

National University of Public Service
Doctoral Board

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**The role of arms control in the security of Europe, with special
emphasis on the Organisation for Security Co-operation in
Europe**

PhD thesis

Author's summary

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1. Introduction

The security situation in Europe in 2012 is basically stable. In the background of our daily life there are ongoing complicated and complex international processes ensuring this stability, but they are hardly recognisable for the ordinary people. One of them is arms control.

We don't hear every day about arms control, in particular conventional arms control. Maybe that's fine: until the arms control regimes fulfil their functions by maintaining and strengthening our security they won't come to the centre of attention; they just "do their job". Nowadays the crisis of the CFE Treaty or the modernisation of the confidence- and security-building measures within the process of re-assessing the role of the Organisation for Security Co-operation (OSCE) could reach the attention of readers.

The issue has got limited attention in the Hungarian technical literature, too. Although we speak about one of the most important aspects of European security the knowledge of the experts dealing with security and/or defence policy issues or even decision/policy makers are very superficial or insufficient.

One cannot speak about European conventional arms control without recognising the role of the OSCE, since this is the organisation which either by fulfilling its primary tasks or by providing the needed framework for negotiations actively contributed to shaping the European security architecture. But since the end of the cold war one couldn't succeed or has only partially succeeded in modernisation of content and tools of the relevant arms control regimes.

Hungary has been playing an active role in creating the co-operative security system, the career and military diplomats taking part in the negotiations has contributed significantly to the building of conventional arms control regimes, which since that time has proven their existence. Hungary has been fulfilling her obligations always showing exemplary consistency and discipline.

2. The aims of the research

On the basis of my professional experiences during the last more than 20 years I believe and in the thesis I prove that conventional arms control has imperishable achievements in strengthening European security and the OSCE itself has achieved its most concrete and visible results in this area. I'm convinced about the importance of the issue that's why I intend to systematise the relevant knowledge, to outline the achievements, to point out the deficiencies. I'll do that in order to prove the importance of arms control from the point of view of European security and stability, to provide the decision/policy makers with scientific basis and to make researchers willing to continue working on this topic. These are the aims of the thesis.

3. Limitations of the research

In the thesis I only mention the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the issues relevant to WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes; I narrow my research to the regimes of conventional arms control. Since I focus on the activities of the OSCE in the relevant field I do mention the other relevant international organisations (UN, EU, NATO etc.) only in specific cases. Of course by outlining the OSCE's efforts in the field of conventional arms control I don't want to mislead the reader by presenting arms control as the only area where the OSCE is active, but the achievements of the organisation in the other dimensions will be mentioned only in case when they have special implications for arms control.

4. Hypotheses

In the thesis I'm going to confirm the following hypotheses:

1. Arms control is one of the possible responses to the security dilemma and as such one of the most important success areas of the OSCE. As a consequence the OSCE answers to the security dilemma.

2. The definition of arms control needs precision.

3. The modernisation of the conventional arms control agreements has failed yet, that's why they don't reflect the realities of the 21st century. This has already led or can lead in the future to malfunctions. Decreasing the efficiency or the cessation of the agreements represents a serious security risk (security vacuum).

4. Confidence- and security-building in particular its specific form, the bilateral confidence- and security-building measures have been contributing significantly to strengthening the security of Hungary.

5. The Hungarian conventional arms control strategy should be shaped by taking into consideration all national and allied obligations and rights. The Hungarian verification capabilities today are limited. These capabilities may not be decreased further.

5. The structure of the thesis

In **Chapter I** I deal with the theory of arms control. I systematise the relevant basic terms and use them for formulating a possible new definition of arms control at my own. I introduce the security dilemma, but to the question whether arms control is a response to the security dilemma I answer only at the end of the thesis. After having explained the basic terms I introduce conventional arms control as one of the international security regimes and describe shortly the other regimes, too. I compare the two basic forms of arms control: structural and operational.

In **Chapter II** I familiarise the reader with the main stages of the history of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) – after 1994 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – basically focusing on conventional arms control. I prove that conventional arms control has been always placed very high on the agenda of the CSCE (OSCE) and indeed the organisation has reached its most valuable result in this area. I point out the necessity of modernisation.

In **Chapter III** during the presentation of the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (VD '11), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Treaty on Open Skies (OS Treaty) and the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) I describe how conventional arms control works, which results it reached, how the data exchange, the commitments and verification are linked. I present the "evolution" of the Vienna Document. Using statistics I prove the concrete results of conventional arms control. I make the reader familiar with the problems of modernisation. In the part dealing with the CFE Treaty I give an overview of Russian concerns addressed to NATO in general, and to Hungary in particular and the responses given by the Alliance. By introducing the OS Treaty I outline the problems. At the end of the Chapter III I give an overview of membership of European states in conventional arms control agreements.

I dedicate **Chapter IV** to one of the specific parts of the VD '11, namely regional co-operation. After introduction in general terms I show the concrete example of the Hungarian-Ukrainian and the Hungarian-Serbian Bilateral Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. I prove the exceptional importance of such agreements for the security of Hungary.

In **Chapter V** I summarise the history of the Hungarian Arms Control. Having no doubts about the political character of arms control I concluded that this history practically coincides with the history of the military arms control organisations, so I present the history

of the Hungarian verification organisation starting with the year 1990. I also make an outlook at the European verification organisations.

Chapter VI is a summary of conclusions. I prove item-by-item that arms control is indeed a response to the security dilemma. I formulate my conclusions, new academic contributions and my recommendations for practical usage.

In the **Attachments** I placed useful charts, statistics and pictures.

In the **Annex** I present my thoughts regarding the inspectors: I place them among those dealing with international relations, I identify requirements towards their selection and education. On the basis of my own experiences I propose a plan for the theoretical part of an arms control inspectors' course, which I've already used in practice.

6. Methodology of research

I've been dealing with arms control since 1991 including seven years at the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the OSCE in Vienna. On the basis of my practical work and experiences I've created a meaningful data base. I've studied the Hungarian and international technical literature in general, the English, German and Russian original sources in particular, and have used the benefits of the Internet. I've collected materials and have researched in archives of the OSCE, established direct contacts to the Delegations and Verification Centres of the OSCE participating States.

Since 1995 I've been participating in the most appreciated international events relevant to arms control. I've collected and analysed the received materials and have drawn my own conclusions from them. I've conducted consultations with Hungarian and international leading experts. I've attended Hungarian and international seminars, courses where I've presented my opinion and got feedback from the participants that I've used for my further research. I've had the possibility to test in practice my vision regarding training of arms control inspectors and I've achieved good results. The gained experiences I've incorporated in the next versions.

The research for the thesis I concluded on 15 February 2012.

7. Final conclusions

a.) Arms control responses to the security dilemma as follows:

- ✓ The states in the international system have their own spheres of interest and try to defend them e.g. by achieving military hegemony. Arms control offers an alternative way to defend the national interests: co-operation in the politico-military field and negotiations. The participants of the system will undertake legal or political commitments; with them and with the existing verification mechanisms arms control tries to eliminate military hegemony.
- ✓ There is a lack of confidence among the states. Arms control offers bilateral, multi-lateral, comprehensive or regional co-operation and creates and strengthens confidence.
- ✓ States have very limited information and even this is misinterpreted and misunderstood. They suspect automatically hostile intentions from the others. Arms control offers openness, transparency and predictability not only regarding the military activities, but even in the field of military planning.
- ✓ Because of the misinterpreted security interests the states start the arms race. Arms control stops arms race, creates balance, foresees mutual force levels, if needed obliges states to carry out reductions/disarmament and introduces robust verification systems.
- ✓ The tensions among the states are continuous, which can lead – because of any hazardous or not planned event – at every moment to armed conflict or war. Arms con-

ontrol first decreases, later eliminates the possibility of surprising attacks. Through notification of certain military activities and the limitation of their number arms controls decreases the role of unexpected hazards. Arms control builds up a system of international relations and runs mechanisms which aim at risk reduction. These measures can mitigate tensions, react to the doubts and contributes to military stability.

- ✓ To sum up: arms control decreases, mitigates or eliminates reasons for security dilemma and what that contributes sufficiently to strengthening security and stability.
- b.) Since 1986 (1975) arms control has been a part of our life sometimes a visible one, some times less visible. In the CSCE (OSCE) process one can follow very clearly the efforts regarding arms control; the best known and from the point of European security mostly appreciated achievements of the organisation are the building up and continuous running of arms control regimes, so the OSCE has reached its best results in the so called first dimension, which deals with the politico-military aspects of security. To preserve the leading role of the OSCE as negotiation forum for European states on the basis of equality is one of the security interests of Hungary.
- c.) Thanks to the robust arms control regime the European armed forces became transparent and predictable, several tens of thousands of heavy weapons were eliminated. As a result of those reductions the possibility of surprise attacks is practically zero. Using all possibilities of on-site verification there has been tens of thousands of contacts between the military personnel of the participating states in particular between the former enemies. The transparency on the basis of arms control has an impact on the military and political decision makers of the states: the agreed measures contributed significantly to reduction of armed forces, to decrease of military expenditures. The free sources could be transferred to other areas of national economy.
- d.) The conventional arms control regimes became building bricks of the European security architecture. It means that problems in one of them can influence the others as well and as a final result the whole system can get under danger. As conclusion one has to take care of the modernisation of all elements and taking by hostage one by others should be excluded. It refers directly to the tendencies of linking the future of the Vienna Document with the stalemate of the CFE Treaty, which is not permissible.
- e.) The OSCE should be commended for its role as organiser and conductor of the negotiations on politico-military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. It achieved tangible results in building up confidence and security, as well as in arms reductions on the Balkans.
- f.) The Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty as elements of the arms control regime have relatively stable implementation statistics. However because of the political, economical changes and the technological developments in the last decades this stabile implementation cannot be sustained for a long time unless modernising, adapting them to realities of the 21st century. In spite of the loud applaude regarding the Vienna Document 2011 one should state very clearly that this version of the Vienna Document is more or less only a “face lifting” without significant changes in comparison with the Vienna Document 1999. If we have a more focused look at the Vienna Document 1999 one can make another step back in the history: the basics of our today’s activities are laid down in the Vienna Document 1994! There are two approaches regarding modernisation: vertical and horizontal which causes serious problems among participating States. The so called

frozen conflicts are hanging above us as sword of Damocles. These conflicts make us recognise that there is a “security difference” between the regions of Europe; the efforts to create an indivisible security area in Europe have failed. The countries with “grey zones” are disappointed and are eager to announce their demand for “something new”. In 2008 there was a war between OSCE participating States which couldn’t be prevented neither indicated by the arms control regime. The unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia by the Russian Federation has led to a complicated situation in the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, as well as the Turkish-Greek-Cypriot dispute regarding the accession of Cyprus to the OS Treaty. This latter does definitely not belong to the agenda of the Open Skies Consultative Commission, but the commission “achieved” to waste time discussing it during the whole year of 2011 instead of dealing with real implementation problems and the future of the Open Skies Treaty. To sum up

- ✓ there is no alternative to modernisation of conventional arms control: that’s only a matter of time when it becomes obsolete; if there are no real steps there will be a real danger of a so called “security vacuum” which may have unpredictable consequences for the European security,
- ✓ the possibility of making use of the agreements under „bad weather conditions” should be enhanced,
- ✓ one should avoid “over-politicizing” of the agreements,
- ✓ considerations should be taken regarding new approaches to the conventional arms control.

- g.) European conventional arms control is at a crossroads: the three main pillars, the Vienna Document, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Open Skies Treaty are partly obsolete from the point of view of political and technological changes. Their modernisation has not been concluded, so their further viability is under question mark. One should observe the decrease of political will from the side of European states, as well as that of Canada and the United States of America. Without questioning the achievements of the arms control agreements it became for some states a “disturbing element” from several aspects in conducting their national security interests. In some cases one can observe even counter-interest, like the Russian behaviour towards the CFE Treaty. To be objective the activities of the NATO has shown neither the willingness to save the CFE Treaty at all costs. The Alliance using the already existing levels of conventional armaments can fulfil all of its tasks; inclusion of new elements like naval forces, rapid reaction forces or transit element may have an impact on the operation capabilities of the Alliance.
- h.) The CFE Treaty in its current form cannot be rescued, and without Russia has not too much meaning. The Russian moratorium, the stalemate in the negotiations and the decision of NATO not to provide data to Russia made it clear, that this is only a matter of time when the Treaty collapses.
- i.) The NATO countries are not ready to consider the proposal of the Russian President Medvedev on a “European Security Treaty”. In spite of that there is a possibility starting negotiations towards a new European conventional arms control system, even though not mentioning the Russian proposal.
- j.) In case of a new start of considerations on European conventional arms control the two directions of arms control – operational and structural – should be taken into consideration equally, although its predictable that operational arms control will gain more atten-

tion. One should think about the possibility of including some results of the export control regimes, like those of the Wassenaar Arrangements.

- k.) The system of arms limitations should be kept, but one has to modernise them. Any liberalisation shouldn't lead to uncontrolled spread of weaponry, in opposite the overall levels of armaments should be decreased in Europe, if possible. For that reason verification is needed furthermore. The categories of conventional weapons should be reviewed, the technological achievements should be taken into account and new quantitative parameters should be introduced. For that purpose the information exchange system of the Vienna Document can be used as a basis, but it could be further developed e.g. by putting data on small arms and light weapons, in particular on MANPADs.
- l.) The most appropriate forum for the negotiations on the future conventional arms control regime is the OSCE. This organisation has a lot of experience at his disposal and its membership is very broad.
- m.) One can calculate on long negotiations: during those one should ensure that there is no security vacuum, which means that the already existing regime must be implemented without discrepancies. It can be achieved by either renewed commitments by the participating States to fulfil the obligations, or by transitional commitments which will achieve the most important goal: to eliminate the possibility and capabilities for arms build-up, to preserve the needed transparency.
- n.) The system of information exchange should be prevented, but its scope and content should be modernised, updated. In accordance with the most recent principles of warfare the thresholds for notification should be decreased. By keeping the relevance of static information exchange the dynamic data exchange should be enhanced. The OSCE information network should be reassessed with an aim to create a good functioning and fulfilling all expectations system.
- o.) There are no alternatives to on-site inspections. One can negotiate, dispute on costs, on the length of inspections, on the quotas, on the number of inspectors in the teams etc., but one cannot doubt the importance and irreplaceable character of inspections regarding mil-to-mil contacts and information gathered during the on-site activity. The multilateral character of verification activities should be enhanced.
- p.) The new conventional arms control regime must be open for membership to all European states as well as to Canada and the United States of America. It would be desirable if countries would use this possibility. Hungary is very much interested in getting on board our neighbours from the Balkans. The new arms control system should be free of actual political issues which would be one of the guaranties of stable and smooth functioning. On the basis of positive experience there is a possibility of regional approach to arms control, but it should be seen very clearly: the new arms control regime cannot solve the political disputes between the participating States, neither to eliminate the "grey zones" in the security of Europe.
- q.) In the National Security Strategy of Hungary conventional arms control is considered to be an important tool of strengthening security through co-operation.

- r.) Conventional arms control has been contributing significantly to the mitigation of consequences of the security dilemma in Europe in general, and in case of Hungary and her neighbours in particular. While implementing the obligations stemming from the agreements Hungary established a new type of mil-to-mil contacts with all European countries, of course including all neighbouring states and the other states from our region. We exchanged information on the armed forces, plans of development, budgets and using the verification rights we confirmed the received information by e.g. conducting observation flights over the territories of our partners. The information gathered during the on-site inspection is irreplaceable. The bilateral confidence- and security-building agreements with Ukraine and Serbia, as well as the bilateral co-operation in the field of arms control with Montenegro and Cyprus should be maintained. One should seek for new possibilities for co-operation with other states, too.
- s.) The experience gained during making use of all rights and fulfilling all obligations stemming from the conventional arms control agreements contributed to Hungary's accession to NATO. Hungary has been appreciated as a partner who fulfils all obligations promptly, consistently, without compromises and has been acknowledged – not only by Allies – as “great power” in arms control. The Hungarian arms control became a donor: by organising international courses, providing guest inspectors we could multiple our capabilities. This status and capability is nowadays practically eliminated.
- t.) In the absolute majority of the OSCE participating States verification activities are carried out by military organisations. In spite of economical restraints the states try to maintain and if possible develop their capabilities in the field of verification. For the organisations that implement the rights and obligations on behalf their respective countries the appropriate placing of these organisations within the internal hierarchy is essential; they should have appropriate authorisation for their work domestically and in the international arena.
- u.) The new Strategic Concept of the Alliance speaks about three essential core tasks in order to assure security: collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security. Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament are considered to be the tools for achieving co-operative security. The Alliance remains committed to the active role in these fields. The NATO „...*seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts...*”. Taking active part in the efforts of the Alliance in the field of conventional arms control demands relatively shy financial contributions but gives very considerable and serious results, the “Hungarian flag can be visible”. If we really want to take significant part in the named above efforts of the Alliance the verification capabilities shouldn't be decreased even referring to financial restraints. Eliminating verification capabilities would mean closing down a very special area of expertise which cannot be restored easily. The Hungarian Verification organisation should be appropriately placed within the military/governmental hierarchy and the requirements for smooth functioning should be ensured. The inspectors' corps should be maintained, and the number of trained inspectors should be increased, if possible.

7. New academic contributions

1. I have proved that arms control in its comprehensive and broad interpretation is indeed a response to the security dilemma. Conventional arms control is one of the biggest successes of the OSCE, so the OSCE itself offers a solution to the security dilemma.

2. I have worked out my own definition of arms control by putting in a comprehensive system the elements of arms control and separating the conventional arms control.

3. I have proved that the resources of conventional arms control are running out, its modernisation (adaptation) is unavoidable. If it would fail, there would be a danger of security vacuum in Europe.

4. First in the Hungarian technical literature on the basis of the Hungarian-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Serbian bilateral agreements on confidence- and security-building measures I have proved the exceptional importance of such agreements for the security of Hungary.

5. I have summarised, complemented and brought into comprehensive system the history of Hungarian Arms Control using the sources existing in the Hungarian technical literature. I have underlined the importance of maintaining the existing capabilities from the point of view of the future of Hungarian arms control.

8. Recommendations for practical usage

I recommend my thesis to experts with an interest in foreign/security/defence policy, as well as dealing with international relations. The thesis thanks to its comprehensive character can be useful in the education of experts and policy makers in the field of security and defence policy. In case of acceptance of the thesis my recommendations might be taken into consideration by taking decisions regarding Hungarian Arms Control policy, as well as by identifying the national position on the negotiations.

Further I propose using my thesis for the education in relevant academic subjects, in particular for the training of arms control inspectors (verificators).

Conventional arms control regimes as a part of international security regimes and international regimes are on the table of scientific researches. The evolution of arms control is a challenging process the success or failure of which will have a broad impact on our daily life. That's why I propose to keep the issue on the agenda and continue researching.

The functioning of international arms control regimes, in particular the achievements and problems of conventional arms control regimes are current issues which can be interesting even for the readers in general.

9. Publications

1. „A Magyar Honvédség részvétele a fegyverzetellenőrzésben” (cikk könyv-fejezetben) – In: Dr. Fapál László (szerk.): A honvédelem négy éve 2002-2006. – HM Zrínyi Kht., Budapest 2006. – ISBN 963 327 408 7 – p. 132.
2. „Részvétel a NATO non-proliferációs tevékenységében” (könyv-fejezet) – In: Szemes Zoltán – Tóth Péter (szerk.): Tíz éve a NATO-ban. – Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest 2009. – ISBN 978 963 327 427 9 – pp. 101-105.
3. „Bizalom és biztonság – jó szomszédok között” – In: Új Honvédségi Szemle, LX. évf. 2006/7 szám. – ISBN 1216-7436 – pp. 117-122.
4. „A fegyverzetellenőrök kiválasztásának alapelvei és felkészítésük főbb témakörei” – In: Új Honvédségi Szemle, LXI. évf. 2007/7 szám. – ISBN 1216-7436 – pp. 37-43.

5. „A CFE Szerződés (az Európai Hagyományos Fegyveres Erőkről szóló Szerződés) helyzetének értékelése” – In: Új Honvédségi Szemle, LXI. évf. 2007/11 szám. – ISBN 1216-7436 – pp. 43-56.
6. „A „néma halál” elleni egyezmény tíz éve” – In: Nemzet és Biztonság, I. évf. 3. szám, 2008. március – HU ISSN 1789-5286 – pp. 56-64.
7. „A NATO-Oroszország Tanács” – In: Hadtudomány, 2008. elektronikus szám – ISSN 1215-4121
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http://mhht.eu/hadtudomany/2008/2008_elektronikus/2008_e_11.pdf
8. „Az orosz békefenntartás és az Oroszországi Föderáció katonai jelenléte külföldön” – In: Felderítő Szemle, VII. évf. 4. szám, 2008. december – ISSN 1588-242X – pp. 123-137.
9. „Doverije i bezopasnoszty – puty k dobroszoszedsztvu (Довіра та безпека – шлях до добросусідства)” – In: Nauka i oborona, 2009. 2. szám – Ministerstvo Oboroni Ukraini, 2009 – pp. 20-23.
<http://www.nio.mil.gov.ua/pdf/2009-2.pdf>
10. „CFE Szerződés – itt a vége?” – In: Magyar Honvéd, XVIII. évf. 33. szám 2007. augusztus 17. – ISSN 0865-6932 – p. 13.
11. „Bízz, de ellenőrizz! – Néhány gondolat a fegyverzetellenőrzésről” – In: Magyar Honvéd, XVII. évf. 1-2. szám, 2006. január 13. – ISSN 1586-5266 – pp. 32-33.
12. „CFE-felülvizsgálat – 2006” – In: Magyar Honvéd, XVII. évf. 27. szám, 2006. július 7. – ISSN 0865-6932 – pp. 14-16.
13. „A bizalom jegyében” – In: Magyar Honvéd XVII. évf. 30. szám, 2006. július 28. – ISSN 0865 6932 – p. 6.
14. „EBESZ Csúcs – Csúcson az EBESZ?” – honvedelem.hu, 2011. január 6.
<http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/23676/ebsz-csucs-%C3%A2%20%20-csucs-on-az-ebsz>

Presentations

1. Dr. Osvát Szabolcs – Szatmári László (50-50%): „CFE Final Act Commitments (Istanbul, 1999)” – Joint Consultative Group Meeting, Vienna, December 4th, 2007 – https://delweb.osce.org/docin/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/107257/177303/1186195/1202409/5105546/JCG.DEL_0042_07_-_Presentation_by_the_Delegation_of_Hungary.pdf?nodeid=5216497&vernum=1
2. „OSCE Commitments and Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.” – NATO School Oberammergau, 8 February 2012
3. „Bilateral Agreements Supplementing the Vienna Document” – NATO 16th Conventional Arms Control Implementation Seminar, 04-05 October 2007, Brussels – CD published: January, 2008
4. „CBRN Defence Concepts and Capabilities of the Hungarian Defence Forces” – NATO DGP-Ukraine Workshop on CBRN Defence Policy. CD published: April, 2008
5. “CBRN Training Experiences of Allies who have contributed to the CBRN Task Force” – NATO DGP-Ukraine Workshop on CBRN Defence Policy. 2009. február 11.
6. ”Withdrawal of Military Property from Moldova” – Rome, Arms Control Course, 18 March 2005
7. „Inspection of Reduction” – Rome, Arms Control Course, 18 March 2005

8. „The Wassenaar Arrangements Lists” – Vienna, Meeting between Wassenaar Arrangements and China. 29-30 April 2004
9. „Introduction to the WA control lists” – Vienna, Meeting between Wassenaar Arrangements and Israel. 15 September 2006
10. “What the Experts Group has achieved so far” – Vienna, Meeting between Wassenaar Arrangements and Israel. 15 September 2006
11. „OSCE Best Practices on Control of SALW Exports - Combating Illicit Trafficking Of Small Arms And Light Weapons In Central Asia” – Regional Follow-Up Conference Almaty, 16 September 2010
12. „Lessons learnt from OSCE assistance projects on SALW and conventional ammunition” – Regional Follow-Up Conference Almaty, 17 September 2010
13. „ОБСЕ лучшие практики в области обычных боеприпасов и механизм оказания помощи” – Региональный Семинар, Бишкек, 22-23 ноября 2011 г.
14. „Введение в Венский документ 1999 года в контексте договоров и соглашений по контролю над вооружениями” – Алматы, 27 октября 2008 г.
15. „Az EBESZ katonai-politikai dimenziója Korfu és Athén után” – Budapest, MHTT Biztonságpolitikai Szakosztály, Biztonságpolitikai Szakkollégium és Nemzetbiztonsági Szakosztály. 2010. március 25.
16. „The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the OSCE” – Budapest, 4 April 2011. RACVIAC Vienna Document 1999 Course
17. „Challenges of VD ‘99 & VD PLUS (Hungarian approach)” – Budapest, 4 April 2011. RACVIAC Vienna Document 1999 Course
18. „Background of CSBMs in Europe and their contribution to the international Stability and Peace” – Budapest, 4 April 2011 RACVIAC Vienna Document 1999 Course
19. „A Bécsi Dokumentum létrejötte, háttere, általános felépítése” – Budapest, 2011. január 31. HM NEFEH
20. „A CFE Szerződés létrejötte, háttere, általános felépítése, a szárnyzónák kérdése” – Budapest, 2011. január 31. HM NEFEH
21. „A Bécsi Dokumentum és a CFE Szerződés” – Budapest, 2012. február 6. MH VDK FEO

10. Curriculum Vitae

First name: László

Name: Szatmári

Rank: Lieutenant Colonel

Born: Kecskemét (HU), March 2nd, 1965

Family status: married – wife, Nathalie
son, Richard (1991)

Basic education:

1983-1988 Military University degree in chemistry, chemical engineer, NBC defence officer (Soviet Union)

Advanced:

1988-1989 University of Sciences “Kossuth”, Faculty of German Language, Debrecen (HU)

1990 University of Sciences “Eötvös”, Translator/interpreter courses, Budapest (HU)

1991 Inspectors’ Course, Arms Control Agency, Budapest (HU)

1993 Canadian Forces Academy of Leadership and Languages, CFALL, Base Borden (CA)
 1994 Peacekeeping Course, General Staff, Budapest (HU)
 1996 CFE Arms Control Verification/ Inspector-escort Course, NATO School, Oberammergau (DE)
 1996-1997 “Manfred Wörner” Foundation, Security Policy Studies, Budapest (HU)
 2006- PhD studies (security policy), Doctoral School of Military Sciences, “Zrínyi Miklós” National Defence University
 2007 Non-proliferation Course, NATO School, Oberammergau (DE)
 2008 NATO Nuclear Policy and Risks of Proliferation Course, NATO School, Oberammergau (DE)

Languages: English – advanced (+ NATO STANAG 3.3.3.3)
 German – advanced
 Russian – translator and interpreter
 French – basic (in process)

Positions:

1988-1991 NBC platoon CO; company CO, battalion DCO, chief NBC - mech. inf. brigade
 1991-1995 interpreter, inspector, operational officer - MoD, Arms Control Centre, Budapest (HU)
 1995-1997 desk officer, senior desk officer – MoD, NATO and Multilateral Co-operation Department, Budapest (HU)
 1997-1998 deputy head of Defence Policy Division – MoD, Defence Policy Department, Budapest (HU)
 1998-2002 deputy head of Military Advisory Group, Hungarian OSCE Mission to the OSCE, Vienna (AT)
 2002-2005 deputy head of Inspection Division, MoD, Arms Control Agency, Budapest (HU)
 2005-2006 senior desk officer (arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament), Arms Control Centre MoD GS General Directorate Operations
 2006-2009 senior desk officer (arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament, CBRN, UN, NATO, OSCE), Defence Policy Department, MoD
 2009- deputy head of Military Advisory Group, Hungarian OSCE Mission to the OSCE, Vienna (AT)

Other:

1986-1987 People’s Republic’s scholar
 1989-1991 German language teacher in primary school (Kalocsa), German language instructor on military courses (Kalocsa)
 1991-2009 appr. 200 active/passive missions (CFE Treaty, Vienna Document, Open Skies Treaty), partly as Chief Inspector/Escort
 1996-1997 Oslo Diplomatic Conference on Anti-personnel Land Mines
 2005-2006 Chairman, Experts Group, Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna, AT)
 2006-2009 Representative in NATO HLTF, NATO DGP SC, RACVIAC MAG
 2007-2008 Member of UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in all its Aspects (New York, USA)
 2008 Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions
 2009- Member of the Hungarian Association of Military Science

2009- Member of the Hungarian Peacekeepers' Association
2010 *Chef de file* of the Forum for Security Co-operation (OSCE) on the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference
2010- FSC Project Co-ordinator on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
2011 FSC Project Co-ordinator on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition