

**Using Military Force in International
Operations in Relation to the Austrian
Security Policy**

presented to

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by

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Preface

More than ten years ago the Austrian government decided to integrate the officer training system according to the Bologna process. That meant that the training of the officer cadets at the Theresian Military Academy was rearranged and divided into scientific training leading to a bachelor degree and an officer training course. Since 2010 further military education leading to a master's degree has been instituted at the National Defence Academy in Vienna. Military sciences are not recognized in Austria as a scientific discipline and therefore there are no possibilities to study these sciences in Austria.

It seems to be necessary to develop a PhD programme within the Austrian Armed Forces in the long run. In 2008 the National Defence Academy started a co-operation with the Hungarian Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University to offer Austrian officers the possibility to take part in a PhD programme on military sciences. The Austrian students had to participate in certain seminars in Vienna and Budapest, but they were allowed to fulfil the teaching obligations in scientific programmes or universities in Austria. Additionally they had to publish the results of their research in Austrian or other journals, proceedings, or books.

When the PhD programme was first presented in Vienna in the beginning of 2008, the author decided to take part in that programme and applied for it. After the accession three years of intensive studies and research followed and this thesis is now presented to the scientific community. Now it is time to say thank you to several persons who supported the author:

First of all, I want to thank the head of the Language Institute of the Austrian Armed Forces, BG Mag. Horst Walther. He supported the idea from the very beginning because he was convinced of the importance of training officers of the Austrian Armed Forces in military sciences on a PhD level – if Austria wanted to be able to deal with this branch of science, it had to have officers holding PhD degrees as well.

I want to address a special thank you to my first supervisor, Hon. **A.o.** Prof. Dr. habil. Dr. Andrea RIEMER PhD, who very early gave me a first advice on how to fix the research design. Her useful feedback on my draft version of the thesis helped to produce an austere text, which came to the point according to her expectations. Secondly I want to thank my second supervisor Col. Dr. András UJJ very much for chairing the pre defence and his helpful advises afterwards.

Finally, I want to thank my wife Claudia and my children Ines and Fabio for their understanding during the final phase of writing. During that time they had to tolerate my concentration on the thesis and that I had only very little time for them.

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Introduction

“Austrian foreign policy will be solidarity within the European Union (EU) and neutrality outside of it”

(Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel 1995)

This famous quotation by Wolfgang Schüssel was made when Austria became a member of the EU in 1995. From that moment on, Austrian neutrality policy formally split into two approaches. A definition and analysis of the practice of neutrality had never been done before. To take a look into Austria’s foreign policy requires us to start right at the beginning, following World War II. The reconstruction of the Republic of Austria is tied to the Declaration of Austrian Independence on 27th April 1945. On this day, the Austrian provisional government, headed by State Chancellor Karl Renner, declared independence from the Third Reich in the last days of the Second World War. In September 1945, this provisional government expanded to accommodate national representatives of the western part of Austria. All four Allied powers recognized this government,¹ but it would take another ten years before Austria gained full independence. One of the main conditions for Austria to become fully independent was to turn into a neutral state according to the Swiss model. The Swiss neutrality model was agreed by the Austrian government based on the Moscow Memorandum in 1955.

The concept of neutrality as a concept of security policy had already been defined in general during the 19th century. It was a concept of strict non-intervention in armed conflicts between two or more countries. During the twentieth century the United Nations (UN), a number of confederations of states like the European Union (EU), and some “supra-state-organisations” like the Conference/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) were founded. At the time of their inception, there was no concept of how a neutral state could take part in a confederation of states. There were no ideas either, as to how a neutral state should deal with UN, EU, or OSCE affairs. Today, there is no doubt that neutral states can be members of the UN, OSCE, and even the EU.

Austrian foreign policy has been determined by neutrality since the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. During the years from 1955 until now, interpretations of Austrian neutrality have changed according to practical politics. As early as in 1955, by joining the UN, Austria left the path of

¹ United States of America (US), United Kingdom (UK), France and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR).

pursuing the specific understanding of neutrality that followed the Swiss model, because at that time Switzerland rejected UN membership as incompatible with its neutrality. Since Austria joined the European Union in 1995, Austrian security policy has changed considerably in terms of content and legal formality. For that reason, the concept of neutrality had to change, too. As the EU member states have been in the process of developing a common European security and defence policy (CSDP), Austria has had to reconcile being a member of the EU and, at the same time, being a neutral state.

During the second half of the 20th century some organisations e.g. the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU established security policy concepts and in Austria these inter-state security concepts were interpreted as security policy centred on solidarity. For this reason, the Austrian concept of neutrality is divided into three periods:

- a) *Classic neutrality policy*²
- b) *“Active” neutrality policy created by the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky*
- c) *Security policy between the poles of neutrality and solidarity during the period from 1995 to 2010.*

There were certain times of redefining the Austrian security policy, for instance between the end of the Cold War and the end of Austria’s accession negotiations to join the EU. The understanding of the scope of security policy has also changed in the last 60 years. In the years after the Second World War, security policy was equal to military security policy. During the following years – step by step – this rather narrow understanding had to be broadened. The first step to such a broader understanding of security was defined by the three baskets of the CSCE conference Helsinki Final Act in 1975.³ In 1999, the NATO summit of Washington took a further step by establishing a new understanding of security in its official strategy document:

*“The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension.”*⁴

Although the NATO member states agreed on a new security strategy in 2010, this thesis mainly refers to the 1999 NATO strategy because the recent one has not been in place long enough to

² **Brackett David S.**, International Relations A La Carte: A New Swiss Neutrality in Europe, University Paper No. 97-4, April 15, 1997, p.6.

³ The first basket focused on security questions in Europe. The second basket stressed the co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment. The third basket focused on co-operation in humanitarian and other fields (<http://www.osce.org/item/44318>, 30 09 2011).

⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, paragraph 25, date 22 01 2010.

influence Austria's decisions. Nevertheless, it remains a core task of a country's government to develop and lay down its security strategy⁵. Security policy comes to life as a result of the current policy of the government and the parliament in foreign, internal, and military affairs. Therefore, in Austria each decision concerning an international operation has to be taken by the government together with the Main Committee of the National Council.

In 1955, only three political parties were represented in the Austrian Parliament. This number increased during the 55-years research period covered by this study from three to five; for this reason, it is understandable that the scope and intensity of the domestic political debate increased, too. During most of the research period, security policy had not been an important topic of the Austrian domestic political debate. This has changed during the past 10 years. International operations of the Austrian Armed Forces have become a topic of domestic political debate as indicated by the debate around the Security Doctrine in 2001, the 2011 draft Security Strategy, and the country's participation in the international operations EUFOR Chad/RCA in 2008.

When Austria started to take part in international operations, no governing Austrian Acts of Parliament existed. Austrian soldiers had to sign a special contract to participate in the international operation in the Congo (1960 – 1962). In the following years, the Austrian Parliament had to enact laws which adapted the processes for international operations.

The research programme will describe the steps that established a legal framework for the Austrian Armed Forces when engaged abroad.

One main part of the research will analyse how the Austrian understanding of neutrality has changed and how this is reflected in the international operations of the Austrian Armed Forces conducted from 1960 until 2010. The research programme will cover the political discussions on a certain number of international operations of the Austrian Armed Forces and will highlight the position of the Austrian parliamentary parties towards neutrality as well. Additionally, the research programme will focus on the changes of the Austrian defence policy on a strategic level and cover the development from a pure defence policy to a security policy. This also includes the effects of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the changes of NATO strategies as well.

Moreover, the research programme stresses the role of the political parties with respect to their present representation in the Austrian Parliament. It covers the programmatic issues on security matters and the values behind the manifestos representing the views of the various political parties. These issues are compared with the political activities of the members of today's political parties in

⁵ **Andreas W. Stupka**, *Strategie denken*, Astoria Verlag, Wien, 2008, p. 39.

the Austrian Parliament. The political actions of the representatives of these political parties resulting in decisions of security policy are also part of the research programme. The research programme covers the discussions on security and defence policy on the one hand and the debates leading to decisions on the conduct of international operations or on membership in international organisations on the other hand. The representatives of the political parties often argued in different ways in order to decide on how to conduct international operations requested by international institutions, and which concrete political actions to take. The aim of the research programme is to compare political actions with respect to the decisions required to fulfil the requests for supporting some international operations, whether they are in line with the main intentions of the manifestos of the political parties, and to find possible justification for their actions.

The thesis consists of the following chapters:

- **Chapter 1** covers the research design and delineates the whole structure of the thesis and the cornerstones.
- **Chapter 2** provides an extensive coverage of international law regarding the rules of various international organisations and the concept of neutrality in general. It also contains an analysis of the specific Austrian neutrality and provides a short overview of the history of Austrian security policy.
- **Chapter 3** analyses the security topics in the party platforms of the Austrian political parties currently represented in the Austrian parliament. These are the Austrian Peoples Party (APP), the Social Democrats (ASDP), since 1955 the Austrian Freedom Party (AFP) and its predecessor Austrian Association of Independents (AAI), since 1986 the Austrian Green Party (AGP) and since 2005 the Alliance for the Future of Austria (AFA). Although the understanding perception of the term “security” has extended within the covered period the analysis will focus only on the military and political aspects of the term.
- **Chapter 4** provides case studies of the early Austrian international operations from the Austrian State Treaty to the end of the 1960s to the Austrian membership in the UN. The development of the Austrian defence policy into a comprehensive national defence is also provided in this Chapter by a framework condition research.
- **Chapter 5** provides the research on the cases of “active neutrality” from the “Kreisky Era” until the accession to the EU.
- **Chapter 6** focuses the security policy of Austria as a member of the EU. It provides cases and framework conditions related to this period of Austrian policy including the new draft

security strategy 2011.

- **Chapter 7** provides conclusions drawn from all case studies and the research on the Austrian National Security Framework as well as of the results of the previous chapters. It also lists the research results.

Chapter 1: Research Design

The research framework covers the development of the practise of Austrian neutrality policy concerning international armed operations. Austria has participated in international armed operations since 1960 under the umbrella of the UN and its participation was placed under the command and control of three different organizations: the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The underlying chapter provides a short overview of the development of such armed operations. It is also necessary to discuss the Austrian legal process of joining or cooperating within such a framework. Additionally, the questions of how to react to measures of the Security Council (SC) and how to deal with the obligations of membership emerge. The main all-encompassing questions are the differences and changes of positions that have taken place within the Austrian political parties during the 50-year period of recent Austrian history. Finally, the changes of the Austrian security and defence strategies also have to be covered. Moreover, hypotheses, targets, questions and methods are explained herein.

First of all, the state of the art of the relevant research has to be explained. There are three lines of research, which could be used for the thesis:

- One line covers the research on the development of party programmes or manifestos. The published results stress the different party manifestos and programmes of the three of the Austrian parties. The Green party and the new Austrian Future Alliance are not covered in this research, because they have not been in existence long enough. The main authors are Böhner, Kriechbaumer and Kernic.
- The second line discusses Austrian neutrality policy in general. Books deal with the understanding of Austrian neutrality from the very beginning and they deal also with the Austrian State Treaty. Main Authors are Rauchensteiner, Strourzh, Verdross, and Ermacora. Books about the “Kreisky Era” could be used very helpfully for background information. After the Austrian accession to the EU, a certain number of dissertations dealt with neutrality within the EU and the change of Austrian neutrality policy. In 2005⁶, a certain number of books were published dealing with Austrian security policy. The main authors were Ermacora, Huzmmer, Kernic, and Luif. These books gave qualified analyses

⁶ The 50th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty and the 10th anniversary of the Austrian accession to the EU.

of the Austrian security policy in general and especially on neutrality policy.

- The third line deals with the research on the Austrian participations in international operations. The dean of that research is Erwin Schmidl, who covers nearly all of the Austrian international operations from a military and security point of view.

The missing research is the link between Austrian neutrality policy, international operations, the security issues in the programmes of the Austrian political parties, and the concrete positions of the political parties on certain questions and issues.

1.1. Research Framework

1.1.1. Issues and Challenges in International Operations: Past and Present

International operations to secure or to enforce peace have been an extending phenomenon since the second half of the 20th century. There were some international operations⁷ in the last 20 years before the outbreak of the First World War but these are not covered in the underlying thesis even though the Habsburg Monarchy took part in them. The Charter of the United Nations⁸ gives only an unspecified framework under which circumstances international operations can be conducted. From a historical point of view, at the very beginning of such operations usually no laws or regulations existed to establish and conduct such operations on an international level except for the resolutions of the Security Council. The very first peace enforcement operation under the authority of UN was the US-lead campaign in Korea, defending the southern part of the peninsula against the invading army of the government established in the northern part in 1950. Only two years earlier, in 1948, the first UN “peace-keeping operation”, the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was set up. Those operations were established by resolutions of the Security Council.⁹ With the increasing number of peace support operations the necessity arose to develop international and national regulations and procedures. Step by step the procedures and rules of engagement (ROE) to conduct operations were established by the UN.

⁷ They were: the six power campaign on Crete in 1897-1898, the intervention in the Chinese Boxer Rebellion in 1900, and the six-power campaign in Albania in 1913.

⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter>, 11 10 2010.

⁹ Bellamy Alex J./ Williams Paul D./ Griffin Stuart, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Second Edition, Polity Press, Cambridge/ Malden, 2010, pp. 93-95.

The first international operations were conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter¹⁰. Although some experts drew the attention to the fact that strictly speaking peace-keeping missions were located between Chapter VI and VII, they are actually much closer to Chapter VI. With the establishment of regional organisations like OSCE, NATO, EU, the Organization of American States (OAS), etc. the situation changed and these organisations were also allowed to organize international operations. Furthermore, the situation within the regions where international operations were to be conducted had changed dramatically. Many of the regions had to be secured and pacified with the help of international forces. The number of peace support operations literally exploded. For that reason, in 1992 the UN Secretary General (SG) introduced a report to the UN SC “*An Agenda for Peace*”. In this report the various Peace Support Operations (PSO) were categorized for the first time:¹¹

- a) Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- b) Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- c) Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.
- d) Peace-building is action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

These definitions rested on the conviction that all parties to the conflict were interested in solutions and wanted to act co-operatively. Especially based on the experiences during the Balkan wars, the UN realised that those missions could fail. Thus new approaches had to be developed, which included temporary force projection by the international community. Sometimes the use of force was directed towards one of the parties, sometimes towards more than one and sometimes even towards all parties to the conflict. Those operations were legitimated by Chapter VII of the UN-Charter.¹² Later, such operations were called peace enforcement operations. Because of this additional category, which came into effect during the international operations against Iraq after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, it was necessary to evaluate the UN missions. This was done by the

¹⁰ “Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.” Un Charter Article 38: (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml>, 30 09 2011)

¹¹ <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>, 14 10 2010, p. 4.

¹² Chapter VII includes the paragraphs 39 – 51 and deals with “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”.

Brahimi Report¹³ in 2000. It stated the requirement for an international headquarters to command and control international operations. Additionally, there were recommendations of Integrated Mission Task Forces, High Readiness Troops and improvement of the internal procedures and responsibilities. In general, the categorization of international operations was confirmed. In October 2010, again a report¹⁴ on a reform for peacekeeping was given to the SC. It dealt with policy development and spoke of a phase in peacekeeping in a broader peace and security context as a tool to address threats in international peace and security.

Even though the idea of well trained troops designated for UN service was not new, a new approach was tried by founding the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). During the 1960s, the Nordic States built battalions, which were earmarked to be sent abroad. In 1965, Austria followed this approach by founding an UN-training battalion (UN Ausbildungsbataillon, UNAB 4). But a brigade was never earmarked specifically for such operations before founding SHIRBRIG on 15th December 1996 by seven nations (Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden)¹⁵. The necessity for such a brigade was stated in 1995 by the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace of the UN SC. That brigade was made up of the Nordic battalions and additional troops of all participating countries. Interestingly, Austria's participation in this military organisation, which was formed by NATO and non-NATO or neutral states, was only mentioned as a footnote in the Austrian press.¹⁶ It was never discussed in the Austrian Parliament, and this interesting approach is not included as a separate case study within this thesis. The command and control of SHIRBRIG rotated among the states and Austria was twice the leading country, in 2004 and 2008. The reaction timetable specified a time frame between 15 to 30 days to be on alert for an international operation under UN mandate. In the year 2000, SHIRBRIG reported its operational readiness to the UN headquarters. Despite the idea of a world-wide action radius, SHIRBRIG operated mainly in Africa. The operations of SHIRBRIG were successful, yet in 2009 SHIRBRIG was disbanded and replaced by the EU Battle group (EU BG) Concept of the EU and the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF) Concept.¹⁷ By establishing

¹³ Lakhdar Brahimi, United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000. The Algerian politician and diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi was asked by the SG to lead a working group on improvement of peace operations.

¹⁴ http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon_update01.pdf, 21 08 2012.

¹⁵ <http://www.shirbrig.dk>, 16 10 2010.

¹⁶ Newspaper Die Presse, 17. 12. 1996, p. 4.

¹⁷ Rosenzopf Georg, *Das war SHIRBRIG*, p. 4., <http://www.shirbrig.dk>, 17. 10. 2010.

a battalion designated for UN operations in 1965 and through participating in SHIRBRIG Austria practised quite a different understanding of neutrality policy compared to the Swiss model. That was not the only difference between the Austrian and the Swiss understanding of neutrality in practice during the last 55 years. Austria took a route similar to Finland, Ireland, or Sweden, which are also neutral European countries. Finland and Sweden changed their neutrality to a non-alignment policy during the EU accession talks. Some experts are of the opinion that Austria has changed its policy to non-alignment policy as well. Yet, from a legal point of view Austria remains a neutral country.

As time went by, some international operations were undertaken without a UN mandate, like the operations in Iraq by the “Coalition of the Willing” in 2003. By the same token, from the US’s point of view the first operations in Afghanistan were a measure of collective self defence. Austria took part in the successive UN operations in Afghanistan within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is NATO-led. Austria still takes part by sending senior officers. This UN operation under NATO command and control was not chosen for a case study because the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations came chronologically first and in principle there was no difference between these two operations.


There are specific milestones in leadership responsibilities in international operations. Initially, the UN itself was leading the UN operations. This principle changed after the end of the Cold War and regional organisations like NATO, EU or African Union (AU) got the authority to lead international operations, for instance NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) or the EU in Chad/RCA. Russia also tried to get an UN mandate for operations in the Commonwealth of independent states (CIS) territory, but the UN SC never authorized Russia in those cases. But the question remains, whether in the future even single countries could get authorisation to run peace operations. These changes in command and control initiated a debate in Austria, as to whether or not to participate in such operations.

These changes for participation in international operations brought challenges and threats to troop contributors as well. They had to decide, whether these new operations were in accordance with their national security policy on the one hand, and whether it was necessary to establish new procedures and enact national laws, on the other hand. Because of these circumstances, Austria had to revise its own understanding of neutrality and redefine its neutrality policy.

Today the Austrian Armed Forces take part in several international operations. The broadness of mandates reaches from classical peacekeeping to peace support operations with a robust mandate

like KFOR. The graph shows the current participation of Austrian troops all over the world.

Foreign Deployments of the Austrian Armed Forces



www.bundesheer.at 

Graph 1.0: Overview of the current Austrian participation in international operations¹⁸

1.1.2. Between Neutrality and Solidarity – the Austrian Dilemma and Ways out

Usually, written international law follows the conduct of the global players in international security policy. Although the concept of neutrality was developed during the nineteenth century, the main interpretations of the rights and duties of a neutral country were defined after World War I and World War II. Although written international law has not changed since that time, the establishment of regional organisations with an obligation to stand by the other member countries influenced the political action of certain countries. Especially with the membership of neutral countries in the UN, EU, etc. the understanding of neutrality changed in daily political life. Thus

¹⁸ http://www.bmlv.gv.at/misc/image_popup/ImageTool.php?strAdresse=/english/introle/images/foreign_deployments.png&intSeite=1366&intHoehe=768&intMaxSeite=1366&intMaxHoehe=713&blnFremd=0, 24. 6. 2012.

the dilemma for a neutral country arose how to remain both neutral and to act in concert with the partner countries during a political crisis as well as how to follow a request for participation in an international operation. The Austrian approach for overcoming the dilemma was based on its experiences since 1995:

To be neutral towards everybody outside the organisation to which a country belongs and to act in solidarity with the partner countries within the organisation or in short: to be neutral outside and to act in solidarity within the UN or the EU.

Therefore, one focus of the research framework is on the changes in the security policy of Austria with special regard to the Austrian policy in fulfilling the requirements of neutrality and solidarity. These changes were marked by the following cornerstones:

- UN membership 1955
- unarmed participation in international operations 1960
- membership in the UN SC 1973
- armed participation in international operations 1972
- membership in the EU and NATO-PfP¹⁹ (Partnership for Peace) 1995
- founding SHIRBRIG 1996 and participation in operations of SHIRBRIG
- participation in international operations under NATO command and control 1996
- participation in international operations under EU command and control 2004

1.2. Hypotheses

- The Austrian concept of neutrality has to be redefined under the aspect of acting as a member of a regional or global organisation.
- For a neutral country, acting in solidarity with the other EU members has to be

¹⁹ The NATO-PfP programme was introduced on 11. Jan. 1994 by the NATO-memberstates. Its aims are: “In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.” (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm, 02. 10. 2012). This programme is open to the OSCE members.

defined on the basis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

- For a neutral country, acting in solidarity with other countries has to be defined on the basis of the UN Charter.
- Austrian security policy has always been a walk on a tightrope between the obligations resulting from neutrality and the obligations caused by the membership in international organisations.
- The actions of the Austrian political parties have usually been determined more by a pragmatic approach rather than by values written down in their programmes.

1.3. Research Questions

The research programme covers Austrian security policy from the signing of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 to the year 2011. It focuses particularly on the participation of the Austrian Armed Forces in international military operations. The procedures for taking part in such international operations and the political situation have changed during these fifty-plus years; it is the goal of the research programme to analyse and compare the legal framework and the political situation with respect to certain international operations with the participation of Austrian Armed Forces.

To reach this goal, it is necessary to answer the following **research questions**:

- *How and under what conditions has the Austrian understanding of neutrality been changed?* In the Moscow Memorandum of 1955 the type of neutrality which Austria should pursue was expressed as the understanding of neutrality as practiced by Switzerland. With the membership in the UN, Austria left this path for the first time. The understanding of Austrian neutrality changed a second time under Chancellor Kreisky, who declared an “active neutrality policy” in the 1970s, of the last century. With the membership in the EU the Austrian understanding of neutrality changed a third time – within the EU: solidarity, outside of the EU: neutrality, as foreign Minister and later Chancellor Schüssel stated at the end of the 1990s.
- *What was the decision-making process to participate in an international operation, and were there any changes to this process? How did the legal framework change and what did these changes cause?* When the Austrian Armed Forces started their participation in international operations in 1960, there were no implementation laws

and procedures in place. The first law was enacted in 1965 and amended in 1995 and 2001, thus at least three different periods have to be analysed.

- *How has political support for international operations changed?* During a long period of time, foreign and security policy was not an issue in domestic political debates. The debate about the operations EUFOR Chad/RCA showed that such a perception was no longer true. It would be quite interesting to see if there had been any signs that might have predicted this change of heart.
- *What is the general position of the main political parties on international operations? Are the parties' positions in accordance with the programmes of the various parties? How did these programmes change during the period?* In the party programmes of the various political parties there are arguments relating to international organisations in general and the EU in particular as well as to international operations. These programmes usually change every ten to fifteen years, and it is interesting to find out if these topics of the programmes developed according to the increasing participation of the Austrian Armed Forces in international operations.
- *What was the nature of the arguments of the different political parties before and after the decisions to fulfil the request for an international operation, and did these arguments agree with the programmes and the values of each political party?* With respect to the decision to participate in international operations the research will point out whether or not the arguments of the members of the Austrian Parliament were in line with the actual party platforms.

1.4. Research Goals

The underlying research study intends to achieve the following **research goals**:

- *The development of an approach, which permits a neutral country to hold membership in an organisation with an obligation to act in concerted action.* From a “classical” point of view, the concept of neutrality excludes countries from membership in such international organisations. But this “classical” point of view became obsolete with Austria’s membership in the UN, especially because Austria was a permanently neutral country as opposed to neutral Sweden, which became member in 1946. Through this membership Austria’s concept of permanent neutrality

changed as well, because international law is defined by current actions of countries and the acceptance of these activities by the international community. Once an action is permitted or accepted by the international community, international law begins to change. This could lead to modifying written international law.


- *A critical discussion of the Austrian understanding of neutrality.* During the period of 55 years between 1955 and 2010, the understanding of the concept of neutrality changed with the emergence of new political challenges. During the period of the Cold War neutrality was determined as being neutral between the two blocs. After 1989 it became more difficult to determine or analyse in what way a neutral country could be considered as neutral. Through the membership in the EU, Austria radically changed its understanding of neutrality policy.
- *An analysis of the change of Austrian military participation in international operations.* In 1960, Austria's contribution to international operations was limited to an unarmed medical contingent. Today Austria conducts robust mandates by heavily armed contingents and armoured vehicles.
- *A critical discussion of the contemporary political behaviour with regard to the political party programme.* Political programmes are frameworks. Some situations need fast answers from representatives of political parties. These answers are more often than not determined by daily political expediency, rather than related to the party programme. This research programme will clarify, whether this theorem is applicable to the topic of security policy with respect to neutrality and international operations.

1.5. Methodology

The methodological approach is based on underlying research topics and issues and on the chosen time frame to which the research topic is dedicated.²⁰ For this thesis it is necessary to use a historical approach as a basis because the research period encompasses more than 55 years. The research topic covers the development of the Austrian practice of neutrality policy, which has changed considerably during this period. By using this method the chronological interdependencies between the milestones of Austrian neutrality policy and the contemporary programmes of the political parties can also be accommodated. In this thesis, a method following

²⁰ Walter Rolf, *Einführung in die Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich, 1994, pp. 24-28.

a chronological order is used to explore and analyse the milestones of practice in Austrian neutrality policy and its underlying principles. The main reason to use the historical method is the necessity of understanding the development of practical aspects in Austrian neutrality policy. By using this method, it is possible to analyse the main stages of the development of de facto Austrian neutrality policy within the context of the historical situation prevailing at the time. Finally, the method provides the possibility to identify whether or not there was a common thread in the practice of Austrian neutrality.



Graph 1.4: Overview of the interdependencies of the research methods²¹

The graph provides an overview of the research methods and their interdependencies during the research. But in a first step, those milestones that are most relevant to the research programme have to be identified. It seems appropriate to use different approaches besides the historical approach in order to reach the goal of the research programme:

- First of all, a phenomenological approach will be used to determine the milestones which identify the case studies important to research. The original phenomenology method was created by Edmund Husserl²², an Austrian psychologist (1859-1938). Originally phenomenology was a philosophical approach, which may be initially defined as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. In recent

²¹ The graphs and tables are numbered according to the chapters; so the number of this graph is 1.4.

²² <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#EpoPerNoeNylTimConPheRed>, 17. 08.2011.

philosophy it is also used to address the meaning and significance of tools, objects or events. In the current thesis it is used to identify the case that represent the significant milestones of Austrian practical neutrality policy, that are to be analysed for the research programme. At the beginning of the case studies I will explain, why each case was chosen as a milestone.

- Secondly, the contemporary legal framework and international security policy have to be analysed and compared. For this analysis the historical or subjective-teleological interpretation is used.²³ This method of interpreting juridical texts covers the purpose and aims of laws from the point of view of the contemporary legislator. Especially the international law and neutrality law as a particular element of it have been changed by practice. First of all, the contemporary legal framework has to be analysed and the changes brought about by practice have to be pointed out. On the one hand, the analysis is based on a historical approach to cover the roots of a law and to understand its development. On the other hand, the aims of certain laws, for instance the law of neutrality, have to be extrapolated following a teleological approach.²⁴
- Additionally, Austrian legal framework and security policy have to be researched as well. These sub chapters of chapters 4 to 6 were identified as framework conditions, because the legal framework was essential for the case studies. But also the legal framework was influenced by the Austrian participation in international operations. It was necessary to analyse how the political parties dealt with the necessary changes of the topic related to the constitutional framework. Therefore, the development of the comprehensive national defence, the security doctrine and the security strategy became additional framework conditions.
- Thirdly, the contemporary programmes and values of the political parties represented in the Austrian Parliament are analysed by a historical and hermeneutic approach. The governmental programmes had to be analysed as well. Hermeneutics is the theory of understanding and interpretation of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions. As a theory of interpretation, it covers a method of dialogue between

²³ Kreuzbauer Günther, juristische Interpretationsmethodik und Lückenfüllung, http://kronos.grf.sbg.ac.at/RI/jat/skriptum/microsoft%20word%20-%20juristische_interpretationsmethodik_kreuzbauer.pdf, 26.01.2012, p.7.

²⁴ Pfordten Dietmar von der, Vorlesung Theorie und Methoden des Rechts, <http://www.rechtsphilosophie.uni-goettingen.de/Vorlesung12SS2010.pdf>, 26.08.2011, pp. 8-10.

different interpretations even of a written text.²⁵ Because the programmes and manifestos of the Austrian political parties seldom express neutrality or security affairs in clear words, it was necessary to interpret the content of these texts as well.

- The political debate will be analysed using the Sessions Minutes of the Austrian Parliament. In certain cases it was necessary to analyse newspapers instead of the minutes. The content of the texts are analysed and related to the issues of the party programmes and manifestos.

Finally, the results of these four steps will be interpreted alongside the research questions and targets. In a summary both general and specific rules are also deduced. As conclusions, a list of the main topics is added to answer the research questions and hypotheses and to see whether the research target could be accomplished.

1.6. Cases and Framework Conditions

But first of all, it was indispensable to clarify why case studies are the proper means to cover the research programme. The first reason for choosing case studies was the long research period with significant time gaps, for instance between 1974 and 1989. Using the historical approach there are five main issues to the case studies or framework conditions which include:

1. The Austrian State Treaty and the question of how to practice Austrian neutrality with respect to the Swiss model and to the other neutral European states.
2. The relationship of a neutral state and the UN: Austria's practical example , with special emphasis on the participation in international operations.
3. The relationship of a neutral European state to regional organisations like COE, NATO, WEU, EEC, EU, or OSCE, by the example of Austria.
4. The development of the Austrian strategic security documents.
5. The development of the Austrian legal framework to participate militarily in international operations.

These five main issues determined the choice of significant cases to prove the hypotheses or to answer the research questions. Therefore, an instrumental case study approach according to Robert Stake was chosen.²⁶ The main issues could not always be separated in each case study or framework condition. Sometimes some or all issues were interwoven into each other. The

²⁵ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/>, 17. 08. 2011.

²⁶ Stake Robert E., Case Studies, in Denzin Norman K./Lincoln Yvonna S.(eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications , London/New Dehli, 1994, pp. 236-247.

research programme on the case studies generally follows a historical line. In one of the case studies this principle had to be broken. The case study on the each UN SC membership included the three periods of membership, each of two years' duration. The whole case study encompasses over 30 years. But it was necessary to compare these three periods in one big case study. The case studies on international operations refer to the milestones of Austrian participation, from the first operations in the Congo and Cyprus by medical personnel, through participation in UN operations by combat troops under NATO and EU command and control. To decide for a case to be relevant for the research it was necessary to ensure it was significant for one or more of the main issues above. The reasons why the cases were chosen are explained at the beginning of each case study.

Each case is analysed by trying to establish a link between the practice of neutrality policy and the positions of the political parties to that practice with respect to their contemporary programmes or manifestos. To research the cases the main method employed was text analysis by case study related key words, e.g. neutrality, United Nations, European Union, international operations, etc. The key words changed from case study to case study, so it made no sense to list all the key words used. The main written resources on the cases were minutes of the Austrian parliament. The advantage of those resources is the fact that all statements of the MPs were officially approved by the MP and his party. Therefore, they could be taken as the particular party's position, and compared to the contemporary manifestos. After identifying the key word in related texts in the minutes or other contemporary resources, they were contextually²⁷ interpreted by a hermeneutic approach, explained, and related to party manifestos or government statements. The interpreted texts were compared to the contemporary party manifestos of each party. At the end of each case study there is an answer to the question of whether or not a party acted according to its manifesto. At the beginning of the case studies a short historical overview is given.

The cases are not compared to each other, but in the last Chapter of the thesis a synopsis stresses the developments of neutrality practice in general as related to the Austrian practice. The results of the case studies are interpreted, generalised and listed in a list of main topics. This list includes, on the one hand, the changes of practice in Austrian neutrality policy. On the other hand, it contains the development of the political parties in the Austrian Parliament and their

²⁷ Hodder Ian, *The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture*, in Denzin Norman K./Lincoln Yvonna S.(eds), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Sage Publications , London/New Dehli, 1994, pp. 393-402.

manifestos regarding daily business of neutrality and security affairs.

The selection of the case studies and framework conditions was based on the development of security policy in Austria. They deal with security policy questions and practical politics following the obligations of a UN member. These case studies differ from the framework conditions. Case studies deal with international operations in which Austria participated or is participating. Additionally, the three periods of the Austrian membership of the UN SC are also regarded as three parts of a case study, because Austria had to act in the SC while maintaining its neutrality policy. The research on the framework conditions covers the changes of the legal framework related to international operations or integration into international organisations. The research on the framework conditions focus on the Austrian State Treaty, the Austrian UN membership, the Austrian EU membership, the Austrian membership in NATO-PfP, and the development of the Austrian security strategy. The development of the Austrian security strategy started with the Comprehensive National Defence, followed by the Security Doctrine of 2001 and, finally, the Security Strategy 2011.

Time	Cases	Framework Conditions	Additional Main Data
1955		Vienna State Treaty 1955 Austrian Defence Law Membership in UN	
1960	Operations in the Congo 1960		
1965	Operations in Cyprus 1965	Austrian Defence Doctrine 1962 – 1982	International Operations Law Earmarked UN-Battalion 1965
1970	Armed Operations Cyprus 1972 Egypt and Golan Heights Operations 1973		
1975	UN SC Membership 1973-74		Revision of Constitution 1975 including International Operations
1980			
1985			
1990	2 nd UN SC Membership 1991 – 1992		End of Cold War 1989
1995	IFOR/SFOR Operations 1996 KFOR Operations 1999	EU – Membership, 1995 Membership in NATO-PfP failed Options Report 1998	Revision of Constitution 1995 Austrian Law on Security and Co-operation 1997 Revision of Constitution 1998
2000			
2005		Security Doctrine 2001	
2010	EUFOR Chad/RCA Operations 2008 3 rd UN SC Membership 2009-10	Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 draft Security Strategy 2011	Revision of Constitution 2010

Table 1.6: Overview of the Time Frame

The case studies and the research on the framework conditions cover three periods of Austrian

security policy,

- the security policy in the late 1960s
- the active neutrality policy of the “Kreisky Era” until the accession to the EU
- the security policy as a member of the EU.

The case studies follow a chronological order. Altogether, there are nine case studies. Sometimes it was necessary to deal with the interweaving of politics and policy like in the case study on BiH 1996: Questions about neutrality needed to be discussed. The first case study deals with the first international operations. It is presented to show how Austria dealt with the obligations of UN membership at that time. The next case study analyses the international operations in Cyprus and the creation of the first Austrian law to conduct international (combat) operations. A main part of the case studies analyses the position of Austria during its three times of UN SC membership – a topic heavily discussed during the first period from 1973 to 1974. That case study has three sub-chapters. During each of the three UN SC membership periods, Austria had to deal with a new quality of international operations and made great strides by practising its neutrality policy. In that case study the degree of interconnections was very high. The next case studies deal with the extension of international operations by regional organisations such as NATO. The last case study concerns the EUFOR Chad/RCA operations because it was the most discussed participation in Austria and it was an example for practical Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Those case studies are embedded into the research of the changing framework conditions starting with UN membership up the Austrian security strategy in 2011/2012.

Even though national operations are a main part of national security policy, this thesis does not deal with national operations and consequences. It focuses on how Austria, as a neutral country, dealt with international affairs. The operations of internal relevance like humanitarian operations in Austria and the assistance operations along the Austrian border in the years 1956, 1967, 1968, and 1991 were therefore not relevant to this thesis. Equally, the operation along the eastern border of Austria to assist the police forces, which lasted for more than 20 years, does not belong here. A special research emphasis was directed on the perception of the security policy by some Austrian political parties, since – according to the case studies – there were remarkable changes in their party manifestos.

The research on the cases and framework conditions was arranged in three chapters following the three periods of Austrian security policy mentioned above. In each chapter an overview is given in a table, these three tables are listed here together.

Period 1

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	4.2 Austrian State Treaty, Neutrality and Membership to the UN 1955
4.3 The first Austrian Contingent in the International Operations in the Congo in 1960	
	4.4 Defence Doctrine and Austrian Defence Plan from 1962 – 1982
4.5 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	

Table 4.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions during Period 1

Period 2

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
5.1 The first “armed operations” in 1972	
5.2 Austria as a member of the Security Council 5.2.1 Austria’s First Period from 1973 – 1974 5.2.2 Austria’s Second Period from 1991 – 1992 a) The Kuwait crisis b) The Yugoslavia crisis from 1991 onwards 5.2.3 Austria’s Third Period from 2009 – 2010	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions during Period 2

Period 3

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations to WEU and Membership in NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The Failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions during Period 3

1.7. Value Added of the Research Work

The underlying research work will demonstrate the following new aspects:

- A reflection of how political parties act in a contradictory environment full of tensions between their current efforts and the obligations, laid down in their programmes or manifestos²⁸.

²⁸ In this thesis, the terms “programme” and “manifesto” are used differently: A manifesto covers the whole scale of political issues a party has to deal with. It includes especially the values a party refers to. It is usually produced for the long run up to 15 years of validity whereas a programme has a short run perspective with a maximum

- A reflection of the political course of action taken by the Austrian government to conduct international operations and to fulfil international obligations as a member of international organisations.
- The development of a framework for the relationship of international or regional organisations with a neutral country.
- A description of the change of the use of force by the Austrian government in an international environment within the research periods.
- The development of a new understanding of neutrality to strike a balance between the obligations under international law versus the obligations arising from membership in regional and international organisations.

validity of three to five years. Sometimes programmes are also produced for a single electoral campaign only. Usually a programme exists at the inception of a political party and before a manifesto can be produced.

Chapter 2: Questions of International Law

This Chapter of the thesis deals with the relevant questions of international law. At the beginning some definitions and general principles of international law are proposed, followed by a short overview of the history and development of international law. Afterwards, the law of war and the law of neutrality are discussed. Especially the law of neutrality is expounded from a historical perspective. Because Austrian neutrality was based on the Swiss model, the Swiss understanding of the rights and duties of a neutral country is explained and the genesis of the Austrian neutrality is stressed.

2.1. General Questions of International Law

In the underlying thesis the term “International Law” is understood as *“the wholeness of principles and regulations of law, which structure the legal relationships between the states or nations”*²⁹. Or in other words, *“...international law is a set of primary rules, pointing to what to do and what not to do...”*³⁰ The law of nations is defined as *“the quintessence of legal norms, which structure the relations between the states and other entities of the level of a state.”*³¹ Today these “other entities” are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), recognized liberation movements, and supranational organisations like the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, etc.

The law of nations is divided into the laws of warfare, the neutrality law, and the laws of peace. Generally, humanitarian law is also added to the law of nations; it mainly consists of the convention of the Red Cross. The pact of outlawing war (the Briand-Kellogg-Pact) of 1928 is usually added to the law of nations as well. The principles of the law of nations include, on the one hand, written law and, on the other hand, the unwritten principles and customary or established practices. In general, the law of nations consists of the principle of acting bona fide or in another Latin phrase, “pacta sunt servanda”. Today a major part of the law of nations is the UN

²⁹ Knauer, Band 9, P. 3843.

³⁰ Hart H.L.A, The Concept of Law, in Akçapar Burak, The International Law of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, Band 102, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1996, p. 29.

³¹ Fischer Klemens, Humanitäts-, Kriegs- und Neutralitätsrecht sowie Kulturgüterschutz, Truppemdienst, Wien, Herold, 1991, p. 25.

Charter of 1945, but many other international treaties are also part of it.

2.2. The Law of War and the Neutrality Law

The law of war has been developed since the Thirty Years' War in Europe. One of the first persons who wrote down Regulations of Warfare, was the Dutchman Hugo Grotius, author of "*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*"³². The "*Land Warfare Regulations*" were written during the conferences of The Hague in 1899 and 1907 and annexed to the Hague Conventions.

Neutrality law was created even earlier than the written law of war. The contents of neutrality accrued at the end of the 14th century. They were deduced from the Latin expression "ne uter – none of both" and meant originally the non-participation and non-involvement in specific wars.³³ In general, one distinguishes between self-determined and forced neutrality. The status of neutrality was defined during the The Hague Conference of 1899 and confirmed by the The Hague Conference of 1907. Based on these conferences, neutrality in general only exists in wartime. The practice of neutrality policy was formulated following the policy Switzerland had practised since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. *Following the Land Warfare Regulations of 1899* the main points of neutrality policy are:

- A neutral country does not have to take part in war.
- A neutral country does not have to allow foreign troops to use its territory in any case.
- A neutral country does not have to help any party in the conflict.
- A neutral country has to defend its own territory.³⁴

Although different kinds of neutrality have been developed after 1899, for instance the permanent, everlasting, economic, moral, or benevolent neutrality, today neutrality is again restored to its core military understanding. Therefore, today neutrality policy is understood as a policy of treating all belligerents equally and to refrain from all acts of war or from supporting acts of war in any way. There are also differences between neutrality, neutrality policy and neutralism. The status of neutrality can also be declared as a maxim of the policy of a country for a certain time or forever. Neutrality can be self-chosen or forced. Permanent neutrality can be declared or practised like Sweden was doing for a certain time in the 20th century. Another

³² Green Leslie C., *The contemporary law of armed conflict*, second edition, Juris Publishing, Manchester, 2000, p.1.

³³ Gehler Michael/Böhler Ingrid (Hrsg.), *Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich, Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945/1949 bis zur Gegenwart*, Innsbruck/Wien, Bozen, 2007, p. 3.

³⁴ Verdross Alfred/Simma Bruno, *Universelles Völkerrecht, Theorie und Praxis*, 3. völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage, Duncker&Humblot, Berlin, 1984, p. 14.

possibility is neutrality guaranteed by international treaties like Switzerland had since the Napoleonic Wars, or Belgium between the First and Second World War (WW II). In 1955, Austria declared self-chosen neutrality, but in the Minutes of the Moscow Memorandum Austria declared that it would choose neutrality following the Swiss model³⁵. Therefore, it was formally self-chosen neutrality, but in reality it was a clever manoeuvre for gaining independence.

Neutralized countries are forced to become neutral by regional powers or superpowers. As a general rule, they have to remain neutral economically, politically as well as militarily. In most cases, neutrality policies of those countries differ from their political convictions. On the contrary, neutral countries are usually neutral in military affairs and have their own positions in political, economic or cultural matters. Neutrality also includes offering good offices, mediation, and impartiality without giving up their own convictions. This kind of policy has been practised by Austria and Switzerland for many years. The difference between neutrality and neutrality politics is that neutrality is a long lasting general political conviction, while neutrality politics is applied in specific political situations which require neutral actions.

Although there is no international written law on how to practise permanent neutrality policy, a permanently neutral country should pro actively practise such policy and act like a neutral country does during an ongoing conflict.³⁶ Therefore, permanently neutral countries like Austria and Switzerland have to pursue a security policy in peacetime which allows them to withstand a conflict in the region or anywhere in the world without being involved. This obligation ends when the country is attacked and has to defend itself.³⁷ From the beginning of neutrality status up to the end of the Second World War, neutrality policies, especially the policy of a permanently neutral country, were understood as equal behaviour towards other countries regardless of ethical and moral questions. Today, the common understanding is that a neutral country has to differentiate between belligerents as democracies or dictatorships. Therefore, it was a pragmatic policy of the neutral countries Switzerland and Sweden towards “The Third Reich” during the Second World War a policy of backing the economy of the “Third Reich” by selling resources and a supportive finance policy. This attitude has been heavily criticized during the last ten

³⁵ Rauchensteiner Manfred, *Der Sonderfall, Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945 bis 1955*, Graz/Wien/Köln, Styria, 1979, Sonderfall, p. 333.

³⁶ Hauser Gunther, *Österreich – dauernd neutral, Studien zur politischen Wirklichkeit*, Band 14, Braumüller, Wien, 2002, p. 55.

³⁷ Stourzh Gerald, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945 – 1955, Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität*, Styria, Graz/Wien/Köln, Studienausgabe, 3. Auflage, 1985, p. 93.

years.³⁸ On the other hand, the policy of Switzerland towards the Allied Forces in the last months of the Second World War was criticized as well. Equal treatment in wartime does not mean that a country is not allowed to have a different political opinion about the politics of conflict partners or alliances, whether the conflict is decided by political means or military force.

A neutral state has to make clear that it will defend its country, if the armed forces of any belligerent crosses the border. The neutral state is also required to proceed against physical persons or legal entities or groups, which intervene in a conflict or war from its territory. In spite of the fact that the League of Nations had invited neutral states as well, in 1945 the founding nations of the UN were of the opinion that neutral countries would weaken the efficiency of the UN. The policy of neutral countries depends to a high degree on the credibility, trustworthiness, and predictability of its policy. Whether the neutrality of a country is recognized by the international community also depends on the expectations of the international community and especially the positions of the “global players”, the regional powers or superpowers. The question of changing a neutrality policy, therefore, is both a legal question and a political question. It is also important, whether or not the factual politics of certain neutral countries and the development of neutrality policy is accepted, tolerated, expected, or even forced by the international community.

2.3. A short Genesis of Austria’s Neutrality

After the Second World War Austria was a country divided into four zones. Unlike **Germany**, **Austria had a central government from the very beginning**. The Austrian government, which was constituted in May 1945, was extended by ministers and state secretaries from the western part of Austria following a conference with the participation of all Austrian federal provinces in September 1945. It was the key issue for the Austrian government to be recognised in power by all four Allied Forces. Thus, Austria got an internationally accepted and capable government. The competences of the Austrian government and the Allied Council in Vienna were enumerated in agreements defining the control function of the Allied Forces in Austria. According to the Second Agreement of 1946, Austria had to publish³⁹ laws after their passing, but only constitutional laws

³⁸ Zemanek, Neutralität, in Hummer Waldemar (Hrsg.), Staatsvertrag und immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, Eine juristische Analyse, Verlag Österreich, Wien 2007, p. 197.

³⁹ That meant that Austria had to report national laws to the Allied Council. Despite the first agreement, the Allied Council could not disapprove of them. Only constitutional law and state treaties had to be approved by the

had to be approved of by the Allied Council. Austria had a lot more freedom of action than the German provinces had. In those years, the central foreign affairs topic was the negotiation and ultimately signing of a state treaty to gain full independence. The second important topic of foreign affairs was the integration into the international community to achieve membership in the UN. Therefore, Austria applied for membership in 1947. But the USSR vetoed it in the UN SC, because Austria was not considered to be fully sovereign.⁴⁰ Austria got the opportunity to become a member in subsidiary organisations of the UN such as UNHCR and FAO. From 1948, the three western zones⁴¹ of Austria took part in the European Recovery Programme (ERP). The Soviet Zone did not take part officially because it was a western programme.

After suffering several setbacks, a window of opportunity opened after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Following the suggestion of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of non-aligned India, neutrality became a topic in the negotiations of the Austrian State Treaty. This option was strongly backed by the Austrian delegation during the Four Power Conference in Berlin in February 1954. But even within the Austrian delegation, the content of neutrality and what that would mean for Austria was not clear. Secretary of State Bruno Kreisky meant non-alliance in order to avoid neutralism. During the Second World War Kreisky had lived in Sweden, and he was impressed by the Swedish understanding of neutrality.⁴² After Austria suggested pursuing neutrality according to the Swiss model, the Western Allies agreed to the proposal.⁴³ But in Berlin the proposal failed because the USSR insisted on a symbolic presence of their troops in Austria.⁴⁴ In February 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov announced that the USSR was ready to sign a state treaty with Austria and the western Allies agreed on bilateral negotiations in Moscow. But the final decisions would be taken in Vienna. The USSR insisted on neutrality as a price for the State Treaty and so the Moscow Memorandum of 15th April 1955 stated:

“...Austria undertakes to exercise permanent international neutrality as it is practised by Switzerland. The Austrian government will submit this Austrian proclamation according to the rules of the Austrian constitution to the Austrian parliament after

Council in advance.

⁴⁰ Emmerich Klaus, *Unterwegs zum Frieden, 50 Jahre Österreich in den Vereinten Nationen*, Ueberreuter Verlag, Wien 2005, pp. 29-31.

⁴¹ The zones of the USA, GB, and France. The zone of the USSR could only take part unofficially.

⁴² Petritsch Wolfgang, Bruno Kreisky, Residenz Verlag, St. Pölten/Salzburg, 2010, pp. 106-107.

⁴³ Stourzh Gerald, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945 – 1955, Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität*, Styria, Graz/Wien/Köln, Studienausgabe, 3. Auflage, 1985, pp. 116-121.

⁴⁴ Kreisky Bruno, *Im Strom der Politik*, Siedler Verlag, Wien, 1994, pp.459-466, Stourzh Gerald, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945 – 1955, Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität*, Styria, Graz/Wien/Köln, Studienausgabe, 3. Auflage, 1985, p.122

*ratification of the State Treaty....*⁴⁵

After this genesis it was clear, that Austrian neutrality was a clever manoeuvre to get the State Treaty and that it had to follow the Swiss model. On 11th June 1955, the Austrian National Council (the first chamber in the Austrian Parliament) passed a resolution to the government to prepare a constitutional neutrality law and to apply for membership to the UN. That move was intended to show the USSR that Austria would pass a neutrality law after ratification of the Austrian State Treaty and after the last foreign soldier had left Austria. By this time, Austria had left pursuing the Swiss model for the first time. The constitutional neutrality law was passed by the Austrian parliament on 26th October 1955 and that day became the National Holiday of Austria later on.⁴⁶

2.4. A short History of Austrian Security Policy

As stated above, the Austrian security policy has oscillated between international integration and the policy to achieve the Austrian State Treaty and the obligations imposed by the status of neutrality. The Austrian constitutional neutrality law was passed by the NC on 26th October 1955. It came into force on 5th November 1955 with the subsequent notification of the signatory states of the Austrian State Treaty. None of them guaranteed the state's neutrality although this was discussed in May 1955. On 15th December, Austria became a member of the UN together with several other countries, e.g. Finland and Ireland. On 16th April 1956, Austria joined the Council of Europe (COE). A first step to international integration could be reached very shortly after gaining independence. But this needed the acceptance through international and national discussion on the neutrality status of Austria and how Austria pursued its neutrality. An overview of those discussions will be given in the next chapter. A membership of NATO or the developing European Economic Community (EEC) was unthinkable at the time because of the Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and the connections between EEC, Western European Union (WEU) and NATO.

The first Austrian defence law of the 2nd Republic listed only three tasks for the Austrian Armed Forces:

⁴⁵ Stourzh Gerald, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945 – 1955, Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität*, Styria, Graz/Wien/Köln, Studienausgabe, 3. Auflage, 1985, Staatsvertrag, p. 226.

⁴⁶ „.....*die Österreich international dazu verpflichtet, immerwährend eine Neutralität zu üben, wie sie von der Schweiz gehandhabt wird. Die österreichische Bundesregierung wird diese österreichische Deklaration gemäß den Bestimmungen der Bundesverfassung dem österreichischen Parlament nach Ratifikation des Staatsvertrages zur Beschlussfassung vorlegen....*“, Stourzh, Staatsvertrag, p. 173.

- a) protection of the borders
- b) protection of constitutional institutions and maintenance of order and security in general and
- c) assistance in the case of natural disasters or accidents of extraordinary dimension.⁴⁷

No assignment for international operations was foreseen at that time. The defence law went back to the defence law of the 1st Republic of Austria and all the tasks provided for in that law became part of the new law.⁴⁸ This was common practice in Austria; already the defence law of the 1st Republic had used nearly the same wording as laid down in the defence law of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Although the Austrian Armed Forces were able to deal with the first challenge during the Hungarian crisis in 1956, it was clear that a comprehensive approach in security policy was necessary. In the government declaration of 1959 consensus was reached to develop a new concept of defence. According to the Swiss model the defence policy should be built of four pillars: military, economic, civil and educational defence; a first comprehensive approach, so to speak.⁴⁹ After in-depth analysis and fundamental assessments the Austrian Council of Ministers drew up a national defence plan including four different threat scenarios:

- a) relative peace
- b) case of crisis,
- c) case of neutrality
- d) case of defence.⁵⁰

Even though the Austrian Armed Forces had taken part in international operations in two previous cases and the Austrian constitutional law for international operations had been passed in 1965. After winning the elections in 1970, the ASDP set up a “Bundesheerreformkommission”⁵¹ for the first time. By reducing the conscription time from nine to six months plus 60 days of special training, it was also necessary to develop a (new) defence doctrine. In 1972, the “Comprehensive National Defence” was imported into the Constitution and the legal mission of

⁴⁷ Federal Law Gazette, 181/1955, 21st September 1955.

⁴⁸ Hans Penkler, Der Rechtsrahmen des Heeres, in Rauchensteiner Manfred/Etschmann Wolfgang, Schild ohne Schwert, Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955 – 1970, Graz/Wien, Köln, 1991, p. 211.

⁴⁹ Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, p. 7.

⁵⁰ Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, p. 13.

⁵¹ A commission, which should restructure the Austrian Armed Forces including principle questions on homeland defence.

the Armed Forces was changed from border defence to homeland defence.⁵² A new defence doctrine was passed by the Austrian Parliament on 10th June 1975. That day the necessary changes of paragraphs 9a and 79 of the Austrian Constitution were also passed. On 28th October 1975, the Austrian Council of Ministers declared the Defence Doctrine to be a guideline for all ministries. Afterwards, the Austrian national defence plan was developed and passed by the NC in 1983.

After Austria joined the EU in 1995, it was necessary to change the Austrian Constitution again to fulfil all duties of the Treaty of Maastricht and the “Petersberg Tasks”⁵³. The Constitutional Law on Security and Co-operation in Europe should ensure solitary acting within the new security structure in Europe. On 1st January, Austria assumed observer status in WEU and in spring 1995 Austria became a member of the NATO-PfP. An Options Report⁵⁴ on Austrian security policy in 1998 should offer different avenues for Austria, but the report failed because of the issue of a possible NATO membership. The Austrian legal expert and member of the Court at The Hague, Helmut Türk, explained in 1997⁵⁵, that NATO and Warsaw Pact were regional security associations according to chapter VIII of the UN-Charter. Therefore, it would have been possible for Austria to become a member of these associations. The Options Report failed, because the ASDP rejected the option of becoming a member of NATO. The new coalition of APP-AFP 2000 produced a new Security Doctrine and it was passed by the NC in 2001. It was the first time a security decision was passed against the vote of the minority party and the path of consensus in security questions was left. In 2005, the Comprehensive Security Provisions following the Security Doctrine were passed by the NC without plenary discussions. 2010 saw the start of a new initiative to promote the new security strategy. A draft was passed by the Austrian Council of Ministers in April 2011. At present it is being discussed in the Austrian Parliament. During that time the ASDP started an initiative to abandon conscription, which has led to big discussions in Austria between the political parties but they have not yet arrived at a

⁵² Erwin A. Schmidl, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zwischen Neutralität und Bündnissystemen, in Gehler Michael/Böhler Ingrid (Hrsg.), *Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich, Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945/1949 bis zur Gegenwart*, Innsbruck/Wien, Bozen, 2007, p. 185.

⁵³ The Petersberg Tasks are kinds of international operations, which were defined as relevant for the WEU. By the Treaty of Amsterdam they were integrated into the CFSP of the EU. A more detailed explanation follows in case study 6.2.1.

⁵⁴ The Options Report on Austrian security policy should be a document of options for the Austrian security policy after joining the EU. It was never signed but it was the basis for the security doctrine in 2001. This will be explained in case study 4.10.

⁵⁵ Türk Helmut, *Österreich im Spannungsfeld von Neutralität und kollektiver Sicherheit*, Juristische Schriftenreihe Band 109, Österreich, 1997, pp. 71-74.

decision on that topic.

Chapter 3: Security Policy in the Manifestos of the Austrian Political Parties

In this chapter of the thesis, the party manifestos and programmes are analyzed to identify statements on security policy and international operations. The research covers those parties (whatever their current status may be) that were represented in parliament during the research period. During the whole research period from 1945 to 2011, only the Austrian Peoples Party⁵⁶ (APP) and the Austrian Social (Democratic) Party⁵⁷ (ASDP) have been continuously represented in the Austrian parliament. In 1949, the Austrian Alliance of Independents⁵⁸ (AAI) was elected into the parliament; it merged into the Austrian Freedom Party⁵⁹ (AFP) in 1955. Since 1986, a Green and Alternative Party has also been part of the parliament, in the thesis the name Austrian Green Party⁶⁰ (AGP) is used for those individuals and groups that subsequently merged into the AGP during the 1990s. From 1945 to 1953, a Communist party was also briefly represented in the Austrian Parliament but it was excluded from the research programme due to its short-lived presence in the parliament. Similarly, a liberal party was part of the parliament in the 1990s, but for the same reason it was also excluded from this analysis. Unlike the parties so far mentioned, the Alliance for the Future of Austria⁶¹ (AFA), which seceded from the AFP in 2005, is still represented in the Austrian parliament and is, therefore, included in the research programme.

First of all, it is necessary to describe the function of party programmes. On the one hand, there are election programmes, which include usually only the topics of an election period. On the other hand, there are party manifestos or basic programmes, which elaborate the underlying values. They are used to convey these values to the members and the outside world.⁶² Party manifestos contain statements of values as well as demands addressed to politics. With regard to the research topic the manifestos include analyses of the current political situation and requirements for foreign and defence policy. The political expediency of the moment, as

⁵⁶ Österreichische Volkspartei

⁵⁷ (Sozialistische) Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs

⁵⁸ Verband der Unabhängigen Österreichs

⁵⁹ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs

⁶⁰ Die Grünen

⁶¹ Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs

⁶² Kadan Albert / Pelinka Anton, *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien, Dokumentation und Analyse*, Niederösterreichisches Pressehaus, St. Pölten, 1979, p. 7.

perceived by the party's key personnel has to be related to these manifesto requirements and the personnel have to act accordingly, to accommodate current topics. The tasks for these individuals include suggestions on how to deal with the demands of the party manifesto and demands of their daily job in their role as part of the governing coalition or the opposition. The job usually covers every-day topics, the values of the parties and the demands of the manifestos. The research in the case studies covers all these aspects.

3.1. Party Manifestos of the APP

In this chapter security related issues of the party manifestos of the APP are analysed starting with the first manifesto of 1945 up to the one recently adopted. At the end of the chapter, a table highlights the main issues in the different manifestos. During the first years after WW II, questions of security policy were concentrated on the negotiations of a state treaty. But even though this aim was most important to Austria, the APP stated in its "*guiding principles*"⁶³ of 1945, that the APP preferred a peaceful foreign policy and the integration of Austria into a "*World Security Union (Weltsicherungsverband)*". To achieve these aims, militia-type armed forces were to be established within the framework of such a World Security Union to take appropriate measures towards violators of peace.

In 1952, the APP rewrote their guiding principles in a new manifesto "*Everything for Austria, manifesto of the APP, 1952*"⁶⁴. Naturally, the independence of Austria was the main aim. But the APP professed to fully subscribe to the aims of the United Nations (UN) and wanted to apply for membership. The APP suggested Armed and Police Forces to be a rescue and auxiliary corps in case of natural disasters. War was the biggest tragedy and all peoples should live in peace and harmony. But the freedom of Austria should not be jeopardized by other peoples.

Three years after the Austrian State Treaty was signed, the APP rewrote their manifesto again and gave it the title "*What we want*"⁶⁵. In this manifesto neutrality is mentioned for the first time. The

⁶³ "Programmatische Leitsätze", in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, pp. 676-681.

⁶⁴ "Alles für Österreich, programmatische Grundsätze der Österreichischen Volkspartei", in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990pp. 699-705.

⁶⁵ "Was wir wollen", Grundsatzprogramm der Österreichischen Volkspartei 1958, in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990pp. 706-717.

APP understood neutrality solely in its military meaning. It was not meant to be a straitjacket, but an instrument to meet international peace obligations.⁶⁶ Therefore, Austria needed armed forces which could conduct peace operations. The overall authority of the UN had to be supported. Additionally, the APP backed the founding of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It was influenced by the Treaties of Rome, which founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and wanted to be active to reach a Union of Europe later on. Therefore, the Austrian economy had to be prepared for participation in a European economic area.

In 1965 the APP updated its programme in the “*manifesto of Klagenfurt*“.⁶⁷ It proclaimed faithfulness to Austria and, declared that Austria needed an efficient defence force. Military neutrality was the main guarantee of the independence of Austria. Austria should have a bridge function and had the obligation to contribute to the peace and wealth of the world. But the future of Austria should be as a neutral state within a European economic unity.

After the defeats in the elections 1970 and 1971, the APP had to swallow the bitter pill of assuming the role of opposition in the parliament. It was necessary to rewrite their programme yet again. In 1972 the “*Manifesto of Salzburg*“⁶⁸ was proclaimed by the APP. In the chapter “*Austria and the world*“, the APP professed freedom as the highest aim of foreign policy. Neutrality was the best shield for independence and sovereignty, but neutralism of convictions and opinions was the wrong way to pursue neutrality. Efficient and comprehensive defence was the expression of the Austrian intention to safeguard freedom and meet international obligations. The support of the UN by Austria should be executed by supporting its work and offering its good offices and presenting itself as an international conference site. The European integration process included support for Austria as a neutral state, as well as the opportunity to gradually remove the obstacles in the way towards cooperation with the peoples living behind the “Iron Curtain“.

After 15 years of opposition and in preparation for the elections in 1986, the future manifesto of the APP was passed.⁶⁹ The APP supported freedom movements and disarmament initiatives and

⁶⁶ Berchthold Klaus (edr), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, p. 396.

⁶⁷ “Klagenfurter Manifest“, 1965, in Robert Kriechbaumer, *Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986*, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, pp. 735-739.

⁶⁸ Salzburger Programm der ÖVP, in Robert Kriechbaumer, *Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986*, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, pp. 759-778.

⁶⁹ *Austria has Future, “Österreich hat Zukunft*“, in Robert Kriechbaumer, *Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986*, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990,

suggested that Austria should take an active part in freedom initiatives as a permanently neutral country. Austria should offer its good offices wherever possible. Austria's defence mechanism needed to be reliable. An active foreign policy was not enough but part of a comprehensive approach. With these words the APP criticised heavily the former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Permanent neutrality was a voluntary obligation, which bound a country only in days of war. Neutrality made it easier to offer good offices and to participate in international operations. Austria had friendly relations with all peoples that proclaimed adherence to the principles of the UN-Charter. Again, the APP stressed their refusal of any form of neutralism and professed the obligations of neutrality.

During the whole period, the APP was the party of European solidarity. Therefore, it was not surprising, that the new manifesto in 1995 was a call to *“take part in and work on a European security structure”*⁷⁰. Austria had to take part in a proper way and the *“European security strategy had to be oriented to current challenges, threats and opportunities”*⁷¹. Austria should be integrated into the development of an all European security and defence system. The APP professed that under the obligations of the UN-Charter Austria should participate in the life of the community of all peoples. In the EU Austria had to take part in *“humanitarian, peace-keeping, peace-making and economic measures under the framework of such obligations”*⁷². Membership in a primarily military security system like NATO was not contained in the manifesto. The APP is still working on a new manifesto. The manifesto of 1995 is the most recent one at the moment.

	UN	Armed Forces	Neutrality	European integration
1945	Integrate to conduct measures	Militia		
1952	Apply for membership	Armed and Police Forces,		
1958	Conduct peace operations		Case of war	Support of EEC, EFTA, Union of Europe
1965	Contribute to peace	Efficient defence	Military neutrality, bridge function	Membership of EEC
1972	Good offices, obligations	Comprehensive defence	Shield, but no neutralism	Integration but neutrality
1986	Disarmament, good offices	Trustworthiness	No neutralism	-
1995	All kinds of PSO			Active in CFSP, ESS,

Table 3.1: Overview of the issues of the manifestos of the APP

pp. 779-813.

⁷⁰ <http://www.oevp.at/download/ooo298.pdf>, p. 4, 23 10 2008.

⁷¹ <http://www.oevp.at/download/ooo298.pdf>, p. 26, 23 10 2008.

⁷² <http://www.oevp.at/download/ooo298.pdf>, pp. 26-27, 23 10 2008.

3.2. Party Manifestos of the ASDP

In the following chapter, the party manifestos of the ASDP after WW II are covered from the first programme in 1945 up to the current manifesto. At the end, there is a table with the main issues. Unlike the APP, the ASDP considered itself the direct successor of the Social Democratic Party of the First Republic of Austria during the first half of the 20th century. Therefore, it would not have been necessary to develop a new manifesto immediately. But a group within the ASDP wanted to produce a “*Reconstruction Programme of the ASDP*”⁷³ This programme demanded that all foreign troops leave Austria immediately. This was in line with the ideas of State Chancellor Renner from the ASDP. Control by the UN would be acceptable. When taking a look at the organisation of the temporary government led by State Chancellor Renner, we notice that an under-secretary of state was responsible for the Armed Forces.⁷⁴ An agency led by Lieutenant-Colonel Winterer was responsible for demobilization, for the protection of main infrastructure facilities, and for the engineers who were disposing of remnants of war. On 12th December 1945, this agency was ordered to be dissolved by the Allied Commission. Besides the demand of rearmament, this faction of the ASDP insisted on integration into an economic community of all peoples and the UN and on lifting all restrictions on Austria.

Since the reconstruction programme was not acceptable to the whole party, the ASDP passed “*guidelines*”⁷⁵ in 1947. The first aim was the restoration of Austria’s full sovereignty and the ASDP showed its fierce opposition to war. All neighbours should co-operate within the framework of the UN. The final aim should be an “*Association of the Peoples of the World (Weltbund der Völker)*”. In security matters the ASDP recommended membership in the UN and internationally guaranteed neutrality. This idea was implemented in 1955. The Austrian Armed Forces would become an army pursuing the Swiss militia model.⁷⁶

In 1948, there was a big debate within the ASDP about the system of Armed Forces, the supreme

⁷³ Erwin Scharf/Bruno Pittermann, *Das Aufbauprogramm der SPÖ*, Eigenverlag, Wien 1946.

⁷⁴ Böhner Gerhard, *Die Wehrprogrammatik der SPÖ*, Österreichische Schriftenreihe für Rechts- und Politikwissenschaft, Band 6, Braumüller, Wien, 1982, p. 181.

⁷⁵ Aktionsprogramm der Sozialistischen Partei Österreichs, in Kriechbaumer Robert, *Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986*, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, pp. 838-848.

⁷⁶ Böhner Gerhard, *Die Wehrprogrammatik der SPÖ*, Österreichische Schriftenreihe für Rechts- und Politikwissenschaft, Band 6, Braumüller, Wien, 1982, p. 187.

command and control, political education, and democratisation of the Armed Forces. Some factions in the ASDP favoured border protection forces under the supervision of the ministry of the interior instead of the Armed Forces. Other factions were concerned about this idea and afraid of professional forces like the Austrian Armed Forces of 1934, the year of civil war in Austria. The negotiations of the State Treaty were interrupted and the discussions cooled down in 1950. There was no reference to those questions in the “*Ten-Points-Programme*”⁷⁷ of 1952. The first point of this programme was the struggle for Austria’s freedom and her reintegration into Europe and into the community of peoples struggling for a worldwide peace. Questions of rearmament and the future structure of the Armed Forces were absent altogether.

In 1958, the ASDP passed their “*New Party Manifesto*”.⁷⁸ The governing principle stated that all peoples should strive for peace and wealth. The ASDP was as much against the “*old capitalistic powers*” as the new “*expansionist policy of the Soviet communists*”. The long perspective of the ASDP was to join the “*United States of Europe*”. Therefore, the membership of Austria in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the European Council (COE) was welcomed. With these organisations, a united European economic region should be created. The reunification of Germany was also demanded. Neutrality meant abstention from every “*Union with a military character*”. Therefore, the ASDP demanded an efficient defence. The Austrian Armed Forces were only to be used to defend the borders. This was a very interesting point because the Constitution and the Defence law spoke about three tasks, defence, assistance in internal affairs and humanitarian aid. Both these laws had been passed in parliament by the ASDP together with the APP. Additionally, the ASDP demanded an economic co-operation of the European peoples; in consequence an Economic Union to be founded which could be responsible for an economic crisis management.

A rewriting of the manifesto of 1958 occurred between 1963 and 1965; it was also used as election programme for the elections in 1966. This “*Manifesto for Austria*”⁷⁹ was a programme to govern the country, but the ASDP lost the elections and the APP ruled alone. The manifesto did

⁷⁷ Zehn-Punkte-Programm der Sozialistischen Partei Österreichs, in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, p. 849.

⁷⁸ “Neues Parteiprogramm” der Sozialistischen Partei Österreichs, in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990pp. 850-869.

⁷⁹ Berchthold Klaus (edr), Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, pp. 306-316.

not have the same importance as its predecessor. It featured an active neutrality policy, which was to be carried out together with all members of the UN, all peoples, and all the neighbouring countries. The core elements of an active neutrality policy were: to establish Vienna as a site of international organisations, international conferences, cultural foreign policy, and efforts in disarmament. Defence measures had to secure the borders and guarantee independence and neutrality. Additionally, all efforts to establish a common European market should be made by all EEC and EFTA countries.

Thirteen years after the manifesto of 1965, on 20th May 1978, the ASDP passed a new party manifesto.⁸⁰ In this manifesto, the ASDP directly professed itself faithful to the UN-Charter for the first time. Austria's policy should aim at disarmament, freedom and peace. Concerning international relations the ASDP stressed permanent neutrality, which meant staying away of military associations. Active neutrality policy stood for stepping in for peace, freedom and solidarity between the peoples, without looking at participation in military blocs. The ASDP demanded to increase development aid, more justice in economic affairs, enhanced activities in international organisations, support for disarmament initiatives, comprehensive confederation of all democratic European states, co-operation with the EEC, and an extension of Vienna as a site of international organisations and conferences. If the world economy had a negative impact on Austria, such an effect should be mitigated, controlled and countered. The ASDP professed the Austrian comprehensive defence, which was based on conscription, and demanded for participation in peace-keeping operations.

After the year of change in 1989, which brought an end to the Cold War, the ASDP rewrote its manifesto in the form of a draft called "*Perspectives '90*".⁸¹ That draft stated that the ASDP was in favour of armed neutrality. But military defence should be subordinated to foreign, neutrality, and security policy. Austria would not jump on the bandwagon of any security system.

After becoming a member of the European Union (EU) the situation of the Austrian constitutional laws changed. Therefore, the ASDP had to rewrite its manifesto in 1998 again. This party manifesto⁸² is still in force. Analysing this manifesto, there are enough links to international

⁸⁰ The new manifesto (Das Neue Parteiprogramm), in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, pp. 870-918.

⁸¹ Kernic Franz, Parteien und Bundesheer, Quellen zur Stellung der österreichischen politischen Parteien zu Fragen der Landesverteidigung seit 1955, Wien, IMS/LVAk, Wien 1988, p. 20.

⁸² http://www.spoe.at/spoe_partei_programm.pdf, 23 10 2008.

operations and international peace policy. Solidarity is interpreted as taking responsibility for one's own society. It should also answer all challenges by regarding its values with respect to international solidarity of all peoples⁸³. Under the chapter “*The Project Europe a European security policy*” is attached, which is not only understood as a military option. European security policy has to include prescient and preventive measures to stabilize and promote democracy. Therefore, a military association is not an appropriate tool to reach this goal. A new European security model has to go far beyond that. It has to be based on flexible structures such as conflict prevention, crisis management, and international operations of solidarity. Additionally, the proven security concept of Austria is discussed, which comprises neutrality in combination with international co-operative solidarity. Any automatic obligation to participate in military operations is rejected. Nevertheless it is important to build supranational structures based on the rule of law. The institutions of the UN have to have the monopoly on the use of force towards peace violators. One part of these efforts should be the development of a foreign and security policy orientated towards European peace.⁸⁴

	UN	Armed Forces	Neutrality	European integration
1945	Integration, control by	Agency		Economical integration
1947	Membership	Militia forces	Internationally guaranteed	
1958	Fight for peace	Defend the borders	No membership in a military union	United states of Europe
1965		Secure the borders and neutrality	Active neutrality policy	Common European market
1978	UN Charter peace-keeping	Comprehensive defence	Step in for peace, freedom and solidarity	Comprehensive confederation
1998	Monopoly of use of force		No military association	Solidarity in Europe, CFSP

Table 3.2: Overview of the issues of the manifestos of the ASDP

3.3. Party Manifestos of the AFP

In this chapter, the party manifestos of the AFP and its predecessors are analysed regarding security matters only. The first manifesto was created in 1949. The current one dates from 2005. At the end of the chapter, there is a table with an overview of issues related to security policy. After the publication of the first Manifesto, the Allied Council had allowed a new group, the

⁸³ http://www.spoe.at/spoe_partei_programm.pdf, p. 6, 23 10 2008.

⁸⁴ http://www.spoe.at/spoe_partei_programm.pdf, pp. 26-27, 23 10 2008.

Austrian Alliance of the Independent (AAI), to run for the elections 1949.. After getting enough votes to win seats in the parliament, they passed a first manifesto.⁸⁵ Foreign policy should secure peace and try to establish the United States of Europe. The UN and other question of security policy were not mentioned at all.

In 1954, the AAI passed a new manifesto, the “*Manifesto of Aussee*“.⁸⁶ In this manifesto, the AAI stressed that Austria was a German state and demanded a unification of Europe according to the right of self-determination. But again, the relationship to the UN and other questions of security policy were absent.

In autumn 1955 the AAI and the Austrian Freedom party unified forming the Austrian Freedom Party (AFP). On 3rd November 1955, a short programme was passed.⁸⁷ Within this short programme, the AFP called for a separate state of Austria. War was rejected as a means of politics. They demanded a European Association of free and equal nations and states. Again, there was no article about the UN. In the 1957 guidelines of the AFP policy was determined by a federal congress.⁸⁸ In these guidelines, Austria’s sovereignty was emphasized again, but at the same time a confederation of the free peoples of Europe was demanded. War of aggression was rejected. Neutrality as a means of politics was mentioned for the first time and Austria had to be protected by efficient homeland defence. At the end, the AFP professed international justice by the UN for the first time and accepted an international UN court to decide in international conflicts.

In 1964, the AFP passed a new manifesto “*the Confessions of Salzburg*“⁸⁹. According to this manifesto, Austria had the duty to use its neutrality to promote active European policy. Aim of this policy should be a unification of the peoples and states of Europe to work for peace and freedom in the world. Austria should join the EEC not only for economic but also for political reasons.

The AFP updated its manifesto in 1968, the “*Manifesto of Bad Ischl*“⁹⁰. This time, a European

⁸⁵ Berchthold Klaus (edr), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, pp. 484-488.

⁸⁶ “Ausseer Programm”, in Berchthold Klaus (edr), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, pp. 488-492.

⁸⁷ Berchthold Klaus (edr), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, pp. 492-493.

⁸⁸ Berchthold Klaus (edr), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, pp. 494-509.

⁸⁹ “Salzburger Bekenntnis, in Berchthold Klaus (edr), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868 – 1966*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1967, pp. 509-512.

⁹⁰ “Bad Ischler Programm“, in Kadan/ Albert Pelinka Anton, *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen*

Federal State was demanded. This federal state should be responsible for economy, currency, society, science, foreign policy and development of a security system. Despite all this, again Austria should secure its freedom and neutrality by homeland defence.

After the elections of 1970 and 1971, which the ASDP had won, the AFP passed a new manifesto, the “*Liberal Manifesto to Social Policy*”⁹¹. Since that programme did not concentrate on security policy it is mentioned only, but it is not analysed at all.

In 1983, ASDP and AFP built a coalition. Therefore, the next manifesto was more detailed on questions of security policy.⁹² The manifesto of 1985 emphasized that neutrality policy must be based on reliable homeland defence. A country has to have enough defence potential to practise preventive strategy. All states should participate in a worldwide peace policy; Austria implemented this requirement on the basis of her neutrality.⁹³

In the current manifesto of 2005, which was passed after the partition of the Alliance Austrian Future⁹⁴ and served as an instrument to distance themselves from this party, there is a clear commitment to Europe:

*“Therefore, we commit ourselves to a common European security and defence policy. We declare our support to assistance duty in case of aggression against one of the members of the EU and to operations outside the EU according to the Petersberg Tasks 95. But these operations must not be conducted automatically and have to be passed by the Austrian National Council.”*⁹⁶

This relatively clear commitment is limited by some points in the above manifesto. Here, neutrality is presented as the supreme guidance of action regarding security policy:

“Neutrality has been the dominant acting guidance of Austrian foreign policy since 1955

Parteien, Dokumentation und Analyse, Niederösterreichisches Pressehaus, St. Pölten, 1979, pp. 212-216.

⁹¹ “Freiheitliche(s) Manifest zur Gesellschaftspolitik“, in Kadan/ Albert Pelinka Anton, Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien, Dokumentation und Analyse, Niederösterreichisches Pressehaus, St. Pölten, 1979, pp. 217-262.

⁹² Kernic Franz, Parteien und Bundesheer, Quellen zur Stellung der österreichischen politischen Parteien zu Fragen der Landesverteidigung seit 1955, Wien, IMS/LVAk, Wien 1988, p. 24 and document 20.

⁹³ Kernic Franz, Die freiheitliche Wehrpolitik in der zweiten Republik, Studie zur Wehrprogrammatische und –politik des VdU und der FPÖ von 1949 bis 1986, phil. Diss, Wien, 1987, pp. 98-102.

⁹⁴ The AAF was founded in 2005 by a certain number of members of the AFP. The AAF stuck the the government coalition with the APP, the other members of the AFP went into opposition.

⁹⁵ The Petersberg Tasks (1992) cover humanitarian operations, search and rescue operations, peace support operations, and peacemaking operations including peace enforcement operations.

⁹⁶ „Wir bekennen uns daher zu einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Wir bekennen uns zu einer Beistandspflicht im Falle einer Aggression gegen Mitglieder der EU und zu Einsätzen außerhalb der EU im Sinne der Petersberger Beschlüsse. Diese Einsätze dürfen nicht automatisiert vorgenommen werden und dürfen nur mit ausdrücklicher vorheriger Zustimmung des österreichischen Nationalrates erfolgen.“, http://www.fpoe-parlamentsklub.at/FP_Partieprogramm_Neu.pdf, p. 10, 26. 10. 2008.

*and has a strong effect on the Austrian identity of the Second Republic. By EU membership the neutrality has been eroded and we are afraid, neutrality will be used only as an alibi.*⁹⁷

From the beginning and up to the first responsibility as a member of the coalition government in 1983, the AFP had been a party, which wanted to join the European institutions as soon as possible. In the manifesto of 1983, neutrality became important for the AFP. In the past few years, it has been lifted to the supreme principle.

1949	UN	Armed Forces	Neutrality	European integration United States of Europe, secure peace
1954				Unification of Europe
1955			Against war	European Association
1957	International justice by the UN	Efficient homeland defence	Means of politics	Confederation of Europe
1964			Active European policy	Unification of European states and peoples, join the EEC
1968		Secure neutrality and freedom		European Federal State, EFSP
1985	Worldwide peace policy	Reliable homeland defence		
2005			Neutrality as a dominant guidance	ESDP – Petersberg Tasks

Table 3.3: Overview of the issues of the manifestos of the AAI/AFP

3.4. Party manifestos of the AGP

In 1986 a new political list was elected into the National Council (NC) of the Austrian Parliament, the “Green Alternatives: List Freda Meissner-Blau“. In their short programme, the group of individuals on this list stood for active foreign policy and against military and comprehensive national defence because of the restrictions the latter imposed on the freedom of the individual. They were against active neutrality policy because it could jeopardise Austrian influence in the 3rd world. Neutrality policy should be active on the side of the suppressed persons and peoples of the world and give them support to empower themselves.⁹⁸

During the 15 years of being in the NC they always played the part of the opposition. The list

⁹⁷ “ *Die Neutralität hat sich als dominierende Handlungsmaxime der österreichischen Außenpolitik seit 1955 bewährt und wirkt identitätsstiftend für die 2. Republik. Mit dem EU Beitritt 1995 wurde die Neutralität in Österreich zunehmend weiter ausgehöhlt und droht innenpolitisch als bloßes Alibi missbraucht zu werden.*“ http://www.fpoe-parlamentsklub.at/FP_Partieprogramm_Neu.pdf, S. 9f, 26 10 2008.

⁹⁸ Kernic Franz, Parteien und Bundesheer, Quellen zur Stellung der österreichischen politischen Parteien zu Fragen der Landesverteidigung seit 1955, Wien, IMS/LVAK, Wien 1988 p. 27 and document 23.

changed to a party at the beginning of the 1990s, and in 2001 they published their current party manifesto.⁹⁹ They rejected every type of violence and pushed for peaceful violence-free methods for solving conflicts. Foreign policy should comply with the law of nations and under the recognition of the UN monopoly on the use of force. The AGP would also accept a SC mandate, if it existed, and back military peace operations towards a violator of peace and freedom. These convictions can also be found in the last election programme of the AGP:

“We, the Greens, espouse Austria’s support for the UN on the solid basis of the law of nations. Austria should help the UN to protect the human rights and to act preventively in conflicts by the whole spectrum of civil means (e.g. monitoring, police) and, if necessary, by military operations as an ultima ratio. Without a UN mandate Austria may not take part in operations of the EU.”¹⁰⁰

The AGP changed its principles during the research period from strictly rejecting every type of projecting power or use of force to accepting these methods, if they would be under the umbrella of the UN. The main reason for this change was the war in former Yugoslavia.

	UN	Armed Forces	Neutrality	European integration
1986		Against military, against comprehensive national defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples	
2001	Monopoly of violence, military peace operations			

Table 3.4: Overview of the issues of the manifestos of the AGP

3.5. Programme of the AFA

The most recent party in the Austrian parliament is the Alliance Austrian Future, which seceded from the AFP in 2005. The first programme of the AFA was published in 2007. It was only a list of main topics. EU and security related topics mentioned in this first programme were:

“Each crisis entails consequences for Austria and Europe, directly or indirectly. Natural disasters, armed conflicts, and terrorist attacks by fundamentalists have become the main

⁹⁹ http://www.gruene.at/partei/grundsatzprogramm2001_03.pdf, S 62, 23 10 2008.

¹⁰⁰ *“Wir Grüne setzen uns dafür ein, dass Österreich auf dem sicheren Fundament des Völkerrechts die UNO dabei unterstützt, Menschenrechte global zu schützen und präventiv gegen Konflikte vorzugehen – mit dem ganzen Spektrum ziviler Mittel (etwa MenschenrechtsbeobachterInnen und Polizei) aber auch, wenn als ultima ratio nötig, militärisch...ohne UN-Mandat, darf Österreich nicht an Einsätzen der EU teilnehmen.”*, http://www.gruene.at/partei/GruenesWahlprogramm2006_04.pdf, S. 25, 23 10 2008.

challenges of the 21st century, which have to be met. Internal and external security is indivisibly connected with each other. We stand for a state of justice, which guarantees security for each individual. We want a police close to our citizens, quick deployment forces, energetic prosecution service, independent justice, fast proceedings, a stronger fight against economic crimes, and support for violence prevention . “¹⁰¹

By this example one can see, that the position of the AFA regarding security and defence policy was not so clear. But it was clear that they preferred European solutions in their security policy. Because most of the AFA team was part of the AFP during the decisions on the security doctrine in 2001, they would vote similarly in the case of an international operation.

This phenomenological approach cannot be applied to the voting in the Austrian parliament after 2008 because the AFA was working on a new programme. It was published in October 2009. The essential positions on security and defence policy were:¹⁰² The AFA stated that neutrality had lost its importance for Austria by the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1995. The Alliance stands for a development of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (ECFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). One main point was the suspension of the conscription system after the end of the assistance to the ministry of interior along the eastern border, which is scheduled for 2011. The conscript system shall be replaced by Armed Forces built of professional soldiers and a militia system for homeland defence. Austria should take part in the CFSP. After developing the EU into an Alliance of European States, the defence should be organized jointly by all member states.

	UN	Armed Forces	Neutrality	European integration
2007				European solutions
2011		Suspending conscription	Lost importance with Maastricht	ECFSP, ESDP, CSDP

Table 3.5: Overview of the issues of the programmes of the AFA

¹⁰¹ ” *Damit hat jede Krise mittel- oder unmittelbar Konsequenzen für Österreich und Europa. Naturkatastrophen, bewaffnete Konflikte und terroristische Anschläge von fundamentalistischen Fanatikern sind zu bestehende Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts. Innere und äußere Sicherheit hängen daher untrennbar zusammen. Wir treten für einen Rechtsstaat ein, der die Sicherheit des Einzelnen garantiert. Wir wollen eine bürgernahe Polizei, rasch einsetzbare Streitkräfte, energische Strafverfolgungsbehörden, eine unabhängige Justiz, rasche Verfahren, eine stärkere Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität und die Förderung der Gewaltprävention.*”, [http://www.bzoe.at/index.php?content=bzoe_Programm aktuell.doc](http://www.bzoe.at/index.php?content=bzoe_Programm%20aktuell.doc), S 2, 26 10 2008.

¹⁰² <http://www.bzoe.at/unsere-politik/programm.html>, pp. 36-38, 13. 06. 2011.

Chapter 4: Case Studies and Framework Conditions during the First Phase of Austria’s Security Policy

As mentioned above, the research period was divided into three stages: period 1 runs from the independence of Austria until the end of the 1960s. Period 2 starts with the active neutrality policy of the „Kreisky Era” and ends with the Accession of Austria to the EU. Period 3 covers Austrian security policy as a member of the EU. The following table gives an overview of the case studies and the research on the framework conditions in period 1. Cases and legal framework often show some degrees of interdependency.

4.1. Framework Condition – Austrian State Treaty, Neutrality and UN Membership 1955

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	4.1 Austrian State Treaty, Neutrality and UN Membership 1955
4.2 The first Austrian Contingent in the International Operations in the Congo in 1960	
	4.3 Defence Doctrine and Austrian Defence Plan from 1962 – 1982
4.5 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	

Table 4.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 1

As mentioned above, on 15th May 1955 Austria obtained a State Treaty after 10 years of negotiations. This opportunity and the subsequent treaty were discussed, together with the Defence Law, the Neutrality Law and the new UN membership during the sessions of the NC on 28th April, 12th May, 15th June, 7th September, and 15th December 1955. All these agendas were merged in the debates; these topics were discussed together. The speakers treated the State Treaty, neutrality and UN-membership as interconnected topics. But a big debate arose about the conformity of neutrality to UN-membership because Switzerland, whose example Austria was supposed to follow as neutral state, considered UN membership incompatible with neutrality. Switzerland had been member of the League of Nations and after this experience it did not want to become a member of the UN. Therefore, it seems to be necessary to discuss neutrality in relation to UN membership. The UN Charter describes the UN as an all inclusive Organisation

*“...to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...”*¹⁰³ Therefore, the articles of the UN Charter allow to take compulsory measures towards any “peace breaker”. All member countries have to cooperate in preventing and suppressing threats to the peace and acts of aggression. Nobody is allowed to be neutral towards a country, which is a “peace breaker” in the eyes of the Security Council (SC) or the General Assembly (GA). Even if a country is not member of the UN, it has to act in accordance with the UN principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN has to make sure that even non-members act in accordance with its principles.¹⁰⁴

Therefore, neutrality was not compatible with membership with the UN in the way of thinking of the “founding nations”¹⁰⁵, when the UN was established in 1945. For that reason in 1955 some experts thought that a neutral country could not be member of the UN because of the principle to enable a collective peace system and a member state cannot be neutral towards measures taken by the UN. But according to Article 2 part 6 of the UN Charter it was irrelevant, whether or not a country was member of the UN; nevertheless, from a practical point of view it was preferable to be a member. According to the UN Charter, each country (member or not) has to give full assistance to all measures and has to support every decision, which is passed by the UN SC or the General Assembly (GA). It is also prohibited to support any country, which is judged being a “peace breaker”. Therefore, neutrality is only possible as long as there is no decision or measure towards a country taken by UN SC or UN GA. In the founding year 1945 neutral members were not welcome, Sweden joined only one year later, though breaking the principle to have no neutral members. Sweden was also convinced that only neutrality policy gave stability to the Nordic region and could not prevent the USSR threatening or invading Finland. Finland and Austria tried to become a member of the UN from 1947 to 1955. In 1947, the USSR vetoed that move because these countries were not fully independent countries. Despite several resolutions by the GA in the following years, the USSR changed its mind only after the State Treaty for Austria was signed and the Treaty of Friendship with Finland was enhanced. In 1955, after signing these

¹⁰³ International Court of Justice, United Nations, Die Charta der Vereinten Nationen mit Völkerbundsatzung IGH-Statut und zwei UNO-Resolutionen, 7. neu bearbeitete Auflage, Verlag C.H.Beck, München 1979 p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ Hauser Gunther, Das europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungssystem und seine Akteure, BMLV, Landesverteidigungsakademie, 4. völlig überarbeitete und wesentlich erweiterte Auflage, Wien, 2008, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁵ Luif Paul, On the Road to Brussels, The political Dimension of Austria´s, Finland´s and Sweden´s Accession to the European Union, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Braumüller, Laxenburg, 1995, p. 255.

treaties, Austria, Finland, and Ireland became members of the UN together with a number of other countries like Poland.¹⁰⁶ A heated debate broke out in Austria about the consequences of membership for Austria and the UN as well. Recognizing the Austrian, Irish and Finnish memberships, one group of experts argued that it was possible for a neutral country to be a UN member, because the UN SC can make exceptions for certain countries while conducting its measures. From their point of view, the bodies of the UN have to observe the neutrality status of neutral members and have to avoid decisions or measures, which do not take into account their neutrality status, or to allow exemptions for such countries.¹⁰⁷ That opinion was backed especially by Alfred Verdross, the Austrian Member of the UN Commission on International Law during the years 1956-1965, and was called “*Verdross Doctrine*”. In Austria, a debate among Austrian experts started during the final phase of becoming a UN member, whether the neutrality status was compatible with the UN membership. But even then a minority of Austrian experts argued that the UN Charter is overriding national law. But things changed after the end of the Cold War and a member of the Austrian delegation to the UN pointed out, that the “*Verdross Doctrine*” was taking a realistic view at the political situation of the late Fifties and Sixties of the last century, and today this opinion could no longer be regarded as realistic.¹⁰⁸

As mentioned above, the debates on 28th April¹⁰⁹, 12th May¹¹⁰, 15th June¹¹¹, 7th September¹¹², and 15th December¹¹³ 1945 covered the following topics: neutrality, UN membership, defence law and the Austrian State Treaty. The following chart gives an overview of the arguments and the manifestos of the parties.

¹⁰⁶ Emmerich Klaus, *Unterwegs zum Frieden, 50 Jahre Österreich in den Vereinten Nationen*, Ueberreuter Verlag, Wien 2005, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰⁷ Verdross Alfred/Simma Bruno, *Universelles Völkerrecht, Theorie und Praxis*, 3. völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage, Duncker&Humblot, Berlin, 1984, p. 26.

¹⁰⁸ Handl Markus, *Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs*, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, p. 90.

¹⁰⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0066/imfname_15861.pdf,05_11_2009.

¹¹⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0066/imfname_15861.pdf,05_11_2009.

¹¹¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0066/imfname_158621.pdf,05_11_2009.

¹¹² http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0066/imfname_158636.pdf,05_11_2009.

¹¹³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0066/imfname_158646.pdf,05_11_2009.

Issue	APP	ASDP	AAI/AFP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	Membership in UN conduct measures militia system	UN membership guaranteed neutrality debate on type of Forces	United States of Europe
UN membership	Yes, but limitations on neutrality	Work for peace, international connections	Yes – benefits for German displaced persons and South Tyrol
Neutrality	Danger of neutralism, military neutrality ¹¹⁴ restrictions by UN membership	Armed neutrality, interpretation by Austria like Swiss model	New dependency, sceptical an armed ¹¹⁵ and permanently demand for integration in western world
Defence law	Pro conscription	To prevent creation of professional Armed Forces	Stop rearmament criticism of assistance of MoI professional Armed Forces

Table 4.1: Overview of the issues related to the manifestos of the parties during the debates in the year 1955

In contrast to the expert's opinions, all representatives of the political parties agreed that neutrality and UN membership were compatible. When the Austrian Foreign Minister, Ing. Figl, announced on 15th December 1955 in the Parliament that Austria was accepted as a UN member, it was greeted with spontaneous acclaim.

The APP and the ASDP stuck to their programmes concerning UN membership. The AAI demanded a unified Europe, implying they also wanted Austria to become a UN member. But during the debates nothing of that sort was discussed explicitly. Therefore, it is not possible to say whether or not the representatives of AAI acted according to their programme or followed the daily routine.

The question of neutrality was discussed in a different manner. The representative of the Austrian Communist Party, Koplénig stressed the positive role of the USSR and was pleased that Austria had left the western orientation by choosing neutrality. He understood it as an ideological neutralism.

At that time, none of the manifestos had anything to say about neutrality. The parties had to vote without such background, and the results of the vote were no surprise. On 26th October 1955, the neutrality law was passed unanimously without debate. In their opinion there was no background

¹¹⁴ Military neutrality means to stick to the four core tasks of a neutral country as mentioned in chapter 2.2.

¹¹⁵ Armed neutrality was used internationally in the 19th century by abstention from war, but keeping the Armed Forces on alert (e. e.g. Austria during the Crimean War 1855), The ASDP wished to defend neutrality with military forces in case of an armed aggression from another country.

in the programme of AAI, and they acted pragmatically.¹¹⁶ On the issue of neutrality only the ASDP could stick to its manifesto, they were the only party to discuss this point in its programme.

On 7th September 1955, the law was debated in the NC.¹¹⁷ The defence law¹¹⁸ assigned three tasks to the Austrian Armed Forces:

- a) Protection of the borders
- b) Protection of constitutional institutions and maintenance of order and security in general (assistance to Ministry of Interior – MoI) and
- c) provision of assistance in the case of natural disasters or of accidents of extraordinary dimension.

Both parties of the governing coalition voted and argued to back the law and the ASDP was convinced that as a consequence the option for a professional army was excluded. Additionally, the ASDP also accepted task b), despite the negative experience in 1934. This showed a change of heart within the ASDP, because only some years earlier they did not mention the Armed Forces at all in their manifesto. On the other hand, international operations as a task were not listed, despite explicit wish of the APP to do so in 1945. The AAI criticized the law and demanded to stop the rearmament until enough money became available and the restrictions of the State Treaty were lifted. A very reckless demand but it was backed by the programme. What would they have done during the Hungarian crisis in October 1956? A second issue the AAI criticized was task b). They were afraid that a minister could order assistance against the will of a political party or democratic freedom. Nevertheless, they demanded a professional army instead of the conscript system. The AAI had no such points in its programme, all discussion topics were personal opinions and influenced by the political expediency of the moment.

¹¹⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00068/imfname_158619.pdf_05_11_2009.

¹¹⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/VII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00077/imfname_158636.pdf_05_11_2009.

¹¹⁸ Federal Law Gazette, 181/1955, 21st September 1955.

4.2. Case Study – the first Austrian Contingent in the International Operations in the Congo in 1960

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	4.1 Austrian State Treaty, Neutrality and UN Membership 1955
4.2 The first Austrian Contingent in the International Operations in the Congo¹¹⁹ in 1960	
	4.4 Defence Doctrine and Austrian Defence Plan from 1962 – 1982
4.5 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	

Table 4.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 1

After 1955 the discussion continued in Austria, on the supremacy of the neutrality law over the UN Charter or the other way round, and the majority of the experts in Austria followed the “*Verdross Doctrine*”. Nevertheless, Austria had been a member of the UN since 1955 and therefore, had to act according to circumstances. Some main principles followed this practice, and were laid down as the Austrian Neutrality Policy by Foreign Minister Leopold Figl in 1959. He listed the following points of Austrian neutrality policy:

- supporting the right of self-determination for peoples, understanding among nations, law and justice, civil and human rights, basic liberties, and the practical implementation of these principles,
- hosting international organisations and agencies,
- strengthening international co-operation and
- cultural exchange.¹²⁰

There was no intention of participating in or conducting international operations, despite the fact that such operations were going on in Korea, Kashmir, or Palestine.

In August 1960, the Secretary General (SG) of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, made a request to the Austrian government, for a contribution by Austria to the UN operation in the Congo. The request of the UN SG was discussed in the Austrian Council of Ministers (ACM) on 6th September 1960. It was the first time Austria had got a request for participation in an

¹¹⁹ Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC, English: The United Nations Organization in the Congo).

¹²⁰ Leopold Figl, *Die Diplomatie der Neutralität*, in Braunias Karl/Stourzh Gerald, *Diplomatie unserer Zeit*, Graz/Wien/Köln, Styria, 1959, pp. 293-303.

international operation; therefore, no procedure existed to handle this issue. Foreign Minister Kreisky was aware of the fact that there was no legal background to conduct international operations. It was decided to set up a Committee of Ministers. Time constraints led to a speedy decision by the committee to conduct the mission and a week later this decision was approved by the ACM. It is remarkable that a main argument in favour of participation in the mission was the reduction of the membership fee to UN.¹²¹ The APP was convinced that it was good for Austria to participate. The media reported the decision but it went largely unnoticed.

The manifesto of the ASDP from 1958 reduced the tasks of the Armed Forces to border protection without any mention of the other tasks of the defence law. This very restricted position may have been a concession to the “left“ wing of the party, which kept reminding everyone of the traumatic year of civil war in 1934. Therefore, the participation in international operations was in contradiction to the manifesto of the ASDP and a pragmatic decision based on the political expediency of the moment. Kreisky tried to create a positive atmosphere by including the “South Tyrol Question“ in the minutes of the UN GA. The Chancellor and the APP had been supporting the participation in the operations from the very beginning. They were backed by their manifesto to support the UN in order to properly fulfil their peace tasks.¹²² The APP had been demanding international operations since 1945. At last the AMC agreed to grant the request, but the soldiers could only participate on a voluntary basis, a principle that survived until today.¹²³

The first Austrian contingent of medical soldiers was despatched. But despite the clear support to the UN, Austria had made no special provisions to finance the operation. Therefore, it had to be financed out of the regular budget of the foreign ministry. Because there was no debate in the parliament, the position of the AFP could not be researched for the purpose of this paper. Additionally, there was a very tight time constraint and it was not possible to change the Austrian laws to participate in an UN operations. Therefore, the soldiers of the contingent(s) were sent after signing a special employment contract and had the status not of soldiers but contractors of the Austrian government.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Zecha, Wolfgang, Der Einsatz des Österreichischen Bundesheeres im Tschad, Reflexion zur Einsatzentscheidung, in *ÖMZ 1/2010*, pp. 64-68.

¹²² “Was wir wollen“, Grundsatzprogramm der Österreichischen Volkspartei 1958, in Kriechbaumer Robert, Parteiprogramme im Widerstreit der Interessen, Die Programmdiskussionen und die Programme von ÖVP und SPÖ 1945 – 1986, österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Sonderband 3, Oldenbourg, München und Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1990, pp. 706-717.

¹²³ Zecha, Wolfgang, Der Einsatz des Österreichischen Bundesheeres im Tschad, Reflexion zur Einsatzentscheidung, in *ÖMZ 1/2010*, pp. 64-68.

¹²⁴ Verhandlungsschrift Nr. 47 über die Sitzung des Ministerrates am 13. September 1960 Punkt 36

The first Austrian contingent was captured by Congolese troops after their arrival in Bukavu on 16th December 1960. Immediate criticism followed in Austria. Representatives of the APP demanded to bring the soldiers back but the ACM declared the continuation of the mission. This decision was criticized by the AFP.¹²⁵

Despite the clear and unequivocal declaration of support for international operations by the APP and the pragmatic point of view of Bruno Kreisky, it took approximately five years for Austria to prepare a legal basis for participation in international operations. The problem was finally solved by the Constitutional Law on International Operations of 1965. From the point of view of national law, the decision of the Austrian government was illegal, but according to the UN Charter Austria followed a proven practice, because a request to contribute in international operations by a permanently neutral country had been answered positively by Switzerland during the Korean crisis in 1953.¹²⁶

To summarize, the first Austrian participation in an international operations was neither an act of neutrality policy or solidarity but a pragmatic decision, which was formally not backed by the Austrian legal framework. The Austrian government acted out of concern for the country's international reputation. Nevertheless the government had the conviction that sending troops was part of "good offices" of a neutral country. The Austrian participation lasted from 11th Dec 1960 until the end of the mission in 1963. The peak strength of the Austrian contingent 55 troops. Altogether, within 5 contingents a number of 166 Austrian troops served in five rotations in the Congo mission. The troops were armed with Thompson submachine guns¹²⁷ for personal defence. Submachine guns as personal arms were characteristic for the first two Austrian participations in international operations.¹²⁸

Beschlussprotokoll, Punkt 24 d der Tagesordnung.

¹²⁵ Der Neue Kurier, 17. Dezember 1960, p. 2.

¹²⁶ Bonjour Edgar, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralität, Kurzfassung, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel-Stuttgart, 1978, p. 212.

¹²⁷ Thompson submachine guns; the US army left these weapons in Austria in 1955. Compare: Schmidl A.Erwin, Blaue Helme, Rotes Kreuz, Das Österreichische UN-Sanitätskontingent im Kongo, 1960 bis 1963, Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, Band 13, Studien verlag Innsbruck-Wien, 1995, p. 53.

¹²⁸ Schmidl A.Erwin, Going International, In the Service of Peace, Vehling, Graz, 2006., pp. 190-193.

4.3. Framework Condition – Defence Doctrine and Austrian Defence Plan, 1962-1982

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
4.3 The first Austrian contingent in the international operations in the Congo in 1960	4.2 Austrian State Treaty, Neutrality and UN Membership 1955
	4.3 Defence Doctrine and Austrian Defence Plan from 1962 – 1982
4.5 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	

Table 4.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 1

In Austria a law for international operations had no priority. Therefore, the government worked on a general doctrine for defence. Because a doctrine for defence has an influence on creating a climate of willingness and a legal basis for international operations in a country, it is important to describe the Austrian situation in this case. As mentioned before, the Austrian government decided to develop a comprehensive national defence system in the form of *”total homeland defence“*¹²⁹ according to the Swiss model. On 20th February 1962 the AMC passed a directive to develop a defence concept. It consisted of military, economic, civil and morale defence components. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was responsible for the co-ordination of the various goals and presented a *”Concept of National Defence“* to the government.¹³⁰ By a decision of the AMC on 11th May 1965 the cases of threat were defined as:

1. Crisis as a result of international tensions and threat of conflict
2. Neutrality in case of war in the region
3. Defence after an attack on Austria.¹³¹

Based on this paper and the decisions taken it became clear, that it might become necessary to elaborate a modification of the Constitutional Law. At the beginning of 1972, the work on these amendments started. After consultations with the Austrian Provinces and the opposition parties the results were presented to the NC on 10th June 1975. In the Constitutional Law, Article 9 was

¹²⁹ *”totale Landesverteidigung“*, in Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, p. 6.

¹³⁰ *”Landesverteidigungsplan“*, Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, pp. 6-8.

¹³¹ 1. Krisenfall als Zustand internationaler Spannungen und Konfliktgefahr, 2. Neutralitätsfall mit einem Krieg in der Nachbarschaft und 3. Verteidigungsfall bei einem Angriff auf Österreich, in Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, pp. 12-13.

extended by Article 9a which contemplated comprehensive national defence. One task of the Armed Forces was changed from “border protection” to “military homeland defence”.¹³² It was very interesting that although Austria had been participating in international operations for about 15 years they were not part of the tasks of the Armed Forces by that law. Maybe the parties thought it was enough to have one law for international operations.

Issue and date	APP	ASDP	AAI/AFP
Related issues in the manifesto(s)	Efficient and comprehensive defence, contribution to peace, good offices	Secure the borders and neutrality	Secure neutrality and freedom
Issues of debate	Acceptance of the law, critics on ASDP and changes of defence law in advance without consensus international task restrictions	Governing party, importance of the law	Agree on the law, neutrality

Table 4.3: Overview of the Issues in the Debate¹³³ on 10th June 1975

The APP was acting according to their manifesto but did not mention the topic of internationalisation in the debate in spite of its high importance in the manifesto. The manifesto of the ASDP went back to their time in opposition and therefore it did not match the new law. But it was interesting to see that since 1960 Austria has been participating in two international operations and yet the programme of 1966 did not mention international operations at all. Therefore, the ASDP was forced to act from the perspective of political expediency of the moment. Additionally, the AFP said that it would agree to the law international operations not being an issue. The manifesto emphasised neutrality and protection of the country therefore the party could vote in accordance with its manifesto. At last the law was passed by an overwhelming acceptance of 100 per cent. The defence doctrine was passed after a decision of the AMC on 28th October 1975.¹³⁴

Following the decision of the AMC a concept for national defence and the legal basis for it was created during the following years. By getting all interested ministries, provinces and opposition parties involved, a draft version could be finished which was accepted by the AMC on 22nd

¹³² Federal Law Gazette, 368/1975, Vienna, 1975, p. 1601.

¹³³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00147/imfname_108864.pdf, 12 11 2010.

¹³⁴ Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, p. 49.

November 1983.¹³⁵ Thanks to the integration of a large number of stakeholders, the national defence issue was taken out of the usual daily quarrels between the political parties, but this advantage ended with the "Wende 1989"¹³⁶. After presentation, a first edition was produced and made available for the public. To bring it up to date, small revisions were scheduled every five years and a significant revisions every ten years.¹³⁷ But these revisions were not done until the Options Report and the Security Doctrine had been produced.

In 1992, the next regular revision was skipped due to the changes in the security environment. In the years thereafter, the procedure of joining the EU again prevented the next planned revision of the Austrian National Defence Concept. In 1995, Austria joined the EU without reservation regarding its neutrality and in the same year became a member of NATO-PfP.

To summarize, the Comprehensive National Defence Concept of 1983 is still in force in Austria, supplemented by the Security Doctrine of 2001 and the brand new Security Strategy of 2011. Both these latter concepts are formal developments of the 1983-concept. In practice, the Comprehensive National Defence Concept has lost its function after Austria joined the EU and the ESDP.

4.4. Case Study – Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	4.2 Austrian State Treaty, Neutrality and UN Membership 1955
4.3 The first Austrian Contingent in the International Operations in the Congo in 1960	
	4.4 Defence Doctrine and Austrian Defence Plan from 1962 – 1982
4.4 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	

Table 4.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 1

During the 1960s, international operations were extended and the international community had to react. In 1964, UN SG, U`Thant, made a preliminary request to the Nordic countries to prepare and earmark units up to battalion size. The Nordic countries responded positively, but the necessity of organising troops from other countries became evident. Even before these troops

¹³⁵ Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, p. 69.

¹³⁶ Wende 1989 is another German expression for End of the Cold War or Fall of the Berlin Wall.

¹³⁷ Bayer Richard, Die Geschichte der Umfassenden Landesverteidigung, Vom Staatsvertrag bis zur Wende, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Sonderpublikation 2/2008/S, Wien, 2008, p. 76.

could become operational, the UN had already made its next request.

The necessity for an armed international operation in Cyprus arose in the year 1964. Sweden, Ireland and Finland offered forces. The UN SC resolution 186/1964¹³⁸ established a peace operation on Cyprus, to which all neutral European countries except Switzerland contributed troops. Austria's contribution to the operation was a field hospital. For reasons of permanent neutrality, the Austrian government refused to send combat troops. Instead, in addition to the field hospital the Austrian government sent a police contingent. Because the Austrian law to conduct international operations was not yet established, again the AMC decided to conduct the operations similar to the ones in 1960 with no previous debate in the Austrian Parliament.¹³⁹

In 1964, Austria participated in a second international operation on Cyprus. Therefore, it became necessary to establish a national law for conducting international operations. That need was supported and even urged by a verbal note of the SG of the UN. This note said that it would be helpful to have a national legislative procedure to conduct international operations.¹⁴⁰

On 30th June 1965, the Austrian Parliament passed a constitutional law to conduct international operations.¹⁴¹ Following this constitutional law, the Austrian government was only allowed to conduct international operations with the approval of the Main Committee of the Austrian National Council. Secondly, a request of an international organisation was necessary and the Austrian government had to respect the requirements of permanent neutrality. A remarkable feature of this law was that any international organisation could request a contribution to its operation. In the law neither the type of aid nor the type of international organisation was fixed. They were specified in a law from the 1970s. Thus, a request for contribution by NATO or the Warsaw Pact (and a favourable response) was not excluded – but this did not happen until the end of the Cold War. The Austrian constitutional law for international operations was passed by all three parties in the NC. This vote was a logical step for the APP, as participation in international peace operations and active neutrality policy were part of their party manifesto. The ASDP, which was also in favour of an active neutrality policy and supported the UN peace-keeping operations, also saw the law as a consistent measure to effectuate its policy. In the party manifesto of the AFP, there was no indication of voting for such a law. The AFP wanted to back

¹³⁸ <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/44/IMG/NR021144.pdf?OpenElement>, 19.08.2011

¹³⁹ Minutes No 37 of the AMC on 17th March 1964.

¹⁴⁰ Schmidl A. Erwin, *Blaue Helme – Rotes Kreuz*, Innsbruck/Wien, 1995, p. 181.

¹⁴¹ Federal Law Gazette, 173, Vienna, 1965, pp.933-934.

the legislation of the UN and to bring active policy into Europe. There were no indications in its manifesto to vote for international operations. The vote was determined by political expediency, but still in line with the party manifesto.

With this law it was possible to contribute troops of the Austrian Armed Forces, the law enforcement agencies or volunteers. The law was passed with the votes of all MPs.¹⁴² The main reason for the unanimity of the vote was the fact that the law legalised a tried and proven practice since 1960. In the APP's party manifesto of 1965 it was stated that Austria should work for peace in the world, so there was no contradiction. The ASDP's party manifesto of 1966 was a work-in-progress in 1963; disarmament was only mentioned as an example for active neutrality policy, and the ASDP voted as was convenient for political expediency. Later on, the peace-keeping operations became part of the active neutrality policy¹⁴³ The AFP did not stress peace operations in their manifesto of 1958, but supported the UN's legal system, and in the manifesto of 1964 it was stated that Austria should promote neutrality for peace and freedom in Europe and in the world. The vote of the AFP was backed by their manifestos in a wider sense.

A short time later the UN SG asked Austria to establish a battalion for international operations. Austria reported in June 1966 after a positive answer in general terms, that a battalion with approximately 600 troops was ready to be deployed.¹⁴⁴ By that step, Austria left the path of the Swiss neutrality model and acted more in line with the Swedish, Irish and Finnish neutrality policy. During those years, UN operations were defined by "*all measures of UN on military, paramilitary or non-military basis to observe, keep, or re-establish freedom and international security*".¹⁴⁵ At that time, peace-keeping operations were defined as follows: observer missions, UN-commissions, contingents, surveillance, negotiation missions, intelligence operations, support of countries to assure security, and preventive measures.

The participation of Austria with a field hospital lasted from 14th April 1964 to 10th April 1976 (after 19th Oct. 1973 the hospital was reduced to a medical Centre). The strength of the Austrian contingent was originally 55 troops, in the medical centre only 14 troops. Altogether 1071 Austrian troops served during that part of the mission. 18 rotations had taken place until 1972. Again the troops had submachine guns for self defence. From 1972 to 1976 the rotation of the

¹⁴² http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/X/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00083/imfname_154340.pdf, 13 11 2010.

¹⁴³ Ginther Konrad, Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik, p. 145.

¹⁴⁴ Notification of Austria to UN SG, BMLV GZ. 310.391-Stb/66 on 2nd Mai 1966.

¹⁴⁵ Caytas Ivo G., Internationale kollektive Friedenssicherung, 20 Jahre Österreichische Praxis, Berlin., pp. 2-3.

medical personnel was organised together with the contingent of lightly armed troops.¹⁴⁶

Chapter 5: Case Studies and Framework Conditions in Period 2

This 2nd period to be examined lasted from the beginning of the era “Kreisky Bruno” as the chancellor of Austria in 1970 until the end of the Cold War. Bruno Kreisky pursued an “active neutrality policy”, which focused on integration into the UN and active participation in the UN to secure the neutrality within the Cold War world¹⁴⁷. This period ended definitely by Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995. The main events in this period were participation in UN operations by combat troops and the membership in the UN SC. To give an overview of the three periods of Austrian membership in the UN SC, they are concentrated in one case study although the last period was from 2009- 2010.

5.1 Case Study – The First “armed operations” in 1972

Despite the readiness of the Austrian battalion in 1966, it took 6 years for the first combat operation to start. At the beginning of the year 1972, the time came to send an Austrian combat battalion to Cyprus, but a newly formed contingent of volunteer soldiers was dispatched instead of the earmarked ones as a unit. But a certain number of the formerly earmarked soldiers joined this international operation as volunteers. Austria made the next concrete step away from the path of the Swiss model and deployed not only medical personnel, but also combat troops on international operations. With these steps Austria extended its participation in UN operations and became the first permanently neutral country to send an infantry battalion as a contingent to conduct an international UN operation, following the proven practices of Sweden, Finland and Ireland.

¹⁴⁶ Schmidl A.Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vehling, Graz, 2006, pp. 190-193.

¹⁴⁷ Bruno Kreisky was convinced, that it was better to secure the Austrian neutrality and safety by extending the UN site in Vienna, participating in international operations, or pressing for an Austrian candidate for the SG post (Kurt Waldheim) than to expand the role of the Austrian Armed Forces (Kreisky Bruno, *Für ein modernes Österreich, Regierungserklärung, Klub der sozialistischen Abgeordneten und Bundesräte*, Wien, 1970, p.58, and Petritsch Wolfgang, Bruno Kreisky, Residenz Verlag, St. Pölten/Salzburg, 2010, pp. 234-260).

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
5.1 <u>The first “armed operations” in 1972</u>	
5.2 <u>Austria as a member of the Security Council</u> 5.2.1 <u>Austria’s First Period from 1973 – 1974</u> 5.2.2 <u>Austria’s Second Period from 1991 – 1992</u> a) <u>The Kuwait crisis</u> b) <u>The Yugoslavia crisis from 1991 onwards</u> 5.2.3 <u>Austria’s Third Period from 2009 – 2010</u>	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 2

On 24th March 1972, an advance team was sent to Cyprus and on 3rd May 1972 the Austrian contingent took over the district of Paphos; the costs were partly refunded by the UN. The AMC had passed the decision on 8th February 1972.¹⁴⁸ The troops were armed with light infantry weapons, for instance assault rifles and automatic pistols. In the media, the contingent was reported but not discussed. The main reason for the decision to take part in an international operation with combat troops was that on 1st January 1972, the Austrian Kurt Waldheim took over as UN SG. The Austrian government could not deny him this wish.

There was no discussion about the armed contingent in Cyprus in the NC at that time. At the end of the year 1972, on 25th October, a special law on the extension of the budget had to be passed. During that debate the APP and the AFP criticised the costs of 20, 5 million Schillings for the battalion in Cyprus. They did not criticise the mission itself but the costs thereof and were of the opinion that these should be refunded.¹⁴⁹ Because the APP wanted to support the UN, it was in line with their manifesto to back the decision on an armed contingent. The ASDP who made the decision in the AMC could refer to their active neutrality policy and the AFP expressed their concerns about the homeland tasks of the Austrian Armed Forces.

After the invasion by the Turkish Armed Forces, Cyprus was divided into a northern, Turkish-dominated part and a southern, Greek dominated part. The Austrian contingent had to separate these two parts of Cyprus by controlling a small partition zone. In 1995 a Hungarian contingent was integrated. That was the first deployment of Hungarian troops on international operations.¹⁵⁰ At last, Austria withdrew its troops in 2001 after integrating Slovene troops in 1998 as well. The continuity of Austrian participation is maintained by staff personnel only. One of the main reasons for withdrawal was lack of personnel. The strength of the Austrian contingent was

¹⁴⁸ Schmidl A. Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vehling, Graz, 2006, p. 57.

¹⁴⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00048/imfname_149794.pdf, 15. 10. 2010.

¹⁵⁰ Szenes Zoltan, *Peacekeeping in the Hungarian Armed Forces*, within AARMS Vol. 6 No. 1(2007), p 122.

approximately 240. During the 29 years, 58 rotations of personnel had to be organised. As a whole, around 16.500 troops served in the Austrian contingent.¹⁵¹

On 6th October 1973, the Yom Kippur War (or in the Islamic world the Ramadan War) began between Israel on the one side and Egypt and Syria on the other.¹⁵² After the Israeli troops had crossed the Suez Canal and encircled an Egyptian army on 22nd October 1973, the UN negotiated an armistice¹⁵³. The UN missions UNTSO and UNFICYP were extended to monitor the armistice and to make sure that the Egyptian forces could withdraw.¹⁵⁴ The UN asked Austria to contribute to this mission, which was called UNEF II. The Austrian government agreed on 26th October 1973 and decided to look for additional volunteers. So the Austrian contingent was expanded to 620 troops. The same day the main committee of the NC got involved and approved the decision of the government immediately.¹⁵⁵ There was no debate in the NC, the media brought extensive reports on those UN-operations but there was no criticism by the media or by the opposition parties. The Austrian government followed their programme, which said:

*“Austria will support all struggles of the UN, which serve peace and disarmament. Additionally the federal government will continue to strive for taking part in peace-keeping operations of the UN by providing qualified personnel.”*¹⁵⁶

In 1973 the ASDP explained their plan for new UN operations with combat troops and postulated that in the future armed forces should be deployed only under UN command. APP stressed that a reliable neutrality policy should rely on strong armed forces; international operations were not mentioned. In contrast to the ASDP, the APP did not mention the operations in Middle East at all. The AFP did not talk about the new operations either.¹⁵⁷ Nine months later there was suddenly a debate about the UNEF II mission. All parties welcomed the operation and accepted it, but the APP and the AFP criticised its implementation and equipment. The ASDP rejected all the critics

¹⁵¹ Schmidl A. Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vehling, Graz, 2006, pp. 190-193.

¹⁵² The Sunday Times Insight Team, *Der Wüstenkrieg*, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1974, pp. 65-70.

¹⁵³ Dunstan Simon, *The Yom Kippur War, The Arab-Israeli War of 1973*, Osprey Publishing, New York, 2007, pp. 20-25.

¹⁵⁴ <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/6/IMG/NR028868.pdf>, 30 11 2010.

¹⁵⁵ Schmidl A. Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vehling, Graz, 2006, p. 64, There were no other resources on the procedures in Austria.

¹⁵⁶ „Österreich wird alle jene Bestrebungen der Vereinten Nationen unterstützen, die der Erhaltung des Friedens und der Abrüstung dienen. Weiters wird die Bundesregierung auch in Zukunft bemüht sein, ihren Beitrag zu den friedenserhaltenden Aktionen der Vereinten Nationen zu leisten, indem sie entsprechendes Personal zur Verfügung stellt.“, in Kreisky Bruno, *Für ein modernes Österreich*, Regierungserklärung, Klub der sozialistischen Abgeordneten und Bundesräte, Wien, 1970, p.58.

¹⁵⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00088/imfname_149839.pdf, 30 11 2010.

and stressed the efforts of the troops.¹⁵⁸

After the disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces, a new UN operation called United Nations Disengagement Force (UNDOF) was established. The Austrian Chancellor reported on 21st May 1974, that the UN wanted to establish operations at the Golan Heights and the Austrian contingent should move in from Egypt. This suggestion by the Federal Chancellor was applauded by all parties and all three stressed the great efforts of the troops in Egypt.¹⁵⁹ In all debates, the high reputation and respect of the peace-keeping operations were stressed by all parties. On 1st June, the AMC agreed to this demand and on 11th June 1974 the main committee of the NC approved it as well. The APP criticized that the first units had been deployed on 4th June, long before the main committee agreed. This attitude was an internal Austrian problem. There was no debate and even after the tragic first landmine casualties there was no intention to end the operations. But did this conform to the manifestos? Again, in the party manifesto of the ASDP there was not a word about peace operations, and even neutrality policy was regarded only as a means to strengthen Vienna as a UN site, enhancing disarmament, and hosting conferences. Therefore, the proclamation of the governing programme was the only basis for the decisions to participate in UN missions with armed forces. But the governing programme was an appendix to the manifesto of the ASDP, thus showing the pragmatic governing style of Bruno Kreisky. The manifesto of the APP spoke of supporting the UN to reach and strengthen peace as its highest aim. The APP was generally in compliance with their manifesto. In the manifesto of the AFP international operations were not mentioned at all. In the manifesto of 1968 a European federal state with a common foreign and security policy was highlighted. Freedom and neutrality had to be defended as long as there was no European federal state. Therefore, it is astonishing that the AFP supported international operations in this significant way. The criticism on the equipment was understandable because the AFP seriously supported national defence.

During the following years, Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden conducted the UNDOF operations. The mission still lasts and the Austrian contingent in general has remained, but received additional troops from Slovakia and also from Croatia. The strength of the Austrian Contingent was originally around 460 troops; at the moment 370 Austrian troops are on duty. Until 2012, at about 31.000 Austrian troops have served in the mission.¹⁶⁰ During the nearly forty years, up to 80 rotations of personnel had to be organised. The troops are armed with light

¹⁵⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00088/imfname_149893.pdf, 30 11 2010.

¹⁵⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00088/imfname_101570.pdf, 30 11 2010.

¹⁶⁰ Schmidl A.Erwin, Going International, In the Service of Peace, Vehling, Graz, 2006., pp. 190-193.

infantry weapons and equipped with armoured personnel carriers (APC). With these decisions the four neutral countries contributed a major part to those UN operations and to establish the good reputation of UN operations during that time. But of course there were the British, US and Canadian forces as well. These countries built the logistic backbone of the UN operations and enabled them by providing strategic air or sea lift.

Following the practical considerations experts thought about the principles peacekeeping forces should observe. These principles are in general:

- a minimum use of force,
- impartiality
- honest and impartial brokerage
- self-defence
- consensus of all parties.¹⁶¹

An analysis of these principles shows that troops of neutral countries are almost ideal to conduct peace-keeping operations, which was one of the main reasons for the neutral countries (except Switzerland) to become the backbone of such operations from the perspective of personnel resources during the time of the Cold War, as considered by some experts.¹⁶²

During the years of this case study, the general conviction of the international community changed. Now, neutral countries were predestined to support international operations by contributing troops and their neutrality policy included active peace policy of the UN as well. Like the other neutral countries, Austria participated in peace-keeping operations and changed its legal framework to do so.

¹⁶¹ Biermann Wolfgang/Vadset Martin, *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia*, Ashgate, Aldershot/Brookfield/Singapore/Sydney, 1998, p. 141.

¹⁶² Neuhold Hanspeter, *Völkerrechtliche und neutralitätspolitische Aspekte friedenserhaltender Operationen der Vereinten Nationen*, within Koja Friedrich/Stourzh Gerald, *Schweiz-Österreich, Ähnlichkeiten und Kontraste*, Böhlau, Wien/Köln/Graz, 1986, pp. 54-66.

5.2 Case Study – Austria as a Member of the Security Council (SC)

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
5.1 The first “armed operations” in 1972	
5.2 Austria as a member of the Security Council 5.2.1 Austria’s First Period from 1973 – 1974 5.2.2 Austria’s Second Period from 1991 – 1992 a) The Kuwait crisis b) The Yugoslavia crisis from 1991 onwards 5.2.3 Austria’s Third Period from 2009 – 2010	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 2

The following case study covers three sub chapters referring to the three periods when Austria was member of the UN SC. The case study starts with an overview of the duties, responsibilities, and power of the UN SC. In each sub chapter, the issues and interwoven issues are listed in a table and analysed afterwards. Although the 3rd period was at the end of the next phase of Austrian security policy, this case is analysed here because logically it fits among these cases. At the end, there is a summary of the three periods.

To start the chapter with the three sub chapters, the respective article has to be explained. The UN SC is the main body regarding security policy and peace. Only if it is blocked by a veto it is possible for the General assembly (GA) to act instead of the UN SC as it happened in 1950 on the Korea crisis. According to Article 23 UN Charter the UN SC consists of:

1. *“The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution.*
2. *The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.*

3. *Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.*¹⁶³

From 1945 to 1964, the number of members of the UN SC was fixed to 11, 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent member states. In 1965, the number of non-permanent members was increased from 6 to 10; the number of members increased to 15.¹⁶⁴ According to article 24, all members confer primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. Furthermore, according to article 25 the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.¹⁶⁵ This means that the members of the UN SC acts in the name of the community of nations and decide, whether the UN Charter was violated and if necessary can pass a resolution with or without follow-up measures. Therefore, a member of the UN SC has to express its position towards all discussed topics, even though it is possible to abstain from voting. A state can be neutral during a vote, but after a resolution is passed it has to be backed by all members of the UN SC, as well as all UN members. This was the case when Austria joined the UN. There was a debate again whether or not a permanently neutral country could be a UN SC member. But then, Sweden and Ireland had been members of the UN SC before Austria, and Finland applied to become a member in 1970. Finland became a SC member first, because Austria withdrew the application for the benefit of Finland. Austria followed a proven practice of neutral countries but this changed the practice of neutrality policy in general. As a permanently neutral country, which reported this status to the UN, Austria's status was unique in being a member of the UN SC, and it is not yet clear whether this will change neutrality policy. Switzerland has not been a UN SC member yet.

In general, neutral countries have been elected to the UN SC as non-permanent members as often as other countries. During the whole period between 1945 and 2010 Sweden and Austria have been UN SC members three times, Finland and Ireland twice. The UN SC membership of non-permanent members is usually for two years. The first UN SC membership of Ireland was astonishing because it lasted only one year; this was an unusual exception to the rule. Sweden was the first neutral country to become member of the UN SC. from 1957 to 1958. At that time Dag Hammarskjöld was Secretary General and therefore it was not astonishing that Sweden got the honour to become a member of the UN SC. From the beginning Sweden was very active,

¹⁶³ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>, 19. 11. 2010.

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>, 11 07 2010.

¹⁶⁵ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>, 19. 08 2011.

initiating the resolutions 123/1957, 122/1957 and 126/1957. Their main area of interest was the Kashmir Conflict between India and Pakistan; the subsequent Swedish presidency initiated negotiations and invited India and Pakistan to the UN SC.¹⁶⁶ In all of the three cases Sweden voted with “Yes”, the USSR abstained, therefore, Sweden voted together with the western countries. By the invitation of neutral Sweden both India and Pakistan could explain their positions. The action of Sweden as a neutral member of the UN SC confirmed the thesis that neutral countries have good possibilities to act within the UN and to give a profile to neutrality policy.

5.2.1 Austria’s First Period from 1973 – 1974

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
5.1 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	
5.2 Austria as a member of the Security Council 5.2.1 Austria’s First Period from 1973 – 1974 5.2.2 Austria’s Second Period from 1991 – 1992 a) The Kuwait crisis b) The Yugoslavia crisis from 1991 onwards 5.2.3 Austria’s Third Period from 2009 – 2010	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 2

When in 1972 Austria was asked to accept a non-permanent mandate in the Security Council in 1973-1974, it was the fourth neutral country to take on this task. And for this reason Austria could benefit from the good practice of three other neutral states. The decision of Austria to apply as a non-permanent member of the UN SC for the period 1973-1974 was made by the ASDP government without consulting the opposition parties.¹⁶⁷ Again some of the Austrian experts opposed this application because in the case of a Chapter VII decision, Austria would have to abandon neutrality, as they argued. The Austrian government denied there was a problem and pointed out it was criteria precondition and the duty of members of UN SC to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization. Despite the discussion in Austria, the Finnish period as a member of UN SC lasted from 1971 to 1972 and was not discussed in that country. But this fact could not serve as an argument in the internal Austrian discussion. Especially for the sake of a new understanding of neutrality in Austria, the Austrian government was convinced that it was good neutrality policy to prevent the development of conflicts at the very beginning by offering good offices and agreements. The

¹⁶⁶ <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/131/30/IMG/NR013130.pdf>, 19 10 2010.

¹⁶⁷ Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, p. 98.

Austrian government saw broad possibilities in being a member of UN SC since this status enabled the country to fulfil the principle of active neutrality policy. Several other Austrian experts backed the decision of the Austrian government, especially because it very rarely happened that a resolution of the Security Council would lead to actual war. Usually it resulted in an act of the collective security system. Therefore, Austria was not supposed to get into a situation in which it had to take action as a neutral country, they argued.¹⁶⁸

On 14th April 1972 the western group of states decided to support the Austrian application. In the following table the related issues and the date of debate are listed.

Issue and date	APP	ASDP	AAI/AFP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	Contribute to peace (1965), good offices, fulfilling the obligations	Support the UN ¹⁶⁹ fight for peace (1958), active neutrality policy	International legislation by the UN (1957)
Debate on membership 7 11 1972 ¹⁷⁰	Compatible after discussion with experts, neutrality practise has changed, possibilities to use	Recognition of Austrian neutrality policy by the invitation, high acceptance by the UN GA	Contrary to neutrality, failure of peace policy, difficult situations favouring a bloc, conduct armed measures

Table 5.2.1.1: Overview of the issues of the debate on 7th November 1972

As this list shows, only the APP acted with full conformity with and in the spirit of its manifesto. It also praised the wise decision to withdraw from the application in 1970 to give Finland a chance. The ASDP's position was guided by the political expediency of the moment, as it had only the fight for peace as a goal, formulated in 1958. The governing proclamations of 1971 discussed only support to the UN, although it was clear that Austria would apply for a membership UN SC.¹⁷¹ The AFP was very sceptical and that was partly in conformity with its manifesto.

To stress the issues, it was a fact that Austria and Switzerland had to enforce the measures of UN SC towards Rhodesia in 1966. Both countries tried to reject such measures because of their neutrality; but enforced them nevertheless under their national law. They tried to act according to the "*Verdross Doctrine*".¹⁷² It made only an academic difference to act by national law. Foreign Minister Kirchschräger mentioned the tactical application and retreat for UN SC membership of

¹⁶⁸ Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, p. 64.

¹⁶⁹ Kreisky Bruno, Politik für Österreichs Zukunft, Kanzler Bruno Kreisky, Regierungserklärung vom 5. 11. 1971, Klub der sozialistischen Abgeordneten und Bundesräte, Wien, p. 34.

¹⁷⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00050/imfname_149795.pdf, 19 11 2010.

¹⁷¹ Kreisky Bruno, Politik für Österreichs Zukunft, Kanzler Bruno Kreisky, Regierungserklärung vom 5. 11. 1971, Klub der sozialistischen Abgeordneten und Bundesräte, Wien, 1971, p. 34.

¹⁷² Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, p. 62.

1970. The benefit was the overwhelming acceptance in 1972 (115 of 118 votes). The advantages of membership would outweigh the risks. He pointed out the ideas of one of the „fathers“ of the Austrian State Treaty, Leopold Figl, who always talked of a comprehensive membership of Austria.¹⁷³ That example backs the pragmatic approach to security matters of the then Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

Issue and date	APP	ASDP	AAI/AFP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	Contribute to peace (1965), good offices, fulfilling the obligations	Support the UN ¹⁷⁴ fight for peace (1958), active neutrality policy	International legislation by the UN (1957)
Membership in UN SC	Decisions could lead to terrorist act against Austria reliability of neutrality policy could be discredited, possible restrictions on budget for defence, lack of equipment ¹⁷⁵	Efforts in foreign affairs, higher confidence in neutrality policy, much success during the presidency ¹⁷⁶	Difficult task
Demands	Move a resolution on terrorist acts, criticism on voting against Israeli attacks, accusation of neutralistic policy	Rejected the accusation of neutralism	Better co-ordination between the ambassador and the foreign ministry
Summary	Participation in peace-keeping operations, contributions on de-escalation in the East-West-conflict, resolutions on Israel and Lebanon ¹⁷⁷	Voting was as often with or without western world ¹⁷⁸	Very sceptical about the ability of the UN SC

Table 5.2.1.2: Overview of the issues of the debates on membership in the UN SC

The APP acted according to its party manifesto, but criticism was so heavy that the impression grew that the purpose of the APP's opposition policy was to better prepare for the forthcoming elections. But at the end of the day, the APP was convinced that a UN SC membership had more advantages than disadvantages and it was backed by its programme. The ASDP made government policy from a practical point of view mostly backed by the proclamations of the government. The congruency with its manifesto was not important in the opinion of Chancellor Kreisky. The AFP was rather free to act, because its manifestos of 1968 and 1972 contained nearly no security topics. Its policy was mainly governed by the political expediency of the moment.

¹⁷³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00050/imfname_149795.pdf, 19 11 2010.

¹⁷⁴ Kreisky Bruno, Politik für Österreichs Zukunft, Kanzler Bruno Kreisky, Regierungserklärung vom 5. 11. 1971, Klub der sozialistischen Abgeordneten und Bundesräte, Wien, 1971, p. 34.

¹⁷⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00050/imfname_101570.pdf, 05 01 2011.

¹⁷⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00050/imfname_149839.pdf, 05 01 2011.

¹⁷⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00050/imfname150057.pdf, 21 11 2010.

¹⁷⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00050/imfname149839.pdf, 21 11 2010.

During this first period in the Security Council, Austria was not confronted with decisions which would have been difficult due to Austria's neutrality. During those two years only the UN operations UNEF II and UNDOF were established and the Austrian mission for the biennial period was fulfilled since it consisted at continuing to offer its good offices and to offer negotiations between parties to a conflict.¹⁷⁹ In total, 20 resolutions were passed in the year 1973, an on-going increase during the last years. Almost all of those resolutions concerned security matters and not routine affairs. Abstention was practised much less frequently than before and the People's Republic of China and the other members with veto power often vetoed. The picture during the year 1974 was nearly the same, 22 resolutions were passed, only 4 concerning new members. China and the other members with veto power sometimes abstained. During both years Austria voted with "Yes" in each case. Maybe an additional reason for these votes was the fact that the Austrian diplomat Kurt Waldheim was Secretary General at that time and Austria did not want to embarrass him by its voting.

In the UN SC Austria was followed by Sweden from 1975 to 1976 for its second period. In Sweden there was no discussion on their UN SC membership and neutrality because it was the second time for Sweden. During the two years of the Swedish membership the situation did not change. In each of the two years 19 resolutions were passed and the number of abstentions did not increase. The topics of the resolutions were mainly security affairs in concrete matters, about a quarter of them related to new memberships. In all cases Sweden voted with "Yes".

5.2.2 Austria's Second Period from 1991 – 1992

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
5.1 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	
5.2 Austria as a member of the Security Council 5.2.1 Austria's First Period from 1973 – 1974 5.2.2 Austria's Second Period from 1991 – 1992 a) The Kuwait crisis b) The Yugoslavia crisis from 1991 onwards 5.2.3 Austria's Third Period from 2009 – 2010	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 2

In this sub chapter, the second Austrian period as a member to the UN SC is analysed. The chapter is divided into two parts because during this period two crises took place, the Kuwait

¹⁷⁹ Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, p. 66.

crisis and the Yugoslavian crisis. Austria's acting as a member of UN SC and as a more or less affected country is analysed together, being an interdependent subject. This was necessary because the discussions in the Austrian Parliament, too, tended to conflate the two issues.

As we know, 1989 was the year of the big change, the fall of the "Iron Curtain" and of the "Berlin Wall". These circumstances had an impact on the UN SC as well. In the year 1989, 20 resolutions passed the UN SC, 18 of them in consensus, in only two cases did the US abstain. During the year 1990, the number of resolutions increased from 20 to 37, which means that they nearly doubled in one year. Nine of the resolutions were not in consensus. It was also a new situation, because in one case Yemen did not vote at all and in four cases Cuba and/or Yemen voted with "No". The topics of these resolutions related to the Kuwait crisis, which peaked in December 1990. Finland voted with the majority of members in all cases with "Yes".

The second Austrian membership in the UN SC was determined by two major crises. In the Middle East, Iraq under Saddam Hussein had invaded the neighbour country Kuwait (which in Saddam Hussein's view, was the 19th province of Iraq). The UN SC reacted by passing measures that permitted even war to restore peace and to re-establish Kuwait within its former borders. These new measures were suddenly possible because after the end of the Cold War the USSR went through a phase of co-operation with the western states. China did not veto either, so it was possible to pass the resolution 678 which authorized a coalition to re-establish the status quo ante. After several ultimatums the fight to liberate Kuwait started 16th January 1991, 15 days earlier Austria had entered the UN SC.

The second big crisis in 1991, the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 25th June 1991, developed differently.¹⁸⁰ In these conflicts there were no long-term resolutions as the resolution 678, which had been the legal basis to liberate Kuwait. The situation of the Yugoslav crisis was different because Slovenia and Croatia were not independent states at the beginning, and the crisis remained a domestic problem for a long time. After international recognition of the independence of the two states in the beginning of the year 1992 the situation changed, but there was still no desire in the international community to intervene. That situation first changed in the year 1996; in 1999 NATO intervened in the Kosovo crisis without a mandate of the UN. The legitimacy of the intervention will be discussed later on. Because of the direct connection between Austria's UN SC membership and these two crises they are researched and discussed in

¹⁸⁰ Libal Wolfgang, *Das Ende Jugoslawiens, Chronik einer Selbsterstörung*, Europaverlag, Wien/Zürich, 1991, p. 163.

this chapter as case studies. In accordance with the historical approach the Kuwait crisis is discussed first.

a) The Kuwait Crisis 1990 – 1991

In this subchapter the positions of the Austrian political parties were researched, as they were stated in the records of the Austrian Parliament. There was one difference to the chapter before: after the elections of 1986 the AGP, a green and alternative party, had entered the Austrian Parliament. The beginning of the Kuwait crisis coincided with the elections to the NC in Austria. Therefore, there was no plenary from 13th July to 5th November 1990.

On 2nd August 1990, the Iraqi Armed Forces invaded neighbouring Kuwait. Because Kuwait had only a weak army, the Iraqi Armed Forces occupied the “19th province of Iraq” within days. The day the occupation started, the UN SC – including the neutral member Finland – passed resolution 660 condemning the occupation, and called for immediate withdrawal and negotiations. Four days later, the UN SC acted according to Chapter VII, based on Resolution 661, and demanded the Iraqi forces to withdraw. In addition, economic sanctions and an embargo on all arms were imposed.¹⁸¹ The Austrian government followed measures of its own, similar to other cases before and specified a reservation of neutrality like Switzerland. A few days later, on 9th August 1990, the UN SC declared the annexation of Kuwait null and void and appealed to all other states to co-operate with the exiled government of Kuwait. During the next weeks eight resolutions were passed by the UN SC, which demanded negotiations but allowed Kuwait’s exiled government to search for support and aid. On the 9th August the deployment of troops started. The coalition troops were led by the US, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. On 25th August, the UN SC demanded all states to support the exiled government of Kuwait and to take part in the surveillance of the embargo.¹⁸² On 29th November 1990, the UN SC authorized all nations co-operating with the Kuwaiti government to use all means to implement Resolution 660, unless Iraq implemented the resolution fully on or before 15th January 1991.¹⁸³ Austria granted overflight rights following the Resolutions 665 and 678 for all

¹⁸¹ <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement>, 02 04 2011.

¹⁸² <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/15/IMG/NR057515.pdf?OpenElement>, 03 04 2011.

¹⁸³ „Bundesregierung sich dabei von der wachsenden internationalen Solidarität und Mitverantwortung unter Wahrung der Verpflichtungen und Grundsätze leiten lassen wird, die sich aus dem Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die immerwährende Neutralität und der Neutralitätspolitik als stabilisierendem Element der europäischen

airplanes of the coalition, again together with a reservation of neutrality. Switzerland closed its air space for military planes for reasons of neutrality, an important difference to Austria's position.¹⁸⁴ From the point of view of the UN Charter this was wrong, because § 103 states that in case of a conflict the UN Charter shall prevail over any other international agreement, including the The Hague agreements on international law of war or the neutrality law. Since Iraq refused to comply with Resolution 678 by 15th January 1991, the coalition started its attack by executing Resolution 678. On 16th January 1991, the air strikes started, and on 24th February the ground attacks began from Saudi territory. The attacks were so successful that the Iraqi government surrendered on 3rd March 1991.

Because the NC had not scheduled the next plenary session until 5th November there was no debate about the application for membership in the UN SC. But even if there had been a plenary meeting no big debate could have been expected because it was the second application. But in the proclamation of the government, Federal Chancellor Vranitzky stated on 18th December 1990, that

*“the federal government will be guided (in being a member of UN SC) by the growing international solidarity and co-responsibility to preserve the obligations and principles, which were caused by the constitutional law of permanent neutrality on the one hand and neutrality policy as a stabilizing element of European order on the other hand.”*¹⁸⁵

The Federal Chancellor especially underlined that Austria will have the opportunity to develop and work on a collective security system through the membership in the UN SC. Active support of the UN was one of the main tasks in the security policy of the Austrian government, which clearly said that it wanted to become a member of the EU. That aim became feasible after the changes in the world in 1989 and the following year.

The concrete political decisions of the Austrian government on security topics were discussed more often than during the first period as a member of UN SC. This was mainly because of the different political situation prevailing at the time. The measures taken against Iraq were not comparable to e.g. those provoked by the Yom Kippur War 1973. Another example was the partition of Yugoslavia which was a much bigger challenge to the international community than

Ordnung ergeben.“, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement>, 02 04 2011.

¹⁸⁴ Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, pp. 70-72.

¹⁸⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00007/imfname_141879.pdf, 15 03 2011.

the problems of Palestine in the 1970s. Therefore, Austria's actions with respect to the measures against the Iraqi government, the handling of the Yugoslavian crisis, the crisis in Lebanon, the Kurds, or the Palestine questions were discussed intensively in the NC. In those cases the debates centred not only on Austria's actions in the UN SC in general but also in respect to the Austrian neutrality.¹⁸⁶

Prior to Austria's UN SC membership Europe had faced changes nobody would have thought possible only two years earlier. These changes led to discussions in Austria on the Austrian State Treaty. Two of the following questions were, if Russia was the successor of the USSR as a signatory of the Austrian State Treaty and whether or not the Austrian State Treaty was still in effect in light of this new development, and if yes, did this concern only some parts of it or the entire content of the treaty. The first question was quickly answered with "yes" and the second question was debated in the Austrian Parliament. One other substantial question, that of neutrality, was intensively discussed and it has not been resolved yet. However, Austria was changing the practice of its neutrality policy in important issues.

The Austrian Federal Government decided on 6th November 1990 to annul articles 12 to 16 and article 22 paragraph 13 of the Treaty, and to notify thereof the signatory states. France agreed, the US signalled their approval for the Austrian point of view and Great Britain and Russia did not have any objections to it either. For an overview a short table lists the main issues and arguments of the four parties during the debate on 22nd November 1990¹⁸⁷ related to their manifestos:

¹⁸⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00003/imfname_141875.pdf, 21 11 2010.

¹⁸⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00003/imfname_141875.pdf, 21 11 2010.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related Issues in manifesto(s)	UN-Charter peace-keeping, step in for peace, freedom and solidarity, reliable neutrality and defence policy	Disarmament, good offices, no neutralism, contribute to peace, neutrality as basis for peacekeeping ¹⁸⁸	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples
Annullment of parts of the Austrian State Treaty	Result of WW II, end of partition of Europe, Finland annulled also – proven practise, act in Europe like a free country	Neutrality and State Treaty are the roots, membership in UN, UN SC, CSCE, COE, COE were possible, no additional annulment	Too late for the whole treaty, 2+4 Treaty on Germany signed two month earlier, annul neutrality law, active work on Europe, NATO membership	Acting without parliament, UN as a court would have been better than annulling the treaty by pieces, to wait for the Treaty of Paris would have been better, moves to revoke

Table 5.2.2.1: Overview of the issues of the debate to annul parts of the Austrian State Treaty

All Austrian political parties were surprised by the events of the years 1989 and 1990. The manifestos of the parties had not anticipated the end of the Cold War and the end of the partition of Europe. According to its manifesto, the APP acclaimed the possibility for Austria to buy modern armaments like guided antitank and anti-aircraft missiles thanks to the end of the restrictions on the weapons regulations of the Austrian State Treaty. The APP was responsible for defence in the Austrian government. The annulments matched their aim of reliable armed forces. It was adequate for a party of integration into a larger Europe to acclaim the annulments of the restrictions regarding the relations with Germany laid down in the Austrian State Treaty. During the debate, the APP professed neutrality as compatible with its manifesto.

The AFP demanded a reliable neutrality policy in its manifesto of the year 1985. This was in a diametric contradiction to the current demand to end neutrality and to join NATO.¹⁸⁹ To defend the policy of the AFP one has to keep in mind that the manifesto was written during the time of the Cold War and therefore the AFP acted on political expediency of the moment considerations; to accommodate to the new situation they had to go back to the old goal of integration into a free, western European world dating from 1954.

¹⁸⁸ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressedienst, Wien, 1987, p. 36.

¹⁸⁹ Franz Kernic, Die freiheitliche Wehrpolitik in der zweiten Republik, Studie zur Wehrprogrammatische und –politik des VdU und der FPÖ von 1949 bis 1986, phil. Diss, Wien, 1987, pp. 98-102.

The ASDP manifesto stated that neutrality was the basis for foreign policy, neutrality policy, and security policy and therefore defence policy had to support these branches of policy. By annulling the old restrictions, it was the defence policy that offered more room to manoeuvre. By emphasizing that the memberships in various international organisations were possible for a neutral country, the ASDP acted in conformity with its manifesto.

The AGP had entered the NC in 1986. Therefore, they had no party manifesto but only a short programme. In this programme they spoke of a neutrality policy supporting suppressed peoples in the “Third World“. Therefore, the connection between security policy matters and those of minorities was in conformity with its programme and the general mindset of “green“ politicians. The same goes for the demand to negotiate the Austrian State Treaty on the level of the UN SC: this too was conform with the “green“ views, because at that time the AGP thought that the UN was the only legitimate actor.

Only a few days after Austria took a seat in the UN SC, the Kuwait crisis reached a new peak. On 15th January, the ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw its forces expired. The coalition led by the US started an air campaign against the Iraqi forces on 16th January. On 24th February, the air attacks were continued by land and sea forces. On 3rd March, Iraq surrendered and an armistice was signed. Those events were heatedly discussed in the Austrian Parliament and the decisions of the Austrian government to support the peace operation were criticised. The Austrian government received heavy criticism for granting overflight rights to the coalition. The situation in Kuwait and Iraq was discussed in the Austrian NC at great length, especially because the government changed some paragraphs in the respective laws with relevance to neutrality. A list of issues and dates of the debates is also provided:

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related Issues in manifesto(s)	UN-Charter peace-keeping, step in for peace, freedom and solidarity, reliable neutrality and defence policy	Disarmament, good offices, No neutralism, contribution to peace, neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ¹⁹⁰	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples
Plenary sessions on 16 th 1. 1991 ^{191 192} , and on 17 th 1. 1991 ¹⁹³	Obey to the measures especially because of membership to UN SC, amendment was necessary for domestic policy reasons, difference between war and measures as police actions, conducting measures were police actions, military not political neutrality, 30 years of peace-keeping, neutrality was not eroded, solidarity with the victim Kuwait, UN Charter was above neutrality law, collective security system worked and could be a shield for Austria	Conduct measures especially because of membership, according to neutrality of 1955, measures are to be conducted immediately, amendment an advantage, policy according to article 24 supporting UN SC, art 103 priority to UN Charter, air transports according to article 25 UN Charter ¹⁹⁴ , publishing resolutions to become national law, no military means	Changes in laws too late, demanded neutrality in pragmatic matters, denied automatism of measures of the UN SC, accused a acute turnaround demanded a decision between neutrality and solidarity, backed a collective security system, measures of the UN SC were rightful war, demanded European co-operation, demanded membership to EEC, backed membership to UN, demanded PSO in the Arabian Gulf,	Refuse the moves, end of neutrality, critics on the US dominated UN SC, US hindered a peaceful solution, Austria should convoke the UN SC, demands a resolution to end to fighting, suspicions on US flights, no police action but war, stressed “ <i>Verdross-Doctrine</i> ”, Austria left pursuing the Swiss model, was on side of the powers, demanded back to neutrality, no form of violence of the UN SC, no war at all
27 th 2. 1991 ¹⁹⁵ : On policy in the UN SC	Solidarity act to liberate Kuwait, peace costs blood, in consensus with Arabic world, new form of PSO under umbrella of UN, neutrality and UN are compatible, welcome of the new active role of the UN SC, offer for peace-keeping, proposal for a peace conference pursuing CSCE, liberation by force was according to the mandate “by all means”, no movement of weapons through Austria	UN SC proofs mandates, no case of neutrality, collective security did not touch neutrality, obligations to UN fulfilled by flights granting, demand on an on-going UN peace order, neutrality and solidarity were combined, suggested a conference like CSCE and reconstruction aid, denied “western” policy	Backed measures of UN SC, UN Charter was prevailing over neutrality law, criticism on different statements of the government, demanded a discussion on neutrality and collective security, demanded own ideas on security policy	Criticized overwhelming bombing, accusations on weapons transport, criticism on UN SC lack of negotiation in resolution 678, neutrality case no police action, US exceeded resolution, stressed again „ <i>Verdross- Doctrine</i> “, suggested to cancel vetoing in UN SC, demanded to stop fighting,

Table 5.2.2.2: Overview of the issues of the debate on the attack to liberate Kuwait

Because the AGP was a newcomer to the Austrian Parliament its demands often were unrealistic. It was driven by its idealistic dreams of a non-violent society and the absence of any military

¹⁹⁰ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressedienst, Wien, 1987, p. 36.

¹⁹¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00003/imfname_141880.pdf, 21 11 2010.

¹⁹² http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00003/imfname_141881.pdf, 21 11 2010.

¹⁹³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0003/imfname_141883.pdf, 21 11 2010.

¹⁹⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>, 21. 08. 2011.

¹⁹⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00003/imfname_141928.pdf, 21 11 2010.

options in international relations.¹⁹⁶ Its representatives accused the government of having abandoned the Swiss model, although this had already happened in 1955 by joining UN. In its programme it demanded active neutrality policy in support of suppressed peoples. It might have supported the measures of the UN SC, but its representatives insisted that a collective security system should avoid war not provoke it. At that time, the AGP had a view of neutrality which was similar to neutralism, a point of view which was very different from that of other Austrian parties. In a certain way the AGP stuck to its programme rejecting all violence.

The AFP backed every worldwide peace-support policy under the axiom of neutrality in its manifesto of 1985. It was in conformity with the manifesto to back collective security systems and all measures of the UN SC. But to dismiss neutrality was against their manifesto. Especially the demand to join NATO was yet another change in direction in the party's security policy.

The governing coalition tried to deal with criticism from two different sides but the members of the coalition were not adjusted to each other. The more active party, the APP, criticized its partner the ASDP for dithering.¹⁹⁷ The APP explained that the time given to pass the laws was very restricted and it was too late anyhow, but the government believed until 15th January 1991 that Saddam Hussein would withdraw. Looking at the contemporary manifesto of 1986, according to the APP, neutrality existed only in times of war. It could react flexibly to the new situation. By definition, the measures of UN SC were police actions. According to its manifesto, the APP was able to support each measure. At last the Foreign Minister (APP) explained that Switzerland was in a different situation because Switzerland was not a UN member. Nevertheless, Switzerland should accept the measures according to the new understanding of article 103. From his point of view it was a fact that international law had changed through actions of the countries and the international community as a whole. The ASDP stressed the legal aspect of the decisions of the government and added its support for the UN SC. That position was in conformity with its manifesto. With this it rejected the accusations of the APP of dithering.

During the debate in February, according to its manifesto, the APP stressed the necessity of supporting the UN SC and the coalition forces in liberating Kuwait. The proposals for a peace conference in the format of the CSCE were accorded with the governing partner ASDP. The differences between the coalition partners calmed down and together the parties rejected accusations by the AFP and especially the AGP. The ASDP too acted according to its manifesto.

¹⁹⁶ Kernic Franz, *Parteien und Bundesheer, Quellen zur Stellung der österreichischen politischen Parteien zu Fragen der Landesverteidigung seit 1955*, Wien, IMS/LVAk, Wien 1988, p. 27 and annex 23.

¹⁹⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00003/imfname_141880.pdf, 21 11 2010.

The AGP accused the governing parties of inactivity for the sake of holding the coalition together. One major point of the accusations was that Austria stood before the broken pieces of its neutrality as a price for membership in the EEC. The AGP accused the government fulfilling the demands of the US-led coalition in order to prepare favourable conditions for the negotiations to join the EEC as soon as possible. It demanded to adopt the “*Verdross Doctrine*”, which matched its programme. On behalf of the government, the ASDP rejected such accusations and demands. In 1991, the UN Charter was considered to supersede the neutrality law. This change of policy by the ASDP was not really in line with its manifesto at all. On the other hand, in the ASDP’s view Austria did meet all requirements of a UN member by granting overflight rights, Sweden did so by providing weapons and Switzerland by providing financial funds. Austria acted like the other neutral countries and followed a general practice. The AFP backed the measures of the UN SC and the policy of the government on the one hand. On the other hand it demanded a discussion on neutrality and solidarity to be taken up immediately. These party positions were backed by the manifesto and the AFP declared to be ready for a consensual foreign policy by Austria.

The discussions about Kuwait ended in the Austrian NC with the debates in February 1991. As a conclusion it can be stated that the actions taken against Saddam Hussein were discussed intensively by the AGP whereas the other parties agreed with the decision of the UN SC. The differences between the governing coalition parties were about the Austrian way of acting in the UN SC and how to support the measures. At that time the APP was the active party and the ASDP was the cautious one. The differences were getting very pronounced indeed until they turned into accusations by the APP against its partner ASDP. These differences became even more pronounced during the next crisis.

b) The Yugoslavia Crisis from 1991 onwards

First, it is necessary to give a short overview of the development and the facts of the crisis up to June 1991. Yugoslavia was founded after the First World War and was home to at least six nations and three religions; its peoples had had different histories and development because they had been occupied by different powers over the centuries e.g. by the Turks, by Venice and by the Habsburg monarchy. After WW II Josip Broz Tito re-founded the state, established a communist system and in 1974 he created a new constitution. This new constitution was aimed at balancing the power between the peoples and the religions. The country consisted of the five republics

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and two autonomous provinces of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. After the death of Tito on 4th May 1980, a balanced rotation system in the presidency was established. After Slobodan Milosevic had come to power in Serbia, he demanded superiority over the two provinces, something they did not want. Step by step, he tried to restrict their autonomy and played more and more the nationalist card. The other republics were very concerned about this development, especially because the Federal Armed Forces, which had to guarantee the unity of the state, were dominated by Serb officers. After the Change of 1989, the national tensions increased more and more and became especially pronounced in the republics of Croatia and Slovenia, which had been parts of the Habsburg monarchy, and democratic parties came into power. The two republics increased the power of their territorial forces to balance the strength of the Serb-dominated Federal Armed Forces. On 2nd July 1990, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence but still remained within the state of Yugoslavia. The tensions between the Croats and the Serbs in Croatia increased in July and August 1990 until the Serb Krajina in the Republic of Croatia declared its autonomy. In 1991, the situation escalated in connection with the scheduled takeover of the rotating presidency by the Croat Stipe Mesic, whom the majority of the other provinces opposed. On this occasion, Croatia and Slovenia declared to leave the Federation on 25th June 1991. The Federal Armed Forces moved in to deploy troops on the borders to Austria and Italy and thus to prevent the secession. The territorial forces of Slovenia and some militia groups organised defence groups against the Federal Armed Forces and it came to battles along the main roads as well as to a siege of border installations. After several days of fighting, the EEC-Troika¹⁹⁸ negotiated an armistice on 2nd July. The Federal Armed Forces moved back to their barracks. The secession of Slovenia was accepted by the Serbian politician Milosevic and the Federal Armed Forces.

On 27th June, units of the Austrian Armed Forces were put on alert. After the situation escalated on 28th June 1991 at 18:45, the operation order was given in accordance with paragraph 2 lit. a Defence Law. The Austrian troops were deployed on the Austrian border to Yugoslavia. During the following days, more Austrian troops were added. The Forces reached their highest level on 6th July 1991. After de-escalation the Austrian troops were reduced over the following days and the operation ended on 31st July 1991.¹⁹⁹ On 26th June 1991, Austria and Italy had started the CSCE procedure and on 4th July 1991, a conference took place in Prague. During discussions of

¹⁹⁸ At that time the foreign ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

¹⁹⁹ Gerhard Christiner, *Sicherungseinsatz an der Staatsgrenze 1991*, in Etschmann Wolfgang/Speckner Hubert(Hrsg.), *Zum Schutz der Republik Österreich ...*, Wien, 2005, pp. 625-640.

these events, the AGP proposed to accept the right of self-determination according to the CSCE 1975 Final Act.²⁰⁰ Before analysing the case in detail, a short overview of the Helsinki process and the CSCE is given:

The Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki 1975 was the first ever occasion during the Cold War where the Eastern and the Western Blocs were united in agreeing on a document on confidence-building measures. This document was the basis of the Charter of Paris²⁰¹, which was signed in January 1991. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe lasted from July 1973 until July 1975. It began and ended in Helsinki, but most of the time it was held in Geneva. The formal Final Act was signed in Helsinki on 1st of August 1975. From a present-day perspective it was the dawn of the end of the Cold War. A significant part of this Final Act was related to security matters and the Principles Guiding Relations²⁰² between the participating States²⁰³ were declared. They were:

- I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
- II. Refraining from the threat or use of force
- III. Inviolability of frontiers
- IV. Territorial integrity of states
- V. Peaceful settlement of disputes
- VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs
- VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
- VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
- IX. Co-operations among States
- X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

On 8th and 9th July 1991, the Austrian NC discussed the situation in Yugoslavia and the development in the last days of June. After a report by the Federal Chancellor and several Federal Ministers each party had the opportunity to speak out. Again it is useful to give an overview of topics in the debate related to the issues in the manifestos and the programme. In that list the following debates are also included:

²⁰⁰ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1975.

²⁰¹ www.osce.org/de/mc/39518, 12. 06. 2011.

²⁰² Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, pp. 77-88.

²⁰³ All European States, the US, the Commonwealth and Canada.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	UN-Charter peace-keeping, step in for peace, freedom and solidarity, reliable neutrality and defence policy, no neutralism	Disarmament, good offices, No neutralism, contribution to peace, comprehensive defence neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ²⁰⁴	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate on 8 th and 9 th 7. 1991 ²⁰⁵	Conference of Paris, early warning, recognition too early, invitation of all attachés on 2 nd July, only defence measures, support for all democratic movements, umbrella of the CSCE	No interest of the international community for fighting, reject violence, solution by dialogue, no recognition because of loss of possibilities and aggravation of the problem, sympathy but no advantage of a recognition, together with EEC because of application, importance of CSCE process,	Supported the will to independence, talk about violence on the level of COE, critics on APP – differences within government, support for membership to EEC, self-confident foreign policy, demanded a discussion on principle of integrity of states, accused political neutrality,	Immediate recognition
Issues of the debate on 17 th 9. 1991. ²⁰⁶	Recognise as soon as possible but the coalition, inform the EEC, involve the UN SC, criticism of dithering (ASDP), recognition depended on certain criteria and EEC members, peace conference of The Hague, established peace-making forces (no troops found), resolution in the UN SC failed,	Recognition could be worse, backed CSEC negotiations, deploring the lack of consensus, sceptical on intervention scenario even under umbrella of UN, no icebreaker because of the history, recognition could imply case of neutrality,	Recognize immediately, accusations of dither (ASDP) and to be irresolute (APP), protection of minorities, icebreaker for recognition, proposed UN operations, Austrian false pretence of neutrality	Against violence and war, quick recognition could have prevented the war, recognition only if the rights of the minorities were guaranteed, measures by the UN SC, right of self-determination, neutrality implies to have an opinion, no neutrality on violations of Human rights

Table 5.2.2.3: Overview of the issues of the debates in July 1991

During the first phase of the Yugoslavian crisis, all parties acted in conformity with their manifestos. All parties wanted to stop violence and war; the AGP by a quick recognition, the other parties placed their hope in the CSCE conference of The Hague. After the summer break, the main question was to agree on an acceptable date to recognise the two republics. The

²⁰⁴ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressedienst, Wien, 1987, p. 36.

²⁰⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00035/imfname_141926.pdf, 21 11 2010.

²⁰⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00038/imfname_142028.pdf, 21 11 2010.

government declared support for the negotiation process that had opened in The Hague and stressed that Austria would recognise them together with other countries when the time came. A recognition which came too early could result in counterproductive effects. The Chancellor stressed the importance of support actions like “Neighbour in Need” and condemned the impulse of using military force as a means of conflict resolutions. Foreign Minister Mock of the APP explained that until July Europe tried to save Yugoslavia as a state. He characterized Europe and the member states of the EEC by saying: “*too little and too late*”. In August, the conviction grew that the world should be confronted with a *fait accompli*. On 7th August 1991, Austria and the EEC states presented an information initiative to the UN SC. The same initiative was put forward as a motion in the CSCE states. On 3rd and 4th September, Austria presented the topic to the CSCE again. The Foreign Minister defended the method of dialogue as the only option to solve problems, but negotiations were only possible on the basis of the Charter of Paris. The ambassador to the UN was advised to start negotiations on Yugoslavia. For the first time, the Foreign Minister stated clearly to be in favour of the recognition of the two states. Because of the unclear situation, there were different opinions within the government and it was decided to wait for results from The Hague. His main strategy was to internationalise the crisis.

The AFP changed its position to a quick recognition and accused the ASDP Chancellor of dithering. It proposed UN operations and stood for the rights of minorities. Those demands were backed by the manifesto of the AFP. The AGP accused the AFP of restricting minority rights in Austria but at the same time standing up for such rights in Yugoslavia. It stood by its line for a quick recognition, which was compatible with its programme. It also demanded the end of violence and war. The rights of minorities should be granted by all parties. The ASDP brought up the historical connections and old grievances in regard to Austria in the region. Therefore, Austria could not be an icebreaker, but now the ASDP brought up the possibility of recognition together with the EEC countries. This was according to its manifesto. The APP qualified its demand of recognition only after putting forward some criteria to be met and stood for a Peace Support Operation (PSO). Those demands matched its manifesto.

This way the inter-party fighting in Austria led to a de-facto recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and needed only the formal recognition procedure by more than one country. Contrary to the ASDP the APP wanted to start this procedure immediately, since in their opinion this was a question of European security and therefore Austria could not remain neutral. It demanded also that a peace conference be organized by the WEU. APP and ASDP passed a move to recognize

Slovenia and Croatia, and that this should be done together with other countries. The next phase lasted from December 1991 until March 1992. Again, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was the main topic but gradually the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) became more important.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	UN-Charter peace-keeping, step in for peace, freedom and solidarity, reliable neutrality and defence policy, no neutralism	Good offices, No neutralism, Contribution to peace, comprehensive defence neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ²⁰⁷	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate in the plenary session on 5 th 12. 1991 ²⁰⁸	Accused ASDP of the late move, necessity of convincing the EEC countries	No comments	Criticism for late move	Immediate recognition would have been better, demanded quick recognition, BiH has to be next
Issues of the debate on defence budget 17 th 12. 1991 ²⁰⁹	Recognition on 15 th January 1992 together with EEC countries	Successful convincements,	Criticism on the long procedures November until January	No new world order, UN were put into service of the US, criticism of APP tactics, contrary to EEC membership because of restrictions in policy,
Issues of the debate on neutrality on 26 th and 27 2. 1992 ²¹⁰	Neutrality changed, no WEU membership	Announced a security system which includes collective defence, weapons were needed for UN operations also, neutrality policy of Sweden, Finland, and even Switzerland changed, Austrian practice more solidarity than Swiss model,	Neutrality lost importance	No new weapons for the Austrian Armed Forces, negotiations instead of refusal of weapons in the neighbourhood,
Issues of the debate on the security sector reform on Iraq on 5 th 3. 1992 ²¹¹	Questions of Human rights could not be a domestic question, Austrian Armed Forces field hospital, install UN peace-keeping operations to secure the "protected areas", extend the UN mandate on BiH, readiness for recognition of BiH, transit permitted, accused ASDP of dithering	Criticism of Turkey, security conference, denied dithering, the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris, supported UN operations, suggested economic support	A move for international help and a quick recognition of BiH	No problem solved by the liberation of Kuwait, demanded a security conference including the Kurds, criticism of the long way to recognition, immediate recognition of BiH

Table 5.2.2.4: Overview of the issues of the debates between December 1991 and March 1992

On 5th December 1991, the motion to recognise Croatia and Slovenia was passed by all four political parties. During the debates Foreign Minister Mock declared recognition would take

²⁰⁷ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressedienst, Wien, 1987, p. 36.

²⁰⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00049/imfname_142052.pdf, 21 11 2010.

²⁰⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00054/imfname_142057.pdf, 21 11 2010.

²¹⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0059/imfname_142078.pdf, 21 11 2010.

²¹¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0061/imfname_142079.pdf, 21 11 2010.

place on 15th January 1992, together with other European countries and after the formal recognition had led to diplomatic relations. The governing parties stressed the importance of a proper time frame. The recognition would be pronounced together with over 50 other countries. The opposition parties complained that the recognition was too late to stop the war. All parties acted according to their programmes. At that time the AGP started to criticise the UN heavily because the UN had even warned against a recognition based on the right of self-determination. This was a contradiction in itself, the AGP complained. This was a new facet of AGP policy, which was not backed by their programme.

During the debate in February the Foreign Minister stressed that it was necessary to think about the relations with the Western European Union (WEU),²¹² but membership was not on the agenda. As we know now, Austria, Finland and Sweden got observer status after joining the EU in 1995. In 1999, on its 50th anniversary, the WEU was integrated into the EU.

During the plenary session on 5th March 1992 all other parties passed a motion on international help to solve the Middle East problem. The second question being discussed was the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Regarding this question Minister of Defence Fasslabend, of the APP remarked that diplomatic relations already existed since 15th January and in the meantime more the 50 countries had recognised the two countries. Pending further decisions, recognition was bound to the criteria of the Helsinki Act; therefore, Macedonia would not be recognised without guaranteeing the rights of the Albanian minority. The APP also expressed its concerns about the situation in Kosovo. In general recognition brought impetus for peace but the consequences had to be considered, too, therefore timing was imperative, the Foreign Minister explained. Again he complained about the dithering of the ASDP, and much time was lost. The ASDP underlined its support for UN operations and the Helsinki process. The AGP criticised the long way to recognition and demanded the immediate recognition of BiH. Again all parties acted accordingly to their programmes.

In April 1992 the then Foreign Minister Mock reported to the NC that the UN SC had started consultations on the crisis in BiH in the beginning of November 1991, but the UN SC had decided to suppress this motion. Austria's second motion in this case on 6th April 1992 was more successful.²¹³ By the end of April, a four-point programme was passed which covered:

1. Strong involvement of the UN SC, which was the only organ of the international

²¹² The WEU was founded in 1954 by certain European countries with the purpose to defend their countries together. By the Treaty of Amsterdam it was integrated in the EU and dissolved in 2011.

²¹³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0082/imfname_142111.pdf, 21 11 2010.

community to impose measures in case of an aggression.

2. Humanitarian assistance,
3. The establishment of protected areas,
4. Activities to finance these programmes.

Austria also insisted on closing the air space above BiH, a measure that was passed by the UN SC.

The Austrian Foreign Minister Mock discussed an initiative of the CSCE to set up an observation mission in Kosovo and stated that NATO and WEU would make forces available to the CSCE for peace-making operations, but this never happened. The AGP emphasized the necessity of involving the Albanian people of Kosovo. Austria was successful in its demand to integrate them into the peace conferences at Geneva. The AFP also supported the respective motions of the other parties. But the Foreign Minister still maintains that the system of collective security was discredited.

In August 1992, peace conferences on Yugoslavia by the OSCE countries were held in London and Geneva. On 22nd September 1992, the UN GA condemned the Serbian policy and expelled Yugoslavia from the UN, which was a novelty in the history of the organisation. Austria had the opportunity to actively participate in the UN SC until the end of 1992 and was going to organise the conference of Geneva on peace in BiH from March to June 1993. Austria wanted to push through the following 6 points during this phase:

1. the end of the fighting in BiH,
2. the creation of protection zones, especially for Sarajevo,
3. securing the military no-fly zone over BiH,
4. a UN monitoring mission on all military airbases in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and BiH,
5. placing all heavy weapons under UN control, and
6. the increase of political pressure to conduct the UN embargo.

In this debate, the AGP accused the APP of installing a European bloc to get an advantage for the negotiations on Austria's the EU membership. The AGP preferred a pan-European security system under the leadership of the UN or the CSCE; therefore, it was against the Treaty of Maastricht and its consequences on foreign and security policy in Europe. From this point of view solidarity and neutrality were not compatible. The AGP criticised the refusal of participation in UN operations in Somalia. Additionally the AGP demanded of Austria to strive for the

abolishment of the veto power in the UN SC because the Cold War was over and it was against democratic principles. The ADSP stated that acting in solidarity under a collective security system was compatible with neutrality. Therefore, it was clear that Austria should participate in all measures and operations according to the “*Agenda for Peace*”²¹⁴. The ASDP replied that the refusal to participate in the operations in Somalia was justified by the responsibility towards Austria and its policy. The Treaty of Maastricht was the first step to a common security system in Europe. The ASDP explained that the concept of NATO was from a bygone era. The APP stressed the importance of the East-West conflict for the identity of Austrian neutrality as a distinguishing mark of the country. In any case, the conflict had ended two years earlier. Therefore, the concept of neutrality had changed and a common security system should be created in Europe. The first step was reached by the Treaty of Maastricht, and therefore WEU, NATO, and CSCE should be integrated into this system with Austria as a member of such a system. In Europe neutrality had to be replaced by solidarity, in the international environment Austria should remain a neutral country. The participation in the Somalia operation was not possible because of ASDP’s refusal. By that refusal Austria had lost a part of its international reputation, the APP claimed. By the way, the APP was very concerned about the situation in the ”powder keg“ Kosovo and demanded an operation in Kosovo and a second one in Macedonia, which would extend the activities of the CSCE. The AFP criticised the European Economic Area (EEA) membership and the application for EU membership. It was against the participation in the operations in Somalia for financial reasons and therefore it was also against any humanitarian activity in Somalia. The AFP demanded a NATO membership. The EEC membership was rejected because it had no collective security system at the time. The EEC membership was only possible after Austria had done its homework; next on the agenda was the membership in NATO and WEU. The AFP would have been in favour of the operations in Somalia if the mandate had been clear in regard to possible peace enforcement operations. The European integration could be a project for peace, but Austria was not ready from perspective of the AFP.

To give an overview of the last debates, the issues and dates are listed and related to the issues of the manifestos and the programme:

²¹⁴ Kofi A. Annan, *Agenda for Peace*, General Assembly, UN, 2000???. The agenda for peace defines preventive negotiations and three types of peace operations: conflict prevention and peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-building.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	UN-Charter peace-keeping, step in for peace, freedom and solidarity, reliable neutrality and defence policy, no neutralism	Disarmament, good offices, no neutralism, contribution to peace, comprehensive defence neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ²¹⁵	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debates on 12 th and 13 th 11. 1992 ²¹⁶ .	Transformation of neutrality, declaration of adherence to the CFSP, security system according to Chapter VIII UN-Charter, coordination of CFSP, WEU and NATO	CFSP would not touch neutrality, measures would be police actions,	Suggested NATO membership, CSFP incompatible to neutrality,	The government ended the neutrality, backed a collective security system like UN or OSCE, fostered the offices and responsibilities of neutral countries
Issues in the plenary session on 3 rd 12. 1992 ²¹⁷	CSCE initiatives, new type of a “preventing peacekeeping” in Macedonia	All duties of a member of UN, importance of the Agenda for Peace, coordination with the WEU, importance of the UN site of Vienna, neutrality was no future concept any more,	Consensus in foreign policy, early warning system by the UN, including soldiers and civil forces to monitor elections,	Missed chance on the UN operations in Somalia

Table 5.2.2.5: Overview of the issues of the debates in November and December 1992

Summarising these two debates, it was the short phase of consensus between all parties. The APP explained that the UN could be a model for a future European Union (EU). Neutrality was just as compatible with EU membership as with the UN membership. Austria would conduct all measures of the UN SC and UN GA of the UN without any prejudice to neutrality. The main idea was to keep strict neutrality in all issues except EU-related ones. A special challenge would be any further integration steps between EU, WEU, NATO, and CSCE. Austria was part of the UN system like almost all neutral countries in Europe (except Switzerland, which joined the UN in 2002). These neutral countries were reducing their practice of neutrality to the core military issues. The CSCE had failed to resolve the crisis of Yugoslavia, but for the future the desire of neutral countries for peace had to be incorporated into a future collective security system of

²¹⁵ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressedienst, Wien, 1987, p. 36.

²¹⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0088/imfname_142117.pdf, 21 11 2010.

²¹⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0092/imfname_142144.pdf, 21 11 2010.

CFSP. The other parties agreed on this matter, but the AFP insisted on also joining NATO as soon as possible. The AGP was sceptical on the CFSP following the Treaty of Maastricht and indicated the decision of the government as fraudulent, but they would have agreed on a collective security system according to Chapter VIII of UN-Charter.

The debate in December 1992 showed nearly the same situation. The APP backed again the compatibility of the Treaty of Maastricht both with a collective security system and with neutrality. Additionally, it proposed a new type of “preventive peacekeeping” in Macedonia. The AGP complained about a missed chance to take part in the UN operations in Somalia and the AFP voted for a collective common security system within the framework of the UN. The ASDP came out with the surprising the statement that neutrality was not a valid concept for the future any more and Austria had to decide which UN operations it was prepared to join. In this short period of time new daily challenges had brought many changes to the party positions.

On 13th December 1992²¹⁸ Foreign Minister Mock stated that the CSCE procedure was very important although not very helpful. He explained the four steps of the CSCE procedure:

- Measure one was to install a guiding council, which could pass resolutions and take decisions in consensus minus one, thus preventing the state concerned from blocking it.
- Measure two concerned disarmament.
- Measure three settled the rights of minorities.
- Measure four dealt with questions of economy, environment, and security.

In the beginning of October 1991 Austria wanted to start a peace-keeping operation in BiH but it was rejected since there was officially no conflict in BiH. On 15th April, Belgrade was condemned by the CSCE; the guiding council had to meet to start step number two of the measures of the CSCE. On 11th May 1992, the Austrian ambassador and the ambassadors of the other EEC countries were called back from Belgrade and the foreign ministers wondered whether the CSCE measures could be successful if a state refused to co-operate. The special benefit of the CSCE was the supervision of democratic elections and promotion of democratic procedures in general. The ADSP stressed its outrage over the on-going civil war in BiH and was hoping to stop it through the measures of the CSCE. It criticized the lack of coordination between the Council of Europe and the CSCE, it claimed that it was the CSCE’s fault and Austria should start some initiatives. From the ASDP’s point of view the CSCE had been very important before and

²¹⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0069/imfname_142087.pdf, 21 11 2010.

after 1989 in bringing the communist systems in Eastern Europe to an end, but the measures would be effective only after the recognition of a country. It was important to develop a European Charter to protect minorities including a catalogue of measures. On the other hand, the ASDP was against UN measures in this particular case. The AFP admitted the historical benefits of the CSCE but thought that today there was no basic consensus on the values shared by its members and some measures were not working at all, from its point of view. Therefore, the AFP demanded a peace-making force of the UN and to strengthen the efficiency of the CSCE to protect small countries. The CSCE would need peace enforcement operations. Especially the example of Croatia showed how important a collective security system of all EEC member countries would be, the AFP added. At the end of the debate the AFP demanded to join NATO, forgetting about what was written in their manifesto. The AGP criticised the failure of the CSCE and that the measures came too late. At this moment, there was nothing left to help but to offer humanitarian aid. The CSCE should coordinate the measures of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, measures against Yugoslavia should be taken up.

During this period some difficult decisions in the UN SC had to be taken, e.g. regarding the measures on Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia. Austria was involved directly in most of the measures and voted like the other western countries. In the year, 1991, 42 resolutions passed the UN SC, most of them in consensus. Similar to the previous year Cuba and Yemen voted with “No” in several cases; sometimes China, India and other countries abstained. The Resolution 688/1991 got only 10 votes with “Yes”, it addressed the suppression of the Kurdish people and the displaced persons (DP) in Iraq. China and India abstained and Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe voted “No”. In 1992 the number of resolutions increased significantly to 74. This was caused in the first place by the Yugoslavian crisis and the situation in Somalia and Mozambique. There were also 13 resolutions related to new members in the UN. The voting behaviour changed, most of the resolutions were passed in consensus, and only a few of them had abstentions by China, India, Ecuador or Zimbabwe. In both years, the neutral Austria voted “Yes” every time, together with the majority.

This period of Austrian UN SC membership can only be qualified by including the Austrian national reactions to the crises in Kuwait and Yugoslavia. As a result for Austria, the perception grew that Austria tended to tell the UN what it would not be able to execute because of its neutrality. Otherwise, it was recognised in Austria that UN law superseded the national law on neutrality. During those two years Austria took neutrality policy a step further towards UN

measures or resolutions. While in 1991 Austria followed the resolution on Iraq in an autonomous way, in 1992 the UN-resolution 748 on Libya immediately became national law. In 1993, Austria passed a new constitutional law amending its constitution, whereby international measures of the UN-SC immediately became national laws.²¹⁹ That law was passed by all parties in the parliament. It enabled the government to conduct measures together with the main committee of the NC. For the authorities, no separate law was necessary for the future. The execution of measures became much quicker than before. In this debate, all parties agreed that this law was the demonstration of Austrian solidarity in the international environment on UN level.

During this period, the domestic understanding of Austrian neutrality policy changed. The “*Verdross Doctrine*”²²⁰ changed into the “*Ermacora Doctrine*”²²¹:

*“UN SC measures are to be implemented because they can be seen as police actions and therefore they have no impact on the Austrian neutrality law”*²²².

The new axioms of this understanding of international policy towards neutral countries were at that time:

- a) Measures by the Security Council are not war but action against a peace breaker. Nobody is allowed to be neutral in regard to such measures.
- b) Measures under the collective security system are to be implemented by all member countries of UN. Military measures must not be hindered but need not be followed.
- c) If there is no resolution of the Security Council, traditional international law including neutrality law is applicable.
- d) Even a permanently neutral country must participate when the collective security system is in use. If a permanently neutral country is a member of the UN, it has the duty of loyalty and solidarity.²²³

In those approximately two years, the Austrian neutrality policy had changed considerably. Therefore, party policies had to adapt to the new situation. Every party did this in a different manner. None of them was prepared for the changed situation since their manifestos had been

²¹⁹ Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001 pp. 93-94.

²²⁰ The UN has accepted the neutrality of Austria. It had to consider that circumstance in its decisions and it had to exempt Austria from measures contrary to neutrality.

²²¹ Felix Ermacora was an Austrian expert on international law and the first expert in Austria to state the supremacy of the UN Charter.

²²² Handl Markus, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, jur. Diss. Wien, 2001, pp. 92-94.

²²³ Türk Helmut, Österreich im Spannungsfeld von Neutralität und kollektiver Sicherheit, Juristische Schriftenreihe Band 109, Österreich, 1997, p. 51.

passed before and during the Cold War. In the course of daily politics they had to decide how to meet all the new challenges. The APP was in the “best” position. In the party manifesto it promoted neutrality, which only focussed on the core military aspects of neutrality. During all debates, this was the prevailing argument of the APP. But the political activity with which it tried to bring about the end of neutrality and to join a collective security system was surprising in its radicalism. The APP even promoted a NATO membership referring to an Austrian expert, who had been member of the International Court, Helmut Türk, who believed that joining NATO would have been compatible with neutrality from a juridical point of view. The main problem for the APP at that time was to deal with the different opinions existing within the ASDP, which was its coalition partner. The ideas and motions of the APP often were stopped by this partner. In general, the APP acted according to its manifesto.

The ASDP stated in its manifesto that it stood for permanent neutrality and participation in peace support operations as well as for solidarity between the peoples. It stood for equidistance between all military blocs. It reacted very restrictively and negatively to the attempts of the APP to become member of EEC, WEU and NATO. The APP tried to convince the ASDP, but had no chance of success without the prior application for membership in the EEC. Therefore, the APP several times criticized the ASDP for its position in the NC. Nevertheless the ASDP stood by its manifesto during those years, although sometimes its explanations were not clear and straight.

The AFP stated in its programme to stand for neutrality and to participate in a world-wide peace policy. It came rather as a surprise that the AFP promoted membership in NATO from the beginning of both crises and argued against the development of CSDP according to the Treaty of Maastricht. The arguments for that were not backed in its manifesto and that made it clear that during that time the AFP promoted a security policy in stark contrast with its previous principles in that respect.

The AGP stood for a neutrality policy, which favoured suppressed peoples. They argued against any step taken according to the international policy by the UN SC or against a coordinated policy of the European countries. It promoted a quick recognition of the new states of Croatia, Slovenia and BiH. It was against any support for the coalition on the campaign against Saddam Hussein while acting under a mandate of the UN SC, because it was the US that led the coalition. On the other hand, it demanded to take part in the operations in Somalia. It also stood for an armed operation to solve the Yugoslavian crisis by force and forgot its main principle never to resort to acts of violence. The AGP partly stuck to its manifesto and it partly left the path of peaceful and

non-violent intervention it promoted therein. During the whole period it had to balance on a borderline.

5.2.3 Austria's third Period from 2009 – 2010²²⁴

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
5.1 Cyprus 1964, Austrian Law to Conduct International Operations, Amendment of the Austrian Defence Law	
5.2 Austria as a member of the Security Council 5.2.1 Austria's First Period from 1973 – 1974 5.2.2 Austria's Second Period from 1991 – 1992 a) The Kuwait crisis b) The Yugoslavia crisis from 1991 onwards 5.2.3 Austria's Third Period from 2009 – 2010	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 2

Finally, Austria was elected for a third period – from 2009 to 2010. Although this membership in the UN SC was not in second phase of Austrian security policy, it is analysed in this chapter because of the connection to the other periods. In 2009 the number of resolutions was 87; 83 of them were adopted by consensus. In 2010, the number of 58 resolutions was passed; 52 resolutions were voted with “Yes” by all members, three resolutions were passed despite one or two “No” votes, three were passed despite abstentions. Again in 2010, Austria voted always with the majority “Yes“. Therefore, Austria voted in both years always with “Yes,“ no matter which country stood in abstention or voted “No”. In each case, Austria voted in solidarity with the international community represented by the UN SC, thus following the main principle that there could not be any neutrality in UN matters.

In 2008, when Austria applied for membership in the UN SC, elections to the NC took place, and on 3rd December 2008, the new Federal Chancellor Faymann reported to the NC in his proclamation of the coalition government consisting of ASDP and APP²²⁵. Regarding questions on international policy it mentioned the European unification project and that Austria had always aspired for membership in the EU. The federal government stood for a strong Austria in a strong unified Europe. For those reasons, the Austrian federal government stood for strong Austrian Armed Forces and their tasks to protect neutrality and sovereignty, to the military's defence of

²²⁴ The period of Austria as a member to the UN SC lasted from 2009 – 2010 but the debate on that was extended until March 2011.

²²⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0006/imfname_146399.pdf, 21 11 2010.

the homeland, assistance to the ministry of Interior and military participation in case of disaster relief. Another key task was participation in international peace operations under the framework of European and international mandates. Therefore, the federal government stood for international peace support operations on the basis of the Austrian constitutional laws, which was in accordance with the UN-Charter. Any message on a mission of Austria in the UN SC for the next two years was missing although Austria was already elected by the UN GA. In the proclamation there was a passage with the affirmation of the conscript system with a duration of at least six months. About two years later, in October 2010, that affirmation was put into question by the Minister of Defence, who declared to promote a professional military system for the future. The Federal Chancellor backed that idea, whereas the ministers of the APP, the coalition partner, were against that development. The discussion about the system of the Austrian Armed Forces is still going on; the ASDP left in that case its manifesto in a clear way so it seems that that new step was caused by an important regional election at Vienna, which the ASDP wanted to win by that step.

On 3rd December 2008, the proclamation of the government was discussed in the NC. To give a better overview of the issues and arguments they are listed in a table relating also the issues of the manifestos.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP	AAF
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, no neutralism, Active on CFSP,	Monopoly of use of force, Solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Neutrality as dominant guidance, ESDP – Petersberg Tasks	Monopoly of violence, military peace operations	ECFSP, ESDP
Issues of the debate on 3 rd 12. 2008 ²²⁶	Offensive policy on Europe, challenge on the membership in the UN SC	Urged a co-designing on politics in the UN SC, the UN and the OSCE, active neutrality policy, Austrian Armed Forces to forces of peace, European Battle Groups, forced the conscript system	EU was not practising peace project, leave EURATOM by a vote,	Critics of EUFOR Chad/RCA	Criticism of the assistance on the Austrian border, low budget
Issues of the debate in the plenary on 26 th 5. 2009 ²²⁷	Mentioned the coordination with the other European partners in the UN SC, showed its solidarity,	Importance of the participation in UN operations, prestige of Austria in NATO for peace operations,	Criticism of the high costs of the Austrian membership in the EU and UN, reduce the UN missions because of low efficiency	Higher budget for active foreign policy	
Issues of the question hour on 17 th 6. 2009 ²²⁸	Coordinated with EU presidency, France and Great Britain,				Criticism of the UN ambassador's vote not to condemn the Israeli settlement policy
Issues of the debate on the Report on Foreign Policy 2008 on 19 th 11. 2009 ²²⁹	Reach improvements in human rights and the rights of women and children	Solution of the Slovenia-Croatian conflict	Stronger advocacy for human rights for South Tyrol,		A more efficient CFSP, better protection for soldiers in UN operations
Issues of the debate on the Report on Foreign Policy 2009 on 18 th 11. 2010 ²³⁰	International terrorist networks, improvement of humanitarian aid, freedom of religious activities, and improvement of the protection of the civil population in armed conflicts, crisis on Gaza strip	Demanded further work on the topics,		Shrinking of the foreign policy budget	More robust mandates for UN operations

Table 5.2.3.1: Overview of the issues of the debates on the policy in the UN SC

²²⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00006/fname_146399.pdf, 21 11 2010

²²⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0023/imfname_168044.pdf, 21 11 2010

²²⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0027/imfname_168704.pdf, 21 11 2010

²²⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0046/imfname_179601.pdf, 21 11 2010

²³⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0085/imfname_203848.pdf, 27 04 2011.

A third term of Austrian membership in the UN SC was discussed for the first time within the framework of the proclamation of the new government. The two governing parties (APP and ASDP) stressed the challenge and the integration into the different collective security systems. The AFP criticized strongly the proclamation in general and brought up the lack of security measures in the EU. The AGP and the AAF criticized specific issues. All parties stuck to their manifestos. A special case was the Minister of Defence and Sports Darabos of the ASDP. He praised the conscript system of the Austrian Armed Forces, and two years later he stood for a professional army – a clear case of change of mind because of political expediency.

During the next debate on that issue on 26th May 2009, the APP stressed the coordination with the EU partner countries and the solidarity of Austria. The ASDP emphasized the importance of international operations. The AFP argued against EU and UN membership although the ESDP and the Petersberg Tasks were in its manifesto, another turnaround to gain an advantage in daily politics. The AGP demanded more money in foreign policy.

In the debate on 17th June 2009, the AGP argued against the position taken by the Austrian UN ambassador, which was rejected by the Foreign Minister.

The last two debates concerning the membership in the UN SC took place during the Reports on Foreign Policy for the years 2008 and 2009. Those debates took place in November of the following year. The APP and the ASDP stressed the efforts and the successes. Even the critics of the opposing parties began emphasizing the efforts to hold a seat in the UN SC.

At last Foreign Minister Spindelegger delivered a positive summary of the membership in the UN SC on 1st March 2011.²³¹ Austria had concentrated on the enforcement of international law for instance during the Gaza crisis or in the situation in Somalia. Also the protection of the civil population was implemented by UN SC resolution 1894. That was very important especially for women and children. Additionally the enforcement of security in international operations was reached by revitalisation of the 10 years old UN SC resolution 1325. Another aim was the strengthening of the UN site of Vienna and the EU in general. Many countries had praised the cautious activities of Austria in the UN SC and the reputation of Austria was raised again. The next plan of Austrian foreign policy was to reach a membership in the UN Humanitarian Law Council, because Austria had developed into a hub of international peace activities. The ASDP praised the activities in the UN SC and mentioned the generally positive foreign policy. During the debate the AFP warned that Austria was being smoothly integrated into NATO and expressed

²³¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0096/imfname_211492.pdf, 27 04 2011.

its concern about the loss of neutrality. It criticized the participation in the EU battle groups and demanded to participate in UN operations only by strict preservation of neutrality. All these tasks could only be fulfilled while retaining the conscript system in Austria. The AFP made a turnaround in its understanding of neutrality in comparison to the years before 2005. In 2005 the new manifesto stressed the adherence to a CFSP but only under the restrictions of neutrality policy. That turnaround in the debate was backed by the new manifesto that was fundamentally different from the policy the AFP had practised and demanded before that turnaround.

5.2.4 Summary of the Austrian Memberships in the UN SC

In general it seems to be clear that the number of resolutions increased after the end of the Cold War. Also the approval ratio increased during the last 20 years, approximately 90 percent of the resolutions were passed in consensus. Only in exceptional cases did some nations abstain. That circumstance depends probably on the intensive preparation process of negotiation and consultations before a move is presented in the UN SC. Another reason could be the decrease of antagonism between the western world and Russia or China. It was astonishing that there were no votes with "No" during the Cold War and these possibilities of voting appeared in the last 20 years. The underlying reason was probably that moves with probable "No" results had not been voted during the Cold War because of the bilateral world order. With the end of that system, some non-permanent members, like Cuba, Zimbabwe, Yemen, or Turkey, were not asked before a motion or could not be convinced to abstain. Therefore, they opposed certain motions.

Switzerland has not been member of the UN SC because of the short time of membership (for 8 years) in the UN. The voting of the neutral countries in general showed the following picture:

The four neutral European countries tried to negotiate and to mediate before a motion led to a resolution. The four countries have voted nearly almost with the majority (with "Yes") over all periods these countries were in the UN SC. That voting kept predictable unattached to voting of the permanent members of the UN SC; one may say it was independent of political influence from the global or regional powers. The sole exemption to that "rule" was the voting of Finland in the period of 1968 to 1970. Finland stood in abstention for two resolutions towards Namibia together with the US, maybe an example of independence towards the big neighbour USSR during the period of the Cold War.

It should be mentioned that the neutral countries by their consistent voting behaviour of „Yes“ in nearly all matters showed a neutral policy towards the promoters of moves. Therefore, the neutral countries showed a neutrality policy in the UN SC towards each group of promoters of moves. The neutral countries conducted two resolutions towards the addressees and backed it by e.g. contributing troops to UN operations. There was no neutralism towards the addressee of a resolution following the principle that there exists no neutrality after a resolution has passed the UN SC.²³² By that research the opinion of some of the experts was rebutted that usually in security affairs a neutral country acts like someone who jumps on the bandwagon.²³³ At last, if you look on the voting in the UN SC and on the conducting of measures and mandates by neutral countries, that opinion is proved to be untrue.

²³² United Nations, Die Charta der Vereinten Nationen mit Völkerbundsatzung IGH-Statut und zwei UNO-Resolutionen, 7. neu bearbeitete Auflage, Verlag C.H.Beck, München 1979, Chapter XVI, § 103.

²³³ Hummer, Beistandspflicht, Neutralität, Solidarität, within Kernic Franz/Hauser Gunther (Hrsg.), Handbuch zur europäischen Sicherheit, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin/Bern/Bruxelles/New York/Oxford/Wien, 2005, p. 121.

Chapter 6 – Case Studies and Framework Conditions in Period 3

The 3rd period lasts from the EU membership until the March 2011. It starts with the main changes in Austrian security policy, the membership in the EU and NATO-PfP. Shortly after those steps, Austria took part into international operations led by NATO, which were authorized by the UN. At last, Austria participated in the EU-led EUFOR Chad/RCA, which had a robust mandate.

6.1. Framework Condition – EU-Membership, Relations with WEU and Membership in NATO-PfP

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations to WEU and Membership to NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The Failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

The membership in the EU became the biggest change in Austrian foreign policy because of the subsequent development of the CSDP. This step of Austria had a deep impact on Austrian neutrality policy, which will be explained later on. But first back to the beginning of that process: Soon after becoming independent, a majority of the Austrian politicians were convinced that European integration could be a big advantage for the economic prosperity of Austria. Therefore, Austria concluded a customs agreement with the European Coal and Steel Community. In summer 1956 Austrian politicians started to talk about joining that organisation. It was one of the main organisations which became part of the European Economic Community (EEC), which was founded in 1957. After the USSR crushed the Hungarian uprising in October 1956, the Austrian

government became more cautious.²³⁴

The USSR criticised those efforts strongly and Italy also vetoed negotiations because of the South Tyrol problem in the following years. Austria had to accept the disappointment of its wishes for membership in the EEC and 1972; a Free Trade Agreement was concluded. By the mid 1980s the global situation slowly began to change. The USSR weakened its strictly “No” policy and on the other hand the EEC began a deeper integration process. Austria had to decide whether or not it would apply to integrate into the internal market of the EEC. On 28th January 1987, two years before the change of 1989 happened, the federal government decided to take part in the internal market and on 3rd February 1987 the AMC passed the relevant decision. After it was clear that only members of the EEC would have all necessary rights, the Austrian government had to decide what to do. After a working group had given a positive report the Austrian NC passed a decision on 29th June 1989 to mandate the federal government to apply for membership in the EEC. On 17th July 1989, the Austrian Foreign Minister Mock handed over the application for membership in the EEC to the French Presidency of the European Council, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. In that letter the Austrian neutrality status was explicitly noted and that became a problem later on. On 28th July 1989, the current 12 members of EEC agreed on accession negotiations with Austria, but it took an additional three and a half years to start the negotiations. On 1st February 1993, the negotiations with Austria, Finland, and Sweden were officially opened. During the negotiations from 1993 to 1994 the three countries had to abandon the reservation of neutrality. The EEC demanded from the three countries assurances that after their accession to the EEC these states would execute a future Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), which appeared only as a thought in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.²³⁵ Therefore, in the accession treaty Austrian neutrality was not mentioned any more. This development meant a clear departure from the previous line of neutrality policy back to the route of a core neutrality policy which meant neutrality in case of war. Concretely this meant:

1. no participation in wars,
2. no bases or barracks of foreign troops on Austrian soil, and
3. no delivery of weapons or any transport and supply of weapons through Austria to a party in any war.

²³⁴ Paul Luif, *Austrian Neutrality and the Europe of 1992*, in Bischof Günter/Pelinka Anton, *Austria in the new Europe*, Contemporary Austrian Studies, Volume 1, London/New Brunswick, 1993, p. 22.

²³⁵ Luif Paul, *On the Road to Brussels, The political Dimension of Austria's, Finland's and Sweden's Accession to the European Union*, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Braumüller, Laxenburg, 1995, p. 87.

By the “avis definitive”²³⁶ on 6th May 1994, and after a national referendum on 12th June 1994, which agreed on the accession, the treaty of accession was signed on 24th June 1994 at Corfu. The treaty of accession and the necessary changes of the Federal Constitutional Law were proposed to the Austrian NC on 7th November 1994. On 11th November 1994, both were discussed in the NC. Before the discussion on the treaty and the laws started, the Federal Chancellor Vranitzky was questioned on the CFSP:²³⁷

In his answer to the questions Vranitzky mentioned the new possibilities for Austria to force peace by the CFSP. He welcomed the comprehensive approach of the CSFP and stressed that Austria could keep its neutrality because of the principle of consensus in the European Council of the EU. The CFSP was directed against violators of peace and it was a system of collective security similar to the UN or the OSCE.²³⁸ Therefore, it was possible for a neutral country to become member, he explained. After that statement the political parties had the opportunity to stress their positions. The ASDP called the membership a milestone in Austrian history and emphasized Austria’s place was in the EU, but neutrality was indispensable and a membership in NATO was unthinkable for them. It professed to be against violators of peace and for economic sanctions. The membership in NATO-PfP was one expression of solitarian neutrality, a completely new approach. Those positions were compatible with the party manifesto because it said that Austria with its armed neutrality should not ride on the bandwagon of any security system.²³⁹ The APP stated that the aim of its manifesto of 1951 was finally reached by the membership in EU. Neutrality had only a restricted function and should be re-evaluated if a new security system were created. The membership in NATO-PfP was a clear aim of the party; next, the relations towards WEU and NATO had to be clarified. The AFP doubted the reliability of the government on the topic of neutrality and stressed that only NATO was able to guarantee Austrian security and therefore neutrality had to be given up. That was a clear deviation from the party manifesto of 1968, which considered neutrality as the main basis of Austrian security.²⁴⁰ In the manifesto of 1985 the AFP had not mentioned accession to the EU and the manifesto of 1968

²³⁶ After closing the negotiations for accession, the European Commission sends the „avis definitive“ to the applying country. In this document the positive finalisation of the negotiations is granted.

²³⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0004/imfname_141717.pdf, 07. 05. 2011.

²³⁸ The OCSE was founded 1994 by the current CSCE members at its conference in Budapest and is the successor organization of the CSCE.

²³⁹ Kernic Franz, Parteien und Bundesheer, Quellen zur Stellung der österreichischen politischen Parteien zu Fragen der Landesverteidigung seit 1955, Wien, IMS/LVak, Wien 1988, Parteien, p. 20.

²⁴⁰ Kernic Franz, Die freiheitliche Wehrpolitik in der zweiten Republik, Studie zur Wehrprogrammatisierung und –politik des VdU und der FPÖ von 1949 bis 1986, phil. Diss, Wien, 1987, p. 98.

was the one to justify their voting.²⁴¹ The AGP demanded that Austria should play a mediation function in security policy and was very anxious about an increase of the military budget caused by the EU membership. The FSP had to be compatible with neutrality, it demanded. At last the AGP too voted together with the APP and ASDP to pass the treaty. The AGP had not fixed its position to the EU in its manifesto. During the preparation of the poll it was against membership but stated that it would accept the results as the will of the people. Therefore, it voted also to pass the treaty.

On 30th November, the Federal Chancellor Vranitzky gave the proclamation of the government programme. On security policy and EU membership it said (translation by the author):

” In the year 1995 we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, the neutrality law and the departure of the last foreign troops. On the same day we celebrate the birth of Austria as we know it today. That step (membership in the EU) is also the logical continuation of the idea of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, the enlargement of the Austrian scope of action. Only the participation in the European unification process allows a state in our days to maintain some manoeuvre space in a Europe which moves together. In the field of the CFSP Austria will stand for the creation of a European Peace System. Austria as a neutral state will contribute as an active and solidary player. The participation in WEU as a monitoring state seems to be a congenial addition. To strengthen the power of UN and OSCE the federal government will contribute on reforms of these important institutions. Additionally for the Austrian way to be successful it is necessary to participate in international operations of the UN and the OSCE. A next intent for the future will be the participation in NATO-PfP. The Austrian contribution to that organization will concentrate on peace-keeping operations, humanitarian activities, and disaster relief.”²⁴²

In the following debate the APP discussed the new order of peace in Europe. The AGP criticized

²⁴¹ Kadan/ Albert Pelinka Anton, Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien, Dokumentation und Analyse, Niederösterreichisches Pressehaus, St. Pölten, 1979, pp. 212-216.

²⁴² „So feiern wir im Jahre 1995 mit dem Jahrestag von Staatsvertrag, Neutralitätsgesetz und Abzug der letzten ausländischen Truppen den 40. Geburtstag des Österreichs, wie wir es heute kennen...Dieser Schritt (der EU – Beitritt, der Verfasser) ist auch die logische Fortsetzung der Idee des Staatsvertrags von 1955, nämlich die Erweiterung unseres vollen souveränen Handlungsspielraums. Nur die Teilnahme am europäischen Einigungsprozeß erlaubt es einem Staat heutzutage, seine Handlungsfähigkeit in einem immer enger zusammenrückenden Europa wirklich zu erhalten. Im Bereich der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik werden wir uns dafür einsetzen, eine Europäische Friedensordnung zu schaffen. Österreich wird als neutraler Staat aktiv und solidarisch an ihr mitwirken. Die Teilnahme als Beobachter bei der Westeuropäischen Union bildet dazu eine sinnvolle Ergänzung. Um die Schlagkraft der Vereinten Nationen und der KSZE auch für die Zukunft zu erhalten beziehungsweise dort, wo sie möglicherweise verlorengegangen ist, wiederherzustellen, wird die österreichische Bundesregierung aktiv an der Reform und Stärkung dieser wichtigen multilateralen Einrichtungen mitwirken. Zu unserem bisher schon sehr erfolgreichen Weg gehört auch die weitere österreichische Teilnahme an internationalen Friedensmissionen sowohl der Vereinten Nationen als auch der KSZE. Ein weiteres Vorhaben für die nächste Zukunft wird die Teilnahme Österreichs an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden sein. Der österreichische Beitrag wird sich auf peace-keeping- und humanitäre Aktionen sowie auf Katastrophenhilfeeinsätze konzentrieren.“

http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0009/imfname_141722.pdf, 07. 05. 2011.

the intention to conduct peace-keeping operations under NATO command and control, because that was the exclusive prerogative of the UN. This point of view changed within the next year in connection with the operations in Bosnia. The AFP stressed its goal to become a member of NATO.

At last the laws on membership in the EU and the changes of the constitutional laws were passed on 15th December 1994²⁴³ The ASDP mentioned again the connection between solidarity and neutrality by the CFSP. The APP declared that the participation in the CFSP did not touch the core part of neutrality, because the treaty did not mention an obligation to support all measures conducted under it. The AGP insisted on its rejection of a membership in WEU or NATO. The AFP voted against the treaty and the necessary constitutional laws.

On 17th January 1995, foreign and security policy questions were discussed on the occasion of a declaration of Foreign Minister Mock. All parties reasserted their positions on foreign and security policy questions on 10th February 1995 the Austrian Foreign Minister Mock signed the membership in NATO-PfP. During the rest of the year 1995, there were several debates on security policy in the NC. To give an overview of the issues of the debates, they are listed and related to the issues of the manifestos.

²⁴³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0011/imfname_106828.pdf, 07. 05. 2011.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All types of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Disarmament, good offices, no neutralism, contribution to peace, comprehensive defence neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ²⁴⁴	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Aactive neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate on 4 th 4. 1995 ²⁴⁵	Impact by monitoring status in WEU and NATO-PfP	No reason to give up neutrality, no membership to NATO or WEU, active UN policy	Ccriticism of differences in the government related to NATO; WEU, neutrality, co-operative international security system for Europe by NATO,	Missing line of government, engagement for UN activities, standing for neutrality
Issues raised in the actual hour on 1 st 6. 1995 ²⁴⁶	Neutrality, opposition to the timetable in EU matters, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, training and peace-keeping is planned for NATO-PfP		Questions on NATO-PfP, EU intergovernmental conference	
Issues of the debate on 23 rd 6. 1995 ²⁴⁷	Achievements of the UN, participation of Austria in peace operations	Vienna as a cite of the UN	Changes of the neutrality, importance of peace operations	Importance of the UN for the peace in the world
Issues of the debate on security policy on 14 th 7. 1995 ²⁴⁸	Conduct peace operations under the umbrella of NATO-PfP	EU to force a common security, membership in NATO was unthinkable	Membership in NATO and WEU,	
Issues of the debate on the preparation of the conference of governments on 16 th 11. 1995 ²⁴⁹	Move away of the neutrality, wanted to pass a law on solidarity,	Only membership to NATO-PfP and the monitoring status in WEU, no abandoning of neutrality	Not be neutral any more, membership to NATO	Fears of the militarization of the EU, membership of Austria in WEU and/or NATO

Table 6.1.1: Overview of the issues of the debates during the year 1995

In those debates the position of most of the political parties was the same as before. The ASDP was pro neutrality under the umbrellas of EU, OSCE, and UN but opposed against membership in NATO according to its manifesto. The AFP stood strongly for an application for NATO membership, which was contrary to its manifesto. The AGP was pro neutrality and critical towards EU, NATO, NATO-PfP and WEU, which was according to its programmatic approach. Only the APP changed back to more distance to NATO membership and conducted a more pragmatic policy to prepare favorable conditions in the coalition toward the ASDP. On the other hand that more pragmatic approach was better in line with its manifesto than the policy during the last years.

²⁴⁴ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressedienst, Wien, 1987, p. 36.

²⁴⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0031/imfname_141760.pdf, 07. 05. 2011.

²⁴⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00040/imfname_141767.pdf, 07. 05. 2010.

²⁴⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00042/imfname_141778.pdf, 07. 05. 2010.

²⁴⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00048/imfname_160766.pdf, 07. 05. 2010.

²⁴⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0057/imfname_141787.pdf, 07. 05. 2011.

6.2. Case Study – IFOR/SFOR Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) 1996

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations to WEU and Membership in
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

The IFOR/SFOR operations in BiH were the first operations Austria took part in under the command and control of NATO. Therefore, it was chosen as a case instead of the later ISAF operation. Nevertheless, both operations were authorized by an UN mandate. The aim of the case study is to analyse if the parties made any distinction between UN-led and NATO-led operations. At the end of the chapter, the SHIRBRIG's establishment (1996) and history of are discussed.

Austria had become member of the EU, as mentioned above, on 1st January 1995. Austria's membership in NATO-PfP in February 1996 led to a deeper integration into the security policy of the western world. NATO-PfP was founded during the summit of NATO heads of state and government from 10th to 11th January 1994. It was founded because of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. The main reasons for the establishment of the programme were the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace.²⁵⁰ It was founded with respect to the UN Charter and the documents of CSCE/OSCE.

In principle, NATO negotiates with each partner country an individual partnership programme. Therefore, there are no obligations which a neutral country could not subscribe to, and after a certain number of years all neutral European countries became member to NATO-PfP. The first countries to become member were Finland and Sweden on 9th May 1994, only some months after that organisation was founded. Austria became member on 10th February 1995 as the third neutral country and Switzerland followed on 11th December 1996. The last one of the neutral countries was Ireland, which became member on 1st December 1999. It can be stated that Austria followed

²⁵⁰ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm, p. 1, 08. 07. 2011.

two other neutral countries but it was a model in practising neutrality for Switzerland. Today it is a proven practice for neutral countries to train together and co-operate with NATO and non-NATO-partners under the umbrella of NATO-PfP. Under that umbrella also foreign troops are deployed for a certain time on the territory of neutral countries. That was an altogether new practice of neutrality policy.

Before the case study on IFOR/SFOR operations will be explained, a short summary and overview of the facts in BiH between 1992 and 1996 will be given. The civil war started in the year 1992, about half a year after the war in Croatia had begun. The UN Protection Force in Croatia (UNPROFOR) was extended to BiH, but it was not able to stop the struggle in either country until the summer of 1995. In August 1995, NATO started massive air strikes on the Serbian forces in BiH. Therefore, the conflict partners were forced to sign the peace treaty of Dayton (Ohio) in November 1995. The peace treaty implemented a military force to guarantee the treaty; the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) was mandated by UN SC. After that resolution was passed, troops and materiel of the participating countries were transported through the territory and the air space of Austria. Early in November 1995 NATO had asked officially whether or not Austria would participate in NATO-PfP operations which would be mandated by UN SC. Austria agreed on the condition a signed peace treaty and a UN SC resolution existed. Especially the ASDP demanded a UN SC mandate as a “*conditio sine qua non*“, whereas the APP would have participated also under other umbrellas like OSCE or EU or even NATO. The AFP was strictly against any participation because the Austrian Armed Forces did not have enough money for such an operation. After the signing of the Dayton Agreement on 22nd November 1995, the concrete planning for IFOR operations started. The necessary UN SC Resolution 1035 was passed on 21st December 1995.²⁵¹ After the resolution was passed, the first operation under command and control of NATO was no longer an issue in Austria. Beginning with 15th February 1996 the Austrian logistic contingent (AUSLOG/IFOR) was deployed to the area of operations. In 1996, the operation was renamed Stabilization Force (AUSLOG/SFOR) and was transformed into an EU operation, EUFOR ALTHEA, in 2004. In 2001, the Austrian contingent was withdrawn because of the lack of personnel, only staff personnel remained. The strength of the Austrian contingent had varied from 160 to 300 troops. Altogether 1851 Austrian troops in about ten rotations served in that mission. After SFOR was transformed into the follow-on EUFOR ALTHEA mission, Austria participated again. At the beginning the contingent was around 150

²⁵¹ <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/413/60/PDF/N9541360.pdf>, 02.06.2011.

military police personnel, then over the last two years Austria has deployed the largest contingent with approximately 370 troops. Austria has organised 15 rotations during the last seven years. As a whole, Austria participated in both mission by around 6700 troops.²⁵²

The operations were not discussed in the Austrian NC until the troops were deployed to the area of operations. With the deployment a discussion on participation under NATO command and control and neutrality started. The issues and dates of the different debates are listed in the following table:

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All types of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Good offices, comprehensive defence neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ²⁵³	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the urgent request on 28 th 2. 1996 ²⁵⁴ :	EU connected to NATO by WEU, membership to NATO-PfP enables Austria to cooperate,	Rejected membership to NATO or WEU, conscript systems remains, mandates by UN or OSCE	Appliance to NATO, untrusted security policy of Austria, professional armed forces	Agree on a collective security system
Issues of the debate on the proclamation on 13 th 3. 1996 ²⁵⁵ :and 14 th 3. 1996 ²⁵⁶	Peace operations under UN, OSCE, WEU or NATO command and control, EU security policy under UN umbrella	Active cooperation in the framework of NATO-PfP and OSCE, ESDP functioned under the umbrella of the UN-Charter,	Starving the military homeland defence, against the concentration on international operations	Cold reduction of neutrality
Issues of the debate on foreign affairs budget on 30 th 3. 1996 ²⁵⁷ :		Importance of neutrality 109atures European security system would be similar to membership to UN,	Strict observance of neutrality and international operations,	Demanded a membership to NATO
Issues of the debate on defence budget on 23 rd 4. 1996 ²⁵⁸ :	The change of neutrality , planned membership to WEU	Austria participates on international peace operations, humanitarian aid and disaster relief	High cost of the IFOR operations, full membership to WEU and NATO,	Neutrality as a pillar of the Austrian constitution

Table 6.2.1: Overview of the issues of the debates in the first half of the year 1996

²⁵² Schmidl A.Erwin, Going International, In the Service of Peace, Vehling, Graz, 2006, pp. 191 – 193.

²⁵³ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressdienst., 1987, p. 36.

²⁵⁴ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0008/imfname_114005.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

²⁵⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0010/imfname_114009.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

²⁵⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0011/imfname_114011.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

²⁵⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0029/imfname_141758.pdf, 07. 05. 2011.

²⁵⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0017/imfname_114023.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

During the next five months the discussion on neutrality and the relation of Austria to WEU and NATO went on. In general, the four parties stood to their manifestos but there was some movement on the government side. The APP did not force a NATO membership but tried to convince the ASDP on a future option of a NATO membership and the ASDP moved. For the first time, the proclamation of the government spoke of participation in an international operation led by another organisation than the UN. In July, the ASDP agreed on the changes in NATO towards a new NATO. On the other hand, the APP spoke of full membership to WEU which was not agreed by the ASDP and failed. The AFP urged NATO membership and criticized the costs of the international operations. But it had favoured a participation in the operations in Somalia, which failed later on. The AGP was concerned about a possible membership in NATO without a national referendum and criticized the erosion of neutrality.

During the following months there were two related debates in the NC. The issues are listed also in a table:

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Disarmament, good duties, No neutralism, Contribute to peace, comprehensive defence neutrality as basis for peace-keeping ²⁵⁹	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate on the Report on Foreign Policy on 20 th 9. 1996 ²⁶⁰	Peace project of the EU, freedom to interpret its neutrality practise, add solidarity to the UN or the EU to neutrality,	Broad initiatives of Austria in EU and UN, extension of Vienna as a site, the principle of consensus for Petersberg Tasks under the umbrella of the UN-Charter		Loss of the bridge function, demanded again a membership to NATO, demanded a national referendum after the Treaty of Amsterdam, no offensive military operations by the EU,
Issues of the debate on neutrality on 26 th 2. 1997 ²⁶¹ :	Neutrality had changed	Good practise of neutrality policy under the umbrella of the UN, new possibilities by NATO-PfP, NATO stayed a defence coalition	NATO becomes a security system, join as soon as possible, offer to the APP to reach that,	Membership to NATO-PfP was a violation of neutrality

Table 6.2.2: Overview of the issues of the security related debates in September 1996 and February 1997

²⁵⁹ Vranitzky Franz, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Franz Vranitzky, 28. Jänner 1987, Bundespressdienst., 1987, p. 36.

²⁶⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0038/imfname_114065.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

²⁶¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0063/imfname_114115.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

During those discussions the APP did not try to force a discussion on membership in NATO in preparation to convince the ASDP of new options. It explained the understanding for a cautious neutrality course, contrary to the policy before. But it stressed the new developments in NATO and mentioned also the Treaties with Russia and the Ukraine as a sign that NATO had become a security system. On the other hand, the APP stressed that Austria interpreted its neutrality policy and practice all by itself. It did not accept the offer of the AFP to reach a NATO membership together. The AGP was very concerned about the prospect of a looming membership in NATO and deplored the erosion of neutrality.

During the research on that case study it was interesting that the discussion on membership in certain security organisations went on with a fierce intensity but there was hardly any discussion on the concrete operations IFOR/SFOR despite the fact they were NATO-PfP operations. That showed the ambiguity of the discussion and the positions of the ASDP. On the one hand it opposed and warned against a NATO or WEU membership from a principle point of view, and on the other hand there was no criticism of the IFOR/SFOR operations in principle. The AFP expressed its regret that the Austrian Armed Forces would be starved to death by those operations, but demanded a quick membership in NATO. The AGP was firmly opposed to NATO, NATO-PfP, the Petersberg Tasks and the WEU, but it demanded participation in the operations in Somalia, which turned into a big disaster later on.

At the end of this chapter another step in the changing practices of neutrality should be explained, which was never discussed in the Austrian parliament, and that was the founding of and participation in SHIRBRIG. As we know, the UN had always suffered a lack of troops which could be deployed within a short time. Early in the 1960s the UN SG U'Thant asked the neutral countries to earmark troops for that purpose. Upon that demand the Nordic battalion, composed of Sweden, Denmark and Norway was founded and earmarked. In Austria in 1966 a battalion was raised. It was called and designated a UN training battalion, but it was never deployed. The Austrian contingents were always composed of troops drawn from various battalions all over the country. As it was, the problem stayed the same, and most of the troops needed a long time to be alerted and trained.

According to the UN Charter Article 43 all members of the United Nations have to undertake to

make their services available to the Security Council, on its call.²⁶² Therefore, the time had come to raise a force in accordance with the recommendation of the UN SG Kofi Annan. In the year 1994 the UN created a data base for all troops that could be deployed on a mandate of UN SC, the "United Nations Standby Arrangement System" (UNSAS).²⁶³ On 15th December 1996, Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden founded SHIRBRIG – Standby High Readiness Brigade, which had its headquarters near Copenhagen. The Nordic battalion was integrated into that brigade. In 1997 Kofi Annan installed the planning element as a core part of a brigade headquarters. In the beginning of the year 2000, SHIRBRIG reported its readiness to be deployed to the UN SG. Meanwhile, the members had increased up to 14: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Argentine defined its membership as a dormant one and the following countries were monitors, but sent troops for military exercises: Chile, Croatia, Egypt, Jordanian, Latvia, Portugal and Senegal. In principle, SHIRBRIG could be deployed all over the world, with a reaction time of 15 to 30 days. After 6 months UN should have enough time to install usual peace support operations and SHIRBRIG could be withdrawn. The first operations of SHIRBRIG were the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) from November 2000 until June 2001. The SHIRBRIG missions were located on the African continent. The reasons for that is explained by the fact that during those years UN activities concentrated on the African continent, whereas the other crisis areas were in the focus of other security systems like NATO. Another reason was that Africa was in the focus of the European countries, which were the dominating SHIRBRIG countries. Despite the fact that SHIRBRIG had shown the workability of the concept and that it was the first and only truly multinational, permanent UN combat unit dedicated to Chapter VI and VII²⁶⁴, it was dissolved by 30th June 2009. The reason was the new Battle Group Concept of the EU and the NATO Response Forces Concept, which made it impossible for the European countries to earmark troops additionally to SHIRBRIG. Austria contributed to SHIRBRIG mainly by deploying Officers and NCOs for the headquarters. Troops in strength more than a company were not deployed. At the end of SHIRBRIG Austria had the honour to delegate the chief of staff, the highest position Austria had in SHIRBRIG. As a summary it can be stated, that the founding of SHIRBRIG was in a line with earmarking troops to

²⁶² <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>, 09 07 2011.

²⁶³ Rosenzopf Georg, Das war SHIRBRIG, <http://www.shirbrig.dk>, 17. 10. 2010.

²⁶⁴ Koops Joachim, UN SHIRBRIG and EU Battlegroups, The Oxford Council on Good Governance, www.oxfordgovernance.org, 09 07 2011, p. 4

UN operations. But to deploy own troops in the headquarters of a multinational brigade was a new aspect of practising neutrality related to UN. Because at least four of the five neutral European countries did the same, it can be stated that it became a proven practice for neutral countries. Switzerland did not join SHIRBRIG at all, maybe because it became UN member in late 2002, and it did not follow the model of the other neutral European countries as it did in conducting UN peace-support operations or UN membership. Austria again had abandoned the Swiss model (if that still existed).

6.3. Case Study – KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations to WEU and Membership in NATO-PPF
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

The case of Kosovo was chosen partly because it is still an on-going operation. But the main reason was that before the operation was authorized by the UN NATO had already flown air strikes against Serbia. That was heavily discussed in Austria and these discussions were extended to the operation KFOR. At the beginning a short overview of the historical situation is given, followed by an analysis of the discussions on the operation.

Yugoslavia had been constituted by Josip Broz Tito, the founder of the State after WW II in 1974 by uniting five republics (Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia) and two autonomous regions of Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The idea to establish these two regions was to strike a balance between the nations of Yugoslavia. That was based on experience after the First World War (WW I). There had been strong tensions between the Serbs and the Albanian population during the 1980s, but after suspension of the autonomy by Slobodan Milosevic the Albanians of Kosovo organised an underground movement and wrote their own constitution in

1992. On 24th May 1992, elections were held in Kosovo but Serbs did not recognize them. Because of the ongoing suppression of the Albanians in Kosovo an underground army (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves – UCK) was established and began a resistance struggle. The Serbian counter-insurgency operations lead to more fighting and after some heavy clashes in autumn 1998 the Serbian police and military forces began to expel the Albanian people²⁶⁵. On 10th January 1999, the Serbian forces were accused perpetrating a massacre at Racak. The negotiations of Rambouillet²⁶⁶ failed in February 1999 and in the aftermath the expulsion of the Albanian people intensified, NATO decided to start air attacks on the Serbian Forces and Belgrade. After two months of bombing, Belgrade withdrew its troops from Kosovo and a NATO-led UN-mandated protection force (KFOR) was established.²⁶⁷ It was the first time that a security system was brought into action without a mandate of UN SC and referring to humanitarian law. NATO argued that it had to protect the Albanian people against genocide and therefore it started its bombing campaign.

The first overview is given on the issues of the debates prior to the KFOR operations. They stressed the situation in Kosovo and the support of Austria to NATO during that time:

²⁶⁵ The Serbian politicians argued that the situation in Kosovo was an inner-state problem of Serbia. UN SC resolution 1199 spoke of violence towards the Albanian people in Kosovo.

²⁶⁶ Between the US, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia on the one side and Serbia on the other side.

²⁶⁷ Truppendienst, Militäroperationen und Partisanenkampf in Südosteuropa, Vom Berliner Kongress zum Ende Jugoslawiens, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Truppendienst, Astoria, Wien, 2009, pp. 417-420.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Monopoly of use of force ,to UN, solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate on Kosovo on 21 st 4. 1999 ²⁶⁸ :	EU tried to mediate by a Comprehensive Approach, NATO air raids were necessary, backing the five points plan, contribute troops to an UN peace support operation, no neutrality to peace breakers	Backed the five points programme of the UN ²⁶⁹ , humanitarian camp in Albania ,a stabilization conference in Vienna, still neutral, no flights of NATO except to support SFOR, postpone neutrality for five years	CFSP did only rudimentary work, mentioned the genocide, backed the NATO air raids, membership in NATO would be more honest	Immediate armistice, breach of neutrality law, demanded an UN peace operation, operations of NATO were illegal
Issues of the debate on the Report o Foreign Affairs on 19th 5. 1998 ²⁷⁰	War was the last resort in politics, wanted to explore all options for Austrian future security policy, strengthening of the ESDP, take part also in the military tasks of WEU/EU,	Criticized especially the pro NATO arguments, accused APP to join NATO after the elections,	Neutrality was dead, dishonesty of the government, lost its trustworthiness, neutrality and solidarity were not compatible	Immediate armistice in Kosovo, pursue neutrality

Table 6.3.1: Overview of the issues of the debates in April and May 1999

During the end of the air campaign on Serbia a big debate began regarding the consequences for Austria. The AGP demanded a moratorium of NATO accession to hinder the operation of ground troops. It accused the Austrian government of backing the bombing which was a breach of international and neutrality law. The AGP stood by its line that all fighting was condemnable. According to its manifesto, a UN operation was demanded. On the other side, the AFP insisted on joining NATO because CFSP had flailed. It pointed to the contradiction between the permission of overflights for SFOR and the Austrian soldiers acting under NATO command and control in Albania on the one hand, and the prohibition of NATO flights into Kosovo on the other. Therefore, it would be more honest to join NATO. It stood by its demand for joining NATO despite the fact that this was not contained in its manifesto.

The APP underlined the actual difficulties of being a member state of EU and being neutral as well. Neutrality aimed at negotiations but at the moment Austria stood between conducting measures of the EU and the wish for neutral mediation. It demanded to explore all options for the future of Austrian security policy. This point was brought up due to the failure of the Options

²⁶⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0165/imfname_114319.pdf, 21. 11. 2010.

²⁶⁹ The Treaty of Rambouillet was meant by that plan.

²⁷⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0169/imfname_114327.pdf, 21. 11. 2010.

Report a year before, which will be discussed in the next chapter. A European peace system was only thinkable within WEU and NATO, and it noted that the other neutral members of EU took a similar position. The manifesto of the ASDP pointed to the monopoly of use of force exclusive to UN. Therefore, the ASDP backed the five points programme of the UN,²⁷¹ and announced its resolve to contribute to future UN peace operations in accordance with the APP. It made clear that all NATO overflights of Austrian air space were conducted to support SFOR. Finally it accused the APP of preparing to join NATO after the elections.

The next phase of the debate began in June 1999 after establishing a UN-NATO-led peace operation by UN Resolution 1244 on 10th June.²⁷² The issues of the debates are listed in the following table:

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Monopoly of use of force, to UN, solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate on 16 th 6. 1999 ²⁷³ :	UN Resolution 1244 was voted even by Russia, NATO was acting on demand of UN	Restore peace in Kosovo, stressed the legality of the operations, rejected any plan to join NATO, guarantees to keep neutrality	Government slowly abandoned neutrality, EU became a military coalition, danger for the Austrian soldiers, criticized both operations	UN Resolution sanctions in violation of international law, rejected the participation in the KFOR mission, erosion of neutrality
Issues of the debate on security affairs on 13 th 7. 1999 ²⁷⁴	International honesty on the Austrian soldiers, Swiss contingent for the AUCON/KFOR, conscript armed forces	Conscript armed forces,	Criticized the high number of current international operations, armed forces of professional soldiers, European security system	Importance of neutral professional armed forces
Issues of the debate on EU and neutrality on 26 th 1. 2000 ²⁷⁵ :	Importance of Article 23f ²⁷⁶ on a solitary EU policy, neutrality was developed, peac-support operations only under the umbrella of an international organisation	Validity of the neutrality law, no options to join NATO,	Austria had not pursued neutrality according to the Swiss model, neutrality was full of loopholes like a Swiss cheese, to join NATO	National referendum on neutrality and membership in NATO, neutrality had been eroded

Table 6.3.2: Overview of the issues of the debates in June 1999, July 1999 and January 2000

²⁷¹ The Treaty of Rambouillet was meant by that plan.

²⁷² <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>, 22. 08. 2011.

²⁷³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0174/imfname_114327.pdf, 21. 11. 2010.

²⁷⁴ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0179/imfname_114347.pdf, 21. 11. 2010.

²⁷⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0006/imfname_114367.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁷⁶ It will be discussed in the next chapter 6.1.1.

The genesis of the KFOR operations was as follows: Early on 15th February 1999, Austria was asked if it would participate in an UN operation. There was a decision by the AMC on 9th March 1999 and after the formal request of the UN SG on 9th June 1999 the decision was immediately implemented. On 14th June 1999, it was decided to send an infantry battalion with an approximate strength of 450-500 troops. The UN sided with the threatened people on the one hand, and on the other hand a peace conference on new Yugoslavia was organised. The Austrian Contingent had certain difficulties to integrate and to fulfil all tasks. The first contingent had certain restrictions in the mandate given by the Austrian government because of Austrian neutrality. The second contingent's mandate was extended, so the contingent could at last fulfil all necessary tasks. The Austrian contingent is a mechanized battalion with APC and even some long range weapons, but no tanks at all. Additionally a Swiss contingent of a maximum of 220 troops has been integrated into the Austrian Contingent. Also a Slovak engineer platoon was integrated until 2002. The participation of the Austrian and Swiss troops is still ongoing. Since 1999, Austria has participated with approximately 15.000 troops, in 25 rotations.²⁷⁷

The core discussion on the operations emphasized the arguments of the first phase. The AGP criticized heavily the operations and did not stick to its manifesto because it did not accept the legality of UN-mandated operations. The second key point was the demand to conduct a national vote on security policy (NATO or not). The demand for professional forces was an old demand and the party stuck to its manifesto on that issue. The APP stressed the importance of ESDP and of acting in solidarity with the international community. The compatibility of the operations was shown by the integration of a Swiss contingent into the Austrian force. Suddenly the APP stressed the Swiss model because it fitted. It had no problems to adhere to its manifesto. It also backed the plan to introduce an obligation of common defence for the EU. The ASDP emphasized that in the ESDP there were plans to introduce an article-five-duty like in the WEU Treaty. The CFSP could also be conducted with military force under Article 51 of the UN Charter and therefore the ASDP strictly rejected any plan to join NATO. As a consequence, the ASDP guaranteed to keep neutrality and not to discuss its core meaning. After the ASDP had become an opposition party it stressed the validity of the neutrality law and that there were no options to join NATO. But the ASDP backed the legality of the operations during the whole period.

During this period the AFP changed direction twice: In June 1999, it was anxious that the

²⁷⁷ Schmidl A.Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vehling, Graz, 2006, pp. 191 – 193.

integration of WEU into EU could militarise the EU. For a short time, the AFP changed from a pro-NATO-membership party to an advocate of neutrality. In January 2000, after becoming a governing party, it demanded that Austria should honestly give up neutrality, because it was as full of holes like a Swiss cheese.

To close this chapter a last point has to be emphasized: Switzerland joined the UN on 10th September 2000. Prior to that Switzerland had joined NATO-PfP on 11th December 1996, two steps which were done pursuing the Austrian model.

6.4. Framework Condition – Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011

These framework conditions cover the development of the Austrian strategies on security after the accession to the EU. It includes four sub chapters: *the Options Report, the Security Doctrine, the Comprehensive Security Provisions, and finally the Security Strategy*. The documents and the political discussions in the NC around these documents covering neutrality, solidarity, international operations, and the system of the Austrian Armed Forces are analysed following the historical approach. The documents depend on each other and have their own history. It was necessary to analyse even a failed report because it was the starting point for the Security Doctrine. Most of the issues of the failed Options Report were integrated into the Security Doctrine. Therefore, it seemed advisable to analyse the debates on that report as well.

6.4.1. The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations with WEU and Membership in NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 5.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

After the conference of governments at Amsterdam (Treaty of Amsterdam) the Austrian government decided to develop an Options Report on Austrian security policy. That report was written after the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed and before the Kosovo crisis arose. Because of its direct connections to the security strategy it is discussed after the case study on Kosovo. As mentioned before, the ESDP got more and more substance and therefore the discussions on how to deal with it gained intensity. The ASDP-APP coalition government proclaimed at the beginning of its session to develop an Options Report on Austrian security policy on 11th March 1996 and to discuss it in the NC during the first quarter of 1998²⁷⁸. The time frame was determined by the fact that in the second half of 1998 Austria would take over the EU presidency for the first time and therefore the government wanted to clarify its positions on security policy. The report was discussed on the level of officials but at the end of the year 1997 the draft versions drawn up by the experts of the ministry of defence (which was led by the APP) and those of the federal chancellery (which was led by the ASDP) could not come to an agreement on whether or not an option to join NATO should be mentioned in the paper. Thus, the report was neither finished nor was it presented to the NC. The APP published its draft informally and used that report as a basis to develop the national security strategy together with the AFP after the coalition changed in 2000. In spring 1998, the political parties discussed those matters in the plenary of the NC over several days. An overview of the issues is listed in the following table. The table covers the debates prior to the ratification debate on the Treaty of Amsterdam. That debate will be analysed afterwards.

²⁷⁸ **Schneider Heinrich**, Der Sicherheitspolitische "Optionenbericht" der österreichischen Bundesregierung: Ein Dokument, das es nicht gibt – und ein Lehrstück politischen Scheiterns, <http://www.bmlv.gv.at>, 08. 07. 2011, p. 4.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Monopoly of use of force to UN, solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues of the debate on changes in the Defence Law on 26 th 2. 1998 ²⁷⁹ :	Flights were a host nation support to SFOR, to an UN operations, NATO-PfP developed into a regional security organisation	Defended the flights because of the solidarity to UN and EU	Neutrality was originally a means of security policy, no future any more, demands NATO membership again, offer to APP to fulfil that	Critics on the host nation support to NATO, especially to abolish the flights
Issues on foreign policy on 15 th 4. 1998 ²⁸⁰ :	Treaty of Amsterdam integration of WEU to EU within the next two years, demands an option to join NATO within the report,	Neutrality law, no option of membership in the military organisation NATO, international operations needed an UN mandate	Demanded NATO membership, "out-of-area-operations" ²⁸¹ only under UN mandate	Rejected an option on NATO membership, preferred the OSCE
Issues of the debate on a possible membership to NATO on 16 th 4. 1998 ²⁸² :	NATO as the first address on security matters, write down an option to join, Neutrality was a relic of the Cold War, solidarity with actions against peace breakers according to the UN Charter	Mentioned a comprehensive security policy, expressed adherence to CFSP and to cooperation with the UN, OSCE, and NATO-PfP-Plus, recommended to wait until a European security system was in place, possible to join WEU	All security organisations like UN or OSCE needed the capacities of NATO, (treaties with Russia and Ukraine), WEU was identical to NATO, NATO transported armed and material, therefore join NATO	A national referendum on neutrality, neutrality was gradually eroded by the government
Issues of the debate on the budget of MoD on 26 th 5. 1998 ²⁸³ :	Demanded to join NATO, Austrian Armed Forces were able to act under NATO command and control	No membership as long as the US was the dominating factor in NATO, stick to the conscript system	Demanded the options report	Accused the APP to prepare NATO membership,
Issues of the debate on the budget of foreign affairs on 27 th 5. 1998 ²⁸⁴ :	Demanded a reasonable and calmer debate on the questions on NATO, solidarity was on top of the issues of CSFP,	NATO changed in the last years, active neutrality policy was still a modern security concept,	CFSP would jeopardize neutrality, abandon neutrality and join NATO	Criticized the campaign for NATO membership, the new "status of forces agreement" as an additional erosion of neutrality

Table 6.4.1.1: Overview of the issues of the debates in the first half of the year 1998

During those debates the AGP criticized the support of NATO within the NATO-PfP operations and training programme. In the party's opinion permission of flights supporting NATO operations especially eroded neutrality. By that demand the AGP was acting strictly according to its programme. The other parties defended the flights according to their manifestos and they stated that UN operations were not touching neutrality law. This interpretation of neutrality law has become standard practise. The second point the AGP brought up was the "status of forces agreement" which Austria had signed previously. That agreement was necessary for fulfilling the NATO-PfP Treaty because foreign troops needed a legal status to stay on the territory of the host

²⁷⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0110/imfname_114209.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁸⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0115/imfname_114219.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁸¹ The AFP meant an operation out of the Austrian territory.

²⁸² http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0116/imfname_114221.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁸³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0123/imfname_114235.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁸⁴ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0124/imfname_114237.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

nation. Meanwhile it has also become standard practise for all European neutral countries to permit foreign troops on their territory for training programmes. That also was a new practice of the neutrality law.

The option of a membership in NATO was the second main issue to be discussed during this time. The APP openly proposed that option to join NATO should be included into the Options Report on future Austrian security policy, and extended that proposal to a demand to join NATO at a later stage. Thereby it deviated from its current manifesto and referred to its programme that had been adopted before the passing the neutrality law in 1955. The AFP highly recommended to join NATO immediately and invited the APP to support this position. Actually, this demand was also contrary to its manifesto. The AGP's programme was strictly against membership in NATO, and the party consistently demanded a national vote on this issue. The ASDP was also against membership in NATO and did everything to prevent the inclusion of NATO membership as an option. Therefore, the Options Report failed. On the other hand it conceded that NATO was transforming into a comprehensive security organisation – a point that was truly correct, and had been discussed at that time within NATO, as well as included in the new security strategy of 1999. That strategy spoke of a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. It also spoke of support for the development of a collective security system of EU and partnership with the UN, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine and the countries of the Mediterranean dialogue²⁸⁵. But a membership in NATO was unthinkable for the ASDP as long as the US was the dominating factor in NATO.

On 18th June 1998, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the necessary changes of the federal constitution of Austria (§ 23f) were discussed. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed by the Heads of States and Governments on 2nd October 1997²⁸⁶. After the ratification procedure it came into force on 1st May 1999. By that treaty the WEU became a core part of the EU. Also the Petersberg Tasks, which were developed and passed by the Heads of States and Government of the WEU, were integrated into the CSFP and ESDP. In view of that integration the Austrian Constitutional Law had to be amended by inserting a new article (Article 23f). This article was necessary to make sure that Austria could conduct all operations included in the Petersberg Tasks.

²⁸⁵ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?mode=pressrelease, 09. 07. 2011.

²⁸⁶ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0092010003>, 23. 08. 2011.

The new article stated, that Austria co-operated integrally in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Following this new Article 23f, Austria was able to conduct the full scope and scale of the Petersberg Tasks up to armed peace-making operations. The Petersberg Tasks were integrated into the ESDP by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997.²⁸⁷ The Petersberg Tasks covered:

- humanitarian operations
- search and rescue operations
- peace support operations
- peacemaking operations including peace-enforcing operations.²⁸⁸

An overview shows in a table the discussion on the day of ratification and the related following debates:

²⁸⁷ Hauser Gunther, *Das europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungssystem und seine Akteure*, BMLV, Landesverteidigungsakademie, 4. völlig überarbeitete und wesentlich erweiterte Auflage, Wien, 2008, p. 63.; “Österreich wirkt an der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union auf Grund des Titels V des Vertrages über die Europäische Union mit. Dies schließt die Mitwirkung an Maßnahmen ein, mit denen die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu einem oder mehreren Ländern ausgesetzt, eingeschränkt oder vollständig eingestellt werden“ (Türk, p. 72.)

²⁸⁸ Hauser Gunther, *Das europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungssystem und seine Akteure*, BMLV, Landesverteidigungsakademie, 4. völlig überarbeitete und wesentlich erweiterte Auflage, Wien, 2008, p. 35.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Monopoly of use of force, rests with UN, solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Active neutrality policy for suppressed peoples, against comprehensive national defence
Issues on the debate on the Treaty of Amsterdam on 18 th 6. 1998 ²⁸⁹ :	Change of practice of neutrality, neutrality has always been an instrument of security policy, solidarity with actions against international peace breaker, not necessary to join WEU or NATO	CFSP allowed more solidarity, participation in the Petersberg Tasks were not a participation in a military coalition, compatible to the UN Charter and neutrality law integration of WEU in EU did not harm the specific kind of security policy	Contrary to the treaty, rights of the national states were transferred to Brussels, contrary to its convictions, a national referendum, demanded to join NATO and to abandon neutrality	A national referendum, neutrality had also lost its core value, military solidarity was usual now, neutrality law was partly abandoned, theoretically participation on operations without UN/OSCE mandate
Issues of the debate on the Report on Foreign Affairs on 7 th 7. 1998 ²⁹⁰ :	The EU peace project in the Treaty of Amsterdam could be compared with the UN Charter on a European level	Austria was neutral only outside the UN, OCSE, and EU, after an attack all members would defend the EU under the Article 51 UN Charter, Operations of the EU had to be mandated by UN	Membership in NATO, peace in Kosovo needed an intervention by NATO	Petersberg Tasks operations had to be mandated by the UN
Issues of the debate on 8 th 7. 1998 ²⁹¹ :	Stick to the conscript system	Stick to the conscript system	Produce a security doctrine,	Mixed system of professional soldiers and a draft system, solidaritarian neutrality

Table 6.4.1.2: Overview of the issues of the debates in June and July 1998

During the debate on the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the two opposing parties AFP and AGP were opposed to the laws and forcefully demanded a national referendum. But they had different interests, the AFP wanted to join NATO and the AGP wanted a clear decision by the people of Austria. They also rejected the change of the constitutional law by adding an Article 23f. The AGP acted according to its programme whereas the AFP showed no indication at all of joining NATO in its manifesto. Again the APP went back on the argument NATO membership was not necessary. That was also the red line of the ASDP. At the end of the day the two laws were passed only by the votes of the coalition. In July the debate went on. APP and ASDP stuck

²⁸⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0130/imfname_114249.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁹⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0133/imfname_114255.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

²⁹¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0134/imfname_114257.pdf, 23. 11. 2010.

to their arguments. The AGP suddenly conceded the possibility of participation in the Petersberg Tasks although only under UN mandate. That was a change towards realism after the constitutional law had been changed. It was a clear sign to change its programme which they finally did in 2001. In that manifesto the AGP wrote what it had demanded in the past years: the UN had monopoly on using force and on military peace operations. That was a step to accept the necessity of such operations and a step towards realism. The AFP demanded the development of a security doctrine instead of the failed Options Report. It was interesting, that the AFP made that demand, and then acted on it during its participation in the government, starting in 2000. Finally, a debate started whether or not the Austrian Armed Forces should change from conscription to professional forces but it calmed down very soon.

By the way, Swiss policy began to change, too. It followed the Austrian way of practising neutrality policy and engaging in the international community. In 1990 and the following years Switzerland joined the economic sanctions against Libya, Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia following resolutions of the Security Council. From July 1996 to December 2000, an unarmed Swiss logistics company was operational in the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina²⁹². In 1999, an unarmed Swiss company joined the NATO mission KFOR and was part of the Austrian contingent. On 6th October 2000 the Swiss contingent became an armed contingent and it fulfilled the same tasks as the Austrian contingent.²⁹³ With its move to join the UN²⁹⁴ after a national referendum in 2002 Switzerland followed the Austrian model of a permanently neutral country and its understanding of neutrality policy with respect to the UN changed as a whole.

²⁹² http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/vtg/en/home/themen/einsaetze/peace/archiv/shqsu_gelbmuetzen.html, 24. 08.2011.

²⁹³ Luginbühl Kaspar/Vogt Marcus Jurij, Schweizer Neutralität im Wandel, pp. 53-61, in Hartmann Rudolf/ Meyer Christian Wilhelm/Vogt Marcus Jurij (Hrsg.), CIMIC-Aspekte I: Traditionelle Neutralität in Europa, Speyer 2005, Speyrer Arbeitsheft 176, pp. 35-70.

²⁹⁴ Frik Silvan, Ist die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik europafähig, Ruegger, Zürich, p. 6.

6.4.2. Security Doctrine 2001

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations with WEU and Membership to NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.2 KFOR, International Operations on Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

In October 1999, there were national elections to the Austrian parliament and at the end of the day, there were three parties, ASDP, AFP and APP, which were more or less equally strong. Only the AGP had significantly fewer votes than the others. It became clear that two of these three would build a coalition to govern the country. The problem was that the AFP, a right wing populist party, had a very bad reputation in Austria and in Europe as well. After the negotiation between ASDP and APP had failed, the APP and AFP formed a coalition. This decision was heavily criticized by the Austrian Federal President, Klestil, and led to bilateral measures of the 14 other EU countries in respect to the new Austrian government. That had never happened before and led at last to the Treaty of Nice in 2000. This treaty listed for the first time measures towards an EU country, which had abandoned the overall values of EU. To trigger such measures, certain criteria had to be fulfilled and a strict procedure had to be undergone. At the end of that procedure it was possible to exclude a member from the EU. But that has not happened yet. Back to Austria, after a peer review by three elder statesmen, the bilateral measures were suspended after approximately half a year.

During the phase of bilateral measures the new government proclaimed its programme²⁹⁵ on 9th February 2000. During the last years both parties had promoted a membership in NATO. The expectations were that the new government would start a process to approach or join NATO. But in the aims of the security policy there were no points which could be interpreted in that direction. It said that the peace, stabilizing and security project of a united Europe was to be shaped actively. Also the engagement in the UN and the OSCE had to be strengthened. The

²⁹⁵ Schüssel Wolfgang, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat: Wien, am 9. Februar 2000, Bundespressdienst, Wien, 2000, pp. 5-13.

Austrian Armed Forces had to be modernized to be better equipped for disaster relief and international solidarity operations. The assistance to the ministry of interior should also remain a task.

An overview of the issues of the debate on the proclamation and on the following debates on security matters is listed in a table:

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, active on CFSP, no neutralism	Monopoly of use of force, to UN, solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Worldwide peace policy, active European policy, reliable homeland defence	Monopoly of violence, military peace operations
Issues of the debate on the proclamation of the government on 9 th 2. 2000 ²⁹⁶ :	Integration into different security organisations like UN, OSCE, EU, COE and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European peace and defence alliance, to amend the neutrality law after a national referendum	Accused the government of planning to join NATO,	Construction of the European security and defence structure, a full obligation to assist within the EU, autonomous decisions on participation in international operations of the EU	No issues
Issues of the debate on defence budget on 11 th 5. 2000 ²⁹⁷ :	Participation and contribution on the CFSP, a new security doctrine was necessary because of the new Petersberg Tasks, conscript system was not negotiable	Low budget of 0,8 % gross national product (GNP), AFP had criticized the former higher budget, demanded a new security doctrine – dismissed, promoted the conscript system,	Moved for a new security doctrine – passed – on possible integrations to alliances,	Contrary to the work on a new security doctrine, no armed forces any longer, suspected a membership to NATO was about to be fixed
Issues of the debate on the defence budget 2001/2002 on 29 th 11. 2000 ²⁹⁸ :	Urged a special budget on international operations,	Anxious that UN operations could be reduced or even cut, those operations were on the basis of neutrality	High costs of participation in NATO-PfP, promoted a turnaround from falsely interpreted neutrality policy, announced a draft version of the security doctrine, obligation of assistance	Obligation to assist was contrary to the Neutrality Law, neutrality meant negotiating in cases of conflict

Table 6.4.2.1: Overview of the issues of the debates during the year 2000

²⁹⁶ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0009/imfname_114373.pdf, 21. 11. 2010.

²⁹⁷ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0048/fnameorig_114401.htm, 27.04.2009.

²⁹⁸ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0048/fnameorig_114451.htm, 27.04.2009.

The debates on security issues in the first year of the new APP-AFP coalition were characterized by certain interesting developments. The government announced a new security doctrine which would include an obligation of assistance within Europe and an option to join NATO. The two parties had promoted these issues for some years, although they did not fit their manifestos. The AFP, as a governing party, deplored the high costs of the assistance to the ministry of interior and of the membership in NATO-PfP. A contradiction was to complain about the costs on the one hand, and to promote NATO membership on the other hand. The APP announced its intention to amend the neutrality law and to have a national referendum on the issue, but it never materialized. One important reason could have been the results of opinion polls that showed that there would be neither a consensus on membership to NATO nor on the amendment of the neutrality law. The ASDP and the AFP moved for a new security doctrine but only the move of the AFP was passed. A clear example of party-related policy was shown by the governing parties. The ASDP feared a reduction of international operations and mentioned in particular the NATO-led KFOR operations. That was rejected by the government, but due to lack of personnel Austria began to integrate national contingents of other nations into the Austrian contingents on UNFICYP and UNDOF. In the meanwhile this has become a proven practice and UNFICYP had been handed over to the Hungarian contingent. The ASDP was proven partly right. The Austrian contingent is a mechanized battalion with APC and even some long range weapons, but no tanks at all. Additionally a Swiss contingent of a maximum of 220 troops has been integrated into the Austrian Contingent. Also a Slovak engineer platoon was integrated until 2002. The participation of the Austrian and Swiss troops is still ongoing. Since 1999, Austria has participated with approximately 15.000 troops, in 25 rotations.²⁹⁹

The AGP was of the opinion that this proved Austria no longer needed armed forces. The party argued that times had changed and Austria was surrounded by NATO member states. It was an interesting point because the AGP had stated the necessity of armed forces to conduct international operations only a year earlier. Secondly, the AGP wrote in its new manifesto of 2001, which was in preparation during that year, that the UN had the monopoly of the use of force and that Austria had to participate in international operations. On 10th May 2001 amendments in the war material law were debated in the NC:³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹ Schmidl A.Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vehling, Graz, 2006, pp. 191 – 193.

³⁰⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0069/fnameorig_114493.htm, 03.12..2010.

Now the ASDP found an ongoing erosion of neutrality by the very law, which had been passed with their approval ten years earlier. In the draft version of the security doctrine neutrality was abandoned on European matters, which was legalized under the ASDP Chancellor by the amendment of Article 23 f. The temporary stationing of foreign troops, which was first allowed by the Status of Forces Agreement under an ASDP Chancellor, was now criticized and the ASDP was strictly against

that violation of neutrality. The ASDP promoted a combination of solidarity and neutrality, but with neutrality having priority over solidarity. The AFP countered and claimed that now all those changes of the ASDP had to be legalized in that doctrine, which was untrue. It promoted the European security system and the good co-operation with NATO by participation in NATO-PfP. It moved for a European Defence doctrine, which was passed in December 2003 as a European Security Strategy (ESS).³⁰¹ The AGP warned again that the doctrine practically put an end to neutrality and was a de-facto invitation to join NATO. The APP replied that the doctrine was only a consequence of Article 23 f and supported solidarity with the UN, OSCE and also the EU. According to the APP, it was clear that NATO was a unifying construction for Euro-Atlantic security measures. Nevertheless it underlined that the practise of neutrality had changed over the years, e.g. in 1955, 1960, 1962, 1990, 1995, 1998 and now, in 2001, but neutrality stayed still alive formally.

On 11th May 2001, the Treaty of Nice and an amendment of the Foreign Operations Law were debated:³⁰² Federal Chancellor Schüssel (APP) emphasized again that NATO was the transatlantic connecting element and only NATO could ensure an efficient CFSP. The ASDP touched upon the gain on security by the Treaty of Nice³⁰³ and underlined the necessity of a common security policy for Europe. The AFP hoped for a common security system and for efficient peace enforcement measures in the treaty. The AGP centred its criticism on the lack of information by the government. On the amendment of the Foreign Operations Law no discussion took place at all, only the APP noted that the procedure had been made easier. It was not necessary to have a request for conducting an operation and even individual persons could be deployed.

On 12th December 2001, the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine were discussed in the

³⁰¹ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 10. 03. 2011.

³⁰² http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0070/fname0rig_114495.htm, 27.04.2009.

³⁰³ The Treaty of Nice replaced the Treaty of Maastricht and therefore it had a main impact on the internal procedures of the EU. On the CFSP it had only low influence.

NC:³⁰⁴ The ASDP complained that it had not been possible to come to a four-party-initiative in consensus, but the ASDP would never give up neutrality. From its point of view to act in solidarity was very important but it had to be combined with neutrality, which unfortunately had been eroded. For the APP it was a pity that the ASDP had disengaged from its position on the security doctrine. Nevertheless, that doctrine should be given a long life, the APP underlined. The AGP missed clear answers and regretted the lack of perspectives on Europe and its challenges in the field of security questions. The AFP noted that the comprehensive security policy reached farther than its predecessor, the comprehensive national defence policy, and the Defence Council was transformed into the National Security Council. From its point of view neutrality had been abandoned in 1995 as a result of the membership in the EU and the AFP was in favour of joint European armed forces in the future.

At last the new Security Doctrine³⁰⁵ was passed in the Austrian Parliament. Only the coalition parties of the Austrian government backed the move; the Social Democrats and the Green Party voted against it. By that security doctrine Austria's security policy was divided into two different and independent approaches: solidarity policy within the EU, and neutrality policy outside the EU. That indicated that neutrality and international obligations lost their validity for Austrian policy within the EU, and that the Austrian government acted under the principle of solidarity with its EU partners. This approach of dividing the obligations of a permanently neutral country is unique in international law and the understanding of neutrality policy by the Austrian government took a new direction with respect to international affairs.³⁰⁶ Most international cases were discussed within the EU and the field of neutrality became ever smaller. During the membership in the UN SC in 2009 and in 2010 Austria was content to adjust its policy to the EU presidency and the other European countries in the UN SC. On 12th December 2003 the European Security Strategy, "*A Secure Europe for a better World*"³⁰⁷, was passed by the Heads of States in Brussels. This body reacted on 9th November 2001 to the changes in the world by new threats like terrorism, proliferation, migration, or organised crime. A main focus was on conflict and threat prevention. The EU wanted to build security in its neighbourhood, which meant Russia and Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean area and the Middle East. All

³⁰⁴ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0087/fnameOrig_114529.htm, 27.04.2009.

³⁰⁵ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, www.parlinkom.gv.at/doktrin_Sicherheit.pdf, 13. 05. 2009.

³⁰⁶ Waldemar Hummer, Beistandspflicht, Solidarität, Neutralität, in Kernic Franz/Hauser Gunther (Hrsg.), *Handbuch zur europäischen Sicherheit*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin/Bern/Bruxelles/New York/Oxford/Wien, 2005, pp. 115 – 140.

³⁰⁷ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 10 07 2011.

measures were focused on effective multilateral actions and operations, based on the framework of the UN. Regional organisations e.g. OSCE and COE had great relevance to the EU. The transatlantic relationship had an important impact, mainly expressed by the relations to NATO. The strategy forced more coordination and cooperation within the EU and with other regional organisations and powers as well. There was only really very little leeway left to act neutrally even if neutrality was reduced to its military core content.

At the end of this chapter it is necessary to say a few words about the ISAF operations, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. After the victory of the US and the coalition forces over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by the end of 2001, the region was secured by the troops of the winning coalition based on a UN mandate. Because of the special situation (the attack of the US forces was a consequence of the attack on the New York Twin Towers on 11th September 2001) only the UN SG was informed about that operation. But after the European Council's meeting in Copenhagen it was clear that every country of the EU would participate in the operation. The Council of Ministers decided on 10th December to contribute by a contingent of approximately 70 troops. The mission was passed by the main committee of the NC in consensus of all parties and there were no discussions at all. Even after the deployment³⁰⁸ ISAF was only a footnote to other topics. In the plenary on February and March 2002 the APP stressed the policy of solidarity and stated that the main focus was to restructure Afghanistan after restoring peace, and Austria would take part not only by contributing troops but providing financial aid as well. The AFP did not mention the operations at all, especially because it was responsible for defence in the government. Even the opposing ASDP offered no criticism of that operation. Only the AGP remarked critically that the money to buy the fighter bombers "Eurofighter" for the Austrian Armed Forces could have been put to better use in Afghanistan. On 19th August 2002 it commended the performance of the troops deployed and that operations would be prolonged. The Austrian contribution to that operation ended by 11th December 2002. Because of the special political situation in the world at the end of the year 2001 and the broad consensus on that operation, it also became only a footnote in this thesis.

³⁰⁸ Roman Horak, ISAF, within Etschmann Wolfgang/Speckner Hubert(Hrsg.), Zum Schutz der Republik Österreich ..., Wien, 2005, pp. 769-780.

6.4.3. Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations with WEU and Membership in NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

During the following years a new constitutional treaty on the EU was prepared by an EU convention led by the French elder statesman Valerie Giscard D'Estaing. A draft of the constitutional treaty was passed by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament and had to be ratified by the national parliaments as well. On 11th May 2005 the Constitutional Treaty for the EU was debated and ratified by the Austrian NC:³⁰⁹ During that debate the APP brought up again the peace project incorporated in the existence of the European Union and that this treaty was a further step towards a unified Europe. Neutrality still existed and therefore it was not necessary to conduct a national referendum on that treaty. The new international operations of the EU, like EUFOR Althea in BiH, had the same importance to Austria as the classical UN operations or the NATO-led KFOR operations. These operations showed the solidarity approach in Austrian neutrality. The ASDP professed a European peace policy as well; pointing out that a neutral state could maintain its neutrality status. Only the UN had the monopoly to use force and the ASDP was glad to see that there was an opt-out scenario in critical EU decisions. The major arguments for criticism were on the European Defence Agency from a neutrality point of view. The AAF rejected a possible federal EU and professed an alliance of states in the EU, and anyhow, in their view, the changes in the neutrality law dated back to 1998 and were not a result of the policy at present. Even the AGP and AFP underlined the advantages of the Constitutional Treaty, which introduced a new dimension in European affairs, and the treaty was passed by majority with only few dissenting votes. But after the rejection of the treaty in national referendums in France and The Netherlands the situation changed

³⁰⁹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0109/imfname_046454.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

again.

On 8th June 2005 a debate in the NC started on general EU matters.³¹⁰ The ASDP demanded to reconsider the situation after those rejections, but on the agenda for this day were security matters. Neutral Austria should take part in international operations only under a mandate of the UN SC or the OSCE. The APP emphasized the peace and security project incorporated in the EU and brought up the question of capabilities in domestic and out-of-area operations. The AGP agreed on the peace project EU and advocated abandoning of the conscription system after the Schengen border moved eastward and the FIFA championship 2008 had to be taken into account. The AFP demanded an modified security strategy which took into account the changes in EU and NATO-PfP. But it would take more than one year until such modified strategy was produced by the government. In 2006, a convention was organized to revise the constitution but it failed and therefore it is not discussed in this thesis.

After the first rounds of negotiations of the Austrian Convention the contemporary governing parties APP and AAF, which had split from AFP in 2002, moved comprehensive security provisions on 21st September 2006 in the NC.³¹¹ In the debate the ASDP underlined that it was only thanks to its resistance that neutrality had not been abandoned and that it was interesting to see the AFP taking a pro-neutrality stance again. There was no possibility to abandon neutrality as long as the ASDP could hinder such a step. The AAF brought up that there was no intention to abandon neutrality now because it had already been abandoned by the APP and the ASDP in 1998 by Article 23f. The APP pointed to their agreement with the neutrality law. After all, after the coalition government formed by APP and AAF had come to an end, there was consensus on security matters between all parties of the parliament to launch a common initiative.

³¹⁰ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0112/imfname_046870.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

³¹¹ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0163/imfname_070402.pdf, 20. 12. 2010.

6.4.4. Security Strategy 2011

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations to WEU and Membership to NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

On 19th November 2010, NATO revised its security strategy after having spent a year and a half on procedural issues.³¹² At the summit of Lisbon the Heads of States and Governments adopted the new strategy. In that new strategy the co-operation between EU and the UN was addressed in the very first chapter, thus highlighting the importance of that cooperation. The Alliance wanted to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations in cooperation with these two organisations and the Alliance was ready to play a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations. Even though it was the first core task to safeguard the freedom and security of its members, the alliance stuck to three tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. These principles were to be reached with partners such as the UN, EU, OSCE, Russia, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and others. It could be said that the Alliance was a step further on a way to a collective regional security system according to Article 51 UN Charter.

In 2010, Austria, too, started a procedure to revise its security doctrine and the comprehensive security provisions. A new security strategy was brought into the Austrian Parliament in 2011 by the MoD but has not yet been passed by it. Nevertheless, this security strategy will be discussed in the thesis together with a debate on the conscript system, which started in Austria shortly before the day of election of the Vienna Provincial Parliament in October 2010. Although the debate on the defence system in Austria is still in progress, it seems to be necessary to draw attention to that issue as well. On 20th May 2010 the Austrian Minister of Defence Darabos of the ASDP answered a question in

³¹² <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>, 08. 09. 2011.

the NC:³¹³ Darabos underlined that the Austrian Armed Forces were able to be operational a hundred percent based on all of the four potential operational cases according to the defence law, i.e. military defence, assistance to the ministry of interior, disaster relief, and international operations. That guarantee could be given despite the well-known financial constraints. The minister praised the conscription system in addition to the militia system and professional soldiers. The participation of militia soldiers (about 20 percent) in operations in support of the ministry of interior was an important contribution to the completion of tasks. He maintained his advocacy for national service and stressed the importance of international operations even with the lack of budgetary funds for training. Additionally he denied rumours about differences between himself and the Chief of the Defence staff.

The following debates have lasted approximately four months. To give an overview the issues of the debates are listed in a table and related to the issues of the manifesto.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP	AAF
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, no neutralism, Active on CFSP	Monopoly of use of force, Solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Neutrality as dominant guidance, ESDP – Petersberg	Monopoly of violence, military peace operations	ECFSP, ESDP
Issues of the debate on the defence budget on 21 st 12. 2010. ³¹⁴	High cost of professional armed forces, potential lack of personnel could cause doubts on neutrality and international operations	Mentioned the constitutional task of defence	Fury of saving, stood to national service	Conduct international operations only by professional soldiers	To save money until the armed forces were dead, the operational capabilities were in doubt, professional armed forces
Issues of the debate on national service on 20 th 1. 2011 ³¹⁵ :	A new security strategy, national service	No rapprochement to NATO, professional armed forces, the speaker on defence was pro national service,	Against abandoning national service, strictly against NATO membership	Suspension of national service, reduction to 10000 troops, demanded a debate on a security strategy	Professional armed forces, 1998 the neutrality had been abandoned by article 23f

Table 6.4.4.1: Overview of the issues of the debates in December 2010 and January 2011

The main discussion points during the three debates were on the restrictions of the budget and

³¹³ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0067/imfname_189812.pdf, 21 11 2010

³¹⁴ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0091/imfname_208681.pdf, 27 04 2011.

³¹⁵ http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0093/imfname_208974.pdf, 27 04 2011.

whether or not Austria should change from national service to professional soldiers. On the budget restrictions, the three opposition parties criticized the minister heavily, whereas the two governing parties (ASDP and APP) defended him. In this respect, there were no disagreements with the manifestos of the parties. Concerning the issue of national service the situation was different: The APP promoted national service according to its manifesto. The AAF stood for professional soldiers, but nothing was said on this issue in its programme. The AGP was glad to hear that the ASDP had changed its mind. It stated that since 1960 the international operations have been conducted only by voluntarily militia, professional and former conscript soldiers.

The AFP cited the Minister of Defence Darabos, who in September had stated that *„the national service is carved into stone and as long as he will be chief of the MoD there will be no abandoning of national service.“*³¹⁶ The AFP accused him of putting party interests above national interests and that he was not telling the truth. The AFP stuck to national service and neutrality and warned that abandoning of national service would endanger neutrality. Moreover, national service promoted the integration of citizens with a migration background. Additionally it brought up its apprehension that a professional military system would necessarily lead to NATO membership. Some years earlier it had vehemently demanded NATO membership. But in the meantime it had changed its manifesto and therefore it was against NATO membership now. To close this analysis of party positions, the ASDP was divided into two groups: the one supporting Minister of Defence Darabos who promoted a professional soldier system³¹⁷ and pointed to the fact that already the report of the Austrian Armed Forces Reform Commission discussed the abandonment of national service. It also confronted the AFP with the latter's earlier moves to suspend the national service in its annual meeting in 1997. It pointed out that in 2005 the AFP stood for a general conscription service. On the other hand, the party spokesman on defence issues promoted national service. By the way, this new position on national service was without a reference to the manifesto of the ASDP and contrary to its tradition.

On 17th March 2011, the Minister of Defence Darabos was asked about the development of the security strategy debates that had started in the Austrian Federal Council (FC), the second chamber of the Austrian parliament. The answer was that after the decision in the Austrian

³¹⁶ *„die Wehrpflicht in Stein gemeißelt sei und mit ihm als Verteidigungsminister es kein Ende der Wehrpflicht geben werde“*, http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_0093/imfname_208974.pdf, 27 04 2011.

³¹⁷ MoD Mag. Darabos changed his mind in the beginning of October 2010. Since then he has promoted a professional army system.

Council of Ministers it was sent to the parliament immediately. During the work on it in the Constitutional and Defence Councils it should be supplemented by an operational part. In spite of the security doctrine of 2001 a broad consensus was the aim and therefore the rapprochement option to NATO had been removed. Neutrality and membership to NATO-PfP remained. During the following question hour Darabos was criticized by APP and AFP and supported by AGP and ASDP on the question on national service.

This draft version of the security strategy is still in negotiation in the parliament. During the rest of 2011, it has undergone a re-drafting process in the Austrian parliament, which still is on-going. The main issues are:³¹⁸ At the beginning of the document, the mode of security policy in the 21st century is described as comprehensive, integrated, active and solidary. The Austrian security policy had to deal with measures on national, European and international level. All efforts have to concentrate on active steps to reach an advantageous security situation for the peoples of Austria and of the EU, to prevent threats, and to protect from them. It is the first time the Austrian interests and political-strategic goals are enumerated. The Austrian security policy was subdivided into three levels,

- the national level,
- the European level, and
- the international level.

The national level includes comprehensive security provisions, domestic security, defence policy; civil-military co-operation, diplomacy and international site policy. The European level encompasses Justice and Interior, CFSP, policy to the COE. The international level comprises security of interior, foreign security including UN policy, NATO-PfP, OSCE, and international operations.

³¹⁸ Entwurf der Österreichischen Sicherheitsstrategie 2011.mht, internal version of the Austrian Armed Forces.

6.5. Case Study – EUFOR Chad/RCA 2007 – 2009

Case Studies	Framework Conditions
	6.1 EU-Membership, Relations with WEU and Membership in NATO-PfP
6.2 IFOR/SFOR, International Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996	
6.3 KFOR, International Operations in Kosovo 1999	
	6.4 Security Doctrine 2001, Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006, Security Strategy 2011 6.4.1 The failed Options Report on Austrian Security Policy 1998 6.4.2 Security Doctrine 2001 6.4.3 Comprehensive Security Provisions 2006 6.4.4 Security Strategy 2011
6.5 EUFOR CHAD/RCA 2007 – 2009	

Table 6.0: Overview of the Case Studies and Research on the Framework Conditions in Period 3

The last case study will deal with the situation regarding the operations in Chad/RCA from 2008 to 2009, because it was the most discussed operation with Austrian participation during the more than 50 years of experience. That operation was closely connected with the third membership in the UN SC of 2009 and 2010, even though it had been decided earlier, but it started immediately after Austria had become member of the UN SC. The operation was also connected with the situation in Darfur, the western part of Sudan. Because of intertribal rivalries and religious differences, thousands of people fled across the green border into Chad and Republic of Central Africa (RCA). But even there the refugees were not safe, because paramilitary troops, for instance the Janjaweed, persecuted them. Additionally drought and crop failures led to starvation among the refugees. The situation escalated in 2007 and even the NGOs could not work without being threatened. To improve that situation the UN SC passed a resolution following chapter VII UN-Charter on 25th September 2007:

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

(a) Authorizes the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation (hereinafter referred to as “the European Union operation”) aimed at supporting the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, and decides that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to fulfil the following functions, in accordance with the arrangement to be concluded between the European Union and the United Nations, in liaison with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic:

(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;

(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of

humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;
(b) Authorizes the European Union operation, at the close of the period referred to in sub paragraph a, to take all appropriate measures to achieve an orderly disengagement, by means including fulfilment of the functions indicated in sub paragraph a, and within the limits of its residual capacity”³¹⁹

Prior to these events, negotiations between UN and EU on that resolution had been held, so the EU was ready to conduct operations using its own troops. Additionally, the governments of Chad and RCA had agreed to the operation. On 23rd October 2007 the European Council of the EU passed the decision to conduct operation EUFOR Chad/RCA under the mandate of the UN SC. That procedure was according to the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003. In this strategy the EU had made it clear that it wanted to support the peaceful goals of UN, and the purpose of the operations should be to support the successful attainment of this UN goal.³²⁰ By that combination of the security political aim and interests of the UN and the EU it became much easier to actively conduct EU operations following the ESDP by neutral countries like Austria. After the international basis had been established, Austria could refer to its national security doctrine. In that doctrine Austria stressed that it would contribute adequately to the military and civil capabilities of the EU and take part actively and in solidarity with the ESDP.³²¹

In reference to the national security doctrine Austria pursued a policy of peace based on the UN Charter to protect the basic rights, among them the European Human Rights Convention or the European Basic Rights Charter³²². The Austrian security policy was interwoven with the European CFSP. In the proclamation of the Federal Government of Chancellor Gusenbauer it was also stated that Austria would participate in peace-support operations of the EU or the UN. Additionally, Austria wanted to announce its candidacy for a non-permanent mandate in UN SC in the period 2009-2010, and it was understandable that Austria had more than one good reason to participate in that new mission abroad.³²³ On 7th November 2007 the Austrian Council of Ministers passed a decision to participate in EUFOR Chad/RCA with up to 160 troops for a limited time. That decision was backed by a recommendation of the National Security Council

³¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007), 25th September 2007.

³²⁰ Europ SiPol.pdf, p. 12.

³²¹ Doktrin_Sicherheit.pdf, Außenpolitische Aspekte Punkt 11.

³²² Doktrin_Sicherheit.pdf, p. 1.

³²³ Regierungserklärung_16012007.pdf, p. 22.

(NSC) two days later on 9th November 2007, and that showed with whom the real decision power laid.³²⁴

To many political observers it came as a surprise when in November 2007 Minister Darabos of the ASDP agreed to Austrian participation in EUFOR Chad/RCA operations, which was much more dangerous than any other international operation before. Analysing the current party manifesto of the ASDP³²⁵ it was logical that it backed international operations.³²⁶ Acting similarly, its coalition partner APP had passed the decision in the Council of Minister, but that party was the traditional party of European solidarity and had been the co-author of the Security Doctrine 2001. The party manifesto of 1995 gave a clear affirmation of its support for a „*new European security structure, in which we want to take part*“.³²⁷ It professed solidarity with the whole community of peoples and its security organisations and to participate in humanitarian, peace-keeping, peace-building and economic measures.³²⁸ The AGP as an opposition party and traditionally sceptical towards any kind of violence or power projection wrote in its manifesto of 2001 that it preferred peaceful and non-violent methods of conflict management. Therefore, it was required to arrive at a foreign policy of the EU which was consistent with Human Rights and accepted the monopoly of power of the UN to manage all crises.³²⁹ Based on a mandate of the UN SC the AGP could accept to take part in military peace-support operations. In that case the AGP could have voted for the operations. In the party manifesto of the AFP of 2005 there was a clear commitment to Europe, albeit restricted by neutrality. Therefore, it professed adherence to the ESDP and even to the out-of-area Petersberg Tasks but this after prior approval by the Austrian NC.³³⁰ Because the AFP had passed the Security Doctrine 2001 and it was in accordance with its manifesto, it could have agreed on the decision to participate in the EUFOR Chad/RCA operations. The AAF had broken away from the AFP in 2005, and in 2007 its manifesto existed only in the form of an item of its enumeration of tasks and „Orange“³³¹ answers to them. In those answers the AAF stood for a policy which dealt with natural disasters, armed conflicts and terrorist threats. To answer those threats it was necessary to have quickly

³²⁴ Decision NSR 9_11_2007.pdf;

³²⁵ http://www.spoe.at/spoe_partei_programm.pdf, 23 10 2008.

³²⁶ Zecha, Wolfgang, Der Einsatz des Österreichischen Bundesheeres im Tschad, Reflexion zur Einsatzentscheidung, in *ÖMZ 1/2010*, pp. 64-92.

³²⁷ „für eine neue europäische Sicherheitsordnung, an der wir aktiv mitwirken wollen“, <http://www.oevp.at/download/ooo298.pdf>, p. 4, 23 10 2008.

³²⁸ <http://www.oevp.at/download/ooo298.pdf>, S. 26-27, 23 10 2008.

³²⁹ http://www.gruene.at/partei/grundsatzprogramm2001_03.pdf, S 62, 23 10 2008.

³³⁰ http://www.fpoe-parlamentsklub.at/FP_Parteiprogramm_Neu.pdf, S. 10, 26 10 2008.

³³¹ Orange is the colour of the AFA. It called its first programme „Orange Answers“.

deployable armed forces.³³² Although the position of the AAF was not very clear, it should have agreed on operations by the EU based on a mandate of UN, especially because most of its representatives were part of the governing coalition which had passed the Security Doctrine 2001.

The analysis of the debates is divided into two phases: the first phase lasted from October to December 2007, the second from January to March 2008. The issues of the different debates are listed in two tables related the date and to the issues of the party manifestos.

³³² http://www.bzoe.at/index.php?content=bzoe_Programm_aktuell.doc, S 2, 26 10 2008.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP	AAF
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All kinds of PSO, no neutralism, active on CFSP	Monopoly of use of force, Solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Neutrality as dominant guidance, ESDP – Petersberg	Monopoly of violence, military peace operations	ECFSP, ESDP
Issues of the debate on 31 st 10. 2007 ³³³	Critical question on the equipment	Especially neutral countries as Ireland, Finland or Sweden, led by France	Decrease the budget on defence, bad for the other tasks	Critical question on the equipment	
Issues of the debate on 8 th 11. 2007 ³³⁴ .		Masterpiece of European solidarity under the umbrella of an UN mandate	Criticized the operations heavily, contradiction between that EU operations and neutrality, no advantage for Austria		Contrary to it caused on neutrality
Issues of the debate on 9 th 11. 2007 ³³⁵ .	The character of a humanitarian mission	The protection of the people, increase the Austrian reputation	False priorities of the Austrian Armed Forces, contrary to its understanding of Austrian neutrality, risks too high	Rejected because of the role of France	Though in principle commitment to international operations, EUFOR Chad/RCA was rejected
Issues of the debate in the Foreign Council on 27 th 11. 2007 ³³⁶	Backed	Promoted	Constricted timetable	Potential connection to membership in UN SC	Lack of resources
Issues of the debate on 5 th 12. 2007 ³³⁷ .	No support to French policy in Chad, humanitarian character of the mission	Supported by the UNHCR, Austria had to help immediately.	Violation of neutrality	Concrete operation was rejected because of French operations “Epervier”	High costs of that operation
Issues of the debate on 6 th 12. 2007 ³³⁸ .	All-party-solution		Accused the government of wrong parameters	Queried the all-party-function of the operations	Lack of budget, principle justification of the operations
Issues of the debate on 12 th 12. 2007 ³³⁹ .	Rejected again the critics and the moves	Rejected again the critics and the moves		Doubt about the compatibility with neutrality	No clear and quick logistic decision
Related issues of the debate in the FC on 16 th 12. 2007 ³⁴⁰ .	Committed again to international operations	Humanitarian character of the operations	Criticized the operations		

Table 6.5.1: Overview of the issues of the debates from October to December 2007

³³³ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_101384.pdf.

³³⁴ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_102347.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³³⁵ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/PR/JAHR_2007/2007.shtml/PK0848.htm, 23.10.2008.

³³⁶ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/PR/JAHR_2007/2007.shtml/PK0911.htm, 23.10.2008.

³³⁷ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_106917.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³³⁸ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_110028.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³³⁹ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_095453.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³⁴⁰ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_106989.pdf, 23.10.2008.

The EUFOR Chad/RCA operations has been the most criticized operation of the Austrian Armed Forces. Most of the parties were in a difficult position. Generally the AGP backed international operations since the days of the Yugoslavia crisis, but that operation was criticized because of the dubious role of France. The operation was rejected and the AGP could not stick to its manifesto. It brought up neutrality reasons and the fact that participation in operations was an all-party decision. The AAF did not back the operations because of the lack of resources and its costs, but it stated that it would back such operations in general. It also did not stick to its programme. But it mainly acted on its party interests. The AFP declared that it backed such operations in principle, but this particular operation was too expensive and neutrality was not guaranteed. It stuck to its new manifesto but the reasons were mainly party interests as well. The APP backed the operations in accordance with its manifesto, but it also spoke of a primarily humanitarian mission despite its knowledge of the presence of Special Forces. There is room for the suspicion that it did not want to communicate the real character of the operations for party policy reasons. The ASDP was in charge of the MoD and therefore the MoD tried to understate the risks and the tasks of the operations because of party interests as well. The MoD stated for example, that the operation was not more dangerous than UNDOF or UNFICYP; an argument that was not true at all. For the first time there were no-confidence motions against the minister which were caused by an international operation. The no-confidence-motion by the AFP against the MoD Darabos was rejected by APP, ASDP, and AGP. The motion of the AFP to revise the deployment of Austrian soldiers on the EUFOR Chad/RCA was rejected as well.³⁴¹ Especially the intensive and loud debates by the representatives of the AFP showed that it wanted to win the confidence of the population and it acted primarily on party interests. This was the first time such a massive debate had erupted on decisions to participate in international operations in Austria.

At the beginning of the year 2008, the operations in Chad again were the topic of several debates and the heaviest debate took place on 31st January 2008 in connection with the departure of the first contingent. An overview of the issues of the debates is listed in a table:

³⁴¹ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG\PR\JAHR_2007\2007.shtml/PK0968.htm 23.10.2008.

Issues and dates	APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP	AAF
Related issues in manifesto(s)	All types of PSO, no neutralism, active on CFSP	Monopoly of use of force, Solidarity in Europe, CFSP, no military association	Neutrality as dominant guidance, ESDP – Petersberg	Monopoly of violence, military peace operations	ECFSP, ESDP
Issues of the debate on 16 th and 25 th 1. 2008 ^{342 343} :		Rejected the accusations	War operations in Chad, suspected link to the membership in UN SC		
Issues of the debate on 30 th 1. 2008 ³⁴⁴ :	Defended the necessity of the operation, no connection to the applied membership to UN SC	Compared the operations to those in Afghanistan, humanitarian action to help refugees	Criticism of the operations on EUFOR Chad/RCA, spoke of an adventure of the „Legion Étrangère“ ³⁴⁵	Not possible to be neutral under a French command and control	Concerned about the high costs, lack of funds for the tasks in Austria
Issues of the debate on 31 st 1. 2008 ³⁴⁶ :	Austria did not need any „advance payment“, EU and the international community were searching for political solutions		Horse-trading the operations in Chad for a membership on the UNSC, fear for the safety of the soldiers	Interconnection between the French operations „Epervier“ and the EUFOR Chad/RCA, demanded a political solution	
Issues of the debate on 14 th 2. 2008 ³⁴⁷ :	The situation in Chad had calmed down	Austria neutrality was no passive concept and the participation was one such example. ³⁴⁸	Negated the calming down and criticized the operations		

Table 6.5.2: Overview of the issues of the debates in January and February 2008

During that second phase the debate calmed down, one of the reasons being that the tensions in Chad decreased after the rebels withdrew from the capital N'Djamena, and the deployment went on. The issues of the debate changed slightly from the core aspects of the operations to political bargaining. The opposing parties suspected that participation was a precondition to become a member in the UN SC. The governing parties denied this, but the connections were evident.

In contrast to other international operations the discussion in the Austrian Parliament remained on the agenda. The party most interested in the discussion was the AFP, sometimes supported by

³⁴² http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_110744.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³⁴³ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_099143.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³⁴⁴ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_106927.pdf, 23.10.2008.

³⁴⁵ The French Foreign Legion

³⁴⁶ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/NR/NRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_114688pdf, 23.10.2008.

³⁴⁷ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/StP/BR/BRSitz/XXIII.shtml/fname_110714.pdf, p. 49.

³⁴⁸ http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PG/PRVAHR_2008\2008.shtml/PK0142.htm.

AAF or AGP. Every two or three months, which meant every two or three plenaries, the AFP brought the topic of the operations in Chad into the debate, in most cases by critical questions and remarks on statements of members of the governing parties. It stressed the following topics: lack of equipment, danger for the soldiers, costs, and violation of neutrality by participation in the operations. The half-year extension of the operations in May 2008 was also criticized by the AFP. The ASDP rejected all those questions and criticism by the well-known arguments. The APP backed the decisions to extend the operations but was not really involved in the discussions. On 3rd December 2008 the Minister Darabos gave a first summary on the operations and he stressed the success in security and humanitarian affairs but the AFP again raised doubts on the first results of the operations.

During the first plenary in 2009 on 21st January, the AFP again suggested that the operations in Chad was the prize for the membership in the UN SC and it was a mistake that Austria agreed to participate in that operations. On 26th February 2009 the discussion reached a new peak. The AFP again criticized the lack of equipment and the high costs. In the AAF's opinion the operations had been unnecessary and Austria should withdraw from it immediately. The ASDP and the MoD Darabos rejected those arguments, he and his party stood firmly by the efforts and achievements of the soldiers. The operations had calmed the situation and next on the agenda was the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). The EUFOR was a big success and now the UN operations could continue, he argued. The Austrian contingent was transferred from Special Forces to Logistics. The AGP did not change its mind and was against the operations even under those new circumstances.

During the rest of the year 2009, the AFP criticized the operations regularly, e.g. in the plenaries of May, July, and September. It used the operations as an opportunity to criticise the EU, the government in general the costs in particular. After the decision in the main committee of the NC in May 2009 to extend the operations until December 2009, the AFP and the AAF demanded the immediate withdrawal because of the costs and the absence of any Austrian interests in Chad. More criticism was again expressed concerning the equipment and the violation of neutrality. The ASDP rejected all those critics and stood by the operations it regarded as success. After the operations were transformed into genuine UN operations the AGP did not criticize it any more, and the APP also gave them its backing. On 3rd December 2009 Minister Darabos explained that Austria would withdraw from the operations MINURCAT by the 31st December 2009 and that both operations were big successes. None of the other parties disagreed. But during the next

sessions of the plenary in February and March 2010 the AFP again questioned the minister on the operations in Chad. This general criticism of international operations was stated for the first time, whereas the operations in Chad were continuously receiving much criticism. They heckled the speeches of members of the ASDP by shouting them down with their criticism of the Chad operations. That lasted until the end of 2010. The AAF, too, was critical towards the operations in Chad but stated that generally it did back international operations. The AGP did not mention Chad any more, neither did the APP. In the Austrian Parliament it was the first time that an international operation was criticized during the whole session period and even after its end.

Austria participated in EUFOR Chad/RCA with two rotations of forces, and in the following mission MINURCAT with two rotations as well. The contingent was well equipped for an operation in the desert. It had light weapons and machine guns mounted on its vehicles. The Austrian participation ended in 2011. As a whole, Austria participated with approximately 1000 troops.³⁴⁹

To summarize that case study it can be considered that ASDP and APP stood by their manifestos and backed the operations EUFOR Chad/RCA during the whole operations. But that was quite logical because both parties were in the governing coalition and it was agreed in the proclamation of the government to support peace under the umbrella of the UN and to act in solidarity with the other EU countries. The two opposition parties AGP and AAF were in a more difficult situation. On the one hand they backed international operations, especially under the umbrella of the UN, by their party manifestos. On the other hand, they thought that they had to criticize the government on its decisions on operations, which was really difficult to handle because of the long distance and of the unclear role of France in those operations. The EUFOR Chad/RCA operations were also an operation which was conducted by Austria's Special Forces and, therefore, it was a new quality of operations. In that dilemma both parties decided to act mainly based on political expediency and criticized the operations. In so doing, they acted contrary to their manifestos. Even though their representatives stressed the parties' good reasons for their behaviour and their statements, it has to be pointed out that both parties acted mainly from the position of party interests. After the transformation of the operations to MINURCAT the AGP changed its statements and backed the operations at last. The AAF was critical till the end but emphasized its general support for international operations, but there was no clear position of that party. The AFP was fortunate to have different and unclear positions on international operations

³⁴⁹ Schmidl A. Erwin, *Going International, In the Service of Peace*, Vohler, Graz, 2006, pp. 190 – 193.

in its current manifesto; it was able to criticize the operations according to its manifesto. Its representatives were able to act from a daily business approach very critically on the operations and at the same time stay on the basis of their manifesto. The new dimension in their behaviour was that a party criticized international operations during the whole duration of it and even after it had ended. A second point to make was that especially the AFP had been the party of international solidarity with and membership in NATO until 2005 and had backed the participation in NATO-led UN operations on Afghanistan in 2002, during its responsibility for defence issues in the coalition with the APP. The harsh criticism of that operations seemed to be a new quality of dissenting policy related to the hope of stable advantages in the polls, something absolutely new to foreign and security policy matters in the Austrian Parliament.

Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Results

In this Chapter a synopsis of the research questions, the party manifestos and the case studies will show and explain the changes and developments of Austrian security policy and the politics of parties in the Austrian Parliament in the approximately past 55 years.

7.1. Answers to the Research Questions

The first research question was: How and under which conditions did the Austrian understanding of neutrality change?

The Austrian neutrality law was changed in practice, but not as a law. The new Austrian conviction was that neutral countries were able to conduct all kinds of measures of the UN or other regional security organisations, like OSCE. Today there is no doubt that neutral countries can be members in the COE.

Also in 1949, NATO was founded and because of its main purpose³⁵⁰ to defend the member states, it was clear that no neutral country could become member in it. For the same reason it was impossible for neutral states to join the WEU, which was founded in Paris in 1955. After becoming member of the EU the three neutral countries, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were granted observer status in WEU. Ireland had been an observer state from 1955.

In 1957 the EEC was founded and because of the close connections of the six founding members to NATO and the US, the USSR opposed the accession of any neutral country to this organisation. Over the years, the EEC developed and increased its membership. In 1973 the first neutral country, Ireland, joined the EEC and in 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members, but these three countries had to send a notification in advance, declaring they would back and execute the developing CFSP. **De facto, the four neutral countries of the EU gave up neutrality in all EU-related matters, especially with respect to the CFSP and later also to the ESDP.** The four neutral countries got the possibility of opting out, if a decision were contrary to their specific security policy, in other words to neutrality. Switzerland did not become a member of the EU because it argued this would be contrary to its neutrality. The four neutral

³⁵⁰ Article 5, NATO treaty; in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, 16. 07. 2011.

members of EU argued that the EU would either defend itself according to Article 51 UN Charter or act as a regional security organisation under the umbrella of UN SC or UN Charter, so membership was compatible with their neutrality.³⁵¹

Additionally, the tasks of the Austrian Armed Forces changed: Until 1965 the task was the protection of the borders and assistance in case of emergency. Beginning with 1965, participation in international operations became an additional task. That task was formally integrated into the constitution in 1977. In the early 1980s, comprehensive national defence was integrated into the Austrian constitution. After becoming EU- member in 1995, a paragraph was added to the constitution , which allowed to conduct Petersberg tasks and to fulfil the obligation to assist EU countries even in case of defence.³⁵² The security doctrine and security strategy changed the focus of Austrian security policy from national defence to participation to international operations. **The Austrian Armed Forces were transformed from national defence forces to flexible international operating forces.**

In 1994, NATO initiated the Partnership for Peace program aimed at increasing security in Europe, decreasing international tensions and for cooperation in military training and in conducting peace- support operations, offering humanitarian aid and international help in disaster relief operations. 1994 Sweden and Finland joined the program, followed 1995 by Austrian and in 1996 by Switzerland. Finally in 1999, Ireland was the last neutral country to become member of this program. **To summarize it can be said that the interpretation of neutrality policy of all neutral European countries has changed dynamically during the last 55 years.** International law of the UN Charter and the resolutions of UN SC and UN GA take precedence over national neutrality laws and the international neutrality law as it was applied before: **neutrality law ends where the Charter of UN takes over and the resolutions of UN SC and UN GA follow suit.**

Two additional questions arose while researching this topic. The first was: *How have the neutral countries dealt with membership in the UN SC?*

In absence of a UN membership until 2002 Switzerland has not been elected into the UN SC, but the other four neutral European countries have been member to the UN SC; several times, e.g.

³⁵¹ "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States." (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 41, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF>, 27 08 2012).

³⁵² Caused by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010, the Austrian Constitution was added by a paragraph 23j.

Austria and Sweden three times, Finland and Ireland two times. Sweden started in 1957, followed by Ireland in 1962 and Finland 1970. **Austria was the fourth neutral European country in 1973 and therefore it followed a proven practice.** The arguments were that in the UN SC usually a country has to take sides in all security-related questions and it would not remain neutral any longer. **The other, winning argument was that a country could abstain, and in any case UN measures, even military ones, were police actions not war. The international law changed in a way that allowed a neutral country also to be a member of the UN SC.**

The second additional question was: *Did the neutral countries change their policy conducting measures of the UN SC?*

Measures of the UN SC start by political measures, followed by economic up to military measures of peace enforcement even in cases of military resistance of a country or other armed groups. Therefore, according to the “*Verdross Doctrine*”, by becoming a member in UN, neutral countries should be exempted from measures by the UN SC, if that was required by the neutrality status of a country. For approximately 27 years the neutral countries conducted measures of the UN SC guided by domestic laws. That situation changed after the Kuwait crisis and during the Yugoslavia crisis. **In 1992 Austria, Sweden, and Finland changed their policy and passed domestic laws declaring measures of the UN SC to be police activities and therefore not affecting their neutrality.** Ireland did not have that problem at all, it conducted the measures automatically. **The understanding of the nature of measures of the UN SC changed fundamentally; so did international law, but only in practice, and not in its written form.**

Neutrality law regarding membership in security organisations has changed in general, but the legislation stayed unchanged in the following points:

- All neutral European countries are members in UN, OCSE, EU, and NATO-PfP, proving that neutral countries can be members of international security organisations without violating neutrality.
- Four of the five neutral European countries are members in the EU, and the EU agreed on special exemptions on CFSP for those countries. A neutral country can opt out of certain measures of the CFSP because of its neutrality practice. Switzerland did not become member of the EU; it is an unanswered question whether or not Swiss neutrality law has changed.
- Four of the five neutral European countries have been members in the UN SC, that is

also compatible with neutrality and therefore it changed neutrality law. Switzerland has not been member in the UN SC yet, but there is no information that it would not apply because of neutrality.

- Since 1992 measures of the UN SC have been understood as police activities and do not affect neutrality at all. Only Switzerland conducts such measures by domestic laws. The question whether the practice of neutrality has changed over time rests undecided, but most neutral countries conduct measures automatically without special domestic laws.

Swedish and Austrian diplomats served as GS of the UN on the grounds that they were elected as individuals, and neutrality and international law had no relevance.

The next research question dealt with *what was the decision-making process preceding participation in international operations, and were there any changes to this process? How did the legal framework change and what caused these changes?*

That question was only related to Austria because it would have gone far beyond the research framework to cover the different situations in other neutral European countries. Austria was asked to participate in international operations under a mandate of UN SC 1960 for the first time. Switzerland participated in an UN mission 1953 by sending a medical contingent of 93 troops. Finland and Sweden started their participation in 1956 conducting the UNEF I, Ireland in 1958 conducting UNOGIL. All of these operations were armed operations, with light weapons for self defence. **Austria was the last of the neutral countries to join UN operations in 1960.** The Austrian government was surprised by the request of the UN SG and therefore the decision to participate in those operations was passed by the Council of Ministers without a legal foundation. The government was conscious of that situation but did nothing to change it; the personnel were employed by special work contracts by the government. In 1964, Austria participated in another operation (UNIFICYP), again without a legal foundation,. The participants in these operations were medical personnel. **In 1965, the Austrian Parliament passed a constitutional law on international operations, which amended the constitution.** That constitutional law is still in force, only the law passed in the same year to allow participation in international operations was slightly adopted, the final version dates from 2001. After the membership in EU and NATO-PfP it was necessary to develop a law on international training and co-operation. **Such law was passed in 1997 and it followed the same principles as the above-mentioned law.** The decision on a training or co-operation law had to be passed by the Council of Ministers in consensus with the main committee of the NC.

Following a UN request, Austria earmarked a battalion for international operations in 1966, two years after the Nordic states, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had done so. Although the Austrian UN battalion was earmarked and trained, it was never deployed as a whole or partly, but most of the troops took part in several operations, after the Austrian government started deploying armed troops in 1972. The lack of troops, especially troops to be deployed rapidly, led to an initiative of about ten countries to found a High Readiness Brigade, SHIRBRIG, in 1996. Austria was one of the founding countries. **It was interesting how far the interpretation of the neutral countries stretched in order to earmark own troops for intervention within the framework of the UN.** The decision showed the change of practising neutrality, because four of the neutral European countries contributed to that brigade, only Switzerland stood aside. SHIRBRIG was dissolved in 2009 following the new Battle Group Concept of the EU and the Rapid Reaction Forces of NATO. **The following changes occurred in Austrian Law:**

- Constitutional Law and Law on Execution of International Operations, 1965,
- Change of the Federal Constitutional Law and the Defence Law, 1977,
- Constitutional Law on Co-operation and Solidarity, 1997,
- Earmarking of UN troops, 1966 and
- Founding of SHIRBRIG, 1996.


International operations themselves changed. In the beginning the troops were unarmed and the purpose was to separate the fighting parties after an armistice and with the consensus of all parties. Beginning in 1960, troops with more than light weapons were also deployed, but only in consensus with all parties. After the end of the Cold War and the failures in the crisis of former Yugoslavia, the UN developed a new concept, the Agenda for Peace, which defined several types of peace support operations. From that time on peace enforcement and peace-making operations against belligerents, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter were also mandated. **Like the other neutral European countries, Austria participated in all types of UN-authorized operations except the campaign against Iraq in 1991.** Switzerland joined the armed operations in Kosovo as part of an Austrian contingent in 2000, and followed the Austrian model of participation in armed UN-authorized operations. The following Austrian steps can be identified:

- 1960 unarmed operations in the Congo,
- 1972 armed operations on Cyprus,
- 1996 armed NATO-led operations IFOR,
- 1998 Status of Forces Agreement to conduct NATO-PfP training,

- 2004 armed EUFOR operations Althea, BiH,
- 2008 armed operation EUFOR Chad/RCA.

Over the years the main precondition for Austria to participate in international operations was a UN mandate for operations but there were discussions on the military operations which were led by institutions other than the UN. At the Moment, Austria participates in the following operations:³⁵³

Foreign Deployments of the Austrian Armed Forces



State of May 2012

www.bundesheer.at



7.0 Overview of the current Austrian participation in international operations

The next research question was: *How did political support for international operations change?*

During the approximately 40 years of Austrian participation in international operations the political support for international operations changed in the following manner.

- Until the end of the Cold War there was consensus on international operations overall Austrian political parties.

³⁵³http://www.bmlv.gv.at/misc/image_popup/ImageTool.php?strAdresse=/english/introle/images/foreign_deployments.png&intSeite=1366&intHoehe=768&intMaxSeite=1366&intMaxHoehe=713&blnFremd=0, 24. 6. 2012.

- The APP and the ASDP backed missions even during the time they were not in government.
- The AFP backed the operations on Afghanistan mainly because the party was in government. . The other operations were criticized and rejected by formal reasons but mainly on principle.
- The AGP insisted on international operations after the end of the Cold War in theory, but it rejected each concrete operations due to the role NATO or France played.
- The AFA in principle backed international operations but the EUFOR Chad/RCA was rejected because it might be detrimental to homeland defence.
- The opposition parties (except APP and ASDP) rejected the international operations for the reason of party interests and political expediency.

The next questions focus on the party manifestos with respect to internationality, solidarity and international operations. The research question was: *What positions towards international operations do the main political parties argue in their programmes in general? Did the programmes change during the period?*

The APP understood itself as the party of European unification and internationalism. From the very beginning the party's different manifestos contained the points of co-operation in Europe and a united world. Therefore, it had no problems with any steps Austrian security policy took and in most cases it was the driving force for internationalism. After the end of the Cold War it was the party of membership in the EU and that wish was one of the main reasons to convince the ASDP to sign the application. It was understandable that the APP also tried to convince the ASDP of a membership in NATO during the 1990s. That motion was not compatible with its manifesto at all, but in a long-term perspective it fitted into the overall idea of cooperation and unification. **In conclusion, the APP stood by its manifesto in most cases and in the long run with one exemption of an application to NATO during the 1990s.**

The ASDP had no idea how to deal with international affairs for a long time, but the foreign-policy-centered Minister and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky overcame this deficiency in the party manifestos by a creative and practical view of international relations. Therefore, the programme and especially the practice of his foreign policy over more than 20 years favoured Vienna as an international city to secure Austria's neutrality status, international operations, as well as placing Austrian politicians in high-profile international posts, like Kurt Waldheim as UN GS from 1972 to 1981. It seemed to be clear that after the election of Waldheim as UN SG Austria forced its

international operations (first armed operations 1972, UNEF II, UNDOF,...), the building of the UN-City and the International Conference Centre in Vienna. **Most of the time, the policy of Bruno Kreisky was straight from his party's manifesto.** The approximately last 20 years the party was always struggling with the APP on further steps of integration and the party manifestos were always lagging behind. In the end, the party started practising a more restricted line of European and international integration, except the decision on EUFOR Chad/RCA. In that respect it was at the forefront by extending its manifesto as much as possible but still within the unwritten limitations. It also backed the international operations in Afghanistan even though the party was now in opposition – a clear case of putting the interests of the country before party interests. **For the ASDP, the practical view on foreign and defence policy was always more important than the written texts in its manifestos.**

The AFP declared itself to be the party of the western world. It backed the integration into the UN and that fitted to their manifesto, which stood for peace in Europe and the world. In contrast to that clear statement in the manifesto it mentioned it was permissible that tasks at home might suffer from the international operations. During the time of the Cold War it backed the decisions on international operations. **After 1989 the AFP changed its policy to a clear promotion of membership in NATO instead of any other option.** That new policy jeopardized the party manifesto in that respect, but in those days the party leader Jörg Haider was famous for creative albeit erratic policy. His party therefore backed NATO policy on Kuwait and Yugoslavia and did not omit to mention its wish to join NATO in each statement on security. **A new phase in the party's security policy began by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersberg Tasks and its impact on Austrian security policy.** Although not backed by any manifesto, it rejected the operations in Kosovo and EUFOR Chad/RCA. Only the ISAF operation was backed because of the responsibility of Minister Herbert Scheibner from the AFP. Lately, it went back to strict neutrality policy, **a third turnaround in manifesto and daily practice.**

The AGP was a party represented in parliament for only a short time in 1989, but this was the period when the security world changed massively. Therefore, no manifesto was ready at that time, and there was no possibility to quickly develop a security policy in a changing world. Therefore, it put all its hope on the new circumstances within the UN after 1990 and demanded to back all UN operations, or it promoted operations in the former Yugoslavia. It had to realize that the UN peace-keeping did not work and the OSCE had no success. The only operations which were successful for a short run were NATO-led and the UN in most cases mandated NATO

or the EU to lead the new operations. The party was caught in a dilemma between backing UN operations in principle and rejecting NATO as a military dominated organisation (from its point of view). **It rejected the operations despite the fact that in its manifesto it backed international operations.** A similar dilemma arose for the AGP on the EUFOR Chad/RCA operations because of the double role of France, and therefore it rejected it too. Only the ISAF operation was accepted by the AGP in view of the specific situation at that time.

The AFAFA as a very young party had only to decide on the EUFOR/RCA. At that time it had only a list of important issues – in reality little more than a general statement of the party's intention to support the policy of EU and UN. But the AFA decided to reject the operations despite backing international operations because of concerns of eroding the armed forces and reducing their ability to fulfil their home tasks.

To summarize, the critical discussion of the contemporary political behaviour with regard to the political party programmes of the Austrian political parties:

- Generally, the political expediency of the moment counted more than party manifestos when a party defined its position on a particular international operation.
- The APP and the ASDP always backed international operations even during their time as opposition parties. But in most cases they were in the government, and that made it easy for them to back their own decisions.
- The AFP backed the government's foreign policy and especially the international operations until the end of the Cold War. After 1989 the AFP changed its security policy two times without changing its manifesto first.
- After the new security situation in which a unipolar and later multi-polar world had been stabilized, all three opposition parties criticized and rejected decisions on participation in international operations that conflicted with their programmes.

While researching policies in regard to international organisations and international operations an additional research question arose: *How did the parties deal with the question European and international integration's effect on neutrality?*

About the time of the Austrian State Treaty the three parties very belatedly realized that a window of opportunity existed for such a treaty. Therefore, none of them had that option in its manifesto. The ASDP was only interested in avoiding a neutralistic direction, while the other parties emphasized the core understanding of military neutrality. Integration into Europe was a

special goal of the APP. Therefore, all three parties welcomed the membership in the UN, but especially the ASDP stressed the “*Verdross Doctrine*,” whereas the other parties did not have such a clear position. The following approximately 30 years were marked by active neutrality policy and all parties backed that. The APP always promoted deeper integration into Europe, e.g. in economic questions, whereas the ASDP followed a pragmatic policy. Together they achieved Austrian membership both in the EU and CSCE, the founding of EFTA, and agreements on the EEC. The AFP agreed with that policy as well, and sometimes it demanded a membership in EEC.

By the end of the Cold War everything changed. The APP promoted membership in EEC and the ASDP slowly followed, thereby eroding its understanding of neutrality. The AFP turned around and demanded membership in NATO as well. After 1992 this demand replaced its former push for a membership EEC. The AGP promoted neutrality and rejected membership in EEC/EU. The APP promoted membership in NATO as well from 1992 on, but after realizing that was not possible together with the ASDP, it gave up and did not push it further, after having entered into a coalition with the AFP. In 1998, the AFP turned a second time to neutrality because of the development of the CFSP, and it was strictly rejecting all things which came from the EU. The WEU’s integration into the EU and NATO may have been an additional reason for the AFP’s change of mind. Although membership in NATO was mentioned as an option in the security doctrine; the APP stopped promoting it, possibly because of the changes that occurred in the AFP. For the last 13 years the AFP promoted neutrality with equal consistency as did the AGP.

APP	ASDP	AFP	AGP	AFA
Backed international operations and stood to its manifestos	The practical view on foreign and defence policy was always more important than the written texts in its manifestos	Three turnarounds without being backed by the manifestos	It rejected the operations despite the fact that in its manifesto it backed international operations.	Changed its policy after losing the governing responsibility and has rejected all international operations since 2006
Core neutrality, during the 1990s it wanted to join NATO but gave up	Neutrality, but with pragmatically differences in practice	Two turnarounds: neutrality, 1989 to NATO-membership, 1998 back to neutrality	Neutrality, but during the euphoric phase after 1989 until 1992: UN or CSCE/OSCE government	European solutions, CSDP, CFSP

7.1 Overview of the policy of the political parties with respect to international operations

To summarize, it has to be stated that the security-related issues in the manifestos of the Austrian political parties were usually general assumptions and not so much in-depth analyses. Therefore,

their politics were mostly determined by the political expediency of the moment. Sometimes their demands were contrary to the issues in their manifestos. The practice of neutrality policy changed gravely. Classic neutrality does not fit to the demands of the UN Charter any more. Therefore, the “Land Warfare Regulations” and “Neutrality Law” of the Conferences of The Hague should be changed by an international UN-guided conference. But the world of today has other preoccupations than to adapt neutrality law to the practice of neutrality policy. Therefore, this state of affairs will continue; nobody knows for how long. A quotation of the famous archbishop of South Africa and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Bishop Desmond Tutu, highlights the key message:

“If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality.”

The policy of the European neutral countries is now far beyond this quotation by their integration into the UN and the EU. (The exception is Switzerland which only joined the UN but not the EU although it cooperates intensively with the EU).

7.2. Achievement of the Research Goals

It can be stated that the *first goal* of the research programme to ***develop an approach*** permitting a neutral country membership in an organisation with an obligation to act in concerted action ***has not been fully achieved***. Today, nobody questions the membership of a neutral country in UN, EU, NATO-PfP or similar organisations. Neutral country can also be member of the UN SC or take part in the CSDP of the EU with the obligation to act in case of emergency. ***Within an organisation, neutrality is not practised any more.***

The ***second target*** – a critical discussion of the Austrian understanding of neutrality – ***was pursued*** but the result leads to the requirement of ***rewriting the Neutrality Law***. Austria abandoned the Swiss model and acts similar to non-aligned countries like Sweden or Finland.

The ***third target*** – an analysis of the change of Austrian military participation in international operations – shows a change. At the beginning Austria deployed only medical personnel because of its neutrality. In the Kreisky Era Austria also deployed armed troops in classical peacekeeping missions. Today Austrian armed forces take part in international operations with robust

mandates.

*The **fourth target** – the critical discussion of the contemporary political behaviour of the political parties with respect to their programmes results in an answer. **In most cases the representatives of political parties consider the political expediency of the moment rather than their parties’ manifestos.***

7.3. Conclusions Concerning the Hypotheses

The conclusions concerning the hypotheses are:

Hypothesis:

- The Austrian concept of neutrality has to be redefined under the aspect of acting as a member of a regional or global organisation.

Conclusion:

- The Austrian neutrality policy was redefined twice: From core neutrality policy to “active” neutrality to neutrality policy outside the EU.

Hypothesis:

- For a neutral country, acting in solidarity with the other EU members has to be defined on the basis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Conclusion:

- Today neutral countries act in solidarity with the other EU members on the basis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). That is formally contrary to neutrality.

Hypothesis:

- For a neutral country, acting in solidarity with other countries has to be defined on the basis of the UN Charter.

Conclusion:

- Today, neutral countries act in solidarity with other countries on the basis of the UN Charter, because nowadays measures of the UN SC are interpreted as police actions, so it is not contrary to neutrality. The interpretation of the UN Charter has changed.

Hypothesis:

- Austrian security policy has always been a walk on a tightrope between the obligations resulting from neutrality and the obligations caused by the membership in international organisations.

Conclusion:

- This hypothesis has been fully confirmed.

Hypothesis:

- The actions of the Austrian political parties have usually been determined more by a pragmatic approach rather than by values written down in their programmes.

Conclusion:

- In general political manifestos are written in a broad sense, so in most cases the expediency of the moment of representatives of political parties is not contrary to their political values. Only in certain cases the AFP, the AGP and the APP acted or demanded contrary to their manifestos.

7.4. Value Added

It was possible to reach most of the planned *value added* during the research programme:

The value added was:

- The development of a framework for the relationship of international or regional organisations with a neutral country.
 - To develop a framework for an international organisation to deal with a neutral member was **not necessary** because the neutral countries **acted always under the umbrella of the UN Charter**. So it can be said that the **UN Charter is the framework** to deal with a neutral member.
- A description of the change of the use of force by the Austrian government in an international environment within the research periods.
 - The Austrian government changed its mode of the use of force within the research periods from deploying medical personnel to a participation in international operations with a robust mandate.
- The development of a new understanding of neutrality to strike a balance between the obligations under international law versus the obligations arising from membership in regional and international organisations.
 - If the neutrality law will be rewritten with respect to the UN Charter, a framework would be established for international organisations to deal with neutral members and vice versa. With a new neutrality law a new understanding of neutrality also seems within reach.

- Together with the other European neutral countries the Austrian government developed a course of action to deal with the obligations imposed by membership in international organisations. This new course of action of neutral countries implies the necessity to rewrite the neutrality law.
- A reflection of how political parties act in a contradictory environment full of tensions between their current efforts and the obligations, laid down in their programmes or manifestos.
- A reflection of the political course of action taken by the Austrian government to conduct international operations and to fulfil international obligations as a member of international organisations.
- Political parties act usually driven by current events. If the issues in their manifestos are broad enough their current actions will fit to them.

7.5. Recommended Directions for Future Research

The following suggestions for future research are recommended:

- Research in the field of jurisprudence, especially how to align and amend the different branches of international laws, especially the UN Charter to the Neutrality Law and the Law of Warfare.
- Research in the field of military science, especially on the changes of the character of international operations: from peace-keeping to peace enforcement.
- Research in the field of political science, especially on the challenges of the CSDP of the EU with respect to the neutral member states.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAI	Austrian Alliance of the Independent
ACM	Austrian Council of Ministers
ACP	Austrian Communist Party
AFA	Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich)
AFP	Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)
AGP	Green Party of Austria (Die Grünen)
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
APP	Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei)
ASDP	Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs)
AEAU	Austrian Election Alliance of the Independents
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COE	Council of Europe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DP	Displaced Persons
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ERP	European Recovery Programme
(E) CFSP	(European) Common Foreign and Security Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR Chad/RCA	European Force Chad/Republic of Central Africa
FC	Federal Council of the Austrian parliament
GA	General Assembly
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNP	Gross National Product
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC	National Council of the Austrian parliament
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States

OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
OECD	Organization for Economic Development
OSCE	Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe
PhD	Philosophical Doctorate
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RCA	Republic of Central Africa
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
SC	Security Council
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations
SG	Secretary General
UCK	Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves – Kosovo Liberation Army
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAB	United Nations Ausbildungsbataillon (Training battalion)
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Lebanon Forces
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Operation
US (A)	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WW I	First World War, World War I
WW II	Second World War, World War II

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