

Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University
Military Science Faculty
School of Doctoral Studies

COL Alexander Stephen Kocsis (Ret.) Ohio Military Reserve

**The experiences of the operations of the Ohio National Guard
of the United State of America, and the possibilities of their
utilization in the development of the Hungarian reserve system**

PhD thesis presentation

Advisor:

COL Sándor Felházi, PhD

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The goal of the preparation of the study

My primary goal for the research, development, and preparation of this doctoral dissertation is to better acquaint military science researchers in this field, and those entrusted with the planning and responsibility for the defense of Hungary, with the complete operation and activity of the Ohio National Guard (hereafter ONG). I desire to present the widest overall, as well as most detailed, picture of this subject; from which military and civilian defense planners, as well as defense experts, can find useful examples which they can adapt to Hungary's own particular situation for the development of the Hungarian reserve system.

My second goal is to demonstrate how the ONG developed over the course of two centuries, and to prove that a similar part-time volunteer reserve system can adapt to the changing circumstances and demands of national defense.

Thirdly my goal is to examine the ONG's national defense reserve activities to date, as well as in the State of Ohio's internal defense, emphasizing its role in meeting the challenges of catastrophes; from which it can be proven how such a part-time volunteer reserve organization is suited for the accomplishment of such missions.

Finally my goal is to introduce in detail the material and financial provisions and real estate ownership and licensing provisions of the ONG to prove what an extraordinarily economic solution the introduction of a part-time volunteer reserve system is from the perspective of national budgeting.

At the same time, due to the extraordinarily broad scope of the subject of the ONG, many arguably germane areas such as the current military readiness system, training systems (enlisted, officer, unit), selection and preparation of units for federal service, etc. are not treated in detail, primarily due to the space limitations and the narrower topic focus of this dissertation format. These significant areas are suggested for future scholarly research and analysis.

Reasons for the study

Hungary, as a member state of NATO, is a member of a defensive alliance, within which the United States contributes the largest and most definitive portions of the alliance's military strength. However, following the end of the Cold War, such an extensive reduction-in-force occurred in the US Army that currently it is incapable of conducting prolonged deployment and military operations without the utilization of the National Guard. For this reason it is useful, not just for Hungary, but for all countries who either as allies of the USA, under the auspices of the UN, or of other multinational missions, desire to contribute militarily to common peacekeeping operations, to extend and strengthen their understanding of the National Guard.

The military exchange program of the Partnership for Peace Initiative began in the first half of the 1990's between the ONG, the Hungarian Defense Forces (hereafter Honvédség) and the Hungarian Civil Protection. From the beginning of the program in 1994, at every visiting groups briefing, exchange of ideas, discussion, or demonstrations - I was personally present at all of these - the ONG proudly emphasized that the cost of maintaining a unit in the National Guard cost 1/3 or less than the operation/maintenance of a similar unit in the US active-duty military establishment. The ONG especially

pointed out that these ONG forces were already organized, trained, and completely equipped units, which could immediately be utilized for national or internal defense.

The ONG itself is the most fitting subject for research analysis, since it is the analysis of the organization, operations, and missions of the ONG that is precisely what presents the most appropriate model for Hungary for the creation and operation of its own reserve system. Of all of the United States, the state of Ohio is the most similar to Hungary in respect to population, size, geographic features, climate, and mixed industrial-agricultural economy. One might as well say they are “twin states”. Both rely upon higher “federal” structures for protection against external danger, to which they are obligated to contribute their own military forces. At the same time, the ONG, through skillful recruiting, as well as effective material support from the state government, has for years been able to maintain 110% of its authorized strength, and maintains a waiting list of new recruits. Throughout this time, it has kept its first place standing among the 54 National Guards of the USA in federal readiness assessment.

Finally it can be posited, as a basic principle of military science that it is primarily through the training and deployment of reserves, that a developing external or internal threatening situation can be most effectively influenced, and future events favorably impacted. However the Honvédség essentially has no meaningful organized reserve, and is said to be the only military force in the world without reserves.

My research convinces me that Hungary, like the United States, has need for a military reserve to support its all-volunteer professional military establishment, and to ensure that the country will not become a hostage to the whims of fate. My research and experiences to date have convinced me that such an economical force-multiplier part-time volunteer reserve structure would be equally useful for the Republic of Hungary as well. In the USA the role of a military reserve has been filled for more than a century by the National Guard; and it is my conviction that the creation and operation of a similar part-time volunteer reserve - modeled on the ONG - to augment Hungary’s new all-volunteer military establishment, would be the most effective and economical solution to its national defense challenges.

Anticipated results of the research

1. To prove through general and specific historical examples, the organizational flexibility of the ONG which has enabled it to adapt to the changing social and national defense conditions of the changing times.

2. To prove in detail the utility of such a part-time volunteer reserve system as a national strategic reserve for the most challenging demands of war, as well as a general operational reserve in today’s continuously changing national defense environment.

3. To prove through concrete examples, the overarching importance of the ONG in the internal defense of the state in the maintenance of public order and to assist in the event of natural disasters, during which it has a uniformly favorable and reassuring effect upon the populace.

4. To prove, through personally developed detailed mathematical models based upon current real-world numbers, the exemplary savings and economization of such a part-time volunteer reserve system.

5. Finally, to shed light upon the “moral” factors leading to the ONG’s success as a part-time volunteer reserve system.

Research methodology

I present a wide-ranging exposition of the historical origins and development of the ONG from which I develop a more detailed examination of its utilization and of its complete operations in its role as a federal military reserve and force-multiplier; as well as its role in internal state defense both during disturbances of public order and in case of natural disasters. From this examination, by induction and deduction, I analyze its current detailed structure; the demands upon it; and its financial/material support. Then by synthesis I discern the resultant general encompassing conclusions and applications

Of primary importance is the analytical review of surviving contemporary sources, from which I create a faithful “period picture” of the ONG. Where there is an absence of contemporary sources, I substitute more recent, but still the nearest-in-time, sources for inductive analysis. At the same time through analytic methodology I synthesize to create a historical “birds-eye” view of events and trends removed from the passions of the immediate moment.

Also of basic importance is the detailed analysis of the pertinent federal and state statutes with “legal” eyes, the inductive comparison of their changes and amendments, and their “translation” into everyday ordinary language. The same process is applied to the judicial decisions of various courts.

Finally, I create the pertinent mathematical models by inductive means, based upon the analytic examination of the real-world financial/material data of the ONG, which are utilized to perform conclusive assessment of the economic efficiency of the ONG.

Structure of the dissertation

In the first chapter of the doctoral dissertation I present an historical review of the development of the Ohio militia as an exclusively state organization from 1788 to 1903: and from 1903 to date as a dual status state militia and official federal military reserve organization.

In the second chapter I present and evaluate the national defense activities of the ONG as a national strategic reserve from 1903 to the end of the Cold War, followed by its activities as an operational reserve from the end of the Cold War to date.

In the third chapter I examine the role of the ONG in performing internal state defense missions, in the maintenance of public order during civic disturbances, as in natural disasters; and draw conclusions in respect to the effectiveness of its activities.

In the fourth chapter I examine the real estate of the ONG, which also illuminates the history of its development from a different perspective.

Finally, in the fifth chapter I analyze the material and financial basis of the ONG and demonstrate its cost-effectiveness for the nation, utilizing actual real-world data.

General summary

In the first century of the existence of the United States, the exclusive mission of its small regular army was the defense of the frontier against Indian attack. The military demands of broader wars would have been met, in theory, with the militia, its male population armed with their own weapons. In reality, in case of war, it augmented its insignificant professional army with volunteers recruited from the population. Although the United States had militia laws from 1792 onward, in essence these only provided for the organization of the militia of the various member states.

Based upon this militia concept, an enrolled militia system was created, initially from 1788 for the Northwest Territory, then from 1803 onward for the state of Ohio; whereby every man was obligated to serve, when called to duty, with his own arms. Despite the fact that the entire Ohio militia was called to duty twice during the War of 1812, by the beginning of the 1840's this system, as a practical matter, had disappeared. In its place, to defend against theoretical foreign danger, the volunteer units of the enrolled militia, and the local, privately organized "independent" volunteer military associations, came into existence.

After the Civil War (1861-1865), in which 67.6% of Ohio's military-aged male population performed military service for various periods of time, these local volunteer units were reborn under state auspices, and combined into the ONG. This organization was primarily utilized for the maintenance of public order - both in labor as well as civil disturbance. All the while its members increasingly recommended themselves for the more desirable role of a military reserve for the national defense of the country.

After the Spanish-American War (1898), and the entry of the United States upon the stage of world-wide imperialism, the defense of its newly acquired overseas territories became the main mission of its regular army. The National Guard's formal reserve role in national defense began in 1903, and then permanently materialized in 1916; whereby in exchange for complete federal funding, state independent control was relinquished. From then onward until the end of the Cold War, the National Guard constituted the strategic reserve of the nation's military might, which role it successfully performed at the Mexican Border (1916-1917), during both World Wars, and in the Korean War. Despite the fact that military conscription was introduced during both World Wars, nevertheless it was the volunteer National Guard divisions that played the most significant military role in their early phases. It was the National Guard that initially "manned the dikes" and constituted the defensive shield behind which the nation could mobilize its strength, as well as then constituting the first units that were committed to battle.

During the period 1954-1971, the National Guard's anti-aircraft artillery units were progressively integrated into the unified active air defense system of the United States. Also from the creation of the separate US Air Force in 1947, the Air National Guard's flying units were regularly included in its operations, thereby expanding the its operational capabilities.

With the end of the Cold War the USA progressively reduced the size of its active army. Despite keeping its most modern technological characteristics, it thereby became incapable of extended military operations without significant reinforcement. In

consequence, the role of the National Guard changed to become an operational reserve which could anticipate being routinely called to federal duty every third or fourth year. In spite of these frequent calls to duty, effective state financial support and skillful recruiting (which featured patriotism, love of adventure, and opportunity for rendering effective assistance during disasters), as well as the respect and support of the population, all played equally beneficial roles and made it possible for the ONG, even in the present circumstances of frequent calls to active duty, to keep its 110% strength levels.

Over the course of the years there were many instances which demonstrated the economic effectiveness of the operation of this part-time volunteer reserve system. Between the two World Wars, the National Guard constituted 57% of the military strength of the United States, while only receiving 10% of the national defense budget. In 2010, similar contributions were had from half of that budget percentage. In the era of the Cold War, the anti-aircraft defense missile batteries manned by the National Guard were able to be maintained operational for half of the cost of being operated by active duty military personnel. Furthermore, using three mathematical models, based upon actual ONG statistical data, I have demonstrated that the cost-effectiveness ratio between the ONG and the active establishment ranges from 1: 5.13 to 1: 11.25. Of these models the one most useful, and most practical from Hungary's perspective, is the one based upon the company/battery model. Using this model, it is demonstrated that at the company/battery level the cost-ratio of maintaining such a unit is 1: 9.025.

In the interest of the conservation of costs, the ONG controls significant real estate. The ONG has in its possession the largest and best-equipped small-arms firing range in the USA, Camp Perry on the shore of Lake Erie. It also has the use of Camp Sherman, in southern Ohio, under federal license. Field exercises also can be carried out, also under federal license, upon the 8,782 hectares of the north-east Ohio one-time Ravenna Ammunition Plant site. Armories exist throughout the state for the assemblies of the units of the ONG, as well as for their monthly week-end drills. The number of these facilities reached their peak of 96 during the 1960's. Through disposal of out-dated facilities, and consolidation, today their number has been reduced to approximately 50. Since the 19th century, when the ONG was not utilizing all their facilities, they were rented out to public use. This policy strengthened the relationship between the local population and the ONG, and contributed to the fact that the citizen felt the ONG to "be his own".

The ONG has for many years earned the populace's favorable goodwill. In cases where it deployed its large-numbered strength in (primarily natural) disasters, it was the first for innumerable times to begin rescue and assistance work, damage recovery, and the restoration of order out of chaos. The respect and acknowledgement that the ONG has among Ohio's population is demonstrated by a saying that when the ONG arrives at the scene of a disaster, the populace often greets it with the relieved sigh of "The National Guard has arrived, the situation is in hand".

Summarized conclusions

Reviewing the detailed conclusions of the chapters and of the results reached by the dissertation, the following general conclusions can be summarized:

- In the absence of immediate external threat, economization on the political level leads to such “cost-cutting” that in consequence, the professional military establishment becomes inadequate for broader-based defense missions. Although when external danger threatens the country, the society accepts general military conscription (in consequence of which the recruiting of volunteers is also enhanced) at the same time the training, organization, and equipping of these conscripts, in order that they become an effective military force, is time consuming. This inadequacy of the reduced active forces can be overcome by the organization of part-time volunteer reserve units in peacetime.
- The most important factors facilitating the recruitment of young men for such part-time volunteer reserve units are the masculine appeal to adventure, the enhancement of self-respect, and simple patriotism. Also helpful is offering the opportunity for rendering organized assistance in cases of disaster. In order that the above-listed factors be credible, it is necessary for there to be a “real” national military defense mission, even if at the present only on a theoretical basis. Likewise absolutely necessary is equipping these units with military weaponry and equipment, and their training in their use.
- Basic and branch training of both reserve enlisted men and officers by the active establishment ensures their equivalency with the active component, while at the same time permitting the concentration of the reserve unit’s training time upon training it as a unit. Supervision, as well as inspections by the active component ensures the effectiveness of this “self-training” of the units. For these reserve units to be combat-capable, manning them at full “wartime” strength is all-important in order that they can be directly deployable for national defense missions without the necessity of first training “war-time” recruits. This approach also applies to their equipping. Such trained, equipped, and maintained part-time volunteer reserve units are capable of performing the same national defense tasks as the active establishment.
- Among internal state defense missions, the reserve establishment most effectively earns the support of the populace primarily by its service in cases of natural disasters. Due to its dispersed local stationing its local units can participate fastest with organized strength in rescue/assistance work. At the same time, on a national level, its rapid-reacting large-numbered strength can effectively help meet the manpower needs of a broad range of public defense tasks.
- “Street missions” are the tasks most frequently required: that is rescue, traffic control, patrolling to prevent looting, clearing away debris, provision of food/shelter/medical care for “refugees”, etc. These are all “non-military specialty” activities for which any members of any unit may be utilized. At the same time, specialized tasks can be performed by the appropriate specialized support and service units (e.g. engineer, transportation, communication, etc.).

- The statewide local stationing of reserve units, as well as their participation in local public events provides “visibility” to the reserve system. Furthermore periodic rental of the reserve unit’s facilities to civilian groups not only can contribute toward meeting the cost of the upkeep of these facilities, but the widest civilian use also enhances identification of the populace with “their own” local reserve unit - which then has a beneficial effect upon local recruiting.
- Complete material support by the national government ensures complete centralized control, uniformity, and accountability. Similarly uniform Tables of Organization & Equipment for both the active component and the reserve ensures the equivalency of the reserve units with those of the active component, as well as ensuring their equal utilization capability.
- Daily pay equivalent to the active establishment for their reserve service, the complete furnishing of their equipment, as well as other material benefits (most important of which is the payment of their university tuitions) contributes to the appeal of the reserve to a broader spectrum of socio-economic levels. This broader appeal as well as these economic incentives leads to more effective recruiting.
- Lower level units (i.e. company/battery) with their lower proportion of full-time personnel (in the ONG only two/three at the company/battery level) are generally the most economical as demonstrated by the fact that at the company/battery level for the “cost” of **one** active duty member, **nine** part-time reservists can be maintained.

Summarized results of the research

Through detailed historical examples, I have demonstrated the crucial organizational flexibility of the ONG (and its Ohio militia predecessors).

I have analyzed in detail the road the ONG traveled to become an official part of the nation’s military reserve, and how it has successfully fulfilled that role: from 1903 to the end of the Cold War as solely a strategic reserve, and from then to date as a general operational reserve.

I have proven through concrete examples, from the 19th century onward, the particularly vital role the ONG has filled in the defense of public order as the ultimate maintainer of such public order; whereas in cases of widespread natural disaster the ONG constituted, and continues to be the most effective means of state assistance.

With the assistance of several mathematical formulas I prove that the ONG, as a part-time volunteer military reserve, is much more economical from the perspective of national budgeting, than the maintenance of similar numbers in the active army. In connection with this I have also examined the financial/material management of the ONG in detail.

Finally I have shed light upon those material and moral factors which contributed to the development of the ONG, as well as its continuing survival over the years, thereby providing useful examples for the effective creation of a similar Hungarian reserve force.

New academic/scientific findings

1. In respect to the role of the ONG in national defense I have analyzed and proven that such a volunteer part-time military reserve organization is suitable in every respect for performing the entire spectrum of real-world national defense missions for the United States - as it can for Hungary.
2. In respect to the role of the ONG in internal defense I have established and proven that the ONG is extraordinarily effective and important in meeting the challenges of internal defense, in areas such as the maintenance of public order, and in the amelioration of the consequences of natural misfortune, and shown that the maintenance of a similar volunteer part-time military reserve would be equally effective for Hungary, most especially in cases of natural disaster.
3. With the development of three mathematical models using real-world financial-statistical data, I have demonstrated and quantified the economic frugality of the ONG from the perspective of the United States defense budget, and shown that the third (company/battery) model can best serve as the economic justification for the creation of a Hungarian reserve force.

Recommendations

I recommend that the ONG's "weekend warrior" model, as well as those of the ONG's historical models of "bottom up" development, be utilized as a useful exemplar to be followed in the creation and development of the Hungarian military reserve system. Furthermore that the various organizational details and conclusions cited in the dissertation be utilized in the continuing development of the specifics of the Hungarian volunteer part-time reserve system. In addition the cited results are presented, and suggested as the basis for future research by specialists in this subject area.

Possibilities of practical application

In considering the academic results and conclusions of my research, I recommend adhering to an incremental approach in the creation of the Hungarian operational reserve forces. That is that it would be more useful to begin by establishing in the Honvédség, using the ONG as an example, a test model part-time volunteer "weekend warrior" operational reserve Field Artillery battery. (Since such a unit's primary weapons are the artillery pieces themselves, the question of furnishing individual weapons to it can be deferred to the future - while the "thunder of the guns" would satisfy the spirit of adventure of its members).

Considering the particular situation of the Honvédség - that is that it currently has only a single field artillery battery, and annually commissions 5-10 field artillery officers from its military academy, with the result that only a few have the opportunity of serving in branch-specific assignments, it would be simplest to detail the officers for such a reserve battery from the professional establishment. Thus, by a single stroke the opportunities for branch-specific assignments as well as the accompanying opportunity of maintaining individual branch qualification could be doubled; and the need to specifically

train reserve officers avoided. This would also meet the reserve unit's everyday - weekday - manning requirements. The non-commissioned and enlisted personnel recruitment base could be recently discharged contract soldiers, which would obviate the need for their basic military training.

The reserve battery would assemble one weekend a month at the base of the Honvédség's active artillery battery (Tata), where its military equipment and facilities could be utilized for training the reserve battery. Initially the reserve battery would train on the base and local training areas, then after being "loaned" those pieces for which the active battery has insufficient manpower to man, it would deploy with the active battery as a "twin-battery" for live firing. Thus, not only would the "weekend warrior" battery be fully trained, but the active component would also be able to exercise and gain experience in higher level (as a two-battery battalion) operations. Creating such a battalion (that is consisting of separate active and reserve batteries) on a permanent basis requires only minimal material investment, and would also ensure higher level/ranked branch-specific assignments for the professional component artillery officers.

The "recruiting area" of the reserve battery can be extended by dividing the enlisted men's monthly training in half. While half of the battery would remain at Tata, the other half would assemble either at Debrecen or Hódmezővásárhely. Two artillery pieces, two prime movers, and a set of instruments and associated technical items would be sufficient to allow them to perform their own specialized training at these location(s), under the leadership of their officers. In such an event, the separate portions of the battery would assemble and drill on succeeding weekends (thus allowing all their officers to work with all their men). Upon occasion, the complete battery would assemble at Tata, primarily for preparation and deployment to conduct live fire exercises.

After the passage of sufficient time to analyze the experiences and lessons learned from the operation and activities of this test unit, similar company-sized units could be organized in other arms and branches (e.g. infantry, engineer, military police, transportation, etc.). Departing from the strict ONG example, due to the unique situation of the Honvédség, the combining of these company/battery sized units into an "autonomous" higher reserve system can be deferred for the present time. Instead they can be incorporated into the existing command system of the existing/forming active battalion level units, as reserve "round-out" units. If further experience and repeated test models establishes the usefulness of higher level, purely reserve units, then the ONG again provides a useful exemplar for the development of the Honvédség's reserve in such a higher level reserve unit direction.

Finally I again emphasize that the actual numerical financial data in the dissertation proves that the creation and operation of volunteer part-time reserve units, capable of performing the same missions as the active establishment, is economical from the perspective of the national defense budget. In its simplest form, based upon the company/battery model, for the same cost of creating an additional **platoon** in each of the Honvédség's brigades, the equivalent of a part-time volunteer reserve **battalion** can be provided for them. This would be a more effective contribution to their flexibility, and increase their capability to perform national defense missions of broader scope.

Pertinent publications

1. KARD ÉS TOLL (SWORD AND PEN) (2006) No. 1., 154-162, Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok haderejének kialakulásáról és fejlődéséről - I. rész, (1607-1916). (The creation and development of the military forces of the United States of America - Part I)
2. KARD ÉS TOLL (2006) no. 2., 23-33, Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok haderejének kialakulásáról és fejlődéséről - II: rész, (1898-2005). (The creation and development of the armed forces of the United States of America - Part II)
3. AARMS 2006, Volume 5, Issue 2, 245-260, Defending the force against disease. The court-martial of Specialist Kurt W. Hickman, Ohio National Guard: Cross-currents of Policy, Military Discipline, and Public Relations
4. AARMS 2009, Volume 8, Issue 1, 23-33, „Dirty Bombs” - Their place and role in the CBNR spectrum;
5. AARMS 2009, Volume 8, Issue 2, 189-202, A thumbnail sketch of a „live” peace operation: The Ohio National Guard in Kosovo.
6. Hadtudományi Szemle (Military Science Review) (2010) Volume 3., No.1., 53-59; Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda - az USA egyik szövetségi államnak „saját” haderő-szervezéséről - 1. rész (Bevezetés). (The Ohio National Guard - the organization of one of the federal states „own” military force. Part 1., Introduction)
7. Hadtudományi Szemle (2010) Volume 3. No. 2., 19-25; Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda - az USA egyik szövetséges államnak „saját” haderő-szervezéséről - 2. rész (Az Ohio-i Milícia Megszervezése). (Part 2. The Organization of the Ohio Militia)
8. Hadtudományi Szemle (2011) Volume 4., No. 2, 13-19; Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda - az USA egyik szövetséges államnak „saját” haderő-szervezéséről - 3. rész (Az Önkéntes Helybeli Önálló Milícia). (Part 3. The Independent Local Volunteer Militia)
9. Hadtudományi Szemle (2011) Volume 4., No. 3, 10 pages (pending publication, September); Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda - az USA egyik szövetséges államnak „saját” haderő-szervezéséről - 4. rész (A Polgárháború). (Part 4. The Civil War)
10. Hadtudományi Szemle (2011), Volume 4, No. 3, 9 pages (pending publication, September); Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda - az USA egyik szövetséges államnak „saját” haderő-szervezéséről - 5. rész (Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda Újjászülése). (Part 5. The Rebirth of the Ohio National Guard)
11. Hadtudományi Szemle (2011), Volume 4, No. 4. 9 pages (pending publication, November); Az Ohio-i Nemzeti Gárda - az USA egyik szövetséges államnak „saját” haderő-szervezéséről - 6. rész (Az Újjászületett Nemzeti Gárda Nemzetvédelmi Színpadra Lépése). (Part 6. The Entry of the Reborn Ohio National Guard Upon the Stage of National Defense)

12. Hadtudomány 2011 Elektronikus Szám (Military Science 2011 Electronic issue), Issue 2, 9 pages; Az Ohio Nemzeti Gárda Repülőterei Közös Polgári/Katonai Használata. (The Joint Civil/Military Use of the Ohio National Guard's Airfields)

Pertinent presentations

„Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok haderejének kialakulása és fejlődése”; Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság. (2006) (The creation and development of the armed forces of the United States of America: Hungarian Military Science Association)

„The constitutional/statutory basis of the Ohio Militia”. Annually to the Ohio Military Reserve Basic Officer Course, 13 occasions 1996 - 2008

„Ohio Code of Military Justice”. Annually to the Ohio Military Reserve, 4 occasions 1996 - 1999.

PROFESSIONAL-ACADEMIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY

CIVILIAN EDUCATION:

- 1974-1977. The Ohio State University College of Law, Juris Doctor
- 1971-1974. University of Arkansas, Master of Arts – Political Science-International Relations
- 1959-1963. The Ohio State University, Bachelor of Arts – History

MILITARY EDUCATION:

- 2006-2009 Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University, Military Science Doctoral Faculty, non-resident PhD candidate
1998. Judge Advocate General Reserve Component Officer Basic Course
1970. NATO Nuclear Weapons Employment Course, Oberammergau, Germany Honor Graduate
- 1969-1970. Field Artillery Officers Advanced Course, Fort Sill, USA, 15th of 157
1967. Instructor Training Course, Fort Sill, USA
1964. Field Artillery Officers Basic Course, Fort Sill, USA
- 1959-1963 Reserve Officers Training Course, The Ohio State University (As a Distinguished Military Graduate commissioned in the United States Regular Army in Field Artillery)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:

2011. ARMA Basic level German, Type „C”
2006. English Upper level (based upon the above English-language diplomas)

MILITARY SERVICE:

- 1996-2008. Ohio Military Reserve: Staff Judge Advocate; Commander 6th Judge Advocate General Detachment. 1996 MAJ, 1997 LTC, 2001 COL.
- 1964-1974. US Army: Regular Army Field Artillery officer. 1964 2LT, 1965 1LT, 1966 CPT.

Command assignments:

- 1967-1968 Battery Commander „A” Battery, 6th Battalion, 84th Field Artillery (155 mm towed howitzer);
- 1968 Headquarters Battery Commander, 41st Artillery Group (Vietnam);
- 1968-1969 Headquarters Battery Commander, 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (Vietnam)

Other significant assignments:

- 1965-1967 US Army Field Artillery Officer Candidate School, Tactical Officer;
- 1967 US Army Field Artillery School, Tactics & Combined Arms Department, Military History Instructor;
- 1973-1974 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, Chief, Propaganda Development Center.

Overseas service:

- 1964-1965 Korea
- 1968-1969 Vietnam
- 1970-1973 Germany