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**Raison d'être of terrorism and Islam radicalism in North African region – similarities and differences**

**Terrorizmus és az iszlám radikalizmus okai az észak-afrikai térségben – azonosságok és különbségek**

**Abstract**

*Terrorism has plagued the Maghreb for decades, long before the attacks of September 11. However, before 9/11, North African terrorism was largely contained and the localized. North Africa remains afflicted by the spectre of terrorism, and there are indications that the threat is on the rise. After beheading French alpinist Herve Gourdel by the "Jund al-Khilafah" (Soldiers al-Khilafah), we should examine the North African states capability to cop the phenomenon of terrorism and the governments across the region applying their own counterterrorism capabilities.*

*The "raison d'être" of current paper is the analysis of the state inefficiency in North Africa and the problem of terrorism's increase of in the North African region. This monograph explores the spread of extremist Islamic religious movements and extremist ideologies that advocate violence in the face of both moderates and secularism in North Africa.*

*The author also analyses the current measures adopted by states and regional actors to combat extremism. Furthermore, Islamic networks of extremist movements, state efficiency of each country of the region and transnational relationships are examined in order to gain a better understanding of the factors leading to the convergence and growing linkage among extremist groups. The importance of this study stems from the fact that it tries to develop an understanding, however partial or limited, of the mechanisms by which these Islamist movements review and determine their political and intellectual orientation, and not to stop at a generalized analysis of their position vis-à-vis democracy. A reflection on the interregional challenges of Islamic fundamentalist movements in North Africa and they relation with the state's efficiency raises some analytical questions. The main goal of this study is to find the answers to those questions.*

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## INTRODUCTION

The People of North Africa, the societies of North Africa are culturally diverse and geographically dispersed. The rule of the region was often changing, as new mobile groups overran established rulers, and new movements of people destabilized older regimes of power. Nation-states, as we know them, didn't exist in world history until the 19th century, and in North Africa they were for the most part created by colonial rulers.

Islamist movements of one kind or another have been a feature of the political landscape of North African states for the last 40–50 years or more (for over 80 years in Egypt), but it remains the case that these states have displayed an impressive structural stability throughout this period. A corollary of this structural stability has been the absence of substantive political and constitutional reform, in the sense of genuine movement from undemocratic towards more democratic forms of government, an absence that has been thrown into relief over the last 20 years by the inclination of Western governments to make an issue of this.

This absence has coincided with and is often identified with the observable loss of dynamism of North African governments in respect of their notional domestic agendas and the general syndrome of stagnation that has become a striking feature of public life in Egypt and Algeria, but is also, if less obviously, a feature of political life in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. A question which accordingly arises is whether or not – and, if so, how – Islamic activism has contributed to this state of affairs. A secondary question is how the policies of North African governments have conditioned the impact of Islamic activism in this regard.

Since the fact that North African states have proved fundamentally stable until very recently has often been obscured in the alarmist analyses that have characterised so much of contemporary Western commentary on the region, it is worth insisting on this. We should also note that Islamist movements have not been primarily responsible for the instability that has recently been occurring. Also, the not really sophisticated security apparatus of the North African regimes has driven many political and religious movements underground. However, the majority have fled in self-exile to various Muslim countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, Europe and North America. This has led to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence.

The study will analyze *the current measures adopted by states and regional actors to combat extremism* and the elements of the state inefficiency that are typical as the reason for the terrorism in North African region. The methodology of the examination will be a detailed analysis conducted country by country.

Finally, some conclusion and suggestions will be made on the strategies in developing the states' efficiency in order to improve the counter-terrorism capabilities of North African countries.

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## 1. MEANING AND RELEVANCE OF STATE EFFICIENCY IN NORTH AFRICA

The question of the efficient state has been one of the most often debated issues in Europe and the US since the 1980-s. The *neoliberal economic policy* which was rooted in the US in the second part of the 1970-s, was transformed to the practice in the form of *New Public Management*. This latter one had three segments: establishing more market and less state, using management means in the public sector, and applying business principles.

The good governance includes several requirements towards the government, e.g. predictability, accountability, transparency, accessibility, public interest-orientation, professionalism, etc.

When the study is trying to analyze in the *North African countries* how the state inefficiency has led to the escalation of the terrorism, it is needed to identify what elements of the state efficiency will be examined.

When examining the efficiency requirements of the state in their relation with the terrorism, it should be emphasized the specialties that reflect the failures of the states in North Africa. Many political analyzers believe that the Arab Spring has led to the "arc of instability"<sup>1</sup> in North Africa, which gave a path to the al Qaeda and its affiliates to have a safe have here, and implement terrorist attacks from this basis.<sup>2</sup> The AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and its affiliates however, have been in Chad, Niger, North Nigeria, Mali, East Mauritania, South Tunisia and South Libya, which is not coincided either with the countries of Arab spring, or with the collapsed and failed states.

## 2. MEANS OF MEASURING THE TERRORISM AND THE QUALITY OF THE STATE

The question the study tries to answer is that the countries in North Africa in what sense should be considered as efficient or inefficient states, and if any conclusion can be drawn between these factors and the increasing danger of the terrorism that developed during the last decade since 9/11 in this region. The diagram made by the ICTS (Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies) about the "*Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel since 9/11*" shows that the number of the terrorist attacks increased from 21 to 204, almost ten times more, by 2009, and decreased by 144 in 2012.<sup>3</sup> The number of the terror-

<sup>1</sup> The arc of instability covers Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Mali.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander, Yonah: *Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications*. p. 4. Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA 22203, February, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Prof Yonah Alexander: *Terrorism North Africa* ,, Potomac institute, 2012, downloaded from [http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/article/1358/Terrorism\\_in\\_North\\_Africa\\_and\\_the\\_Sahel.pdf](http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/article/1358/Terrorism_in_North_Africa_and_the_Sahel.pdf)

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ist attacks since 9/11 was extremely high in Algeria, 1.234, between 27 and 58 in Mauritania, Mali Niger, Chad and Ethiopia but relatively low, between 4 and 9 in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

The next step of the study is to identify the methods for the measuring of the inefficient versus successful states, and set up a preconception, if it is related to the features of the terrorism in North Africa. According to the *“Failed States Index of 2013”*, made by FFP (Fund for Peace) countries.<sup>4</sup> The widest accepted *criteria of the failed state* are as follows:

1. *Human dimension*: Demographic pressure; Massive movement of refugees; Chronic sustained of human flights; Violation of human rights;
2. *Political/government dimension*: Group grievances; Lack of legitimacy of government; Weak security apparatus (military and police); Rise of factionalized elite;
3. *Economic dimension*: Economic recession; Poverty – economic inequality; Declining level GDP/capita; Corruption;
4. *Public service dimension*: Inefficient infrastructure; Epidemics; Poor health and education; Inefficient food and water supply;

Besides the Failed States Index, there are three other indexes, such as *corruption*, *global peace*, and *democracy*. These indexes show almost the same: the stable and sustainable states are the best ones from the point of view of corruption, peace and democracy, but North African countries have the lowest level peace, the highest corruption, and the lack of democracy is typical. North African countries are authoritarian (Chad, Somalia) flawed democracies (Libya, Mali, Tunisia) or hybrid (Morocco, Mauritania, Egypt, Niger) and the rest ones (Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia) are still fairly problematic.<sup>5</sup> We can draw the conclusion on the basis of the aforementioned indexes that *terrorism is not closely connected with the failed characteristic of the states*.<sup>6</sup> The question to be answer is, what kind of factors have led to the contemporary situation, i.e. North Africa has been increasingly jeopardized by the terrorism?

### 3. REQUIREMENTS OF STATE EFFICIENCY IN NORTH AFRICA

On the basis of the aforementioned analyses, conclusion can be drawn that the indexes mapping the failures of the states do not give a clear pictures about the reasons of the increasing terrorism in North Africa. Instead of these indexes, the study will examine this problem form another aspect: the *special questions of state efficiency* in North African countries. The study has outlined the following *segments of the efficient state* that will be

<sup>4</sup>Failed States Index 2013 downloaded from <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable> on 5 July 2014

<sup>5</sup> Kennedy Boudali, Lianne: The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. p. 8. The Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West Point, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Colonel A Dempsey, Thomas: Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions. p. 1-4. 2006.

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examined as determining factors of the terrorism, and also, the *means of combating against terrorism* in North Africa.

- a.) *Stable and predictable government*
- b.) *Strong central and local government*
- c.) *Implementation of public tasks:*
- d.) *Transparency and accountability:*
- e.) *Prevention and management of internal conflicts:*

## 4. THE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE STATE VS. TERRORISM

### 4.1. AUTOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM

The presidential system in North Africa does not mean a Western-type democratic model, but an autocratic one. It is typical in these countries, that the autocratic governments can keep their power for decades, or, are often changed, but in both cases come to power by coup-d'état, not parliamentary elections.

When parliamentary elections or referendum are held, they are in most cases not fair and free, but serve to confirm the president or the constitution, in order to give them legitimacy, after the president has not been democratically elected, or the constitution has not been based on a wide recognition of the population. A military leader in most cases acquires the political power by coup-d'état, and become the president. It also often happens that the president tries to keep his position, and makes the parliament amend the Constitution to regulate that the president can be elected unlimited times. The president in these autocratic systems tries to centralize the political and the state power in his hand, which means that there are no political parties, or just one in the parliament and it is the right of the president to appoint the prime minister and his cabinet, the president of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.

### 4.2. CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

The only constitutional monarchy in North Africa is *Morocco*, but it is not a Western-type, either. The most important difference is that the king has a wide competence over the state system, while the kings in Europe play a balancing role based on their prestige and represent the unity of their nations without real authority. After *King Mohammed VI* had died in 1999, his son, *Hassan II* came to the throne. The legislative power has been divided between the government and the parliament however, as mentioned above, the king has a wide competence to control both the government and the parliament. The multi-party system was introduced and political reform was implemented in 1999 by *Hassan II*, who is – as opposed to his father, who tried to suppress the parliament and did not hinder human rights abuses – considered a reformer.

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## 4.3. MILITARY JUNTAS

As mentioned before, the political power of the *military junta* is not rear phenomena in the continent of Africa. The North African states that we described above as presidential systems, used to be military juntas in many times, but typically just in a relative short time. As mentioned, the military leaders who implemented the coup-d'état, tried to legitimate their political power and became president. It is another question that it in most cases does not happened in a democratic way, and the presidential system they established were in fact autocracy, which differs from the military junta only with the formal existence of the branches of the state power. The most extreme example to the military junta in North Africa is *Libya* under the power of Gaddafi.

In fact it was a dictatorship in the form of military junta. Gaddafi often called himself as "the king of the kings in Africa". *Gaddafi* had an unlimited political power represented an extreme dictatorship until the revolution in 2011. The 80 % of the GDP was based on the income from the oil production. This wealth of the country gave him an opportunity to develop social security, housing and education.

## 5. THE STRONG CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS VS. TERRORISM

### 5.1. THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN NORTH AFRICA

The characteristic of the terrorism has different features in the West, in the Middle East and in the North African countries. The Western countries have to face with the *global terrorism*, especially with *Al Qaeda*. The Islamic fundamentalism has been rooted in the *Middle East*. In the Political Violence and Terrorism Risk Index, the Middle East is in the worst, severe category, together with North Africa.

The question may arise if there is any relationship between the terrorism and the Islamist extremism? As mentioned above, Islam is the typical religion in the world currently, which has an extreme branch, the fundamentalist Islam that is based on violence. The next issue to examine is that in which African countries have the tradition of the fundamentalist Islam, or, have been widespread in the last decades?

The Islamic fundamentalism did not have sufficient traditions in *Tunisia*, because the Ben Ali government had already introduced the secular state in 1987 so that Islamic fundamentalism should be suppressed. Salafist movement has emerged in Tunisia after the revolution in 2011, as a reaction to the prohibition of every manifestation of the Islam fundamentalism by the former Ben Ali government. The spots of Ansar al-Sharia appears, too, but did not have serious influence in the country, especially not in the form of terrorist attacks. "Only" 4 terrorist attacks, the least in North Africa, occurred here since 9/11.

*Libya*, during the Gaddafi regime sponsored more terrorist attacks, and for this reason UN sanctions were implemented in the country. However, the Gaddafi regime tried to suppress the spread of the fundamentalist Islam. Two Islamist terrorist groups were created

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during the civil war in Libya both of them belong to the Al Qaeda. The Ansar al-Sharia was created during the civil war in 2011, and was involved in the terrorist attack in Benghazi in 2012. The country is, however, controlled by Islamist, rouge and criminal militias, and the government is too weak to strengthen the central state power.

In *Morocco* the Islamic fundamentalism did not have any tradition, and no Islamic terrorist group can be found here. Relatively few, 9 terrorist attacks happened here since 9/11, too.

*Algeria*, which has a stable and authoritarian state with strong military since its independence, during the 1970-s, the Bendjadid government attempted to establish an Arab style society and public life. Social unrest upheld during the 1980-s, and resulted a multi-party system by 1991, when the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) won the election. A harsh civil war was broke out between the FIS and the FLN, and ended only in 1999.

The GSPC<sup>7</sup> formed at the end of the 1990-s, fought against the Algerian military in order to establish an Islamic state. It is the case in spite of the fact that the Algerian government has a strong military and an efficient counter-terrorist strategy. The GSPC became later the AQIM that is also based on the Salafist-jihadist dogma.<sup>8</sup> 88% of the AQIM operates in North and South Algeria, but some of them in North Mali, in South Libya, South Tunisia, and South Mauritania. The AQIM perpetrates terrorist attacks in the neighboring Sahelian countries, such as Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger and Mali, as well, and have financial resources from kidnap for random, smuggling cigarettes, narcotic, and drug. It established links with Latin American cartels in smuggling drug and weapons. In Algeria have happened extremely high terrorist attacks, 1234, since 9/11.

The terrorist groups led by the AQIM here, perpetrated suicide bombings, car bombs in Algeria, Niger and Mali. Their aim is to attack Western targets, such as foreign workers, officials, embassies, military basis, etc. In Mali a rebellion was launched in 2012, when the Tuareg tribe, an ethnic minority in the country represented by the MNLA<sup>9</sup> took control the North of Mali and declared independence of Azawad. The AQIM and its splinter groups, the MUJAO in West Algerian and the Ansar al-Dine, the latter one was established in Mali in 2012, supported the Tuareg. These terrorist groups marginalized the Tuareg then, and introduced the Sharia law in this area. The Tuareg were forced back by the French military, but the terrorist groups are still at present sporadically in the area.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> GSPC: Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat

<sup>8</sup> Harmon, Stephen: From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian islamist terrorist group into an Al-Qaida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region. p 12-22. Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin N 85 – Spring 2010.

<sup>9</sup> MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

<sup>10</sup> Arieff, Alexis: Crisis in Mali, p. 1-13. Report of Congressional Research Service, 2013. Washington, DC.

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## 5.2. THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE TERRORISM

On the basis of the analyses above we can make more conclusions. The most important is that *the tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism can directly lead to the escalation of terrorism* in these countries regardless of the state is stable, weak, or collapsed.

*Egypt*, although it always used to be a stable autocratic presidential state, could not cope with the terrorist group, the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and its successors, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Al-gama'a ad-Islamiyya, either in the second part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, or at the beginning of the 21<sup>th</sup> century, even if implemented harsh law enforcement. The party represented by the Islam fundamentalists, won the democratic election in 2011, and only the military could overthrow the Morsi government in 2012. This is because the Islam fundamentalism is deeply rooted in the population of Egypt. *Algeria* can be mentioned as another example to the spread of the radical Islam-based terrorism, in spite of the fact that it has been a stable autocratic state with a strong military until this time.

In the above mentioned countries the escalation of the terrorist groups was more or less related to the tradition of the radical Islam in the population. The evident difference between the strong and stable states vs. weak or collapsed states in their counterterrorism efforts is that *the strong states*, such as Egypt and Algeria *can successfully hinder that the terrorist groups can infiltrate in the state authorities, and exclusively control an area, or in the worst cases, establish a state based on the Islam fundamentalism.* The stable states can decrease the number of the terrorist attacks, and can expel them out of the country, like it happened in Algeria and Egypt.

## 6. THE STRONG OR WEAK CENTRAL STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT VS. THE TERRORISM

The central state and the local government, as we referred to in the former chapter in the study, could be strong or weak for more reasons: ineffective law enforcement (police, intelligence, military, jurisdiction) violation of human rights caused by ethnic conflicts,<sup>11</sup> or the autocratic feature of the government, little capacity to control the unpopulated, or tribal areas and its borders. In a collapsed state these functions do not operate on any level.

*Egypt* has always had a strong state apparatus and military, but violated human rights during the autocratic presidencies. This led to the revolution of the opposition in 2011 that demanded more democratic governance. The terrorism developed in this country since the

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<sup>11</sup> Vandyke, Matthew: Mali, Sudan, and Ethnic Conflict in Northern Africa, p. 1-6. 2012. downloaded from <http://www.matthewvandyke.com/blog/mali-sudan-ethnic-conflict-north-africa/> domain on 20 July 2014



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middle of the last century, does not connect with the autocratic feature of the government, much rather, as we have already explained, with the tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism.

*Libya*, as mentioned earlier, was an extreme dictatorship during the Gaddafi regime, which suppressed the conservative Islam movement. After it had collapsed due to the revolution in 2011, the state disintegrated, and the military of Gaddafi was defeated, but was not reestablished yet. The Libyan government does not have efficient military, or law enforcement, consequently the radical Islam-based militia, the Ansar al-Sharia can infiltrate in the state system, and tries to control the country. The Justice and Construction Party influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, has 17 seats from 80 in the Parliament.

The desert areas of Libya are not controlled by any state authority, so it serves as a safe haven and place of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the AQIM and the Ansar al-Sharia. *Algeria* has a desert and a rocky mountain area in the Southern and Western parts of the country, which cannot be sufficiently controlled by the state authorities. This is ideal for the AQIM and the MUJAO. The AQIM implemented terrorist attacks in *South Tunisia*, too, in the desert area, but could implement a relative few terrorist attacks in the country. *Morocco* has an effective counter-terrorism strategy, and does not have any factors, such as inefficient police, military, human rights violation, non-stabile state, nomadic or desert area, etc., that could be the hotbed of the terrorism here.

As mentioned earlier, *Mali* has been the most important safe haven for the AQIM and its affiliates, such as the MUJAO and the Ansar al-Dine. The area of the country was an ideal place for the terrorist groups, because being a tribal and desert area, was less controlled by the central government, and the insurgency of the Tuareg in 2013 gave an opportunity for them to infiltrate in the Tuareg groups during the rebellion in order to control the area later.

Conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the analyses above, that *the lack of strong central government* with inefficient military, police, law enforcement, existence of harsh human right violations, ethnic and religious hostilities and tensions, inefficient control over the territory and the border of the state *can be a hotbed of the terrorism*.

## 7. PUBLIC TASKS, TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNAL CONFLICTS VS. TERRORISM.

The economic and social problems have been typical in North Africa, but the difference between the countries is the extent the states here have to face with.<sup>12</sup> It is general phenomena in the countries of the *Maghreb*, that after the independence from the colonial

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<sup>12</sup> H. Cordesman, Anthony: The Causes of Stability and Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa: An Analytic Survey, Center for the Strategic & International Studies, 2012. downloaded from [www.csis.org domain](http://www.csis.org/domain) on 14 Septembere 2014

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state in the middle of the last century, the national industry was nationalized, no matter it was a socialist state under the influence of the former Soviet Union, or not.

By the beginning of the 2000, the *economic and social problems* became widespread in the Maghreb, which – together with the expectation to a more democratic government – led to the Arab spring in these countries. Poverty, high unemployment, especially in the youth (in Tunisia and Egypt it is above 30%) social inequality, shortages in housing and high inflation was widespread.

The countries in the *Sahel* are known as *extremely poor with very low level of public services*. The Sahel is the home of more than 50 million people, who are the poorest in the world. The GDP in these countries ranges only from 200\$ to 700\$. The majority of the population here lives in rural areas and works in the agriculture. They are often nomadic or farmers. The literacy rate is the lowest one of the world in the Sahel, less than 30-40% of the population. Disasters, such as floods, starvation, draught, desertification, water scarcity, demographic pressure, AIDS, etc., are the highest in the Sahel.

The public goals, such as managing public problems, providing public services, can be followed only in those countries that are based on pluralism. It means that the several social groups can express their interests in a pluralist system. It is especially problematic in the poorest African countries, where the population of rural areas does not have any opportunity for this. There is no economic development, proportional taxation, fair redistribution, education, welfare, employment, infrastructure public services in these areas.

However, *there is no direct relationship between the unsolved public tasks and the terrorism*. There are sufficient efforts to elaborate a counter-terrorism strategy even in the poorest countries, such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Ethiopia. Only one relationship in this matter can be mentioned: the poor, uneducated youth who do not have any chance to develop their life, can easily be *recruited by the terrorist groups*, because they are fairly responsive to the radical and extreme ideas. *The relationship between the mismanagement of the internal conflicts and the terrorism has been much more tangible since 9/11.*

In *Egypt* and *Algeria*, however the government had a long tradition to manage the conflict with the Islamic fundamentalists, has not had unambiguous results.

## SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS

Regarding the main features of the terrorism in North Africa, we can make the conclusion that most of the terrorist groups have just a tight relationship with the Al Qaeda, but operate on national level, and do not emphasize the global jihad.<sup>13</sup> The strongest terrorist organization is the AQIM that has affiliates in North Africa, but there is no real integration among

<sup>13</sup> Boukhars, Anouar: Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in North Africa? p. 14. Working Paper, Fride and Hivos, 2013. Neatherland

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them, they are much rather fragmented. There are countries, such Morocco, where there are at present only their small cells. Instead of the global jihad, they concentrate on the local authorities, such as military and police, or the civil population, e.g. kidnap for ransom, taking hostages, and the income from organized crimes, such as human, drug and tobacco traffic and piracy. They do not have political identity, much rather try to use the ethnic-religious conflicts to marginalize them, then infiltrate in the state authorities.

On the basis of the study the conclusion can be made, that the only the democratic governance, which means the multi-party system, respect of human rights, integrity, transparency, accountability, can assure the stability and predictability of the state, which is essential in the counter-terrorism efforts. The unstable and collapsed state authorities have been the primarily factors – the most important hotbed - of the terrorism. The state has to have strong and efficient military, police, intelligence, law enforcement, and international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism to combat against the existing terrorist groups in the region. It includes the control of uninhabited areas, such as the desert and the rocky-mountains, or the tribal areas, also, an effective border control.

The well-managed internal conflict caused by ethnic and religious hostilities, both by political means, such as reconciliation, amnesty, and military using modern procedures, has been an effective tool in the defense against terrorism. The terrorist groups can easily infiltrate in the rebellion groups and militias then dominate them. The Islamic fundamentalism as a source of the religious tension has a high risk here, as well. The unsolved economic and social problems, such as high unemployment, shortage of housing, poverty, and insufficient public services, could be the reason for the terrorism, too, because the unrest of certain social groups can lead to riots, rebellion, revolution, civil war, etc., that can undermine the integration of the state.

*Keywords: North Africa, terrorism, state efficiency, good governance*

*Kulcsszavak: Észak-Afrika, terrorizmus, állam-hatékonyaság, jó kormányzás*

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