, systemic difference at the same time the *price for* and the *fundamental functional principle of* the sustenance of the postmodern values-canon that means inter alia of the current lifestyle of Western democratic societies.
- Therefore it should be avoided with might and main, to let this necessary systemic dissimilarity transform into a disagreeable values-related “incompatibility” or to push armed forces into the role of a foreign body to the democratic structure of the state.

In chapter 3.2.3.2.2. had an analysis been announced on the assumption that mission-effective armed forces would tend to democracy-incompatibility, whereas democracy-compatible forces could only achieve limited mission-effectiveness. By the above deduction, it has now been tried to substantiate the assumption that mission-effective armed forces in postmodern social structures must necessarily get into a certain degree of democracy-political incompatibility, whereas the un-reflected admittance of the values-understanding of the postmodern society, to be protected, must necessarily lead to limited mission-effectiveness.

Concerning the category of a values-based “commitment to global justice”, the social justice-/welfare state principle represents the driving factor for political acting. The sustainment of individual prosperity is a main duty of the state and at the same time a personal security demand of the citizens – and it conflicts with the necessary strategic alignment of armed forces. Responsible political leadership will therefore have to make financial restrictions in the present that are necessary for the long-term security of the state, understandable and acceptable for the voters.

Roughly the same goes for the values-based “willingness to solidary contributions”. Above the individual prosperity-context, this category affects the duty of the citizen, to undergo compulsory military service respectively to join the armed forces voluntarily and to support defense-expenditures of the state that in turn are the precondition for the maintenance of a peaceful living-environment of the citizens.

By the category “democratic compatibility in the respective framework”, are the obedience to the primacy of politics and the avoidance of becoming a foreign body, affected. Just like national armed forces have to obey to the respective national political will and to integrate themselves into the civil society of the state, also the state (including its military instrument), as an element of the higher integration framework, has to align to the values-perception, prevailing in NATO/EU, in a way that in principle mirrors the values-based attitude, which is requested from national armed forces towards their national government. Deficiencies in the values-based attitude of the state towards the superior integration-level, will inevitably be transferred to the values-orientation of national armed forces towards their state.

The category “internal functioning/lived values consciousness“ significantly influences the willingness to undergo compulsory/voluntary military service and to support defense-efforts in general. It serves as the basis for the demands of the state towards its armed forces, in particular the request for mission-effective forces that are reliably obedient to the primacy of politics. Thus becomes the values-aspect the triggering factor for the goal, to combine mission effectiveness and democratic compatibility. It however has to be kept in mind that just this triggering factor is not alterable, with regard to the entire civil population, on a short- or mid-term basis.



This supports the assumption that a factor must be found, by which the effects of values-development can be compensated best (as this factor is supposed to influence the same broad variety of depending sub-principles as the values-development itself), and that is accessible for mid-term political control-measures/interventions – as the interdependency network will have to prove, this will be the principle of humanistic general education.

By the category “recognizing/internalizing the mutual interdependence between democratic rights and civic duties“ are the duties of the state (at the same time factors of the citizens’ personal security) addressed, to maintain sovereignty in the interior and to the outside. Via the interrelation between internal and external security will the insight be created that democratic rights within the country request sovereignty in the interior, and that the latter indispensably depends on the values-based commitment of the citizen towards military defense to the outside.

Both sub-categories, “democratic values-“ and “intercultural compatibility” correlate with the duty of the state to provide humanistic general education, by which a lack of compatibility can be prophylactically counter-steered. The former represents the main precondition for mission-effectiveness that is achieved under obedience to the primacy of politics-principle and under avoidance of a social isolation of the armed forces.

“Education for enlisted men and military leaders” represents the main instrument of the state, to make the armed forces achieve all the goals (mission-effectiveness, obedience to primacy of politics, avoidance of social isolation) that had been set for them with regard to democracy-compatibility. This instrument in some way compensates the fact that the actual driving factor, values-constitution, cannot be controlled, according to political will, on a short- nor on a mid-term basis. Education is also to be seen as the fundament for the right to resistance against unlawful orders (also in the metaphorical sense), and thus provides the core-factor for the ethical corrective of military leadership.

The category “Mission effectiveness”, particularly in humanitarian operations and in operations according to Chapter VI and VII of the UN-charta, correlates with the duty of the state, to grant people fundamental democratic rights and liberties that are to be enforced and protected by the crisis-response-forces (human right to peace, justice, personal development, physical integrity, freedom of the person) and thus represent the actual critical success-factor of the mission as a whole. Above that, show chapter VII-missions a stronger interrelation with the positioning towards International Law, and the principle of co-regulation.

## **The ethical dimension of military leadership as influence-factor on the values-order**

Concerning the ethical dimension of military leadership respectively the overall soldierly ethos (compare the analysis brought forward to 3.4.2., sub-chapter Values-, „Constitution“), the intersection of the above listed category (“Regarding the ethical dimension of military leadership”) with the according democratic principles of the state, has finally led to the below results.

The category “right/obligation to resistance against unlawful, unconstitutional orders” affects the basic laws of constitution insofar, as the hierarchy of the legal system grants the right/obligation to resist, as soon as orders conflict with its highest level, i.e. particularly constitutional laws/principles. Thereby is on the one hand the duty of the state addressed, to safeguard the primacy of politics-principle by this “emergency brake”, regarding the military chain of command (thus can the state facilitate the achievement of the goal of obedience/loyalty towards the primacy of politics). On the other hand, is the personal security of the individual soldier involved, as the constitution provides legal protection for “disobedience” to orders that contradict values like human rights or human dignity. The category is also mirrored in the internal functional principle of the values-based right to resist in a metaphorical sense, whereby military leaders are further challenged to base their claim to leadership on leading by personal example.

The principle “restriction of basic freedoms in favor of the implementation of the primacy of politics” regards the citizens’ ethical motivation to undergo compulsory/voluntary military service or to support national defense-efforts. The degree to which favorable values are internalized, determines the fulfillment of the state’s demand for obedience to the primacy of politics-principle. The right to resistance in a metaphorical sense serves as a kind of “escape valve” that makes the necessary restriction of basic freedoms easier to be accepted by the soldiers.

Leadership in the narrow sense and emotional staff satisfaction serve the *military* principle of “preventing the emergence of a state within the state” logically by their influence on the *state*’s demand for the avoidance of an isolated social sub-system and on the internal military operating principle of democratic participation in a metaphoric sense. Both components (leadership in the narrow sense and emotional staff satisfaction) indispensably depend on the state’s duty to grant the right to education (firstly to create sufficiently skilled leaders, secondly to educate subordinates who are capable of using given leeway for the benefit of their unit).

For the category “education for enlisted men and military leaders” applies in general what had been said for “education” under the above paragraph “the phenomenon of postmodernity”. In this context however, lies the emphasis with the function of an ethical corrective for military leadership. According to what Clausewitz had postulated by his third pillar of the role profile of military leaders, it is particularly humanistic general education that helps to create a sensorium

for the detection of unlawful contents of given orders. Therefrom results the fact that the ratio in which humanistic general education is represented in the curricula of military academies, is an extremely powerful adjusting screw, by which the state can control and support the moral-ethical foundation of military leadership and thus the obedience to primacy of politics as well as the democratic maturity and compatibility of its armed forces as a whole.

#### **4.7. Intermediate Chapter-summary “Analysis”**

Selected democracy-relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership have been analyzed under exemplary application of the structured analysis-model. The analysis-section focused on the German language area, in particular on the Austrian perception of the selected principles. This Austrian perception has been characterized by the specific composition of elements of history of thought, enlightenment, humanistic general education for military officers, military-scientific methodology, military history, military humanities and social sciences as well as by a human-oriented understanding of leadership and a distinct consciousness of the mission-type leadership-principle.

The analysis was to show how the selected principles can be investigated by applying the proposed structured analysis-model. Furthermore was the user to be enabled, to retrace the evaluation-procedure with his individual parameters, and in front of the background of the respective, national security-political situation.

In the course of the sub-chapter “**Thinking about War**” it had been analyzed, how theory of war (in particular the Clausewitzian thinking) influences the democratic quality, respectively democracy-compatibility of armed forces. Above that, the Clausewitzian military-scientific methodology was investigated with regard to its function as a fundament for modern strategic goal-setting, operational leadership-processes and for the development of a new academic discipline “leadership science” that would have to grow up from military-science. The analysis of the “Third Clausewitzian Pillar” aimed at the creation of awareness for the importance of a moral-ethical corrective for the recognition of unlawful orders. It could be substantiated that this corrective, which mainly depends on humanistic general education, represents the indispensable precondition for the perpetuated prevalence of primacy of politics and thus the core-principle of democracy-compatibility of armed forces.

- The analysis of the principle of “**Leadership-Philosophy**” focused on the democracy-supportive effect of mission-type leadership that rather aims at the military leaders’ capability of self-dependent evaluation in a given situation, than on a pragmatic,

mechanistic operating instruction for different predefined, combat-situations. Subsequently were the functional principles of mission-type leadership deduced as well as the factors that represent its precondition. The main finding lay with the two paths, along which mission-type leadership unfolds its **democracy-relevant effect – firstly** via focusing on substantive, pragmatic approaches to achieve mission-effectiveness that enable armed forces to act as a reliable tool for the preservation/projection of democracy, **secondly** via a social dimension that mirrors the democratic participation-principle towards the state, within the unit and that is primarily to be understood as a principle of the internal peace-time functioning of military forces.

- The research led to the conclusion that the necessary synthesis between mission-type- and order-type-leadership would require the capability of military leaders, to be able to switch between the two fundamentally different leadership-methods and to understand the rationale behind changing over.

With regard to **“Humanistic general education in the Humboldtian sense”** were four reasons to be identified that make this basic, democracy-relevant principle of the pluralistic state at the same time a democracy relevant, specific core functional principle of military leadership. *Firstly* the fact that the achieved level of humanistic general education of the society as a whole, is the precondition for superimposing military-related general education, *secondly* the chance to exert beneficial effect on the democratic system of the state, via the policy-advice function of higher military leadership, *thirdly* the increase in democracy-political compatibility of armed forces that can be achieved by a higher level of humanistic general education, *fourthly* the rebuttal of the assumption, mission effectiveness could be sufficiently reached already by military professional “training”.

The core finding lies with the recognition of the impact, humanistic general education could unfold in the field of military-/ leadership science. In times of shrinking budgets, could the preservation of capabilities (soft skills) by tertiary educational institutions of the armed forces, offer one of the last opportunities, to maintain specific military leadership skills and to keep them available for a re-growth in case of need.

**“Organic Leadership”** was to be defined as a systemic interrelation-network comprising strategic goal finding, operational planning, tactical implementation, C4I, leadership in the narrower sense, management/administration and process-accompanying controlling within the armed forces. It could be proved that particularly the systemic interaction between the individual components of organic leadership, increases mission effectiveness and thus the capability of armed

forces to support the state in securing internal democratic stability and stability-/democracy projection to the outside.

Particular emphasis was laid on the principle of leadership in the narrower sense, which had been defined as the human-oriented treatment of subordinates that aims at esteem, respect for human dignity, as far as possible conflict-free interpersonal relations and that is based on mutual trust and empathy. The proof for taking this principle serious, lies with the decision, whether the subordinate is accepted as an equally important partner in a combat-team, or if he/she only is considered a part of the “machine” that has to accomplish the plans and orders of the superior levels. The main finding lay with comprehending the function of leadership in a narrower sense, as a bridging principle between strategic goal-setting and operational planning/implementation, whereby an unimpeded strategic goal-setting at longest possible planning-horizons can be supported but at the same time also the acceptance of short- to mid-term reductions in the present that will become unavoidable with regard to the long term survival of the democratic social order.

The section “**Strategy**” was to substantiate the democracy-supporting effect of the military functional principle “strategic leadership”. Furthermore it was to show that lacking strategic orientation is the factor by which democratic survival of the state can be endangered most directly and drastically and that this lack currently exists. It was to prove that higher military levels could effectively contribute to coping with this strategy-deficit, if strategic leadership would be approved as a core subject of military science and if future military leaders were academically educated towards this capability. It was subsequently deduced that just the undervaluation of the importance of the own strategic thinking can lead to the downfall of the democratic order (as it was demonstrated with regard to the classical example of France in 1940) and that also the underestimation of the strategic quality of the opponent's actions, might endanger the survival of the own state.

Two factors of contemporary strategic leadership that are particularly democracy-relevant, could be identified. Firstly the long-term reach of strategic objectives, which often exceeds the term of the political leadership that had defined them. Secondly the necessity of restrictions in the present that must be imposed on the norm addressees for the sake of long-term survival of the democratic social order, although they can neither be easily understood nor accepted. Therefrom was the finding deduced that a level of military-internal values-understanding has to be kept up that is necessary to guarantee a straight, unadorned and reliable report of the threat assessment, as political advice from the military towards the government. This piece of advice serves only as the imperative precondition for political decision makers, to meet the force-

requirements that result from the threat-assessment, even when their necessary implementation would demand unpopular decisions.

The first key-result of this paragraph lay with the finding that a withdrawal from international missions respectively a fall back on the defense of EU-core territory, does not represent an option that will lead to democracy-based global security. The goal of a global peace-order will much rather request a balanced, comprehensive approach that bases upon forward stability/democracy projection and at the same time meets the demands, resulting from the mutual interdependence between internal democratic stability and external security.

The section “Strategy” resulted also in the key-finding that the constitutionally anchored separation between the responsibilities for internal and external security, can probably not be kept up any longer, as strictly as hitherto. Apart from the necessary demand of an amalgamation of the role-profiles of military and police that is to be expected, an extremely critical demand for armed forces’ assistance missions, in support to forces of the interior, is likely to occur in cases of internal unrest.

The section **Values-“Constitution”** started with the explanation of the reasons that had led to a definition of the current Western values-set via the metaphor of a “constitution”. Subsequently was the fundamental rationale of the values-based approach to be analyzed that had been deduced from the prevailing character of democracy-/stability-projecting missions, which aim at “hearts and minds” of people in the operations area and which alternativelessly have to be carried by the democratic maturity, respectively conviction of the engaged armed forces.

The phenomenon of „post-modernity“ was researched with regard to its role as an influence-factor on the values-order. Therefore was the basic-rationale of the values-based approach transferred to an analysis according to the two main factors, Inglehart/Welzel use in their world-value survey (abscissa of the diagram ranging from “Survival Values” to “Self Expression Values”, ordinate reaching from „Traditional Values““ to „Secular-Rational Values”). It could be shown that particularly a high parameter-value of “Self Expression”, decreases the willingness to undergo compulsory military service respectively to join the armed forces voluntarily. It also could be substantiated that the fatal combination of lacking will to contribute to collective efforts and the decreasing readiness to defend the country and its democratic political system, would make an uncontrolled development towards post-modernity, potentially democracy-imperiling.

The analysis of the phenomenon of „postmodernity” by the help of the analysis-interface resulted in the core-finding that the systemic difference between “modern” armed forces and post-modern society, must not be seen as *unavoidable*, but much rather would have to be accepted as

*indispensable* and that the above systemic difference is at the same time the *price for* and the *fundamental functional principle* of the sustainment of the postmodern values-canon of society. Therefore it should be avoided, to let this necessary systemic dissimilarity transform into an disagreeable, values-related incompatibility or to push armed forces into the role of a foreign body to the state.

The research on the ethical dimension of military leadership, in particular on the overall soldierly ethos, and its role as an influence-factor on the values-order, led to the key-finding that a restriction of basic freedoms is unavoidable with regard to the fulfillment of the state's demand for obedience to the primacy of politics-principle and that the right to resistance in a metaphorical sense can be used as a kind of "escape valve" that makes the necessary restriction of basic freedoms easier to be accepted by the soldiers.

Furthermore, it could be proved that the combination of leadership in the narrow sense and emotional staff satisfaction is best suited to support the *military* principle of "preventing the emergence of a state within the state".

## **PART FOUR**

### **5. Engineering the Systemic Interdependency-network**

*The interdependency-network between functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership among each other, and between democratic functional principles of the state and the former;*

The entire interdependency-network results only from the synopsis of the interrelations deduced in chapter "Democratic functional principles of the state", the interdependencies identified under chapter "Analysis of Selected, Significant, Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership" and the systemic overview given in this chapter.

"Engineering the systemic interdependency-network" is thereby to be understood as the overarching structure that explains the deduced findings about *general* interdependencies and points

at the chapters of the research that tackle the *individual, specific* interrelations between factors, principles and phenomena. Chapter 5 also comprises basic interdependencies regarding principles that have not been chosen for the exemplary analysis.

The relation-networks, which result from connecting-axes, emanating from individual functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership have been analyzed in chapter 3.4.2.. Here in chapter 5, is the interdependence between the above mentioned relation-networks (“spiders”, **figures 11a-j, Annex 1**) to be explained, including the results of the intersections of military democratic functional principles with those of the state, according to chapter “Analysis“.

Findings throughout chapter “Engineering the Systemic Interdependency Network”, refer to the graphic-representation of relation-networks, **figures 12 a-b, Annex 1**.

The goal of this section lies with the deduction of adjusting screws, by the help of which, political decision-makers and force-planners will be enabled to systemically arrive at democracy-compatible/-supporting and at the same time mission-effective armed forces.

Functional principles will have to fulfill the following preconditions in order to meet the criteria of “adjusting screws” in the above described meaning:

- The respective principle must affect as many dependent other factors as possible,
- it must itself be influenced by as few other factors as possible,
- if it is allowed to be influenced by other factors, then only by those which represent the feed-back of loops that originally had emanated from the principle itself,
- it must be subject to political control instances and the latter’s option to actually initiate and conduct alterations.

### **Systemic Interdependency Network – findings** (see figure 12 a, Annex 1)

The Analysis has led to the result that if the state aims at a long-term peaceful survival of its democratic quality, by the support of democracy-compatible and mission-effective armed forces, under the prevailing security-political paradigm and under continuously shrinking defense-budgets, the systemic interdependency network will arrive at 3 main driving-factors that can be judged “adjusting screws” in the above explained sense - *intellectual history, humanistic general education and values-understanding*.



Among these, there are two bundles of factors, whose ratio between “actively influencing” and “passively being influenced” by other factors, shows a clear preponderance of the former - intellectual history and humanistic general education, whereat only humanistic general education meets the criteria of a political control-instrument. Values-understanding largely eludes political will to change, as the values-perception of the entire civil population can hardly be altered on a short-/mid-term basis - its actively influencing-component however, clearly outweighs the passive one.

**Intellectual history** is hardly subject to political control measures as it relates to the past and can always be perceived only a posteriori. Planners will have to know, analyze, respect its influence, care for its being taught at military academies, to learn from abstracted lessons and systemic errors, and to try to derive future developments from it. However, can intellectual history not be recommended as an adjusting screw in the initially defined sense.

**History of thought** influences directly, and via the intellectual history related basics of military leadership, via leadership-philosophy and by thinking about war, the performance-principle, values-understanding and humanistic general education. The latter affects via military-/leadership-science and tertiary leadership education, the complexes of organic and strategic leadership. In turn it has been influenced by the historic values development.

**Thinking about war** serves as a main guarantor of the primacy of politics, thus for the reliability of armed forces and it represents an important precondition, particularly for assistance missions in the interior, in case they would become necessary, due to the development of the security situation. Above that, it strongly influences the basic strategic decision between defensive with operational, (in case of need) offensive capabilities and operations of a more preventive/preemptive character, the choice of security-strategic options (resulting from the strategic alignment-path) and of the respective scientific methodology as a basis for tertiary education of military leaders and thus for the achievement of leadership superiority/mission effectiveness despite limited budgetary resources. Academic education of future officers reinforces the outcome of the “citizen in uniform”-idea and reduces democratic incompatibility (perceived from the outside), when officers prove to be successful in private business, after having quit active service.

Leadership-philosophy, insofar as mission-type-leadership is concerned, represents the basis for a self-depending, situational evaluation capability, and thus provides a compensation for pre-fabricated plan-solutions. Moreover it enables military leaders to judge between the applicability of mission-type- and order-type-leadership in the respective combat situation and to switch

between both, as this will be requested in order to achieve mission-effectiveness and leadership-superiority under the options, network centric warfare provides. Mission-type-leadership also ensures the participation of the soldier in the decision-making/leadership practice, i.e. in the success of the unit, and thus an increase of allegiance and loyalty within the “democratic” framework of the unit.

**Humanistic general education** in the Humboldtian sense, significantly influences the complexes organic- and strategic-leadership, via military-/leadership science. It directly or indirectly influences the majority of functional principles actively and is in turn not passively affected (except for the influence from intellectual history that has to be respected, but via which no controlling effect can be exercised). In case, humanistic general education is chosen as an “adjusting screw”, then any approach to improve the educational quality can (as opposed to an attempt to change the values-perception) be limited to service members only.

According to the above chain of arguments, humanistic general education turns out to be the primary adjusting screw for the alignment of armed forces into the direction of an improved democracy-compatible and mission-effective quality. To start reorganization-approaches with humanistic general education would - according to the metaphor of the tree before winter - allow to contain the lifeblood, i.e. the intellectual soft skills of military leadership-doctrine within the trunk, although the leaves, i.e. hardware and armament that cannot be maintained due to limited budget, are thrown off and eventually to sprout anew when the security-political situation should require it. This principle would particularly pay off in the German language-area, where the existing history of thought-related basis and practiced mission-type-leadership are extremely favorable for an education-driven development.

Abstractly spoken, could the time-span, in which the demand for substantially raised defense-budgets (which were needed in order to maintain sovereignty and autonomy of European countries), is not yet perceived in political reality with the adequate “psychological strain”, be bridged by the preservation and development of those soft skills that are imperative for a grow-up in numbers and capabilities, in case of re-emerging threat.

By raising the level of humanistic general education for service members and a tertiary, military-/leadership-scientific qualification of military leaders, will the external perception, according to which the armed forces could be seen as a foreign body within civil society, be kept low. On the other hand would this approach lead to a better understanding within the armed forces, for a necessary, “seeming” remnant-incompatibility (that actually just serves the primacy of politics, i.e. the democratic compatibility in the higher hierarchical context).

It moreover would generate a higher degree of leadership superiority, by compensating for lacking resources as well as by representing means to keep the number of casualties low (the ongoing development towards a postmodern values-understanding would lead to an immediate withdrawal of public support for a mission, as soon as the number of casualties would go up too high). An intensified humanistic general education would also lead to an increased mission-effectiveness in scenarios that get continuously and increasingly demanding.

As shown in the analysis part, mission-type-leadership emerged from the principle to compensate numeric inferiority by a superior level of education and mental skills. The demand for brainpower did thereby not only regard the higher command-levels. Mission-type-leadership worked its effect much rather via the broadly based educational qualification of leaders of *all* ranks, in particular of non-commissioned officers, as they represented, due to their number, the biggest multiplier of the advantages, leadership-philosophy was able to provide.

To educate a large number of subordinate leaders from a relatively low educational starting position to a medium level, requests big budgetary means – raising only higher-levels' leaders to an intellectual peak-performance, whereas subordinate leaders remain on an educational level that just copes with the requirements of order-type-leadership, can be done at lower education-expenditures.

Therefrom results the choice between

- highly educated military “leadership-elites”, with relatively low educated subordinate levels and an order-type-heavy leadership philosophy based upon sufficient natural/fossil resources,
- and a broad based education of all ranks that contradicts to a disproportionate increase of the educational level for higher ranks, where limited material resources make mission-type-leadership alternativeless.

Both approaches, a broad based education for all ranks and an outstanding military scientific qualification for higher leadership levels alike, will be very unlikely to work at the same time, particularly in times of shrinking budgets. Paradoxically does mission-type-leadership, the rationale of which just is to compensate numeric inferiority by superior brainpower, not leave much space for military-specific peak-performance, regarding scientific qualification of highest leadership levels. If the overhead leadership of mission-type led armed forces needs highly expert, scientific knowledge for reorganization, strategic alignment, strategic concept-

development etc., then it uses to include civil academics of the requested research disciplines into its staffs. These academics are mostly experts on civil scientific disciplines, made familiar with the military-specific request – but they don't tackle the military core-disciplines (military-strategy, operations, tactics, logistics, general basics of leadership) on a specific military-scientific basis.

What would be needed in order to cope with both, almost antagonistic requests, at the same time, is the development of a leadership science that is abstracted from military science, developed further and taught at tertiary educational institutions of the armed forces that tackles leadership under time-critical, hardly predictable, complex situations, also for civil students. By this approach could the military contribute to comprehensive education measures of the state, and thus make the scientific research in military core-disciplines affordable, without giving up on the principle of a broad education of soldiers of all ranks. Just this broad based education is – due to the general impact of education on democracy-compatibility - a major precondition for the democratic maturity of armed forces.

Seen from the systemic perspective of an interdependency network, a humanistic general education-driven approach entails a fivefold, mutually interrelated, implication as it serves:

- As the basis for military education/ training (which particularly applies with forces that are mission-type-leadership oriented),
- thus as the fundament for mission-effectiveness and leadership-superiority,
- as a means to reduce democratic-values related incompatibility of armed forces in the perception of civil society,
- as the precondition for policy-advice and especially for the contribution of higher military levels to the strategic goal-setting of the state, and
- as the starting point for the development of an autonomous military-science and its enhancement towards a general leadership-science, whereby the comprehensive aspect of security-political approaches of the state could be supported.

**Values-understanding** can substantially influence so many vital and critically important, core-functional principles of military leadership, but is in turn affected and driven by a multitude of factors that are not directly politically motivated (i.e. factors that are not consciously controlled, like e.g. the current development of society towards postmodernity), so that any political intervention (which above that would have to address the entire population) would work neither short- nor mid-term success.

Democratic-values-compatibility must therefore be ensured through humanistic general education, tertiary military-/leadership-scientific qualification of officers, participation of soldiers in the decision making of their unit - from the side of the military, and by the conviction that former service-members represent highly educated and skilled personnel-resources in the civil business-environment – from the side of civil society. A certain degree of necessary incompatibility, inherent to the system, will have to be put up with and made understandable/acceptable by a value-related general education of soldiers.

Values-understanding affects the majority of democracy-relevant principles of military leadership, but can in turn, with regard to the fact that change programs would have to include the *entire population* – if at all – only be influenced moderately and on a long-term basis by humanistic general education. Is the values-perception to be altered *only with focus on the military* (this is the case, when the unavoidable portion of remnant-incompatibility is to be made understandable/ acceptable for the soldiers by humanistic education), then will the intended purpose of the acceptance of remnant-incompatibility rather be achieved. However would on the other hand, the overall-suspicion that the military though is an isolated foreign body to society, paradoxically be additionally raised.

The current security political paradigm of Western state community bases on the projection of democratic values. The basic rationale of the resulting values-based approach (see chapter “Values “Constitution” Within the Armed Forces”) had been deduced from the prevailing character of democracy-/stability-projecting missions, and their guiding principle of reaching “hearts and minds” of the people in the operations area. As the strategic goal of these missions lies with the creation of self-sustaining, survivable, peaceful democratic structures and because these missions imperatively require armed forces of a reliable democratic maturity respectively conviction, is an influence of the given values-understanding on mission effectiveness to be recognized.

This influence works via the effect-chain from general values-perception on organic military leadership, from there subsequently on applied leadership-philosophy and finally on mission-effectiveness. So if the general values-understanding of society does not support the defense of a “fortified” democracy and neither can be changed on short-/mid-term basis, and if a more robust and less post-modern values-perception is though needed as a basis for the above effect-chain that leads to mission effectiveness, then will this values-perception have to be altered for the armed forces alone – whereby a certain degree of values-incompatibility will not only have to be put up with but rather have to be accepted as a necessary principle.

Whereas the values-perception of armed forces will have to be oriented towards a less post-modern understanding that supports defense-capabilities (and at the same time is the prerequisite for the primacy of politics-principle), where it is about safeguarding the society's post-modern lifestyle, it also will have to emphasize specific, also postmodern, democratic values, where it is about imbuing soldiers with an understanding that represents the indispensable precondition for the principle of democracy-/peace-projection.

As the analysis part showed, there is the risk that democracy-transfer according to the pattern of the Western state community might be accepted in its perceived outcome, but rejected regarding the way and necessary efforts that are indispensable for the achievement of these goals. Because peace-projection as a whole might therefore be judged as a concealed form of occupation or heteronomy, armed forces, must be sufficiently imbued with democratic values, in order not to favor such a perception.

The further bundles of functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership (except for history of thought, humanistic general education and values-understanding) are controllable by political will, but rather represent derived parameters with a balanced ratio between actively influencing and passively being influenced by others. Therefore it will have to be suggested to control them via the factors from which they are derived instead of defining them as primary adjusting screws.

**Organic leadership** derives from military-/leadership-science via higher leadership-training. It increases mission effectiveness by the systemic interaction between the individual components of organic leadership. Its consistent chain of leadership qualities from strategic goal setting to tactical techniques, supports the primacy of politics by granting the seamless implementation of given missions consistently down through all hierarchical levels, which works most effective, when the highest military level is included in the strategic goal setting-process of the state.

**Leadership in the narrower sense**, supports via its human oriented-quality, democratic-value-related compatibility of the individual soldier within his/her unit, respectively of the armed forces within the state. It serves as the bridging principle between strategic goal setting and operational implementation, as it facilitates the understanding for restrictions of democratic freedoms of soldiers that become necessary with regard to the strategic goals of the state and the democracy-political embedding of armed forces into the state's constitution.

**Strategic Leadership** derives, like organic leadership, from military-/leadership-science via higher leadership-training and additionally from the complex "thinking about war". It signifi-

cantly influences the alignment of armed forces, the military-strategic advice towards the comprehensive strategic level, concerning the security-political options and the according force-planning.

Via its basic idea, to secure sovereignty, and thereby the long-term, peaceful survival of democracy, strategy is linked to humanistic general education, military-/leadership science and organic leadership. Strategic concepts determine the recruiting system, have to be mirrored in the national constitution and contribute to the definition of competences for internal/external security.

**Basic interdependencies between factors that have not been chosen for the exemplary analysis** (see figure 12 b, Annex 1)

Such interdependencies are of particular importance for the definition of the specific starting position for the national evaluation by the help of the structured analysis model. They, sort of predetermine the perspective, under which the interrelation between the factors that had been exemplarily selected for the analysis-part, has to be seen by the respective user of the model.

The choice of joining a **security-political system** or to refrain from, is therefore topic-relevant, because it mirrors the democratic embedding of the state in a higher than the national, democratic integration framework. Above that is the orientation and functioning, particularly of the collective defense systems, crucial for the achievement of a global peace order and thus for the long-term survival of the model of Western democracy.

The decision on which security-political system to join, is strongly influenced by history of thought, via thinking about war. Is there a tradition of thought prevailing that aims at passive avoidance of war that suggests to rely on the stabilizing effect of international treaties or of International Law as a whole, or on bigger states to guarantee peace by military power and to provide shelter under their umbrella of credible armed forces, then there will be a higher inclination to cooperative security systems respectively to keeping up neutrality. Is thinking about war rather oriented towards an understanding that includes active defense, i.e. military power-projection in case the security of the state-community is threatened from the outside, then there will be a higher inclination to a collective alliance/union. As the latter orientation shows more commitment towards a common endeavor to arrive at a global peace order, and a stronger willingness to a fair sharing of coercively demandable contributions, it doubtlessly has to be judged as the one that proves a higher democratic quality-level, from the perspective of an inter-/supra-national integration framework.

The necessity of the acceptance that common security requests substantial contributions by the individual member state, clearly shows that the decision on which security-political system to join, is strongly influenced also by the prevailing values-“constitution”. The values-understanding of society influences the character of the membership to a security-political system. In the case of a collective security-system it can support either the notion that the advantage of the system lies mainly with contributions that are less expensive now than self-dependent national defense was or on the other hand the insight that substantial and fair contributions would allow for necessary capabilities that couldn't have been provided by individual nations alone. In the case of neutrality, the respective values-understanding is to be judged relevant for the orientation whether the national strategy relies on stronger states to provide security against threats from the outside (i.e. if the strategy builds on the hope to get along with budgetary means that are lower than contributions to a collective security-system would be) or if it is carried by the awareness that self-dependent defense – if it were taken seriously - would be more expensive than the collective approach, and that the “privilege” of “independence” would request higher budgets, if defense-capabilities were not to be sacrificed.

The choice between a membership to collective or cooperative security-systems as well as the decision to keep up neutrality, influences the strategic orientation of the state towards democracy-projection or the fall back to the defense of EU-core-territory and thereby indirectly towards the need for measures to cope with the simultaneous demand for internal and external security. As this basic strategic orientation affects the role profile and the capabilities of the armed forces that are to carry it out, it also has a strong influence on the national force-planning.

The decision on a certain security-system is also influenced by the **geostrategic location** of a state. Whereas states in the geographic center of an alliance/union might easier be seduced to refrain from a membership to a collective security-system, respectively from substantial, solidary contributions, will peripheral states have less choice to abstain from such an alliance (the status of Sweden only seemingly contradicts to that finding – Sweden actually compensates lacking defense-guarantees by a tight security-cooperation with the USA). Democracy relevance results here from the fact that halfhearted willingness to solidary defense contributions of states in the geographical center result in a diversified threat-perception and the suspicion of peripheral states that the alliance/union would leave them in the lurch as soon as an outside attack occurs (the development of defense-budgets particularly in the Baltic states substantiates that finding). If Europe understands itself as a supranational *democratic* integration framework then it must take the fears of peripheral member-states more serious, which means that it must force its center-states that are less exposed to external threat, to higher, solidary contributions in



order to prevent the states on the outskirts of the alliance/union from losing trust in the granted defense guarantees.

The geostrategic characteristic (i.e. maritime/continental location) of a state affects the strategic options via the choice of the security-political-system, to join. Maritime states will rather be inclined to forward-stability-projection, and if they have sufficient military power at their command, also to the pursuit of specific national interests in the course of international stabilizing missions. Particularly Mediterranean states will - due to their exposedness to large-scale illegal migration – have a bigger interest in security-systems that commit themselves to mutual assistance in case of excessive migration. The geostrategic location is insofar closely linked to the resources-aspect, as states that don't have access to the sea and above that are at the same time strongly depending on abroad resources, will hardly have another strategic option than to join and credibly engage in a collective security-system that bases upon active stability-/democracy-projection.

The geostrategic conditions exercise their influence on the choice of the security-political-system on a political short- and mid-term basis. On the long-term they affect thinking about<sup>182</sup> war and via the latter on the one hand the continuous actualization of the character of the contribution to the chosen security-political-system and on the other hand strategic goal setting (subsequently, as shown above, also the selection between the strategic options “forward-stability projection” and “defense of European core-territory”).

With regard to the resources-situation, will states that are depending on abroad resources, particularly when they are militarily powerful enough, generally prefer strategic options that aim at stability-projection under possible articulation of national interests. Democracy relevance is given here because of the fact that resource-interests that are not credibly legitimated by the stabilizing effect of a humanitarian mission, might lead to a perception of injustice and thus represent a new source of discontentedness and instability - in other words might endanger the achievement of a reliable, global peace-order.

From the above argumentation can be deduced that the resource-situation as well as the geostrategic location influence the choice of the respective strategic option (stability-projection – withdrawal to the defense of European core-territory) mainly indirectly via their influence on the national decision on the membership to a certain security-political system.

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<sup>182</sup> Compare e.g. Halford Mackinder „Heartland-Theory“, Carl Schmitt „Land und Meer“, Alfred Thayer Mahan about the „unique historical dominance of seapower“, Dean Acheson „Containment-Doctrine“, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The topic-relevance of the aforementioned interrelation is to be explained by the help of the following example. The USA, as the archetype of a maritime power is about to shift its strategic main effort to the Pacific region. Due to the plan to get independent from the Gulf-oil by 2030 (based on American and Canadian shale-gas fields), the Gulf region will cease to be a strategic main concern of the USA. However will the continent continue to depend on the control over the area, as 70% of the container sea-transport for Europe and about 30% of the oil-deliveries pass the Suez Canal. Germany would have the geostrategic conditions but though refrains from strengthening its maritime presence. Its close friendship with Russia, the territory of which covers at least one third of the “strategic resources ellipse”, ensures extensive resource-security even in case that political changes would deny European states access to the Gulf-region. That means that the other European states, i.e. primarily the European member-states of NATO, will have few alternatives to building up an appropriate (maritime) projection-capability onto this area. The way how Germany will support this approach respectively how it will harmonize its regional “alliance” with the security interests of the other EU-states, will be decisive for Europe’s functioning as a “democratic” body with factually shared burdens and crucial for a global peace-order that requests a reliable compensation for the power vacuum, the USA will leave. The global peace-order to be achieved, is in turn – whereby the circle closes - the imperative precondition for the long-term survival of national democracies, the rights granted by them, their livelihood and their postmodern lifestyle. The inherent logic of the current strategic challenge, described by the above example, was to show the complex interrelation between geostrategic location, resource-situation and the alignment towards the chosen security-political system.

**The demographic development** is mutually interrelated with values-“constitution”, as the values perception of immigrants of different ethnic and cultural background changes the prior values-perception and as the currently prevailing values-set of Western democracies leads to a decline of the birth-rate and thus to an increasing number of immigrants from different cultural areas. This change in the perception of Western values will also lead to an altered perception of democratic principles per se, the relation between religious and political power or of basic freedoms (as particularly the societal role of females). Democracy-relevance is therefore given here because of the fact that an excessive development towards post-modernity will coercively lead to a threat to the democratic self-determination, along the lines of the Western pluralistic democracy, by the incorporated new values-set. These new values will – according to democratic rules and majority-ratios - subsequently have to be written down in the national **constitutions**, which is why it will from then on not be possible anymore to contradict these values in a democratic way. Should this development take place, would also the current security-political para-

digm of democracy-/stability-projection lose its function, as what applies for the current democratic understanding, namely its peace-supporting effect, must not prove true for the altered values-set.

The influence of demographic development on the **recruiting-system** results from the fact that given a higher percentage of immigration, professional-armies will disproportionately attract volunteers from a diverse ethnic/cultural background, as this ethnic/cultural diversity regularly correlates to less privileged social strata and because members of these strata often see one of their rare economic chances in enlisting for military service, despite the dangerous missions they have to put up with and despite the relatively low guerdon. This development leads (as it was discussed in depth under “democratic compatibility of armed forces”) on the one hand to armed forces that don’t mirror a representative image of society anymore, and thus run the risk of being perceived as a foreign-body to the state, and on the other hand to units with restricted mission effectiveness due to their multiethnic composition. Multiethnic composition of military units results on the one hand in difficulties with their internal functioning and on the other hand in mission caveats that turn out as soon as contingents that comprise soldiers of a specific ethnic origins, are employed in democracy-/stability-projecting missions, under the imperative of impartiality, and one of the conflicting parties, to be held back from hostilities against each other, is of exact that ethnic origin. A possible remedy lies with the option of conscription elements within the total composition of armed forces, a thorough democracy-political, particularly values-oriented education in order to facilitate a frictionless internal functioning of multiethnic units and a sophisticated contingency planning for abroad missions that ensures that only those soldiers are employed in a certain mission, who are not of the same ethnic origin as one of the conflicting parties.

It had been explained under the paradigm of the mutual interdependence between internal democratic stability and external security that actors who antagonize stabilizing operations, will according to plan, try to hit the homebase of the troop contributing nation at its critical infrastructure. Armed forces will therefore have to develop operating procedures for counter-terrorism warfare (“-assistance”-missions), by which they can support the forces of the interior.

As the terrorist-attack will be carried out by dependents of one of the conflicting parties, and as immigration frequently originates just from these regions to which the state community projects stability, it is very likely that multiethnic-units will comprise soldiers who whether are of the same ethnic background as the terrorists or of the opposite one. Military assistance missions within the state are that sensitive that soldiers under no circumstances must be exposed to such moral conflicts.

If the multiethnic composition of units has reached a level that does not sufficiently exclude any chance of ethnic partiality, then counter-terror-assistance missions within the state must be unconditionally deleted from the role profile of armed forces, whereby the interrelation between demographic development, **force-planning** options and the paradigm of the **mutual interdependence between internal and external security** was to be analyzed.

As the leadership philosophy “mission-type-leadership” bases upon a history of thought-related process (in particular upon the findings of the age of enlightenment) and a values-perception that is specific particularly for European states, would also the therefrom derived, **applied leadership philosophy** have to be abandoned, as soon as the underlying values-perception would have been essentially altered due to a demographic development that had led to a massive immigration from regions of diverse ethnic/cultural background.

### **Three mainstreams of interdependencies**

The systemic interdependency network eventually arrives at three mainstreams of interdependencies and according path-sequences of interrelations:

- Firstly intellectual history that via history of thoughts related basics of military leadership, thinking about war and leadership philosophy, influences the principle of humanistic general education, subsequently military-/ leadership-science and the performance principle.

It has to be taken into account as a basis for the tertiary education within the armed forces, but cannot serve as a primary setting screw for political interventions, as it regards developments that have already passed.

- Secondly humanistic general education that influences military-/ leadership-science, general staff education, via the scientific methodology of the synthesis between theoretical and empirical approaches and the ethical component of leadership, the complexes of organic and strategic leadership, derived from the latter the strategic alignment of armed forces, the choice of security-strategic options, including the according force planning and the links to the determination of the recruiting system, the national constitution as well as to the competence-distribution between internal and external security-tasks. Humanistic general education influences the majority of military core-principles without being in turn influenced by other factors except for intellectual history. It can – as opposed to intellectual history - be controlled by political interventions.

- Thirdly values-understanding with its influence on the recruiting system, strategic-leadership, performance-principle, humanistic general education, military-/ leadership-science and the ethical dimension of military leadership. Values understanding can on a short-/mid-term basis not be successfully altered for the entire population.

Values-education with focus only on service members will support the acceptance of necessary restrictions of democratic freedoms due to the superior strategic goal, but will paradoxically increase the suspicion of a remnant democracy-incompatibility.

This remnant-incompatibility will have to be countersteered again by humanistic general education of soldiers.

### **Critical Path – suggested solution**

The analysis, the derived interdependency network and the three mainstreams of interrelations have led to the following critical path that at the same time represents the suggested solution under the chosen, exemplarily evaluated, democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership. Thereby is also a first feed-back to the hypothesis given, as this critical path aims at logically deduced recommendations, on how interacting factors must be steered and controlled militarily as well as politically, in order to achieve the requested democratic quality of armed forces (according to 1.2.2. Hypothesis/ Concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.3)) and simultaneously the optimal mission effectiveness, at lowest possible costs.

- **Intellectual history** has to be taken into account with respect to its importance for humanistic general education. Via thinking about war, has leadership-philosophy to be made the basis upon which humanistic general education and derived from the latter military-/ leadership-science may build.
- **Humanistic general education** is to be defined and used as the **primary adjusting screw**, through which military-/ leadership-science, higher leadership-training, the synergetic theory/empiricism methodology, organic leadership (that aims at decision-making-superiority in order to keep the numbers of casualties low and that provides a synthesis between situational assessment-capability and pragmatic operating instructions as well as between situational decision-making and contingency-planning) including applied leadership-philosophy, the ethical dimension of military leadership and finally strategic leadership can be systemically influenced.

- **Humanistic general education with the derived military-/ leadership-science** will have to be used a second time as an adjusting screw, with respect to the necessary reduction of the values-related, democracy-political incompatibility of armed forces. Tertiary education will represent the critical success-factor in order to countersteer the external perception of the military as an isolated, subsystem of society. Through values-related general education, with focus only on service members, will the necessary, system-inherent remnant-incompatibility have to be made understandable/acceptable for soldiers.

## **6. Results, Prospects, Recommendation, Verification**

### **6.1. New Scientific Results, Future Prospects, Recommendation**

Analysis and systemic interdependency network were planned to give an answer, on how future, 21<sup>st</sup> century armed forces will have to be set up in principle, structured and strategically oriented in order to cope with the task of effectively securing the survival of values-defined, western democracies. Thus a first feed-back to the hypothesis had been given.

Now, in chapter 6.1., will the innovatory value of the deduced scientific results have to be identified and described, together with the according useability for present force-planning processes.

Furthermore will the outcome of the research, presented in chapter 5 be checked for applicability under a changed situation that might result from foreseeable security-political developments. Above that, there are general pragmatic recommendations to be given that could facilitate the initiation of a profound systemic reorganization-process, to be based on the suggested assessment-model.

#### **New Scientific Results – Innovatory/Explanatory Added Value of the Research**

It has been explained in chapter „Academic Problem“ that a down-grading of armed forces without knowledge and consideration of the systemic interrelation between their democracy-related functional principles, would destroy the fundament for the maintenance of the internal democratic stability of the state.

By the structured analysis model, it had been tried to catch up with the missing analysis of the above relationships and to provide a basis for a systemic advice to force-planners and the political level that couldn't be given so far.

Therefore lies the the main-part of the achieved innovatory added value of the research, with the structured analysis model, which is a tool in a triple manner – a tool for the conduct of the research itself, a tool for the national users individual evaluation, and finally the tool, the exemplary use of which results in the findings that were to be transformed into recommendations to the political decision-level. The novelty of the approach primarily lies with

- the aptitude of the model, to be easily adapted to the national assessment-needs of the user, because of starting from an initial-position for the evaluation that is deduced from the respective history of thought related development,
- the widest possible range of military functional principles, on the basis of which the synopsis is conducted,
- the *simultaneous* and balanced transformation of military functional principles as well as of functional principles of the state into an interface-appropriate order logic that allows for a systemic intersection of individual factors,
- the differentiation between “driving” and “depending”-factors, and the therefrom derived, suggested sequence of control- respectively steering measures that allow for a systemic reorganization of armed forces,
- the prioritization of phases of a reorganization that are derived from the suggested sequence of steering-measures and that allow for the system-compatible implementation of the most urgent process-steps, in case available budgetary means for the entire restructuring of forces are not sufficient,
- identification of setting screws that allow to restructure armed forces systemically i.e. without generating unintended collateral disadvantages that outweigh the benefits of the entire reorganization-process.

Furthermore it had been deduced that armed forces must not mainly be considered a tolerated evil, but rather the *conditio sine qua non* for the peaceful survival of the state, which only on the basis of its intact sovereignty may grant democratic rights and freedoms. Paradoxically however – and there lies another portion of the innovatory added value of the research - is the

security, created by the armed forces, at the same time precondition for the carelessness of the people that only enables the questioning of military defense and the depreciation of military forces in general, and which thus significantly weakens the willingness to confess to a fortified democracy.

By the explanation of dependencies between democratic functional principles of the state and democracy-relevant military principles on the basis of a systemic interdependencies-network, had *a tool been offered to the political decision-making level as well as to force planners* that helps to secure peace and state-sovereignty as the basis for a democratic social order, through effective armed forces and that at the same time allows to counteract the paradox mentioned above, in a democracy-compatible way.

### **Useability For Present Force-Planning Processes**

The usability of the presented research results is to be evaluated with regard to their aptitude to support force-planning processes and armed forces-related political decision making, including their potential collateral use for the civil society. Usability in this understanding had been achieved in the following results:

- The analysis of the history of thought related development that had led to the democracy-policy related starting position of the individual user of the model, contributes to a better understanding of national peculiarities respectively of different notions concerning the perception of the democracy-principle and thus supports a better multinational cooperation in defense matters.
- Using armed forces as a “sample” for the appraisal of the values-orientation of society – a sample that is particularly telling because the internal functional logic of armed forces and the threat one would be exposed to, when serving with a military unit under combat-conditions - makes the importance of values and their necessary restriction, extremely visible and painfully perceivable. Thus a starting point for force-planners as well as for the state can be given, to influence and counteract values-development as a precondition for the democratic quality of armed forces respectively of the society as a whole.
- The compilation of the current democracy-political quality of armed forces provides the basis for the identification of a possible request to catch up with the desired standard.



- The detection of democracy-political strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces offers different strategic options for the reorganization of armed forces, if the threat-scenario allows such a choice.
- Scenario-based planning that includes the effects of an overvalued democracy-compatibility on mission effectiveness as well as approaches, which gradually sacrifice democratic quality of armed forces for an increase of combat-readiness, allows the definition of a national strategic profile for foreign missions (i.e. to give an answer to the strategic question, if the respective user's current ratio between democracy-compatibility and mission effectiveness does rather predestine towards humanitarian-, peace enforcing missions or towards operations, which aim at extorting access to vital resources abroad, when they are detained by troublemakers in order to hold Western democracies ransom).
- The detection of synergy-effects between humanistic general education (for the purpose of the internal democratic functioning of armed forces) and the beneficial influence of higher educated soldiers/military leaders on civil society as soon as they leave active service.
- The detection of setting screws for a systemic restructuring of armed forces towards a democracy-compatible and at the same time mission effective aggregate state.
- Advice to the political decision-level and to force-planners on how to restructure armed forces towards democracy-compatibility and mission effectiveness at lowest possible costs, by the use of the above setting screws and the suggested sequence of their operationalization.
- The creation of a tertiary educational institution that offers the academic discipline of "Leadership Science" (leadership in time-critical, complex, hardly predictable situations) for future leaders in the fields of politics, diplomacy, private business and military.
- The side-effect of an abstracted leadership expertise, derived from leadership-philosophy (in particular from mission-oriented leadership) can be used by private business leadership – whereby a higher degree of „quasi-“ democratic participation of co-workers could be achieved.
- A contribution to the integration of soldiers of different cultural-/ethnic background into military units – whereby, in a longer run, also a contribution could be made to the integration of citizens of different cultural-/ethnic background into public social life.

- Transfer of the democracy-political sensitivity that is achieved by the state through the use of the analysis-model, to superior integration-frameworks – whereby long-term peace-oriented approaches can also be supported on a transnational/global level.

### **Future Prospects – Applicability Under a Changed Security-political Situation**

Seen from a mid-term perspective, democracy-projection will remain alternativeless. Any fall-back on the defense of the European core-territory will not represent a new strategy – it will on the contrary only have to be judged as a deficit of the previous one. Armed forces will therefore, more coercively than now, have to be structured and organized around the core principle of mutual interdependence between internal and external security, i.e. will have to provide capabilities for interventions and simultaneously for national defense and homebase-protection. This scenario will dramatically increase the importance of a democracy-compatible military and thus of the need for instruments and processes to create mission effectiveness under the imperative necessity of democratic values imbued armed forces. The research at hand aimed at supporting just these approaches.

This above described demand will emerge for European states regardless of their strategic orientation. The protection of critical civil infrastructure will be imperative for states that participate in intervention missions at a high level of ambition (such states will depend on homebase-protection like the boxer depends on the fist, covering his face), but also for nations that abstain from interventions, as the guiding principle of terrorism will still lie with its unpredictability. If continuously shortened defense-budgets would result in the necessity to withdraw from the idea of democracy-projection, homebase-related capabilities of armed forces will be required for the common defense against illegal migration, organized crime and proliferation – phenomena that necessarily would expand and get worse due to western state community's abstinence from stabilizing missions in the periphery.

Europe is at the moment the only region on this globe, where defense-budgets are continuously shrinking. The United States plan to be self-sustaining, with regard to fossil resources, from the Gulf-region by 2025-2030 – not so the EU. Europe will have to create the capability to intervene in order to maintain access to vital resources – without large-scale military support from the United States, to fight terror and cyber-threat inside the homebase, to fend off illegal migration and to provide effective missile-defense.

The question of how important the capability of conventional defense will get, substantially depends on the prognosis of how likely the recovery of Russian offensive capabilities will have

to be assessed. Syria might be the acid-test for such an estimate. The strategic assessment of states on the Northern flank of NATO-territory (Sweden, Finland) as well as the budgetary development in the Baltic states point out into the direction of a regaining of conventional offensive capabilities by Russia.

As the thesis had explicitly excluded to argue in favor of higher defense-budgets, it will be complied with this resolution also for the future-prospects part. What must be concluded here however, is the European demand, to bridge this phase of limited budgets until a point of time, when foreseeable security-political changes will require to grow up in numbers and skills, which – as deduced above – will include the demand for conventional defense, intervention-capabilities, simultaneous homebase-protection (i.e. counter-terror, cyber-defense, defense against illegal migration) and for missile defense.

Analysis and systemic interdependency network have arrived at the suggestion, to start the reorganization of armed forces at the setting screw “humanistic general education”. The latter provides, via its influence on military-/leadership-science, an instrument that is best-suited for supporting the preservation and development of soft-skills while budgetary means for defense-procurement are lacking, and the basic readiness to grow up in a future case of need has to be kept up.

The result of the analysis and of the systemic interdependency network has thus proven to be consistent with foreseeable future developments.

## **Recommendation**

Pragmatic recommendations on how to initiate a profound reorganization of armed forces will have to start with the proposal to conduct a first national assessment about the principle interrelation between the survival of a democratic social order and democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership - the structured analysis model supports this initial estimate by the findings represented in chapter “Assessment of the Respective User’s Initial Situation”, sub-chapter “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State”.

If the ultimate goal of democracy-projection lies with global peace, then it is recommended to think democracy-relevant interrelations always in the intergration-framework-levels, as suggested in sub-chapter “Categorization Dimensions / Participation”.

As the core-finding of the analysis lay with the dominant influence of humanistic general education on the democracy-political quality of armed forces that worked effect via its aggregate states “military-” respectively “leadership-science”, and as the demand for strategic assessment expertise is articulated in various fields of public life, then it has to be recommended to establish a tertiary educational institution on university-level, under the responsibility of the armed forces that commits itself to military-/leadership-science in order to cope with the demand for strategic expertise and to contribute to the comprehensive defense-approach of the state by providing profound policy advice.

In order to countersteer the perceived deficits of strategic target-identification and -assessment expertise, should a trans-ministerial staff-organisation be considered, directly responsible to the parliament or the federal chancellery The top leadership-echelons of the armed forces could - via the instrument of policy advice - be called upon, to support strategy development, strategic goal-setting/-evaluation and to contribute to a professionally underpinned threat-analysis (thus creating a helpful corrective regarding excessively optimistic threat perceptions).

Democracy relevance of this approach is given, because a long-term strategic orientation represents the imperative precondition for enduring democratic peace.

Should the insight prevail that the state needs a trans-ministerial staff under direct responsibility of the parliament/chancellery, for the purpose of strategic goal-setting, then it has to be recommended that military leadership-functions should contribute to this staff by suggestions regarding the decision-preparatory phase of the political target-definition. The expertise for such a contribution would derive from the level of the tertiary military education that originally had to be raised for the purpose of achieving the necessary democracy-political quality of the armed forces, and that can be used now also for the participation in the strategic staff, described above.

Political leadership and force-planners are to be recommended to create and support a new discipline of leadership-science for complex, time-critical, unpredictable situations that could be derived from military-science and that could be developed under responsibility of the military, and that would represent a unique and imperative contribution to the requested strategic target identification and -assessment expertise.

The contribution to the national strategic goal-definition, aims at a long-term peaceful survival of the state, which is in turn imperative precondition for the latter’s capability to guarantee democratic rights and freedoms and thus of enormous democracy-relevance.

Regardless of the specific national starting position and framework-conditions of the respective

user of the analysis model, does the research-result allow for the general core-recommendation, to lay the main effort of reorganizations on raising the level of general humanistic education with the armed forces, to underpin military-/leadership-science, which has to grow up from this education, by history of thought related findings, to transform the outcome of military-/leadership-science into a highly expert basis for operational and tactical leadership-training, to use the increased educational level for the reduction of asserted democracy-political incompatibility and at the same time for the purpose, to make the inevitable but also necessary remnant incompatibility, digestible and acceptable for the military.

Aside from the systematic assessment, following the pattern of the suggested structured analysis model, and aside from the practical implementation according to the respective national evaluation of factors-complexes/adequate “setting screws”, there can recommendations be given that are insofar of particular importance, as they – *in this specific composition* - facilitate the initial understanding for core-principles of the analysis process and their mutual influence best:

- considering intellectual history as the basis for humanistic general education, tertiary education and strategic leadership,
- raising the level of humanistic general education within the armed forces as a precondition for the creation of military-/leadership-science and for the avoidance of democracy-political incompatibility,
- establishing military-/leadership science as the basis for organic leadership, the strategic orientation towards global peace, and the ethical corrective for military leadership as a whole,
- raising the level of tertiary education/training for leadership-personnel as a means to preserve soft skills in times of limited budgets and to maintain readiness to grow up in numbers and capabilities if the security political situation requests it (see the “tree-metaphor”),
- reducing values-related incompatibility of armed forces by tertiary education/training that results in „citizens in uniform”, which prove to be successful also in a private business-environment,
- making inevitable remnant-incompatibility understandable/acceptable bei emphasizing humanistic general education.

The above formulated recommendations are – from the side of the author – substantially influenced by the events of the decades since 1990. The decline of European military forces and budget constraints indicate a development in Western democracies that are not without risk. Secondly there is a clear tendency that large segments of the European societies do not consider military defense, sufficient defense budgets and capabilities as necessary. Thus the “European Peace Project” might degenerate into a union without adequate defense. In order to countersteer such a development, armed forces are required that are capable of maintaining the current values order through effective democracy projection and that at the same time are democracy-compatible enough to be accepted and supported by Western societies. The recommendations given here, are to be understood as an advice how to organize, educate and lead armed forces in order to achieve the above goal.

## **6.2. Conclusion – Verification/Corroboration<sup>183</sup> of the Hypothesis**

### **Conclusion (cross-sectional view)**

Starting from the axiom that democracies are, at least among each other, inhibited to apply military force in an offensive way and by trend peace-loving that they represent the only system so far that has proved to be capable of providing peace in such a broad area and over such a long period, one will have to conclude that a reliable peace-order can only be achieved, based on the principle of democracy. Controversially discussed or not - one will have to admit that there will not be found any better principle for the mid-term future.

The world is far from a state, where the territorial coverage by genuine democracies would be big enough to provide global peace – therefore are and will armed forces be the means, indispensably needed to project, establish, defend and maintain peace in areas, where the democracy principle in a Western pluralistic sense only has to be implemented and where the local people will have to be convinced of the benefits of democracy.

For this purpose Western democracies will need forces that are themselves imbued with the democratic principle, they are supposed to project that are mission effective to the outside, at

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<sup>183</sup> The term „verification“ subsequently was deliberately avoided due to Popper’s “induction-problem”.

the same time capable of defending the homebase (as the indispensable precondition for democracy-projection). These forces will have to be made sufficiently compatible with the prevailing values-canon of civil society, in order to avoid to be judged a foreign body but on the other hand to endure (i.e. understand and accept) the degree of incompatibility that is needed to defend a postmodern society with “modern” operational-procedures.

Above that, they have to keep up the primacy of politics, to contribute with their highest leadership-levels to the strategic goal setting of the state/alliance/union and thus to be able to influence the security-related strategic orientation, “with regard to contents” – and those future armed forces will have to comply with all those deduced tasks, or at least generate the preconditions for their fulfillment, without raised defense-budgets. The analysis resulted in the finding that humanistic general education in the Humboldtian sense is to be identified as the main instrument, by which armed forces can be aligned according to the tasks, listed above. And once this education has worked its effect via its influence on further military functional principles, the state will be able and should be willing to trust the democratic quality of its armed forces. “Democratic control” of armed forces in the understanding of keeping them with tight reins, permanently forcing them into a straitjacket through rigid regulations and immediately punishing them for the slightest attempt to deviate from given orders, when their own evaluation would promise a higher probability of success, would be a contradiction in terms – just like a continuous examination of educated and field-tested firefighters, due to the suspicion, they could be incendiaries.

The research was designed, to support a systemic analysis, to be conducted by respective national users. This analysis-part was to deduce and suggest priorities for a systemic, force-planning related implementation of the overarching, complex goal, described in the above paragraph. By the exemplary application of the elaborated systemic analysis model on selected, democracy relevant functional principles/ phenomena/factors of military leadership, have adjusting screws and the logical sequence of their appliance been identified and defined for the German language area, particularly for specific Austrian framework conditions that support a systemic alignment of armed forces towards a democracy-/stability-projecting mission-effectiveness.

Thereby factors have been identified that will have to be changed prior to others, if democracy-projecting and at the same time democracy-compatible armed forces are the goal of the envisaged reorganization. These driving-factors have been deduced due to the condition that their

alteration must promise the highest systemic use, because they don't cause malfunctions elsewhere that would outweigh the benefit of the modification.

The suggested analysis model was designed to offer the respective user also the option of a more thorough and profound assessment that supports approaches aiming at a principle, i.e. strategic re-thinking of the state's basic attitude towards its armed forces and their importance for the creation of a peace-order in the European, transatlantic and finally global context – instead of searching for solutions that work through a superficial economization of defense-budget-shares, like the models of Pooling and Sharing or Smart Defense.

The latter are actually rather carried by the intention to spare financial means, while though achieving visibility of contributions - regardless if capability-gaps can be definitely closed/bridged by them.

### **Conclusions structured according to an interconnected line of argument**

Starting from the definition of the academic problem, it had been tried to develop the different threads of argumentation that emanated from this problem “parallelly” and in permanent mutual interconnection over the process steps (Hypothesis, Research Questions, Research Targets etc.). This approach led to the above conclusions in a cross-sectional view, which is best suited for the explanation of the mutual interdependency-network of democracy relevant factors complexes.

However, the structure of the thesis also allows for a view on isolated threads of argument. As it was tried to indicate,

- which hypotheses emanate from which sub-problems,
- which research questions had to be defined in order to operationalize the respective sub-thesis,
- which intersection of democratic principles of the state and military functional principles provides an answer to the corresponding research question, and
- which concrete evidence (that had been deduced from the intersection by the help of the analysis-interface) could be identified in order to substantiate the respective underlying sub-thesis,



it is possible to retrace an interconnected line of isolated arguments from the definition of the problem to the corroboration of the corresponding sub-thesis and eventually to new scientific findings, future prospects and recommendations. This view would allow a more precise analysis of the peculiarity of individual lines of argument, when such accuracy is required. As this approach necessarily leads to a negligence of the mutual interrelation between argumentation-threads, it was not chosen as the leading method.

The research primarily aimed at the analysis of mutual interdependencies of argumentation lines and therefore focused on the parallel development of causal connections. However, it is structured in a way that offers the possibility to view isolated issues in their logic sequence from the definition of the academic problem to the corroboration of the hypothesis, if the user of the analysis-model needs a deeper insight in a specific line of argument. The below diagram is to show (a) the abstract principle and (b) two thematic examples of an isolated view of argumentation threads.

Lines of isolated arguments follow the below principle sequence:

Argument	Academic Problem	Hypothesis	Research Question	Research Targets	Analysis	Conclusion Corroboration	New Results	Future Prospects	Recommendation
Argument	Identified sub-problem  Concise definition of the academic problem, paragraph 1-7	Sub-thesis derived from the identified sub-problem  Concise definition of the hypothesis, paragraph 1-5	Question designed to operationalize the sub-thesis  Research question 1-8	Concise definition of the research targets, paragraph 1-7	Intersection of factors, extraction of findings providing answers to the research question  Chapters 3.4.2. and 4.1. -4.7., 5	Deduction of findings that substantiate the corresponding Sub-Thesis  Referring to: Ad hypothesis (1-5) Ad research questions (1-8) Ad research targets (1-7)	Extraction of new findings	Extrapolation of findings with regard to research fields/-directions	Nomothetic quality
Humanistic General Education	Paragraph 7	Paragraph 2	Research questions 1, 2	Research targets 4, 5	3.4.1. (Education), 4.3., 4.1., 4.2., 5	Ad hypothesis 2 Ad research questions 1,2 Ad research targets 4, 5	"Driving" vs. "dependent" factors	"Instrument" for the preservation of soft-skills	

### Abstract principle

One sub-thesis tries to answer a specific issue that is broached by a defined sub-problem (for the purpose of retracing the initiated line of argument, sub-problems are marked as "Concise definition of the academic problem", paragraph 1-7 and sub-thesis as "Concise definition of the hypothesis", paragraph 1-5). Research questions (1-8) are designed to operationalize the sub-

theses with regard to the desired research target (“Concise definition of the research targets”, paragraph 1-7). The answer to the respective research question is to be found via the intersection of identified influence factors by the help of the structured analysis-interface.

The corroboration of the sub-theses (with regard to the chosen argument) is conducted against the backdrop of the corresponding sub-thesis (Ad “Concise definition of the hypothesis”, paragraph 1-5), the research question (Ad research questions 1-8) and the research targets (Ad “Concise definition of the research targets”, paragraph 1-7).

### **Exemplary Argument “Humanistic General Education”<sup>184</sup>**

Starting point for the isolated line of argument regarding the issue “Humanistic General Education” lies with “**Concise definition of the academic problem**”, paragraph 7, where the demand for armed forces is defined that are long-term mission effective and at the same time democracy-compatible although the current decline of values hampers necessary developments into that direction and undermines the belief of the population in the necessity of military defense.

“**Concise definition of the hypothesis**”, paragraph 2 picks up this sub-problem and states that the key factor for a values-understanding, which supports the insight that democracies depend on armed forces, and which is necessary for the attainment of democracy-compatibility and at the same time of mission effectiveness of the military, lies with a broad humanistic education of soldiers of all ranks.

The above sub-thesis is operationalized by **research questions 1 and 2**. Research question 1 addresses measures to be taken by governments, to countersteer a drifting towards a “postmodern society”, which might lead to keeping armed forces out of the social life and at the same time to undervaluing their importance for maintaining democratic stability. Research question 2 asks for possibilities to influence respectively exclude the progressive values change towards a post-modern society from the armed forces’ development in a way that sustains the military capability to safeguard the democratic survival of the state.

The analysis of the chosen argument serves to achieve **research targets 4 and 5**. Research tar-

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<sup>184</sup> Findings within this paragraph may partly be a repetition of text-passages used earlier. This example is to present an isolated argumentation thread. The most findings have already been presented while analyzing *all factors in their mutual interdependence* at certain given process steps of the research (academic problem, hypothesis, research questions, research targets, analysis, corroboration etc.) – now the findings that regard *one single military functional principle* only are extracted and retraced over the entire sequence of research process steps.

get 5 aims at sensitizing for the importance of training, education and character-building as means to counteract an uncontrolled and negative development towards a post-modern values-order that results in a loss of military capabilities. The further development of this approach points into the direction of research target 4 that envisages the definition of a new discipline of “leadership-science” for complex, time-critical, unpredictable situations, as the intellectual basis for the attainment and enhancement of the required strategic assessment expertise of higher military leaders.

According to the **analysis** in chapter 3.4.2., democracy-relevance of the chosen argument is given

- because humanistic general education directly influences intercultural competence, one of the indispensable preconditions for democracy-projection and the multicultural composition of military combat units,
- because of its effect on strategic goal finding and thus on the long-term survival of the democratic social order and finally
- because of the intellectual basis which can be provided for responsible leadership in the sense of the Clausewitzian 3rd pillar via “thinking about war” and “general staff-/higher leadership- training”.

Chapter 4.3. arrives at the finding that the achieved level of humanistic general education of society as a whole, is the precondition for superimposing military-related general education and only based upon the latter, for specific military-professional training. Where the required level of civil, humanistic general education is not achieved sufficiently, the military has to make up leeway, because this basis is imperative for the democracy-political reliability of armed forces and their unconditional obedience towards the primacy of politics.

Chapter 4.1. substantiates the importance of humanistic general education for the Clausewitzian “third pillar”. The constitutive meaning of a broad humanistic education for soldiers of all ranks is proved in chapter 4.2.

The systemic **interdependency-network (chapter 5)** resulted in the finding that humanistic general education in the Humboldtian sense, significantly influences the complexes organic- and strategic-leadership, via military-/leadership science. It directly or indirectly influences the majority of functional principles actively and is in turn not passively affected (except for the influence from intellectual history that has to be respected, but via which no controlling effect can be exercised). In case humanistic general education is chosen as an adjusting screw, then

any approach to improve the educational quality can (as opposed to an attempt to change the values-perception) be limited to service members only. According to this chain of arguments, humanistic general education turns out to be the primary adjusting screw for the alignment of armed forces into the direction of an improved democracy-compatible and mission-effective quality.

The conclusion summarizes the above findings in a way that allows to **corroborate** “Concise definition of the hypothesis”, paragraph 2, to check that research questions 1, 2 had been answered and that research targets 4, 5, have been achieved.

The differentiation between “driving” and “dependent” factors influencing a systemic reorganisation of armed forces, turned out as one of the **new scientific results** of the research – humanistic general education being the predominant of the driving factors.

**Future prospects** point into the direction of a timespan of limited defense-resources, which has to be bridged. It is suggested, to start the reorganization of armed forces at the setting screw “humanistic general education”. The latter provides an instrument that is best-suited for supporting the preservation and development of soft-skills while budgetary means for defense-procurement are lacking, and the basic readiness to grow up in a future case of need has to be kept up.

Due to the above interconnected line of arguments regarding the issue “Humanistic General Education”, it has to be **recommended** to establish a tertiary educational institution on university-level, under the responsibility of the armed forces that commits itself to military-/leadership-science in order to cope with the demand for strategic expertise and to contribute to the comprehensive defense-approach of the state by providing profound policy advice.

### **Corroboration (“Verification”) of the Hypothesis**

By the results of the analysis and of the systemic interdependency network, the hypothesis could be substantiated in the following assertions

#### **Ad: Hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.1)**

Via the analysis of democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership and the systemic interdependency network, it could be proved that there is a natural

contradiction (“inverse proportionality”) between democracy compatibility and mission effectiveness of armed forces, and that imbuing these forces with an internalized democratic values-understanding, is the most appropriate way to overcome this tension.

This internalized democratic values-understanding could in turn be confirmed as the indispensable precondition for the internal, respectively democracy-compatible functioning of armed forces, and for their capability to project democracy.

As the principle of calming crises in the periphery - before negative effects spill over to troop contributors’ homebases - could be substantiated as the currently prevailing security political paradigm of Western democracies, the capability of armed forces to support this strategic approach effectively, has been proven to be the imperative precondition for their (Western democracies’) peaceful, long-term survival.

**Ad: Hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.2)**

The analysis of the interdependencies between the functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership clearly shows that a broad humanistic general education for soldiers of all ranks and the therefrom resulting values-awareness, represents the critical key factor for aligning armed forces towards a democracy-compatible and at the same time -supporting effectiveness.

The initial assumption that influencing the values constitution could be a second adjusting screw of equal effectivity, had to be abandoned, as any approach to alter the values-set, would only work in a long-term perspective and above that would have to be conducted for the entire society of a state – whereas raising the humanistic education level would already result in an improved democracy-compatibility, if it only were conducted for the military alone. So consequently, humanistic general education had to be affirmed as the primary adjusting screw for the democracy-compatible/-supporting reorganization of armed forces.

**Ad: Hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.3)**

It could be shown that it is possible to engineer a structured analysis model that transforms functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership as well as democratic functional principles of the state, each into an interface-appropriate order-logic, which allows to intersect the elements of both, and to deduce firstly isolated interdependencies, secondly systemic interrelations between them. The derived interdependency network made it possible to identify driving (i.e. ones that have to be altered prior to others and that way ensure systemic success) re-

spectively dependent factors, and thus to deduce a sequence of military as well as political control measures, by which the requested democracy-relevant quality of armed forces can be achieved most effectively and systemically.

The functionality of the systemic analysis model had been proved by the application of exemplarily selected democracy relevant functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership on the model, which eventually had arrived at the identification of setting screws and the suggested sequence of their implementation.

The logical interdependence between intellectual history, tertiary education, organic-leadership, strategic-leadership and values-understanding had been deduced from the analysis model and transferred to the critical path/suggested solution-part of the systemic interdependency network, whereby a first feed-back to the hypothesis had been acknowledged.

**Ad: Hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.4)**

The assertion that an inward, democracy-constitutive effect of armed forces, has to be understood as the organic unity of the components defense against conventional and sub-conventional threat from the outside, democracy-/peace-projection respectively securing access to vital resources abroad and continuous alignment to the mutual dependence between the demands of internal democratic stability and external security could be substantiated firstly by the intersection of the subcategories of “mission effectiveness” and their mutual interdependence (conventional/sub-conventional threat, projection, access to vital resources) and secondly by the analysis of the military functional principle “mutual interdependence between internal democratic stability and external security. The added value of the recognition of this interrelation lies with the finding that any reorganization of armed forces - when it aims at a systemic result with regard to the long-term peaceful survival of the state – must be carried out by taking into account all of the above analyzed components at once, i.e. by coping with the demand for their simultaneous and balanced implementation.

The assumption (*sub-thesis 1*), “Western pluralistic, democratic states need mission-effective armed forces in order to maintain sovereignty to the outside and inwards, the latter being the indispensable precondition for guaranteeing basic democratic freedoms and for surviving as a democratic-value based community” could be corroborated via the interface-appropriate categorization of democratic functional principles of the state, the deduction of demands of the state towards the armed forces and the subsequent intersection with functional principles/phenomena/factors of military leadership.

**Ad: Hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.5)**

*Sub-thesis (2)*, postulated that it were imperative for the achievement of mission-effectiveness, to project democratic values-understanding of civil society consistently into the armed forces and down to the common soldier. The validity of this assertion, could be substantiated via the following approaches:

- With regard to the finding that the worth of the life of the citizen, to be protected and of the engaged soldier is of dominant importance, particularly in post-modern social orders – it could be shown via the intersection of functional principles in the analysis model that the sequence “humanistic education, tertiary education, organic-leadership and applied mission-type-leadership”, allows for leadership superiority also with limited budgetary means, whereat leadership superiority in post-modern systems self-evidently aims at the lowest possible casualties in combat.
- “Primacy of politics” and “obedience principle” have been entered as a sub-line of the „demands of/goals to be achieved“-category into the analysis interface and subsequently intersected with functional principles of military leadership. The analysis showed that most military leadership principles support primacy of politics at least partly. The main finding however was that the majority of affected leadership principles could be traced back to the humanistic general education complex, whereby the conclusion could be affirmed that the latter are particularly suited to be chosen the primary setting screw for envisaged reorganizations towards democracy-compatible and mission-effective armed forces.
- “Armed forces prevented from becoming a foreign body, an isolated social subsystem” has also been entered as a sub-line of the „demands of/goals to be achieved“-category into the analysis interface, intersected with the different sub-categories of compatibility and subsequently subsumed under the category “democracy-political compatibility within armed forces and between the latter and the state”. The intersection of the regarding democratic principles of the state with military functional principles confirmed, how constitutive the avoidance of social isolation is for the capability of armed forces, to credibly project democratic values into crises-areas.
- The assertion that armed forces, given the appropriate alignment, value-understanding and leadership, can feed-back a democracy-invigorating effect on civil society, could be substantiated by the deduction of the possibility to make the higher, military strategic

level participate in the decision-preparatory phase of strategic goal-setting of the state. The highly expert input, requested for policy-advice, turned out to be dependent again on humanistic and tertiary education, whereby the thesis, explained under “concise definition of the hypothesis, lit.2)” could be confirmed additionally.

- The logic of the assumption that the democracy-invigorating effect on society is necessary, particularly in order to countersteer the loss of the sense that a functioning democratic order depends on the synallagmatic relation between the contribution of the citizen to the state, and the (in return) granted participation in political decision-making, could be explained theoretically – the assumption itself, as well as a possible factual outcome, recognizable in political/military reality, could not be confirmed.

### **Check on the completeness of answers to research questions**

As the research questions have been transformed into the hypothesis, the corroboration of the latter must logically include the answers to the initial research questions (section 2.3.). Just in order to go for sure that all research questions have been answered properly, it however is to be identified in which step of the analysis the respective question had been tackled. In this understanding, the check on the answers to the research questions is to be seen as a completion of the corroboration of the hypothesis.

**The answer to the overarching, guiding question of the research** (according to chapter “Research Questions”) on how to make functional principles of the state and the military consistent, and on how to keep armed forces mission effective and capable of guaranteeing a peaceful survival of the state without becoming a foreign body to society has been given in the analysis (in particular under chapters 3.2.2., 3.2.3., 4.4. and 4.6.).

The results are mirrored by the synopsis of the conclusions’s assertions, particularly regarding “conclusions / ad hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis”, lit.1 (democracy-projecting capability of armed forces as imperative precondition for the long-term peaceful survival of the state), lit. 4 - sub-thesis 1 (the necessity of armed forces for the maintenance of sovereignty inwards and to the outside, had been proven by the intersection of functional principles of the state and of the military by the help of the structured analysis model) and lit.5 (the above intersection confirmed, how imperative the avoidance of social isolation of armed forces is for their democracy-projecting capability).



**Research question 1**, on how to countersteer the negative influence of the combination of the lack of strategic goal-finding expertise and progressive post-modernity on the valuation towards the armed forces, had been tackled under chapter “Strategy Related Principles” (military scientific education as a part-remedy to cure the lack of military-strategic thinking and as the basis for military contributions to the comprehensive strategy of the state) and “Values “Constitution” Within the Armed Forces” (the increase in self-expression- and simultaneously in secular-rational values, was identified there as one of the major factors that are responsible for the depressive defense-will and therefore have to be taken into account by political leadership).

**Research question 2**, on how to keep an excessive values change towards a post-modern society off from armed forces, has been analyzed under chapter “Values “Constitution” Within the Armed Forces” (the systemic difference between “modern” armed forces and postmodern society, must not be seen as *unavoidable* - it much rather would have to be accepted as *indispensable*, if armed forces are expected to safeguard the post-modern lifestyle of society against “modern” and “pre-modern” threats).

**Research question 3**, on how to be prove that underestimating existing threat and undervaluing of armed forces deprives the state of its capability to maintain security that has been answered particularly under chapter “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State”. “Conclusions / ad hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis”, lit. 4, summarizes the results accordingly by pointing at the different capabilities, armed forces must provide to support the state’s actionability and at the inevitable influence of external democracy-/peace-projecting military missions on internal democratic stability.

**Research question 4** on how to prove the mutual interdependence between democracy and peace, has been answered in chapter “The Particular Influence of the Democratic Principle on the Security of the State”.

**Research question 5**, on how the mutual interdependence between external security and internal democratic stability and its influence on a democracy-compatible alignment of armed forces can be explained, was answered in chapter 4.5. “Strategy Related Principles” (starting from the assumption that a balanced comprehensive approach meeting the demands of internal and external security is one out of three ideal-typical alternatives for the strategy-based orientation of the state respectively of its armed forces).

**Research question 6** (Are democracy-transfers into (foreign) mission areas accepted, and is a “democracy-understanding” (of western type democracy) transferable? Are such missions at

risk if such understandings are missing?), which required an analysis if democracy-projection imperatively requests credible democracy-understanding, had been elaborated on particularly in chapter “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State” (which results in the finding that the perception of the overall military operation and thus of peace-projection per se, depends on adoption, i.e. does not work out without acceptance).

The elaborated findings indicated that the perception that “democracy” can be exported and implemented in mission areas is (as experience has shown) questioned and is usually rather quickly overturned by old traditions and habits.

This has some effects on the success of such missions, on the acceptance of armed forces in foreign mission areas, including the very first question about the understanding and internalizing of democracy and values in the sent force, and secondly, what is the assessment of mission effectiveness? Findings have demonstrated certain obstacles (usually carried by traditions, habits) which are blocking democracy projections into other cultures and missing compatibilities of democracy and cultural/traditional roots in the mission area.

The confirmation of this finding became part of the corroboration of the hypothesis (see “conclusions / ad hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis”, lit.1- which resulted in the assertion that the most appropriate way to overcome the tension between democracy-compatibility and mission-effectiveness, lies with imbuing armed forces with an internalized democratic values-understanding).

**Research question 7**, on the implications of a paradigm shift from democracy-projection to a core-European “territorial” defense, has been answered under 3.5. “Strategy” (starting from the assumption that a fall back on what critics exaggeratingly might call a “fortress Europe”, is a further, out of three ideal-typical alternatives for the strategy-based orientation of the state respectively of its armed forces).

It moreover has been tackled in chapter “New Scientific Results, Future Prospects, Recommendation” (a fall back to territorial defense of European core-territory could be judged there rather a deficit of the previous than a result of a new strategy).

**Research question 8**, on how a structured analysis model must be designed that allows for systemic changes towards democracy compatible and at the same time optimally mission-effective armed forces, has been answered under sub-chapter “Conclusions / ad hypothesis / concise definition of the hypothesis”, lit. 3 and in chapters “The Structured Analysis-model”, “Engineering the Structured Analysis-interface“, “Analysis of Selected Functional Princi-

ples/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership” and “Engineering the Systemic Interdependency – network”.

The summarized results of the answer to the question is represented in “conclusions/ad hypothesis/concise definition of the hypothesis”, lit.3.

### **Check on the achievement of envisaged research-targets (from the side of the research)**

#### **Ad: Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.1**

The main target was (from the side of the research) achieved by the deduction of the mutual interdependence between mission-effectiveness and democracy-compatibility of armed forces and their impact on the long-term peaceful, democratic survival of the state, in chapter “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State”. The organic/systemic interrelation between the factors that are constitutive for the survival of the democratic social order, were elaborated on in chapter “Engineering the Structured Analysis-interface, Explanation of its Basic Function”.

#### **Ad: Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.2**

This target was met via the structured analysis-model that allows the respective user to evaluate the requested reorganisation-steps according to his individual, national initial situation and. The advice given to political leadership and military force planning was not an advice that aimed at reaching predefined/specified goals – it rather was an advice how to evaluate self-dependently according to the respective framework conditions.

#### **Ad: Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.3**

Each military functional principle has been analyzed (see chapter “Democracy Relevant Functional Principles/Phenomena/Factors of Military Leadership) with regard to factors by which it is influenced (this includes also changing, external framework conditions) as well as to factors it influences itself. Thus the user is enabled, to predict which effect the alteration of one factor will have on the development of another and when a state will be reached that is that unfavorable that it cannot be accepted anymore. It is exactly that knowledge about the principles of mutual influence of factors that allows to countersteer just in time – i.e. to run national defense on low budgets, but though to be able to react preventively to adverse developments, before their negative outcome catches the state flat-footed.

**Ad: Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.4**

The target to substantiate the need that higher military leadership-levels are to be enabled to provide policy recommendation through contributing strategic target identification and -assessment expertise, had been tackled under chapter “Strategy Related Principles”. The demand for a new discipline of leadership-science for complex, time-critical, unpredictable situations, as the intellectual basis for the military contribution to the comprehensive strategic assessment of the state, had been elaborated on under chapter “Humanistic General Education in the Humboldtian Sense”.

**Ad: Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.5**

The seemingly paradox phenomenon that armed forces must preserve a certain degree of “not-yet-post-modernity” in order to safeguard the postmodern lifestyle of the society, they are to protect, had been analyzed and explained under chapter “Values “Constitution” Within the Armed Forces”. The importance of *training, education and character-building* as means to countersteer to an *uncontrolled post-modern values-development*, had been elaborated on in chapter “Humanistic General Education in the Humboldtian Sense”.

**Ad: Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.6**

The target of sensitizing political leadership for the necessity to recognize armed forces as the imperative precondition for the long-term democratic survival of the state, has been achieved by the analysis in chapters “The Particular Influence of the Democratic Principle on the Security of the State” and “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State”.

**Ad : Research-targets / concise definition of research-targets, sub-targets, lit.7**

Consciousness concerning the necessary commitment of citizens to military defense as the precondition of the fortified democracy, has been created via basic considerations in chapter “Armed Forces and the Sovereignty of the State” and the analysis in chapter “Values “Constitution” Within the armed forces”. The latter chapter was also to sensitize for the fact that armed forces have to safeguard the democratic values-order already in relative peace. The correct valuation of the interdependence between peace and democracy, had thoroughly been deduced in chapter “The Particular Influence of the Democratic Principle on the Security of the State”.

**Awareness of** the simultaneity-requirement between internal democratic stability and external security should be achieved by the deductions in chapter “Strategy Related Principles”.

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## **ANNEX 1 - Illustrations**