

ZRINYI MIKLÓS NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Colonel József Kis-Benedek

**SECURITY POLICY AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN INTIFADA**

PhD Resume

Project manager

János Szabó, Professor

Budapest, 2005

1. FORMULATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM

The September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the United States of America had major impacts on the Middle East, the world's most complicated and controversial region. Writing this dissertation I have outlined the Palestinian Intifada, the sharpest manifestation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian dialog, developed as an outcome of the Madrid process came to a sudden stop during the summer of 2000 as the second Palestinian Intifada broke out. The low intensity conflict that started with the Intifada escalated steadily, giving the chance for a regional conflict, damaging the relationship between Israel and the Arab states, having an effect on the conflict in Iraq, on the terrorism and on the European security as well.

While analysing the conflict I have come to the conclusion that the Intifada was the direct and logical consequence of the difference in opinions and interests of the states having a share in the arrangement. Approaching different interests is not an easy task even in peaceful circumstances. In my dissertation I wish to prove that the Intifada did not cause a regional war, but has a negative influence on the establishment of a Palestinian state. I will prove that the Intifada could only be managed by a wide international co-operation. I will search and assess the success and the lack of success of military operations against terrorism; I will search the new procedures and try to prove that the armed forces, along with other means, have an important part in the fight against terrorism.

2. AIMS OF RESEARCH

Choosing the subject matter of my dissertation, I have set the following aims of research:

- To find an answer as to whether the evolution of the Intifada was regular, by presenting the historical roots of the Intifada and the agreements concluded before the summer of 2000 between Israel and the Palestinians;
- To search the possibilities of a regional war, by exposing the political factors and military balances;
- To demonstrate the effects of the Intifada on the establishment of a Palestinian state, by analysing the aims of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the radical organizations;

- To expose the effects of the Intifada on the regional situation, on the activity of the international security organizations (UN, NATO, EU) and on international security;
- To analyse the influence of the Intifada on the extension of terrorism in the region;
- To expose the political and military experiences of asymmetric warfare.

I have tried to reach the above-mentioned goals by using personal experiences during my service in the region. I have studied the essays of the foreign strategic institutes dealing with security policy and terrorism, with special regard to the operational analysis of the IDF (Israel Defence Force), the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, the Moshe-Dayan Institute for African and Middle East Studies, the Middle East Media Research Institute (Israel), the Middle East studies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), the Institute for Political and Strategical Studies (Israel), analyses of Purdue and Nablus universities. I studied the publications, specialised literature, dissertations published the last few years and consulted security policy experts as well.

3. THE SHORT DEMONSTRATION OF MY RESEARCH

The dissertation is divided into 5 chapters:

In Chapter 1 I analyse the outcome of the UN General Assembly resolution 181 on the division of Palestine. By presenting the different strategical aims of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), I underline the circumstances that contributed to the eruption of Intifada. I analyse the most important agreements of the Madrid peace process. I explore the reasons for the failure in the peace process and the eruption of the Intifada. I compare the first Intifada to the second. I make deductions concerning the aims and procedures.

In chapter 2 I analyse the internal problems of Arab societies, the military balance in the region, its features and consequences, the regional and international context of the conflict and the mediation endeavours by international organisations. I prove that the management of the intifada requires international efforts, in which the great powers, the international and regional organisations have their own particular functions and responsibilities. I make deductions concerning the possibilities of turning the Intifada into regional conflict.

In chapter 3 I assess the motivations of the State of Israel and the PA related to the management of the Intifada, the internal problems of the Palestinian and Israeli societies having an effect on relationship of Israel and the PA. I describe the different manner of exercising the power by the Israeli and Palestinian leadership. I analyse the continuous deterioration of relations, the radicalisation of the Palestinian security services, the increasing role of terrorist organisation, which contributed to the hardening of Israeli politics. I analyse the activities of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership concerning the management of the crises and their effectiveness and failures.

In the chapter 4 I analyse the military-geographical situation in the area of operation, demonstrate the handling of conflict by military means, the asymmetric procedures pursued by Palestinian radical organisations and the responses of the IDF to asymmetric challenges. I analyse the effectiveness and features of the Israeli crisis management methods, emphasising those that can be utilised in other conflict areas as well, where Hungarian soldiers participate in crises management operations. I expose the main characteristics of the IDF's operation Defence Shield and describe the possibilities of using military forces against terrorist organisations.

In the chapter 5 I expose the problems of the international attempts during the intifada, which cannot be neglected in crises management and in the establishment of a Palestinian state. I search the methods of handling Intifada, with a focus on formulating Hungarian interests with regard to the management of the Intifada. I make deduction concerning the effects of Intifada on regional and international security, and how its termination would influence security of the Middle East.

4. CONCLUSION

In reaching my goals of research I have come to the following conclusions:

1. Among the historical causes of the Intifada I have explored those, whose solution may have a positive impact on reaching an agreement. I analysed the security policy aims and principles of the state of Israel, the circumstances and means of their realisation. Analysing the problems of defensible borders I proved that Israel has no interest in giving up territories occupied in 1967, but because of its special geopolitical positions it seeks for developing buffer zones. This conviction was reinforced during the Intifada and even Israeli experts elaborated the Disengagement Plan. In my view the fact that the US

and the EU support the principle of two states and two nations, they have contributed to the disengagement. At the same time, Israel realised that the country's Jewish character can be maintained only by establishing a Palestinian state. By analysing the function of the PA, I have explored that without democratic institutions and under continuous pressure an organisation can collapse, especially if it misinterpret the prevailing realities. By analysing the processes of Oslo I have explored that the possibility for peaceful settlement presents itself if all factors are taken into consideration and the discussion of delicate issues are not put aside. Events have proved, since the beginning of the Intifada the fact that framework-agreements without end goals cannot bring successful results. By analysing the shortcomings of the agreements I came to the conclusion that the development of the Intifada was could not be avoided.

2. By demonstrating the regional aspects of the Intifada and the regional security risks, I proved that the Intifada would not escalate into a regional conflict, but the chance for minor clashes cannot be ruled out. By analysing the military balance in the region and demonstrating the modified strategical aims and tools I proved that no neighbour of Israel is interested in military confrontation with Israel. One of the most important reasons for this is that in terms of military capabilities all neighbours of Israel are at inferior level. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan do not seek after military aggression, and moreover, are interested in restraining the containment of the conflict to prevent the spreading of hostilities on their own territory. I have proved that without the active participation of the USA, there is no real possibility for finding solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time the EU has an important role in the solution of the conflict and, to this effect, the moderated Arabic countries cannot be neglected as well. In a most optimistic version, the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be followed by reconciliation between Israel and Syria, as well as, between Israel and Lebanon. I came to the conclusion that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a negative impact on the Iraqi consolidation process, and the settlement of the two issues is connected and determines the future of the entire region.

- 3. By analysing the motivations of Israel and the PA in the management of the Intifada I have explored the limits of the crises management, the internal problems of the Israeli society, the nature of the state and military decision-making. By analysing the Palestinian motivations I have proved that by resorting to the Intifada and choosing the methods and devices, the PA have made the wrong decision. Studying and analysing the facts I came to the conclusion that the Palestinian security services – lacing clear tasking and appropriate control – have radicalised, its members being busy in terrorist organisations as well and in consequence of this they became targets of the Israeli attacks. The incapability of the PA adversely affected the conditions for establishing of a Palestinian state.**
- 4. Through the military-geographical analyses of the conflict area I have explored the different characteristics of the conflict and the possibilities and limits of military operations. By analysing the procedures of the Palestinian radical organisations I presented the escalation of the intifada and the use of new methods. By analysing the Israeli reactions to the terrorism, I have explored the different procedures of the asymmetric warfare, their advantages and disadvantages. Studying and presenting the war by the IDF on terrorism, I explored the experiences of the asymmetric warfare that may be utilised in other armed forces as well. I have proved that in the war against terrorism, the armed forces are only one but an essential tool. Because of the asymmetric character of the conflict, the planning of military operations against insurgents is complicated, the surprise becomes imperative, the reconnaissance and the employment of Special Forces have a determining role. To command the troops, there is a necessity in comparison with the conventional warfare to have other attitudes: better force-protection, effective civilian-military co-operation, and more cautious handling and use of media. By analysing the operations I have drawn the conclusion that the best method to fight against terrorism is to eliminate the roots and causes of the terrorism.**
- 5. With the disclosure of the possibilities for crisis management, I have proved that the political arrangement has no alternative; the use of military force and terrorism causes further damages and triggers irreversible processes. I have assessed that in spite of this, both sides ignore these realities and prefer using**

aggressive (military or terrorist) solutions, which may lead to the eventual destruction of the weaker side and the continuation of the conflict. The parts involved in the conflict without the active support of the international community are not able to settle the crisis. I have explored and proved that interim settlements do not lead to result, at the same time the Israeli leadership is not ready for concessions, even it handles the PA almost in the same manner as the radical organisations. The freedom of action determined by the circumstances is for both parts limited, on the other hand the possibilities are always much more favourable for stronger side. The USA – the most involved country in the settlement – is concentrating now on the protracted crisis in Iraq and it is unlikely that after the inauguration of president Bush, the new administration will be able to give the Israel-Palestinian conflict with adequate political impulse. Taking into consideration the post Arafat period I do not believe in a rapid consolidation.

6. NEW SCIENTIFIC RESULTS

In my research on the chosen subject I consider as a scientific results the followings:

- 1. I have outlined the regional and local problems, causes, contexts that have a decisive influence on the Middle East crisis, with special emphasis on its element, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.**
- 2. In the field of military science research I have been the first in Hungary to disclose, in such a great detail, the contents, the peculiarities and the contexts of the Intifada as a low intensity conflict.**
- 3. I have demonstrated the limits of the settlement of the conflict determined by Israelis and Palestinians. On the basis of analyses I have defined the possibilities for the settlement of the crisis.**
- 4. I proved that the region is tightly connected with the asymmetric threats and challenges, which affects the security of the Alliance and our country.**
- 5. Analysing the experiences of the IDF, I have explored the procedures that can be used by other military organisations dealing with crisis management, in the training of soldiers for fighting against terrorism.**

6. THE AREAS WHERE THE RESULT OF MY RESEARCHES MAY PROVE TO BE USEFUL

The issues discussed and analysed in the chapters of my dissertation and the conclusion drawn might contribute to the understanding of the very complicated situation in the Middle East. It may help the political and military decision makers in forming political and military relations and, in case of special request, it may serve as a theoretical basis for the decision on our participation in the crisis management.

The dissertation might contribute to the elaboration of appropriate methods and procedures against new types of threats posed by the asymmetric warfare, with special regard to the terrorism, to the establishment of anti terror forces, their training and deployment.

I consider my thesis suitable for being used as a work of reference by civilian and military institutes of higher education. It may prove to be an important source of information for people interested in or doing researches into the issues of my dissertation. It may contribute to the preparation of candidates for serving in the region.

7. LIST OF PUBLICATION

Abroad:

1. The road map: Is this a way out or a dead end street. Rissener Einblicke June, July 2003. pp. 43-50.

Domestic publications:

- 2, The nature of terrorism. New Military Review, 03. 2002. pp. 24-36.
3. The Israeli Palestinian conflict in the light of the second intifada, New Military Review, 09. 2002. pp. 51-65.
4. The Israeli Palestinian conflict. Intelligence Review, 09.2002. pp. 61-87.
5. Intelligence in peacekeeping operations. Intelligence Review, 12. 2002. pp. 102-120.
6. Suicide terrorism. New Military Review, 12. 2002. pp. 45-55.
7. Iraq on the eve of a war? New Military Review, 02. 2003. pp. 2-9.
8. Intelligence against terrorism. Intelligence Review, 12. 2003. pp. 92.102.

9. Intelligence experiences of the Iraq war. *Intelligence Review*, 07. 2003. pp. 105-112.
10. Crisis management operations and reconnaissance. *Intelligence Review*, 11. 2003. pp. 39-57.
11. The European Union and the intelligence. *Intelligence Review*, 10.2003. pp. 41-46.
12. The experiences of the war in Iraq. *Bolyai Review*, No. 3. 2003. pp. 5-18.
13. Guerrilla operations in Iraq. *New Military Review*, 09. 2003. pp. 6-14.
14. Code of conduct on operational territory, *New Military Review*, 03. 2004. pp. 2-9.
15. WMD proliferation in the Middle East, *Intelligence Review*, 03. 2004. 5-17.
16. Military assessment of crisis regions: The Middle East. *Lecture Notes Zrínyi Miklós NDU 2004*. pp.6-48.
17. Suicide terrorism as a strategical weapon, *Intelligence Review*, 06.2004. 74-84.
18. Intelligence on war against terrorism, Publication of the Zrínyi Miklós National University about a scientific conference in 2003.
19. Iraq analysis: goals and results, *Intelligence Review*, 09. 2004. pp. 76-91.
20. The Palestinian presidential election, *Intelligence Review*, 03. 2005.

Presentations, conferences

30. October 2001: The security situation in the Middle East (Lecture for students at National Defence University Zrinyi Miklós).
05. December 2002: Threats for the Hungarian Republic (Presentation at high level management course, MOD).
04. February 2003: Intelligence support of crisis management operations (Lecture for officers training, MIO)
06. February 2003: Terrorism and intelligence (Lecture for officers training, MIO)
19. March 2003: The terrorism on the Balkans (Lecture in the UK, MNICC).
- 15 May 2003: Challenges of the XXI. Century, the threats for the Hungarian Republic (Lecture for the Air Force staff leader).

19. May 2003: The lessons of the Iraq war (Presentation at Kiss Károly Military Science Club).
25. October 2003: Intelligence support of crisis management operation (Presentation at scientific conference in the MIO).
18. November 2003: Intelligence on terrorism (Presentation in scientific conference at the Zrínyi Miklós NDU).
13. November 2003: the military technology of the modern war (Lecture for students at the Corvinus university).
21. November 2003: Defence industrial co-operation in the NATO and EU (Lecture for students at the Corvinus university).
27. November 2003: The national security services of the Hungarian Republic (Lecture for students at the Corvinus university).
13. May 2004: the situation in Iraq (Lecture for policemen to be on duty in Baghdad).
- 18, 19, 21. October 2004: Analysis of the Middle East security situation (Lecture for students at the Zrínyi Miklós NDU).
- 26, 28. October 2004: Analysis of crises areas (Lecture for students of the staff course, Zrínyi Miklós NDU).
20. October 2004: Analysis of the Middle East (Presentation on the National Security Special Service Higher –Level Management Course).
25. November 2004: Features of the asymmetric warfare (Lecture for the students at the Corvinus university).
29. November 2004: The Palestinian Authority after the death of president Arafat (Presentation at the Pallas Association).

8. BIOGRAPHY

I was born on the 4th September 1948. in Dédes. I went to Dobó István Secondary School in Eger. After the school-leaving exams in 1967 I was admitted to the Kossuth Lajos Military College. After my graduation as a reconnaissance officer and a teacher of education I began to work in Szolnok at a special unit of the Hungarian Defence Forces. In 1973-76 I studied at Zrínyi Miklós war college

where I studied military diplomacy. After graduating from the war college I was posted to the Military Intelligence Office. From the first of September 1976 I filled different posts, from subdivision leader to the head of a main department. From 2002 I am deputy director of Assessment. I served 10 years abroad (two years in Belgium, four years in Rumania, four years in Israel). I graduated in 1987 at the International Liaison Officers Course in Israel and in 2002 at the Intelligence Director's course in UK. I have exams in English, German, French, Romanian and Dutch languages. I am married, have two children.

I am a member of the Scientific Council of the Military Intelligence Office and the Board of the Intelligence Review. I delivered 17 lectures to different audiences about the Middle East and the Hungarian security policy.

Budapest, 10 February 2005.

Colonel József Kis-Benedek